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PERSONALITY OF A HIGHER ORDER

subjects. The merely natural world is an abstraction from this personalistic world. T his attitude does not yet focus on the intentional relation to subjects, as does the phenomenological attitude , but it does focus on the person as engaged in the world and the world as lived in our rich, concrete experience. See also CULTURE; INTENTIONALITY; LIFE-W ORLD. PERSONALITY OF A HIGHER ORDER. Husserl claims that genuine communities are constituted as personalities of a higher order. By this he means that the community is a unified personality with its own striving, willing, and active life. T his life is analogous to that of an individual person; it is directed to a single end, and the willing and acting of the individuals comprised by the community are coordinated with one another and subordinated to the communal willing. Such a community is not reducible to the mere collection of individuals it comprises, nor are its achievements reducible to their joint achievements. See also SOCIAL W ORLD. PFNDER, ALEXANDER (18701941). Alexander Pf nder, a prominent student of Theodor Lipps, was a member of the M unich Circle . By virtue of his age and seniority as well as the fact that he was the first of the group to hold a professorship at the University, he was broadly recognized as the leader of the Circle. As a student of Lipps, Pf nder was interested in psychology , although not the empirical psychology of his time. His concern was to develop a descriptive, philosophical psychology and a phenomenological philosophy that would explore not only features of behavior but features of the human personality. He developed a phenomenology of the will, explored issues of motivation, character and the human soul , and lectured on the significance and goals of life. In the period from 1920 to 1927, Pfnder was the de facto editor of the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und phnomenologische Forschung). PHANTOM . The phantom is the purely sensible thing. Our experience of objects in the world grasps them in their full materiality and substantiality as havin g cau s al an d func tio na l pro p e rtie s a lo ng w ith the ir va lue attributes. T he experience of the object as having these properties is ro o ted, however, in our grasp of the purely descriptive and sensible properties of the thing. The object considered purely with respect to its sensible properties is the phantom. It must be stressed that the phantom, while it can be experienced as such, is essentially an abstract moment upon which is founded the material thing in its full substantiality and with its full scientific and causal significance . Husserl thinks that there are