SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999]

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents. DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and May 18, 1990, respectively, dismissing petitioners charge that Honorable Benigno T. Dayaw, Presiding Judge of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering them to deliver to private respondents the six-wheeler truck and its cargo, some 4,000 board feet of narra lumber which were confiscated by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and forfeited in favor of the government.i[1] The antecedent facts: On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber:ii[2] a. What were declared in the documents (Certificate of Timber Origin, Auxiliary Invoices and various Certifications) were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber; b. As appearing in the documents, the Plate Numbers of the truck supposed to carry the forest products bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the Plate Number of the truck apprehended is NVT-881; c. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin, which merely covers only transport of logs and flitches; d. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber and Hardware,iii[3]

which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD Circular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and (4) Tally Sheets.iv[4] Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.v[5] Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the sixwheeler truck.vi[6] On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Secretary) issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.vii[7] Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction on March 20, 1989.viii[8] On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.ix[9] Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2045 and raffled to Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City. On the same day, the trial court issued an Order directing petitioners to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.x[10] On March 20, 1989, the scheduled date of the auction sale, private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00.xi[11] The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representative x x x.xii[12] On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith.xiii[13] David G. Brodett, Sheriff of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City (hereinafter referred to as the Sheriff) reported that petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the DENR Compound and transferring them to the Mobil Unit Compound of the Quezon City Police Force. To avoid any unwarranted confrontation between them, he just agreed to a constructive possession of the properties in question.xiv[14] In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. But the trial court did not oblige petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on private respondents. Petitioners then immediately made the required service and tendered the cash counterbond in the amount of

P180,000.00, but it was refused, petitioners Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989. xv[15] On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond which was, however, denied for the same reason. xvi[16] On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure.xvii[17] The trial court gave petitioners twenty-four (24) hours to answer the motion. Hearing thereon was scheduled on March 30, 1989. However, on March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.xviii[18] On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO). On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.xix[19] However, on March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that as the complaint for replevin filed by private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.xx[20] As for the contempt charges against petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the report submitted by the Sheriff.xxi[21] On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision. However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.xxii[22] Hence this petition. On the one hand, petitioners contend, thus: (1) Confiscated lumber cannot be subject of replevin.xxiii[23] (2) Petitioners not compelled to criminally prosecute private respondents but may opt only to confiscate lumber".xxiv[24] (3) Private respondent charged criminally in court.xxv[25] and (4) Writ of Replevin issued in contravention of PD #605.xxvi[26]

On the other hand, private respondents argue that: (1) The respondent Judge had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for recovery of personal property and, therefore, had jurisdiction to issue the necessary orders in connection therewith.xxvii[27] (2) The issuance of the order for the delivery of personal property upon application, affidavit and filing of replevin bond by the plaintiff is mandatory and not discretionary, hence, no abuse of discretion can be committed by the trial court in the issuance thereof.xxviii[28] (3) The Order of March 20, 1989 was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court and is, therefore, valid.xxix[29] (4) The private respondents have not been proven to have violated Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.xxx[30] (5) The petitioners do not have the authority to keep private respondents property for an indefinite period, more so, to dispose of the same without notice and hearing or without due process.xxxi[31] (6) Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, no formal investigation was conducted by the PIC with respect to the subject lumber in this case.xxxii[32] (7) The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the petitioner Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. of the DENR is not valid and does not make the issuance of the order of replevin illegal.xxxiii[33] and (8) The subject properties were not in custody of the law and may be replevied.xxxiv[34] At the outset we observe that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705 which reads: All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President x x x. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.xxxv[35] As to the application of this doctrine in cases involving violations of P.D. No. 705, our ruling in Paat v. Court of Appeals, is apropos:

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court held: Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.xxxvi[36] However, petitioners did not file a motion to dismiss based on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.xxxvii[37] Nonetheless, the petition is impressed with merit. First. A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicants filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Said provision reads: Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts: (a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or entitled to the possession thereof; (b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention thereof to his best knowledge, information, and belief; (c) That it has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized under an execution, or an attachment against the property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure; and (d) The actual value of the property. x x x xxx x x x .

Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, to wit: SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. - In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water, or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.xxxviii[38] As the petitioner Secretarys administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided by law, the taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents. Second. Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and sixwheeler truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis.xxxix[39] When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it.xl[40] Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken.xli[41] So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Sec. 2(c), Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts: x x x xxx x x x;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution, or preliminary attachment or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; x x x x x x xxx x x x.xlii[42]

Third. Petitioner Secretarys authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, in Paat, we held that: x x x precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. x x x. The preamble of EO 277 that added Section 68-A to PD 705- is most revealing: WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos; WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations; WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the Penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and WHEREAS, to overcome this [sic] difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities; It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power of confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, x x x.xliii[43] Sec. 68-A was added precisely to supplant the inadequacies and supplement criminal enforcement of forestry laws. Fourth. Sec. 80 of P. D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A. Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 provides: SEC. 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest even without a warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the

proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court. x x x xxx x x x.

The title of Sec. 80 - Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions - bespeaks this intendment of the law. The fact, too, that Secs. 68 and 80 were co-existing prior to the introduction of Sec. 68-A, proves that Sec. 80 applies to the criminal prosecutions subject of Sec. 68 and not to the administrative confiscation subject of Sec. 68-A. Sec. 68-A, therefore, should not be interpreted in relation to Sec. 80 as to require that criminal charges be filed with and seized forest products be immediately delivered to, the fiscal in case of administrative confiscation, for this renders nugatory the purpose sought to be achieved thereby. Statutes should always be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such interpretation as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.xliv[44] Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the confiscation of their properties. On the contrary, by private respondents own admission, private respondent Sy who drove the six-wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy and his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain the deficiencies in the documents.xlv[45] Private respondents categorically stated that they made a continuous and almost daily follow-up and plea x x x with the PIC for the return of the truck and lumber x x x.xlvi[46] Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private respondent Lily Francisco Uy requested petitioner Secretary for immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn lumber.xlvii[47] Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order of confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in all instances, essential in administrative proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.xlviii[48] Moreover, respondents claim that the order of confiscation was antedated and not the product of the investigation supposedly conducted by the PIC of the DENR. However, they proffer no proof to support that allegation. On the other hand, there is the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is even particularly strong with respect to administrative agencies like the DENR which are vested with quasi-judicial powers in enforcing the laws affecting their respective fields of activity, the proper regulation of which requires of them such technical mastery of all relevant conditions obtaining in the nation.xlix[49] Finally. The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which

presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order having been issued, no contempt of court could be committed.l[50] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17194 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Respondent Presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989 in Civil Case No. Q-89-2045, or if said orders have already been enforced, the said respondent Judge is directed to render judgment of forfeiture on the replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent Judge is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private respondents against the petitioners. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997] LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents. DECISION TORRES, JR., J.: Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines? Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government? These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution. The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents

for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,li[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.lii[2] Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.liii[3] Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayanliv[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,lv[5] which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.lvi[6] Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989.lvii[7] Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.lviii[8] Hence, this present petition,lix[9] with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,lx[10] the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court. Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime. Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide

on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.lxi[11] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.lxii[12] This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,lxiii[13] (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,lxiv[14] (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,lxv[15] (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,lxvi[16] (5) when there is irreparable injury,lxvii[17] (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,lxviii[18] (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,lxix[19] (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,lxx[20] (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,lxxi[21] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.lxxii[22] In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,lxxiii[23] private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus: xxx If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.lxxiv[24] It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very

nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.lxxv[25] In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, lxxvi[26] which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,lxxvii[27] this Court held: Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.lxxviii[28] One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings.lxxix[29] In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.lxxx[30] Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration,lxxxi[31] as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco,lxxxii[32] we ruled that : The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

SECTION 68. xxx xxx The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours) A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein below: SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline ours) It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.lxxxiii[33] Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.lxxxiv[34] In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus: But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing: WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations; WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities; It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.lxxxv[35] Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part , viz. : xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxxlxxxvi[36] We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out: xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. xxxlxxxvii[37] Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section

68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus: SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 ) SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended) With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.lxxxviii[38] From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.lxxxix[39] To detain is defined as to mean to hold or keep in custody,xc[40] and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever there is

an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.xci[41] Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.xcii[42] Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with out the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar. Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads : SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City FIRST DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-06-2025 April 5, 2010 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2472-RTJ) CECILIA GADRINAB SENARLO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, RTC, BRANCH 38, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Respondent. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Before the Court is an administrative Complaint1 filed by complainant Cecilia Gadrinab Senarlo (Senarlo) against Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, relative to Civil Case No. 2005-160, captioned Lorna Cabarrubias Bacalzo, represented by Cecilia Gadrinab Senarlo v. The Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church of Cagayan de Oro City. The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: Civil Case No. 2005-160, an action for reconveyance and quieting of title, was instituted by Lorna Cabarrubias Bacalzo (Bacalzo) against the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church of Cagayan de Oro City (the Archbishop) before the RTC, presided over by Judge Paderanga. Bacalzo was seeking to recover a piece of land, measuring about 350 square meters, which her predecessor-in-interest had previously donated to the Roman Catholic Church, since allegedly the said property was no longer being devoted for the purpose it was donated. Considering that Bacalzo was already residing in the United States of America (U.S.A.), she was represented by her granddaughter, Senarlo, in Civil Case No. 2005-160. In an Order2 dated October 7, 2005, Judge Paderanga referred Civil Case No. 2005-160 for mediation to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC), in accordance with Rule 16, Section 2(A) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings.3 Judge Paderanga directed the parties in Civil Case No. 2005-160 to proceed and personally appear, with or without their respective counsels, for mediation proceedings, on November 4, 2005 at 2:00 p.m. at the PMC Unit Room 217, 2/F Hall of Justice.

On October 14, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 933 declaring November 4, 2005 a regular holiday, i.e., non-working holiday, in celebration of the Feast of Ramadan (Eidl Fitr). In view of the foregoing development, Bacalzo, who arrived from the U.S.A., went with her counsel to the PMC on November 7, 2005, instead of November 4, 2005. Bacalzo and her counsel signed on even date a Request for Resetting of Mediation Conference to November 15, 2005. The Request for Resetting was not signed by the Archbishop and his counsel, and written on the lines allotted for their signatures was the phrase "failed to appear." The Request for Resetting was approved by Mediator Atty. Zoilo Antonio G. Velez (Atty. Velez) and noted by Daily Supervisor Ariel V. Lamco.4 Bacalzo and her counsel subsequently executed another undated Request5 for Resetting of Mediation Conference to November 29, 2005. The second Request for Resetting, again unsigned by the Archbishop and his counsel, who once more failed to appear for mediation, was likewise approved by Atty. Velez. Regardless of the resetting of the PMC mediation proceedings, Judge Paderanga issued on November 9, 2005 an Order,6 which read in part: The mediator has reported that both parties failed to appear at the Philippine Mediation Center on November 4, 2005, at 2:00 p.m. for the mediation conference. For failure of the parties to obey the Order of the Court and to appear at the mediation conference on November 4, 2005 at 2:00 p.m., the plaintiff is declared non-suited and this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Consequently, Senarlo filed the present administrative Complaint against Judge Paderanga for (a) Gross Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment for issuing the Order dated November 9, 2005, without regard to the fact that November 4, 2005, the date when the mediation conference was first scheduled, was declared a holiday; and (b) Grave Abuse of Authority, for issuing the said Order in the absence of the corresponding Mediators Report. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., required Judge Paderanga to comment on Senarlos complaint within ten days from receipt.7 In his Comment,8 Judge Paderanga denied the allegations in Senarlos Complaint, insisting that he did not dismiss Civil Case No. 2005-160 precipitately and without any basis or out of bias and hostility. Judge Paderanga maintained that his actions in Civil Case No. 2005-160 were proper. He pointed out that when he issued the Order dated October 7, 2005, setting the mediation conference in Civil Case No. 2005-160 on November 4, 2005, the latter date had not yet been declared a holiday. Being busy with daily court trials, Judge Paderanga explained that he could not keep track of all events, nor monitor in detail the development of cases which he heard, including those he referred to PMC for mediation. Judge Paderanga attached a Manifestation (Mediators

Report)9 dated November 7, 2005, signed by Mediator Emmanuel G. Talipan and noted by Daily Supervisor Lamco, stating: 1. THAT a Court Order dated 7 October 2005, required the parties to immediately appear before the Philippine Mediation Center Unit Room 217, 2/F Hall of Justice, Cagayan de Oro City on 04 November 2005 at 2:00 P.M., however [erasures] failed to appear. 2. THAT in conformity with our mandate to exert effort to reach for a possible settlement, the undersigned would like to seek the courts assistance in securing the appearance of 1.) LORNA CABARRUBIAS BACALZO, represented by CECILIA GADRINAB B. SENARLO 2.) THE ARCHBISHOP OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY Before the Philippine Mediation Center, Cagayan de Oro City on 21 November 2005 3:00 P.M. and to pray for appropriate sanction(s) that this Honorable Court may impose for non-appearance and refusal to obey Court Order and processes. Said Mediators Report was received by the RTC on November 8, 2005. Judge Paderanga claimed to have been misled by the above-quoted Mediators Report into believing that both parties failed to appear during the mediation conference on November 4, 2005. He considered the purported non-appearance of Bacalzo at the mediation proceedings as lack of interest to pursue the case. Judge Paderanga additionally argued that Senarlo could have availed herself of other judicial remedies, such as the filing of a timely motion for reconsideration, instead of the present administrative case. Because Senarlo failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the November 9, 2005 Order, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2005-160 already attained finality. On September 12, 2006, the OCA submitted its Report10 with the following recommendations: 1. The instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case; 2. Respondent Judge Maximo G.W. Paderangga be found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of Authority and accordingly meted a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos; [and] 3. The rest of the charges be DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court re-docketed Senarlos Complaint as a regular administrative case and required the parties to manifest within ten days from notice if they are willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.11 Even though both parties duly received notices, it was only Judge Paderanga who submitted his Manifestation12 on November 20, 2006 regarding his willingness to submit the case for resolution on the pleadings.13 Senarlo filed instead an Urgent

Motion for Resolution14 and Motion for Resolution15 on July 2, 2007 and May 21, 2008, respectively. The Court finally deemed the case submitted for resolution based on the pleadings filed. The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether Judge Paderanga is liable for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the Order dated November 9, 2005 which declared Bacalzo non-suited and dismissed Civil Case No. 2005-160. The Court, although finding that Judge Paderanga is administratively liable for issuing the assailed Order, does not fully agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA. To the eyes of this Court, Judge Paderanga is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." Also administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is a judge who shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence.16 Such is not the case presently before this Court. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated 16 October 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court grant judges the discretion to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at mediation proceedings. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA considers mediation a part of pre-trial and provides sanctions for the absent party: 12. Sanctions Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings. (Emphases ours.) Under Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, failure of the plaintiff to appear at pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the action: SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. - The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphasis ours.) As may be gleaned from above, there was ostensible legal basis for Judge Paderanga to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to attend the mediation conference. However, Judge

Paderangas Order dated November 9, 2005, dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, was improperly and prematurely issued. Judge Paderanga failed to take into consideration that Bacalzo, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2005-160, could not have attended the mediation conference scheduled on November 4, 2005 because the said date had been declared a regular holiday under Presidential Proclamation No. 933. The declaration of November 4, 2005 as a holiday was a development totally outside Bacalzos control for which she should not be sanctioned with the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2005-160. It is true that when Judge Paderanga issued his Order dated October 7, 2005, setting the mediation conference for Civil Case No. 2005-160 on November 4, 2005, the latter date had not yet been declared a holiday. Presidential Proclamation No. 933, declaring November 4, 2005 a regular holiday in celebration of Eidl Fitr, was issued only on October 14, 2005.1avvphi1 Nevertheless, the Order dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160 was issued by Judge Paderanga on November 9, 2005, well after the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 933 on October 14, 2005, and the actual celebration of the holiday of Eidl Fitr on November 4, 2005. By the time Judge Paderanga ordered Civil Case No. 2005-160 dismissed, he should have already been aware that November 4, 2005 was a regular holiday. Judge Paderanga cannot entirely put the blame on the supposedly misleading Mediators Report. As the Court notes, the RTC had already received on November 8, 2005 the Mediators Report, which stated that the parties failed to attend the November 4, 2005 mediation conference. Judge Paderanga issued the assailed Order dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160 the following day, on November 9, 2005, a mere five days after November 4, 2005. Judge Paderanga could not have forgotten so soon that November 4, 2005 was a holiday. Moreover, the same Mediators Report requested for the resetting of the mediation conference to November 21, 2005. Judge Paderanga could have easily inquired with the PMC or required them to explain the reason for the resetting. Yet, Judge Paderanga no longer bothered to look into the reason for the non-appearance of the parties or the basis for the request of the mediator for resetting. Without providing any reasons therefor, Judge Paderanga chose to ignore the request for resetting and immediately ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2005-160. His action is contrary to the policy that the judge referring the case to mediation should extend to the mediator every possible support and assistance.17 Courts and litigants should give the mediation process a fair chance to work in order for mediation to become an effective tool in facilitating amicable settlement of cases. A heavy workload does not excuse Judge Paderanga from ascertaining all pertinent facts that would have enabled him to justly resolve or decide a case. A judge must not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case. A prudent judge should have ascertained the facts before reaching conclusions and issuing orders. It is routinary in every case that the judge carefully evaluates facts before issuing an order in court. Otherwise, the judge may be held liable for culpable negligence.18 Evidently, Judge Paderanga failed to exercise the necessary diligence before issuing the Order dated November 9, 2005 dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, to the prejudice of Bacalzo. This,

however, makes Judge Paderanga liable for simple negligence, and not gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority, as charged by Senarlo. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which pertains to the Discipline of Justices and Judges, does not provide any penalty for simple negligence. The Court, though, deems simple negligence as falling within the ambit of simple misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.19 Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.20 Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, simple misconduct is considered a less serious offense, sanctioned with suspension without pay for not less than one month but not more than three months, or a fine of not less than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but not exceeding Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Judge Paderangas personal records show that he had been charged with and found guilty of committing several other administrative infractions,21 and that he was already dismissed from service by virtue of the Decision dated 19 June 2008 of this Court in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Ret.) v. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City.22 Hence, for the simple negligence committed in the instant case, the Court imposes upon Judge Paderanga a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from his accrued leave credits withheld by the Court. WHEREFORE, Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga is found GUIlLTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. He is ORDERED to pay a FINE of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), which shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits withheld by the Court. SO ORDERED.