[G.R. No. 118295.

May 2, 1997]

WIGBERTO E. TAADA vs. EDGARDO ANGARA DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the thirdmillennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-thy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity.

Brief Historical Background To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its nonratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement. After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the World Trade Organization -- with the signing of the [1] Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the r eduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more investments into the country. Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of member -countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the

1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.

The Facts On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity). By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed: (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the [3] Philippines, stating among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pur suant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the [4] Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitutio n. On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a [5] resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopt ed Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World [6] Trade Organization. The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows: ANNEX 1 Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Agriculture Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement on Textiles and Clothing Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection Agreement on Rules of Origin Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
[2]

Annex 1B: Annex 1C:

Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures Agreement on Safeguards General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ANNEX 2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ANNEX 3 Trade Policy Review Mechanism
[7]

On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed

the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:

NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof. To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof. On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial [8] Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows: The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement. The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service. On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations [9] stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper, for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements. During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed: (a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and (b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible. After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.

The Issues In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:

A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable. B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the concurrence. C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Phili ppine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines; E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power. F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners int o [10] the following: 1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress. 3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence. 4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act. By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus: (1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue; (2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents favor, will not cause the petitions dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and (3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.

During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by [11] procedural matters. To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are: (1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION? (2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? (3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS? (4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE? (5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy? In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than [12] political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal [13] issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters follows:
[14]

raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution,

[15]

as

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part [16] of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former [17] Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty
[18]

to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition. Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Articl e XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows: Article II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES xx xx xx xx

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. xx xx Article XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY xx xx xx xx xx xx

Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. xx xx xx xx

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive. Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their [19] memorandum: a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity): Article 2 National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions. 1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.

2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121, emphasis supplied). The Annex referred to reads as follows: ANNEX Illustrative List 1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require : (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or (b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports. 2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict: (a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports; (b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or (c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p.22125, emphasis supplied). The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows: The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied). b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity) : Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis supplied) (c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services: National Treatment

1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. 2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. 3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610 emphasis supplied). It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the [20] annexed agreements. Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization. We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The counterpart of this article in [21] [22] the 1935 Constitution is called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are [23] not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case [24] of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor them, thus:
[25]

that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement

On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles. In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self -executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2). The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic pol icy [26] making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., explained these reasons as follows:

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal rig ht -- a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss. It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: Section 1. xxx

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases supplied) When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read: Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a susta ined increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. x x x xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:

1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; 2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and 3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in [27] favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally -produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help [28] make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively [29] controlled by Filipinos. In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and ut ilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of [30] equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al ., this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and whi ch needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It isper se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are. All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits [32] protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
[31]

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council. WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Minist erial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the [33] expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development . These [34] basic principles are found in the preamble of the WTO Agreement as follows: The Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with the

objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development, Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations, Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while developing countries -including the Philippines -- are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years. In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years. In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidyby 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction. Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including antidumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self -reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy: Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion ; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
[35]

international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in [36] such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities. The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a [37] trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large. Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality? Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it wil l -- as promised by its promoters -- expand the countrys exports and generate more employment? Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public? The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council? It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change [38] necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist explains: The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and framework only o f the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its stre ngth and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative [39] procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. Petitioners maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of investments and [40] money x x x as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x. More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the [41] Congress. And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to specified limits and x x x such limitat ions and [42] restrictions as Congress may provide, as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of internatio nal law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all [43] nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are [44] considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to [45] make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances,the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, [46] the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of [47] interdependence is here.

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign 47-A rights under the concept of sovereignty as auto -limitation. Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were expenses of the United Nations under Article 17, paragraph 2, of t he UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example: although sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the

Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor. Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both bilateral and multilateral -that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows: (a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines. (b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. (c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation. (d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation. (e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts. (f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil. (g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements. (h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days. (I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days. (j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related charges. (k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of international obligation. In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT. International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or trade , constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the

costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller country s [48] market. The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as p art of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all nations.

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related [49] Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning [50] pleading, practice and procedures. To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS,
[51]

it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:

Article 34 Process Patents: Burden of Proof 1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process: (a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new; (b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used. 2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled. 3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account. From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deeme d to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is substantial likelihood that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented pro cess but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process. The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the patented process.

The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus: SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying. (underscoring supplied) Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of legislative power will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the [52] adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to [53] the Senate which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate. A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts [54] agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference. It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the [55] Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one page in Vol. I of the 36volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook: "(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions." The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representative s of the members can meet to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the [56] objectives of this Agreement. The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal [57] course of business.

On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral [58] parts, as follows: Article II Scope of the WTO 1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement. 2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to as Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members. 3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them. 4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as GATT 1994) is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947). It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members deliberation on [59] August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely [60] dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified. And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first submission? MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter. THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday? Senator Taada, please. SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services. I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.

SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina. SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants. In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote: By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures. In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales. SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays session and I dont see any need for repeating the same. Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela. THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this? SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make .

Epilogue In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or exce ss of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of [61] jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an [62] evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure on [63] the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot find any co gent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article [64] VII of the Constitution.

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of excha nge on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member. The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance where the East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century. He refers to the free market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Padilla, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
[65]

EN BANC

SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 158088 Vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, represented by Promulgated: HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE, July 6, 2005 Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION PUNO J.:

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal [1] jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as [2] defined in the Statute. The Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December [3] 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, [4] require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification. It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the [5] treaty. The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence. A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the [6] performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. We have held that to be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the [7] duty or act to be performed. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being

challenged. The term interest is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from [8] mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who asserts his legal standing to file the suit as member of the Senate; Congresswoman Loretta Ann Rosales, a member of the House of Representatives and Chairperson of its Committee on Human Rights; the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court which is composed of individuals and corporate entities dedicated to the Philippine ratification of the Rome Statute; the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, a juridical entity with the avowed purpose of promoting the cause of human rights and human rights victims in the country; the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances, a juridical entity duly organized and existing pursuant to Philippine Laws with the avowed purpose of promoting the cause of families and victims of human rights violations in the country; Bianca Hacintha Roque and Harrison Jacob Roque, aged two (2) and one (1), respectively, at the time of filing of the instant petition, and suing under the [9] doctrine of inter-generational rights enunciated in the case of Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.; and a group of fifth year working law students from the University of the Philippines College of Law who are suing as taxpayers. The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of [10] difficult constitutional questions. We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit. The other petitioners maintain their standing as advocates and defenders of human rights, and as citizens of the country. They have not shown, however, that they have sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate. Their contention that they will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and enforcement of their rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is intended to complement national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient remedies are available under our national laws to protect our citizens against human rights violations and petitioners can always seek redress for any abuse in our domestic courts. As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of [11] each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such authority of the Senate. We now go to the substantive issue. The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have aministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President. We rule in the negative. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external [12] relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to internatio nal affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise [13] transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided: Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties xxx.

Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated: Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa. The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the [14] executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political mat urity and [15] growth. In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate. We disagree. Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise: The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties. Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even collapse in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration. If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state. Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them . xxx The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification , which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed [16] effective upon its signature. [emphasis supplied] Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is [17] generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads:

Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement. The domestic requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be as follows: A. Executive Agreements.

i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for the preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall include the highlights of the agreements and the benefits which will accrue to the Philippines arising from them. ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement by the concerned agency, shall transmit the agreements to the President of the Philippines for his ratification. The original signed instrument of ratification shall then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action. B. Treaties.

i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with the requirements provided in sub-paragraph[s] 1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence in the ratification by the President. A certified true copy of the treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the Senate, together with a certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall accompany the submission of the treaties to the Senate. ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force. Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty whi ch it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its [18] plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on [19] substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense. It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the [20] ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its [21] consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is [22] a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the [23] performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125865

March 26, 2001

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. RESOLUTION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28, 2000, denying the petition for review. The Motion is anchored on the following arguments: 1) THE DFA'S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS. 2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE. 3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB). 4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA PROTOCOL. 5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONER'S CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)MANDALUYONG. 6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. This case has its origin in two criminal Informations for grave oral defamation filed against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial 2 Court dismissing the criminal cases. Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty. On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum. For the most part, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this
1

case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the "Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank," to wit: Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities: (a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner's and intervenor's Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED. Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., I also join concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno. Puno, J., Please see concurring opinion.

Concurring Opinions PUNO, J., concurring: For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Jeffrey Liang of this Court's decision dated January 28, 2000 which denied the petition for review. We there held that: the protocol communication of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect that petitioner Liang is covered by immunity is only preliminary and has no binding effect in courts; the immunity provided for under Section 45(a) of the Headquarters Agreement is subject to the condition that the act be done in an "official capacity"; that slandering a person cannot be said to have been done in an "official capacity" and, hence, it is not covered by the immunity agreement; under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions; the commission of a crime is not part of official duty; and that a preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is anchored on the following arguments: 1. The DFA's determination of immunity is a political question to be made by the executive branch of the government and is conclusive upon the courts; 2. The immunity of international organizations is absolute; 3. The immunity extends to all staff of the Asian Development Bank (ADB); 4. Due process was fully accorded the complainant to rebut the DFA protocol; 5. The decision of January 28, 2000 erroneously made a finding of fact on the merits, namely, the slandering of a person which prejudged petitioner's case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) Mandaluyong; and

6. The Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations is not applicable to this case. Petitioner contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the Department of Foreign Affairs is a political question. It is solely within the prerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. In support of his 1 2 submission, petitioner cites the following cases: WHO vs. Aquino; International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja ; The Holy 3 4 5 See vs. Rosario, Jr.; Lasco vs. United Nations; and DFA vs. NLRC. It is further contended that the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute . It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of international organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such organizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The exception allegedly has no application to the case at bar. Petitioner likewise urges that the international organization's immunity from local jurisdiction empowers the ADB alone to determine what constitutes "official acts" and the same cannot be subject to different interpretations by the member states. It asserts that the Headquarters Agreement provides for remedies to check abuses against the exercise of the immunity. Thus, Section 49 states that the "Bank shall waive the immunity accorded to any person if, in its opinion, such immunity would impede the course of justice and the waiver would not prejudice the purposes for which the immunities are accorded." Section 51 allows for consultation between the government and the Bank should the government consider that an abuse has occurred. The same section provides the mechanism for a dispute settlement regarding, among others, issues of interpretation or application of the agreement. Petitioner's argument that a determination by the Department of Foreign Affairs that he is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a 6 political question binding on the courts, is anchored on the ruling enunciated in the case of WHO, et al. vs. Aquino, et al., viz: "It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction." This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja; The Holy See vs. 8 9 10 Rosario, Jr.; Lasco vs. UN; and DFA vs. NLRC. The case of WHO vs. Aquino involved the search and seizure of personal effects of petitioner Leonce Verstuyft, an official of the WHO. Verstuyft was certified to be entitled to diplomatic immunity pursuant to the Host Agreement executed between the Philippines and the WHO. ICMC vs. Calleja concerned a petition for certification election filed against ICMC and IRRI. As international organizations, ICMC and IRRI were declared to possess diplomatic immunity. It was held that they are not subject to local jurisdictions. It was ruled that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor over the case would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations from political pressure or control by the host country and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. involved an action for annulment of sale of land against the Holy See, as represented by the Papal Nuncio. The Court upheld the petitioner's defense of sovereign immunity. It ruled that where a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state, which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in that case is the Holy See. In Lasco vs. United Nations, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration was sued before the NLRC for illegal dismissal. The Court again upheld the doctrine of diplomatic immunity invoked by the Fund.
7

Finally, DFA v. NLRC involved an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development Bank. Pursuant to its Charter and the Headquarters Agreement, the diplomatic immunity of the Asian Development Bank was recognized by the Court. It bears to stress that all of these cases pertain to the diplomatic immunity enjoyed by international organizations. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the same diplomatic immunity and he cannot be prosecuted for acts allegedly done in the exercise of his official functions. The term "international organizations" "is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general 11 international business in which the member states have an interest." International public officials have been defined as: ". . . persons who, on the basis of an international treaty constituting a particular international community, are appointed by this international community, or by an organ of it, and are under its control to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in 12 the interest of this particular international community, and who are subject to a particular personal status." "Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields, such as posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health 13 and refugees. Issues 1. Whether petitioner Liang, as an official of an international organization, is entitled to diplomatic immunity; 2. Whether an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all acts, whether private or official; 3. Whether the authority to determine if an act is official or private is lodged in the courts; 4. Whether the certification by the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner is covered by immunity is a political question that is binding and conclusive on the courts. Discussion I A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is. Thus: 1. Charter of the United Nations "Article 105 (1): The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. Article 105 (2): Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization." 2. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations "Section 2: The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.

xxx xxx xxx Section 11 (a): Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations . . shall . . . enjoy . . . immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, immunity from legal process of every kind. xxx xxx xxx Section 14: Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Members not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the United Nations. Consequently, a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded. xxx xxx xxx Section 18 (a): Officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. xxx xxx xxx Section 19: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in Section 18, the Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded in respect of themselves, their spouses and minor children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law. Section 20: Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interest of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations. xxx xxx xxx Section 22: Experts . . . performing missions for the United Nations . . . shall be accorded: (a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage; (b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind." 3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations "Article 29: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity. xxx xxx xxx Article 31 (1): A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in certain cases. xxx xxx xxx Article 38 (1): Except in so far as additional privileges and immunities may be granted by the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently a resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions." 4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

"Article 41 (1): Consular officials shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority. xxx xxx xxx Article 43 (1): Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions. Article 43 (2): The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not, however, apply in respect of a civil action either: (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or (b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft." 5. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies "Section 4: The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution. Section 13 (a): Representatives of members at meetings convened by a specialized agency shall, while exercising their functions and during their journeys to and from the place of meeting, enjoy immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of every kind. xxx xxx xxx Section 19 (a): Officials of the specialized agencies shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. xxx xxx xxx Section 21: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in sections 19 and 20, the executive head of each specialized agency, including a any official acting on his behalf during his absence from duty, shall be accorded in respect of himself, his spouse and minor children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law." 6. Charter of the ADB "Article 50 (1): The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities, in which cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territory of a country in which the Bank has its principal or a branch office, or has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. xxx xxx xxx Article 55 (i): All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including experts performing missions for the Bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity." 7. ADB Headquarters Agreement "Section 5: The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities, in which cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent jurisdiction in the Republic of the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx Section 44: Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the President, Vice-President and executive officers as may be agreed upon between the Government and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic of the Philippines in connection with their official duties with the Bank: (a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage; (b) immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their official capacity; and (c) in respect of other matters not covered in (a) and (b) above, such other immunities, exemptions, privileges and facilities as are enjoyed by members of diplomatic missions of comparable rank, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations. Section 45 (a): Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purposes of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy . . . immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity." II There are three major differences between diplomatic and international immunities . Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving State only with the express consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the receiving State. International immunities may be specially important in relation to the State of which the official is a national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of international immunities there is no sending State and an equivalent for the jurisdiction of the Sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of reciprocity and the danger of 14 retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities enjoy no similar protection. The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the foundation of international immunities are contained in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic propositions , namely: (1) that international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; (2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and (3) that the international organization should, as a collectivity of States Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The thinking underlying these propositions is essentially institutional in character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their 15 responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. III Positive international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of international organizations. The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an international organization and its personnel, but the status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms are determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent Court 16 of Justice, and the United Nations. The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this third category . There is a connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to international officials. The connection consists in the granting, by contractual provisions, of the relatively well-established body of diplomatic privileges and immunities to international functionaries. This connection is purely historical. Both types of officials find the basis of their special status in the

necessity of retaining functional independence and freedom from interference by the state of residence. However, the legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different from the relationship between the 17 international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions. The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations . Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending state based on customary international law, those granted to international officials are based on treaty or conventional law. Customary international law places no obligation on a state to recognize a special status of an international official or to grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from 18 specific treaty provisions. The special status of the diplomatic envoy is regulated by the principle of reciprocity by which a state is free to treat the envoy of another state as its envoys are treated by that state. The juridical basis of the diplomat's position is firmly established in customary international law. The diplomatic envoy is appointed by the sending State but it has to make certain that the agreement of the 19 receiving State has been given for the person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State. The staff personnel of an international organization the international officials assume a different position as regards their special status. They are appointed or elected to their position by the organization itself, or by a competent organ of it; they are responsible to the organization and their official acts are imputed to it. The juridical basis of their special position is found in 20 conventional law, since there is no established basis of usage or custom in the case of the international official. Moreover, the 21 relationship between an international organization and a member-state does not admit of the principle of reciprocity, for it is contradictory to the basic principle of equality of states. An international organization carries out functions in the interest of every member state equally. The international official does not carry out his functions in the interest of any state, but in serving the organization he serves, indirectly, each state equally. He cannot be, legally, the object of the operation of the principle of reciprocity between states under such circumstances. It is contrary to the principle of equality of states for one state member of an international organization to assert a capacity to extract special privileges for its nationals from other member states on the basis of a status awarded by it to an international organization. It is upon this principle of sovereign equality that international organizations are built. It follows from this same legal circumstance that a state called upon to admit an official of an international organization does not have a capacity to declare him persona non grata. The functions of the diplomat and those of the international official are quite different. Those of the diplomat are functions in the national interest. The task of the ambassador is to represent his state, and its specific interest, at the capital of another state. The functions of the international official are carried out in the international interest. He does not represent a state or the interest of any specific state. He does not usually "represent" the organization in the true sense of that term. His functions normally are administrative, although they may be judicial or executive, but they are rarely political or functions of representation, such as those of the diplomat. There is a difference of degree as well as of kind. The interruption of the activities of a diplomatic agent is likely to produce serious harm to the purposes for which his immunities were granted. But the interruption of the activities of the international official does 22 not, usually, cause serious dislocation of the functions of an international secretariat. On the other hand, they are similar in the sense that acts performed in an official capacity by either a diplomatic envoy or an international official are not attributable to him as an individual but are imputed to the entity he represents, the state in the case of 23 the diplomat, and the organization in the case of the international official. IV Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of international organizations, it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise of their functions The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and France which provided "all the rights of neutrality" to persons employed in regulating navigation in the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the European Commission of the Danube "complete independence of territorial authorities" in the exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League which granted "diplomatic immunities and privileges." Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of international organizations to a minimum . The tendency cannot be considered as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on the privileges and immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to international functionaries lies in the general reduction of

the special position of both types of agents in that the special status of each agent is granted in the interest of function . The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. While the current direction of the law seems to be to narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international organizations, the reverse is true with respect to the prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal entities. Historically, states have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to 24 organizations than they have to the personnel of these organizations . Thus, Section 2 of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that the UN shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. Section 4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies likewise provides that the specialized agencies shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process subject to the same exception. Finally, Article 50(1) of the ADB Charter and Section 5 of the Headquarters Agreement similarly provide that the bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities. The phrase "immunity from every form of legal process" as used in the UN General Convention has been interpreted to mean absolute immunity from a state's jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce its law by legal process, and it is said that states have not sought to restrict that immunity of the United Nations by interpretation or amendment. Similar provisions are contained in the Special Agencies Convention as well as in the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were accorded privileges and immunities in their charters by language similar to that applicable to the United Nations. It is clear therefore that 25 these organizations were intended to have similar privileges and immunities. From this, it can be easily deduced that international organizations enjoy absolute immunity similar to the diplomatic prerogatives granted to diplomatic envoys. Even in the United States this theory seems to be the prevailing rule. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was passed adopting the "restrictive theory" limiting the immunity of states under international law essentially to activities of a kind not carried on by private persons. Then the International Organizations Immunities Act came into effect which gives to designated international organizations the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments. This gives the impression that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has the effect of applying the restrictive theory also to international organizations generally. However, aside from the fact that there was no indication in its legislative history that Congress contemplated that result, and considering that the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations exempts the United Nations "from every form of legal process," conflict with the United States obligations under the Convention was sought to be avoided by interpreting the 26 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the restrictive theory, as not applying to suits against the United Nations. On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule . Section 18(a) of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity. Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his international functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the principle that an international official is independent of the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to waive an official's immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over an individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. Provisions for immunity from jurisdiction for official acts appear, aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of most modern international organizations. The acceptance of the principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as declaratory of international 27 law. V What then is the status of the international official with respect to his private acts ?

Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of the specified categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their private life and empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases without 28 the necessity of waiver. It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international officials were granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered immune for both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional 29 immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives. This much is explicit from the Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar provisions to that of the General Convention . VI Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or official? This is an entirely different question. In connection with this question, the current tendency to narrow the scope of privileges and immunities of international officials and representatives is most apparent. Prior to the regime of the United Nations, the determination of this question rested with the organization and its decision was final. By the new formula, the state itself tends to assume this competence. If the organization is dissatisfied with the decision, under the provisions of the General Convention of the United States, or the Special Convention for Specialized Agencies, the Swiss Arrangement, and other current dominant instruments, it may appeal to an international tribunal by procedures outlined in those instruments. Thus, the state assumes this competence in the first instance. It means that, if a local court assumes jurisdiction over an act without the necessity of waiver from the 30 organization, the determination of the nature of the act is made at the national level. It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private or official in the courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion seems to be to leave to the local courts determination of whether or not a given act is official or private does not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If the United Nations questions the decision of the Court, it may invoke proceedings for settlement of disputes between the organization and the member states as provided in Section 30 of the General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is official or private is made by the national courts in the 31 first instance, but it may be subjected to review in the international level if questioned by the United Nations. A similar view is taken by Kunz, who writes that the "jurisdiction of local courts without waiver for acts of private life empowers the local courts to determine whether a certain act is an official act or an act of private life," on the rationale that since the determination of such question, if left in the hands of the organization, would consist in the execution, or non-execution, of waiver, and since waiver is not mentioned in connection with the provision granting immunities to international officials, then the decision 32 must rest with local courts. Under the Third Restatement of the Law, it is suggested that since an international official does not enjoy personal inviolability from arrest or detention and has immunity only with respect to official acts, he is subject to judicial or administrative process and must claim his immunity in the proceedings by showing that the act in question was an official act. Whether an act was performed in the individual's official capacity is a question for the court in which a proceeding is brought, but if the international organization disputes the court's finding, the dispute between the organization and the state of the forum is to be resolved by negotiation, by an agreed 33 mode of settlement or by advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Recognizing the difficulty that by reason of the right of a national court to assume jurisdiction over private acts without a waiver of immunity, the determination of the official or private character of a particular act may pass from international to national control, Jenks proposes three ways of avoiding difficulty in the matter. The first would be for a municipal court before which a question of the official or private character of a particular act arose to accept as conclusive in the matter any claim by the international organization that the act was official in character, such a claim being regarded as equivalent to a governmental claim that a particular act is an act of State. Such a claim would be in effect a claim by the organization that the proceedings against the official were a violation of the jurisdictional immunity of the organization itself which is unqualified and therefore not subject to delimitation in the discretion of the municipal court. The second would be for a court to accept as conclusive in the matter a statement by the executive government of the country where the matter arises certifying the official character of the act. The third would be to have recourse to the procedure of international arbitration. Jenks opines that it is possible that none of these three solutions would be applicable in all cases; the first might be readily acceptable only in the clearest cases and the second is available only if the executive government of the country where the matter arises concurs in the view of the international organization concerning the official character of the act. However, he surmises that taken in combination, these various possibilities 34 may afford the elements of a solution to the problem.

One final point. The international official's immunity for official acts may be likened to a consular official's immunity from arrest, detention, and criminal or civil process which is not absolute but applies only to acts or omissions in the performance of his official functions, in the absence of special agreement. Since a consular officer is not immune from all legal process, he must respond to any process and plead and prove immunity on the ground that the act or omission underlying the process was in the performance of his official functions. The issue has not been authoritatively determined, but apparently the burden is on the consular officer to prove his status as well as his exemption in the circumstances. In the United States, the US Department of State generally has left it to the 35 courts to determine whether a particular act was within a consular officer's official duties. Submissions On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, I submit the following conclusions: First, petitioner Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, 36 unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, 37 that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes . This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity. Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which seeks to narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to personnel of international organizations, while at the same time aims to increase the prerogatives of international organizations. Second, considering that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only for their official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as the agency in charge of the executive department's foreign relations, nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to invoke immunity for private acts of bank officials and employees, since no such prerogative exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify. As an aside, ADB cannot even claim to have the right to waive immunity for private acts of its officials and employees. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement are clear that the immunity can be waived only with respect to official acts because this is only the extent to which the privilege has been granted. One cannot waive the right to a privilege which has never been granted or acquired. Third, I choose to adopt the view that it is the local courts which have jurisdiction to determine whether or not a given act is official or private. While there is a dearth of cases on the matter under Philippine jurisprudence, the issue is not entirely novel. The case of M.H. Wylie, et al. vs. Rarang, et al. concerns the extent of immunity from suit of the officials of a United States Naval Base inside the Philippine territory. Although a motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants therein invoking their immunity from suit pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the trial court denied the same and, after trial, rendered a decision declaring that the defendants are not entitled to immunity because the latter acted beyond the scope of their official duties. The Court 39 likewise applied the ruling enunciated in the case of Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan to the effect that a mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. While it is true that the Chavez case involved a public official, the Court did not find any substantial reason why the same rule cannot be made to apply to a US official assigned at the US Naval Station located in the Philippines. In this case, it was the local courts which ascertained whether the acts complained of were done in an official or personal capacity. In the case of The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr., a complaint for annulment of contract of sale, reconveyance, specific performance and damages was filed against petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of, among others, lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, which was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration, and subsequently, a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense" were filed by
40 38

petitioner. The trial court deferred resolution of said motions until after trial on the merits. On certiorari, the Court there ruled on the issue of petitioner's non-suability on the basis of the allegations made in the pleadings filed by the parties. This is an implicit recognition of the court's jurisdiction to ascertain the suability or non-suability of the sovereign by assessing the facts of the case. The Court hastened to add that when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, in some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels, or where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved. Finally, it appears from the records of this case that petitioner is a senior economist at ADB and as such he makes country project profiles which will help the bank in deciding whether to lend money or support a particular project to a particular 41 country. Petitioner stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary, the private complainant herein. Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation to his official functions as a senior economist. I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration. Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs.

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994 THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents. Padilla Law Office for petitioner. Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183. The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order. Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). I On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No. 90-183). The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to

private respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8) private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00. Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages. On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21). On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration. On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22). Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio. On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87). Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda. II A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial. The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).

In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]). In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja , 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. InWorld Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae. In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity. In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved. III The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines. A. The Holy See Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a sovereign state is in order. Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]). In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]). The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]). In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]). One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]). Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 ( Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations. B. Sovereign Immunity As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]). Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character." The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii. The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and international trading. This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is

undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra): There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965. In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint ( Rollo, pp. 26, 27). The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994).

IV Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice: By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]). WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. The facts are: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void. On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001. Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus: In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions: 1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government; 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and 4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. SO ORDERED. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail. In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. 1 Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus: x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the follow ing trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international 2 community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the 3 Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process. The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order. First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to 4 criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the 8 9 demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its 10 nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing 11 its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the 12 13 potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of 14 trial or punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the " immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently." Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major
6 7

premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential 15 extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed " clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC Vinuya vs. Sec. Alberto Romulo DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more [1] peaceful world services the debt.

There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter. Factual Antecedents This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in thePhilippines during the Second World War. Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having [2] endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Issues Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Petitioners arguments Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against [3] [4] [5] humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine governments acceptance of the apologies made by Japan as well as funds from the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) were contrary to international law.

Respondents Arguments Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty [6] of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace provides: Article 14. Claims and Property a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet its other obligations. b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.
[8] [7]

In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan have been satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by the Asian Womens Fund. Historical Background The comfort women system was the tragic legacy of the Rape of Nanking. In December 1937, Japanese military forces captured the city of Nanking in China and began a barbaric campaign of terror known as the Rape of Nanking, which included the rapes and murders of an [9] estimated 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese women, including young girls, pregnant mothers, and elderly women. In reaction to international outcry over the incident, the Japanese government sought ways to end international condemnation by establishing the comfort women system. Under this system, the military could simultaneously appease soldiers' sexual appetites and contain [11] soldiers' activities within a regulated environment. Comfort stations would also prevent the spread of venereal disease among soldiers and [12] discourage soldiers from raping inhabitants of occupied territories. Daily life as a comfort woman was unmitigated misery. The military forced victims into barracks-style stations divided into tiny [14] cubicles where they were forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many 30 soldiers per day. The 30 minutes allotted for sexual relations with [15] [16] each soldier were 30-minute increments of unimaginable horror for the women. Disease was rampant. Military doctors regularly examined the women, but these checks were carried out to prevent the spread of venereal diseases; little notice was taken of the frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones inflicted on the women by soldiers. Fewer than 30% of the women survived the war. Their agony continued in having to suffer with the residual physical, psychological, and emotional scars from their former lives. Some returned home and were ostracized by their families. Some committed suicide. Others, out of [18] shame, never returned home. Efforts to Secure Reparation The most prominent attempts to compel the Japanese government to accept legal responsibility and pay compensatory damages for the comfort women system were through a series of lawsuits, discussion at the United Nations (UN), resolutions by various nations, and the Womens [19] International Criminal Tribunal. The Japanese government, in turn, responded through a series of public apologies and the creation of the AWF. Lawsuits In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two other survivors filed the first lawsuit in Japan by former comfort women against the Japanese [20] [21] government. The Tokyo District Court however dismissed their case. Other suits followed, but the Japanese government has, thus far, [22] successfully caused the dismissal of every case.
[17] [13] [10]

Undoubtedly frustrated by the failure of litigation before Japanese courts, victims of the comfort women system brought their claims before the United States (US). On September 18, 2000, 15 comfort women filed a class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of [23] Columbia "seeking money damages for [allegedly] having been subjected to sexual slavery and torture before and during World War II," in [24] violation of "both positive and customary international law." The case was filed pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allowed [25] the plaintiffs to sue the Japanese government in a US federal district court. On October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the lawsuit due to lack of jurisdiction over Japan, stating that *t+here is no question that this court is not the appropriate forum in which plaintiffs may seek to reopen x x x discussions nearly half a century later x x x [E]ven if Japan did not enjoy sovereign immunity, plaintiffs' claims are non-justiciable and must be dismissed. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted [27] the womens petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and remanded the case. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior decision, noting that much as we may feel for the plight of the appellants, the courts of [28] the US simply are not authorized to hear their case. The women again brought their case to the US Supreme Court which denied their petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2006. Efforts at the United Nations In 1992, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS), submitted a petition to the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), asking for assistance in investigating crimes committed by Japan against Korean women and seeking reparations for [29] former comfort women. The UNHRC placed the issue on its agenda and appointed Radhika Coomaraswamy as the issue's special investigator. In 1996, Coomaraswamy issued a Report reaffirming Japan's responsibility in forcing Korean women to act as sex slaves for the imperial army, and made the following recommendations: A. 137. (a) At the national level The Government of Japan should: Acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War was a violation of its obligations under international law and accept legal responsibility for that violation; Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese military sexual slavery according to principles outlined by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A special administrative tribunal for this purpose should be set up with a limited time-frame since many of the victims are of a very advanced age; Make a full disclosure of documents and materials in its possession with regard to comfort stations and other related activities of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War; Make a public apology in writing to individual women who have come forward and can be substantiated as women victims of Japanese military sexual slavery; Raise awareness of these issues by amending educational curricula to reflect historical realities; Identify and punish, as far as possible, perpetrators involved in the recruitment and institutionalization of comfort stations during the Second World War.
[26]

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e) (f)

Gay J. McDougal, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, also presented a report to the Sub-Committee on June 22, 1998 entitled Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slaverylike Practices During Armed Conflict. The report included an appendix entitled An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for [30] 'Comfort Women Stations' established during the Second World War, which contained the following findings: 68. The present report concludes that the Japanese Government remains liable for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity. The Japanese Governments arguments to the contrary, including arguments that seek to attack the underlying humanitarian law prohibition of enslavement and rape, remain as unpersuasive today as they were when they were first raised before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal more than 50 years ago. In addition, the Japanese Governments argument that Japan has already settled all claims from the Second

World War through peace treaties and reparations agreements following the war remains equally unpersuasive. This is due, in large part, to the failure until very recently of the Japanese Government to admit the extent of the Japanese militarys direct involvement in the establishment and maintenance of these rape centres. The Japanese Governments silence on this point during the period in which peace and reparations agreements between Japan and other Asian Governments were being negotiated following the end of the war must, as a matter of law and justice, preclude Japan from relying today on these peace treaties to extinguish liability in these cases. 69. The failure to settle these claims more than half a century after the cessation of hostilities is a testament to the degree to which the lives of women continue to be undervalued. Sadly, this failure to address crimes of a sexual nature committed on a massive scale during the Second World War has added to the level of impunity with which similar crimes are committed today. The Government of Japan has taken some steps to apologize and atone for the rape and enslavement of over 200,000 women and girls who were brutalized in comfort stations during the Second World War. However, anything less than full and unqualified acceptance by the Government of Japan of legal liability and the consequences that flow from such liability is wholly inadequate. It must now fall to the Government of Japan to take the necessary final steps to provide adequate redress.

The UN, since then, has not taken any official action directing Japan to provide the reparations sought. Women's International War Crimes

Tribunal The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT) was a people's tribunal established by a number of Asian women and human [31] rights organizations, supported by an international coalition of non-governmental organizations. First proposed in 1998, the WIWCT convened in Tokyo in 2000 in order to adjudicate Japan's military sexual violence, in particular the enslavement of comfort women, to bring those responsible for it to justice, and to end the ongoing cycle of impunity for wartime sexual violence against women. After examining the evidence for more than a year, the tribunal issued its verdict on December 4, 2001, finding the former Emperor [32] Hirohito and the State of Japan guilty of crimes against humanity for the rape and sexual slavery of women. It bears stressing, however, that although the tribunal included prosecutors, witnesses, and judges, its judgment was not legally binding since the tribunal itself was organized by private citizens. Action by Individual Governments On January 31, 2007, US Representative Michael Honda of California, along with six co-sponsor representatives, introduced House Resolution 121 which called for Japanese action in light of the ongoing struggle for closure by former comfort women. The Resolution was [33] formally passed on July 30, 2007, and made four distinct demands: [I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan (1) should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as comfort women, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II; (2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as a public statement in his official capacity; (3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual enslavement and trafficking of the comfort women for the Japanese Imperial Army never occurred; and (4) should educate current and future generations about this horrible [34] crime while following the recommendations of the international community with respect to the comfort women.

In December 2007, the European Parliament, the governing body of the European Union, drafted a resolution similar to House [35] Resolution 121. Entitled, Justice for Comfort Women, the resolution demanded: (1) a formal acknowledgment of responsibility by the Japanese government; (2) a removal of the legal obstacles preventing compensation; and (3) unabridged education of the past. The resolution also stressed the urgency with which Japan should act on these issues, stating: the right of individuals to claim reparations against the government should be expressly recognized in national law, and cases for reparations for the survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law, should be prioritized, taking into account the age of the survivors. The Canadian and Dutch parliaments have each followed suit in drafting resolutions against Japan. Canada's resolution demands the Japanese government to issue a formal apology, to admit that its Imperial Military coerced or forced hundreds of thousands of women into sexual

slavery, and to restore references in Japanese textbooks to its war crimes. The Dutch parliament's resolution calls for the Japanese government to uphold the 1993 declaration of remorse made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdoms Parliament also produced a report in November, 2008 entitled, "Global Security: Japan and Korea" which concluded that Japan should acknowledge the pain caused by the issue of comfort women in order to ensure cooperation between Japan and Korea. Statements of Remorse made by representatives of the Japanese government

[36]

Various officials of the Government of Japan have issued the following public statements concerning the comfort system: a) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in 1993: The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime "comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study. As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the KoreanPeninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc. Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment. We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history. As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto.

b)

Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayamas Statement in 1994

On the issue of wartime comfort women, which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies

c) Letters from the Prime Minister of Japan to Individual Comfort Women The issue of comfort women, with the involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of a large number of women. As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who endured immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.

d) The Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed resolutions in 1995 and 2005 Solemnly reflecting upon the many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression that occurred in modern world history, and recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past and inflicted suffering on the people of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House hereby express deep remorse. (Resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on June 9, 1995)

e) Various Public Statements by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe I have talked about this matter in the Diet sessions last year, and recently as well, and to the press. I have been consistent. I will stand by the Kono Statement. This is our consistent position. Further, we have been apologizing sincerely to those who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable psychological wounds as comfort women. Former Prime Ministers, including Prime Ministers Koizumi and Hashimoto, have issued letters to the comfort women. I would like to be clear that I carry the same feeling. This has not changed even slightly. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at an Interview by NHK, March 11, 2007). I am apologizing here and now. I am apologizing as the Prime Minister and it is as stated in the statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at the Budget Committee, the House of Councilors, the Diet of Japan, March 26, 2007). I am deeply sympathetic to the former comfort women who suffered hardships, and I have expressed my apologies for the extremely agonizing circumstances into which they were placed. (Excerpt from Telephone Conference by Prime Minister Abe to President George W. Bush,April 3, 2007). I have to express sympathy from the bottom of my heart to those people who were taken as wartime comfort women. As a human being, I would like to express my sympathies, and also as prime minister of Japan I need to apologize to them. My administration has been saying all along that we continue to stand by the Kono Statement. We feel responsible for having forced these women to go through that hardship and pain as comfort women under the circumstances at the time. (Excerpt from an interview article "A Conversation with Shinzo Abe" by the Washington Post,April 22, 2007). x x x both personally and as Prime Minister of Japan, my heart goes out in sympathy to all those who suffered extreme hardships as comfort women; and I expressed my apologies for the fact that they were forced to endure such extreme and harsh conditions. Human rights are violated in many parts of the world during the 20th Century; therefore we must work to make the 21st Century a wonderful century in which no human rights are violated. And the Government of Japan and I wish to make significant contributions to that end. (Excerpt from Prime Minister Abe's remarks at the Joint Press Availability after the summit meeting at Camp David between Prime Minister Abe and President Bush, April 27, 2007).

The Asian Women's Fund Established by the Japanese government in 1995, the AWF represented the government's concrete attempt to address its moral [37] responsibility by offering monetary compensation to victims of the comfort women system. The purpose of the AWF was to show atonement of the Japanese people through expressions of apology and remorse to the former wartime comfort women, to restore their honor, and to [38] demonstrate Japans strong respect for women. The AWF announced three programs for former comfort women who applied for assistance: (1) an atonement fund paying 2 million (approximately $20,000) to each woman; (2) medical and welfare support programs, paying 2.5-3 million ($25,000-$30,000) for each woman; and (3) a letter of apology from the Japanese Prime Minister to each woman. Funding for the program came from the Japanese government and private donations from the Japanese people. As of March 2006, the AWF provided 700 million (approximately $7 million) for these programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; 380 million (approximately $3.8 million) in Indonesia; and 242 million (approximately $2.4 million) in the Netherlands.

On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Our Ruling Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. The petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
[39]

Baker v. Carr

remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained that:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
[40]

In Taada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to bedecided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to [42] judicial inquiry or decision." The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has [43] neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.
[41]

To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or [44] invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US Supreme Court held that *t+he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. x x x
[45]

This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v. [46] [47] Executive Secretary and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary; its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief) Justice Punos [48] dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion: x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine government was without authority to negotiate the Treaty of Peace with Japan. And it is equally true that, since time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords and settling international claims: x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as their own, treating them as national assets, and as counters, `chips', in international bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked, claims deriving from private debts with others that were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in regard to one category of claims might be set off against concessions in [49] the other, or against larger political considerations unrelated to debts.

Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, [50] thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton, a case brought by a British subject to recover a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during the war, Justice Chase wrote: I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for, British property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could only be provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these subjects, in the treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in courts of justice. (Emphasis supplied).

This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is certainly [51] nothing new. For instance, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, the US Supreme Court held: Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of another country are sources of friction between the two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the government of another are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x x x Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments or the establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their

interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a whole. Henkin, supra, at 262-263. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 213 (1965) (President may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state x x x *even+ without the consent of the *injured+ national). It is clear that the practice of settling claims continues today.

Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan not necessarily for the complete atonement of the suffering caused by Japanese aggression during the war, not for the payment of adequate reparations, but for security purposes. The treaty sought to prevent the spread of communism in Japan, which occupied a strategic position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised individual claims in the collective interest of the free world. This was also the finding in a similar case involving American victims of Japanese slave labor during the war. In a consolidated case in the [53] [54] Northern District of California, the court dismissed the lawsuits filed, relying on the 1951 peace treaty with Japan, because of the following policy considerations: The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the agreement was to settle the reparations issue once and for all. As the statement of the chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well understood that leaving open the possibility of future claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace: Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception. On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering. On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. x x x The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for reparations should be sharply limited was informed by the experience of six years of United States-led occupation of Japan. During the occupation the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the region, General Douglas MacArthur, confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with the task of managing the economic affairs of the vanquished nation and with a view to reparations payments. It soon became clear that Japan's financial condition would render any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At the end of 1948, MacArthur expressed the view that *t+he use of reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a viable economy in Japan should be combated with all possible means and recommended that the reparations issue be settled finally and without delay. That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only from the negotiations history but also from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending approval of the treaty by the Senate. The committee noted, for example: Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy of x x x the United States x x x.
[52]

We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claims.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has [55] been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. Nowhere is this position more clearly reflected than in the dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case: By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of [56] its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant. Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than the legal merits of the particular [57] claim. As clearly stated by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position [58] internationally. (Emphasis supplied)

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i) state that [59] "the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State, (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a [60] "sovereign prerogative" of the State; and (iii) stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection [61] on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so." It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are [62] injured. However, at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic [63] protection of their own nationals abroad. Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio jurishas evolved in such a direction. If it is [64] a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment. We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under [65] contemporary international law. However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments suppor t the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits against perpetrators of international [66] crimes. Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute [67] international crimes. Of course a customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective [68] prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligationsowed by States towards the community of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga [69] omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice. The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms [70] of equivalent authority. Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s, but peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention [72] with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law. The recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [73] [74] (VCLT). Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens, the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms. After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any [75] generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens. In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked [76] out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is [77] [78] undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance, beyond a tiny core of principles and rules. Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to challenge those that have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to say, our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their fundamental human rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power tourge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
[71]