Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

175846 July 6, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ROSILA ROCHE, Respondent. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the need for applicant for original registration of title to prove that the land applied for is alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The Facts and the Case On December 5, 1996 Rosila Roche applied for registration of title1 of her 15,353-square-meter land in Barrio Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,2 denominated as Lot 8698, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Roche alleged that she inherited the land in 1960 from her father, Miguel, who in turn had held the land in the concept of an owner when Roche was only about six years old. She was born on that land on January 10, 1938 and had helped her father cultivate it.3 Roche had also paid the realty taxes on the land, which had an assessed value of P490,000.00. To support her application for registration, Roche presented, among others, a certified true copy of the survey plan of the land,4 its technical description,5 a Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in lieu of the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,6 tax declarations,7 and real property tax receipts.8 She also presented certifications that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the National Printing Office issued to show compliance with requirements of service of notice to adjoining owners and publication of notice of initial hearing.9 As proof of her open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the land, Roche presented Manuel Adriano, a former resident of Napindan who owned an unregistered property adjoining Lot 8698. Adriano testified that he had been a resident of the place where the land was located from 1949 to 1996 when he moved to Pampanga.10 He drew a sketch showing the location of Lot 8698 in relation to his own and identified the owners of the other adjoining lots.11 He claimed to have known Roches father since the latter had been cultivating vegetables and rice on the land.12 The Republic of the Philippines (the Government), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the grounds a) that neither Roche nor her predecessor-in-interest had occupied the land for the required period; and b) that the land belonged to the State and is not subject to private acquisition.13 The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) also opposed14 Roches application on the ground that, based on technical descriptions, her land was located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters and, therefore, may be deemed part of the Laguna Lake bed under Section 4115 of Republic Act (R.A.) 4850.

On September 7, 1999 the OSG filed a manifestation that, since Roche failed to prove that the land was part of the alienable land of the public domain, the Government did not need to present evidence in the case. It also adopted LLDAs opposition.16 On September 30, 1999 the RTC rendered judgment,17 granting Roches application. The RTC held that Roche had proved continued adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1959. Assuming that the land was part of the public domain, Roche and her predecessors occupation and cultivation of more than 30 years vested title on her, effectively segregating it from the mass of public land.18 Moreover, the LLDA did not prove by substantial evidence that the land was inalienable and part of the Laguna Lake bed. On appeal by the Government,19 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.20 The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, prompting the Government to file the present petition. The Issue Presented The sole issue the petition presents is whether or not the land subject of Roches application is alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The Ruling of the Court The Government insists that the subject land forms part of the lake bed and that it has not been released into the mass of alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As such, Roche cannot register title to it in her name.21 Roche points out, on the other hand, that the lot could not possibly be part of the Laguna Lakes bed since it has always been planted to crops and is not covered by water. R.A. 4850 provides that the Lake is that area covered with water when it is at the average maximum lake level of 12.50 meters. This presupposed that the lake extends only to lakeshore lands. The land in this case does not adjoin the Laguna Lake.22 An application for registration of title must, under Section 14(1), P.D. 1529, meet three requirements: a) that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land; and c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.23 Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and the latter is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land. Thus, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration is alienable and disposable.24
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Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land.25 In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)26 or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)27 of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the

DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.28 Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.29 Since Roche was unable to overcome the presumption that the land she applied for is inalienable land that belongs to the State, the Government did not have to adduce evidence to prove it. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV 65567 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in LRC N-11330 dated September 30, 1999 and DENIES respondent Rosila Roches application for registration of title over Lot 8698 located in Barrio Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, without prejudice to her proving by appropriate evidence her right to registration of the same at a future time. SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice WE CONCUR: Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-47331 June 21, 1983 SPOUSES PABLO DE LOS REYES and ALEJANDRA DE LOS REYES, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, and CARMEN R. CANTOS, respondents. Leon Gonzaga, Jr. for petitioners. Mario D. Ortiz for private respondent Cantos.

FERNANDO, C.J.: The right sought to be vindicated in this certiorari proceeding by petitioners, plaintiffs in the lower court, arose from the undisputed fact that they are bona fide holders and possessors since 1949 of a parcel of land consisting of 6,163 square meters whereon they built that same year their residence. They still have a pending miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands for such

property. They thereafter discovered that their house occupied five meters of the adjoining lot, at the time of the construction in 1949 still public land but subsequently applied for in a miscellaneous sales application by private respondents, defendants in the court a quo, who were granted a patent only in 1972. Thus arose the conflict over the five meters in question. The action was for reconveyance with damages. Respondent Judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action should have been filed by the Bureau of Lands on behalf of the Republic. With their sales application still pending, the lot in question is still public. That is to conform to a ruling of this Court that an action for reversion in such cases "shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines." 1 This doctrine was affirmed expressly in Magay v. Estiandan, 2where this Court reiterated that where "the land in question is still part of the public domain, then the appellant is not the proper party to institute the reversion of the land but it must be the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines." 3 From the standpoint then of strict law, what was done by the lower court cannot be characterized as a violation of controlling legal principles. Still there are equitable considerations that call for this Court resolving the question raised. It is undoubted that there is a dispute appropriate for judicial determination. The contending parties are before the court. For petitioners, it is vital that their claim to the disputed five meters be passed upon. Their good faith is quite clear. As of the time their house was built, they were bona fide possessors, thereafter applicants for the sale of such parcel of land including the five meters. Unfortunately, the patent granted to private respondents twenty-three years after the construction of their residence included the same five meters. 'Mere is justification then for equity to set matters right. Petitioners are thus entitled to the remedy sought, namely, ownership of the five meters in question, upon payment of just compensation to respondents to be determined as of the time the patent was granted in 1972. 1. This conclusion finds support in Armamento v. Guerrero. 4 In that case, property covered by an original certificate of title pursuant to a free patent was granted by the Director of Lands on July 20, 1961 in favor of defendant Guerrero. In that case as well as here, there was a claim by plaintiffs that it was acquired through fraud and misrepresentation, their allegation being that they were in actual possession thereof as actual occupants as far back as 1955. Thereafter, a homestead application was made in 1959, resulting in a grant to them in 1964. It turned out that in the meanwhile, as it did likewise happen here, a free patent was if sued to defendant. Under such circumstances, this Court, stated: "The particular circumstances obtaining herein impel us to exercise our equity jurisdiction to the end that substantial justice may be dispended to the party litigants. To affirm the trial Court's Order of dismissal would leave the present controversy unresolved and pending investigation at the administrative level. Aside from the length of nine it would probably take for the case to reach the highest administrative authority, any final adjudication rendered by the latter may eventually be raised to the appellate Courts for judicial review. This circuitous and tedious process can be eliminated for the sake of speedy administration of justice by remanding the case to the trial Court for determination on the merits of the issue of validity of the issuance of Free Patent No. V-19129 and of the title which followed as a matter of course." 5 2. Nor is it necessary that this case be remanded to the trial court on the question of the validity of the patent obtained by respondents. As of the time the house of petitioners was built in 1949, they were in actual possession of the lot for which thereafter a miscellaneous sales application was submitted to the Bureau of Lands. Unfortunately, the patent granted to petitioners in 1972 included five meters thereof. It would be unduly-time consuming, if there being no claim to the rest of the property included in such patent to the respondents, the question of the alleged fraud would still

have to be inquired into. Under the circumstances that can be avoided by an outright determination that upon payment of the five meters in question, petitioners are entitled to be recognized as the owners thereof. 3. As far as the Bureau of lands is concerned, there seems to be no thought of reclaiming the property from respondents. There is, therefore, an express grant which justifies such acquisition. In Lee Hong Kok v. David, 6reference was made to the Regalian doctrine to the effect that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. 7 The government, therefore, as the agent of the state is, in the language of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 8 "possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership?" 9 4. The relevant facts thus justify the ruling that this litigation, presenting as it does an issue between the contending parties as to the disputed five meters, can. be resolved by this Court exercising its equity jurisdiction to award the same to petitioners upon payment of the due compensation determined as of the date when respondents acquired their patent. Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioners are entitled to ownership of such disputed portion upon payment by them of the just compensation to respondents for such five meters on the amount to be based on the value thereof as of the time the patent was granted on March 14, 1972. WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of September 20,1977 is reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for the purpose of determining the compensation due private respondent Carmen R. Cantos for the five meters of the lot in question, upon payment of which plaintiffs would become the owners of such five meters. No costs. Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur. Aquino, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24661 February 28, 1974 BENJAMIN RABUCO, VENANCIO G. GUIRNALDA, LEODEGARIO ALOBA, ELEUTERIO IBAES, ROGELIO ARAGONES, ASENCIO ABANCO, BENEDICTO BAUTISTA, MAXIMO AQUINO, PAULINA DALUMIAS, NENITA RAMOS, GUILLERMO VARIAS, EMELDA ARELLANO, PEDRO BILBAO, ERNESTO BONBALES, ROSITA OCA BAUTISTA, TERESITA ESTEBAN, JOSE BENJAMIN, LORENZO BELDEVER, LEODEGARIO TUMLOS, PATRICIO MALATE, ANSELMO CORTEJOS, ANACLETA ADUCA, SALOME BARCELONA, ENRICO CELSO, IRENE CAMBA, MARIA COLLADO, RUFINO CANTIL, ANANIAS CANILLO, MAXIMO DE CASTRO,

CEFERINO SALAZAR, PATRIA ANAYA, FELISA VELASCO, IGNACIO SARASPI, FLAVIO DINAGUIT, REMEDIOS BAROMETRO, PEDRO GEBANIA, RUBEN GEGABALEN, EMETRIO EDAO, LUCIANO ARAGONES, ADRIANO ESTRELLADO, BONIFACIO EVARISTO, ISIDORO EDORIA, TIMOTEA ECARUAN, BIENVENIDO COLLADO, CENON DAJUYA, RAFAELA FERNANDEZ, ALFONSO FAUSTINO, AVELINO GARCIA, RICARDO GUIRNALDA, FRANCISCO HENERAL, CARMEN KIONESALA, FELICIANO LUMACTOD, DOLORES VILLACAMPA, NARCISO LIM, EUFEMIO LEGASPI, MATILDE MABAQUIAO, EULOGIO VIA, MACARIO ANTONIO, JEREMIAS DE LA CRUZ, MARTIN MANGABAN, SIMEON MANGABA T., CARIDAD MER MILLA, FELIX MAHINAY, NAPOLEON MARZAN, ISAIAS MANALASTAS, JOSEFA CORVERA, JOSE APRUEDO, ARSENIO REYES, EUGENIA A. ONO, CORNELIO OPOLENCIA, SEDECIAS PASCUA, ABUNDIO PAGUNTALAN, ESPERANZA DE QUIROS, CRESENCIO SALEM, MOISES FERNANDEZ, FORTUNATO GONZALES, SOCORRO R. VALEN, RODOLFO COLLADO, VENERIO CELSO, GREGORIO DE LA CRUZ, CELSO ALCERA, NICOLAS ARAGONES, JOSEFINA MANANSALA, ADELAIDA CALASIN , JOSE AGUSTIN, TOMAS JOSEPH, MANUEL DADOR, SERGIO LIPATON, ERNESTO SUMAYDING, MARCELINO DIOSO, MIGUEL ALCERA, CRISANTA ENAMER, JUAN VIADO HILARION CHIOCO, EUROPIA CABAHUG, VICTORIA DUERO, CONSORCIO ENOC, MAMERTO GAMONIDO, BONIFACIO SABADO, MARIA INTROLIZO, HENRY ENOLBA, REYNALDO LIM, FORTUNATO LIPON, ERNESTO MALLOS, FLORENTINA PATRICIO, MAMERTO PALAPALA, RAMON DE PERALTA, JOSE PARRAS, APOLINARIO YAP, JUAN ROQUE, FELIX ROQUE, GLICERIA SALAZAR, MIGUELA SABIO, AGAPITO SAYAS, PAULINO SARROZA, PACIFICO JUANICO, LIBERADO TULAWAN, LIGAYA LAUS, ERNESTO VERZOSA, LEOPOLDO BERNALES, JAIME VISTA, ISAIAS AMURAO, BENITA M. BARENG, and BRIGIDA SANCHEZ,petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. LADISLAO J. TOLENTINO, City Engineer of Manila, their agents, employees, assistants and all persons acting under them; HON. BENJAMIN GOZON, Administrator, Land Reform Authority substituted by HON CONRADO ESTRELLA as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reforms and his agents, employees, assistants and all persons acting under his orders, respondent. 1 G.R. No. L-24915 February 28, 1974 BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al., (the same co-petitioners in L-24661), petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, et al., (the same co-respondents in L-24661), respondents. G.R. No. L-24916 February 28, 1974 BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al. (the same co-petitioners in L-24661), petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, et al., (the same co-respondents in L-24661), respondents-appellees. Manuel D. Melotindos and Ricardo M. Guirnalda for petitioners. Second Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State property. The origin and background of the cases at bar which deal with the decisive issue of constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 enacted on June 17, 1961, as raised by respondent mayor of Manila in resisting petitioners' pleas that respondent mayor not only lacks the authority to demolish their houses or eject them as tenants and bona fide occupants of a parcel of land in San Andres, Malate 2 but is also expressly prohibited from doing so by section 2 of the Act, may be summarized from the Court of Appeals' 3 certification of resolution of May 31, 1965 as follows: Case L-24916 involves petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals 4 from the decision of the Manila court of first instance dismissing their petition for injunction and mandamus to enjoin the demolition of their houses and the ejectment from the public lots in question and to direct respondent administrator of the Land Authority (now Secretary of Agrarian Reform) to implement the provisions of Republic Act 3120 for the subdivision and sale on installment basis of the subdivided lots to them as the tenants and bona fide occupants thereof, and instead ordering their ejectment. Case L-24915 involves petitioners' independent petition for injunction filed directly with the Court of Appeals January 29, 1965 5 to forestall the demolition overnight of their houses pursuant to the order of demolition set for January 30, 1965 at 8 a.m. issued by respondents city officials pending the elevation of their appeal. The appellate court gave due course thereto and issued the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for. The two cases were ordered "consolidated into one" since they were "unavoidably interlaced." The appellate court, finding that the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 was "the dominant and inextricable issue in the appeal" over which it had no jurisdiction and that the trial court incorrectly "sidetracked" the issue, thereafter certified the said cases to this Court, as follows: The validity of Republic Act 3120 which was seasonably posed in issue in the court below was sidetracked by the trial court, thus: The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 need not be passed upon as the principal question in issue is whether the houses of the petitioners are public nuisances, which the court resolved in the affirmative. As a matter of fact even if the petitioners were already the owners of the land on which their respected houses are erected, the respondent city officials could cause the removal thereof as they were constructed in violation of city ordinances and constitute public nuisance. It is significant to note, however, that what is sought by the respondent City Mayor and City Engineer of Manila is not only the demolition of the petitioners' houses in the premises in controversy, but their ejectment as well. Moreover, Republic Act 3120 does intend not only the dismissal of the ejectment proceedings against the petitioners from the land in controversy upon their motion, but as well that any demolition order issued against them shall also have to be dismissed. The law says:

Upon approval of this Act no ejectment proceedings against any tenants or bona fide occupant shall be instituted and any proceedings against any such tenant or bona fideoccupant shall be dismissed upon motion of the defendant. Provided, That any demolition order directed against any tenant or bona fide occupant thereof, shall be dismissed. (Sec. 2, R. A. 3120). Indeed, the petitioners-appellants, who contended in the court below that it was not necessary to decide on the validity or constitutionality of the law, now asseverate that 'Republic Act No. 3120 expressly prohibits ejectment and demolition of petitioners' home.' The petitioners' argument in their appeal to this Court runs as follows: 1. Petitioners-appellants are entitled to the remedies of injunction and mandamus, being vested with lawful possession over Lot 21-B, Block 610, granted by law, Republic Act No. 3120. 2. Civil Case No. 56092 has not been barred by any prior judgment, as wrongly claimed by respondents-appellees. 3. Ejectment and demolition against petitioners-appellants are unlawful and clearly prohibited by Republic Act No. 3120. The defense of the respondents Mayor and City Engineer of Manila to arguments 2 and 3 is the invalidity of the said Republic Act 3120 for being in violation of the Constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation. So that even if argument 2 interposed by the petitioners-appellants should be rejected, still they may claim a right, by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of Republic Act 3120, to continue possession and occupation of the premises and the lifting of the order of demolition issued against them. The constitutionality of the said Republic Act 3120, therefore, becomes the dominant and inextricable issue of the appeal. Case L-24661 for the continuation and maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court of Appeals for preservation of the status quo was filed by petitioners directly with this Court on June 21, 1965, pending transmittal of the records of Cases L-24915 and L-24916 to this Court as certified by the Court of Appeals which declared itself without jurisdiction over the principal and decisive issue of constitutionality of Republic Act 3120. The Court gave due course thereto and on August 17, 1965 issued upon a P1,000 bond the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for enjoining respondents "from demolishing and/or continuing to demolish the houses of herein petitioners situated in Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, or from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of their present possession." The records of two cases certified by the appellate court, L-24915 and L-24916, were eventually forwarded to this Court which per its resolution of August 24, 1965 ordered that they be docketed and be considered together with case L-24661. In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners' instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining

respondents city officials "from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners' possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila" as safeguarded them under the Court's subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965. The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar, as correctly perceived by the appellate court is the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable or alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration" for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof 6and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court's certification resolution, supra. The incidental issue seized upon by the trial court as a main issue for "sidetracking" the decisive issue of constitutionality, to wit, that petitioners' houses as they stood at the time of its judgment in 1965 "were constructed in violation of city ordinances and constituted public nuisances" whose removal could be ordered "even if petitioners were already the owners of the land on which their respective houses are erected" has become moot with the burning down of the petitioners' houses in the fire of April 19, 1970. If the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for constituting deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation as contended by respondents city officials, then the trial court's refusal to enjoin ejectment and demolition of petitioners' houses may be upheld. Otherwise, petitioners' right under the Act to continue possession and occupation of the premises and to the lifting and dismissal of the order of demolition issued against them must be enforced and the trial court's judgment must be set aside. Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be stricken down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is untenable and without basis, since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietarycapacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation. 7 Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts. The case of Salas vs. Jarencio 8 wherein the Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act 4118 whereby Congress in identical terms as in Republic Act 3120 likewise converted another city lot (Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of Manila also in Malate) which was reserved as communal property into disposable land of the State for resale in small lots by the Land Tenure, Administration to the bona fide occupants is controlling in the case at bar. The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to

the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use" 9 and stressed that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." 10 There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not "intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyane of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, 11 but simply as amanifestation of its right and power to deal with state property." 12 Since the challenge of respondents city officials against the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 must fail as the City was not deprived thereby of anything it owns by acquisition with its private or corporate funds either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of said Act must be enforced and petitioners are entitled to the injunction as prayed for implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment and demolition of their houses. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court (in Case No. L-24916) is hereby set aside, and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued on August 17, 1965 is hereby made permanent. The respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform as successor agency of the Land Tenure Administration may now proceed with the due implementation of Republic Act 3120 in accordance with its terms and provisions. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Fernandez, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring: It is undoubted that the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Teehankee, with his customary lucidity and thoroughness, is in accordance with our past decisions on the matter. Reflection on the

innovation introduced by the present Constitution on local government, did, however, give rise to doubts on my part as to the continuing authoritativeness of Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga 1 and Salas v. Jarencio, 2 the two principal opinions relied upon, both of which decisions were promulgated before the effectivity of the new fundamental law. Hence this separate opinion setting forth the reasons why I join the rest of my brethren. 1. In the declaration of principles and state policies 3 it is specifically provided: "The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 4 What was succinctly expressed therein was made more definite in the article on local government. 5 Its first section reads: "The territorial and political subdivisions of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barrios." 6 Then comes this provision: "The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 7 After which there is this limitation on the power of local government: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." 8 The autonomy of cities and municipalities is guaranteed in these words: "(1) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barrios, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are with the scope of their assigned powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities, as determined by standards established in the local government code, shall be independent of province." 9 Then comes the last section: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." 10 The objective is thus crystal-clear and well-defined. The goal is the fullest autonomy to local government units consistent with the basic theory of a unitary, not a federal, polity. It is the hope that thereby they will attain "their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 11 It is more than just the expression of an aspiration as attest by one of the articles of the Constitution devoted to such a subject. 12 It was not so under the 1935 charter. On this point, all that appeared therein was: "The President shall ... exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law ... . 13 According to Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil, 14 "the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the supervisory authority to the Chief Executive in this regard was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body, mainly between the historical view which recognizes the right of local self-government ... and the legal theory which sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local governments .. . The result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in imperio to the detriment of a strong national government." 15 For the above provision starts with the vesting of control in the President "of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices," as distinguished from "general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." 16 The difference in wording is highly significant. So it was stressed by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion in Pelaez v. Auditor General: 17 "The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President

cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 18 2. So it was that under the 1935 Constitution, the national government when acting through the executive had only such general supervisory authority as was provided by statute. There was no restriction, however, on the legislative body to create or to abolish local government units. What was more, the powers vested in them could be expanded or diminished depending on the will of Congress. It could hardly be assumed therefore that under the previous charter, they could justifiably lay claim to real autonomy. For so long as the legislation itself took care of delineating the matters that were appropriately within the scope of their competence, there could be no objection to its validity. No constitutional problem arose. Things have changed radically. We start with the declared principle of the State guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of local government units. 19 We have likewise noted the earnestness of the framers as to the attainment of such declared objective as set forth in the specific article 20 on the matter. It is made obligatory on the National Assembly to enact a local government code. What is more, unlike the general run of statutes, it cannot be amended except by a majority vote of all its members. It is made to include "a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall," with an expressed reference to "qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, [as well as] all other matters relating to the organization and operation of local units." 21 Mention is likewise made of the "powers, responsibilities, and resources," 22 items that are identified with local autonomy. As if that were not enough, the last sentence of this particular provision reads: "However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 23 To the extent that the last section requires that the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of a boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio, must be in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in such unit or units, the adherence to the basic principle of local self-government is quite clear. 24 Equally significant is the stress on the competence of a province, city, municipality or barrio "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." 25 The care and circumspection with which the framers saw to the enjoyment of real local selfgovernment not only in terms of administration but also in terms of resources is thus manifest. Their intent is unmistakable. Unlike the case under the 1935 Constitution, there is thus a clear manifestation of the presumption now in favor of a local government unit. It is a well-nigh complete departure from what was. Nor should it be ignored that a highly urbanized city "shall be independent" not only of the national government but also of a province. 26 Would it not follow then that under the present dispensation, the moment property is transferred to it by the national government, its control over the same should be as extensive and as broad as possible. Considerations of the above nature gave rise to doubts on my part as to the decisions in the Zamboanga del Norte and Salas cases still retaining unimpaired their doctrinal force. Would this be a case of Republic Act No. 3120 being rendered inoperative by virtue of its repugnancy to the present Constitution? 27 3. Nonetheless, such doubts were set at rest by two considerations. The opinion of Justice Teehankee makes reference to the ratio decidendi of Salas v. Jarencio as to the trust character impressed on communal property of a municipal corporation, even if already titled. As set forth in the opinion: "The Court [in Salas v. Jarencio] reaffirmed the established general rule that 'regardless of the source of classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the

benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as agent for the performance of a part of its public work, municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use' and stressed that 'the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." 28 This is a doctrine which to my mind is unaffected by grant of extensive local autonomy under the present Constitution. Its basis is the regalian doctrine. It is my view that under the Constitution, as was the case under the 1935 charter, the holding of a municipal corporation as a unit of state does not impair the plenary power of the national government exercising dominical rights to dispose of it in a manner it sees fit, subject to applicable constitutional limitations as to the citizenship of the grantee. An excerpt from Lee Hong Hok v. David 29 is relevant: "As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that 'Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown ... .' That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof." 30 4. Much more compelling is the reliance on the opinion of Justice Teehankee on the even more fundamental principle of social justice, which was given further stress and a wider scope in the present Constitution. According to the opinion of the Court: "There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Act 4118 in Salasand Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not 'intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property." 31 It is true of course, that a local government unit, if expressly authorized by statute, could make use of its property in the same manner. It does appear, however, that there was no such grant of authority. Moreover, the national government is not only in a better position to make a reality of the social justice principle but also is subject to less pressure on the part of the affluent, at least where the distribution of state property is concerned. It is thus a more efficient instrument than a province, city or municipality to attain this highly desirable goal. In an economy essentially based on capitalism, where the power of concentrated wealth cannot be underestimated, the countervailing force exerted by a strong national government sensitive to the needs of our countrymen, deeply mired in the morass of poverty, the disinherited of fortune, can make itself much more effectively felt. If only for that cogent reason then, I am prepared to ignore whatever doubts or misgivings I did entertain at the outset.

Hence this concurrence.

Separate Opinions FERNANDO, J., concurring: It is undoubted that the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Teehankee, with his customary lucidity and thoroughness, is in accordance with our past decisions on the matter. Reflection on the innovation introduced by the present Constitution on local government, did, however, give rise to doubts on my part as to the continuing authoritativeness of Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga 1 and Salas v. Jarencio, 2 the two principal opinions relied upon, both of which decisions were promulgated before the effectivity of the new fundamental law. Hence this separate opinion setting forth the reasons why I join the rest of my brethren. 1. In the declaration of principles and state policies 3 it is specifically provided: "The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 4 What was succinctly expressed therein was made more definite in the article on local government. 5 Its first section reads: "The territorial and political subdivisions of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barrios." 6 Then comes this provision: "The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 7 After which there is this limitation on the power of local government: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." 8 The autonomy of cities and municipalities is guaranteed in these words: "(1) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barrios, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are with the scope of their assigned powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities, as determined by standards established in the local government code, shall be independent of province." 9 Then comes the last section: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." 10 The objective is thus crystal-clear and well-defined. The goal is the fullest autonomy to local government units consistent with the basic theory of a unitary, not a federal, polity. It is the hope that thereby they will attain "their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 11 It is more than just the expression of an aspiration as attest by one of the articles of the Constitution devoted to such a subject. 12 It was not so under the 1935 charter. On this point, all that appeared therein was: "The President shall ... exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law ... . 13 According to Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil, 14 "the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the supervisory authority to the Chief Executive in this regard was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body, mainly between the historical view which recognizes the right of local self-government ... and the legal theory which

sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local governments .. . The result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in imperio to the detriment of a strong national government." 15 For the above provision starts with the vesting of control in the President "of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices," as distinguished from "general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." 16 The difference in wording is highly significant. So it was stressed by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion in Pelaez v. Auditor General: 17 "The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 18 2. So it was that under the 1935 Constitution, the national government when acting through the executive had only such general supervisory authority as was provided by statute. There was no restriction, however, on the legislative body to create or to abolish local government units. What was more, the powers vested in them could be expanded or diminished depending on the will of Congress. It could hardly be assumed therefore that under the previous charter, they could justifiably lay claim to real autonomy. For so long as the legislation itself took care of delineating the matters that were appropriately within the scope of their competence, there could be no objection to its validity. No constitutional problem arose. Things have changed radically. We start with the declared principle of the State guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of local government units. 19 We have likewise noted the earnestness of the framers as to the attainment of such declared objective as set forth in the specific article 20 on the matter. It is made obligatory on the National Assembly to enact a local government code. What is more, unlike the general run of statutes, it cannot be amended except by a majority vote of all its members. It is made to include "a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall," with an expressed reference to "qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, [as well as] all other matters relating to the organization and operation of local units." 21 Mention is likewise made of the "powers, responsibilities, and resources," 22 items that are identified with local autonomy. As if that were not enough, the last sentence of this particular provision reads: "However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 23 To the extent that the last section requires that the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of a boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio, must be in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in such unit or units, the adherence to the basic principle of local self-government is quite clear. 24 Equally significant is the stress on the competence of a province, city, municipality or barrio "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." 25 The care and circumspection with which the framers saw to the enjoyment of real local selfgovernment not only in terms of administration but also in terms of resources is thus manifest. Their intent is unmistakable. Unlike the case under the 1935 Constitution, there is thus a clear manifestation of the presumption now in favor of a local government unit. It is a well-nigh complete departure from what was. Nor should it be ignored that a highly urbanized city "shall be independent"

not only of the national government but also of a province. 26 Would it not follow then that under the present dispensation, the moment property is transferred to it by the national government, its control over the same should be as extensive and as broad as possible. Considerations of the above nature gave rise to doubts on my part as to the decisions in the Zamboanga del Norte and Salas cases still retaining unimpaired their doctrinal force. Would this be a case of Republic Act No. 3120 being rendered inoperative by virtue of its repugnancy to the present Constitution? 27 3. Nonetheless, such doubts were set at rest by two considerations. The opinion of Justice Teehankee makes reference to the ratio decidendi of Salas v. Jarencio as to the trust character impressed on communal property of a municipal corporation, even if already titled. As set forth in the opinion: "The Court [in Salas v. Jarencio] reaffirmed the established general rule that 'regardless of the source of classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as agent for the performance of a part of its public work, municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use' and stressed that 'the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." 28 This is a doctrine which to my mind is unaffected by grant of extensive local autonomy under the present Constitution. Its basis is the regalian doctrine. It is my view that under the Constitution, as was the case under the 1935 charter, the holding of a municipal corporation as a unit of state does not impair the plenary power of the national government exercising dominical rights to dispose of it in a manner it sees fit, subject to applicable constitutional limitations as to the citizenship of the grantee. An excerpt from Lee Hong Hok v. David 29 is relevant: "As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that 'Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown ... .' That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof." 30 4. Much more compelling is the reliance on the opinion of Justice Teehankee on the even more fundamental principle of social justice, which was given further stress and a wider scope in the present Constitution. According to the opinion of the Court: "There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Act 4118 in Salasand Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not 'intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent

domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property." 31 It is true of course, that a local government unit, if expressly authorized by statute, could make use of its property in the same manner. It does appear, however, that there was no such grant of authority. Moreover, the national government is not only in a better position to make a reality of the social justice principle but also is subject to less pressure on the part of the affluent, at least where the distribution of state property is concerned. It is thus a more efficient instrument than a province, city or municipality to attain this highly desirable goal. In an economy essentially based on capitalism, where the power of concentrated wealth cannot be underestimated, the countervailing force exerted by a strong national government sensitive to the needs of our countrymen, deeply mired in the morass of poverty, the disinherited of fortune, can make itself much more effectively felt. If only for that cogent reason then, I am prepared to ignore whatever doubts or misgivings I did entertain at the outset. Hence this concurrence.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 131501 July 14, 2004

FRANCISCO ZARATE, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRECIOSA T. DAVILA, REGALADO TORIAGA, PATRIA TORIAGA, RENATO TORIAGA, ROSALINDA TORIAGA, RYL TORIAGA, PROBO TORIAGA, JOSE CORPUS, MARCELINITO HONORIO, JOSE MELO, LOLITO TALAGA, FELIPE VILLANUEVA, DOMINADOR TAGBALAY, MAXIMO VILLANUEVA, and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28241 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, in Land Registration Case No. 273. The Antecedents

As gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the factual backdrop and antecedental proceedings are as follows: This is an application for registration of title filed by appellant Francisco Zarate on 27 December 1976 to have his three parcels of land brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act. The subject parcels of land contain a land area of 68.2787 hectares and 10.5135 hectares, located at Dumatiad, Tangalan, Aklan, and of 3.8500 hectares, located at Afga, Tangalan, Aklan. The said parcels have been subdivided into six (6) lots. Appellant claims that the first two parcels of land which formed only one parcel of land consisting of about 78.7922 hectares originally belonged to the spouses Solomon Tirol and Venancia Hontiveros. When they died in 1905 and 1913, respectively, the said parcels of land were inherited by their children Gregorio, Ignacio, Lamberto, Eleanor and Carmen, all surnamed Tirol. On 26 May 1923, they donated said parcel to Josefino Tirol, son of Gregorio, and Angeles Arcenas in consideration of their marriage (Exhs. (sic) "Z"). Said land was later subdivided into two, one with an area of 68.2787 hectares and the other 10.5135 hectares which was later sold to herein appellant on 7 January 1976 (Exh. "HH"). The third parcel (with an area of 3.8500 hectares) was inherited by Gregorio Tirol, father of Josefino, from his ancestors. When Gregorio died, Josefino inherited the same. He later sold the said land to herein appellant on 11 March 1976. Applicant claims that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in peaceful possession and usufruct of the property for over eighty (80) years, religiously paying the taxes thereon. Nobody disturbed their possession and usufruct for more than fifty (50) years, until oppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpuz, Dominador Tagbalay, Marcelinito Honorio, Lolito Talaga, Felipe Villanueva and Jose Molo, entered and occupied portions of the land sometime in 1970. Oppositors Preciosa Tirol Davila, on the other hand, contends that Lot 1, Plan Psu-06000253 with an area of 530,310 sq. meters situated in Tangalan, Aklan, owned by her, was previously the property of Ignacio Tirol, her father. When Ignacio died, the said lot was entrusted to Josefino Tirol, who was his lawyer and first cousin. She did not have any tax declarations because Josefino assured her that he would be responsible for them. Preciosa denied that the said property was donated by his father to Josefino and that the signature appearing on the deed of donation was forged. Oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines gave another version. It claims that the questioned lots are owned by spouses Valeriano Molo and Lutgarda Molo. The said parcel which consists of about 190,922 square meters located at Afga, Tangalan, Aklan, was mortgaged to the bank. When the couple failed to pay their indebtedness, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land became the property of the bank in whose name the land is now declared for taxation purposes. Oppositors Regalado, Patria, Renato, Rosalinda, Ryl and Probo, all surnamed Toriaga, likewise, contend that the land claimed by them which is about 4 hectares in area and situated in Afga, Tangalan, Aklan, originally belonged to Eulalio Tanasa, who possessed it before 1949. When he died, the land was inherited by his daughter Prima who was married to Probio (sic) Toriaga. Prima continuously resided on the land until her death in 1977. The land passed to her son, Regalado Toriaga, Sr., husband of oppositor Patria and father of the other oppositors. The said land is declared in the name of the Toriagas.

All the oppositors claim that the land applied for by appellant was unoccupied and covered with wild trees and cogon. They cleared the land, built their houses and planted mangoes, casoy, jackfruit, bananas, camote, and cassava. Neither Josefino Tirol nor Francisco Zarate possessed the land nor enjoyed the products thereof. Oppositor Republic of the Philippines, for its part, claims that the subject land was timberland or unclassified forest. In 1970, at the time of oppositors occupation, the lands were covered with wild trees and thickets and was (sic) released as alienable and disposable under Land Classification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A only on 16 April 1973. Since there were many claimants, the trial court commissioned a geodetic engineer to determine the different portions claimed by the applicant and the oppositors. The commissioners report shows the following claims: Regalado Toriaga, et al. Maximo Villanueva Jose Molo Jose Corpuz Marcelino (sic) Honorio Dominador Tagbalay (pp. 1,310-1,313, Vol. IV, Record) Oppositor DBP also claimed an area of 19.092 hectares while Preciosa Davila is also claiming an area of 53.0310 hectares of Lot 1. After the contending parties presented their evidence, the trial court on 26 April 1990 rendered judgment dismissing the application of title filed by applicant Francisco Zarate, and the claims of private oppositors. Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, applicant filed this appeal assigning the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ADVERSE CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALL THE OTHER OPPOSITORS ARE FALSE AND FRAUDULENT WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND LAW. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPLICANT-APPELLANT, INCLUDING THE POSSESSIONS AND USUFRUCTS OF HIS PREDECESSORS-ININTEREST, HAS BEEN IN POSSESSION AND USUFRUCT OF THE LANDS SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS PROCEEDING FOR OVER 80 YEARS AND FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL AND HE, THEREFORE, ACQUIRED VESTED RIGHTS THEREON. 4.1444 hec. 4.3572 " 3.7575" 6.3555" 7.5123" 2.6496"

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPROVING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LAND WHICH THE APPLICANT BROUGHT (sic) TO HAVE HIS THREE PARCELS OF LAND BROUGHT UNDER THE OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT AND TO HAVE THE TITLES THERETO IN THE EXCLUSIVE NAME OF THE APPLICANT REGISTERED AND CONFIRMED.3 On February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court. The applicant-appellant, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review contending that: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF GEODETIC ENGINEER RONDARIO AND RESPONDENT (OPPOSITOR) MAXIMO VILLANUEVA AND NOT TO THAT OF THE PETITIONER (APPLICANT) AND HIS WITNESSES, RELATIVE TO THE TRUE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND. II THE CLAIMS OF THE RESPONDENTS (OPPOSITORS) ARE RIDDLED WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES, WHICH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES ONLY STRENGTHEN PETITIONERS (APPLICANTS) CLAIMS. III A STRICT APPLICATION OF THE RULE REGARDING THE RELEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS AS EMBODIED IN THE CASE OF VALLARTA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 151 SCRA 679 (1987), WOULD WORK SERIOUS AND IRREPARABLE INJUSTICE TO THE PETITIONER APPLICANT).4 The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence and probative weight to the testimony of Geodetic Engineer Jose Rondario and his Certification that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable area of Tangalan, Aklan, certified and released as such under Land Classification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A on April 16, 1973. He asserts that the appellate court should have considered his testimonial and documentary evidence, that the property subject of his application hardly comes close to being a forest or timberland, and that there were hardly any big trees on the property. The petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest even planted bananas, cassava, coconut trees, and camotes on the property. The petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,5 should not be applied so as to prejudice his vested rights over the subject property. The petitioner asserts that for a period of eighty years before 1973, he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in public, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession of the property. He cites the ruling of this Court in Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands to fortify his plea.6 On the other hand, the trial court declared that:

To find out the real nature of the lands, the Court examined the testimony of the witnesses Witness Jose Rondario, for the oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines, and surveyor of the lands of the applicant, testified as follows: ATTY. TEJADA: Q You stated that you have gone over the property that you have surveyed for Valeriano Molo, can you tell the court what [were the] improvements, if there are (sic) any, during the survey in 1974? A When I execute[d] my survey, I found out that there is no(t) any (sic) plant only kaingin. xxx Q When you conducted the survey for Valeriano Molo in 1974, were you approached by any person? A There is (sic) nobody questioning me during my survey because actually there was a (were) people making kaingin there I think that (sic) was the tenant of Valeriano Molo." (Tsn, Melgar, November 5, 1987, pp. 7 and 13). Witness Maximo Villanueva (one of the oppositors) declared: ATTY. TAPLAC: Q When you first occupied this land in question, what was the condition of the land? A Filled with thickets and second group forest. Q How big are (sic) the trees found when you first occupied this land? A Some were big trees because we used to get (sic) our materials in building our house. Q Were there signs of occupation when you first entered the land? A There was no sign that there was a previous occupation (sic)." xxx COURT: Q What kind of trees were existing on the land when you occupied it? A Wild trees not planted by people. Q There were no coconut trees existing at the time you occupied the land? A No, Your Honor." (TSN, Peniano, January 31, 1990, pp. 9-10 and 17).

Witness Agustin Bautista, an employee of the Forest Management Sector of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Kalibo, Aklan, testifying for the oppositor Director of Lands, averred: ATTY. TORRE: Q In this land classification map 10-A, which is described as alienable and disposable, would you mind informing this Court as to what is the status of this Project No. 10-A previously classified as alienable and disposable? A That is timberland. Previously, it is not being classified alienable and disposable. xxx Q But previous to April 16, 1973, what is (sic) the status of the land then? A It is (sic) timberland. It is (sic) not classified as alienable and disposable." (Tsn, Gonzales, February 1, 1990, pp. 3 and 5). Evidently, the three parcels of land in question were forest lands. The applicants predecessor-ininterest, Josefino Tirol, and the private oppositors, who claimed possession over the area did not and could not have acquired ownership over the said lands considering that the area was then inalienable and non-disposable. In the present case, the lands applied for title were released as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973 (Exhs. "5-RP" and "6-RP") as per Project No. 10-A, Land Classification Map No. 2779. The application for registration was filed on December 27, 1976. Since the applicant, and likewise, the private oppositors, possessed the land from the time of release on April 16, 1973, for only three (3) years and eight (8) months prior to the filing of the application, the thirty (30) year possession required by law was not complied with.7 Moreover, to warrant registration, proof of possession must be "conclusive" (Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734), or "well-nigh incontrovertible" (Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146). The applicant was not able to prove such possession. The bulk of the evidence submitted revealed numerous occupants on the lands. The survey plan submitted by Reynaldo Lopez, a geodetic engineer commissioned by the Court to determine the different portions claimed by the applicant and the oppositors (Records, p. 1,314), showed that of the three parcels of land with a total area of eighty one (81) hectares, the private oppositors claim the following: Regalado Toriaga, et al. (Lot A); Maximo Villanueva (Lot B); Jose Molo (Lot C); 4.1554 hectares 4.3572 hectares 3.7575 hectares

Jose Corpus (Lot D); Marcelinito Honorio (Lot E); and Dominador Tagbalay (Lot F).

6.3556 hectares 7.5123 hectares 2.6496 hectares

The evidence likewise showed that Valeriano Molo, now substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines, claims 19.092 hectares, and oppositor Preciosa Tirol Davila, 53.0310 hectares. The aforementioned oppositors claim that they are in actual, physical possession of their respective portions. It is admitted by the applicant in his amended application and in his evidence presented during the trial that oppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpus, Marcelinito Honorio, Joselito Honorio, Dominador Tagbalay, Jose Molo, Valeriano Molo (now substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines), and the heirs of Regalado Toriaga, Sr., occupy portions of the land through "illegal entry, unauthorized squatting or usurpation." More than one-half (1/2) of the total area applied for registration not being in the possession of the applicant, he cannot, thus, claim exclusive and notorious possession under claim of ownership, nor can he support his claim of title through acquisitive prescription. The Court, therefore, holds that the applicant, as well as the private oppositors, failed to prove by sufficient evidence that they have complied with the requisites provided by law to warrant registration of title to the three (3) parcels of land.8 The Court of Appeals concurred in toto with the findings of the trial court and cited the ruling of this Court in Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court9 in ruling against the appellants. We find the petition to be barren of merit. The decisive issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appealed decision dismissing the petitioners application, on the ground that he failed to prove ownership of the three parcels of land subject of his application under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The question raised by the petitioner, whether the parcels of land subject of his application are forest lands, and whether the petitioner, by himself, and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding his application in 1976, are questions of fact which the trial court and the Court of Appeals resolved in the negative. Such factual findings are generally conclusive in this Court and will not be reviewed on appeal.10 This Court is not a trier of facts in a case appealed to it under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There are, to be sure, exceptions to this rule. However, we have carefully reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts that the subject property was, before April 16, 1973, forest land, and that the petitioner failed to prove his claim of title over the parcels of land subject of his application under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and the legal conclusions based on their findings. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within

private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11 Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration.12 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.13 Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. The petitioner was burdened to prove, by positive and incontrovertible evidence, two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and, (2) the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of his application on December 26, 1976. One claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with the legal requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which prescribes the substantive as well as procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands.14 When the conditions set forth by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of the law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.15 Under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department.16 In Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held that the rule on the confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The applicant must secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for by the applicants are alienable and disposable.18 The petitioner failed to discharge his burden. First. The petitioner failed to adduce in evidence any certification from the Bureau of Lands or the Bureau of Forestry to the effect that the property is alienable or disposable. On the other hand, the respondents adduced evidence that the property applied for by the petitioner was classified by the Director of Forestry as disposable and alienable only under Forestry Administrative Order No. 41295 issued on April 16, 1973, and Land Classification No. 2779 and Project No. 10-A. This is gleaned from the Certification of the Director of Forestry, viz: I hereby certify that this is the correct map of the areas demarcated as timberlands pursuant to Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code and those set aside as Alienable or

Disposable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1295 dated April 16, 1973. These areas were surveyed and the field notes plotted in accordance with the standard procedure and mapping instruction of the Bureau of Forestry. Therefore, this map is hereby approved. The original reports, field notes and computations in connection herewith are on file in this Office. Manila, Philippines. April 16, 1973. NOTE: FAO No. 4-1295 Approved on (Sgd.) JOSE VIADO June 19, 1973. Actg. Director of Forestry19 Geodetic Engr. Jose R. Rondario, who was commissioned by the petitioner to prepare the survey plan for the subject parcels of land certified, thus: I hereby certify that this area surveyed is within the alienable and disposable area of Tangalan, Aklan, certified and released as such on April 16, 1973 per L.C. No. 2779 and Project No. 10-A. I further certify that this Lot surveyed is outside civil and military reservation. (Sgd.) JOSE R. RONDARIO Geodetic Engineer20 The petitioner cannot denigrate the verisimilitude of the contents of the Certification of Engr. Rondario because the same was offered as his evidence and is based on the records of the Bureau of Forestry. Since the property was reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973 and the petitioner filed his application only on December 27, 1976, or only less than four years after the said reclassification. He irrefragably failed to prove his possession of the property for the requisite thirty (30)-year period. The possession of the land by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, even assuming that his predecessors had been in possession of the property prior to the reclassification thereof as alienable or disposable, cannot be credited as part of the thirty (30)-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.21 Indeed, inBracewell vs. Court of Appeals,22 we held that: Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with the respondents that the petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that [the] petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the

basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on [the] confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.23 The ruling of the Court in Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Island24 has no application in this case because in that case, the Court ruled that the property was "indisputably" agricultural land. The petitioners bare claims, even if true, that no big trees could be found in the property and that he and his predecessors planted bananas, camotes and other fruit trees on portions of the property, do not divest the property of its classification as forest land. A similar issue was raised in Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,25 where we held that: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184 [sic]) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition. The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. 26 We reject the claim of the petitioner that he had acquired vested rights over the property, on his assertion that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property for decades before he filed his application in the trial court. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.27 Such lands are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership.28

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28241 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.