E. LAW GOVERNING VALIDITY OF MARRIAGES ABROAD 1.

) General rule in contracts (a) As to form

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. (1) When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (2)

(b) As to substantive requirements

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Article 17. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (3)

2.) Special rule in marriage 3.) (a) Lex loci celebrationis

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.

YAO KEE vs SY-GONZALES

FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the Philippines. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws. HELD: Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

REPUBLIC vs ORBECIDO III

Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Laman, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to

remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
(b) Exceptions
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.

F. COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES/LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. Article 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph. Rule 131 Burden of Proof and Presumptions SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; (bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry. (cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal.

Article 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. TITLE III CO-OWNERSHIP Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title. (392) Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a) Article 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied. (394a) Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)

Article 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership. (395a) Article 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a majority as determined in article 492. (n) Article 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules shall be observed: (1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each; (2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata; (3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and so on successively. (396) Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief. (397a) Article 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be binding. There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co-owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of the co-ownership. Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an administrator. Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common, the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in common. (398) Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)

Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a) Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498. (401a) Article 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code. (402) Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity. (403) Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. (404) Article 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before the division was made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the co-ownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the partition. (405) Article 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason of his negligence or fraud. (n) Article 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defects of title and quality of the portion assigned to each of the other co-owners.

LESACA vs LESACA YAPTINCHAY vs TORRES

FACTS:

Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay, the petitioner, lived as husband and wife openly for 19 years. Isidro Yaptinchay died Intestate. Teresita Yaptinchay was first appointed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay. An opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent. After the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a P50,000-bond. This time, Teresita filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the Rizal, CFI an action for replevin and preliminary injunction for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro and for damages. Respondent judge Torres ordered issued a temporary restraining order that Virginia et. al. and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering with Teresitas rights to, and possession over the house now standing at North Forbes Park

ISSUE: W/N preliminary injunction may be granted (in relation to Teresitas prayers) HELD: NO. Petition dismissed and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved and set aside. Injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been clearly established. In the verified petition before this Court, Teresita avers that construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by her and deceased, Teresita even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor. But in her amended complaint she had said that she acquired through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as North Forbes Park house. Virginia et. al. dispute Teresitas claim of complete or even partial ownership of the

house. Maintaining that construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased without Teresita's intervention and with his own personal funds. Note that it was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after the death of Isidro the Forbes Park house was among the properties of the deceased placed under Virginias administration that respondent judge issued the injunction order. Thus, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below. Furthermore, grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although Teresitas presented loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under construction as proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction workthe evidence, on the contrary were indicative that the loans she obtained from the bank were for purposes other than the construction of the home. Thus, the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on Isidros lot (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Art. 144, CC be decisive. Art. 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Art. 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to coownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the

existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
EUGENIO vs VELEZ

FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased. HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased. Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
ESTRADA vs ESCRITOR

FACTS: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signe d by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement. HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
G. VOID MARRIAGES General rule:
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

1.) Kinds of void marriages (a) Absence of requisites

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(b) (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (c) (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (d) (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (e) (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (f) (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (g) (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years. Emancipation also takes place: (1) By the marriage of the minor; or (2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable. Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years." Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed. Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one. "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice. Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

ALCANTARA vs ALCANTARA
FACTS: Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and

administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

SO vs VALERA DE CASTRO vs DE CASTRO REPUBLIC vs DAYOT

FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sw orn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement. HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

ABBAS vs ABBAS (c) Bigamous and polygamous marriages