System's Sole Constituent, The Operation

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System's Sole Constituent, the Operation: Clarifying a Central Concept of Luhmannian Theory
Jean Clam Acta Sociologica 2000 43: 63 DOI: 10.1177/000169930004300106 The online version of this article can be found at: http://asj.sagepub.com/content/43/1/63
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Systems Sole Constituent, the Operation: Clarifying a Central Concept of Luhmannian Theory
Jean Clam
CNRS. Paris, France
ABSTRACT
The autopoietic turn in Luhmanns later theory is not thinkable without the refocusing of systems theory around a new concept of operativity. The article shows the lines of development from the earlier theory towards the final prevailing of a purely operativist conception of the system. The movement is one of deconstructing all intuitive representations of a border-defined, thing-like system. The radical version that emerges leaves the operation as the sole and unique systemic constituent. The article shows that such a strain of thought contracting an extensive transitive structure into a purely operative core has major philosophical antecedents: Aristotles conception of the actuation of life or intellection in a composite being, Fichtes self-position of the transcendental I. Heideggers subject and authorless Ereignis constitute very similar figures of operativization. This sheds light on the most problematic aspect of Luhmannian theory, namely its reliance on a protologic that does not elaborate, like similar philosophical endeavours before it, on the fundaments of its own evidence.
Jean Clam, 1796 Av. de Grasse. F-83300 Draguignan, France © Scandinavian Sociological Association 2000
Niklas Luhmanns systemist sociology is, in its own project, often misunderstood. The option for a description of society within a systems theoretical framework is very often reduced to an all-commanding assertion of the structuring function of systems in todays societies. Luhmannian systemism is conceived frequently as
an
shall have
to
show
the
intricacy of the
constructions necessitated by the categorial radicalization it undertakes. I begin with an
attempt
social of
to
to apply a general systems approach phenomena. The benefits of such an

to be assessed in
introductory presentation of the systems problematics in Luhmanns sociology in order to come to the core concept of the whole theory: that of a non-real, purely actual system, containing nothing and made of nothing but
operations.
1. The transformation of
approach would then have

terms
a
description
greater accuracy of the sociological as well as a greater explanatory

into
systemism
consideration the complete transformation of the original framework through Luhmanns fresh modelling of its central concepts, such an assessment is doomed
potency. Not taking
to
misapprehension.
I will show in the following how and why Luhmann goes far beyond the current systems model, and in what direction his theory heads. I
Luhmanns interest in the systems model is particularly ambiguous. To have a clearer idea of the status and function of the model within the theory, I will set Luhmanns fundamental options and intuitions into the broader context of his sociological work. My thesis, which stresses a statement obvious Cor any person
64
acquainted with the work,

conatus of Luhmanns
is that the specific enterprise is to conceive
constant
complex objects by means of an adequate, equally complex theory capable of accounting for the emergence of complexity as a specific
mode of reality or givenness of the real. Luhmann had a very firm intuition of an inescapable and profound break in the representation of reality, making impossible or illusory the continuation of heretofore familiar self-descriptions of thinking, feeling and theorizing. He held the conviction that the objects to be modelled in sociology (personal interaction, institutions, groups, organizations, functional subsystems, society...) could not be constructed in the terms of classical sociology. Unlike Parsons, Luhmann had a vision of the
borrowings of incongruous theoretical are required and given order by their distance from inadequate modes of thought. Luhmann is the sociologist of our
perspectives
most acute sense of the poststructure of communication
century with the
ontological (non) events.
constituting a world where things (res) have no consistency and where only differences are
He has, as a theoretician, an acute consciousness of the need for non-metaphysical
historiality of categorial settings. His knowledge of Heidegger enabled his perspective on the transformations of all-sustaining matrices of thought as ontohistorial (scinsgesc11ic11tlic11) ones. The epoqual comprehensions of being precede and determine the modes of action and
experience realizable setting. Luhmanns
historical social reflected the problems of theory-building in the historial terms of philosophical hermeneutics. He was profoundly conscious of the rupture of the ontological tradition. From the beginning his project is very clearly one of a post-metaphysical theory of society. The reformulation of systems theory initially seeks to critique and thereby overcome the sociological concept of action, a concept that seems to Luhmann both undefendable and doomed to atrophy. This took place at a time when no convincing model was available that could compete with it or prevail over it in descriptive or heuristic terms. Long before a new version of systems theory was developed. Luhmann saw the categorical nature of action as making too many massive assumptions of self-identity, internal consistency and ontological firmness of the acting subject. The predominance of the action model was for him intimately associated with the concept of a privileged, dignified actor. Luhmanns constant and very early rejection of any axiological assumption is reminiscent of Heideggers own repulsion with all value thinking. The functionalism of the early Luhmann could thus be seen as the expression of his definite disqualification of all ontologically impregnated ways of thinkin
a concerns
ing. His increasingly complex interdisciplinary arrangements integrating a number of heterogeneous theory pieces (Tlieoriestdcke) and his
frameworks for the description and comprehension of what is. Thus, functionalist systems theory was. for Luhmann, a convenient departure point for a much more comprehensive theory designed to grasp the non-identity, the paradoxical and unsummarizable character of reality. The systems theory of Parsons and the first-order cybernetics had to be enlarged and transformed to integrate a variety of systemic and nonsystemic approaches capable of enhancing its complexity and reflexivity, viz. Second-order cybernetics (von Foerster), paradoxalist difference theories (Spencer Brown, Derrida), emergence medium-form theory (Fritz Heider), horizontalist meaning theory (Husserl), differentialist linguistic (Saussure) and communication (Bateson) theories. There thus remains nothing of the representation of a previously available general theory that could be applied to a special field of research. What should be most insistently noted is that the system cntectory is o1lly apparently wider than that of society as its eventual application field. Luhmanns special intuition, the one which gives his theory its specific profile and bestows on it a real autonomy with regard to all other philosophies and theories that contribute to its constructions, is the following: society is a self-contained field of social communication and the site of all self-descriptions of human communication; it is the place where all meaning is born and can be equated with a constituting intersubjectivity stripped of its transcendental nature. Since all partial or global world representations are communicatively elaborated, society (i.e. social communication) is the self-engendering reality like Hegels Geist, once more denuded from metaphysical assumptions. The condensations of social communication (in meanings, institutions, routines, systems... ) are purely circular and have no anchoring in any reality outside. They are paradoxical because they include a structural reference to an indefinite further connection and to an unattainable internal consistency. Society is the paradigm of a system
65
;~~<,
entity that escapes all objectivation and engulfs the observation itself that posits it as its objective correlate. Luhmanns vision of sociology as a science
or an
sociology
to the most
sophisticated
theoretical
expressions of the self-reference of communication is an interesting one. It shows us how an

interest in the universal theme of takes body in the project of a general
of society transforms it into a sort of vagrant supertheorie with a special reference to the basic category of system. The radical remodelling of the system category enables it to remain a unifying pattern of the theory. Nevertheless, a reformulation of the theory in terms of differentiation and mediation as an alternative to systemist ones is thinkable throughout. What is fundamental, then, is a type of category capable of expressing the measure of reflexivity, circularity and paradox inherent to society as it is thought by Luhmann. The specific performance of his sociology is, thus, the identification and manifestation of social communication as the last convex, the untranscendable envelope, of all meaning and all reality.~Society - that is, the SillllSYStCI1l KOl1l11l11llikati011 - constitutes the of indefinitely self-referential and inconcludable differences as a multi-dimensionally articulated system of meaning, overarching consciousness. There is no access to the world of meaning without a socialization of individual consciousness in the field and flux of an unending and ungroundable communication. Communication is, thus, a self-engulfing structure, being the context of itself. Society and system are interdependent concepts insofar as the motive for the revision of systems theory was the conception of society as a circular, self-contextual structure of a very specific type; on the other side, the systems theoretical framework offered a departure point for developing a post-ontological theory which will very soon exceed it. Moreover, the intuition of the unbounded status and scope of sociology is not a late product of the theory itself, but is there from the beginning: when Luhmann comes to sociology after many years in administrative office, he is attracted by the generality of its perspective, the possibility to advance in any theoretical direction, free from disciplinary limitation. Sociology, in his perception, is a field where one can do everything!pursuing any interest in knowledge. The range of themes is almost unlimited, and the sociologist can direct his choice towards any mundane object: persons, nature, the state, music, intimacy, etc ... There is a sociology of everything, everything being communicatively constituted through social media and systemic processes. Luhmanns path from the presentiment of the omnicompetence and thematic vagrancy of
society and how the generality of

leads
to
a
sociology theory of this theory
unfolding
radical reformulation of the concept of well as of the concept of system, the society latter being designed to be the main category reflective of the former. Thus, the project of a general theory of an enlarged and profoundly reflexive concept of society induces the radical recasting of the systemic categories.To retrace Luhmanns progression towards a de-ontologization of the system category is thus worthwhile. The initial research in Luhmanns early work is concentrated on organization theory. Systemist and affinitive approaches were already developed in this domain, and they have been considerably amplified since.&dquo; Luhmanns main questioning in this seminal phase centred on the conception of an other rationality. Actually, administrative science and orgaas
nization
theory
were
soaring
in
an
impressive
their fundaments: the heretofore unitary conception of the formal organization as a human institution designed for the realization of definite goals instrumented through complex informational and procedural means was foundering. The sociology of organization was discovering how almost all formal organizational schemes, tokens and routines were doubled through informal ones. Therewith. the system constituted by the organization revealed itself as much more complex than its instituted, unifying, mostly hierarchical design. Particularly. the category of goal and goal attainment was withering away: the difficult identifiability of final representations, the confusing interdependence and co-variation of apparent, strategic and objective goals, the constant but irregular re-import in the organiization system of informal secondary and unintended positive ends ... made necessary such a complexification of the notion that it became 7 eventually soundless to work with it further. New light was also shed on the relations of the organization with its environments, thereby showing an incomparably more nuanced image than that of an internally functional system unit subjected to environmental constraints and producing correlative responses.
to renew
effort
The conclusion that Luhmann
as
an
organization theorist drew from these premises
66
resulted in a research programme focussed on the concept of complex, or as he termed it, systernic ratiollality. The programme was to be implemented in two stages: (1 a critique of the supposition of an immanent instrumental
of organization presenting the organizational mode of action as a unique tool, defined and unified by its goals and ends, and whose rationality is univocally inscribed in its transitive hierarchical architecture: and (2) a descriptive and conceptual work on a great number of phenomena constituting complex rationality in a variety of complex figures. The programme went through a series of reconstructions of the complex intelligence sedimented in organizations as well as in every communicational phenomenon. Actually, every such phenomenon combines a series of mutually conditioned devices to a relatively functional and operative whole that can take various forms, ranging from quasi-instant social systems of fugitive face-to-face interaction to the heaviest and most enduring formal institutional ventures. This combination is far from being a product of pro-projecting design and, above all, from being grasped in its consequences. Thus, the descriptive work converges towards the problem of order. of its origin and evolution. Within the framework of a theory of complex rationality, order appears as emergent. open to variation and self-sensitive, requiring nonlinear, intransitive and original theoretical concepts. At its origin, the research identifies
rationality
self-destabilizing
instance of such
paradoxical settings. settings is the double
An
conover
tingency scheme, which Luhmann takes
from Parsons and Shils and develops into a generative figure of all order&dquo; in collective 1 meaning systems - that is, social systems. 1 Systemic rationality is thus a title for the central intuition of the improbability. fluency and circularity of order. Order is improbable not because it calls for human - or divine - design. but because it has to be accounted for as the non-natural, non-spontaneous - although selforganizing 1 2 _ realization of forms of being that no design could have predicted and no selfdirected process could have produced. The system-order emerging from non-reproducible conjunctions of factors and circumstances is fluent, nurtured through fluency 13 It is never structured only from within. Order is differential in the sense that it is the unceasing negotiation of a difference between non-order and order. The maintenance of the system-order is an explicit and continuous performance. As
such it is not self-evident. Most fallacious is thus the spatial representation of the order-unity as a closed entity containing in itself its order components and internally quiescent as long as its environment does not exercise any pressure on its boundaries. Order is rather an actual difference, order/non-order, which is reflected in its first term (order) and whose maintenance takes the deceptive, metaphorical form of a (spatial) boundary. In fact, the boundary is a complex actuol relation, an effectuation or an actuation - I try to translate the German word: I>I>11=iig of an asymmetrical difference and its retlection in one Ot~ its terms. Very soon the problematic oi~ complex order concentrates on the de-realization or de-ontologization of the spaces, the fluxes and functional activities related to the system. To think systems as pure differences becomes the deontologizing programme Ot LLlllfIlaI111s systems theory. All its lines of argument converge in this direction. To sum up, I could say that the new deontologized concepts arch an alternative to the metaphysically grounded theoretical frameworks of action theory. This does not mean that those frameworks are altogether invalid: they are just outclassed by a new theoretical design called for by deep transformations in the projections (Elll BBl/fe) H of the meaning and structure of the objects of the relevant sciences. To use an analogy I will discuss more thoroughly at the end of the article, the projection of the unconscious as the primary psychic object and the proper theme of the science of the psyche is an alternative to the previous introspectivist and cognitivist projection of such an object within the psychology of consciousness. The old designs, which are thus superseded, do not lose their whole relevance. They must nevertheless be brought up to the new level. restructured so as to fit into the new categorial projections. Coming back to the problematics within sociology at the emergence of the postactionalist systemist model. I can read it as follows: Action theory is intrinsically ontological in its categorial design; it is co-extensive with the triadic, extensive, transitive o~tr~for-~r~tio-opertitlitiz structure, which objectifies its terms as real, self-identical terms: it lives from the equally ontological assumptions made on the nature of the subject-actor as self-conscious bearer of intentions and will, promoter of his action through its more or less rational instrumentation. The invention (in the double sense of founding and figuring) of a de-
67
ontologizing level of intcllectionis equivalent to the breakthrough in the direction of ncw categories framing the comprehension of the
is a convenient one and yet, importantly, not the only one possible. Luhmanns early - and a fortior-i later - work is not restricted to this social. These categories enable and demand an theme and contains already a series of more abandonment of the assumption that there is an general as well as different perspectives. Neveractor or an action behind social communicatheless, where law or politics, power or values are at stake, the systems theoretical approach tion. They allow the positing of a specific, transforms the traditional problem positions autonomous, anonymic, non-aggregative objectivity. Such objectivity is no more ontologically through discovering the underlying paradoxical projectible. It requires the framework of a structures. Thus. the juridical code (lawful/
transformed systemism. centred on the inherently circular, self-differentia) entity which Luhmann continues to call a system,. The new subject-object of sociology - the social - is
communication as a system. Communication is the last constituent of the social, behind which there are neither actors nor things, but only
operations. These
are the sole. variously specifiable constituents of all communicative systems.
2.
Figures
of thought
Differential self-actuation
on his way from the of reception systems organization theory to his elaboration of systemic rationality. I saw that what was to be thought could not be conceived along the classical ontological schemes of objectivation. The kinds of objects that came to the fore were paradoxical in the sense that they could not be thought of as identities or unities, bearing extrinsic relations to their environments, but as system-environment dualities with an asymmetrical anchoring of the self-position of the duality in the system. This was the abstract frame of systemic rationality. which had to enable us thinking organizational devices, active or sedimented intelligence as ambiguous contributions to the systems stability as well as instability. When boundaries are de-spatialized to become the expression of the self-difference of the system (as system-environment) in the system (as building a selfidentity), the system enshrines in itself its own negation. It becomes a circular dynamic chose potentialities flow from the internalization of its environment (non-self) in itself. That is how order is built from noise: that is why the main resources for stability and adaptation are inherent instability and variety and why tived optimality is suboptimal and diverse suboptimality a major asset for evolution. This access to the problematic of asymmetrical self-identity of system from Luhmanns initial preoccupation with organization theory
I have followed Luhmann
can itself be neither lawful nor unlawful: the medium of politics, power, lives communication ally from its non-use: values are a sort of complexity stoppers, instrumented to cover the self-reference of all orders of meaning. Throughout these examples, the fundamental theoretical difficulty is that systems are inherently incotnplete and made unstable through their differential structures. I should, however, insist on the passage from ( 11 the classical representation of a system as a unity with an immanent order facing an environment which acts on it. thus promoting or inhibiting the unfolding of its order structure: to (2) a differential representation where the order unit is that of an asymmetrically retlected difference order/non-order. The contrast brings out the features of the end term. Actually, the involved relational and theoretical structure in this term is not unprecedented. It is part of a stock of very special, rarely used figures I encounter in the philosophical tradition from Aristotle to Heidegger. Where such figures appear, they are regularly associated with a daring and violent effort to think at a challenging level of originarity and against habits of intuitive thought. I will discuss two such figures in unequal detail. The first. which I call the originary self-positing self-identity, is the one at stake here: the second is the one I call the
unlawful)
Ntit--17c)llzlig
structure,
meaning
structure
whose terms are contracted in a sole selfcontained act or effectuation (this figure engulfs the first one and will be explained in more
detail l.
My main purpose in this article is to show how Luhmanns most central theses can be read instructively by means of such a structural commentary of the engaged tigures of thought. The objects of my attention are then those figures of thought - I could say lociisrnoi - that make possible a radical transformation of the
problem
vision.
My logismological approach
focuses on the constitution and performance of such figures and in this sense, it has certain at1inities with I~1111t11~ttltl~s theory-building as a
68
venture. Luhmann pays lot of attention to the theorization choices and their figures themselvcs. The actually unfolding theory becomes thus an object for itself and the result of a series of construction decisions made consciously by the theoretician. This leads to a very high level of reflexive abstraction in thought and argument. I,L111r11ar1I1S theory of theory did not. however, thematize the underlying figures of its most crucial categorial contractions. While it is ultimately enlightening to the problematics of complex theorizing,1 it still lacks a genuine analysis of most decisive figures. These figures have, in my eyes, analogues in the specific theory-building of first
type of highly reflexive

a
(pi-6td philosophicr or prima philothe ground of the originary of the first lineaments of being. emergence Our thesis is. in particular, that the selfdifference paradox can be compared with such a figure of prime philosophy and thus be clarified through the reminiscence of some of the transcendental deductions that give expression to it. I chose Fichtes jNissenschaJtsloi~ro whose
philosophy sophin)
7
on
line of progress is most elaborated. I&dquo; In Fichtes deduction, at the beginning is a Tlzatllluzdlll11g (self-performing act ).which is the self-position of the I (the transcendental subject ).2( ) Before this self-position, there is nothing worldly* and the emergence of the I is that of being, i.e. of a world. However, the self-position of the Ursubjokt is not global-spherical: the I is not a closed Izf1l kai pan, self- and all-containing in the sense of having no other. Fichtes argument is precisely that the advent of the I in its originary act is the advent of a difference, of a same and non-same, of I and not-I (lei nnd Nioht-Ichl. The subject is a subject of something which is not itself. Fichtes vision differs, thus, from the conceptions of the Parmenidian metaphysics or that of scholastic theological speculation on the state of being ante iiiiiizdi creati011em. The difference I/Not-I is. further, what is retlected in the I itself and constitutes the most genuine act of the I as I. The I is not a closed and total sphere. It is embedded in a split (or a scratch, Rit~). The I is the split whose name is world and whose act is the reflection of this same splitting difference. The scheme of thought here calls for a distancing from intuitive modes of comprehension, wherc unities or identities are posited as separate and closed wholes. I and Not-I cannot be thought of as two distinct entities standing in an extrinsic relation to each other, whose product is, a third and distinct new term. Not
all terms here a sole differential and a sole self-actuating Voll:ug (effectuation), but also an asuml1lctrical one. The Not-I can never attain to the determinative density of the I, because precisely the I is the site of the retlection of the uneven difference I/Not-I. This asymmetrical moment is best stressed in the protologic of G. Spencer Brown, who conceives the unmarked state within the inaugural distinction as a sort of residual term. correlative to the marked state of the distinction. Here also the duality of the selfdifference (I/Not-I, marked state/unmarked state) is reflected in the active density of. so to speak, the positive term of the distinction - the indication, in Spencer Browns terminology. Distinction is thus, in a specific, paradoxical sense, self-continent. insofar as it needs nothing more to exist than its moments united in one sole act: effectuation. As a matter of fact, Luhmanns reliance on Brownian protologic for the presentation and development of his own theory gradually escalated to reach a quasi-dominant position in his later work. As I shall stress later on, this dependence makes the question about the theoretical status of Luhmannian assumptions and proto-sociological theorems most acute. At what level is the body of the most general and abstract sentences of Luhmanns theory of society to be situated? Is it transcendental a pr-ior-i or is it simply a generalization of a set of crossed evidences stemming from various domains of observation? My thesis is that Luhmanns major assertions rely on a sort of a priori ground with no transcendental reference, which is that of the Brownian protologic. Thus, I think that the logical calculus of George Spencer Brown, published under the title taws
only
are
structure
oj Form,1:! is most accurately qualified as a protologic. Classical logics included (1) an encompassing theory of enunciation (sentence
and discourse) and inference (deduction of sentences from sentences), like the inaugural logic of Aristotle; (2) an apriorical deduction or description of the constituting acts of a pure consciousness performing the cognitive operations of judgement and reckoning, like the transcendental logics of Kant and Husserl; (3) a formal or mathematical body of theorems - an algebra - syntactically inferred from a small set of axioms and symbol definitions, like the logic of the Principia 11l11t/lCIIllltica of Russel and Whitehead. In contrast to these logics, particularly the last one, Spencer Browns programme is an inquiry into the pre-discursive laws
69
emerging with the
most elementary position of something. These laws must be situated at a level preceding the level of expression grasped by classical logic. Protologic denotes, thus, in our context, the logic implied in the most general act of appearance or position of a something (a form). It reveals our internal knowledge of the structure of the world ( lays of Form 1969:xiiil. The form, as it is understood by Spencer Brown, is prior to anything logic can thematize at its own levels of generality. It is to be thought of as lying at such a depth of originarity and generality as to be beyond the point of simplicity where language ceases to act normally (ibid. :xx). It, then, resists expression (il)id.), whereas logic is something discursive
originary-structural level
think from
a
are twofold: (1) to theoretical site lying before experience in a transcendental world without time and without objective firmness; and (2) to think in a world of pure actuality without time and without objective products of activity. Despite the fact that Luhmanns theory does not develop on any transcendental ground, its figures of thought still have many essential features in common with the apriorical tradition. The theoretical constructs shaped in this tradition as groundwork of all subsequent empirical acting and experiencing have a sort of homological counterpart in an enlarged systems theory. This is even more the case as
systems theory integrates protological components and is shaped in such a manner as to become a sort of universal theory of objects .24 It is actually inescapable that at a certain level of originarity - which we could call protological, and where we would situate most apriorical theories - heterogeneous schemes share in a series of figures. The instance of Fichtes deduction shows how a thought taking place at the emerging point of things, at an observation site revealing their most universal features. is forced into unintuitive, highly reflexive. contracted paths. One should see that Luhnmnns theory is not just a sociological theory of a particularly high generality. It should be seen that such a theory incorporates a very central protological dimension. Taken seriously, this fact changes the basis of the theory reception. It is thus hopeless to try to make sense of the theory of self-referential social systems, above all when they are conceived of as nothing but operations. while occulting the protological problematic.
about which I
can
talk and which I

a
can
objectivize. 233
To be
sure,
and this is
point I have already
noted, Brownian protologic is not the only
approach Luhmann draws
upon in order to think systems as differences and not as res. Luhmanns own method commanded a diversification of the contributions integrated into the theory, in order to raise its incongruity and curb the tendency towards massively unifying and potentially re-ontologizing concepts. Nevertheless, Spencer Brown becomes gradually the dominant reference of the late theory, which develops into an observation theory based on the Brownian concept of difference as a bilateral concept (~n~ei-Seiten-Forml. This evolution is not altogether advantageous. Browns logic is still a very poorly elucidated theory waiting for a genuinely appropriating reception. Yet, Luhmann works with it as if it were not only common knowledge, but as if one had fully grasped the transformation of the deep ontological structure it induces. In his texts, the same concise, schematic hint at Spencer Browns Laws of Form suffices to justify the most abstract concepts and the shorthand-like exposed arguments. This is the reason why I think that I should try to build an analogical space as much around Spencer Browns protologic as Luhmanns use of it. For this purpose, I turn to the philosophical tradition as a reservoir of most instructive figures of thought. The advantage of the philosophical references is that they bring with them the necessary diachronic and historical depth severely needed for the clarification of categorial revisions. Fichtes deduction of the asymmetrical selfdifference structure and of its reflexive entanglements is instructive because it reminds us that the main difficulties of theorizing on an
Circular
Let
us
actuality (Nur-Vollzug) examine more accurately some important moments of the figure of thought elaborating on the self-difference structure. In
now
the course of my commentary on Fichtes deduction, I said that the main pressure bending
thought into counter-intuitive, highly compacted patterns originates from the twofold necessity of abstracting time and the necessity to reabsorb all intuitively - i.e. extensively posited - terms into one or a few (verbal)1
actual aspects of a circular process. I now show that this figure of contraction of extensive terms is not specific to in actual effectuation < 14>11=ii g ) the transcendental tradition, but is also required in other philosophical approaches confronted with problems of the composite constitution of specific beings. Concerning Luhmann, the pre-
70
stage of my discussion will offer an instructive specification of his general conception of system as a differential non-entity. It will take the form of a commentary on its most fundamental, most pregnant statement: nur
sent
enacted
being) in their multiplicity, factual diversity and dispersion into that of an originary
actus esseridi. There is
a transformation of the extensive, transitive multimoment structure into a circular intransitive,
thick-setting of
The
an
Kommunikation kann kommunizieren

communication can communicates I begin with a presentation of the it is elaborated by Aristotle, in crucial
(only
internally effective, unique-moment structure. logico-grammatical triadic structure of

operator-operatio-operatwn
must
figure as develop-
ments of his psychological theory. 21 It is the central figure of the act theory of the soul, which solves the major problems of the preceding doctrines. The theory reacts to the quasimythological treatment of psychology by Plato. for whom the soul is a composite being extended over several heterogeneous domains and whose unity seemed ever since problematic. It is topologically dispersed and its heterogeneous parts are thought of as co-existing and often interacting with each other in a global space. The question for Plato was that of the uniting domination (11egemondn) of one part over the 7 other or all others within this plurality.Z Aristotle simplifies the stratificatory scheme of the soul into three main parts: a vegetative (growth and decay without motion), an animal (autonomous motion and sense) and an intellectual (knowledge) part. He then resolves the problem of the unity of the strata in superior living beings like animals or men in an audacious and straightforward manner. He rejects the idea of cumulative stratificatory endowments and brings to the fore an actualeffectual or verbal concept of form, which transforms the problem: the soul (psyche) is the form (eidos) of the living body in the sense that it is the act (the realized dynamis, the energeia) of living, which is its perfection (entelecl1eia). In the soul of a human being there are not three partial souls or three psychic floors interrelated through the material being they animate. There is only one act, through which the living human being lives and realizes his being ( tois z6isi to zn einai, esse viventibus vivere, De anima 415b:14). Each time this act is specified as vegetative (when man sleeps), animal (when he perceives) or intellectual (when he thinks). The life of such a being is effectuated (actually realized) in one sole act of being, which is here life in its vegetative, animal or intellectual form. There is no need to multiply the involved beings. The act theory dispels all forms of being which are not actual-effectual (Vollzug), i.e. all forms of already given res-like beings. The theory transforms the comprehension of being as presence of objects (frozen products of once
be countermonadic structure intuitively compacted with one last irreducible component, the operatio. A step must be made to cut behind the current logical and linguistic settings of triadic ontic evidence and to attain to the protological founding dimension of the soleoperation structure. The act theory invokes the originary ontological ground, out of which a reality emerges, whose obscured perception breaks its primal collection (Sanztnlting) and scatters its vivid core into cooled disjected members. The problem created by such an analogy between Aristotles act theory in its modern interpretation and Luhmanns operation theory is that of the limits beyond which both theories are no more comparable. Massive misinterpretations lurk, should the analogy be loaded with more than it bears. Aristotles form actuality is metaphysical in the sense that it is
into
a
not
historically
a
or
self-organizationally
a
emerging operation, but is the actuating of
primarily actual
distinction,
essence.
It is not
on
an
arbitrary
the worlds surface. The Aristotelian actuality is essential. It is also strictly unitary and self-sufficient. Its circularity is not differential or paradoxical; it is spherical and global. No form-act refers to another form-act or to an environing non-act, the difference to whom is reflected in the formact itself. However, if these are the restrictions to be made on my analogy, the analogy itself remains pertinent as an elucidation of the actual-effectual figure which is decisive in Luhmanns categorial revision of sociology. While the Fichtean deduction could help us to understand the asymmetrical three-step process (position of system as concomitant with the position of difference to an unmarked environment and reflection of the difference as core operation of the system) as a protological untemporal unique circularity: the Aristotelian figure gives us a key for understanding more than the actual-effectual aspects of the resorption of extensive terms into one
contingent split
operative
ened
structure, already partially enlightby the comparison with Fichte. It is mainly interesting for the invaluable contribu-
71
tion it offers to the
understanding of the between different couplings operation types, that is, different systems. The relatedness and dependency of the brain autopoiesis8 to the autopoiesis of consciousness, as well as the relatedness of the latter to the autopoiesis of communication, can be explained in terms very much analogous to Aristotles act theory. Only communication can communicate, meaning that consciousness - as well as the brain - cannot: this refers to an actual contraction necessary to think the form as act. There is no place for whatever multiplicity in the Aristotelian scheme because the entities at stake are not objective (res-like), but actual-effectual ( Uollzug). Multiplicity is the coexistence of many different items at a time, in a
actuality - or protological pronon-spatial and are untemporal in the sense that they are not in time as in a preexisting space. They are, on the contrary.
space. Prime
cesses - are
reflection that constitutes the communication acts. The conscious actuality entering the communicative actuality does not operate like a
ence
material component entering a material synthesis. Consciousness is already fully and genuinely present in communication. When communication is actuated, consciousness and cerebral life are as well. Aristotle had already stressed this presupposition relationship of the lower actuality by the higher one.31 In Luhmannian terms: whereas only communication communicates, there is no communication without consciousness and no consciousness without cerebral life. The difference between the two visions lies in Luhmanns conception of the absorption of the subordinate actuality in the effectuation of the more specific one in terms of contribution and stimulation. Since the lower actuality does not imply the realization of the higher one, since
e.g. consciousness is not already communication, the coming to pass of communication must
themselves time-generative. There is thus no place, on the originary ground, for a multiplicity of acts. The actiis essencdi of a living being is life and that of a thinking living being is thinking (noein). There is no stratification, ordering the acts of being, life, vegetation, perception and intellection as a multiplicity in space or time, arranging their cumulation at the higher levels. In the action theoretical framework, the most specific act is always and alone the actual one. All others, underlying ones, are there, in it. They are superseded by its actual specificity so that their actuation is its own.
specifically conditioned. Communication being autopoietic, the continuous connection of its operations from one instant to the next, building more or less coherent sequences, is purely communicative in nature. That means that each level of actuality is completely autonomous in its sequence-building and
time-consuming operation. The system endures
on
be
the basis of self-motion and self-continuation
through the structural connectibility of its parts - each operation demanding the connection of a new one of the same actuality. The lower actuality systems do not condition the operative continuity of the higher ones - these would Coupling of operative levels Aristotle proposed a detailed theory of the otherwise not be autopoietic; rather they supply couplings involved in the actual absorption of them with the type of actuality they need, lower act dimensions within higher ones, in which is in turn transformed by them, through particular the famous abstraction theory coup- a specific reticulation into the higher type ling perception and intellection through the actuality. The material out of which commudata into intellectual sense It is not possible to expose it here, but what is sure is that the analogical setting of both theories, Aristotles and Luhmanns, persists around their central logismic figures. Thus, Luhmann approaches the problematics of coupling as one of a contribution of the autopoiesis of the lower systems to the autopoiesis of the higher ones. This contribution takes the form of an entry of lower difference reflections in higher ones without breaking the unity of the specific actual effectuation. When conscious material 30 (thoughts - Gedanken) enters communication, it does so in the form of that material which structurally stimulates the asymmetrical differ-
processing of
nication is made is conscious Erlebnisse,
sense
forms.29
syntheses of the specific kind that I call consciousness. These syntheses build the basic material of communication by entering into the higher syntheses specific to this higher type
of sense system. Not all conscious syntheses enter, however, into the higher communicative ones, as the conscious of transformation experience (thought, in Luhmanns terminology) into intersubjective communication is not itself automatic. Moreover, not all conscious syntheses are
communication -
equally appropriate to enter into some being structurally

con-
excluded, like incommunicable, ineffable
72
experiences. The choice of the terms contributions and stimulations to describe the relations between a pair of asymmetrically conditioned levels of actuality reflects this unequal and selective structure of systemic
scious
actuating
is
sempiternal
informing
the local
matter.33
Some conscious operations are more to engage in communication. Once communication is actual, the theory considers that the conscious material has ceased to operate and has acceded to the higher operative synthesis of communication. The problem of a conscious experience of communication itself during its own operation is not that of a confusion of the two levels of operation, but that of a simultaneity or doublestage effectuation <~~2N~) of the two syntheses. The problem is prevented through the multidimensional structure of communication itself in Luhmannian theory. Through its conception of communication as a threefold operation consisting of information, impartation (Mitteilutig )32 and comprehension (Verstelzen), the theory accounts explicitly for the phenomenon of the continuous ]lll7nt a soi underwriting communication. Thus, the unquestionable phenomenon of a current being-for-myself, feeling and judging in myself of the contents of communication, while engaged in communication, is not occulted in the theory. The conscious sequences accompanying continuously actual communication and forming, so to speak, its background, are respectively among the constituting acts of communication. The unimpeachable autonomy and self-referentiality of the communicative sequences guarantee the autopoietic character of the communication system and inhibit any attempt to resolve communication into consciousness. A possible interpretation of Aristotles act theory points towards a new logismic horizon that I will have to explore. It has been suggested to conceive of the Aristotelian actuation of a specific and individual being as a continuous realization of a form in its adequate matter. The actuation of vegetative life in a rose is thus an actuation of being-arose in adequate matter, throughout each moment of its existence; that of a cell, the continuous actuation and thereby maintenance of the being or form cell in adequate matter throughout all its metabolic processes. The metaphor that bears the whole interpretation is that of a whirlpool maintaining the stability of the form through the flow of matter. This conception of transtemporal stability, within which specific and individual form
coupling.
stimulated than others
heretofore explored such a view of the temporal-operative event continuum we enter the domain of the concrete realization of the prime originary actuality. We leave the protological level, reaching what we could call a strictly operational one. Whereas the former described the state of things at their untemporal, timeinaugural emergence, the latter corresponds to a consideration of the concrete actualeffectual (Nur-Vollzug) event. In real time, the compactness of the Nur- Vollzug structure is reflected in a very specific form. One would expect that, in the protological event of a selfreflecting difference, the bundling or knotting of all extensive terms into one circular actual effectuation must embody in a contraction of the operator and the operntum into a timeconsuming self-centred operatio. The empirical world is, however, when compared to its originating matrix, a world of cooled out derivatives. It constitutes a level of constructed reality opposite to the protological one and structurally unable to host its circular archetypes. These must, when the departure is taken from the empirical level, always be reinvented in a stark effort of theoretical thought. The whirlpool metaphor is thus the best suited one to conceive of the sole-being and the circularity of the operation, as well as the derivative, transitory status of its cooled formations. It has, moreover, a not uninteresting, most concrete basis in biological phenomena.
wrap or bend goes beyond the theoretical space. With
Actually, the material components of living tissues are continuously renewed and replaced within relatively constant periods, while the biological form is altogether maintained. Thus, the metaphor is in a way inescapable or ceases
almost to be one. It offers a convenient transition towards metaphysically unsaddled representations of operative processes. Presuppositions on the status, ideal identity or supratemporal sameness of the act forms need not to be made within it. The conception of a transtemporally stable oper-atum through the unceasing, continuous action of a specific,
contingent operatio
(eventually consuming
quite well
as a
time and matter) fits
de-
ontologization of Aristotelian act theory. It establishes the problematic on an empirical operative ground and draws on the contingence and (evolutionary) variability of the form as opposed to its supposed incorruptible ideal
sameness.
On
the
whole, this conception
73
seems to
operation
with
no
be very close to Luhmanns view of the as a prime constituent of the system guarantee of ontological identity and
building of self-identity, when the environment is not already so differentiated as to impose internal complexification of the system through
the differentiation of diverse roles and functions within the latter. These processes are namely factors of variation that inflect the actuated form in a number of directions. The systemic structure is maintained as long as variation does not provoke a switch to a changed form, whose confirmation would require anew a high measure of shape- or structure-building redundancy. A major feature of Luhmanns systems operativity theory is finally its inversion of the status of structure (in all functionalist and systemic theories) from one of a superordinated commanding magnitude, whose stability enhancing is the finality of the functional processes, to one of a flowing process with no real anchoring in things. Structure reflects just the temporary redundancy tendencies of operations, with enslaving effects upon certain
stability. Through the flow of time, the
concretions of life, consciousness and communication are cooled forms of current continuous operations. These maintain transtemporally identifiable, functionally in fine advantageous operata. The
stability of the operata (a cell, a thought, a specific communication such as a friendly interaction, a work conflict, a legal procedure) is nothing but the permanence, from instant to
of the actual effectuation of the corresponding operation. The operata have no subsistence and no substance outside the operation. But what then probabilizes coherent. enduring, system-building operations rather than anarchic, non-self-confirming, non-condensing, instantly vanishing ones? Within Aristotles act theory, such a question is irrelevant. The act form is an ontologically firm eidos, ever since, and self-identical under all conditions. Within de-ontologized frameworks like systems theory, the tendency to condensation must be especially accounted for. Luhmanns proposal elaborates on the ground of the self-organization theory in a protological differentialist formulation. Thus, each difference that scratches the surface of the world tends, from its prime event on, to iterate in a way that builds a nucleus for redundancy as well as for variation. Redundancy is the basic, variationenabling process, while variation is the marginal one. Both are the substance, the content of the operative life pulsing in the constituted form through the time-matter flow. Each operation, from moment to moment, either confirms and condenses further the form, or inflects its wrapping movement and prepares the possible (not necessary)emergence of new forms. The double trajectory of confirmation and variation is an unpredictable one. Predictions of evolution have some pertinence after bifurcation has occurred, in phases of necessary condensation through strong redundancy, the post-bifurcative phase being similar to theoretically initial ones. The nearer to the inaugural distinction, the more redundant operating is likely to prevail. The more virginal the ground where the distinction is drawn, or the more originary the level of emergence, the more hasty and intense are the processes of iteration. This is clear from protological, form-theoretical premises: the reflection of the difference system-environment within the system is stronger, and enhances the
instant,
operative
To
sequences. 34
up:
a
sum
system would be
sort of
transtemporally stable whirlpool, a form maintained in actuality through a constant bend of

its individual operative components into a global structure. The complex mechanisms
that link
successive
together
or
mutually indent the

are
operations
not
deterministic.
They are inherently unstable because they are grounded on paradoxes. These paradoxes are the main source of systemic dis-equilibrium as well as the main resources for complexitybuilding and actuality-furthering variation.
Pure event The last instantiation of the logismic figure of Nur-Vollzug I would like to present before closing this commentary on Luhmanns systemic operation could help us understand its
evential aspect. Operation happens as the reflection of a difference in a form act. The products of this happening are living beings, conscious contents and social interchanges. Luhmanns theory tends to deconstruct these cooled objectivities into their constituting operations. But as soon as we leave the real-objective level for the operative one, we face the problem of the representability of protological complexes. One of the problematic aspects of thinkability of originary operativity is the happening of pure operations. What does it mean that an operation happens or comes to pass? Once more the evocation of a philosophical figure is most instructive. It is Heideggers doctrine of
asymmetrical
74
5 Ereignis (event ).3 The idea of Ereignis
and
specific operations which
are
at
that
represents the climax of the fundamental effort of Heidegger to think be (Sein) in its difference
to the structures concentration on building ways of access to the non-objective, purely actual universe of prime reality. The main statements
moment effective. This idea is
developed by
being (Seiendes). This effort complete verbalization of thought

with
a
leads to
Luhmann along with a well-known theoretical topic, that of the connection or connectability
(Anschluss, Anschlussf11igkeit. Anschliessbarkeit)

of current operations in systems. Thus, the pure operativity of systems, though circular, is not
prime-eventual.
Its
protological description
can
Welt weltet, Nichts nichtet, 36 reminiscent of Ereignis ereignet, ist istet that fundamental structure of pure actuality where operator operatum and operatio are contracted in a sole intransitive, internally actual. circular act. Heideggers novelty is that pure actuality is thought as ab-solute finite, with no anchoring in any transcendent nor transcendental nor worldly reality. Being is the pure event of itself, the gift of time and being, winding in itself like an out-less finite ring. The pure event is a circular event, a
...
have the form:
show it in status llascendi as emerging and inaugural, and elucidate its structure, moments and movement. It does not make any assump-
Operative systems - in as structurally or immanently unstable: they can never stop operating, being, as I would say, tilted ahead and ever searching adequate connection to operate. They are literally pro-clivious, bent
tion
on
its
prime
event.
Luhmanns
sense -
appear then
coming into its own being (Er-eignen). Once again, the circular structure is a complex one with a dual movement of giving time and being
reciprocal duality of themselves. protological conception of a self-sustaining operativity is certainly nearer to the asymmetrical three-moment movement of the Fichtean deduction than to Heideggers dual, quasi-mystical movement of a self-giving being. The interest of the Heideggerian figure is,
to the
Luhmanns
however, its insistence

circular
on
the event character of

event
actuality.
one
Its
shaping of the
whose central stakes are the saying of the gratuity of the givenness of the given. Ereignis is irrelative and causeless. There is no transcendent nor any other actor who does. makes or motivates the event. There is no internal necessity eliciting it and unfolding its movement. Sole-actuality is eventual for Heidegger in the sense that its effectuation ( Uollzug) has no motive outside of itself. When it comes to pass and endures through time and being, it is still inaugurally motiveless, with no relation to anything outside its pure event. This radicality of the Heideggerian figure has no correspondent in Luhmanns theory. Thus, my last analogical presentation designed to enrich my commentary on Luhmanns operational conception has to be much more contrastive than the preceding ones. Operations, the sole systemic constituents,
motive is
forward in a relentless concatenation with similar entities. This ever-current connecting is nothing else than the effectuation of the asymmetrical reflection of the difference between the system and its environment within the system. This difference can never attain the status of an in itself quiescent unity. As an actual difference, it is continuously, unceasingly in effectuation (in Vollzug). Thus, systems consisting in actual operations presuppose themselves. Their operations can never begin out of nothing, but always lack connection to other operations of the same autopoiesis in order to happen. Each singular operation is structurally referential of other operations immediately connected to it through a puzzlelike key mesh. The operations sequence is concatenated through a sort of structural intrusion of the end of one operation into the beginning of the next. To be sure, the expression of this state of things in terms of a beginning and end of
operations
is not very
appropriate, though
it
happen,
occur, in an
already existing
stream
of specifically identical operations. Metabolic

processes, thoughts and communications come to pass through insertion in such a stream,
connecting themselves
to
respectively adequate
reflects the fact that the circular process of the singular operation refers constantly backwards from its (protological) end moment to its beginning one. In a way each operation has a part of itself pre-posited in an undetermined next operation, specified through the key fit characteristic of the relevant autopoiesis. An operation of social communication cannot be connected with an operation of life or of consciousness, as none of the moments of the autopoiesis of life nor of consciousness are able to fit between the circularly organized moments of the communication operation, i.e. information, impartation and comprehension. Each operation of a specific autopoiesis hosts in itself the reference to a homopoietical operation
75
under the form of an entangling intrusion of their different moments in the circular process 7 of their effectuation. 3
Other
communication
3. The world
problem
an embeddedof the advent of the like in the stream of ever-actuated like, the Heideggerian event concept still has illuminating aspects. It actually shows the thought of Nur-Vollzug in a state of full completion. Unfolding its immanent motives and making explicit its internal horizons, pure operativity would tend to these extremes of pure eventuality. Acutely elaborating on the protological structures, Luhmanns approach is, for its part, not blind to the problem of pure eventuality. In its terms, the problem of the event of circular actuality would be a world problem, outreaching the scope of a theory of society - however radical the theory may be in its categorial casting of pure, internal-intransitive, circular operativity. The achieving piece of Nur-Vollzug thought is the reflection of an aspect of reality which hints towards a horizon that out-ranges, and in a way engulfs the horizon of all- and self-engulfing communication. The world problem of world event is, however, like everything having sense, a potential object of social communication. It can be indicated, discussed, referred to. Any emergence of it is socially constructed. In contrast to all other constructions of communication, it is. however, something that directly hits upon the paradoxical, self-eluding, circular limitations of social communication itself. It unites all the paradoxity of the latter in one enigma and gives it the name of the sole horizon of all its horizons, that is, the world. Social communication being the ultimate envelope of itself cannot cross beyond itself. However, it does not reflect this self-limitation as a problem of communication itself, i.e. as a social problem. Communication reflects its paradoxical character as a whole in the form of a (non-social) world problem. It 3s shows, then, in its most paradox forms like art or religion, that there still is a problem that is not its own. A problem that is neither a part of it nor coextensive with it, but definitely larger than it. It is the problem of a sphere that transcends communication and should not be confused with any sphere of the incommunicable within communication. We have seen that conscious experience, especially when very intimate and intense, is not easily communicable.
ness
Although contrasting with such
of meaning do not motivate adequately. Besides, there is a whole shadow domain of communication which is structurally incommunicable: a communication can never impart, in its own act, the impartation quality of this same act.39A whole stream of non communication is thus cocurrent to that of communication, building the non attainability of the whole of communication to itself.40 These are the paradoxes of pure operativity as structurally pro-clivious and unending. Besides these specific paradoxes, communication hosts, very centrally, another type of communication that does not reflect problems of its self-reference, but the fact that although all-engulfing and self-contextual, communication is not the largest horizon of being. Communication, thus, contains the most paradoxical hint towards a world, larger than it is. The extreme of paradox is thus reached in a communication - which could be, like silence, a renunciation of communication - that shows beyond itself. World problems are problems of the pure eventuality of ever-streaming pure operativity. They are not those of self-reference of communication, but those of the self-refer1 ence of the givenness of a world for it.41
spheres
4. Social communication:
concept for
refounding sociology
of Luhmanns version of it as a radical transformation of the initial model through a new shaping of its central categories. The main line of thought commanding this categorial revision could be characterized as a programme of universal de-ontologization viewed as historial necessity. My endeavour was to shed some light on the ways and motives that led to the final centring of the whole theory upon the concept of operation. I have proceeded by establishing some conjunctions of Luhmanns approach with philosophical theories, all of which documented efforts to conceive the emergence of fundamental structures of meaning at protological levels. The convergence of these theories towards a de-realization (Ent-dinglicirung - or desubstantivization) of current ontological categories was in itself instructive. Thus, most efforts went in the direction of a counterintuitive thinking of internal-intransitive, circular, effectual actuality. I brought them under the logismic title of Nllr- Vollwg. Whereas Luhmanns theory stands somewhat alone in
Our
exploration
systems theory showed
76
contemporary sociology and

erratic and
seems
therefore
procedure allowed me to situate it in a line of philosophical thought. The trajectory of the reviewed figures of sole-operation could lead us, in an altogether
my
incomprehensible,
ordered way, from the first shapings of the system-operation motive within the complexity problematics to the last of its reflections in the world problem. Let us venture a last remark on the sociological interest of such a theory of social communication. Its primary level reveals itself. once more, as very remote from the traditional settings of social theory - and not only its empirical ones. It would thus further the scepticism of those who feel that its entry rights are prohibitively high. Moreover, while showing the strong stimulation such a general theory receives and exerts on the specifically a priori theorizing of neighbouring philosophy, my interpretation could have enhanced the opinion of its marginal sociological fertility. My thesis would here be that a sound approach to Luhrnanns design cannot do mithout a miniifium of philosophicnl analysis of its theoretical premises. Such an analysis should deliver a characterization of the nature and level of the involved concepts. We should avoid self-delusion and recognize the basic evidence that the ground on which Llljlnl(inrlS theory stands - and falls - is protological. Protologicity. as practised by Luhmann, is a very new and peculiar setting for forging primary categories, conceptual architectures and descriptive frameworks. Whereas classical sociology could lean on philosophical groundwork (Simmel and Weber on neoKantianism, Scheler and Schutz on phenomenology, etc.), Luhmann inaugurates a new type of relation between a theory of society and the foundational or categorial work of philosophy. He rejects any reliance on a global philosophical position. Instead, he combines a multiplicity of theoretical pieces to a conception of high abstraction and logical priority. The protological status of the whole synthesis is not always clear. Yet, my conviction is that the central pieces of the theory are protological, and hence require a philosophical elucidation. Actually, protologic is a sort of unidentified transcendental logic which is poorly established and whose contours are still very ambiguous. I can see no way to dispense with a philosophical elucidation of its
statements.
from the fields of its is that the main and most potent acquisition of Luhmanns theory is the concept of social communication. To make clear what I suggest, I would compare, in strictly epistemological terms, Freuds invention of the Unconscious with Luhmanns construction of social communication. 42 The basic epistemological feature they share is that both concepts embody a sort of coming to themselves of their respective disciplines. Actually, both social communication and the
so
tion and
remote
acknowledged objects. My thesis
unconscious
are
primary object concepts,
cir-
cumscribing the proper theme of a specific science. As the phenomenological thorough theorizing of these matters has shown, such projections of specific objectivities are nothing less than inductive. They represent fundamental Etitik,tit-fe (castings) of primary objects, impulsing a decisive differentiation of the scientific discipline at stake and establishing it on a new basis. They open unsuspected horizons for theory-building, allowing a much fartherreaching inspection of their objective domains, as well as a much more rigorous formulation of their accounts. They are prior to any set of observations or cognitions, and have something of a founding performance. Our suggestion is to consider the Luhmannian concept of social communication as an
inaugurative performance endowing sociology
with its proper object: the social. In the same manner, Freuds Unconscious represented a new foundation of psychology on the basis of a recasting of the psychic. The analogy holds in a very pertinent manner. The problem of psychology at the beginning of the 20th century was, from a psychoanalytical point of view, the dominance of I-centred, introspective and cognitive thematizations of the psychic. The psychic as an objectivity was featured in a massively
manner, supposing a firm, selfidentical and individual mental entity. The concept of the Unconscious anonymized the psychic entity, transforming it in a bundle of processes governed by a complex affectual economy. We can observe in Luhmanns theory a similar aversion from individualistic ontology and a striking analogy with the anonymizing effects of the position of an anthropologically decentred - or de-anthropologized - third person, non-mechanical processual object. The limits of these similarities between both castings of deindividualized, centre- and nameless primary objects, is that the Freudian Unconscious has been often thought of as an objective entity
ontological
Admittedly, all this being done, the

tion remains
as
ques-
theory so costly
to the concrete returns of a in terms of conceptual elabora-
77
existing somewhere covered by

a
of Atlantis diswho, after a good-hearted long search, came across it. From a Luhmannian point of view, Freuds casting of the psychic was not thoroughly de-ontologizing. For this purpose, the Unconscious should have been 3 thought as a difference and not as an identity.43 However, on the whole, we can maintain the analogy and insist on the autonomizing and fertilizing effects of the switch, in both psychology and sociology, to anonymous and autonomous primary objects who allow the observation of a level of reality in its own right. Psychic life is no more an aggregate of conscious or cognitive mental states than social interchange is an aggregate of individual actions. The contribution of Niklas Luhmann to a refoundation of sociology on the basis of a proper primary objectivity not only delivers the concept of such a specific object, but also a
a
sort
Gesellschaft (Luhmann 1997)

basis of such literature 7 The major reference
was
developed partially
on
the
man
in Luhmanns work is definitely Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität (1973). Yet Legitimation durch Verfahren (1969). where the rationality of subordinate, microfinal devices like procedures is theorized, is also interesting.
highly reflexive, epistemological and protological theory thematizing all central processes of any de-ontologization project. My purpose here
was
to
a
internally
of such
show how the idea of a circular, actual operation constitutes the core
theory.
First version received
Final version
July accepted September
1999 1999
Notes
to this consciouswhere the Uberholtsein der uberlieferten metaphysischen Bestimmung der Wahrheit von ontologischen Pramissen her (Luhmann 1962-1, 63) is stated as the basis for a profound transformation in the dogmatic structure of social beliefs. 2 A political project, a juridical dogmatics, the perception of or the acting in a market, a scientific theory, a game. a conflict all are conceived as self-descriptions of social communication, constituting modes of representing the world within communication as well as modes of experiencing or acting related to it. 3 The text (Derrida), consciousness (Husserl), language or logic (Saussure. Spencer Brown) are other figures of the same
ness,
...
1 Luhmanns first articles bear testimony
A formulation Luhmann uses in biographical interviews: weil... man als Soziologe alles machen kann, ohne auf einen bestimmten Themenbereich festgelegt zu sein (1987-141) 5 Parsons systemism was in many respects too narrow. too essentialist for that purpose, lacking the main characteristics of the required theory, namely high reflexivity. For a reconstruction and critique of Parsons essentialism, see Clam (1999:142150). 6 The relevant literature is immense. The theoretical sophistication has been ever-increasing. Organization theory and its literature remained a constant source of inspiration for the later Luhmann - until recently, where the evolutionary problematic in the chapter Evolution of Die Gesellschaft der
protological paradigm. 4
See Clam (1997), the first part of which is dedicated to Luhmanns early work. A stimulating discussion of Luhmanns administration and organization theory is Dammann et al. (1994). 9 That is, reacting to its own variation. 10 As checked disorder 11 It should be noted that the double contingency scheme is the paradigm of what I would call the indefinite generativity of paradox It is the genus, so to speak, of all other reflexive paradoxes like, for instance, that of the circular making of law through legal procedures. See on this latter circularity the enlightening work of G. Teubner (1989). 12 Imake a terminological distinction between spontaneous and self-organizing order. I understand spontaneous processes as reproducible, whereas self-organizing order is emergent, coming but once to pass and self-encaging. 13 We could call it the principle of das Feste wird auf das Fließende gegrundet (found the solid upon the flowing. Luhmann 1962 190). 14 Using the terms of the phenomenological eptstemology of Husserl and Heidegger. 15 One should always insist on the fact that Luhmanns invention does not proceed like an abstract, apriorical deduction. It is nurtured through the evidence coming from constructivistically reconceived sciences (like attribution theory in psycho-sociology) and is developed along the lines of a theoretical sociology - and not those of an aprioric philosophy. 16 Like those of the sequencing ) Sequenzierung of notions ( and arguments in circular or reticular topics, or those of the sense and scope of abstraction in general theory (cf. Luhmann 1979:170-177). 17 Succeeding Platos distinction of different levels of philosophizing, the top of which is the Platonic dialectic. Aristotles pröté philosiphia is a research on how being reveals itself as being; a research upon the most fundamental. i.e. categorial. ground of our world comprehension. 18 The Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 is the most detailed exposition of the system However, the Grundriss des Eigenthumlichen der Wissenschaftslehre of 1795 contains, at its beginning, a very brief and clear presentation of the figure I am discussing. We quote from the first edition of the Werke (1834-35. 1845-16). 19 The I is understood by Fichte as a pure activity (reine ) das Handelnde ) (Grundlage §1, 6), where the actor ( Thätigkeit and its product ( die That ) sind eins und dasselbe (are one and the same thing: §1. 6). The same passage implicitly identifies das Handelnde (the actor) and die Handlung (the action). This is a very clear token of the underlying Nur-Vollzug structure that I discuss later. 20 No need to say that our presentation of Fichtean deduction is a most cursory one. The exegesis of the extremely dense principles ) Grundsätze of the deduction fills an extended ( literature. I concentrate, in our interpretation, on the central and consensually acknowledged figure of thought ) logismos A ( . few hints at the literature may suffice: P Rohs (1991). brings an interesting image to illustrate the activity-based conception of the I like a photon which is nothing when stripped of its movement, the I is nothing besides its actual activity (p. 53, Thathandlung being the identity of Tat (activity) and Handlung (product of the activity): Hans-Jurgen Muller (1980:120ff.) stresses the problems of the sequenciation of circular activity under the title of symbolic narrative (the Thalhandlung being
.
78
explained in the deduction symbolisch erzählend) as well as the fact that the Thathandlung of the I is the paradigm of every setzen Dieter Henrich (1982) brings into discussion ( position );
the later (1801) Fichtean formula an activity whom an eye has been implanted (p. 75ff.) which would fit very well into our interpretation -however, he proposes a divergent assessment of it; Reinhard Lauth (1984:19ff.) analyses very accurately the doubling of self-reflection/determination and hetero-determination in
21 one
of such nominal-verbal doublets is. World worlds,

...
nothing
reflect quite accurately the nothings, event events, is ises challenging violence done to language in the German of the text original 37 Empirically, all systems are described as being always in a state of operative ongoing. 38I mean the figure of art which Luhmann calls world art in distinction from all other art configurations. World art is the
unique
act
Vollzug or Selbstvollzug ( ).
The transcendental philosophy of consciousness is no longer modelled on the perfect and divine intellectus originarius, of whom the human intellect represents a derivative form intellectus derivativus). Thus far, the statement that worldliness ( begins with a finite subjectivity does not prejudge the givenness or not givenness of a pre-worldly consciousness. 22 First edition: London (1969); second edition: New York
(1972) containing
23
some
A recent discussion of Spencer Browns
significant complements. logic with a clear
link to Luhmanns revival of its central stakes is to be found in the two volumes edited by Dirk Baecker (1993a, b). 24 The allgemeine Gegenstandstheorie in the manner of the pure Logistik of the beginning does not reach such deep originary levels as Spencer Browns protologic It doesnt really propose a theory of purely actual, paradoxical and circular
objects
The context of the statement is the following: Aber Menschen konnen nicht kommunizieren, nicht einmal ihre Gehirne konnen kommunizieren, nicht einmal das Bewusstsein kann kommunizieren. Nur die Kommunikation kann kommunizieren (in the chapter entitled Wie ist Bewusstsein an Kommunikation beteiligt? Luhmann 1995b:37). 26 The main text is De anima (especially Book II:412a-b, 414a). Our interpretation draws on Inciarte (1970), Frede & Patzig (1988) and Liske (1985). 27 Plato, Republic 436a, 544e, 580d-e, 588c-e: Timaeus 69c-e.
28
25
Autopoiesis
means,
in
our
context,
self-producing
circular actuality and activity. 29 Cf Hamelin (1953). I suppose that Anstotle, with his theory of the totalizing unity of the most specific form act, resolved the problem of the coupling between the principle of intellectual knowledge and that of animation of the body. For a detailed study of the long groping search for that solution, see
form of art characteristic of our differentiated societies, where art has no reference outside itself. concentrating its self-creating mission and paradoxity on the closure of the work of art itself on itself. See Luhmann (1990, 1995a). 39 It cannot convey or communicate its own intentionality (communication quality), because the intentionality of the intentionality communicating act would, while this latter is in effectuation. itself be still veiled - awaiting a higher act of explicitation, whose intentionality again would have to be unveiled... 40 Erreichbarkeit (attainability) of social communication forms a consistent topic in Luhmanns theory (1997, ch. 5).It has been explicitly thematized by Fuchs (1992) 41 Luhmann does not make a clear distinction between communicational paradoxes and world problem. World, as the Einheit der Differenz all-engulfing unity of difference ( ), is what is concomited ) mitgefuhrt in the paradoxes of communication. I ( opted for a formal distinction as a means of giving a higher profile to a world problem that is not just silently concomitant with current communication, but takes form as such and for itself A basic Luhmannian text dealing with the world problematic is Reden und Schweigen (1989). 42 What is at stake is not on any account an assessment of the scientific or cultural repercussions of both. That would be obviously mistaken, the weight of the Luhmannian theory being, in this respect, rather modest when compared to that of Freudian psychoanalysis. 43 Moreover, the energetic economy of psychic life by Freud is still too mechanistic, that is, not complex enough to enable the emergence of a difference theoretical theorizing.
References
Baecker, D. (ed.) 1993a. Kalkul der Form. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Baecker. D. (ed.) 1993b. Probleme der Form. Frankfurt: Suhr-
Nuyens (1948)
I would like to add, in the wide sense of all conscious Erlebnisse However, Luhmanns texts on con( experience ). sciousness occult the affective domain of conscious expenence. 31 With the exception that pure intellects are not only conceivable, but really exist with no anchoring in animal or
30
kamp.
Clam, J. 1997. Droit et sociéte chez Niklas Luhmann - La contingence des normes (Avec un Avant-propos de Niklas Luhmann). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Clam, J. 1999. Choses, échange, média: enquête sur les étapes dune dématérialisation de la communication. Archives de Philosophie du droit, 43, 97-137. Dammann, K., Granow, D. & Japp, K. P (eds.) 1994. Die Verwaltung des politischen Systems. Neuere systemtheoretische Zugriffe anf ein altes Thema. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Fichte, J. G. [1834-35/1845-16] 1971. Werke. 11 vol. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Frede, M. & Patzig, G. (eds.) 1988. Aristoteles Metaphysik Z: Text. Ubersetzung und Kommentar. 2 vol. München: Beck. Fuchs, P 1992. Erreichbarkeit der Gesellschaft Zur Konstruktion der Imagination gesellschaftlicher Einhert. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Furth, M. 1978. Transtemporal Stability in Aristotelian Substances. Journal of Philosophy, 75, 624-646. Hamelin. O. 1953. La Theorie de lintellect dapres Ariostote et ses
vegetative life.
32
To avoid confusion I translate the second moment of the
Kommunikation operation, namely Mitteilung, ( ) impartation - rendered otherwise most naturally into English communication. Impartation has the advantage of replicating with relative fidelity the etymological composition of the German word - an advantage the word utterance (the adopted rendering in English translations of Luhmann) does not
communication
as
have.
in Liske 1985:256). These effects have drawn the attention of the selforganization theorists. On this point, cf. Schweitzer (1997). Most impressive examples of redundancy in initial phases of selforganizing processes are paths (or tracks: Wege ). 35 The basic text is Zur Sache des Denkens (1969). As for Fichte and Aristotle, a thorough penetration of the philosophical notion requires a much greater textual basis, extending to the 34
33
Furth (1978, quoted
Heidegger,
commentateurs. Paris: Vrin. M. 1969. Zur Sache des Denkens.
Tübingen: Niemeyer.
entire corpus.
36
One
can
easily figure how embarrassing the translation
Henrich, D. 1982. Selbstverhaltnisse: Gedanken und Auslegungen zu den Grundlagen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. Stuttgart: Reclam.
79
Inciarte, F. 1970. Forma formarum: Strukturmomente der thomistischen Seinslehre im Ruckgriff auf Aristoteles. Freiburg: Alber. Lauth, R. 1984. Die transzendentale Naturlehre Fichtes nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre. Hamburg: Meiner. Liske, M.- Th. 1985. Aristoteles und der aristotelische Essentialismus. Individuum, Art, Gattung. Freiburg: Alber. Luhmann, N. 1962. Soziologische Aufklärung 1. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, N. Legitimation durch Verfahren. 3rd ed. Frankfurt:
Unbeobachtbare Welt:
Haux.
Über
Kunst und Architektur. Bielefeld:
Luhmann, N. 1995a. Die Kunst der Gesellsehaft. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
Luhmann, N. 1995b. Soziologische Aujklärung 6. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, N. 1997. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
Muller, H.J. 1980. Subjektivität als symbolisches und schematisches Bild des Absoluten: Theorie der Subjektivität und Religionsphilosophie in der Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes. Meisenheim.
Suhrkamp.
Luhmann, N. 1973.
Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalitat. Frankfurt : Suhrkamp. Luhmann, N. 1979. Unverstandliche Wissenschaft: Probleme einer Theorieeigenen Sprache In N. Luhmann (ed.), Soziologische Aufklarung 3, pp. 170-177. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Luhmann, N. 1987. Archimedes und wir. Berlin: Merve. Luhmann, N. 1989 Reden und Schweigen. In N Luhmann & P Fuchs (eds.). Reden und Schweigen, pp. 7-20. Frankfurt:
Nuyens, F.
1948. LEvolution de la
psychologie dAristote. Louvain
Rohs, P. 1991. Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Munchen: Beck. Schweitzer, F. 1997 Wege und Agenten: Reduktion und
Suhrkamp.
Luhmann, N.
1990.
Selbstorganisationstheorie. SelbsorganisaJahrbuch für Komplexität in den Natur-, Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften, 8, 113-13 5. Spencer Brown, G [1969] 1972. Laws of Form. London: Allen Unwin/New York: Julian Press. Teubner, G. 1989. Recht als autopoietisches System. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
tion:
Konstruktion in der
[with
F. D.
Bunsen &
D.
Baecker].

System&#39;s Sole Constituent, The Operation

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Acta Sociologica http://asj.sagepub.

Nordic Sociological Association

>> Version of Record - Jan 1, 2000 What is This?

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constructions necessitated by the categorial radicalization it undertakes. I begin with an

to apply a general systems approach phenomena. The benefits of such an

approach would then have

greater accuracy of the sociological as well as a greater explanatory

potency. Not taking

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acquainted with the work,

is that the specific enterprise is to conceive

century with the

ontological (non) events.

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expressions of the self-reference of communication is an interesting one. It shows us how an

society and how the generality of

sociology theory of this theory

The conclusion that Luhmann

organization theorist drew from these premises

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paradoxical settings. settings is the double

tingency scheme, which Luhmann takes

Downloaded from asj.sagepub.com at Univ of Education, Winneba on August 10, 2013

are the sole. variously specifiable constituents of all communicative systems.

I have followed Luhmann

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type of highly reflexive

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emerging with the

talk and which I

point I have already

noted, Brownian protologic is not the only

approach Luhmann draws

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Kommunikation kann kommunizieren

internally effective, unique-moment structure. logico-grammatical triadic structure of

emerging operation, but is the actuating of

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tion it offers to the

the basis of self-motion and self-continuation

nication is made is conscious Erlebnisse,

equally appropriate to enter into some being structurally

excluded, like incommunicable, ineffable

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stimulated than others

wrap or bend goes beyond the theoretical space. With

time and matter) fits

whole, this conception

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stability. Through the flow of time, the

transtemporally stable whirlpool, a form maintained in actuality through a constant bend of

mutually indent the

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5 Ereignis (event ).3 The idea of Ereignis

specific operations which

moment effective. This idea is

being (Seiendes). This effort complete verbalization of thought

(Anschluss, Anschlussf11igkeit. Anschliessbarkeit)

have the form:

however, its insistence

the event character of

of specifically identical operations. Metabolic

System's Sole Constituent, The Operation

System's Sole Constituent, The Operation