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T r o o p B u i l d U p T h e c o n t b m i n g s o u t h w a r d m o v e m e n t o f
t h e e x p a n d i n g K o r e a n P e o p l e ' s A r m y
t o w a r d t h e t h i r t y - e i g h t h p a r a l l e l p r o b a b l y c o n s t i t u t e s a
d e f e n s i v e - M e a 7 s u r e t o o f f s e t t h e g r o w i n g s t r e n g t h o f t h e
o f f e n s i v e l y m i n d e d S o u t h K o r e a n A r m y , T h e i n f l u x o f
C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t - t r a i n e d t r o o p s f r o m M a n c h u r i a , h o w -
e v e r , w i l l p a r t i a l l y s o l v e N o r t h K o r e a ' s m a n p o w e r s h o r t a g e
a n d w i l l a d d m a t e r i a l l y t o t h e c o m b a t p o t e n t i a l o f t h e N o r t h
K o r e a n A r m y . N o r t h K o r e a n m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h h a s b e e n
. f u r t h e r b o l s t e r e d b y t h e a s s i g n m e n t o f t a n k s a n d h e a v y
f i e l d g u n s t o u u i t s i n t h e t h i r t y - e i g h t h p a r a l l e l z o n e a n d b y
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f N o r t h K o r e a n a i r c a p a b i l i t i e s . D e s p i t e
t h i s i n c r e a s e i n N o r t h K o r e a n m i l i t a r y , s t r e n g t h , t h e p o s s -
i b i l i t y o f a n i n v a s i o n o f S o u t h K o r e a i s u n l i k u l y u n l e s s N o r t h
K o r e a n f o r c e s c a n d e v e l o p a c l e a r - c u t s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e
i n c r e a s i n g l y e f f i c i e n t S o u t h K o r e a n , A r m y .
V P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 1 7 - F e b - 2 0 1 0
f! KOREA
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 17-Feb-2010
Troop Build Up The continuing southward movement of
the expanding Korean People’s Army
toward the thirty-eighth parallel probably constitutes a
defensive -rne<me to offset the growing strength of the
offensively minded South Korean Army, The influx of
Chinese Communist-trained troops from Manchuria, how -
ever, wfll partially solve North Kgrea’s manpower shortage
and will add materially to the combat potential of the North
Korean Army. North Korean military strength has been
further bolstered by the assignment of tanks and heavy
; field guns to units in the thirty-eighth parallel zone and by
the development of North Korean ai r capabilities, Despite
this increase in North Korean military strength, the poss-
I
, $ I
i
lbility of an invasion of South Korea is unlik& &less North
Korean forces can develop a clear-cut superiority over the
increasingly efficient South Korean. Army.
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I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9

THE KOREAN SITUATION
The Soviet-inmired invasion of South -and the
promprand vigorous US reaction have overnight changed the
complexion of the cold war and will lead to the development
of new and critical problems for the US in nearly every quar -
ter of the globe. It is not believed that the USSR desires a
global war at this time. It is probable, however, that a con-
certed attempt will be made t o make the US effort in Korea
as difficult andxostly as possible; (The USSR has sizedble
forces -of Chinese Communist troops at its disposal for this
purpose.) The implications to the US of defeat in Korea would
be far -reaching. It would become nearly impossible to develop
effective anti-Communist resistance in Southeast Asi a, and pro-
gress toward building a strong Atlantic community would be
seriously threatened. A US victory in Korea would also pose se-
rious‘problems for the US.
Increased Demands The adoption of a vigorous stand by the
US against Communist expansion has,
throughout the nondmiet
however, implies that any
iprompt,and effective action
eE-y have even more
t0 US’and’Westkrn prestige than would
have resulted from failure to come to the aid of South Korea.
The Korean.invasion has increased fears that the USSR will
take aggressive action in other “soft spots” on the Soviet peri-
phery, thus tending to create in these areas greater demands
for US military and economic aid. The areas most immediately
affected are Southeast Asi a (particularly Indochina), Iran, Yugo-
slavia, Greece, apd Germany.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE - 2 -
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
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r 1 P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E D A T E :
- A p r - 2 0 1 0

THE KOREAN SITUATION
Soviet Intentions and Capabilities
Two weeks after the beginning of hostilities i n Korea,
the world was still waiting for some firm indication of Soviet
intentions regarding not only Korea but other countries on
the Soviet periphery. It became clear, however, that the North
Koreans were not to be intimidated by US involvement in the
t the all-out effort t o overrun South Korea would
ed. A s long as the North Korean advance con-
tinues;’the USSR can remain aloof; the crucwl moment will
co-me when and if the battle turns in favor of US and South
K orea Scsces. A t ahat t$me, the USSR must decide whether
a North Korean defeat or to hke whatever steps are
to prolong the action,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE.
- 2 -
Soviet Inpntions At the moment, the Soviet and Communist
propaganda line offers no clue regarding
Soviet propzgandists would have no difficulty
nt line as a basis either for withdrawal from
the USSR has
Soviet troops, for prolonging the fighting i n Korea, as well as for
initiating hostilities elsewhere. Thus, although the USSR would
prefer to confine the conflict to Korea, a reversal there might
impel the USSR to take greater risks of starting a global war either
by committing subsbntial Chinese Communist forces i n Korea or
by sanctioning aggressive actions by Satellite fqrces in other areas
. . . . .,.
.
. , .
. .
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of the world. The decisiveness of the US reaction to the Korean
invasion will thus cause the Kremlin to move cautiously, but
the danger still exists that the USSR, as it did two weeks ago,
, wii~ again miscalculate the Western neaction t o any future moves
it may feel are necessary.
The Par East The Korean invasion has had its most immediate
and compelling impacton the Far East, parti-
cularly as it has affected international Communist intentions
tca speed the expansion of Communism throughout the area through
the-instrumentality of the Peiping regime. Pending clarification
of the Soviet position, the Peiping regime has not yet committed
itself and,,as far as Korea is concerned, wi l l probably not take
icant changes have occurredin troop dis-
positions along Southeast Asian frontiers. Reported movements
of large troop format&& from South and Ce&1 China toward
the Northeast are largely discounted. Communist troops already
i n North China and Bhnchuria are sufficient to pmi de substantial
support to the North Koreans and of these approximately 40-50,000
- 3 -
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. . . . . . . . . .
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are of Korean nationality. Despite these reported troop
movements and Chinese Communist capability to launch
simultaneous and successful military actions in Korea,
Hong Kong, Macao, and Indochinaj no immediate action is
expected. With regard to Taiwan, the US committment to
defend the island has almost certainly delayed the-hvasion
timetable if only because it will make occupation of the is-
land too costly an operation for the Peiping regime to under -
take without outside assistance.
Non-military Action
increase its efforts short of military aggression to further the
spreadd Communism throughout Southeast Asia. Political sup-
PO itary supplies-will be granted Ho,Chi Minh’s forces
in , ‘eff orb ;will be made i to s trengthen’the insurgent
movement inMalaya, and the tempo of organizational activity
among labor. and poHtical groups wi l l be stepped up. In this
-campaSgn; efforts by the.J Peilling regime to use the nine million
Overseas Chinese.willbe impeded by its recent loss of popu-
larity at home and a growing anticipation in.Overseas Chinese
Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist
regime will continue and probably
munist influence,
Cammunit& faction. An immediately explosive .situation in South-
east Ash, however, derives from the presence i n northern Burma of
approximately 2,000 Chinese Nationalist troops. ThePeiping regime
has demanded their internment, the Burmese Government is ap-
parently incapable of doing so, and the Chinese Communists thus
have a legal “excuse” for carrying out local or major military
operations in Burma.
- 4 -
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A P P R O V E D F O R
R E L E A S E D A T E :
0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
COMMUNIST CHINA’S ROLE
As it becomes more apparent that the fighting in Korea
wh l be prolonged, the military capabilities of the Chinese Com-
mu.@sts, as-well as Soviet intentiDIls regarding the. use of these
capabil€t€es, provide the principal key t o the outcome of the
action:against Korea, Hong
ineseCommunist invasion of
.to permit a North Korean
mmunist-forces
Chinese Communist troops in Korea would
Communist prestige, as opposed to that of the USSR, would be en-
hanced; and Peiping might be tempted as a result of success in Korea
- 9 -
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to challenge Soviet leadership in Asia. In addition to these
purely iqternal difficulties, the use of Chinese Communist
forces in Korea would increase the risk of global war, not
only because of possible UN or US reaction but because the
USSR itself would be under greater compulsion to assure a
victory in Korea, possibly by committing Soviet troops.
Taiwan Invasion The principal problems confronting the
Kremlin in deciding whether to permit
an invasion of Taiwan are the nature and extent of US re-
r<precipitated because of the
spread of Communist ’military aggression. Several factors
may lead to a decision to launch a assault on Taiwan before
the typhoon season i n late August. Recent evidence indicates
e Communist forces are poised for the invasion
le land, sea and air fo may now be capable of
successful assault. le beachhead is .
established, the resultant panic ist ranks bight
well induce desertions and snowballing defections sufficient
to cause a virtual collapse of organized Nationalist resistance.
The Peiping reg€me is already p y committed to the Taiwan
rt forces which might
may reason that US
1 support than the
sion should be under -
neutralization’! forces
on and the risk of global
in the Formosa Strait. Despite these favorable considerations
the fact remains that &n invasion of Taiwan would be an immense-
ly costly operation with the resulting political and strategic ad-
vantages balanced by the increased risk of precipitating .a’global
war which it is believed the USSR does not presently desire.
- 10 -
- . . . _ _ . . . .
. .
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Support for Indochina Indochina offers the Chinese Com-
munists their greatest opportunity
for expanding Communist influence in Asia with the minimum
military or political risks. From a military viewpoint, the
Indochina conflict has been a stalemate. Despite considerable
successes, the French have been unable fully t o capitalize on
their superiority in equipment and manpower because of the
essentially guerrilla nature of the fighting and the terrain
which prevents large-scale operations. Given equipment and
supplies similar to that of the French, the forces of Ho Chi-
Minh could shift the course of the present inconclusive warfare
p their favor. The Chinese Communists have the capabilities
t o supply the material needed by HO Chi-Minh and may be ex-
pected to step up such assistance in the immediate future.
.
I
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.
- 11 -
. . . .
. .
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A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E D A T E :
: 1 6 - D e c - 2 0 0 9

A Chinese Communist diplomatic mission, includ-
ing an Ambassador, arrived i n Pyongyang on 10 July. The
timing of this development may be significant in view of
possi bl e participation by Chinese Comunist forces i n /
North Korean operations,
For the past several months, the USSR has shippod
considerable quantities of petroleum products, trucks,
medical supplies and industrial equipment I n t o Manchuria,
North Korea and North China. Sizeable stockpiles of food
atad petroleum products exist in adjacent areas of the U66R
which can be moved quite readfly into Korea and North
Chim,
an eat h at ed 150 Soviet tanks and a considerable quantity
of Soviet medium artillery,
The North Korean Army waa reoently suppl i ed with
A major redeployment of Chinese Commmi st forces
i s believed to be tn progress, with the movement generally
north from the Hainan area vi a Canton for probable regroup-
ing I n the Changsha area of Central China,
involved are those of the crack Fourth Field Azm, originally
fromManchuria, under the able command of Lin Plao, There
is no oompletely conffrmed evidence of a movement of forces
t o Manchuria, although numerous reports to that affect have
been received. Reinforcements for the North Korean Army
nag be drawn from the estimated 70 000 Korean troops of the
Chinese Communist Ar my who are bellevad t o be located at
present i n Manchuria,
Among the forces
Soviet advisers are known to be located in key
ar ea8 of North Korea (estimated 5,000) and Commuaist Chi na
(estimated 5000 for ground forces alone)o
TOP E
L~PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: I
116-Dec-2009 1
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H R 7 0 - 1 4
A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E D A T E :
, 1 6 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
' ./'
P'
xi.
. . . . .
t -.--
HR70-14
. .
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASEDATE:
I 16-Dec-2009
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I N

.. . . .
W
HR70-14
KOREA
L. vlorth Koreans launching supreme effort to drive out UN forces--
The 1naradel.s are massing all available manpower and equipment
along thhe entire €writ in what may be their superne efiort to drive
the UN forces lnto the sea before US reinforcements can arrive
to .redress thhe present North Korean superiority in troops and
armored equipment. The North Koreans are continuing their
unopposed drlve through southwestern Korea, with an enemy
force in regimental sbength reported to be in the coastal city
of Mokpo. Along (.he front from Taejon to ihe east, the enemy
continues to mass troops and materiel and t o increase pressure
amlnst US and South Korean positions. Two new North Korean
divisions have been idenMSied in the central sector, which, com-
bined with the shl€ting of khhs combat-w9se North Korean First
Division, indicates preparations for a major push south toward
Taegu and Kumchon. Enemy troops south of Yongdok on the
east, coast were pushed back one mile by USSouth Korean forces,
but the situation remains serious. Aircraft of the US Seventh
Fleet are styikfng at enemy l roops in southwest Korea.
Reports f ram refugees indicate that Seoul, the former South
Korean capital, I s suffering from Inflation and a rice €aminey with
rice prices there .ranging from 7 t o 11 times the levels prevailing
in Pusan and Taegu, On the third day of enemy occupation, author-
Mee confiscated all rice found during a house-to-house search and
the people 1x1 Seoul have been without rlce since that time.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 17-Feb-2010
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i n t h e c e n t r a l s e c t o r , a n d 9 0 a i r l i n e m i l e s a b o v e P u s a n a l o n g
t h e e a s t c o a s t . D e s p i t e h e a v y l o s s e s a n d d i s r u p t e d a n d e x -
t e n d e d l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e e n e m y i s s t i l l s u p e r i o r t o
t h e t h r e e U S D i v i s i o n s a n d f o u r S o u t h K o r e a n D i v i s i o n s i n
m a n p o w e r , e q u i p m e n t , a n d g u n s
2 6 S I R i g g o
1 3 5 1 b . S
H R 7 0 - 1 4
T h e r e c e n t a d v a n c e o f e n e m y f o r c e s i n t h e s o u t h w e s t
h a s s e c u r e d p r a c t i c a l l y a l l o f t h a t a r e a , a n d a d v a n c e e l e m e n t s
a r e m o v i n g e a s t t o H a d o n g o n t h e c o a s t r o a d t o P u s a n . I n t h e
w e s t e r n s e c t o r t h e e n e m y h a s f o r c e d e l e m e n t s o f t h e U S F i r s t
C a v a l r y t o w i t h d r a w t o n e w p o s i t i o n s t h r e e m i l e s e a s t a n d
s d u t h o f Y o n g d o n g . T h e c e n t r a l s e c t o r h a s b e e n r e l a t i v e l y .
q u i e t . N o r t h K o r e a n s a r e c o n t i n u i n g t h e i r b u i l d - u p i n t h e
T h y a n g - P u n g g i - Y o n g j u a r e a , h o w e v e r , a n d t h e a p p e a r a n c e
t h e r e o f f r e s h e n e m y t r o o p s i n c r e a s e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a m a j o r
e n e m y e f f o r t t o b r e a k t h r o u g h u n r e s t e d S o u t h K o r e a n d i v i s i o n s
t o T a e g u . O n t h e e a s t c o a s t , e n e m y s t r e n g t h h a s b e e n i n c r e a s e d
i n t h e Y o n g d o k a r e a b y t h e a p p e a r a n c e t h e r e o f t h e F i f t h D i v i s i o n ,
a n d a d d i t i o n a l e n e m y t r o o p s i n u n d e t e r m i n e d s t r e n g t h a r e m o v i n g
s o u t h a l o n g t h e e a s t c o a s t r o a d b e l o w S a m c h o k .
U S a n d B r i t i s h f l e e t u n i t s c o n d u c t e d a c a r r i e r a i r s t r i k e
a g a i n s t s o u t h w e s t e r n K o r e a d u r i n g t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s , b u t i n 1 1 0
s o r t i e s o v e r t h e K u n s a n - M o k P o - K w a n g j u a r e a t h e p i l o t s c o u l d f i n d
n o e n e m y t r o o p c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o r m o v e m e n t s . T h e e n e m y i s
a p p a r e n t l y o b s e r v i n g s t r i c t c a m o u f l a g e d i s c i p l i n e a n d m o v e s o n
t h e r o a d s b y n i g h t w h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e .
A P R R e O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 1 7 - F e b - 2 0 1 0
I
A P WV E D FOR RELEASE
KOREA
1. Defense perimeter witbin 100 miles of Pusan--'She winding
. defense line, agalnst which the North Koreans are throwing
an estimated nine divisions, is now within 75 airline miles
of Pusan along the left flank, 105 airline miles from Pusan
in the central seebop, and 90 airline miles above Pusan along
the east coast. Despite heqq losses and disrupted and ex-
tended lines of communication, the enemy is still superior to
the three US Divisions and four South Korean Divisions in
manpower, equipment, and guns ,,
has secured practically all of that area. and advance elements
The receni. advance of enemy forces in the southwest
....
HR70-14
are moving east to Hadong on the coast'road Lo Pusan. In the
western sector the enemy has forced element.. of the US First
Cavalry to withdraw to new positions three miles east and
south of Yongdong, The centrad sector has been relatively .
quiet. North Koreans are contfnuing their build-up in the
W T,yang -Punggi -Ydngju area, however, and the appearance -
there of fresh enemy troops increases the possibility of a major
enemy effort to break through unrested South Korean division..
to Taegu. On. the east coast, enemy strength has been increased
in the Yongdok area by the appearance there of the Fifth Division,
and additional enemy troops in undetermined strength are moving
south along Ihe east coast road below Samchok.
W and British Eleet units conducted a carri er ais strike
against souihwestern Korea during the past 24 hours, but in 11.0
sorties over the Kuman-Mokpo-Kwangju area the pilots could find
no enemy lroop concentrations or movements. The enemy is
apparently observing sixkt camouflage discipline and moves on
the roads by night whenever possible.
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T O P S
C O P S E
I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 4 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
H R 7 0 - 1 4
' N R
HR70-14
.. . . . .., ' ..q
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 24-Mar-201 0
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F O R R E L E A S E I
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57
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24.9.5s T 0 P y d R E T
KOREA
27 J UL 1950
1352
1. Defense lines stable, but enemy build-up continues--No major
changes have occurred in the defense line during the past 24
hours, but the continuing build-up of enemy pressure in all
sectors increases the possibility that the North Koreans are
preparing for another onslaught, In the south, the North Korean
Fourth Division was forced back ttwo miles by attacking US forces
east of Hadong. In the area southwest of Yongdong,envelopment
isolated one company of US troops; a second attack by the enemy
succeeded in making a minor penetration into southern-held ter -
ritory near Kidae. On the eastern sector south of Yongju, UN
forces repulsed the Seventh North Korean Divislon oflensive which
was supported by tanks,
North Korean propaganda, yhich is being supervised by
Soviet advisors, is stressing Stalin s reply to Nehru’s letter on
the Korean issue as further evidence of the Soviet desi re to
defend the peace and security of the world. Radio broadcasts
state that the North Korean regime would welcome a “peaceful
settlement,” but repeat the point made by Stalin to Nehru that
the door to such a peaceful settlement will be open only after
delegates of the Chinese People’s Republic are seated in the
UN and the Security Council hears ‘‘representatives” of the
Korean people.
W
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
E T
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
D A W 17-Feb-2010
. . . . . . . .
28 JUL1950
w
-. . . . . . 1-353
HR70-14
KOREA
1. North Koreans attack in central sector-North Korean forces
in considerable strength are attacking US positions in the cen-
tral sector near the *tal city of Yonidon6 and at t he same time
enemy Ior ces are attempting to turn the defensive flanks in the
extreme south and along the east coast near the battered city
of Yongdok. Present evidence indicates the Invading forces have
the reserves and equipment necessary to launch a major onslaught
designed to destroy the defending UN forces or to push them into
the sea. In &e southern area, the North Korean Fourth Division
has advanced well beyond Hadong along the road toward Chinju
and enemy forces in battalion strength have occupied the port
city of Yosu. Along the northern Plank, the battered port city of
Yongdok has m::orte: l?.y been recaptured by South Korean forces
following a saturation bombardment of the city by US naval forces.
The navy also bombarded other points in enemy-held territory
along the east coast.
W
Approximately 132 of the 2 10 South Korean National
Assemblymen met in Taegu for their first post-invasion meet-
ing to heat Presjdent Rhee and Assembly Speaker Shin declare
their confidence in an eventual UN victory in Korea. Rhee and
Shin also expressed confidence that *he 38th Parallel boundary
would be abolished and that the fatherland would be unified.
During the course of this meeting, radio broadcasts originating
from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang sent out an appeal
allegedly made by 48 former members of the South Korean Na-
tional Assembly in Seoul asking the Assemblymen In Taegu to
withdraw their support of Rhee anal come over to the side of the
people.” Foreign correspondents of the Communist press of
France, England, and China, now touring North Korean cities that
have been bombed by US forces, report that US planes are bomb-
ing from above the clouds and clearly engaging i n “terroristic
bombing designed to kill the peaceful inhabitants.” Such reports
are obviously designed to feed the Communist propaganda charg-
ing that the US is the aggressor against Asiatic peoples.
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D o e = t N .
N O C H A A ' a C l a s s . 0
E j E L C L A S S I F
C l a s s . C A A N G E D
T S S
D D A M e m o , 4
7 7
A u t h : ( 1 =
G . 7 7
D a t e : M A R 7 9 7 0 B y :

1 3 5 4
KOREA
I.. Little change in tactical situation-These have been no
subsianlial changes in b e tactical situation in the past
29 JUL 1950
1354
twenty-four hours. Principal activity has been in &e key
western sector where North Korean troops are exerting
heavy pressure against the US First Cavalry and Twenty-
Fifth ZnfanRry Divisions. In the southwestern sector, enemy
hoops are moving eastward toward contact with advanced
US positions. Fu~Sher l o the north enemy troops are moving
east to gain positions on the road running north from Kochang
to Kumchon, present headquarters of the First Cavalry Divi-
sion on the main rail line from Kumchon to Pusan. Positions
are generally slabilized in the eastern sector where South
Korean troops hold the line, allhough the concentration of
enemy troops indicates the possibility of a major push
towards Hamchang in the direction of Kumchon and Taegu.
An attack by UN forces loward Yongdok on the east coast
met stiff enemy resistance, and no change in the location
of the front line one mile south of Yongdok has been reported.
US naval units conllnued to support ground forces in the
Yongdok area by off -shore bombardment of enemy concentra -
tions, and other units launched four carri er air strikes, hitting
enemy lines of communication and troop concentmtions i n the
southwest and west sectors.
The Uailed Natioris Commission on Korea estimates
Ual Erom 750,000 Co 1,000,000 refugees are now added to the
~,OOO,OOO persoras normally occupying the area still under
ROK control. Water supplies are deficient and unreliable,
sanitation extremely poor, and congested living conditions
most serious. Although this congestion and continued mili-
hr y reverses are unquestionably having a delete cious effect
on the morale of the SouLh Koreans, hey are continuing t o
suppocl Lhegovernment.
DSCLASS~F\ ~~
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CCA hfcrno. 4 77
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.
2. Views on US policy toward Korea--US Ambassador Kirk
3/73
in Moscow has emphasized the importance af clarifying
US political objectives in Korea and of properly correlating
US policy in Korea wiah the problems of containing Soviet
expansion in ot her areas of he world. Kirk believes the
key political issue regarding Korea is whether UN forces
should be committed now or in the near future t o the elimina-
tion of Soviet inlluence and pawer from Korea norlth of the
38th parallel. Ambassador Kirk recommends that the UN
declare its determination to assist the Koreans by all possible
means to achieve their freedom in an independent, unified
and democratic state, but believes it would be decidedly pre-
mature in such a declapation deHnitely t o commit the US to
the use of its forces north of the 38th parallel. Kirk stresses
that the US is not now in a posftion t o make a realistic ap-
praisal of #e obstacles, m1lidat.y and otherwise, which will
exist after North Korean troops are driven back to the 38th
parallel, According to Kirk, elementary prudence dictates
that the US not now assume an obligation which would re-
quire a US military elfort out of proportion to the political
and strategic imporbnce of Korea.
In estimating Soviet Intentions, Kirk points out that
the USSR has thus far cautiously avoided involving Soviet
prestige and has given no indication of its reaction when the
tide of batkle turns against North Korean troops. In support
of his belief that the USSR at that critical point will not
throw its own forces or those of the Chinese Communists
into South Korea, Kirk points to: (a) estimated Soviet re-
luctance to inUiate global war; (b) the flexibility shown by
the USSR when confronted with opposition in such areas as
I ran, Greece and Berlin; and (c) the Soviet attitude since the
Korean fighting began. Kirk considers it more likely that the
USSR will attempt t o arrange some kind of truce on the basis
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of the status quo, and, if unsuccessful, to withdraw North
Korean troops to the 38th parallel. This latter move might
be accompanied by a proclamation affirming the inviolability
of the 38th parallel. On the other hand, if the USSR should
decide that a commitment to defend North Korea would in-
volve too great a risk of global war, Kirk recommends that
the US be prepared to hike advantage of any temporary mili-
tary vacuum and, coincident with political unification moves
by the UN, take whatever military measures might be neces-
sary to maintain internal law and order north of the 38th
parallel.
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' A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 1 7 - F e b - 2 0 1 0
KOREA
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 17-Feb-2010
31 JUL 1950
1. UN forces give ground slawlg-4JN fotces in Korea continue
to give gruund sluwly under rahtless hammer blQws in tae,
central ssctor nedr the stmbgic supply hub of mewr in t h w ,
south %mad@ troops have reportedly captured the port city
of Chin@, and the North Koreans are breaking Into the imd
portant defense anchor of flamehang in the north central sector.
There wa8 UktIe actkvity mar tole hatbred east c o a ~
of Yrrragdok which has changed ha* repeatedly duri q
several days. Seventh fleet units am contfnuing to bo
east coast positions d the emmy, and other UW have been
dispatched to provida protection IOF the south flank of UN
ground troops in the Chinju area.
I Radio Pyongyang broadcast a statement by North Korean.
Communist Chief Kfm Il Sung: that the No~t h Korean armed forces
h d were guaranteed enough weapons and ammunition for vlctory. In
8ouOh Korea, the outbreak of seven smallpox case6 ts a warning
of the dangerous public health situation which i s develop ng as
b8 l f ~ e s that the growing menace d epidemics providers an 0x-
ceuent opportunity to solicit intermtiom1 assistance Ln non-milibry
activSties in South Korea,
!
refugees crowd into UN-held Smth Korea, US Ambassa d or Muccio
2. -- Embassy MOSCOW’S views on Soviet return to UN-US Embassy 1
Moscow estimates the return of the USSR t o the Se’curity Councfl
t Lo be a tactical retreat dictated by the course of world devel op
ments since the invasion of Korea, and particularly by tbe unity
of ~e free world. The Embasy also believes that b e failure cd
~e Soviet bpycott to disrupt she UN duping its consideration of
the Korean issue and h a growhg unity of the bee world within
- 1 -
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the UN has made a deep impression on Soviet leaders, and that
the Kremlin must view wlth serious coneern the march of events
which thseakens to make the West much stronger within a year
or two.
The Embassy esthnates that the Kremlin may now feel
that propaganda moves and obsbuction within the UN are in-
sufficient and that h e time has come for makwconcrete ap-
peasement moves which would tend to relax the marshalling of
the free world’s strength. In assessing Soviet intent in returning
to the UN14 the Embassy points out that now is the propitious
time for peace” moves in Korea and comments that the USSR
will probably submit proposals based on the withdrawal of foreign
troops and new electlons, perhaps under UN observation. If the
USSR intends a real appeasement move, the Embassy believes the
proposal may be accompanied ?jy a wtthdrawal of North Korean
troops to the 38th Parallel t o avoid their eventual defeat and t o
permit maximum polltical capital to be derived from the Soviet
role of “peacemaker.” The Embassy warns that the outcome of
such elections might favor the Korean Communists. The Embassy
suggests the USSR will continue to link a peaceful settlement OnKorea
to the question of admitting ?he Chinese Communists to the UN,
with a Vote delayed for the time beingJ and that ‘he USSR may
attempt to make Formosa an issue in the hope of exploiting the
US unilate yl commitment On. that island, The Embassy believes
the Kremlin s eyes are on the major issues involved, and doubts
that the USSR is returning l o the SC with the somewhat legalistic
motive of blocking UN action wf& T Wrd t o aggression elsewhere.
I
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T o le arn more ab out O CR and P D F Compre ssion visit our we b site
K O R E A
4 , U G 1 9 6 0
1 . U S t r o o p s a t t a c k i n g o n s o u t h f l a n k n e a r C h i n j u - - F r e s h U S
t r o o p s a r e c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g a l o n g t h e e x t r e m e l e f t f l a n k
n e a r C h i n j u i n a n e f f o r t t o h a l t t h e N o r t h K o r e a n s , w h o a r e
o n l y 4 0 m i l e s f r o m t h e k e y p o r t c i t y o f P u s a n . U N f o r c e s
a l s o a d v a n c e d s l i g h t l y n o r t h o f Y o n g d o k o n t h e e a s t c o a s t ,
b u t t h e e n e m y r e t a i n e d t h e i n i t i a t i v e a t a l l o t h e r p o i n t s
a l o n g t h e d e f e n s e p e r i m e t e r . I n t h e c e n t r a l s e c t o r , U N
f o r c e s w i t h d r e w s l i g h t l y u n d e r h e a v y e n e m y p r e s s u r e . U N
a i r c r a f t f l e w 4 2 5 s o r t i e s d u r i n g t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s ( t h e
l a r g e s t t o t a l o f t h e w a r ) a n d r e p o r t e d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f
6 e n e m y t a n k s , 4 5 t r u c k s , 1 b r i d g e , a n d o t h e r m i l i t a r y
e q u i p m e n t a n d t a r g e t s . T w o a i r r a i d s c a u s e d h e a v y d a m a g e
i n H a n g n a m , N o r t h K o r e a , w h e r e t h e t h r e e m a j o r i n d u s t r i a l -
c h e m i c a l p l a n t s o f K o r e a a r e l o c a t e d . O n e p l a n t i s t h e
l a r g e s t e x p l o s i v e p r o d u c e r o n t h e A s i a t i c m a i n l a n d ; t h e
s e c o n d i s o n e o f t h e l a r g e s t c h e m i c a l f e r t i l i z e r a n d s y n t h e t i c
a m m o n i a p l a n t s i n t h e w o r l d ; a n d t h e t h i r d m a n u f a c t u r e s
i n d u s t r i a l c h e m i c a l s , i n c l u d i n g c h l o r i n e , c a u s t i c s o d a , a n d
c a l c i u m c a r b i d e .
A r e f u g e e f r o m S e o u l r e p o r t s t h a t a l l p e r s o n s b e -
t w e e n t h e a g e s o f 1 7 a n d 3 0 h a v e b e e n m o b i l i z e d f o r s u p p o r t
o f t h e N o r t h K o r e a n m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . T h e m e n h a v e b e e n
a s s i g n e d t o h a u l s u p p l i e s t o t h e b a t t l e a r e a s w h i l e t h e w o m e n
p r e p a r e f o o d f o r t h e t r o o p s a n d r e p a i r r o a d s . T h e C o m m u -
n i s t r a d i o i n P y o n g y a n g r e c e n t l y a n n o u n c e d t h e a r r i v a l o f
v o l u n t e e r H u n g a r i a n a n d B u l g a r i a n m e d i c a l g r o u p s , w h i c h
a r e a p p a r e n t l y s c h e d u l e d t o s e r v e w i t h N o r t h K o r e a n t r o o p s .
I S R A E L
1 3 5 7 H R 7 0 - 1 4
A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 1 7 - F e b - 2 0 1 0
N s .
1
L I '
KOREA
1. US troops attacking on south flank near Chinju--Fresh US
troops are counterattacking along the extreme left flank
near Chinju in an effort to halt the North Koreans, who are
only 40 miles from the key port city of Pusan. UN forces
also advanced slightly north of Yongdok on the east coast,
but the enemy retained the initiative at all other points
along the defense perimeter. In the central sector, UN
forces withdrew slightly under heavy enemy pressure. UN
aircraft flew 425 sortles during the past 24 hours (the
largest total of the war) and reported the destruction of
6 enemy lanks, 45 trucks, 1 bridge, and other military
equipment and targets. Two air raids caused heavy damage
in Hangnam, North Korea, where the three majo~ industrial-
chemical plants of Korea are located. Om plant is the
largest explosive producer on the Asiatic mainland; the
second is one of the largest chemical fertilizer and synthetic
ammonia plants in the world; and he third manufactures
industrial chemkals, including chlorine, causlic soda, and
calcium carbide.
tween the ages of 17 and 30 have been mobilized for support
of t he North Korean military effort., The men have been
assigned to haul supplies to the battle areas while the women
prepare food for the troops and repair roads. The Commu-
nist radio in Pyongyang recelitly announced the arrival of
volunteer Hungarian and Bulgarian medical groups, which
are apparently scheduled to serve with North Korean troops.
A refugee Irom Seoul reports that all persons be-
' ISRAEL ,
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DATE: 17-.Feb-2010
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D A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
















































59
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
fiT
T O
1371
KOREA
I
1. Enemy making strong drive toward Tasgu--Front line
positions in Korea remained relatively unchanged during
the past 24 hours whDls heavy fighting between small units
continued, In h e south sector, in the vicinib of Chin@,
Norh Korean forces have managed a quick reorganization
following the planned wllkhdsawal of Task Force Kern and
halve initiated a limited a€fexnsive agafnst the US 25t h
DfvSsfon, tn the Kasong area. The enemy’s main effort,
however, appears to be in the direction of Taegu mrough
the central sector held by h e US 1st Cavalry and the South
Korean 1st DivisEon. In the heavy fighting going on in the
vicinity of Waegwan, 1st Cavalry elements have recaptured
an enemy -occupied hDll ai d have inflicted hbavy casualties.
Simultaneously, however, a strong enemy attack has forced
ti 1200-yard withdrawal of elements of th0 South Korean
c - ? let Division. North Korean forces are reportedly reorgan-
lzfng and regrouping in this area and furtheir attacks in the
direction of Taegu are expechd. J ust south of Waegwan,
L,
North Korean forces are putking up strong resistance t o
heavy US counteraWcks against .the two bridgeheads on the
east bank of tRe Naktong River, The situation of Pohw
an the east coast is not clear although late press reporb
claim its recapture by US-UN losces,
Meanwhile, he South Korean National Assembly
recessed on 17 August at the auggestion of President Rhee;
the Assembly will reconvene on 1 September at Pusan. No
official confirmation has been recehed of press reporb
that civilians have been ordered t o evacuate Taegu and that
Rhee and US Ambassador Muccfo have both left the city.
T T
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2 9 MAR 1978
NO.
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A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
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1 9 7 2 8 1 C A T I O N



61
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
1.
W
KOREA
Heavy fighting conttnues in Poham area--Heavg fighting
continues in Pohang where UN forces are holding the
invaders near the edge of the city, bur. no substantial
changes have occurred in the 120-mih defense perimeter.
Increasing :memy activity in the rear areas of the central
and north sectors may be preparations for renewed attacks
in these sectors. UN naval and air force units continued to
make heavy strikes against air fields, industrial areas,
raUroads,and enemy troop concentrations during the past
24 hours.
t
I
E T
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K O R E A
1 . E n e m y p r e s s u r e i n c r e a s e s i n s o u t h N o r t h










e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e s










2 4 9 i'; 0
w'
KOREA
1. Enemy pressure increases in south--North Korean forces
maintained heravy pressure all along the line as new US
troops were rushed into positions threatened by invaders
moving east from the south port city of Chinju, Other
enemy forces are repohed to have occupied Namhae lsland
off the southern coast. UN naval fomes bombarded the east
coast and maintained blockade patrols on the west coast .
Estimated enemy casualties to 30 fuly number 37,597;
estimated UN casualties, hcludbg don-combat, total 6,572.
The South Korean National Assembly, meeting In
Taegu, has passed all eight emergency l aws proposed by the
government providing budgetary, legal and economic measures
for the duraiion of the crisis. Af ks adjournment today, the
majority of the members plan to go l o Pusan to establish a
"liaison office," and to rally support for the government.
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ATE: 17-Feb-2010
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DATE: 17-Feb-2010
KOREA
1. Cefenders withdrawing to Naktong river defense line--UN
forces along the broad central f cont in Korea are making
an orderly and planned withdrawal to new positions on the
east bank of the Njkktong river, which offers the best
natural defense line in the area remaining in the hands of
%he defenders. Sharp attacks by fresh US troops have
apparently blunted the attempt of North Korean forces to
turn be extreme left flank east of Chinju; South Korean
troops have again pushed back the invaders north of Yong-
dok on the east coast . The UN defenders now have limited
reserve forces located in the areas of Pusan-Masan and
Taegu.
UN naval forces bombarded the town of Mokpo
along the southwest coast, and the east coast naval patrol
continued to provide close fire support for UN forces in
.the Yongdok sector. B-29’;; made their third bombing
raid on tndustrial targets i n Hangnam (chemical center
of North Korea); other air activity was limited to close
ground support missions and attacks on enemy lines of
communication.
The North Korean radio broadcasts are now
- claiming that elections have been held for “Peoples
Committees” in virtually all the ‘61iberated” provinces
In South Korea. North Korean x‘opaganda has always
insisted that the Peoples Committees, whlch were banned
in South Korea by the US Military Government in Septem-
ber 1945, weye the rightful organs of government for all
Korea. The “re-establishment” of these Committees
has been consistently presenbed as the first step in the
liberation” of South Korea. The announcement of these
elections” paves the way for later propaganda claims
that South Koreans have approved their inbgration into
the framework of the North Korean Democratic Peoples
Republic,
( (
I (
- 1 -
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A t f f . A V A P A r
( S e c u r i t y C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
o r A f f A r A l r A r A r A P P - A r A r
R O U T I N G
T O : N A M E A N D A D D R E S S D A T E I N I T I A L S
I
2
3
4
O C T I O R D I R E C T R E P L Y P R E P A R E R E P L Y
P P R O V A L R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
O I R I E N T
1 L P A T C H
R E T U R N
C O N C U R R E N C E I N F O R M A T I O N S I G N A T U R E
R E M A R K S :
F R O M : N A M E , A D D R E S S . A N D P H O N E N O . D A T E
C O N T R O L N O
C o p y . _ _

P I

A c c e s s t o
c t I v i t i e s :
e n t w i l l b e r e s t r i c t e d

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-7 -
-’
.w’ ,
- s 7
4 AUG 1950
1359
...
KOREA
1. UN, enemy forces massing In south- Both UN and North
Korean forces are massing in the area east of Chinju for
what may be the first. ma)& test of the new defenseline
along the Naktong river. At other points along the broad
cenkal front, UN Eorces are already under artillery fire
from North Korean troops who rushed overnight into the
areas vacated by the recent withdrawals of defensive troops.
North Korean patrols are already probing the new defense
line and some enemy pabols have reportedly infiltrated
for reconnai usance ,,
reported, particularly along the east coast where all rnar-
shalling yards north of the 38th Parallel were filled with
rolling stock. Specral efforts are being made by the‘enemy
t o use smoke screens in h e Chongjin area to cover the!
marshalling yards and the industrial sections. US naval
forces are continuing t o provgde close fire support to ground
forces on the east coast. .
US Ambassador Muccio reports that the South Korsaq
Cabinet, with President Rhee’s approval, designated a
specfal war cornmilbee o€ the Cabinet” on 3 August, con-
sisting o€ the Mllxiskrs of Defense, Interior, Transportation,
Finance, and Commerce. The Speclal Committee will meet
daily to recekvve rni1itztr.y briefings and to consider non-
military measures i o support. the war effort. The Cabinet
also approved in princlple the establishment of a military
advisory council l o assist LheDefense Minister.
Considerable Norlh Korean railway traffic was
6 I.
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE I
I
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9 - 2 7 ' 1




















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A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9

'
. . .... . .y.: '
.. 1.. ,... ._ ..
. . _ .
SOVIET RETURN TO THE UN
By returning to the UN, the USSR is seeking to re-
establish maximum diplomatic and propaganda maneuverability
and perhaps t o lay the groundwork for a negotiated settlement
in Korea if the turn of events there convinces the Kremlin of
the need for such a settlement. The Soviet Unfon may also hope
to gain support in Asia by attacking the highly vulnerable US
position on Taiwan.
The Soviet boycott was proving mope and more dis-
the USSR the use'of €he UN
h it could obstruct wol'ld itction in
sounding board. for Soviet propa -
.probably reasoned that by boy-
advantageous to the USSR. Purely aside from failing to accom-
plish its avowed purpose--seating the Chinese Commuiibt re-
presentative--the boyc
either as a medium thro
support of South Korea
ganda. Moreover, the
cotthg the UN it was contkihting both'to the potentialities 6f
Sovi et aggression.
.
questions of Korea and China as well as to save 'face by demonstrat-
i ng that it has not abandoned the issue which precipitatedae boytott
and is therefore not returning to the UN out of weakness. More-
over, the USSR is under no immediate compulsion to seek a
settIement of the Korean issue while UN forces are st i U suffering
reverses in Korea. For the present, therefore, the Wml i n ciL;d be
- 2 -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 09-Dec-2009
t
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. .
. . .
..
, I
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. . . .
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. . . . . . . _. .
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expected to make every effort to prevent the UN from focussing
its attenth exclusively on North Korean aggression. In such
an effort, the USSR will concentrate its attacks where it con-
siders the US to be most vulnerable--namely, tQequestion of
Chinese representation i n the UN and the US stand regarding
Formosa.
the USSR probably believes
that it must offer some form.dfrnegotiated %* . 4 *La..* settlement in Korea
if it is to counter the effe
rotect its position
In the longer run, h&
rean war has had in stimu-
successes continue, any
Soviet peace offer w go beyond proposals for
the withdrawal of UN and the holding of all-
Korean elections pos international
supervision. The such formub to
portray the Soviet
also be designed to cap +orean victories by
eventual UN cou
move to cross the
38th Parallel.
- 3 -
--
-..-, -- . -. . . .
.. . .
. .
. .. ._ .
T o l e arn about P D F Compre ssion and O CR go to T he P ape rl e ssO ffic e .org
V P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E I
A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
5 7 5 A U G 1 9 5 0

2 4 9 6 5
C N F 1 N T J A L 1 3 6 0








o n t n e n o r t h a n d s o u t h















W a S

0
T H E C . I . A . H A S N O O B J E C T I O N
T O T H E D E C L A S S I F I C A T I O N O F
T H I S D O C U M E N T .
N o .
9 M A R 1 9 7 8
c ; 2 3 . . . 5 M Y e / i 7 v
5 7 / .C; BUG 1950
W
2496s
T
KOREA
1, Enemy reported crossinff Naktong River--North Karean forces
have reportedly succeeded in crossing the vital Naktong River
at two points, one near Hamchang in the northern tip of the west
sector and one south of Andong in the northern sector, Mean-
while, northern forces are exerting their heaviest pressure
in the Chinju area on the south coast; one enemy unit has pushed
20 miles east of Chinju, but UN forces are apparently holding
f i rm on bie north and south flanks and are still within 12 miles
of the city. The enemy is continuing its build-up in the vicinity
of Kumchon and heavy fighting is reported on the east coast
where South Korean forces still hold the city of Yongdok.
A concentration of Communist guerrilla forces has been
reported northwest of Taegu ai rstri p and other guerrillas are
located southwest of Yongdok and northeast of Samnangjin,
where UN reserve forces are situated. North Korean reserves
capable of joining the battle have been reported as the First
Division near Chinju, the Ninth and Fourteenth Divisions
in the Taejon area and the Fifteenth Divicion at Yongdong,
In a further attempt to back up its charges of South
Korean aggression, North Korean propaganda is now broad-
casting the details of an alleged US plan for the invasion
of North Korea. The broadcasts assert that the “plan” was
found in Seoul.
L)
I
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
W
THE C. I . A. HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
1360
TBIS DOCUMENT.
2 9 MAR 1978
No.
T T
t
T o le a r n a bo u t P D F C o mpr e s s io n a n d O C R go t o o u r we bs it e

2 4 9 6 6


7 A U G 1 9 5 0
1 3 6 1














P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
N o r '

Ø 3 Z .
T H E C . I . A . H A S N O
O B J E C T I O N
T O T H E D E C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
O F
T H I S D O C U M E N T .
N o .
2 9 M A R . / ( 4 7 9 D V
KOREA
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
t;7
7 AUG195U
1361
t , Increased fighting in southwest sector--Recently strengthened
WN forces in the CMnju-Masan area have launched a limited
offensive which may develop into some of the heaviest fighting
of the Korean campaign, To the north, enemy forces have
crossed the Naktong river in considerable strength; other
enemy forces are making repeated attemyts to cross the Nak-
tong river at other points along the new defense line. UN forces
continue to hold thenbattered coastal town of Yongdok, the
northern pivot of the defeme line, but an enemy column is
reported to be moving eastward in a flanking attempt.
UN aircraft contlnued Cheir close support missions
for ground troops, while UN naval uni b attacked North Korean
positions along the coast, A force of 60 8-29’ s raided the
rail marshalling yards of the North Korean capital.
THE C. I . A. HAS NO GBJXCTION
TO TiIE DECLASSIFICATION OF _ -
THIS DOCUMENT.
NO 2 9 MAR 7q7a
F o r info o n P D F Co mpr e ssio n and O CR go to o ur we bsite
K O R E A
1 . H e a v y f i g h t i n g c o n t i n u e s n e a r C h i n j i i - - H e a v y f i g h t i n g
c o n t i n u e s o n t h e C h i n j u f r o n t , w h e r e a t t a c k i n g U N u n i t s
h a v e m a d e s m a l l g a i n s , b u t N o r t h K o r e a n t r o o p s h a v e
r e p o r t e d l y c r o s s e d t h e N a m R i v e r i n u n d e t e r m i n e d
s t r e n g t h a n d n o w t h r e a t e n t h e r i g h t f l a n k o f t h e a t t a c k i n g
U N f o r c e s . T h e e n e m y i s c o n t i n u i n g t o m a k e p r o b i n g
a t t a c k s i n t h e o t h e r s e c t o r s , a n d t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e
m o v e m e n t o f t r a n s p o r t a n d t a n k s i n t h e N o r t h K o r e a n r e a r
a r e a s . I n t h e c e n t r a l s e c t o r , t w o e n e m y b a t t a l i o n s h a v e
c r o s s e d t h e N a k t o n g R i v e r a n d a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p s w i t h
t r u c k s a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o c r o s s . i n t h e n o r t h e r n s e c t o r ,
t h e Y e c h o n - A n d o n g f r o n t i s g e n e r a l l y s t a b i l i z e d b u t
h e a v y f i g h t i n g C o n t i n u e s n o r t h o f Y o n g d o k , w h i c h r e m a i n s
i n S o u t h K o r e a n h a n d s .
U N n a v a l s u r f a c e a n d a i r u n i t s c o n t i n u e d t o p r o -
v i d e c l o s e s u p p o r t f o r g r o u n d t r o o p s a n d t o a t t a c k e n e m y
l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
N o r t h K o r e a n . r a d i o c o m m e n t a t o r s a r e a s s e r t i n g
t h a t U S m i l i t a r y " f a i l u r e s " i n K o r e a a r e i n p a r t c a u s e d
b y t h e U S " b l u n d e r " o f p l a c i n g t o o h i g h a v a l u e o n m a s s
b o m b i n g , a n d b y " h a p l e s s " r e l i a n c e o n m a c h i n e s . T h e
N o r t h K o r e a n s c l a i m t h a t " m a s s " b o m b i n g h a s p r o v e n a n
i n d e c i s i v e w e a p o n a n d t h a t e a c h r a i d o n l y m a k e s t h e p e o p l e
s t i l l m o r e d e t e r m i n e d t o w i n t h e w a r .
8 A U G
1 9 5 0
1 3 6 2
H R 7 0 - 1 4
' A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 1 7 - F e b - 2 0 1 0
I
!
0-
W
u’
KOREA
1. Heavy fighting continues near Chhju--Heavy fighting
continues on the Chid u front. where atbckiw UN units
have made small gairk, but North Korean tr&ps have
reportedly crossed the Nam River in undetermined
strength and now threaten the right flank of the athcking
UN forces. The enemy 1s continuing t o make probing
attacks i n the other sectors, and ihere is considerable
movement of transport and tanks in the North Koreanrear
areas. In the central sector, two enemy battalions have
crossed the Naktong River and additional troops with
trucks are attemptjng to CPOSS. In the norhern sector,
the Yechon-Andong front is generally slslbilized but
heavy fighting continues north of Yongdok, which remains
in South Korean hands.
vide close support for ground troops and to alllack enemy
lines of communication.
North Korean radio commen.tators are asserthg
that US military ‘‘failures” in Korea are in part caused
by the US “blunder” of placing too high a value on mass
bombing, and by “hapless” reliance on machhes. The
North Koreans claim that “mass” bombing has proven an
indecisive weapon and that each raid only makes the people
still more determined to wjn the war.
UN naval surface and air units continued bo pro-
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE I
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W
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HR70-14
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K O R E A
1 . U N f o r c e s m a i n t a i n t h e i r a t t a c k i n t h e s o u t h - 4 I N f o r c e s e a s t
o f C h i n j u c o n t i n u e d t h e i r s l o w a d v a n c e a g a i n s t d e t e r m i n e d
e n e m y r e s i s t a n c e d u r i n g t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s . A s h o r t d i s t a n c e
t o t h e n o r t h , o t h e r U N t r o o p s a r e r e d u c i n g t h e e n e m y p o c k e t
e a s t o f t h e N a k t o n g r i v e r ; i n t h e W a e g w a n a r e a , d e f e n d i n g
f o r c e s a r e i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r e f f o r t s t o l i q u i d a t e o t h e r b r i d g e -
h e a d s r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y N o r t h K o r e a n f o r c e s w h i c h
p u s h e d a c r o s s t h e N a k t o n g r i v e r . I n t h e n o r t h e r n s e c t o r ,
S o u t h K o r e a n f o r c e s h a v e w i t h d r a w n u n d e r s t r o n g e n e m y a t t a c k .
H e a v y f i g h t i n g c o n t i n u e s n e a r Y o n g d o k y w i t h n o c h a n g e i n
p o s i t i o n s r e p o r t e d .
R e p o r t s f r o m S o u t h K o r e a n s w h o f l e d S e o u l d u r i n g t h e
l a s t h a l f o f i J u l y i n d i c a t e t h a t f o o d i s s c a r c e a n d p r o h i b i t i v e
i n p r i c e . T h e N o r t h K o r e a n r e g i m e i s n o t b r i n g i n g f o o d i n t o ,
t h e S e o u l a r e a a n d i s a t t e m p t i n g t o a l l e v i a t e t h e s h o r t a g e s b y
e x e c u t i n g b l a c k m a r k e t e e r s a n d h o a r d e r s . L a b o r e r s w e r e
c o n s c r i p t e d t o r e p a i r t h e H a n r i v e r d a m a g e . T h e g e n e r a l
p o p u l a c e , w h i c h i s b e i n g k e p t w e l l - i n f o r m e d b y h a n d b i l l s a t r -
d r o p p e d b y U N p l a n e s , i s r e p o r t e d t o h a v e c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e
u l t i m a t e v i c t o r y o f t h e a r m e d f o r c e s d e f e n d i n g S o u t h K o r e a .
4 k A U G M O
. . . .
- - - - - -
. . 1 1 1 1 1 % , 4
1 P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
1 1 ! ) A T E : 1 7 - F e b - 2 0 1 0
l e a s e '
KQREA ,
I
v
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i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 17-Feb-2010
w
' 1,
6 - U N Xorces east
of Chinju continued their slow advance against deteermhed
enemy resistance during the past 24 hours. A short dtstance
to the north, other UN troops are reducing the enemy pocket
east af the Naktong river; in the Waegwan area, defending
forces are increasing their efforts to liquidate ather bridge-
heads recently established by North Korean forces which
pushed across the Naktong river, In the northern sector,
South Korean forces have withdrawn under strong enemy attack,
Heavy fighting continues near Yongdok, wllth no change in
positions reported,
Reports from South Koreans who fled Seoul during the
last half OfIJuly. indicate that food is scarce and prohibebitfve
in price. The North Korean. regime is not bringing food into ,
the Seoul area and is attempting to allevfatrj the shortages by
executing blackmarketeers and hoarders, Laborers were
conscripted t o repair the Han river damage. The general
populace, which is being kept well-informed by handbills ale-
dropped by UN planes, is reported to have confidence In the
ultimate victory of the armed forces defending South Korea,
I I
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N o r
























P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9


T H E C . I . A . H A S N O O B J E C T I 0 1 1
T O T H E D E C L A S S I F I C A T I O N O F
T H I S D O C U M E N T .
N o . 2 9 M A R 1 9 7 8
0 1
0 A U G


24969
1.
\ 57
T 8 T
I
KOREA
4 o AUG 1950
1364
UN attack i n south accelerating--Attacking UN forces near
Chinju are accelerating their pace and forcing the retreating
North Koreans to abandon equipment and supplies as they
move back. The enemy may attempt to consolidate a new
defense line on the high ground southeast of Chinju. In the
central sector, UN forces are continuing to reduce enemy
bridgeheads which are apparently not being reinforced, while
In the north sector, South Korean troops have regained the
ground they lost during the past 48 hours. On the east coast,
however, strengthened enemy forces have again captured
Yongdok and North Korean elements are reported to have
joined guerrillas in the vicinity of Rigye, nine miles inland
from Pohang. This enemy penetration along the east coast
constitutes a serious threat to the port city and the airfield
nearby.
UN naval ai r units from the Seventh Fleet struck at
Inchon and Seoul, destroying or damaging warehouses, oil
storage tanks, railroad marshalling yards, and similar targets.
UN B-29’s carried out their heaviest attack to date, dropping
625 tons of bombs on targets in North Korea, Other UN ai r
forces flew over 150 sorties in support of ground troops.
I
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 09-Dec-2009
\
TIE C.I .A. HAS NO OBJECTIO~
TO TIIE DECLASSIFICATION OR
THIS DOCUMENT.
~ ~ . 2 9 MAR 1978 02
F o r a c o mpr e he nsive guide o n P D F Co mpr e ssio n and O CR visit The P ape r le ssO ffic e . o r g









P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

-
- . . .
-- -. . ... -. .
. I '
. 2,
/ o A 53
3
55
NR
.
HR70-14
PPROVED FOR RELEASE
I
I ATE: 22-Mar-201 0
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to TheP a per lessO ffice.or g
















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. . '
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i r aaaopntod for W rrcroitin8 and by tb, iaaorporrtloa of
B0rd.r Oonrt&bukrt uni t 8 into tho umy.
T8ingt;o I8 baing dmreloped a8 an o i l sapplf barn..
Thoro i r ua air o f urgonar in Chinrro dor nr oi r t u r r y o r
aonoomod rith thi r hai1d-w vhlch polotr t o 8 Qadlinr of
abaut 1 Saptambor, tho o u c t ri gui f i auoco of which l r us-
brown. In addition t o ronixu am a traarrhip+nt point to
Sh-1 md other portr i n chi-, the porribillty u i a t r
t ht Qin&.o ay m p p t s or i ot naval Mi tar
F or info on O CR a nd P D F Compr ession go to TheP a per lessO ffice.or g
- - -
2 4 9 7 0
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D A T E : 1 e b - 2 0 1 0
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- 9 5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE I beb- 2010
KOREA
-W
1. UN forces near Cbinju; Pohann threatened by invaders-
UN forces continuing their attack on the southern front
against sporadic opposition have now driven within a few
miles of Chinju. An enemy bridgehead containing two
regiments in the central sector southwest of Taegu is
stubbornly holding on; enemy troops and equipment are
being built up in considerable strength on the west side
of the Naktong above this bridgehead. Little change took
place during the past 24 hours in the general northern
sector, but an enemy force of two regiments, supported
by artillery and tanks, is now fighting in Pohang and
threatening the nearby fighter airfield at Yonil. UN air
and naval units continued t o provide close support for
ground troops at various points along the defense peri-
meter.
US Ambassador Muccio in Korea reports that,
of the 20,000 South Korean personnel in training, an
estimated 6,000 are now available for combat. A lack of
small arms and infantry support weapons, however, makes
it impossible to utilize these 5,000, and Muccio recom
mends that the necessary weapons be forwarded by airlift.
49.5 percent of all crop taxes in kind had been paid and
has called on the People's Committees to see to it that
crops are harvested on time, The unusually low percentage
figure '(North Koreans regularly cbi m 90 percent) znay indi-
cate a shortage of North Korean agricultural manpower and
security police forces.
Radio Pyongyang has announced that as of 31 July,
T o le arn more ab ou t O CR and P D F Compre ssi on go to ou r we b si te























T H E C . I . A . H A S N O O B J E C T I O N
T O T H E D E C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
O F
T H I S D O C U M E N T .



24972
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
\ 57
T
KOREA
J i3 AUG 1950
1366
-
HR70-14
1. Enemy strengthening bridgehead southwest of Taegu--UN
I orces in the south are continuing their advance toward
Chinju against lessening opposition, but other UN forces
in the central sector are confronted with growing enemy
strength in the bridgehead southwest of Taegu. Bitter
fighting fs taking place in the vicinity of Pohang and the
nearby fighter airfield, with rei dorced UN troa:~s uncle 3:
strong enemy pressure.
550 tons of bombs on the important seaport and rail center
of Najin-Dong, approximately 100 miles southwest of Wadi-
vostok. UN air and naval units again attacked enemy lines
of communication and provided close support for UN ground
troops,
UN B-29’s, in the northernmost raid to date, dropped
NR
03 7
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
THIS DOCUNLENT.
1
NO. 2 9 MAR 1978
()%>
E T
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1 4 A U G 1 9 b 1 1
































I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 2 0 - M a r - 2 0 1 0

D o c g e n t N o .
O C T i n C l a s N '
0 D E C L A S S I D
C l a s s . 0 3 A N C E 3
P D A
H R 7 0 - 1 4


e m o , 4
R E G . 7 7 1 7 6
T S S
r 7 7
- I i - 1 3 ? / /
L
249-13
T O P
14 AUG 1950
HR70-14
1.367
KOREA
1. Enemy continues build-up In central sector--UN forces in
the south have reached their objectives in the hilly terrain
just south and east of the city 2 Chinju, but consiherable
time will be required to w&e out bypassed enemy pockets
which are now harassing lines of Cammunicatfon, The
enemy continues t o build up troops and equipment in the
central sector, where UN forces are increasing their efforts
to liquidate stubbornly-held bridgeheads east of the Naktong
River. To the northeast in the Pohang-Yongdok area, North
Korean forces still hold the smoldering city of Pohang and
UN troops are maintaining their defense perimeter around
the adjacent fighter airfield, UN naval units bombarded the
North Korean port of Chinnampo on the west coast and sank
two enemy ships; UN air units continued to provide close
support for ground troops along the entire front,
2. Kirk’s estimate of Soviel inten!--US Ambassador Kirk in
Moscow reports that neither the Korean conflict nor the
obvious increase in he intensity of the war of nerves has
altered the Embassy’s basic opinion that the Soviet leaders
do not desfre to engage the USSR in a global conflict in the
near future. The Ambassador feels that the Soviet action
in Korea was merely a step forward in the Kremlin’s PPO-
gram to make the most effective use of Soviet capabilities
for championing world peace movements and simultaneously
creating a war scare. Kirk is convinced that the Kremlin
did not expect the North Korean invasion to bring about I
*
united condemnation by 53 UN meder s or to provoke an
increase in Western defense preparations to cope wi th an
eventual major crisis. Kirk believes that the Kremlin, in
the light of this new situation, is now considering the rela-
tive merits of:: (a) touching off at least initially localized
- 1-
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE 1
IDATE: 20-Mar-201 0
Lr
I
\
Doheent No. 0 38/
T o lea r n ho w to use O CR a nd P D F Co mpr essi o n vi si t o ur w eb si te
















R E T
hostilities through a Satellite s l at e on another scene (China
or the Balkans), as a meam of draining the free world’s
resources and inweasEng the strain on its solidarity; and
(b) allowing a settlement to work itself out in Korea, perhaps
over Soviet protests, and permltting a world-wide atmos -
phere of relaxation to set In, thereby 66giv9ng the huge mili-
tary preparations in the West no place t o goo” Kirk com-
ments that the Kremlin may wish, by permitting the Korean
situation to work ikdf aut a d by rnahtaining the mystery
of Soviet streng@”ko keep the West so expensively mobilized
that ~e economic burden will cause disafketion among West-
ern peoples and make them more receptive t o Soviet blandish-
ments. Klrk suggests !that the peace movement and a con-
tinuation or intensificabion 01 Lhepresent war of nerves would
be features of such a long-range Soviet program.
( 6
T o lea r n ho w to use O CR a nd P D F Co mpr essi o n vi si t o ur w eb si te
2 4 9 7 4
T O f *
5 7
K O R E A
1 . N o r t h K o r e a n s c o n t i n u e b u i l d - u p a l o n g
N a k t o n g - - W h i l e t h e
N o r t h K o r e a n s c o n t i n u e d t o b u i l d u p t h e i r f o r c e s a l o n g t h e
w e s t b a n k o f t h e N a k t o n g R i v e r - - n o w e s t i m a t e d a t
s i x d i v i -
s i o n s w i t h s u p p o r t i n g a r m o r - - t h e r e
w a s l i t t l e c h a n g e i n t h e
m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n K o r e a d u r i n g t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s .
T a s k
F o r c e K e a n c o n t i n u e d t o w i p e o u t
e n e m y p o c k e t s i n t h e C h i n j u
r e g i o n a n d t o c o n s o l i d a t e d e f e n s e p o s i t i o n s . T a s k
F o r c e H i l l
k e p t t h e N o r t h K o r e a n b r i d g e h e a d i n t h e U S 2 4 t h D i v i s i o n ' s
z o n e u n d e r p r e s s u r e a n d m a d e l i m i t e d p r o g r e s s t o w a r d
r e -
d u c i n g i t . T h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e Y o n g d o k - P o h a n g
a r e a r e m a i n s
s t a t i c . M e a n w h i l e , t h e r e h a v e b e e n
n o s i g n i f i c a n t N o r t h
K o r e a n a n n o u n c e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e u n i f i c a t i o n
o f K o r e a ,
a s w a s a n t i c i p a t e d f o r 1 5 A u g u s t .
H R 7 0 - 1 4
I 5
A U G 1 9 5 0
1 3 6 8
A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
D o c e n t N i .
o 3 9
N O C H A N
[ 3 D E C L A S S I F
C l a s s . C H A N G E D T
D D A M e
A u t h :
D D A
D a t e ;
3 i 4
KOREA
H R70-14
3 5 1950
1368
1. North Koreans continue build-up along Naktong-While the
i l North Koreans continued t o build up their forces along the
west bank of the Naktong River-now estimated at six divi-
sions with supporting armor --there was little change in the
military situation in Korea during the past 24 hours. Task
Force Kean continued to wipe out enemy pockets in the Chinju
region and to consolidate defense positions. Task Force HilJ
kept the North Korean bridgehead in the US 24th Division’s
zone under pressure and made limited progress toward re-
ducing it. The situation in the Yongdok-Pohang area remaim
static. Meanwhile, there have been no significant North
Korean announcements concerning the unification of Korea,
as was anticipated for 16 August.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
F or a c ompre he nsi ve gui de on P D F Compre ssi on and O CR go to T he P ape rle ssO ffi c e .org
2 4 9 7 5
, - 4 5 1 4 ( 0 T
K O R E A
1 . N o r t h K o r e a n s f u r t h e r e n l a r g e N a k t o n g b r i d g e h e a d - - N o r t h
K o r e a n f o r c e s c o n t i n u e d t o e n l a r g e t h e b r i d g e h e a d
a l o n g
t h e N a k t o n g R i v e r i n t h e U S 2 4 t h
D i v i s i o n ' s a r e a i n t h e
c e n t r a l s e c t o r . T h e e n e m y l a u n c h e d a n e a r l y a t t a c k
i n t h e
l o w e r p o r t i o n o f t h i s s e c t o r b u t a f t e r a t h r e e - h o u r e n g a g e -
m e n t t h e a t t a c k w a s s t o p p e d . T o t h e s o u t h , T a s k F o r c e
K e a n
c o n t i n u e d t o c o n s o l i d a t e i t s g a i n s a r o u n d C h i n j u a n d t o w i p e
o u t i s o l a t e d e n e m y p o c k e t s . I n t h e w e s t e r n s e c t o r , N o r t h
K o r e a n a r m o r e d f o r c e s r e p o r t e d l y p e n e t r a t e d S o u t h K o r e a n
p o s i t i o n s a n d o c c u p i e d a h i l l a b o u t t w o m i l e s e a s t o f W a e g w a n .
S o u t h K o r e a n t r o o p s n e a r Y o n g d o k w i l l b e e v a c u a t e d
b y w a t e r
u n d e r c o v e r o f d a r k n e s s . U S a i r f o r c e s , i n t h e l a r g e s t
r a i d
y e t m a d e i n t h e K o r e a n w a r , m a d e a s t r i k e o f 1 0 0
B - 2 9 ' s
c a r r y i n g a t o t a l l o a d o f 1 0 0 0 t o n s o f b o m b s a g a i n s t e n e m y
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o n t h e w e s t b a n k o f t h e N a k t o n g R i v e r .
6 A U G 1 9 5 0
1 3 6 9
H R 7 0 - 1 4
I R
k P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A - 1 - 4 . 6 2 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
D o c
N O C H A N G
N E C L A S S I F I
C l a s s . C H A N C E D T O
D D A M e
A u t h : o D A
D a t e :
24975
L m
KOREA
3 ti AUG 1950
1369
-
HR70-14
1. North Koreans further enlarge 'Naktong bridgehead-North
Korean forces continued to enlarge the bridgehead along
the Naktong River in the US 24th Division's area i n the
central sector. The enemy launched an early attack in the
lower portion of this sector but after a three-hour engage-
ment the attack was stopped. To the south, Task Force Keas
continued t o consolidate its gafns around Chinju and bo wipe
out isolated enemy pockets. In the western sector, North
Korean armored forces reportedly penetrated South Korean
positions and occupied a hill about two miles eask of Waegwan.
Sout h Korean troops near Yongdok will be evacuated by water
under cover of darkness, US air forces, in the largest raid
yet made in the Korean war, made a strike of 100 B-29's
carrying a total load of 1000 tons of bombs against enemy
concentrations on the west bank of the Naktong River.
p p 1
OAT : 09-Dec-2009
IR
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i
KOREA
59 AUG 7950
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 17-Feb-2010
. .
1, Heavy fighting goes on throughout area--Heavy fighting
-continues in Korea but no sjgnificant changes have been
made in those areas where the heavy fighting is bkw
place. In the Chinju area, US forces have made a planned
withdrawal of several miles and have consolidated; Task
Force Kean, which has been conducting We offenswe nem
Chinju, has been dissolved and Tts responsibiIities turned
over to the US 25th Division. To the north, in the Yongsan
area where the North Koreans hold Weir strongest bridge.-
head across the Nalctong River, the US 24th Division has
been reidorced by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
and heavy fighting is taking place. An attempted enemy
break-out from his bridgehead and a drive to sever the
rail line to Pusan is expected, but latest reports indicate
satisfactory US progress in reskrainfig HIPS movement,
Farther to the north, in the Tuksong area west of Taegu,
another enemy bridgehead has been established and is now
under US attack. Immediately norh of Tuksong, both US
and South Korean troops have made gains against ~e
enemy. To the east, a e situation has remained shble.
The evacuation by water of the South Korean forces near
Yongdok has proceeded without enemy interference. Mean-
while, the South Korean National Assembly reconvened in
Taegu on 15 August despite the enemy threat to that city.
Of the 139 members registered for 1 August, 120 were
present at the session.
U
2, Rau .stresses need for Korean peace, plan soon--The Indian
UN Delegale, Benegal Rau, has told be US delegation at the
UN that he considers i t essential to formulate &hegeneral
terms of a peace plan soon, Rau believes that Malik’s
proyaganda speeches are domg great damage in Asia and
I
t
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Li
that only the formulation of a peace plan can meet this
propaganda. The Indian delegate considers that the basis
af such a plan must be the unification of Korea and the
es’bblishrnent of a free independent government by UN-
supervised elections throughout the entire country. Rau
also told the US delegation that when he approached
Malik concerning his plan for formation of a mrnmittee of
non.-permanent SC members, Mallk did not like the pro-
posal but said he might change his mind if shown the ad-
vantages, When told by Rau that any proposal for peace
must be based on withdsawal of North Korean forces,
Malik asked whether “foreign troops” would also with-
draw.
- 2 -
‘\
NF
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A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E I
D A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
1 1 1 . 1
K O R E A
1 9 A U G 1 9 5 0
1 . U N f o r c e s m a k e g a i n s i n t w o s e c t o r s - - U N f o r c e s i n K o r e a
h a v e a c h i e v e d s u c c e s s e s i n t h e c e n t e r a n d e a s t s e c t o r s
d u r i n g t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s i n h e a v y f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t t h e N o r t h
K o r e a n f o r c e s . I n t h e c e n t e r s e c t o r , T a s k F o r c e H i l l - a n d
t h e 1 s t P r o v i s i o n a l M a r i n e B r i g a d e a r e c o n t i n u i n g t h e i r
a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e C h a n g n y o n g b r i d g e h e a d o n t h e e a s t b a n k
o f t h e N a k t o n g R i v e r a n d a r e i n f l i c t i n g h e a v y e n e m y c a s u a l -
t i e s a s t h e y n e a r t h e R i v e r . A l s o i n t h e c e n t e r s e c t o r , U N
f o r c e s h a v e r e g a i n e d h i g h g r o u n d p r e v i o u s l y l o s t n o r t h o f
T a e g u . I n t h e n o r t h s e c t o r , S o u t h K o r e a n f o r c e s h a v e l o s t
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e e n e m y s o u t h e a s t o f K u n w i , i n d i c a t i n g a
p o s s i b l e r e d e p l o y m e n t o f e n e m y u n i t s i n t h i s a r e a . O n t h e
e a s t c o a s t , R O K f o r c e s s u c c e e d e d i n r e c a p t u r i n g t h e t o w n s
o f P o h a n g a n d K i g y e a n d h a v e a d v a n c e d t o h i g h g r o u n d t o -
t h e n o r t h . A h e a v y B - 2 9 a t t a c k a g a i n s t m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s
i n t h e N o r t h K o r e a n c i t y o f C h o n g j i n o n t h e e a s t c o a s t h a s
r e p o r t e d l y a c h i e v e d e x c e l l e n t r e s u l t s .
* o w "
O V 3
T H E C . I . A .
S N O O B J E C T I O N
T O T H E D E C L A S
I C A T I O N O F
T H I S D O C U M E N T .
2 9 M A R 1 9 7 8
1 3 1 2
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
w
T
KOREA
1. UN forces make gains in two sectors--UN forces in Korea
have achieved successes in the ceaGr and east sectors
during the past 24 hours in heavy fighting against the North
Korean forces. In the center sector, Task Force Hill and
the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade are continuing their
attack against the Changnyong bridgehead on the east bank
d the Naktong River and are inflicting heavy enemy casual-
ties as they near the River. Also in the center sector, UN
forces have regained high ground previously lost north uf
. Taegu. In the north sector, Sout h Korean forces have lost
contact with the enemy southeast of Kunwf, indicating i9
possible redeployment of enemy units in this area. On t he
east coast, ROK forces succeeded in recapturing the towns
of Pohang and Kigye and have advanced to high groundto-
the north. A heavy B-28 attack against military targets
i n the North Korean city of Chongjin on be east coast has
reportedly achieved excellent results,
\
, \093.
THE c . I . A . ~ A ~ ~ OBJECTION
TO THE DECLAS ICATION OF
THIS DOCUMENT. &p
NO. 2 9 MAR 1978
\
T o le arn about O CR and P D F Compre ssion go to our we bsite































I -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE .
DATE: 17-Feb-2010
S!
21 AUG 1950
-1HkkI-14
In he occupied areas, Wle North Koreans are at-
tempting to maintain control and security by imposing
travel restrictions on the movements of persons over
12 kilometers from their domiciles and 'by tfireatening
l o impose the death penalty against all those who fail
dosurrender radios capable of receiving short wave broad-
casts,
.-
I
KOREA
1. in centr a1 east se ctors - -
UN forces are continuing to make gains in the central and
east sectors. The enemy bridgehead over the Nakt.org
River in the Changnyong area has been completely eliminated,
and enemy attacks in. both the south'and central sectors
have been repulsed, Tm the north, the enemy appears to
be either withdrawing or shifting troops to other posi-
tions in the area. On the east coast, UN forces have
pressed forward several miles north of the recaptured
towns of Kigye and Pohang.
US Ambassador Muccio reports from Taegu that the
the city is returning to normalcy after a large portion of
the population streamed southward as a result of con-
flicting orders issued on 18 and 19 August. An estimated
80 percent o€ those who left the city have returned, and,
despite ineffective shelling of &e ci b from extreme rantges,
normal activities are being resumed.
I
E T
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61
. _ .
2 8 AUG 7950
13-14
HR70-14
KOREA
1. Heavy action in south and center sect0 ra--The south and
center'sectors of the Koreqn front were the principal scenes
of activity during the past 24 hours. In the south, the N O P ~
Korean forces are exerting heavy pressure in the direction
of Masan and have succeeded in forcing US units out d
several advantageous positions. US counterattacks have
failed to restore positions lost the day before. In the center
sector, 15 miles north of threatened Taegu, the US 27t h Regi-
ment and t he South Korean 1st Division were successful in
Northeast of Waegwan, however, an enemy battalion has pene-
trated to the rear of the US 27t h Regiment. There was little
action in other areas, except on the east coest norm of P~hang
and Kigjle where UN forces advanced one to two miles.
1
repelling heavy enemy attacks supported by tanks and artillery.
V'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE. 09-Dec-2009
W
To learn abo ut OCR and PDF Co mpres s io n go to ThePaperles s Office.o rg
2 4 9 8 2
I :
6 1
K O R E A
2 4 ,
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1 9 5 0
1 3 7 5 p c
H R 7 0 - 1 4
1 . L i t t l e c h a n g e i n g r o u n d s i t u a t i o n T h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e K o r e a n
f r o n t l i n e s r e m a i n e d l a r g e l y u n c h a n g e d d u r i n g t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s
w h i l e N o r t h K o r e a n f o r c e s c o n t i n u e d t o p r e s s t h e a t t a c k a l o n g
t h e s o u t h c o a s t a n d i n t h e W a e g w a n a r e a . I n t h e s o u t h , e l e m e n t s
o f t h e U S 2 5 t h D i v i s i o n s u c c e e d e d t h r o u g h l i m i t e d c o u n t e r a t t a c k s
i n r e g a i n i n g g r o u n d w e s t o f M a s a n w h i c h w a s l o s t d u r i n g t h e
p r e v i o u s d a y . I n t h e c e n t e r s e c t o r , s i x m i l e s s o u t h o f T u k s o n g ,
e n e m y f o r c e s w e r e a b l e t o r e i n f o r c e t h e i r b r i d g e h e a d o n t h e
e a s t b a n k o f t h e N a k t o n g R i v e r . A l s o i n t h i s s e c t o r , U S f o r c e s
a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o r e d u c e e n e m y u n i t s w h i c h h a v e i n f i l t r a t e d
b e h i n d t h e U S 2 7 t h R e g i m e n t a n d a r e c u t t i n g i t s c o m m u n i c a t i o n
l i n e . T h e r e w a s l i t t l e a c t i v i t y i n t h e o t h e r g r o u n d s e c t o r s o r
b y a i r a n d s e a u n i t s .
N R
A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : I m i - F e b - 2 0 1 0
t .
24982 HR70-14%
b
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
K.OREA
1, Little change i n around slhation--The situation in the Korean
front lines remained largely unchanged during the past 24 hours
while North Korean forces continued to press the attack along
the south coast and in the Waegwan area. In the south, elements
of he US 25th Division succeeded through limited counterattacks
in regaining ground west of Masan which was lost during the
previous day. In the center sector, six miles south of Tuksong,
enemy forces were able l o reinforce their bridgehead on the
east bank of the Naktong River. Also in his sector, US forces
are attempthg to reduce enemy units which have infiltrated
behind the US 27th Regiment and are cutting its communication
line. There was little activity in the other ground sectors or
by ai r and sea units.
NR
- 1 -
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PPROVED FOR RELEASE
ATE: 23-Mar-201 0
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bl
/
KOREA
...........
HR70-14
1. Military situaltion relatively unchanged--The relative quiet
prevailed on the Korean front during t he past 24 hours. In
the south sector, North Korean forces are believed to be
regrouping alun;4he south coast. ln, Lhecenter sector, the
most important development has been the clearing out of the
communication line of the US 27th Regiment which had pre-
viously been cut by enemy forces, Meanwhile, enemy pres-
sure i n this sector appears to have eased, In the north, South
Korean forces have been forced back slightly under strong
North Korean pressure. In the east, South Korsandntts cora-
tinued to move northward. Naval action consisted solely of
patrolling and bombarding targets along the east coast. B-29's
bombed chernkal plants at Hungnam with excellent results.
According to ai r intelligence reports, five new fighter-type
aircraft have been identified at a North Korean alrbase.
7
- 1 -
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1.
KOREA
Front 1 ines remah sWJ1q--No significant changes were made
iin the Korean Iront lines during the past 24 hours. Except for
sharp local engagements, action on tmth sides was confined to
patrollfng and sporadic exchanges of mortar and artillery fhe.
In the soutyx sect or, b e North Koreans continued to move re-
i3lloreements into the Chlnju area and launched a skong attack
against %he US 25Lh DHvisiom. This attack was repulsed after
kwo hours of heavy fighting. In the center sector, a night attack
againsl the 27th Regiment n~rah of Taegul was thrown back.
South Korean forces in the north sector are under heavy enemy
pressure mor& of Uihong and have been forced t o withdraw
slighlly; counkerathcks ace now in progress. Concerning the
report af new fighLer-&ype aircraft, reconnaissance subsequent
Lo the Information of 24 August has disclosed no evidence of
such aircraft and no unusual enemy air preparations have been
W dfscove red.
,:"R
APPl?8VED FOR RELEASE
dATE: 17-Feb-2010
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1 . L u l l i n o p e r a t i o n s c o n t i n u e s T h e c o n t i n u i n g l u l l i n e n e m y
o p e r a t i o n s a l o n g t h e e n t i r e f r o n t m a y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e N o r t h
K o r e a n f o r c e s a r e b e i n g d i s e n g a g e d f o r r e g r o u p i n g b e f o r e
l a u n c h i n g f u r t h e r a t t a c k s . M a n y o f t h e i n v a d e r s b e e t u n t t s
s u f f e r e d h e a v y c a s u a l t i e s d u r i n g t h e p a s t w e e k a n d a m a j o r
r e o r g a n i z a t i O n o f e n e m y u n i t s m a y b e n e c e s s a r y . B o t h s i d e s
c o n t i n u e d p r o b i n g a n d p a t r o l l i n g o p e r a t i o n s , b u t f e w t r o o p s
w e r e e n g a g e d . H e a v i e s t a c t i o n o c c u r r e d i n t h e e a s t s e c t o r ,
w h e r e S o u t h K o r e a n . u n i t s m a d e s l i g h t w i t h d r a w a l s f r o m e x
t e n d e d p o s i t i o n s . U N - U S n a v a l a i r p l a n e s c o n t i n u e d t o p r o v i d e
c l o s e s u p p o r t f o r g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s , a n d a i r f o r c e p l a n e s
c o n t i n u e d t o a t t a c k e n e m y e q u i p m e n t , t r o o p z o n c e n t r a t i o n s
a n d o t h e r t a r g e t s i n r e a r a r e a s .
* I w o '
I D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
T H E C . I . A . H A S N O O B J E C T I O N
T O T H E D E C L A S S t F C A T I O N O F
T H I S D O C U M E N T .
N o ? 9 M A R 1 9 7 8
3 7 8
6 - a 5 e /
w
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 09-Dec-2009
T
f 378
1. gul l In operations continues-The continuing lull in enemy
operations along the entire front may indicate that the North
Korean forces are being disengaged for regrouping before
launching further allacks. Many of the invades’s best unik
suffered heavy casualties during the past week and a major
reorganbation o€ enemy units may be necessary. Both sides
continued probing and patrolling operations, but €ew troops
were engaged. Heaviest action occurred in the east sector,
where South Korean units made slight withdrawals from ex-
tended positions. UN-llt3 naval airplanes continued t o provide
close suppo~t for ground operations, and air Force planes
continued t o aktaek enemy equipment7 troop concenkations
and other targets in rear areas.
\
THISDOCUMENT.
NO. 2 9 MAR 1978
T T
F o r in fo o n P D F Co mpre s s io n an d O CR go t o T he P ape rle s s O ffic e .o rg



2 8 A U G 1 9 5 0



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) A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
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R 1 9 7 8
0 1 / 2 2
24987 61
T T
I.
KOREA
central front quiet, two towns lost in northeast--The broad
central front remained quiet during the past 48 hours, but
UN forces suffered slight reverses in the northeast where
North Korean forces captured the towns of Uihung and Kigye.
UN naval activities were confined to sufface patrols, while
naval-based aircraft flew close support missions and bombed
targets in northeast Korea. On 27 August UN-US aircraft
flew a total of 500 missions; fighters attacked a large troop
concentration in the Kyomipo-Sariwon area (North Korea)
and €3-29’s bombed the northeastern industrial city of
Songjin with excellent results reported.
w-
2 8 AUG 1950
1379
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' D P P R O V E D
F O R R E L E A S E
A T E : 0 9 7 D e c - 2 0 0 9
D o e n t N o . O C

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E j D E C L A S S I F
C l a s s . M A N C E D T . T S S
D D . ( M e m o , 4 A p 7
A u t h : j E G . 7 7 1 7 6 3

D e t 1 0 0 - , .
l y :
24988
KOREA
1. Light action in south and northeast sectorg-South Korean
forces made limlted gains in the north and east sectors,
while UN defenders in the south were subjected to almost
continuous small-unit probing attacks, UN naval units
fired close support missions in the Pohang area; aircraft
from two carri ers attacked targets along me east coast.
A ~ F action continued in close support uf ground troops,
and B-29's hit the marshalling yards in the North Korean
east coast city of Chongjin.
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE 1
(DATE: 09:Dec-2009 I
29 AUG 1950
1380
HR70-14
NR
T o l e arn about P D F Compre ssion and O CR go t o our we bsit e

















A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 1 7 - F e b - 2 0 1 0

N R
.. 0. ..
W
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 17-Feb-2010
!
1.
KOREA
UN defenders forced out of Klase-&Ememy presisure forced
South Korean Itroope in h e east to withdraw from Ki g p t o
porslklona 500 yards south of ' he twm; heavy fight3ng con-
tinues in khe Pohamg areao Other aecLors have remained
relatively quiet, with Borne increase in enemy activity at
the south end af the defense line. UN naval units hit targets
in west Korea, and executed call-fire missions as requested
by grand troops. The air Pome attacked bridges ab:Seoul
and marshalling yards at Seoul, Suwon, and Namwoa,
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35
The Headquartera of the 13th Army Oroup of the Chinese
Cmuni at 4th Field Army was addressed at Ant=, Manchuria, on
26 August 1950. This unit with an estimated e t r e m of 80,000
was located at Canton In South China until ald-July. Other ele-
ments of the 4th Field Army are reliably indicated to be an-
route from Central China to Southern Manchuria. Nilitary Ms-
t r i o t forces normally etationed in Umchurla are estimated at
over 300,000 men.
There have been unconf l mad reports of a hho-
Molotov oonference in Peiping i n rarly August, durlng which the
problem of futwe Potion in Korea, Tairan, and Southeast Asia
was discuaeed.
Chinese CoPmunirrt propaganda has portrayed the US as
an aggpessor.
on Antuog, aero88 thr Yalu River frm North Korea, and has de-
manded tbet the UN Security Councll bring about the withdrawal
of US foroes from Xorea to end t he US t hr eat to pease.
The p e r n a w t b e proteeted alleged US raida
Thus, the stage has been eet for oome form of Chinese
ColPwuiiet intervention or participation In tho Korean Wa r . Overt
partioipation by regular force8 would preclude admiaeion of Com-
munist Chlna to tho UN, while oovert pt i oi pat i on of Manchuricur
"voluntoutrit" might emwe continued localization of the conflict,
HR70-14
NR
116-Dec-2009 I
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Intervention could k launched to rootore peace by
prevaatiDg fwthar US "88~p688ioxP and could be linked with
the ~- 8ponr or e d peaor oampai gn.
lplnr at thiu t i me whether a deoision has been made. In any
case,, #om form of amed ariiutance to the North b r e w ap-
paere .imahent.
It is impossible to deter-
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H R 7 0 - 1 4
A P P R O V E D F O R
R E L E A S E D A T E :
3 1 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
.......................................
HR70-14
KOREA
1. Koreans launch all-out affenslve--The North Koreans
=launched an all-out offensive in $e south and central
sectors aimed at cutiing off Masan and capturing the main
supply port city of Pusan, 35 miles t o the east. Along the
south sector front, UN Pomes are maintaining most of their
defense positions and reserves are being moved forward.
In be lower central sector, North Koreans in considerable
strength have crossed the Naktong Rives at three wldely
separated points. Near Tuksong, about fifteen miles south -
west of Taegu, other enemy attacks were repulsed by ele-
ments of ule US 1st Cavalry Division. Me r sectors re-
b-tfned relatjvely quiet,
-w
I \
- 1 -
IAPPROVED FOR 1
IRELEASE DATE: I
31 -Mar-201 0
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1 0 U N f o r c e s c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n n o r t h e a s t - - U N c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a r e
h a l t i n g t h e a d v a n c e s o f s o m e N o r t h K o r e a n e l e m e n t s i n t h e
b r e a k t h r o u g h n e a r Y o n g c h o n a n d K y o n g j u , b u t o t h e r e n e m y
e l e m e n t s p r e s s i n g f o r w a r d w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e a r m o r a r e
t h r e a t e n i n g t o c u t t h e v i t a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n n e t w o r k c o n n e c t i n g
T a e g u w i t h t h e n o r t h e a s t a n d c o a s t a l d e f e n s e a r e a s . A i r
a c t i v i t y o v e r t h e c o m b a t a r e a i s b e i n g r e s u m e d a f t e r b e i n g
h a m p e r e d b y u n f a v o r a b l e f l y i n g c o n d i t i o n s d u r i n g t h e p a s t
2 4 h o u r s a n d r e s e r v e e l e m e n t s o f t h e U S 2 4 t h D i v i s i o n a r e
b e i n g r u s h e d n o r t h w a r d t o s t e m t h i s l a t e s t e n e m y t h r e a t .
O t h e r s e c t o r s a l o n g t h e U N d e f e n s e p e r i m e t e r a r e r e l a t i v e l y
q u i e t .
U S E m b a s s y r e p o r t s t h a t o n 4 S e p t e m b e r G e n e r a l
W a l k e r o r d e r e d t h e i m m e d i a t e t r a n s f e r o f U N m i l i t a r y
h e a d q u a r t e r s f r o m T a e g u t o P u s a n . G e n e r a l W a l k e r w i l l
r e m a i n i n T a e g u , h o w e v e r , w i t h a s k e l e t o n s t a f f t o d i r e c t
o p e r a t i o n s . G e n e r a l W a l k e r a l s o a d v i s e d t h e S o u t h K o r e a n
P r i m e M i n i s t e r t o t r a n s f e r R O K m i l i t a r y h e a d q u a r t e r s t o
P u s a n . T h e S o u t h K o r e a n H o m e M i n i s t r y w i l l r e m a i n i n
T a e g u f o r t h e p r e s e n t .
A P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
D A T E : 0 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9
\ o w
O C 7
T H E C . . H A S N O O B J E C T I O N
T O T H E D E C
S I F I C A T I O N O F
T H I S D O C U M E N T .
N o .
2 9 M A R 1 9 7 8
21995
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\ 62
KOREA
1 UN forces counterattack in northeast--UN counterattacks are
halting the advances of some North Korean elements in t he!
6 SEP 1950
1386
breakthrough near Yoangchon and Kyongju, but other enemy
elements pressing forward with considerable armor are
threatening to cut the vltal transportation network connecting
Taegu with the northeast and coastal defense areas. Ai r
activity over the combat area is being resumed after being
hampered by unfavorable flying conditions during t he past
24 hours and reserve elements of the US 24t h Division are
being rushed northward t o stem this latest enemy threat.
Other sectors along the UN defense perimeter are relatively
quiet,
US Embassy reports that on 4 September General
Walker ordered the immediate transfer of UN military
headquarters from Taegu to Pusan. General Walker will
remain In Taegu, however, with a skeleton staff t o direct
operations, General Walker also advised the South Korean
Prime Minister t o transfer ROK military headquarters to
Pusan, The South Korean Home Ministry will remain in
Taegu for the present.
~P P ROVE D FOR RELEASE 1
(DATE: 09-Dec-2009 I
THE C . ~ B J E C T I O N
TO THE DEC SIPICATION OF
THIS DOCUMENT.
No. 2 9 MAR 1978 ‘aJ cz
T T
For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
N o r
2 ' 1 3 . 9 6
K O R E A
1 . E n e m y p r e s s u r e i n c r e a s i n g a l o n g e n t i r e U N f r o n t - - N o r t h
K o r e a n f o r c e s a r e e x e r t i n g h e a v y p r e s s u r e a l o n g t h e e n t i r e
U N d e f e n s e l i n e , b u t t h e r e h a v e b e e n o n l Y s l i g h t c h a n g e s
I D
p o s i t i o n d u r i n g t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s . M a s s e d N o r t h K o r e a n
t r o o p s a r e e x e r t i n g e x t r e m e e f f o r t s t o e x p l o i t t h e n e a r - ,
b r e a k t h r o u g h t h e y a c h i e v e d i n t h e K y o n g j u - Y o n g c h o n
a r e a ;
c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g U N d e f e n d e r s , h o w e v e r , a r e m a n a g n g t o
h o l d t h e i r n e w p o s i t i o n s . E n e m y f o r c e s a l o n g t h e s o u t h e r u
f r o n t a r e f o l l o w i n g u p t h e i r s u s t a i n e d a r t i l l e r y - m o r t a r
b a r r a g e o f t h e p a s t 2 4 h o u r s w i t h l o c a l a t t a c k s w h i c h m a y
d e v e l o p i n t o a m a j o r d r i v e t o w a r d P u s a n . T h e c o m b i n e d
U N a i r f o r c e s m a d e t h e i r h e a v i e s t t a c t i c a l a s s a u l t t o d a t e ,
w i t h 4 4 0 o f t h e r e c o r d 6 2 0 s o r t i e s b e i n g f l o w n i n s u p p o r t
o f U N g r o u n d t r o o p s i n t h e n o r t h e a s t s e c t o r . U S h e a v y
b o m b e r s s t r u c k i r o n w o r k s i n C h o n g j i n , l o c a t e d a l o n g t h e
e a s t c o a s t i n N o r t h K o r e a .
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21.336
KOREA
1. Enemy pressure increasing along entire UN front---Nor&lh
Korean forces are exerting heavy pressere along the entire
UN defense line, but there have been only slight changes ~ l n
position during the past 24 hours. Massed North Ko~earn
troops are exerting extreme efforts t o exploit the near-,
breakthrough they achieved In the Kyongju -Ybngchon area;
counterattacking UN defenders, however, are managiqg tm
hold their new positions. Enemy forces along the souhern
front are following up their sustained utillery-mortar
barrage of thepast 24 hours with local attacks which may
develop into a major drive toward Pusan. The combmed
UN air forces made their heaviest tactical assault t o date!,
wi t h 440 of t he record 620 sorties being flown in suppwt
of UN ground troops in the northeast sector., US heavy
bombers struck iron works in Chongjin, located along the
east coast in North Korea.
'? SEP 19513
1387
HR70-14
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ID AT E: 09- D ec-2 009
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T o le a r n ho w t o use O CR a n d P D F Co m pr e ssi o n go t o o ur we bsi t e






































CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS
Mal& and the UN Soviet tactics in the Security Council
during September will in general con-
form to the pattern developed during August; any variations
will be largely the result of having lost those opportunities
for procedural obstructionism deriving from Malik’s position
as president of the SC. Nevertheless, in continuing his campaign
to use the Chinese Communist charges of US aggression on Taiwan
and US violations of Manchuria to pin the label of aggressor on the
US, Mal& will still have considerable opportunity to obstruct, de-
lay and confuse the deliberations of the Security Council, This
campaign, Aowever, designed primarily for Asian consumption, *
may begin to backfire during September as reliance on the veto
rather than purely procedural maneuvers will dramatize Soviet
intransgence. Soviet propaganda efforts will be further deflated
by US willingness both.@ permit UN investigations of the Taiwan
and Manchurian issues and to abide by majority UN decisions re-
garding their disposition.
Q>
North Korean Reserves
serve in Manchuria composed of Korean veterans (who had
sehied with Chinese.C-nmmunist forces in the Manchurian
campaign of 1946-48) tend to be discounted by the non-appear -
ance of such troops in the combat area. I t is logical to assume
that if such a reserve had been in existence on 25 J une, it
would have been cohmitted shortly after UN forces had been
committed and when its use might have proved decisive. More-
over, since mid-July the North Korean Army has been using
recruits with a8 little as two weeks’ training. In addition, even
if not immediately available in concentration areas on 27 June, there
has been ample time since that date to organize and equip any,
Korean veterans in Manchuria who would have been f ar more
The numerous reports of a .readily
. available strategic manpower re-
i /
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useful in combat than the inexperienced reinforcements
being used. Thus, it is likely that the North Koreans will
have to depend for further replacements on: (1) non-
veteran Koreans recruited in Manchuria and that part of
Korea now in Communist hands; (2) untrained Chinese
Communist or Soviet manpower resourceqgr (3) Chinese
Communist or Soiriet military units, if it is decided to
commit such forces in order either to defend the 38th parallel
or t o drive UN forces out of Korea.
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T O P \ E T
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For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
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1 . U N f o r c e s d r i v i n g t o w a r d S e o u l f r o m I n c h o n - - I n t h e f i r s t
m a j o r c o u n t e r - m o v e s i n c e t h e N o r t h K o r e a n a t t a c k , O N
f o r c e s a t n e a r - d i v i s i o n s t r e n g t h a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o c u t t h e
v i t a l N o r t h K o r e a n s u p p l y l i n e s r u n n i n g t h r o u g h t h e I n p h o n -
S e o u l a r e a . E l e m e n t s o f t h e U S 1 s t M a r i n e D i v i s i o n h i m
a l r e a d y s e c u r e d t h e i s l a n d o f W o l r n i i n t h e I n c h o n b s y , a n d
o t h e r U N f o r c e s w h i c h l a n d e d a t I n c h o n a r e m o v i n g i n l l . n d
t o w a r d S e o u l a g a i n s t l i g h t e n e m y o p p o s i t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e r e
h a s b e e n n o o f f i c i a l r e p o r t i n d i c a t i n g h o w f a r t h e U N f o r c e s h a v e
a d v a n c e d t o w a r d S e o u l ( 2 2 m i l e s f r o m I n c h o 4 t h e N o r t h K o r e a n
r a d i o a t P y o n g y a n g a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e U N l a n d i n g a t i n c h o n a n d
s t a t e d t h a t t h e " i n v a s i o n f o r c e s " w e r e h a l f w a y t o t h e S o u t h
K o r e a n c a p i t a l c i t y . M e a n w h i l e , S o u t h K o r e a n f o r c e s a r e r e -
p o r t e d t o h a v e l a n d e d o n t h e e a s t c o a s t n o r t h o f p o l l i n g I n a n
a t t e m p t t o c u t t h e N o r t h K o r e a n s u p p l y l i n e s i n t h a t a r e a .
1 3 9 4
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DATE: 17-Feb-2010
1.396
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KOREA
1. UN forces driving toward Seoul from Inchon-In @e first
major counter-move since the North Koredn attack, ON
Seoul area. Elements of the US 1st Marine Division Kpvs
already secured t he island of Wolmi in the Inchon bay, and
other UN forces which landed at Inchon are moving ' Wpd
toward Seoul against If@& enemy opposition, Although there
has been no official report indicating h6w far Uu W@ fqrcles have
advance$ toward Seoul (22 miles from Inchonkthe North Korsan
radio at Pyongyang acknowledged the UN landiqg at.hchon and
stated that the "invasion forces" were halfway to tsle South
Korean capital city. Meanwhile, South Korean forc'ea are re-
I forces at near-division strength are attempting to cut €he
vital North Korean supply linea runnhg through the lxyhQn-
f
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ported to have, lanbd on the aast coast north of .Pohkng in an
attempt to cut the North Korean supply linea In that area.
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KOREAN DEW LOPMENTS
DATE. 09-Dec-2009
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The UN landing at Inchon, by rapidly changing the
outlook of the campaign in South Korea, brings appreciably
nearerdhe time when North Korea, as well as the USSR,
must implement crucial political and military decisions re-
garding the ultimate fate of North Korea. Wi th presently
available forces, the North Koreans wi l l be unable to hold
South Korea; a choice of the four broad alternative causes,,
of action available to the enemy, therefore, depends in the
last analysis on the extent to which the USSR is willing to
write off North Korean field forces or perhaps North Korea
as a whola[ These courses of action are: (1) North Korean
military action aimed primarily at defending North Korea :
from invasion by UN forces, possibly combined with North
Korean peace proposals; 12) commitment of Chinese Commu-
nist or Soviet troops north of the 38th Parallel; (3) an attempt
by the USSR itself to settle the conflict diplomatically; or
(4) efforts by some third party, perhaps under Soviet influence,
to mediate the conflict.
Military Prospects Successful consolidation of the UN beach-
head at Inchon and Seoul would effectively
interdict,the main route of supply for the estimated 120-130,000
North Korekn troops engaged in southeastern Korea. Unless
UN forces can be expelled from the Seoul area, organized re-
sistance in the south cannot last long. It is estimated, however,
that with the exception of 15-20,000 relatively ineffective
security troops, all North Korean combat units have already
been committed to the fighting in the southeast. Moreover, it
is not believed that Korean reserves now being trained could
undertake action against the Inchon beachhead soon enough to
prevent the retreat, with heavy losses, of NoHh'Korean troops
from the southeast. Militarily, then, the most probable course
- 2 -
F o r i n fo o n P D F Co mpre s s i o n a n d O CR go t o o ur we bs i t e
































d
of action by North Korean forces, and the one offering the
best chance of success, would be the commitment of North
Korean reserves to a defensive role and a simultaneous with-
drawal of as many combat units as possible over secondary
lines of communication from the southeast to defensive posi-
tions along the 38th Parallel.
Soviet Plans
vening and rely on the North Korean forces to prevent their
own military defeat by UN forces; (2) employ Chinese Com-
munist or Soviet troops in North Korea; or (3) attempt to
achieve %diplomatic settlement. The disadvantages to the
Soviet Union of the two latter alternatives makethe first the
most likely Soviet course of action.
Both the commitment of non-Korean military units
and a diplomatic solution. negotiated by the Soviet Union
itdelf would force the USSR to disavow its previous stand
regarding the Korean question. Since the invasion began,
the USSR has made every effort to localize the 'conflict and
to disassociate itself completely from the North Korean action
as well as from the UN action. Military-action at this time
woulilv$learly undermine this position, and even further weaken
the current Sodet peace offensive, while Soviet diplomatic
action would force the USSR t o accept the legality of UN action.
The USSR might, however, encourage the North Koreans or
some third party to seek a settlement. In either event, the
North Korean position would probably be so weak as to leave
the terms of settlement largely in the hands of the UN.
Given this probable military development,
the USSR must soon: (1) refrain from inter-
Global War Soviet unwillingness to substantially increase
the ri sk of global war and the Soviet appreciation
that the employment of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops
in Korea would represent such a risk are even more compelling
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reasons for the USSR to refrain from military intervention,
even at the expense of a Communist military defeat in North
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Korea. Faced with the prospect of UN air and naval harass-
ment of lines of communication in North Korea, the USSR
would probably not employ its troops or those of Communist
China without providing them with substantial air cover.
Inevitable conflict with\UN aircraft might lead to a situation
which the USSR might consider itself unable to control short
of precipitating general war. Even if the USSR issued prior
warning of such a move, it could not be assured that UN air I'
forces would refrain from such attacks. Moreover, Soviet
or Chinese Communist aid to the North Koreans would leave
Chinese and Manchurian supply routes, and possibly indus-
trial instal tions, open to air attack. The USSR would prob-
Far Eastern potential unless it intended to initiate general
war in the immediate future.
ably avoid P Psking damage to this segment of the Communist
/ Diplqmatic Action Any Soviet offer of a negotiated settle-
to'abandon its position of refusing to accept the legality of
the UN's position in Korea, would place the USSR in a very
disadvantageous position. Such an offer would have to go
beyond a pious call for a "peaceful settlement"; in view of
the changed military situation, the USSR no longer has any
trupp'cards. Its bargaining position is so weak that pros-
pects for a settlement favorable to the USSR are extremely
limited. The USSR might attempt to improve its bargaining
position by threatening to reoccupy North Korea; such ar
threat, however, would entail the strMg ri sk of being forced
to carry itfhrougLArr uhfaxorable settlement in which the
USSR had participated or which had been preceded by a mili-
tary bluff would be more damaging to Soviet prestige than
the consequences of a continuation of the present hands-off
ment, in addition to requiring the USSR
e,
- 4 -
T O P S
F o r i n fo o n P D F Co mpre s s i o n a n d O CR go t o o ur we bs i t e

policy. The Kremlin, therefore, is more likely to seek to
thwart UN efforts through its usual tactics of obstructionism
in the UN, coupled with guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage,
and propaganda within Korea. Although the North Koreans either
themselves or through a third party would also be at a disadvan-
tage in seeking a diplomatic solution, if military developments
make such an attempt advisable, neither they nor the USSR wi l l
be restrained by those considerations of prestige which would
deter such action by the USSR alone.
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I A P P R I I N E D
F O R R E L E A S E 1
D A T E : 9 - D e c - 2 0 0 9


O c . t :
1 2 , 3
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.i
. .
KOREA AND SOVET POLICY
Over-all Soviet Policy The loss of No~t h Korea and the
defeat of the North Korean Com-
munist regime are not likely to produce any immediate or
drastic Soviet reaction. The Kremlin will probably view the
Korean failure as a temporary setback to its long-range ex-
pansionist plans, but not one so damaging to the over-all
Soviet position at home or abroad as to require an immediate
change in the tactics it has been pursuing since the end of
World War II. In the immediate post-Korea period, the
gremlin will bemost concerned with the effect the Korean
invasion has had in: (1) uniting the non-Communist world
against Covmunist aggression and stimulating Western re-
armament; (2) revealing to the Satellites and Communist
Parties Soviet fallibility and failure t o rescue one of its
Satellites: (3) weakening Communist promises of early suc-
cess for Communist-led Colonial liberation -movements; and
(4) demonstrating that Soviet power and influence in Asia will
not go unchallenged-by the West. The USSR will probably be
reluctantito attempt another Korean-type venture in the near
future, fearing eithek failure and thus even greater disadvan-
tages than grew out of the Koreaxi invasion, or the necessity to
use Soviet troops t o achieve success, thus increasing the risk
of general war. The$SSR wi l l therefore attempt to minimize
the UN victory whae cdntinuing ;and intensifying its support for
subversive and guerrWa operations by local Communists, especi-
ally in Indochina, and the current “peace” propaganda campaign
dll be pressed with renewed vigor.
I/ Korean Settlement Meanwhile, in Korea itself, the possibility
continues to diminish that the USSR or the
Chinese Communists will intervene militarily to prevent the UN
occupation of North Korea. Soviet propaganda and diplomatic
L, /’
0
- 5 -
CI
FOR RELEASE
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activity of recent weeks suggest that the USSR has, tempo-
rarily at least, written off Korea.
Continued Chinese Com-
munist threats (made through the Indian Ambassador at
Peiping) to intervene if US troops cross the 38th Parallel
are believed to be primarily a last-ditch attempt to in-
timidate the US from taking such a step, In the interim,
the USSR will use its rapidly diminishing opportunities for
obstructing UN action in Korea, but probably will make no
serious effort to reach agreement with the Western Powers.
Realizing that military developments have destroyed any
favorable bargaining position which either the USSR or North
Korea once possessed, the Kremlin will probably not counten-
ance a North Korean peace bid and instead willattempt to make
the UN vicQry as costly as possible.
Military Tactics The general propaganda line and the mili-
tary tactics currently being employed by
the North Korean regime indicate that the North Koreans are
placing little faith in the possibility of a UN agreement satis-
factory to them. The deliberate slaughter of South Korean
civilian prisoners by retreating Communist forces, continued
exhortations for a supreme effort t o expel foreign troops, and
evidence of plans for prolonged resistance all point to the im-
probability of an early surrender. Thus, barring the unlikely
intervention of foreign troops, the North Korean regime will
probably prolong the struggle to the bitter end, inflict the
maximum damage on the country in order to confront a UN-
sponsored government with staggering reconstruction problems,
and then retire to a safe haven in Manchuria to direct continued
guerrilla and subversive activity against the new regime.
c?3
Military Capabilities Lack of trained manpower, a major
contributor to the North Korean defeat
in the south, will probably prove equally disastrous north of the
38th Parallel and is a weakness that could only be cured by time.
- 6 -
T O P \ E S T
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CHINESE COMMUMST PROBLEMS
Foreign Policy Foreign Minister Chou En-lai’s recent
lengthy review d Comrn‘unist China’s for -
eign policy contains no new assertions or accusations and
none of the guarded threats is sufficiently strong to indicate
any major change in Peiping’s foreign policy, The statement
that US “intervention” in China wi l l be repelled is an idle
one, as the promise to liberateTaiwan specified no time
limit; and the intention to liberate Tibet, *prderabl y through
negotiation, but if necessary by force d arms, has been ex-
pressed-before. The Foreign Minister’s remarks regarding
diplomatic relations wi t h Western countries, relations wi t h
the USSR, Wd the hostile attitude of the US. have been uttered
many times in the past. Those parts d Chort’s speech which
have been interpreted as indicating a Chinese Communist
intent-to occupy,North Korea or invade Indochina are in fact
estimated to indicate less drastic actions. The statement
that’ the Korean Communists can “obtain final victory”
through “persistent, long-term resistance” probably implies
extensive Chinese support of North Korean guerrillas and
sanctuary for North Korean leaders. However, the intimation
that Communist China is now prepared to rush to its neighbor’s
assistance was prabably an attempt toqbluff the UN into not
crossing khet38th-Paralle1, rather than a forewarning of
Chinese;intervention. Finally, Chou‘s remarks on the UN
suggested Peiping’s interest in pyticipating in any uN settle-
ment of the Korean question,
J
e-
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- 8 -
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I D A T E :
2 2 - M a r - 2 0 1 0
P P R O V E D F O R R E L E A S E
H R 7 0 - 1 4
N R
HR70-14
: IDATE: 22-Mar-2010 I
I
NR
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S T A T E r e v i e w ( s ) c o m p l e t e d .

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DATE: 20-Mar-201 0
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HR70-14
6 o v i e t transport fli hts to Chi Eonti nue at high l evel s
Possi bl y
--B---6
3.
19 P - 2 transports of u n k n o ~ n su ordi nati on were soheduled from Chita
i n the USSR to Mukden during the period 6 t o 16 December, and an addi ti onal
seven C-47's lefk Voroshilov f or Mukden on 14 December.
oomments that the exact si gni fi canoe of these f l i ghts to China i s
undetermined, although it is apparent that the USSR is oontinui.ng to
i nareme the capabi l i ti es of tho CCAF through the transf er of ai rcraf t
and possible transportation of materiel.
21452, 18 Deo 51)
The US A i r Force
(SUEDE U6 Air Force Roundup 26Z,
Commentt Fl i ghts of more than ona or t w transports from the USSR
There have been several f l i ghts of to Cann were rare before October.
about ten transports eoah si nce late October, and there is 'no reoord
of these airoraft; returni ng t o the USSR. A f ewof these transports are
now believed t o be engaged i n an ai rl i f f . operation to the snow-bound
Tibetan border region, but the di sposi ti on of most of these recent
arri val s is unk noam
6. KQREX, North Korean uni t foresees return of pri soners at Kaeeongo
'korean regiment charged with the securi ty of the Kaesoaa-
1
Pmunj on area, oommented in-a 17 December mess&^ as follows8
is reported that i n the future over 100,000 pri soners of war will be
exohanged at Kaesong."
"It
(SUEDE AS CM I N 61691, 17 Dec 61)
Comment,: Ml e the reporting of thi s regiment has not alw0.y~bean
aoour-e message i ndi cates a defi ni te expectation that a pri soner
of war traizsfer will eventual l y be effeoted.
2 20 Deo 51
-9
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60
Friction may exi st betweon Communist; oommanders over composition-
of Kaesong guard mitt
oations that the- Korean uni t oharged with the seouri ty of the
Kaesong-PannunJ on area was rel'ioved from that assignment and ordered to
return to it8 parent unit. I n a 17 December message, however, the unit
reports that "Comrade Genoral Chief of Staff (Nam 11) again demanded of
General P'aeng Tofk Hoe (Pang Te Huai) by radio that if' al l of the
(Korean) Peoples Amy unite l o f t Kaesong, it would be di f f l oul t to oarry
out the vnrious duti es, so they have been nllowed t o remain stati oned
at Kaesong." The unit f urther reports that they wi l l no l onger acoept
oommande from the Chinese 65th Army to whiol. they were subordinate but
''vd3.1 aooept def i ni tel y the commands of the goneral ohi ef of staff."
(SUEDE AS CM I N 61691, 17 Deo 51)
There has been some suggestion i n onemy co~l mi -
*
Comment; It appears from thi s message that a Chinese Communist
attempt t o remove the l ast remaining North Korean uni t i n the Kaesong
area was sucoessful l y rebuffed by the North Korean Chief of Staff.
the nature and exten* of the di spute betwoen the Chinase and the North
Koreans i n thi s i nstance is not ol ear, the continued maintenwce of
Korena troops i n the area would seem to be a minimumpresti ge requiremen-k
f or the North Korems.
While
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For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org





























For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
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