CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY ON AFRICA IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION: WHAT WILL IT MEAN FOR AFRICOM?

March 10, 2009 Steve McDonald Consulting Program Director Africa Program Project on Leadership and State Capacity Building Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars To begin an examination of AFRICOM, it is imperative to look at it in a broader global, African and U.S. policy context. Despite a history that predates the recent elections in the United States, AFRICOM cannot be understood except within the atmosphere that accompanies the new Obama administration, its foreign affairs philosophy and the global environment within which that administration has come to power. OBAMA AND THE NEW WORLD Lets turn first to the global context. Any new American president, had it been McCain or Obama, would have had to begin his administration with a review of American foreign policy parameters to respond to a world which has changed dramatically in the past eight years. What are those changes? U.S. policy is dictated by global political and economic realities as well as domestic U.S. policy priorities. Not only is President Obama faced with the stark reality of an America perceived by many to have lost its moral compass in an increasingly multi-polar world where American power and resource capacities are dwindling and its leadership role being challenged, but the priorities of policy and resource allocation must remain for the short and near-terms on the domestic economic crisis, the two unpopular wars he has inherited and traditional national interest priorities. In the realm of foreign affairs, this means that Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Japan and China will continue to be the highest priorities and, as the developing world intersects with those policy priorities, it will be mostly in the form of India, Brazil, and, perhaps, South Africa. Not only has the world changed around us, but this new administration is bringing with it a commitment to rectifying the imbalance that has prevailed for the past eight years in the so-called Three Ds of development, diplomacy and defense, where defense and hard power have been previously preferred as the tools of international policy. This situation was highlighted dramatically by Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, while still with the Bush administration, when he stated in December 2008 that The problem is that the civil

side of our government the Foreign Service and foreign policy side, including our aid for international development has been systematically starved of resources for a quarter of a century or more. We have not provided the resources necessary, first of all, for our diplomacy around the world; and second, for communicating to the rest of the world what we are about and who we are as a people. Gates went on to compare the Defense and Foreign Affairs budget, in which 16 dollars are spent on military programs for every 1 dollar invested in diplomacy. He noted that the Bush administrations final budget had asked for an increase of $40 billion in defense spending, the increase alone rivaling the size of the entire annual State Department budget.1 The Stimson Center and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), in a report issued just before Gates made this statement, said our foreign affairs capacity is hobbled by a human capital crisis. We do not have enough people to meet our current responsibilities. Looking forward, requirements are expanding. Increased diplomatic needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the next crisis area, as well as global challenges in finance, the environment, terrorism and other areas have not been supported by increased staffing. Those positions that do exist have vacancy rates approaching 15% at our Embassies and Consulates abroad and at the State Department in Washington, DC. USAID's situation is even more dire. Today, significant portions of the nation's foreign affairs business simply are not accomplished. The work migrates by default to the military that does have the necessary people and funding but neither sufficient experience nor knowledge. The militarization of diplomacy exists and is accelerating.2 These statements decrying the lack of priority given to diplomacy and development soft power, if you will predate the change in government here, as well as the realization of the depth and scope of the financial crisis and how it will put the brakes on spending programs and budget increases. The recommendations of the Stimson Center and AAD study for extensive personnel expansion for State and USAID will undoubtedly be one of the victims of our current financial crisis. Now, what exactly is the foreign policy environment that the Obama administration faces? Since the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, with few respites, there has been an ascendancy in American policy circles of conservative, minimalist state, fundamentalist free market capitalism, only heightened by the Reagan era of deregulation and the postCold War world with the demise of the Soviet Union. Bush stood as a strong link in that chain, continuing the Western triumphalism that has characterized U.S. thinking over this time frame and taking it one step further with the preemptive strike strategic rationale based on a chauvinistic and America-centered view of the world. This view is now being challenged by the global financial crisis and by President Obama himself, who will have to rationalize the U.S. position in this new world order.3 The United States will, of course, remain a global power, but it will need to reexamine some of these assumptions of the past decades and move beyond the uni-polar, "cowboy," go-it-alone attitudes of the Bush administration to a policy platform that values diplomacy, patience, flexibility and pragmatism grounded in international law, consultation, engagement and negotiation. Democracy promotion and state building under the Obama administration will not be done with a sole American model in mind,

but only in full partnership with the nations and organizations of the world and with respect for their indigenous cultures, institutional frameworks and international obligations. The distraction of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the framing of bilateral relations within the context of the "global war on terror" and the chauvinist pursuit of national interests to the exclusion of international sensibilities on global warming, energy use, financial stability and political hegemony, have blinded American policy makers over this very critical eight year time frame and this will have to change. As the new American President assumes the helm of this nation in a dramatically changed world from the one his predecessor faced, among his priorities will be the need to restore American credibility, recommit to international cooperation and approach both national and regional problems in a spirit of partnership, engagement and sound diplomacy. This will require a commitment not only to international cooperation but also to a reexamination of international institutions. The post World War II, Cold War-era institutions for engagement, trade and negotiation - the United Nations, the World Bank, Breton Woods, the Commonwealth, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) - are creaking and ineffective, often outdated and possibly, at least with Breton Woods, moribund. The World Trade Organization, Doha Development Round, the G-8 (made up of northern hemisphere countries Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.), the G-20 (which includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and The European Union), IBSA (Indian, Brazil and South Africa), South-South as a concept, Mercosur Economic Bloc (South Americas leading trade market group), the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and any number of new continental and regional economic and security groupings make up the new world. And, as mentioned above, not only Japan, China and India are emerging as world powers, but Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Venezuela, Nigeria, and other secondary nations are knocking at the door for inclusion as equals or, at least, entities that cannot be ignored. Not only does Obama have the multicultural living experience, but the generational outlook that will be required to revive, reinvent or create the new global institutions of tomorrow. He is the first postwar American President unencumbered by the legacies of World War II, the Cold War or Vietnam. OBAMA AND AFRICA Nowhere is the need for a change in perception and an examination of past attitudes by U.S policy makers more true than in Africa. Certainly, there have been positives in Africa over the Bush years, led by the Bush administrations promotion of the Millennium Challenge Corporation and its support to HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis programs, primarily through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), along with a continued adherence to the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA). But, at the same time, policy towards the continent was driven by a very specific domestic agenda and national interest goals of the United States as seen through the eyes of politically conservative policy makers. Thence the restriction

on funds from PEPFAR or other aid mechanisms to entities that promote family planning. Or, the fact that there is little doubt the overarching security framework of the Bush strategic vision motivated by the war on terror has lent itself to the rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM, which we will discuss below, and other policy initiatives like the overt support to Somalia clan leaders and Ethiopian troops against the moderate Islamic Courts out of fears about Al Qaeda links. This proved to be a mistake that has plunged that unfortunate country more deeply into an intractable war. In terms of the U.S. Government and the future, there are other positive trends, going back to previous generations, for Africans to take comfort from in regards to the new American administration. One is the bi-partisan approach to African policy that has characterized the last three decades, going right back to the across the aisle antiapartheid coalitions that fought Ronald Reagan and finally overrode his veto of sanctions and pressure on the apartheid South African government. The liberal Democrats and anti-apartheid lobby would have never won that ideological battle had not the likes of Nancy Kassebaum and Richard Lugar, senior conservative Republican Senators, joined the fray. In the same vein, there has been a continuing partnership between political parties, government and business interests that resulted in the first AGOA under President Clinton and which lobbied successfully for its extensions under Bush. And, as mentioned above, there is a huge bi-partisan impetus behind the MCC and PEPFAR initiatives of President Bush, including not only both parties in Congress but significant civil society sectors. Almost every creative and progressive element of U.S. policy on Africa in recent years has been the result of joint Senate/House, Republican/Democrat, government/private sector initiatives. This bipartisanship on Africa should and probably will be sustained. Despite the vast differences on domestic policy between Obama and the Republican party, starting with the departed Bush administration, continuing through the campaign with Senator McCain and since the inauguration, and likely future clashes over the conduct of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, global warming, relations with Iran and North Korea and any number of other international diplomacy issues, there is no indication of a major departure or difference towards Africa in most major policy arena. While Obama as president has yet to signal specific policy directions on Africa and is only now putting the finishing touches on his African team at State and the NSC, he did issue clear signals during the campaign that, in policy terms, his presidency would not mean a huge departure from the Bush years. His policy statements emphasized the need to: Accelerate Africa's integration into the global economy. Enhance the peace and security of African states. Promote democratic governance and strengthen relationships with those governments, institutions and civil society organizations committed to deepening democracy and accountability.

Promote development, poverty reduction and eradication of public health scourges like HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, unclean water and inadequate

sanitation, elevated child mortality, and health care systems that do not serve the needs of the nations of Africa. 4 This seems to be mostly good news, at the very least do no harm. But, it is pretty much business as usual if you are African and looking for some changes that would increase focus and raise priorities. If the campaign rhetoric can be taken as a guide, Obama still views Africa through a humanitarian and security lens, rather than a more strategic prism that takes into account the holistic position of the continent in the world global village, to include its emerging markets. And, one element of U.S. policy about which the continent can be certain is that, given domestic and global realities, particularly the financial crisis, Africa will not ascend any higher on the scale of priority foreign policy concerns for the U.S. The one element that will be different under Obama, as opposed to his immediate predecessor, is the tone and nature of relations between the U.S. and Africa. This could be a dramatic and surprisingly meaningful change. The old Bush mindset was to respond to crisis, do what is morally right for development, public health and poverty response, but frame all relations in global security concerns and view the world in a Euro-centric manner, with possible exception of China and India emerging with larger roles. The reader may immediately assume that this opinion is predicated on the fact that Obama is African American and would have a historical, cultural, and personal proclivity to view African issues as a higher priority and to relate to the continent and its people. While that is, of course, a factor, he being a member of the diaspora himself, this view is informed by many other factors. Beyond the different world view, the international living experience and cultural sensitivities that he brings to the office, as described in the section of this paper, on Africa itself, Obama has shown a personal interest and, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he has engaged on many African issues. He has worked to end genocide in Darfur, to pass legislation to promote stability and elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to bring Charles Taylor to justice in Liberia and to develop a coherent strategy for stabilizing Somalia. In 2006, Senator Obama made a lengthy visit to Africa, including such diverse stops as Kenya, South Africa, Djibouti and Chad. While visiting his ancestral home in Kenya, he visited his fathers village and met senior government officials, but also spoke publicly about corruption and freedom of the press issues (the Daily Standard had just been raided and closed by the Government), boldly criticizing the relatively new Kibaki government. In South Africa he asked the government for transparent and open HIV/Aids policies, an issue that was sensitive with the Mbeki government but a stand that was popular with the South African public. In Djibouti, he met with American military commanders at the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa to discuss the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests and to the interests of our partners in the region. Obama also visited refugee camps in Chad, where he heard first-hand about the experiences of Sudanese women who had been forced from their homes, had their families torn apart and were abused by Khartoum's genocidal policies. It was an interesting mix of nostalgia, humanitarian concern and security interests, but shows that Obama was not adverse to critical analysis of African government actions and policies and views the continent in real politic terms.

This "hands on" experience bodes well for Africa in an Obama presidency and there is little doubt that the level of interest, tone of the dialogue, and sincerity of concern will be elevated. Much is to be said for this as the condescension and patronization of the past have often rankled Africans, even as they appreciated the raised levels of aid for HIV/AIDS and other public health crises. But, as of this writing, no further policy initiatives or guidance has emerged nor is the Obama Africa Team fully in place the Africa and Foreign Assistance Directors at the National Security Council are appointed in the persons of Michelle Gaven, with Capitol Hill experience and most recently, at the Council for Foreign Affairs, and Gayle Smith, an former Clinton NSC staffer and most recently at the Center for American Progress but the critical Assistant Secretary of State for Africa is not in place. This fact has disappointed Africa watchers in the U.S., as well as Africans. In an AllAfrica.com posting recently, long-time observer Reed Kramer said "While low visibility for Africa policy may not be entirely unexpected, considering the multiple crises the President faced entering office, it has disappointed many who had hoped the administration might quickly mobilize the high level attention that is needed to spur action on vital issues." Kramer further noted that Sudan, the Congo, and Somalia, as well as development issues, call for urgent attention. But few of the middle-level policymakers for Africa have yet been announced.5 Therefore, Africans must be realistic. Obama will be restrained by domestic realities and policy priorities that he cannot overlook, whether it is reduced resources, pressures from labor unions on imports of textiles and other manufactured goods, falling commodity prices, outsourcing of jobs, popular backlash against immigration or the continuing construct of bilateral and multilateral relations framed in security terms, Africa is destined to remain a low policy priority even if the tenor of relations takes on a very positive tone. The challenge for leaders from the continent will be how to turn that to their advantage, to take firm leadership on their own and move towards a peer relationship with America and the West that is truly equal. Africa should see this administration as a great opportunity.6 AFRICOM 2007-09 Nowhere do the considerations outlined above impact greater than with the institution of AFRICOM. Just a little historical overview is instructive. AFRICOM was announced in February 2007 in Washington by President Bush and Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates; made operational in October of that year; and declared a fully unified command on October 1, 2008. Its stated mission, according to its current website, is in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conduct(s) sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. Further, the site states, The creation of U.S. Africa Command does not mean the U.S. military will take a leading role in African security matters, nor will it establish large U.S. troop bases. Rather, Africa Command is a headquarters staff whose mission entails coordinating the kind of support that will enable

African governments and existing regional organizations, such as the African Standby Force, to have greater capacity to provide security and respond in times of need. Africa Command builds on the many African-U.S. security cooperation activities already underway, yet will be able to better coordinate DoD support with other U.S. government departments and agencies to make those activities even more effective. Again, in perusing the current website, there are a number of interesting pieces of information, from the Commanders Vision to his Focus Areas to his Guiding Principles. I will come back to some of those items later, but would note at this point that one other interesting item is posted prominently on the first page under the Chain of Command. That is the point that the U.S. Ambassadors continue to be the Presidents personal representatives in diplomatic relations with host nations.7 The mission and supporting vision, focus and principles seem unmistakably military in nature and relatively unequivocal as they pertain to broader U.S. security and strategic policy goals. Obviously ones reaction to AFRICOM would, in part, be dictated by how you viewed those overall U.S. strategic and military goals and, as discussed above, that perception has been essentially negative in the global community in recent years, although changes are now underway with the Obama presidency. In my view, AFRICOM, since its inception over two years ago, has been a chameleon, frequently changing its colors to respond to the flood of criticism it has received. The rationale and profile it presented in February 2007 is quite different from that described in its current website and elaborated on by its proponents and managers. The stated rationale in 2007 was for cost savings and efficiency, the need to consolidate three separate Department of Defense (DoD) commands - the European Command (EUCOM), the Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Pacific Command (PACOM) that were then dealing with Africa. In the Bush world view at the time of AFRICOMs creation and in its current iteration now - AFRICOM was an attempt to integrate Africa into its broader global strategic goals. In April 2007, when Undersecretary of State Ryan Henry toured the continent to respond to an overwhelmingly negative African reaction to AFRICOM, he said its mission was training African forces and helping them reach the goals the continents governments and the Africa Union have set, and, he added, AFRICOM will be so different from other U.S. regional commands that it might not even supervise U.S. forces if they become involved in any conflict in Africa.8 As he lead this first inter-agency delegation to the continent, Henry was trying already, on behalf of the U.S. government, to recast the AFRICOM mandate and do damage control over the 2007 announcement which had caught Africans by surprise. The lack of consultation in advance of the announcement and the fears that it raised, real or not, among Africans, were the reasons Undersecretary Henry launched his trip. But, as Francis Kornegay, Senior Research Officer at the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, South Africa, put it, this was a consultation after the fact of a decision in Washington that had already been made without any structured security dialogue with the African Union or its Peace and Security Council or major powers such asSouth Africa or Nigeria.9 Certainly, in my soundings around the continent, both in personal conversations with leaders from countries as diverse as South Africa, Burundi, and

Liberia, and in scanning the African press and internet postings, Africans seemed genuinely surprised by the announcement. Even U.S. government officials intimately involved in its formation have told me that the 2007 announcement took place without significant, high level prior consultation with African leaders. And, whatever the true of that, the perception was strong in Africa that they their views were not incorporated in the planning stage of AFRICOM. Africans felt betrayed and even threatened. In 2007, they almost universally condemned the action. Editorials and articles against it abounded. Call-in and talk shows lit up across the continent with African protest. It was widely seen as the militarization of U.S. policy on Africa. A typical response was one penned by two African writers for South Africas Institute of Security Studies in July 2007, when the prospect of AFRICOM being based in Africa was real: Basing AFRICOM in Liberia will put Liberians at risk now and into the future. Liberias national threat level will dramatically increase as the country becomes a target of those interested in attacking U.S. assets. After elaborating on U.S. private contractors restructuring the Liberian military in violation of its sovereign constitutional prerogatives, the authors said that This pattern of abuse and incompetence with the U.S. military and its surrogate contractors suggests that if AFRICOM is based in Liberia, the Bush administration will have an unacceptable amount of power to dictate Liberias security interests and orchestrate how the country manages those interests. By placing a military base in Liberia, the United States could systematically interfere in Liberian politics in order to ensure that those who succeed in obtaining power are subservient to U.S. national security and other interests. If this is not neo-colonialism, then what is? Finally, they state that Perhaps the South Africans will be the loudest voices on the continent in opposition to AFRICOM. Recent media reports spotlight growing tensions in U.S.-South Africa relations over AFRICOM. The U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Eric Bost, complained that South Africas defense minister Mosiuoa Lekota, was not responding to embassy requests to meet General Kip Ward, the recently nominated first commander of AFRICOM.10 This fear of a major footprint of the U.S. military juggernaut, with all that implied in terms of sovereignty issues, was exacerbated by the preliminary indication by DoD that it would seek to situate the AFRICOM headquarters on the continent, a point brought out by Pajibo and Woods. Even Undersecretary Henry said, after his 2007 trip, that, African leaders also expressed concern that the AFRICOM plan is designed mainly to fight terrorists in Africa, counter Chinese diplomacy on the continent and gain access to Africas natural resources, especially oil.11 In short, Africans commonly saw this initiative as an American one for American purposes and did not believe that it was intended to benefit Africa in any way. Even the Liberian governments preliminary stated welcome for AFRICOM to be based there, and the ill-informed support for that from prominent Americans like Robert Johnson of Black Entertainment Television, as expressed at an Africare funding raising dinner in Washington in early 2008, were seen as at best ill-advised and at most gold digging by other Africans. It is important to reflect on the fact that the African response was informed by a long standing and understandable African sensitivity to outside interference on the continent

reflecting the long colonial and post-colonial/Cold War history of client-statism when world powers sought to manipulate and manage African loyalties, trade patterns, resources and markets. Not only this, but again to quote Kornegay, Africans wondered whether or not Africa and its security concerns are deemed important enough to warrant a dialogue pursuant to major initiatives being undertaken, whether or not such initiatives are undertaken in equal partnership with the continent as the culmination of a security dialogue or are embarked upon unilaterally. African fears were not always rationale, of course, and they went so far as to characterize AFRICOM as the reemergence of American imperialism, as stated above, presaging an invasion of economically or militarily strategic nations. In fact, early linkage of AFRICOM to NATO and its mandate encouraged this more radical reaction. Kornegay quotes Indian career diplomat, MK Bhadrakumar, writing in the October 2007 Asia Times, the leitmotif of the renewed scramble for Africa by Western powers is largely to be traced to the growing Chinese challenge to Western dominance over Africa and the requirement to protect oilNATOs future role in the Indian Ocean forms part of a well-thought-out Western strategy. Bhadrakumar said, NATOs mission to the Indian Ocean in September coincided with another major initiative by Washington. The newly created Africa Command (AFRICOM) of the US military, reflecting the long-term strategic value of AfricaThe newly appointed AFRICOM commander, referring to Kip Ward, has stressed the need for close coordination with NATO. Ward, in fact, did speak of deeper and expanded NATO involvement in Africa, saying, according to Bhadrakumar, that AFRICOM could assist NATO efforts on the African continent by ensuring close coordination of US contributions and capabilities to NATO operations and training. NATO is uniquely suited to allow AFRICOM access to European interests and capabilities and experience on the African continentAFRICOM can provide logistical support to NATO, professional military training and engagement in conjunction with other security operation and outreach efforts. Finally, Bhadrakumar says that AFRICOMs command tasks are profound. As a senior US official put it, they are not about searching for militants in lawless or ungoverned areas or about chasing terrorists around Africa; rather, they include among other things conducting region-wide security operations and if necessary, conducting military operations.12 This chorus of negative response was widely joined in 2007-08 by activist and advocacy groups like TransAFrica Forum, Africa Action and Global Rights. Even a former U.S. ambassador to Africa, David Passage, started up a website and activist group called Resist AFRICOM. This immediate and overwhelming negative response, plus pressures from Africans and domestic critics set the DoD and the Bush Administration back and prompted a quick reexamination of the mandate and structure of AFRICOM. This author sat through many public and private conversations around Washington DC during the summer and fall of 2007, listened to officials as diverse as the then-designated AFRICOM Commander, General William Kip Ward; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Theresa Whelan; Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazier; and Ambassador Mary

Yates, later to become the Deputy AFRICOM Commander. In interactions with thinktank experts, African studies program directors, Congressional Members and staff and, for the first time, African officials, these officials were inundated with thoughtful and constructive criticism of the way in which AFRICOM had been formulated and announced and how it ought to have been rolled out. AFRICOM began an early retreat on several fronts and, to its credit, took the criticism on lack of prior consultation seriously. It began a feverish round of interactions in Washington and Africa with African ambassadors and officials, led first by Undersecretary Henry and then others such as Administrator Whelan, Assistant Secretary Frazier and General Ward. The Christian Science Monitor was able to write on May 16, 2008, that the Pentagon has had to scale back its ambitious vision to adapt Africa's political terrain, military officials acknowledged, adding they remain committed to the original idea of a military command to promote peace in the region. For now, officials have ruled out basing the headquarters anywhere in Africa and may in fact locate it on the East Coast, a senior defense official says. They have also backed away from selling the new command as a full interagency organization that spans military and nonmilitary entities.13 There was little doubt in my mind that the rationale behind this effort by the U.S. Government to redefine AFRICOM and paint a more palatable picture to its African audience, while laudable in most ways - albeit after the fact - included some selfdeception and marketing ploys. I can recall a conversation with a senior U.S. Government official, named above but not to be identified here, who told me with great confidence that then South African Minister of Defense, Mosiuoa (Terror) Lekota, had said he supported AFRICOM personally but that his government had to be negative in public for the sake of solidarity with its African peers. I had spoken to Terror only two weeks before that conversation and he had expressed his absolute personal unhappiness with the way in with AFRICOM had been introduced and with its objectives and structures as he understood them. He told me he had advised his government to oppose it. The marketing ploy I refer to above was the reworking of the original concept into a broader humanitarian, development and assistance framework. I can only assume that this was in response to the concern -even paranoia - that emerged amongst African officials and observers about the militarization of U.S./African relations. But, this redefinition and expansion of the AFRICOM mandate was to, in turn, run afoul of State Department, USAID and other agencies operational mandates in foreign and development policy. Again, as I sat in another of these closed meetings that summer discussing these issues with senior officials and think tank experts, one former senior government official likened AFRICOM to the 800 pound gorilla in the room that will eventually consume its partners, State and USAID, as it wields far greater resources and political prioritization from an administration focused primarily on security concerns, to the detriment of humanitarian, development and even political objectives and overwhelm the local US Ambassador, the whole country team concept and State hegemony in general. The reference was to the role of the American Ambassador in any

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given African country as the Country Team leader who served as the Presidents representative there to manage and coordinate all policy issues. As a former Foreign Service Officer myself, who maintains continuing life long friendships with a number of career diplomats, both active and retired, I knew that this very issue was uppermost in their minds. When the AFRICOM proponents at the meeting said that preempting State Department authority was not the intention of AFRICOM, it was pointed out by the same discussant that the Ambassador could have his/her authority usurped, in fact, by the President on the grounds of national security. If the mandate of AFRICOM now included development, humanitarian and assistance objectives, the amount of resources that the DoD could bring to bear would indeed overwhelm State and USAIDs limited budgets, like that proverbial 800 pound gorilla. Subsequently, in March 2008, an Air Force officer working with AFRICOM told me that they had recognized this as a legitimate fear. He underlined the difference in resource bases for the DoD and State and admitting to me how surprised he was, as a professional military man recently assigned to working with State, to learn for the first time how small its budget was and how few Foreign Service officers there were globally (about 10,000). He opined that few professional military have ever really focused on this fact. The outcome of that outreach by DoD and USAID to NGOs, Africans, other policy makers and experts, as mentioned above, was a retreat from the original goal of placing AFRICOMs headquarters on the continent. It is now temporarily located in StuttgartMoehringen, Germany, and final plans are still unclear as to whether it will stay in Germany or be placed on the East Coast of the United State. There is also still talk of possible regional offices on the continent. In response to the missions conflict with the State Departments authority at an Embassy level, it was decided to appoint a Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs who would be drawn from the State Department that person, as mentioned above, is veteran diplomat Ambassador Mary Yates and have a number of other State Department personnel on staff. According to the website, half of the 1,300 personnel at headquarters are civilian employees, including representatives from non-military agencies of the U.S. Government. Again as mentioned above, the website reaffirms the U.S. Ambassadors prominence as the Presidents personal representative but adds that is in diplomatic relations only, a telling caveat.14 This February, an acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was quoted on the AFRICOM website as saying Our first priority is providing security assistance programs that are critical to securing the objective of a peaceful African continent. The decision to create U.S. Africa Command, also known as AFRICOM, "marks the beginning of a new era where African security issues can be addressed from an Africacentric perspective. AFRICOM is a new type of command that will focus on building African regional security and crisis response. Its objective is a more secure Africa Through AFRICOM's deployment of the African Partnership Station, we are building the capacity of West and Central African states to protect their territorial waters, respond to oil spills and other disasters, and patrol vital oil and gas platforms. We are pursuing the shared goal of ending conflict in Africa by supporting African conflict mediation and strengthening African capacities to mitigate conflict and carry out peace support

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operations. To do so, we work directly with lead African mediators, bilaterally with African Governments, and multilaterally with the African Union, the United Nations, and African sub-regional organizations. To put it more simply, we want to support African leadership and African solutions to African problems.15 Even more recently, on March 3, 2009, the AFRICOM Deputy Commander, Ambassador Mary Yates, told senior Ghanaian officials and former President Jerry Rawlings, that AFRICOM was established to focus primarily on Africa and is in prime position to ensure better security for various African countries through collaboration between several US state agencies such as the Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the State Department and a host of others.16 Does this last statement indicate that the U.S. Government has come full circle in terms of still seeing AFRICOM in purely military terms but also as a vehicle for inter-agency coordination? Or, is the U.S. Government still busy selling AFRICOM? A visit to the current posting on the AFRICOM website, in the Commanders Guiding Principles, referred to above, lists among those principles the need to consider perspectives of African, interagency and other partners in everything we do, and further, to do no harmthe command will seek to support, but not disrupt or confuse ongoing U.S. government, international and nongovernmental efforts in Africa. The verbs used, to consider partners advice and seek to support other efforts, do not give the observer confidence that the DoD has ceded ground to civilian authority. And, when one visits the website of another entity called U.S. Army Africa which comes under the Commander of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), with its mandate to Grow, Partner, Engage and Act, no solace can be taken in its emphasis on the militaristic approach. The web posting talks about laying the foundation for our future success as we prepare to assume full responsibility for U.S. Army operations in Africa. While it talks about partnering with African militaries and security institutions, and transforming partner nation forces, it also states that Army Africa will direct, integrate and employ military capabilities to prevent or mitigate the effects of conflict or respond to crises in Africa.17 African sensibilities and fears will be raised again as they read those statements, no matter what SETAF sees as its mission, how it is couched or how it relates to AFRICOM. AFRICOM IN CONTEXT: THE OTHER TWO Ds OR SOFT POWER So, what does this portend? First, and foremost, it is certain that AFRICOM is here to stay. It is still rife with controversy and still in the stages of being recrafted, but few in Washington circles, even those community based groups calling for its dismantling, feel that there is any realistic option that it will go away. The issue now seems to be how it will fit in with the new focus of the Obama administration on the second two of the Three Ds, Diplomacy and Development. The new catch phrase is soft power. Secretary of Defense Gates has brought it back into the lexicon, borrowed from icons of political science theory like Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Niall Ferguson. It has been picked up by Secretary of State Clinton as well, to describe the way forward for foreign policy in this administration.

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But, soft, or smart power, as Secretary Clinton likes to say, is now in the process of being defined as a strategic and operational principle. Its traditional usage, in the context of Nye, is simply attraction, as opposed to the old fashioned carrots and sticks. Nye goes on to say, in a follow-up article to his seminal books on the issue, telling titled Think Again: Soft Power, that a countrys soft power can come from three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).18 We can begin to put this theory into its practical framework by seeing how it is understood at the highest echelons of our government. It will mean a clear shift of focus or dependence on military as a first option in foreign policy interactions, as elaborated in the first section above and seen in any number of campaign and now presidential pronouncements by Obama. Hillary Clinton has picked up her bosss and Robert Gates - rhetoric and is talking everywhere about the move to soft power, diplomacy and development. Listen to her at her nomination hearings: I believe that American leadership has been wanting, but is still wanted. We must use what has been called smart power: the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. Secretary Gates has been particularly eloquent in articulating the importance of diplomacy in pursuit of our national security and foreign policy objectives. As he notes, its not often that a Secretary of Defense makes the case for adding resources to the State Department and elevating the role of the diplomatic corps. Thankfully, Secretary Gates is more concerned about having a unified, agile, and effective U.S. strategy than in spending our precious time and energy on petty turf wars. As he has stated, our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and under funded for far too long, both relative to military spending and to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world. And to that, I say, Amen!19 These remarks or ones similar to them have been repeated often by Secretary Clinton in these first two months of the Obama administration, both in public forums and in staff meetings with State and Agency for International Development employees. In this latter context, her words are even more precise and telling, as she has stated unequivocally that diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy. Further, she said: Because I think its not just with Secretary Gates, but throughout the military, in my conversations with many of our combatant commanders, they recognize that most of the conflicts we are facing and will face rarely have a military solution. The military is a means to a political solution, and the political side of the equation, which includes our particular areas of expertise diplomacy and development in particular, I guess has been under-resourced and not recognized to the extent of the contribution that we make. And, again: There are three legs to the stool of American foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development. And we are responsible for two of the three legs. And we will make clear, as we go forward, that diplomacy and development are essential tools in achieving the long-term objectives of the United States. And I will do all that I can, working with you,

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to make it abundantly clear that robust diplomacy and effective development are the best long-term tools for securing America's future. As the Gates quote used in the first section above makes clear, a key problem in implementing this new policy precept of soft power is resources. Again, Clinton underlines that dramatically in her talk with State and USAID employees when she says our very best young military leaders captains and majors and lieutenant colonels are given unfettered resources through the Commanders Emergency Response Program to spend as they see fit to build a school, to open a health clinic, to pave a road, and our diplomats and our development experts have to go through miles of paperwork to spend ten cents. She adds that Much of the migration of the authority and the resources to the Defense Department came about because they were able to move, and move aggressively and agilely, to fulfill a purpose or a need. We are going to have to streamline our operations. Were going to have to be smart about smart power. 20 A critical element to be gleaned from Clintons statement is the use of smart power to further define soft power. She says the key is about being smart, using all the tools at the diplomats disposal of diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural and understanding the complimentary roles of the diplomat and the soldier and when they are necessary and appropriate. Again Nye puts it very succinctly: It is a mistake to rely on hard or soft power alone. The ability to combine them effectively might be termed smart power.21 No one, even soft power advocates, dismisses a continuing and necessary military role in foreign affairs at large and Africa in particular. There is wide acceptance of the need for training of rapid reaction forces and national armies, security sector reform in organizational terms as well as conceptual (fighting corruption, incompetence and retribution on ethnic/regional/political grounds), and the need for vigilance and competence in countering legitimate terrorism threats. The key question is if AFRICOM is the best suited tool for meeting these goals, or if they could be handled, as in years past, with the existing command structures and through U.S. Embassy response. Liberia is a good example of the management of Security Sector Reform (SSR) through the U.S. Embassy and contracting of a private firm called Dyncorps International. Burundi, too, has had major SSR work funded by the EC, UKs Department for International Development, the Belgian and French governments and directed through the UN mission in Burundi (BINUB). In this latter framework, where SSR work has been done outside of direct military linkages, it is important to underline one of the most effective and, recently, popular tools for conducting diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building. That is represented by the fields of conflict prevention, management, mitigation, resolution and transformation. Many organizations, international and domestic, are involved in this work. They include the Alliance for Peacebuilding, the Conflict Resolution and Prevention Forum, the Partners for Democratic Change, Search for Common Ground, Center for Strategic and International Studies Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, U.S. Institute of Peace, the

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International Peace Institute, West African Network for Peacebuilding, Centre for Human Dialogue, Mercy Corps, and many others. The experience of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in this regard is instructive and representative of the forward thinking of the administration on the use of conflict prevention and transformation, one of the core elements of diplomacy. The Wilson Center has been engaged in a state leadership capacity building, conflict transformation project in Burundi since 2002, first with World Bank and then Department for International Development, EC and USAID support. At a time when the transitional arrangement after the Arusha Peace Accords in 2000 to provide for a freely elected democracy was floundering, the Bank invited the Centers Director of the Africa Program, former Congressman Howard Wolpe, who had served as President Clintons Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region of Africa from 1996-2000, to launch a program working with the key leaders of that country to rebuild trust, relationships, communications and an agreement on the way power would be shared. A full discussion of this project and its methodology can be found in two articles by Howard Wolpe and myself recently published in the Journal of Democracy and the Commonwealth magazine, Roundtable.22 The project uses training that is interactive, focused on role playing, simulations and negotiations/problem solving exercises, that not only teaches negotiations, communications, problem analysis and problem solving skills, but reestablishes or builds relationships around shared interests and collective and inclusive processes. This program was applied at first to a mixed group of key leaders at the highest levels in Burundi, and expanded in 2004 to the security sector through the ceasefire commission, the integrated military and police commands, the joint verification teams for disarmament and demobilization and eventually political party and parliamentary leaders. The United Nations and donor governments invited the Wilson Center to launch similar projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005 and Liberia in 2006. Other examples abound of significant impact from programs of this nature, such as the early warning system (ECOWARN) that has been instituted in 11 West African countries by WANEP in conjunction with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the mediation of the power sharing agreement in Kenya after last years election related violence by the Accra-based Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Geneva-based Centre for Human Dialogue. The new focus of the administration on soft or smart power, to include diplomacy and development as primary tools, bodes well for the incorporation of conflict prevention, management and transformation into foreign policy agenda. CONCLUSION The question that arises from this discussion is: Is AFRICOM necessary? While this author and many other observers, from Africa and elsewhere, feel that it has gotten off to an unfortunately bad launch, as described above, it is also generally accepted by the same observers that Africa has to deal with its de facto presence. The United States has no

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history of uncreating bureaucracies and this will not happen. With that said, however, is it necessary? is a very different question. Could the training, regional security, advisory and strategic outreach functions of AFRICOM have been conducted as efficiently in the three commands that housed them in the past or through existing funding and policy directives? Does Africa really profit by a more cohesive and structured approach to security and strategic relations with the United States? In the first instance, there are existing mechanisms within the military, and beyond the SSR work being coordinated through State or other donors and international institutions (UN, World Bank, UNDP), that can be used for the kind of assistance that AFRICOM has been created to provide. The Stimson Center and AAD report outlines these succinctly. As it says, since September 11, 2001, there is a new and growing assistance portfoliothat is directly planned, budgeted, overseen and implement solely by the Defense Department. These include current budget Section 1206, a global train-andequip program designed to build the capacity of foreign militaries; Coalition Support Funds, reimbursing countries supporting U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan; Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, a counter-terrorism education and training program for foreign militaries and defense officials; Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), to which Secretary Clinton referred in her remarks, which are used by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan for reconstruction and stabilization programs; and, Section 1207, which gives DoD the authority to transfer up to $100 million annually to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction activities.23 Of course, most of these apply to the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but some go beyond geographically and, along with the mandate referred to above for Army Africa and the SETAF to do training and assistance work, they demonstrate the fact that these functions could have been accomplished without the creation of a separate command. However, unsaid so far in all of this is the fact the AFRICOM represents dramatically an increased recognition of the continent as an important element in American global strategic and security policy outlook. For better or worse by that I mean that many Africans would be just as happy to not have this recognition this flies in the face of past American benign neglect of Africa and that is frequently cited by Africans themselves as the one positive element about AFRICOM. Furthermore, there is little doubt that Africa understands the need to manage conflict on the continent and recognizes its need for help in so doing. According to the former Secretary General of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA), Erastus Mwencha, in speaking at a conference sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in April 2008 on Regional Economic Integration and Conflict Mitigation, conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa were estimated in 2000 to be reducing Africas economic growth by approximately two percent annually. Africa, he said, has been losing about $15 billion every year due to internal and cross border conflicts. Some of the factors Mwencha listed, beyond direct military expenditures, were the loss of productivity, damage to infrastructure, loss of government revenues, degradation of health and education and human costs, including losses to the economy due to premature death and unexpected medical expenses, reduction in agricultural productivity, which is critical for the agro-based African economies, capital flight, and others.24

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Weighing these contradictory assertions about AFRICOM, I believe that once the mandate of AFRICOM is clear and we are beyond its patronizing and stumbling launch, there should be little resistance from African states and the Africa Union to its role. Africa has a great need for advice and assistance on security matters. The AU and its regional economic communities (RECs), in fact, have a renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime that is capable of managing and resolving African conflicts. The AU has laid out provisions for intervention in the internal conflicts of member states, thus overriding the principle of sovereignty and non-interference that guided the OAU and limited its effectiveness. There is conflict resolution and prevention architecture in place, to include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), supported by the AU Commission through its chairperson with four pillars that include the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Special Fund. Each of the eight recognized RECs have peace and security mechanisms of their own design to meet the specific needs of each region. Again, as Secretary General Mwencha put it in the April 2008 conference in Washington, DC, these REC security bodies were established because of the recognition that conflict adversely affects the RECs primary objective, namely, regional economic integration. The critical link between sustainable development and violent conflict is thus fully recognized by regional African bodies. 25 AFRICOM and its predecessors have already been working with the ASF for some time now, and there is much yet to be done. The caveat, as posed in the paragraph above, is once the mandate is clear. This is the rub, as they say. AFRICOM must undergo a redefinition, reframing and re-imaging, probably not in its core mission statement, but to bring it in line with the Shared Security Partnership Program idea that President Obama surfaced during the campaign and the new world of soft power. This does not just mean the need to look at its mission of information sharing, training, operations, border security, anti-corruption programs, technology and the targeting of terrorist financing and operations, but at the nature and tone of its relations with Africa states and other U.S. Government agencies. First and foremost, in this authors mind, it should focus on working with the AU and the RECs directly. The entire administration should take a cue from Africas attempt to coordinate policies and manage itself on a regional/continental basis and begin to channel support, aid and policy outreach through the continental/regional institutions. Despite reservations we may have about aberrant behavior of the current AU Chair, President Qaddafi, and his promotion of a United States of Africa, the fact is that if the AU and the New Program for African Development (NEPAD) were made effective, the continent as a whole would benefit greatly. Bilateral relations have been the cornerstone of past diplomatic and security interaction. While those will not and should not change entirely, particularly with key states like South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, it is important to begin to respond to and support Africas efforts to make more effective and cohesive its governance and development polices and ability to monitor and police itself. AFRICOM could become a part of that new dimension of U.S./African relations.

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The appearance and perception to Africans of AFRICOMs approach need to change and it seems that is already happening. The decision to not headquarter it on the continent was right. Coordination with the National Defense University and African Center for Strategic Studies programs has exposed hundreds of senior African military and government officials to AFRICOMs purpose and profile. It must avoid in the future the militarys natural propensity to do things quickly and in secret and expand its consultative activities beyond just its immediate counterparts in the security sector to civilian government and non-government actors who play a role in state security issues. Most encouraging is the acceptance by the military of the need for integrating the tools of power and influence on an inter-agency basis. There is a reason for the American constitutional mandate that makes the President the Commander in Chief and sublimates the security sector to civilian control. In Africa, in fact in the developing world in general, that relationship must be honored in letter and practice if the United States is to remain or reemerge as a role model. Ambassadors, as Chiefs of Country Teams, must remain the personification of American power and influence. The image of an America that sees its military power as the vanguard of its global position and is seen to use it to the detriment and displacement of diplomacy and development options is terrifying to Africa and raises the ghosts of colonialism and the Cold War. So, what are we left with? A kinder and gentler AFRICOM? That may be it. We know that once the gorilla is there, once the foot is in the door, the DoD doesnt go away. Mission creep is always a problem and that is why there are watchdogs in Congress, the White House and the media. Constant monitoring of the relationship between our military and civilian foreign policy practitioners is necessary. At an American Enterprise Institute conference in October 2008 that looked at AFRICOM, there were a number of cautions expressed by significant observers like Witney Schneidman, heading the Obama campaigns African Group, retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Killebrew, and retired Ambassador Robert Houdek, former National Intelligence Officer for Africa, who looked constructively at the practical implications of interagency friction and resource imbalances. Killebrew presented a very interested idea on managing State/AFRICOM relations with a model for tactical interagency security engagement, as he put it, that would place a military assistance group under the authority of a country's ambassador, creating a unity of command and effort, and allowing for the easier distribution of resources among an embassy's civilian and military elements. This is a restatement in essence of the old Country Team model but gives it a specific security focus. Also, at that conference, the need for full consultation was underlined, with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Theresa Whelan saying a successful U.S. strategy for Africa will "make Africans part of the action in solving" the continent's many challenges and Schneidman agreeing that the U.S. has to listen closely to Africas leaders.26 When all is said and done, this new administration will see AFRICOM in a new light, within the context of its holistic examination of foreign policy writ large and of interagency relationships in general, particularly State versus Defense. The economic realities we now face will contribute to this as well, as resource authorizations and allocations will be fought over tooth and nail both within the administration and between it and Congress.

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AFRICOM will need to be flexible, take seriously the need for inter-agency coordination, seek full disclosure and serious prior consultation with African partners, sublimate its own ego and militaristic tendencies for a larger national policy principle and stay conscious of its own propensity for mission creep. We know AFRICOM will be a player, but how constructive and effective it will be depends on its understanding of these elements.

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1 2

December 17, 2008, interview with Charlie Rose on ABC television. A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, pp. 1, Gordon Adams, William Bacchus , Stephen Chaplin, David Glaudemans, Eric Lief, Richard Nygard, J.J. Saulino, and Stanley Silverman (October 01, 2008, The Stimson Center and AAD). 3 Informed by e-mail exchanges with Francis Kornegay, Chief Research Officer, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa. 4 The Presidential Election: Who is Best for Africa? Article on Obama by Witney Scheidman, Chair of Africa Advisory Group for the campaign, Allafrica.com. 5 See http://allafrica.com, 26 February 2009. 6 Una Sfida per lAfrica, Steve McDonald, Progetto Obama pp. 279-283 (Gruppo Editoriale LEspresso, July 2008). 7 www.africom.mil, February 24, 2009. 8 India, NATO, AFRICOM and the Dilemma of Strategic Spatial Interdependencies, Francis Kornegay, The Post-West Forum, November 7, 2007 (http://postwesternforum.blogspot.com/). 9 Ibid. 10 AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disasterous for Africa, Foreign Policy in Focus, Ezekiel Pajibo and Emira Woods, Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg, July 26. 2007. 11 Op. cit., Francis Kornegay 12 Op. cit., Francis Kornegay 13 Pentagon Scales Back AFRICOM Ambitions, Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor, May 16, 2008. 14 Op. cit. www.africom.mil. 15 U.S. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century, Phil Carter, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, www.africom.mil, February 24, 2009. 16 Rawlings, AFRICOM Deputy Commander Discuss Africas Drug Problems , Ghana News, March 3, 2009. 17 www.setaf.army.mil. 18 Think Again: Soft Power, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Foreign Policy, March 1, 2006. 19 Remarks by Secretary Clinton at her Senate nomination hearing, January 13, 2009. www.state.gov. 20 www.state.gov. Remarks by Secretary Clinton at State and USAID employee meetings on January 22 and 23, 2009, respectively. 21 Op. cit., Nye, Jr. 22 Democracy and Peacebuilding: Rethinking the Conventional Wisdom, Steve McDonald and Howard Wolpe, The Roundtable, Vol. 97, No. 394, February 2008; Burundis Transition: Training Leaders for Peace, Steve McDonald and Howard Wolpe, Journal for Democracy, Volume 17, No. 1, January 2006 (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore).
23 24

Op. cit., Adams, Baucus, et al. pp. 22-23. African Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations: Assessing Their Contributions to Economic Integration and Conflict Management, report of the conference on April 10, 2008, hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, Washington, DC, edited by Steve McDonald, Natalie Jackson and Justine Lindemann. 25 Ibid. 26 AFRICOM and Beyond: The Future of U.S.-African Security and Defense Relations, conference held by the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, October 1, 2008.