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Culture Documents
OF
PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT
A DEFENCE
OF
PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT
BEING AN ESSAY ON
BY
M.A.,
M.R
^IFOK^I^
\ \
MACMILLAN AND
1879,
The right of translation
is
CO.
reserred
'
'
70-3
'As, to the
for Religion
;
religious,
it
will
seem absurd
it
to set forth
any
justification
will
seem absurd
to defend Science.
first
Yet to do the
as needful as to do the
Herbert Spencer
'A doctrine
is
first
;
received as
an
intuitive
truth,
standing beyond
rigid
is
all
;
need of demonstration
then
it
demonstration
and
merely probable
and,
finally,
the effort
is
belief,
the
mere
up an antagonist
Leslie Stephen
2 6y
\^
PREFACE
It
IS
NOT NECESSARY
its
to preface this
Essay by any
It
is
precise account of
sufficiently
may be
a piece
described
by saying
that
it
by a
series of argu-
The
reader
who
the
is
work
find,
think,
no
difficulty in
under-
standing
It
plan.
may be
in
*
first
Mind'
in
was published
the
Fortnightly
Review.'
In
name
of an alteration in
The
be found
in the
number
which
to
I
of
'Mind'
I
for this
month.
For reasons
it
there gave
necessary
consequence of
his remarks.
VI
PREFACE.
I
to
my
brother-in-law,
Mr.
Henry Sidgwick,
interest
in
has shown
in criticising the
various
His
its
the
and
have
to
more reason
to
be grateful
for them,
owing
many
view
widely from
my
own.
Whittinghame
January
1879.
title
of this
for
book was
'
A
me
Defence of Philosophic
that, considering
and
it
was even
name.
It
nature of
number of people who would read the book would probably bear an infinitely small proportion to the number of people who would read only its title, and that most of those who read
its
the
title
of religion.
As
title,
in the
hope
though
is,
as
it
may
less misleading.
CONTENTS
PART
CHAPTER
I.
I.
PAGE
On the
Idea of a Philosophy
II.
Empirical Logic
15
III.
Induction
.
,
30
. . . .
45
PART
V. Introduction to
II.
Part
II
73
VI. Transcendentalism
VII.
85
.
138
VIII.
The
Authority
of
Consciousness
.
.
and
.
of
.
Original Beliefs
154'
X.
XI.
The Test
of Inconceivability
....
.
178
194
209
Viii
CONTENTS.
PART
CHAPTER
III.
PAGE
.
.242
. .
260
SUMMARY
277
PRACTICAL RESULTS
Note on the Discrepancy between Science and
Religion
.
296
^28
APPENDIX.
On the
Idea of a Philosophy of Ethics
.
.335
OF THB
''A
university'
A
PART
I.
CHAPTER
Everything
that
I.
we know, may
may be
and
what
named
thus
Science,
Metaphysics,
is
Ethics,
Philosophy.
By Science
particular
meant
matters of fact
so that
relations subsist-
would be a more
for
accurate,
though
logy and
this
is
less
convenient, expression
is
what
is
intended. In Metaphysics
all
Theoreal or
supposed knowledge of
nomenal.
[part
i.
What
in the
is
meant by Ethics
will
Appendix which
the volume.
it
Here
it
is
Multitudes of propositions,
professing to
emour
body
ments,
acceptance.
(
And
as no one believes
all
of them, so
those
who
and
for
The
and
makes up the fourth of the classes into which possible knowledge is divided, and is here
always called Philosophy.
If
It
be objected that
this
is
not the
common
difficult
meaning of the term, I reply that it would be to point out what the common meaning is.
been used, perhaps, most frequently
department of science.
absolute are also called
in
It
has
England, as
is
properly a
after
But researches
philosophical,
is
is
the
and these
belong to ontology.
Ethics
sometimes called
sometimes called
philosophy
while
Logic,
which
a very
common usage
would, as
I
be included
in
it
CHAP.
I.]
also
by
my
definition.
So
whole, be
much harm
in using the
term to represent
is
no other word.
(
It follows directly
from
how-
may
For
be excluded from
it.
be reasons
that even
for
it
and
is
it is
So
is
an
illusion,
knowledge
far
is
attain-
would be so
from destroying
it
philosophy that
it is
)
could
be established.
If
mankind was in the condition of believing nothings and without a bias in any particular direction, was merely on the look-out for some legitimate creed, it would not, I conceive, be possible, a priori,
to
name any
But since
this is
by no means
number of
and most people have a certain number of ethical and metaphysical (theological)
ones,
it
may be
possible to describe
in a
some of the
at-
tributes
philosophy pro-
For example.
Since
B 2
all
[part
i.
we
it
may
are
which
And
from
this
it
follows that
philo-
sophy must consist of two main departments, one of which deals with these ultimate, or self-evident propositions, the other with
I
modes of
inference.
any
root,
but from
parts,
though
self-
itself is
it
by no means
Of such a system
one part
it
is
derivative
ought rather to be
is
of the whole
an inference
this
But even on
were)
and
a
sufficient
really, as
little
validity
this
'
all
that
is
coherent
true.*
Which
is
is
itself
again either
ulti-
mate or
derivative.
an important character;
of a complete philosophy
it
let
me now
mention
would seem
It
sufficiently
continually ignored.
may be
stated
CHAP.
I.]
thus
' :
business of philosophy
is
to deal with
belief.'
There
no
distinction
more
steadily in
view than
or antecedents which
produce
and the
enquiry
The
second
is
philosophical,
No
may be
various
before
may be
required.
It
necessary to
modes by which we
select those
But
opera-
we
to suppose that
satisfactorily,
by performing the
all.
we
we made
no no
a
its
ideas,
of the
doctrine
of evolution to mind,
for
Thus,
it is
never a
final
it
answer to philosophy to
is
say of a particular
pirical, or,
belief,
innate, connate,
em-
'
[part
i.
Psychology
is
by such
replies, but(^o
science
by
definition
supposed to
?
rest.
It is strictly
*
im-
possible that
How
to believe
it ?
'
though,
it
may go
it.
be ultimate
This
will
perhaps be clearer
if
we
Let
judgment,
e.g.y
Everything has a
cause,'
is
a priori'
The
it is
'
psy-.
chologist
who makes
thereto
Now
if
'
is
be
is
^
;
not ultimate
it
two propositions
ist, all
is
'
a priori'
judgments are
judgment.
an 'a priori
dis-
So
in
loose philosophical
very
common
to
as being self-evident,
neither
'
CHAP.
I.]
wards to adduce
as that
'
it
is
common
in
men/
it
or that
it
has
all-
been implanted
wise Creator.'
In such cases
the principles in
or
these that
ultimate,
when
a priori
'
'
might ap-
A priori
means indepen-
ambiguous.
It
may mean
it.
The
first
meaning
no
philosophy has
as before
part of the
subject-matter of
psychology.
the other
hand, while
belief,
and so
differentia
of ultimate beliefs
we
On
the contrary,
itself directly
judgment
and sometimes
mind when
in
[part
i.
believe
or that
it
;
was implanted
fact that
in
us by the
by the very
judgment
a priori
is
not
While, then,
it
is
philosophy to account
ultimate
axioms
it
and
not
modes
its
of inference,
it is
may be
it
hardly necessary to
make
it
is
To
sion
to
show
;
that
true premiss
so that
if
we were
we
we
we mean by
is
ultimate
is
'
inde-
pendent of
proof.'
But
if
philosophy
what,
I
it
may be
hend
it,
asked,
is
is it
to
do
Its business, as
appre-
them
them
in systematic order.
is
What
we
consider what
logic,
is
is
done by
Deductive
which
it
encumbered,
CHAP.
I.]
mode
of inference
all
by which
it
may be
:
dis-
tinguished from
is
by
definition a
branch of philosophy.
Now when
All
is
B, all
is
*
.
all
is B,'
are legitimately
may
be their content,
it is
mode
of
it
;
of inference
being
witness of
its
own
validity.
the
*
axioms of
procedure
mathematics furnish an
in the
illustration of its
Two
hundred
one
and
forty
shillings,
being each
is
number of
things
'
order to
make them
possible.
Such a deduction
no doubt,
10
[part
i.
I
*
please, say,
'
&c/
Two
shillings
syllogisms
be
and
quite as obvious
introduced to prove
It
is
in
common except
In such an event
But
this
can hardly be
philosophy
speaking,
modes of
is
inference.
The
already,
comparatively
complete
difficult to believe
of classification.
Something very
distantly approachif
each depart-
ment of knowledge had a mode of reasoning peculiar to itself, as some have supposed, e.g;, theology to
have.
To
their
classify inferences
is
to exhibit
is
what
is
called
common
is
form.
And
it
plain that
if
of two
inferences,
which by
false
classification
form, one
CHAP
I.]
ii
philosophically worthless.
in
deductive
*
in
Barbara
were
trust-
It follows
from
this
every kind of
logic, if
it is
must
be formal.
The whole
object of a philosophy of
valid
inference being to
distinguish
and ultimate
common form
To
enun-
valid
at best only
it
have a
is
psychological
misleading.
philosophically,
will
only
These remarks
to
be found of imtheories of
portance
when we come
consider
There
is
(i.e.
following
are
if
all
general
latter,
or
all
par-
Of course,
there must
hope
my
12
[part
i.
What
is
desire to
do
far
remainder of
this
essay
to
examine how
not
and
men, but
modern
This
is
but even
this,
pursued
in
detail,
for its
inti-
aimed
they
;
at here.
sciences,
ulti-
however
but
far
may
;
mately spring
no
science,
common
and even of
limited,
I I
this subject,
so
limited
and doubly
end
shall
not attempt a
it
trust
may be
suf-
in view.
Now,
ways
in
;
of them, so far
We
it
might begin,
for
stands,
of argument
we
CHAP.
I.]
13
time.
we might
attempt to
all
find,
by a process of
mere
casual exploration,
really self-evident,
and
all
made
to produce
any
results at all
thereless
incline to the
how
we
desire to reach.
When
will
of scientific philo-
take to be this
phenomena,
not
is
that observation
and experiment,
in fact, furnish
evidence, however,
of science not only
which
is
considered by most
men
amply
large
sufficient,
be well imagined.
number
who suppose
themselves to derive
their
\
14
[part
i.
sources,
is
somewhat remarkable
information
this feat is to
that
we
should
precise
have so
little
respecting the
method by which
first sight,
be accomplished. At
may
one.
We
are
very abstruse
to
and
all
that
it
may seem
necessary
to
do
is
methods
to
prove, in other
we
by
more
limited truths
life.
Whether
which
I
this
is
possible or not
in
is
the point
propose to examine
I
And
in
doing so
my
'
Logic,'
in
this initial
problem
an
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
15
CHAPTER
II.
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
There are two points of view from -which any system of logic may be criticised. We may consider, first, how far it gives a satisfactory account of those
methods of inference with which
and, secondly,
it
professes to deal
in the
how
far
it is
complete
sense of
first
dealing with
all
methods of
inference.
The
of
is
worth
anything must
satisfy.
He
about
all
all,
that
if
is,
of
we
only
we
shall
to those
which have
already been reduced to system, but rather by bringing forward one single method, and announcing that
all
It is in this last
way
i6
[part
i.
have too
he quotes
of authorities
whom
as witnesses to
its
truth
and importance,
to treat his
a serious
that
it
spirit.
At
the
same
time,
must confess
appears to
me
This doctrine, discovered by Mr. Mill and applauded by Sir John Herschel and Professor Bain,
is,
on
its
the
is
is
Now, when a
on
ing
it
logician puts
its trial,
it,
and, so far as
First,
known
to
what
not
known
is is
whether it
if is
or
not a
mode
?
of inference). Secondly,
there
tion decides
mate).
;
The
question
is,
so to speak, a question of
is
in that form,
any inference
at
all,
it is
legitimate.
The
conclusion
may
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
rate, if these are true, it is true.
17
but, at
any
So
is
that
the
question of
fact.
Do
we, as a matter of
we employ do know or
affirmative
himself,
we know
to
in the
and, indeed,
it
is
so answered by Mill
at least
by
implication.^
Mill,^ are
we warranted
in
'as-
it
fairly includes
answer,
warranted,
this is equivalent
premiss unless
to assert
any major
undoubtedly
something
'
fairly
in
and
it
is
we must
be conif it
know
before
we can
it.
cluded from
true that
To
reply, that
even
be
miss
that
is
So long
fact,
we
premiss without
will the latter
Logic, vol.
i.
p. 206.
"^
Ibid. vol.
i.
p. 207.
i8
[part
i.
that inference.
at
illegitimate,
still,
of
its
relation
to
its
is
So
far,
then,
it
appears to
me
this
that
on
his
own
but
if
was
all, I
should
simply on whether
or the
we
infer
'
word
interpret/
from
'
or of
to,'
to professed logi-
that
if
they
it
would be well
to revise the
common
definition of the
word
infer.'
The
amount
of plausibility to Mr.
is
;
the
syllogism
particulars
inference
in
is
from
and
this is
mixed up
such a manner
I
with
the
general
argument which
a
sort
have been
idea
that
am
convinced,
of
general
it
follows
from
mean Mr.
Mill's
view
by
which they
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
19
syllogism.
The
truth
is
trine,
depends on
it
for its
whole
effect.
Supposing
we know any
we know any
of the particular
then,
if it
is
it
formally possible to
I
make any
suppose, be
deductions from
must be true
either by
we
or
;*
know
else
'everything which
it
superfluous
we
and
which,
method.
be,
can
be arrived at by
no other
first
think
may
affirm without
;
extravagantly absurd
we are,
in
which
amounts
to this
that,
on a certain supposition
mode
of inference, but
would be
in
The
that
in
every
we deduce
20
[part
i.
that conclusion
and
this
is
again
is
founded
all
inference
from particulars.
by Mr.
Mill, to
some
of
its results,
it.
Firstly,
whether
be
true or untrue,
it
does not
it
lie
within
or to assume
:
As
With the
a direct
knowledge
in
logic,
I
way at
These questions
all,
and partly
impossible
it.
It is possible
no doubt
man to go over all his beliefs in turn, and find to his own satisfaction that whenever they are not immefor
diate,
a necessary cha-
of
all
conclusions.
it
Something would be
done
in this direction if
was no
method known by which inferences could be drawn from general propositions unfortunately, it seems at present easier to show this
satisfactory
of particular ones.
^
Logic, vol.
i.
p. 6.
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
remark
is,
21
My third
that
if
our morality must be deduced from general propositions which are not,
be,
themin-
selves inferences
from
To
is
ethical
ferences, therefore,
Mr.
theory
altogether
inapplicable.
Let
us,
all
particular
is
therefore but
one
namely,
inference
from particulars
rules has
far in
by
'
simple enumeration'
what
is
he to give us by which we
legitimately performed
We should
expect before-
logic, consisting of
two large
view of
particular
would
form a considerable
part.
This
is
not
is
so.
What
up
scattered
and down
so that
we have
the
phenomenon
in
is
of a
work professing
to treat
mainly of inference,
inference
How
mode by
this
my
readers are
it
is
which, according to
22
[part
i.
a law of nature
*
Four Methods,'
is
causally connected in a
then,
and
by
virtue of the
this discovery
discovery
is
established.
truths,
we
universal type
But
the most
perfect
example of
its
application,
we
The
on
its
first
is
that the
Mill,
particulars never
that as yet
it
shown how
to
form
is
the
is
same
if it
correct,
by means of extraneous
in
a more
GHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
23
mode
of reasoning gives
similar
me
and
A
D
as an inference from B,
and a precisely
mode
gives
me C
as an inference from
true), then,
(both
being supposed to be
or, at
if I
find that
I
is
not true,
any
rate, is
not proved,
must
for believing
to
be true
inferred from
in exactly the
is
same
manner
let
as
was from B.
So much
plain.
Now
case of the
of Universal Causation.
Universal Causation
'
is
an inference
It
from particulars
has never
by simple enumeration.'
has
;
(I
I
has never,
been known to be
I
false.
This
is
But
if
we
same inducdistin-
tive argument,
grossly.'
It is
*we
says Mill,
in general err
we must
Law
of
Causation
is
which
it
exactly resembles
and
this
it
is
equally
What
are
They can be seen on page 102 of the second volume of the Logic,' and may be paraphrased somewhat in the following way
*
:
Vol.
ii.
p. 102.
24
[part
i.
may be
observed to be con-
stant
limits which,
compared
hazardous
human
to
It is
will
obtain
much
be
true,
because they
may be
an arrangement, or
this
collo-
cation
'
of causes
and
sequently
its effects,
may
where
it
however,
we
sup-
we have observed
total
such a
in pro-
sequence to
portion as
to
it
range open
human
observed sequence approach the certainty and universality of a law of nature, until ultimately the
two
become
indistinguishable.
This
is
Law
of Causation.
the objection that has to be
is
Now
made
to this
method of proof
tion at issue.
that
it
The
distinction
between sequences
and sequences
which depend on the collocation of causes, has no meaning unless we assume a universe governed by
causation
;
is
we want
to demonstrate.
Grant
all
and a great
that at every
deal
grant
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
25
human observation
be accurate
prove.
tinction
And
this
is
precisely
It is
what Mr.
in
;
Mill's dis-
does assume.
dangerous
an ordinary
but
way
we may
do so
our induction
is
sufficiently wide.
And
we
why
Because
we
shall
have observed
causation.
is
This
is
may
'
enable us to judge
of the worth of
ation.'
it
many
inferences
There
is,
Law
ment
basis
This expedient
in
may seem
for
that,
it
as
good
as
was possible
For
in
Mr.
a general
way we may
lay
it
down
that
26
[part
i.
by informal inference we mean inference of which the truth cannot be discovered from the form, any attempt to prove a conclusion by means of such
since
inference, can only tive in
effec-
Firstly,
we may
distin-
principle
which
is
arrived at
This
less
is
Mr.
Mill's
device,
obvious argu-
ment
other
in
tinction
may be given either a priori, or by some mode of inference. This plan, though common
is
enough,
of course
inconsistent
with
empirical
Or, thirdly,
we may adopt no
all,
extraneous principle of
distinction at
cases of inferences
we
not.
am
it
In reality, how-
intuitive
'
judg-
ments.
It is true that in
'
and
in
the other
first
occasions,'
would be
second
is
'
called 'empirical,'
intuitional/
names there
For
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
27
why
are
we
be
proved by the
reasons
?
'
of the reasoning
Not
Precisely similar
reasoning from
leads to
*
equally true
premises
frequently
gross error.'
if
We
I
reasoning,
we do
in
accept
in exactly
to, certain
it
the
same
way
as,
by the
;
theories
allude
judgments
are accepted
is
the reasoning
intuition,
which
is
known
be valid by a special
the judgment.
and
in the other
It
it is
would
not, therefore,
to
Mr.
by which the
proof
'
Law
of Causation
in form,
is
established.
'
It is in reality,
' ;
though not
anxious
is
an
intuitional
and so
taint of
intuitivism,'
it
intuitive
and
if
lies
con-
is
against
we
are familiar.
Mill's
view of
applied to the
I
have said
nothing which, as
28
[part
i.
or another, suggested
logic.
many
students of his
But
am
singling
him out
his merits
his defects.
is
If his
peculiarly easy to
is
is
less
clearly,
what
it
was
had
to
on purely empirical
proof was possible.
failed completely),
in
it
he
(and
think he
believe, be accomplished.
It
is
impossible
if
to
is
only
;
possible
that,
if
we assume
particulars
(or, if you please, has avoided stating) the method of proof from particulars as ingeniously as
and that his statement (or want of statement) cannot in reality stand for a
;
moment
The most
I
impor-
have proved, as
think, in the
I
will
and
now,
go on
even
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
were
it
29
if
possible,
is
by no
means the adequate foundation for the superstructure of science which Mr. Mill, and those who accept Mr.
Mill's general line of thought,
appear to imagine.
30
[part
i.
CHAPTER
INDUCTION.
III.
Admitting then
is
regular,
and that every event has an antecedent upon which follows, and a consequent which init invariably
variably follows
it,
the question
still
remains,
how
covered
How
can
we
effect
and the
?
effects
which are
will again,
by examining
'
his opinion)
Four Methods.'
it
To
see
how
is
correct,
will only
be neces-
the
first
They run
as follows
If
any instance
which the
phenomenon
cumstance
only
in the in
under investigation
it
occurs,
and an
cir-
instance in which
common
;
former
the
effect,
or the cause, or
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
'
31
And If two or more instances of the menon/ phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which
alone
all
is
For the
difference
its
first
of these methods
the
method of
Mr.
is
application
;
nature
and
in
may be
allowed.
law of nature
is
but then
it
The
state of
the universe
be a case of experiment)
in-
knows
all
for
canon
tells
us to the contrary,
may
each or
of
effect.
method
that of
same
;
effect is often
if
produced by more
so that, even
two instances of a
*
in
com-
32
[part
i.
phenomenon.
instances of a
But has
stance in
common
is
We
may
As
in
method of
the
reasoning
by the
fact that
the universe
in
never
differs in
only one
fails,
particular,
so the
method of agreement
two successive
not
moments, never
neither the one
select-
And
among
we
are in search.
this objection as against Mill,
it
have stated
but
it
we
we man swallow the contents of a phial, and immediately fall down dead, we conclude that his death is
see a
and we do
so undoubtedly on the grounds stated in the canon of the Method of Difference. All other circumstances seemed to remain the
liquid
death
we
CHAR
III.]
INDUCTION.
them
off as
33
therefore pair
cause and
effect.
The
must
have been an
indefinite
number
of events which,
immediately preceded
not so plain
in
is
*the
assuming, that
effect,
they are
no part of
its
cause.
Now
ways
It
in
which
this difficulty
reasoning
may be
met.
may,
do, arrive at
some
For
and
we know
in small
taken even
this is a consideration
for illustra-
But though
may be
admitted that
in fact
we do
general laws of nature to guide us in the interpretation of particular observations or experiments, this
is
in the abstract,
on any
ern-
34
[part
i.
themselves have
It is therefore plain
we
all
are
doomed
to
wander
in
an endless
logical circuit,
valid which
derive, or at
extraneous authority.
We turn
what
in this
in error
Mr. Mill (it might be said) is way when he supposes that one properly con:
'
the
"
Method of
If
Differ-
ence."
cases of induction
we
can do no more
our ob-
may be
slight
one
probability
This, however,
demonstrative
denied
us,
we may
life.'
by
this
method
require
is all
we
This,
imagine,
is
the
opinion
of Professor
'
Jevons, elaborated at
ciples
of Science.'
to
understand
rightly,
is
assumed
in
CHAP. HI.]
INDUCTION.
;
35
but, this
assumption once
arrive at a
facts of
by which we
it
directly con-
this chapter.
Now
Jevons
is
it
losophy of science.
But
his
enthusiasm for
this
Because, apart
little,
we
can do
he seems
by the
logic of chance,
we
can do everything.
The
scientific
number of draws, the chances of the next ball being black or white, even when the number of the balls in the box is infinite, he apmine, after any
phenomena
It
in the past.
may be
doubted, however,
how far
the universe
36
[part
i.
though the
infinite.
be
And
is
still
more open
to
question
men of science
Let
us, in
order to
make
may make
as
favourable as
we
choose.
Let us
has been
(if
and
B, are of very
that
whenever
observed
please) that
you
has
Let us further
and
'the method
of
agreement,'
with as
much
means.
there that
when next
it ?
shall occur
will
be found to follow
It
is
which we
the laws of nature is greatly exaggerated (since no law can have better experimental evidence than that which connects and
commonly regard
B), or else
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
37
may be
a world which
we assume
sequence of
to
B on
is
is
probably
some
In other words,
coincidence
is
the
may be
It
it is
not
would be very
and as we are
at liberty to imagine as
many
it
coincidences as
we
please,
we may
consider
it
as
practically infinite.
would
most
seem
next
this
when
A
is,
appeared,
as
I
It
understand
it
certainly
the opinion of
common
sense.
It is not,
however, a con-
The
precedes
fact
invariably
But
it
gives
no probability at
cause of B.
in
favour of
that
is
A
we
Every cause
with
is
complex.
But there
no process whatever
it is.
Mr. Mill
38
[parti.
a process of elimiis
no
the
phenomena which
it
when
produces B.
Of
course
it
is
and
occurring,
and
B by A.
But
it is
this assertion
must be
accepted.
If
we
occurring to
plain
of course that these particulars are not necessary for the production of B.
made
if
the
first
case of
first
may be
that
each case, were in each case necessary, and that without them
B would
in neither case
will
:
have followed.
if
perhaps be clearer
(i)
A happens twice,
The
a,
first
and
is
time
c;
it
happens
is it
accompanied only by
happens
it
b,
the
second time
X, y, z.
c, X, y,
is
accompanied only by
a, b,
It is
production
of B.
{2)
A happens twice
and
is
by
B.
it is
accompanied only
'
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
39
by
a, b, c.
panied
The second time it happens it is accomonly by b, c. From this It may be inferred with
Is
certainty that a
B.
Now
It
Is
though logically
practice.
perfect,
It is like
If
Mr.
it
Mill's
method of
difference
admirable
only
could be used.
Unfortunately
we know only an Infinitesimal fraction of the phenomena which accompany any cause, and even to this fraction the above canon can never be made to fit.
It invariably
it
occurs
will
co-exist with
before,
and
will not
be accompanied
It
co-exist with
before.
It
ac-
companiments have
But
assert
it
production of B.
may be
said,
'
though
it Is
impossible to
positively
panying
B,
still
A
If
we
find
out of the
surely assert
many
in the
times in which
all
A
it
occurs,
we may
that In
probability
was
production of
B.'
It is
my
purpose to dispute
this
whether
40
[part
i.
For
of
how we
On
?
what
principle are
we
in
order
that
B may be produced
?
of elimination here
It
it
cannot be obser-
vation.
probability
and common
which
does
if it
diffi-
culty, furnishes us
it
so.
Now
be admitted, as
in
theory
think
it
must be admitted, that every phenomenon which has always accompanied A is as likely as not to be an
essential part of the cause of
it
appears to follow
A must depend in part on our expectation that each of the phenomena which have always accompanied A
will
do so again.
in
number
infinite.
We
them
yet those
we know
we do not know, but which we have every reason to believe exist in the
infinity of space.
Because, therefore,
we
are unable
to eliminate the
accompaniments of
we have now
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
41
will co-exist
with
it
in the future.
But
this
precisely
into
the
trying to escape.
traverse exactly the
In order to solve
were enquiring
of
into the
B were
to be discovered.
still
For a case of
persist-
more obviously of
recurrence)
The
its
persistence of
existence at this
?
moment
is
only one.
What
and what
is
asked when
we were
method
con-
The
Mars may, for anything we know to the contrary, depend upon the continued existence of the moon, a phenomenon
What
then
is
?
About
this precisely
same
series of questions
s^-mie
may be
of
asked, meeting
unsatisfactory
series
So
that
we
conducted
42
[part
i.
whenever B
for
tell
us
exactly the
same reason
anything
and
it,
about the
accompaniments
of A, however well
we may be
it
acquainted with
;
continuing to accompany
in the future
still
less
the cause of
bers, but of
B which may
exist in indefinite
numIn
is
other
words granting
by the help of
this
we suppose
What
It
is
additional principle,
then,
must be
esta?
may be
obtained
evident in a general
it
way
whatever
tion
;
may
is,
be,
that
it
among the innumerable antecedents of a phenomenon those which we may be certain have nothing whatever to do with
self altogether
its
occurrence.
But
confess
my-
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
to
43
much
and
less
prove
it.
There
is,
no doubt, a
practical
instinct,
common
to
ignore as
much
may
have
are
in the
trying
account.
Nobody,
for
example,
Milky
before
Way
it
is
On
is
so strong
is
any theory
be trusted.
defined,
and
certainly
cannot always
on the
affairs
of
since
if
is
its
perception
in itself
such an
sun,
and
we
consider permanence,
the
by which
all
the events
that occur
duced.
It
is
evident,
that the
difliculty of
not the
only obstacle
which
stands in the
way
sophy.
Even granting
it is
the truth of
these great
principles,
44
[part
i.
unobserved instances
and,
shall
show
it
in the
we prove such
complete
laws,
would, to
itself to
by no means be
sufficient
by
scientific
creed in
ordinary shape.
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
45
CHAPTER
The proper
IV.
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
classification of the sciences is a subject
which has of
late
scientific
philosophers, and
therefore,
is
it
need not be
said,
some
difference of opinion.
do not pro-
pose to enter
is
necesit
sary that
has
in
Every
of
statement
concerning
phenomena
in
is
of one
two kinds
It
despotism
;
is
a law (whether
of no
moment)
that the
French Revois
fact.
That
become permanent
is
a law
46
[part
i.
fact.
That
all
a law
become an
be turned
into work,
fact.
Now,
in so far as science is
groundwork),
it is
plain that
I
all
the pro-
^tdXvcig facts
is
i.e.
on the
What
is,
perhaps
less plain,
but what
is
no
less certain,
in like
manner
As
regards facts
in
is
sufficiently obvious.
means of
foretelling
what
is
to
;
come depends
and
this
indeed
makes
little
reflection
shows that
is
be what
are ordinarily called scientific, as, for example, the existence of the glacial epoch, or whether they are
what are
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
47
historical,'
is
we may
nature
ever by which
we arrive
at facts
we are immediately informed by perception or memory from which it may be deduced that every principle which
or have occurred, other than those of which
;
is
required to
establish
a law must be
required
though
it
In
in
we ought
list
of these
to
will
be more
trusted,
to
be
and that the only general principle required for arriving at this knowledge is the law of universal
causation.
in
On
this
assumption (which
is
sufficiently
Given as premises
some knowledge of existing and recent facts obtained immediately by perception or memory; (2nd) a knowledge of the abstract laws of phenomena as set forth by science (3rd) the law of causa;
of history, and,
if
not,
what additional
so,
principles will
is
be required to enable us to do
evidence on which they rest
?
and what
the
The
first
some know-
48
[part
i.
is
not necessary,
is
appear, because
of
it
required to
these are
the laws
phenomena;
for
already assumed.
It is necessary,
rather,
because
without
it
and
third of the
above-mentioned heads.
The
exist-
by a mere knowledge of
the laws of
it
requires also
and the
future,
must depend
on some immediate knowledge of them, and we have no such immediate knowledge, except concerning the
present and perhaps the recent past.
is
a most important
ployed, according
way in which these laws are emas we are dealing with the futuffe^
For whereas every inference about
so every inference about the
from cause to
effect,
enough,
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
49
cerning which
least
we suppose
the future.
ourselves to
It
know
the
namely,
all
correct,
all
and that if
we knew
them
existing causes,
and
to their consequents,
calculation, then,
powers of
we
of the universe.
large, perhaps, to
The ifs here are somewhat too make this very substantial comfort,
once perceive,
it
is
by no
does
means obvious
that even
words, that
history
equally possible.
then, points
out very
clearly
the
first
question
we have more
particularly
examine
laws such as
of causation,
possess,
sufficient to enable us to
overcome
and,
by the possible
if
this question
be answered
the negative,
we
shall
up
this
it
gap
in
our ordinary
is
The
enquiry,
*
may be
p. 6^).
observed,
of
See note on
50
[part
i.
some importance,
be determined
very
whole human
belongs
we
dwell,
(I
which
it
whether
knowledge
deserves to retain
position,
or should be con-
by im-
laws work or
In order
how natural may work in the concrete. that we may attack the problem with
let
us begin by considering
as simplified
by
The
possibility of history, as
we have
seen, rests
on the
but one of
existing effects
let
us then at
first
and
let
us suppose that
Under
is
we have
to determine
the
justify us in asserting,
as
we
our
actual
To
fix
a concrete case.
collection of
heads
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
51
<f/>
tion.
No human
man, though
at the
same time
it is
not
therefore
all
unknown
this
case, for
convenience,
we may
is
call
accident.
Why
do we unhesitatingly
?
of intelligence
bilities
is,
The answer
in
ready.
The
proba-
are infinitely
enormously,
if
indefinitely, greater
intel-
ligence.
itself to
common
enquiry.
On what grounds
plain that
The
were
likely to
have acted.
It is
see
that in the
supposed to
obtain
to those
which
now.
is
is,
shape was, as
number
of other forms,
of which ^r produced^
52
[part
i.
in
and that
waSy as
it is,
a form which
is
man
it is
in
a state
therefore likely to
quite true
origin are
that
this
manufacture
and on
But
this hypothesis
human
evident
enormous.
hypothesis
fact
;
it
is
no
less
is
it
itself
that
from
effects to causes
may
again
;
we must
in
order to establish
that probability,
to
make a new inference from effects to causes. If, now, we imagine this process carried on indefinitely, we may suppose ourselves at last to arrive at the
deduction of the totality of causes from the totality
of effects.
we now
?
to choose
possibilities
Most of
except the
one we commonly
would,
the highest
degree extravagant
is
and
improbable.
But
their
extravagance
manner
and as
in
am
altogether at a
loss to see
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
53
founded.
effects,
it
Since
we
seems to
me
possible, except
by the intervention
of
some new
I
scientific
axiom.
am
I
may seem
the
and the
illustra-
am
my
view, though
it
hope
it
may make
telligible.
the grounds of
more
clear
and
in-
documents
that,
with
the
exception
of
what each man remembered, he knew absolutely nothing of times gone by beyond what he read in
books or MSS. professing to have been written at
the various periods of which they spoke.
further suppose that from such materials a
less consistent
Let us
more or
structed,
and then
of grounds
we have
The
effects
here
are
the
various
who have
tion accurately
upon
54
[part
i.
tion
by one or more persons of a story, and the forgery of the documents required for its support, it becomes necessary to find a principle which may
enable us to choose between the rival hypotheses.
commonly said that the authenticity of any document may be shown by two kinds of evidence
It is
internal
and since
internal
we are
in
is
From
clusion can be
drawn
in favour of its
its
it
genuineness,
forgery be
is
provided
admitted.
the
bare possibility of
said that
some book
show
it
to
and country
this implies
if
it
is
be admitted as
evi-
it
is
intended to vindicate
and
any possible
for
characteristic
or against
any
the
at
first
sight,
as
if
make
self-
its
genuineness
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
55
But even
of the
It
sup-
time
such
degrees as
;
make
document
itself
it
must
documentary phenomena.
bilities
is
I
The
first
of these possi-
The
last
excluded by hypothesis.
the
second.
There remains,
there-
fore,
will
show that all the remarks just applied to a single document apply equally well to any number of documents taken together. Once admit the
possibility of their forgery, the improbability of
such
facts
which are
of these
in this
It
or
some
all.
may
from
this
be
we
I
start
began
then,
first,
it
is
some
of
it
should be
corollary,
and,
secondly^ as
it
necessary
two versions of
are
mutually ex-
56
[part
i.
elusive,
likely.
is
is
the
more
a
The
when
general
principle
from which
this
Is
If
more
It
effect,
Is
effect,
by what cause
Is
The same
of causes.'
true of
'
groups of
and
the
'
'
groups
It is also true
of the
totality of effects,'
if
'
and the
causes
'
totality of causes.'
'
Now,
effects,
all
totality
of effects
'
means
existing
the
totality
of
Is, if
not history, at
foundation of history.
simply
number
will
of possible versions of
fitting transition to
I
It Is
to one.^
be a
In this discussion If
effect
historical
inferences
mean the universal first cause, whether that be the unknown x of certain philosophers, or the personal
God
of the theologians.
It is of
Cause
in
whole of the premises on which we found our knowledge of history Is produced by It directly
Strictly
speaking
it
mmiis
GHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
Moreover,
It
it
57
or indirectly.
is
clearly impossible
set of
It
to produce
i.e.,
From
at
;
this
it
follows
no period of history
nor
which creation
I
am
able to see
at
it
would do so
one
In other
there
we
select,
the
phenomena which might have produced them according to known laws the other
the group of
;
is
It
may be worth
noting that
the
of
all
things,
but also of
to
any phenomena
-which
may be assumed
for
we
are ignorant.
that,
Supposing,
example,
it
was
shown
by
we
recognised laws of
in
nature failed
us,^
consequence
unknown ways
in
that
case
^
we should
58
[part
i.
us was the
into opera-
The
other way.
For
unknown,
we
as to
make
their appearance
some period or other is shown, according to our hypothesis, by the insufficiency of established laws but when followed up beyond a certain point
;
since, also
of these
their
it
unknown
to
and
have
power
The
the elements
of
I
am
attempting to establish,
if
he
distinction
between a
real
'
and a
is
virtual
is
'
image.
spectator
whose
position
fixed
contemplating
(let
of a candle.
He
if
believes
it
to
be a candle because
would do
forming
may be
altogether in error.
eyes
in precisely
the
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
real
59
from a
manner
in
his
eye
is
(we
may
have
no reason
So
it is
with us
past, if
we substitute time
by
image
able
of the flame.
to point to
If
we
are fortunate
we may be
some given
and
say,
'
now
*
some one
accounted
might
exists,
for.'
say,
On
fully
But just as
in
the
second
case a virtual
effect as the
combinations of
phenomena obeying known laws, or a metaphysical first cause, or phenomena obeying unknown laws which the failure of known laws compels us to believe in, might all of them result in the existing universe.
But whereas
in the
real
6o
[part
i.
some
it is
not
Existing
facts are
facts,
^'
j
and
further to suggest.
All
the cases
we have
these characteristics in
common that
each
we
sets
have
to choose
of causes, which
ante-
we
see
it
are actual^
to
have existed
and that
In
any other.
But
an
in-
Itself.
Why
should
we
preceding propositions
On what
principle
?
do we
Why should
absolutely
we
we know
nothing as possible
^
historical
antecedents,
and
:
if
as
its
This use of the word 'actual is clumsy and not very accurate but meaning in this connection is clearly defined, its employment
'
will,
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
6i
we do
sion
the admishistorical
inference
The
does not
seem hard
ments
to answer.
If
we
in the historic
we now
(if
we
assumptions)
all
past becomes
impossible.
We
may,
if
we
as
please,
actual causes
may
see
we
we must
at the
that the
since
follows
must be founded
in the last
it
effect to cause,
that
if
number
of causes, so far
as
we know,
them
therefore
is
being
show
therefore, history
will
be neces-
sary to
possible
a very
We
We have supposed
;
ist,
between
nomenal causes whose laws are known 2nd, between a noumenal cause and phenomenal causes 3rd,
'
'
62
[part
i.
4th,
between
known
for
to exist, or to
have existed,
anything
we at
present
know
to
may have
;
In
all
sented to us
accepts
one and
in,
at all
common
hope,
made
it
no
justification
It is necessary, therefore, to
of belief by
it
some other
principle or principles,
pos.
sible, to justify.
We
turn
first,
as
is
natural, to the
reflection
'
Uniformity
it
of Nature.'
scarcely gives
since,
But a
little
shows that
us that of which
its
we
are in search,
it
according to one of
meanings,
it is
is
in-
sufficient, while,
according to another,
If
it
not only
insufficient,
it
but untrue.
be taken to mean, as
usually
is,
are uniform
that
the
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
and which have
that the
left
63
we
started,
us with
If,
all
these
on the other
means
we could, no doubt,
fatal
from
this, in
precisely to the
we
can
theory
now
But
opposed
to the practical
we
appeal to
*
it,
and
is
in
'
observation' and to
Order of Nature,
i.e.,
with the
tion
it is
to construct
in theory,
be carried out with absolute certainty.' Since, however, this theoretical possibility can never by any accident be realised in practice, it may, for my purposes, be neglected. I write for human beings with human powers of calculation. But besides this, it is by no means
proved,
I
men
world IS a purely mechanical system. I am, therefore, justified in assuming, with the majority of scientific philosophers, that while one kind of cause can only have one kind of effect, one kind of effect may have more than one kind of cause. The attentive reader will see that, even were this otherwise, still, so long as it is so for our powers of observation and calculation, the main argument of the chapter remains
entirely unaffected.
64
[part
i.
need not
say,
is
inapplicable.
principle
is
'
suggested
by a
sometimes used
The
Simplicity of
possible to
in
far
it is
which we are
simple,'
When we
not,
I
'
it is
stood, that
are
'
simple
'
of comprehension.
In the
place,
it
is
not the
case,
case
in the
second place,
were the
it
we
in
our present
we have
been weighing
other
;
as easily
understood as every
it
and
hypothesis of a pre-established
the 'cosmos' and the
'
harmony between
'
microcosmos
which men of
Nor, for
'
same
reason, can
it
mean
that the
is,
most
simple
'
or
'
natural' explanation
that
the explanation
which,
in
especially to
is
commend
itself to
the investigator
natural.'
It is clear,
indeed, that
we
are to get
it
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
is
65
somein
objective,'
mind of the
the
manner
in
That
'
is
a proposition which
Will
this serve
our turn
So
far
as
to decide
is
concerned,
that
If
apparently
will.
It practically tells
us
we know
do
a given
did
result, that
these causes, or
It
some of them,
in accord-
actually
so.
therefore unquestionably
problem exactly
ance
witji the
If,
however,
we examine
Its
bearing on the
first
and
be
altogether the
we
are re-
by hypothesis known
of
*
to exist
Simplicity
'
leaves us very
much where we
were.
says
66
[part
i.
may add
that,
Nature when
it
am
fit
Though
some
unformulated notion
isting historical
perhaps
which
lies
may
which we are
a sort
in search.
Now
is
unknown
is,
causes.
But such a
statement as
far too
it
stands
it
vague
to
quires a
To
is
It cannot, of course,
as
it
would then
meaning attached
clear that
though
at
which
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
It
Is,
67
shall
mean, impos-
sible to say
what
is
or
is
change
It
because
if
so
it
must
either be
(since
we
It cannot, again,
be the
first,
because recogviolent
many more
is
form
to the standard.
A
it
results,
because
does not at
'
If there are
is
two
to
be chosen
But
this,
must be observed,
Nature, but a
maxim intended
It
judgment
the
authority from
some
Now
what
is
this^i^
Our guesses
68
[part
i.
come more
The
But the
limit here
implied
no change at
a supposition which
is
absolutely
else.
must
also
be remarked that
is
'
rate of change,'
or
amount of change/
it
itself
an expression to
which
precise
is
only
;
possible to attach a
meaning
forth.
we
and so
from
Science
is,
however, so
far at present
it
may
sufficient to
the
second step
in
the
we seek
to
prove
be attempted.
The
truth of the
none the
less healthy
because
is
it
This, fortunately,
quite
experiment
may discover
for himself
provided he
will
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
69
man
4000
B.C. is
for the
commencement
If the enquirer
planet.
fortunate
enough
to get
any answer
at all to so
absurd a question, he
will pro-
known
To
which
it
may be
is
no
parti-
known
causes have
in operation.
On
this the
man
may
to
If
I
that
the deus ex
machmd
from
art.
is
this canon,
answer, though
could find an
answer or
would
not be in any
way
From
tive result.
certain
assumptions,
then,
which seem
very negaas well to
this con-
reasonable enough,
we have arrived
it
at a
Before concluding,
may be
ways
in
be recollected
that
we
we were
be seen
But
it
will
is itself
his-
70
[part
i.
tory.
Of how many
it is
this
may be
said
do not en-
quire, but
way depend on a series of observations carried through many years, such as parts of astronomy and
sociology
(if
this
is
to
be considered a science).
It is also true
of
all
facts
What,
preced-
however,
is
of perhaps
more
interest
is
the bearing
in the
The
think,
shown
to
be
invalid, in
now.
It
commencement of
knowledge of
theless all our
knowledge of particular matters of fact other than those of which we have immediate experience, rfiust
in
their turn
Now, it is commonly admitted that a law of nature depends for its generality upon the law of universal causation, in
other words,
solely
is
by means of
from which
it
follows,
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
is
71
a necessary
we
arrive at
What
ing to
show is,
true, there is
an inevitable ambiguity
to insist
the inference
what
now wish
on
is,
views be true or
if
false, this at
any rate
certain, that
rience at
limited.
that experience
must be extremely
dilating
Empirical
philosophers,
on the
accumulated evidence
we have
it
is
the uncontradicted
;
we
first
we
Turn
the matter as
we
and
if
it
an inference
can be
in-
of each individual
one
re-
move
or two,
is
philosophy
is
it
false
is
but
it
does show,
not plausible.
What-
72
[part
i.
ever be
is
certainly some-
thing consolatory to
common
There
is
something practical
in the
very sound of a
philosophers.
*
But when
'
it
becomes evident
broad basis
Itself rests
perceive,
certainly loses
much
of
Its
dignity,
though
philoit
much what
was
before,
CHAP,
v.]
INTRODUCTION TO PART
11.
73
PART
XL
CHAPTER
V.
IL
INTRODUCTION TO PART
In the three preceding chapters
empirical reasoning concisely, but
I
have discussed
sufficiently,
hope
I
showed, in
sophy,
all
our knowledge
is
that there
was nevertheless no method, or at all events no method hitherto discovered, by whicli inference from particulars was possible and that
;
no sense
it
From
this
reasoning
is
not at
but there
is
a kind of
for
we
This
imagine to be a not
men
74
[part
ii.
by Mr. Jevons
large one
Principles of Science.'
this theory is
The
philo-
assumption required by
evidently a
it,
so
large, indeed, as to
make
;
sophically speaking,
nearly worthless
I
but,
even
showed
in the
next place,
no experience, however
and
will
This
is
as
much
worthless, since
it
according to which
all
known
instances of an event
mixed and
in
in-
less the
the second
for infer-
chapter, affords us
any
satisfactory
method
or experiments
full
showed that, granting \k\2X we possessed a knowledge of the laws of phenomena, and granting the truth of the law of universal causain the fourth chapter
tion
it
in other
was shown
not be proved
it
CHAP, v.]
INTRODUCTION TO PART
knowledge of
Its
II.
75
\
historical facts,
immediate experience.
I
distinct objections
that
may be
scientific beliefs.
can
see, gets
to
being an
so.
adequate
It
This being
Is
not necessary,
sup-
on
even
if
The
first
chapter
The
may be
described as dealing
;
first
of these divisions
and we
be
more
is
particular con-
How
this subject to
approached
On
not
at
ulti-
any
i.e.,
view
depend on science
76
[part
il.
can judge),
unknown
principles,
shown
us.
In the second
;
Law
;
of Universal Causation
which, as
was shown
in the
by induction
shown
in
is
be supposed
It is
two premises
chiefly
now
occupy
me
many
dissimilar
and
dis-
connected systems,
necessary.
I
be
shall
make
henceforth no attempt to
by an argumentative
will contain
On
and
it
the contrary,
each chapter
a discussion as complete as
subject,
will
only be
it
examination of the various methods by which philosophers have attempted to establish the existence of a
persistent universe governed
by
causation,
shall per-
this is a
CHAP,
v.]
INTRODUCTION TO PART
all.
II.
77
requires proof at
(it
may be
one of those
un-
truths which
lie
is
I
at the root of
all
knowledge, for
still
which proof
necessary
?
impossible, or,
if
possible,
is
from the
Each
mind
to his
have described
that can be
said
is that,
by
human
race,
who do
ing
it
accept
it
seem
either
upon expe-
rience, which, as
no proof
principles
at all
or
it
which
be
my
business to examine
persistent universe,
in the sequel.
the
case
is
Everybody
prac-
tically believes
question
it
philosophy seems
its
existence
is
tioned,
and must
true,
be capable
of
some
speculative
it
defence.
So
strations of
have been
offered, that
assumed
that, in the
judgment of those
78
[part
ii.
decide,
ever,
is
required.
is
If,
how-
anyone
a matter which
may be permitted to neglect, the following ations may perhaps induce him to alter his
If
is is
consideropinion.
given us at
given us
fact
will
be admitted,
;
think, that
is
it
in perception
if its
existence
an
ultiit is
mate
a
which cannot and need not be proved, which we are assured by what
*
fact of
is
somewhat
In other words,
we know
same
first
that there
sort of
is
a persistent
world much
in the
same
absolute assurance as
hot or cold.
The
is,
has to be asked
What do we know
The
and
in effect amounted to this. The only know and can know immediately are things we our own sensations and ideas. Objects are merely
Hume
a nominal existence.
were
CHAP,
v.]
INTRODUCTION TO PART
II.
79
The soundness
if
true,
however, open to
dif-
maintained by thinkers of a
we cannot
qualities
and whjgh^ re
If this
theory
of perception Be sound,
it
is
ment
it.
consist of sensations,
We
there-
fore
tion
have again
to ask ourselves
whether
in percep-
we
gain an assurance, both immediate and reof the existence of persistent objects f
flective,
and
to this question,
their views,
I
to all
answered. No.
^
Cf.
article,
published after
the greater part of this essay was written, in the Contemporary Review,
assurance cannot be both immediate ^ reflective. This combination is, however, not only possible, but it ought to be found in all ultimate premises, and is actually found in the axioms of mathematics.
proposition of which
we have immediate
is
reflective assurance, is
one
8o
[part
ii.
must here guard against a possible misconception which may be suggested by the word im'
mediate.'
all
the know-
which
is
obtained by per:
ception alone
may be
called
immediate
since
know-
Nevertheless,
we
all
cannot
properly
be
said to
reflective,
have an
of the
assurance,
truth of
we immediately
perceive.
facts
is
Our
real
;
or
immediate
our
tainly
If,
for
example,
its
see an
object in space,
size is obtained
my
knowledge of
real
shape and
and
size,
and not
if it
so as to look as
a more or
by and
harmony with
this explanation
:
tion
Conceding
legitimate
we
be so
To
my
CHAP,
v.]
INTRODUCTION TO PART
is
II.
8i
so stated
sufficient to
show
It
tive should
be accepted.
appears to
me
that the
have
in
is
of
the
same kind
had
in the
apparent
and
that,
on
reflection,
legiti-
doubt
is
mate, but
If
is
hardly to be avoided.
this statement,
I
would
ask him
how he
is
as immediate,
and
is
given
it
same way,
as
is
when
normal.
The
only difference
is
that on reflection
it is
seen to be incorrect.
And by
By showas
exists a
what method
ing
its
is its
incorrectness
shown
revealed to us by science.
by
science,
is
a dream.
is
given us merely
we can
is
transient
immediate verdict
is
that
it is
persistent.
fact
True/
it
may be
replied,
'
but this
is
which presents no
difficulty.
We
that observation
is
'
82
[part
ii.
wo
qualify
to
any
lies
suspicions
of
contradiction.
this
In
what
the
distinction
?
'
between
case
The
distinction lies in
It
is
perceptions in the
first
case to establish.
We
can
all
deal with a
object
if
on similar
terms,
it
when
is
not, the
be a persistent
that the
occasionally misleads us as to
true character
may
be of small Importance.
But
if
world
fact
made
may
'
CHAP,
v.]
INTRODUCTION TO PART
II.
83
perhaps say
by
relations
may
sistence
by which they are constituted be that very perwhose reality you tell us has to be inferred ?
in the
May
given
strictly speaking,
senses
Now
ance
do not
at present
may be legitimately
attained
by reasoning on the
at
which
But without
safe,
I
present
going into
this question,
it is
suppose, to assert
truths of which
make it we
to
we choose
cannot be one.
into
To
trary
to
is
to
fall
from the
essence.
it
real is thought,
is
thought
were
so,
a doctrine
devised.
84
[part
ii.
philosophic problem.
been to
They
have aimed
at
easy acquiescence
not a thing
Our
natural convictions
may be
right,
shown to be right. Proof of some kind is necessary and where proof is necessary, scepticism is possible.
All that
I
is
tells
us
no assumption
'
subjective,'
external
fails
if
to
show
that scepticism
is
possible.
it
So
that
ever this
to
be established
pass
difficult
employs,
venture
Transcendentalism.'
CHAP,
vi.j
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
85
CHAPTER
That
is
VI.
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
the pure empiricism
still
in
fashion
among
scientific
Hume
presented
It
is
it
to the world
plausibilities.
He
his
impossible
Human
Understand-
result
of very
moderate uneasiness.
still
however,
they
ignored, and
engine of destruction,
telling.
Hume
it,
86
[part
ii.
worth pursuing,
with which he
is
tells
faith
'
and
'
divine
necessarily lead.
On
that
scepticism,
as
is
German philosophy; and modern German philosophy, whatever be its value, is not a phenomenon
which easily escapes
it
notice.
is
If
it
gives
little
light
is
not because
it
In
all
probability, however,
it
vented
scientific
I
and
believe
may
scientific
man
may be
more
difficult
in-
man
I
he may
is,
be forgiven,
the time
say,
may
is
thing he
ever,
more
howeven
unfortunate
that
this
pardonable, and
' ' ;
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
87
empiricism of
Kant and Kant's successors saw in the Hume, and the extremely ingenious
in
order to avoid
it
it
when
becomes
at
once
solution offered of
ation.
it,
at
any
deserves consider-
The
nor,
relation in
it
Hume
said,
is
;
necessary for
it
me
to discuss
could
need hardly be
add
Professor
What more
cendentalist
directly concerns
I
my
purpose
is
to
would make
to the
my
attack
meet on common
'
mean
causation
and the
world.'
Now
problem
the usual
is
way
*
in
put
is,
How
knowledge possible
most
Hume,
is
also the
natural,
because
As, however.
S8
[part
ii.
in this essay
origin
of knowledge,
my
question should
rather be stated,
How much
is
of
what pretends
such,
tract
to
?
'
and why
My
business, therefore,
to ex-
gives to the
if
it
second
and
for this
purpose
necessary to
in
change
the
slight,
The
I
chapter
insisted
What,
we were simply
and
seize
to glance at transcendental
first
literature,
on the
apparent answers to
to think that
these questions,
we should be disposed
is
commonly
to
called
my
view
of the subject,
prove.
'
is
as they certainly
do
are
may
how they
CritiqueJ
p. 13.
Tr.
CHAP, vl]
transcendentalism.
;
89
possible
must be possible
is
shown by
The
question,
How
is
'
knowledge possible
to
is
not,'
supposed
to
Is
knowledge possible
....
Metaphysic
no superfluous labour.
is
It is
any theory of a
^
we
already perform.'
Passages of
this sort
to con-
was not
existence
to to
is
tell
us
it
:
how we do
we ought
philosophy
do
were
so,
transcendentalism might
essay.
it
would
solve
no
difficulty.
truth,
the
language
often used
Green,
if
certainly
misleading.
Transcendentalism
which
have ventured
term
it
does
and the
Contemporary Review
T)tc. i^j J.
90
[part
ii.
manner
may be
On
explicit
the
first
point
its
;
and categorical
but
this is
simply because,
for historical
problem has
Nevertheless,
all
in
the
man who
is
required to postulate,
of,
that he
knows, and
is
certain
sornethmg
he
is
conscious,
for example, or
may be
in
other
This
very
it
moderate
concession,
then,
being
granted, as
sceptic, the
is. How can any knowledge worth speaking of be inferred from such premises ?
It
is
in
the
answer
to
this
in
that such
force
and
is
originality as there
really
may be
it
transcendentalism
to
be found; and
is
is
full
You
allow,'
'
we may suppose
a transcendentalist to say,
is
You
possible
it may only be of the facts of immediate perception, can be obtained by that channel. I therefore ask you '' how that experience
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
"
91
is
possible
in
what
it
essentially consists
I
and
whatever
fact or principle
in that experience
if
that experience
be,
in
to
common
and
of
it
principle
so proved
is
said to be
transcendentally deduced,'
causation
it
and
is
the
existence
of
a persistent
world, that
my
business
more
particularly to
examine.
The whole
value,
then, of the
transcendental
its
being able
show
scientific postulates is
cannot prove
this,
it
may
still
be a valuable
;
it
may
still
show by
nature,
its
searching analysis
all
that
is
implied in
to accept
them
it
cannot do
exists,
it
or that
our accounts of
it
are accurate
it
cannot, in other
its
application in
may be
well to give
some
92
[part
ii.
examples of
character
for
reasonings by which
its
precise
may be more
is
clearly understood.
Here,
instance,
ceived by us except in
it is
of the permanent v/hich renders possible the representation (perception) of a transition from one state
into another,
into being,
which
permanent.
....
Substances
all
in the
the substratum of
determinations of time.
is
....
Accordingly, permanence
a necessary condition
Now
lies,
as the
we
Therefore,
certainly
if
we most
we can can), we
Here
Green's
is
to
Hume:
Tr.
'A
uniformity
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
(i.e.,
93
by a
in the
ex-
is
not contingent on
It
being
felt
by any-
one or everyone.
It is felt It
because
it is
it is felt.
may be
is
objected,
is
fact
once
fact always,
which are
itself
The
answer
is,
The same
to,
and
which renders
them knowable
world which
is
facts, renders
them members of a
its
one throughout
changes.
In
is
to
be
formity in concreto!
is,
We
;
may
is
be as
as
we
we
can
know
facts
which
another
way
of saying that
all.
94
[part
ii.
to
These quotations are not long enough, perhaps, do full justice to the argument of which they con-^
one statement
sort
;
tain
show of what
And
this
:
sight to
lie
in
is
the
to
sceptic, in
shown
tion
which
is
illegitimate,
it
renders
the
He
has to
up the
be
by one of the
relations of
which that
all
reality can
shown
do the
second.
to consist.
first
;
He
is
cannot, in
cases at least,
to
he
bound,
therefore,
do the
Now,
this
reasoning, as
is
employed
in
proving parti-
attaches to
it
generally.
When
argument,
a
it
man
must
is
convinced by a transcendental
I
be, as
admitted
truth of
experience.
This
is
to
him a
fact,
the
which he
is
obliged to recognise.
But another
is
fact,
which he
may
also find
it
it
hard to dispute,
that he himself,
and, as
; '
CHAP, vl]
transcendentalism.
this
it
95
under
it
and
this
second
fact is
one which
interpret in a
manner which
harmonise with
The
transcendentalist wouldj
in question
if it
no doubt, say
not always
at
even
;
had
come
and having
enunciated this dictum he would trouble himself no further about a matter which belonged merely to the
*
But
if an
implicit thought
means
else,
it
connection what
it
means everywhere
is
logically
bound
up
in
may always be
from
this
by
it.
Now,
a mere
thought
implicit
it
does not
possibility,
which may
indeed at any
an
actuality,
and which,
;
be indestructible
bility,
a possi-
of speech.
If,
therefore, this
implicit
be
accepteci,
we
find
difficulty.
it
under
relait,
tions which,
now
see,
are involved in
i.e.,
without which
cannot
or
else
am
in error,
96
[part
ii.
understand
it
it,
smoke
if
the
second,
comes
into
apparent
conflict,
avowed
sophy
scientific
many
of
its
disciples,
For by
in
development
its
till
of thought
stages
it
is
driven on by
own
the
it
can find
and
satisfaction.
by no means intend
to assert as
is
intel-
of the Absolute.
What
mean
is,
and
self-contradiction
cate-
when demonstrated
I
me
may be
them
as
in
a higher unity
fact,
but, they
must admit
not
that,
a matter of
to
this
vouchsafed
few.
There
many,
for
The
universe
itself,
is
nalises
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
by a movement
of
at
97
once
and negative,
sciousness of self'^
highest con-
mankind
to a reconciliation
;
stand
and what
desire
not
shown how,
is
unten-
but how
is
its
existence, as a fact,
is
to
be con-
logic
here misleading.
no doubt, that
we may intelligently
all
may be
legiti-
we
because
it is
In transcendental reasoning
The
ground, and
we
it
significance
and what
wish to
know
is,
how
it
happens that
all
for so
many people
of
to
who
tuted.
are
wholly innocent of
it
any knowledge
said
in this
is
be
constiit
there
^
is
any value
objection,
98
[part
ii.
movement or So long inference in this logic is an impossibility. so long as as the transcendentalist refuses to move he merely declines to abstract the relations by which
that
an object
is
already constituted,
;
he
stands, perhaps,
on firm ground
but directly he
tries to oblige
us
to think a thing
under new
relations,
his
method
If,
on
we can think
there
;
new
relations,
is
compel us to do so
for the
method
consists in
show-
new
it
would
on the other
hand,
we
cannot think
new
re-
we were not thinking it before or the relations are not new and in either case there is no inferential movement of thought from the known to the unknown. From these reflections it would appear that the
;
up the seeming
on which
fact
his
seeming
fact
is,
which
inconsistent with
is
it.
The
is,
first
necessary to constitute
that a
a knowledge of an object
great
many
intelligent beings,
talist himself,
among
know
it
Now,
one solution
of this
difificulty
has been
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
;
99
already disposed of
it
thought which
at
all, it is
is
merely implicit
is
really
no thought
nothing.
It
is
may however,
neither merely
a stage
'
in
which
it is
strong
enough, so to speak, to
not strong enough to be
known
whom
it
This
transcendentalist^; for
Kant
that
*
of Professor Caird,
unity)
the
consciousness (of a
may be
we become aware
unity
of
it
of producing
but
that,
nevertheless, the
be present, though
make
it
stand out'
is
may
reagent,
analysis of
its results.
Such a theory as
its
it
ceases
to
be known as thought,
p. 395.
100
[part
ii.
is
correct.
That a
seninis,
sation can be
its
of course, plain.
It
more or fewer
it
relations.
And
in
the things
so
we may,
makes no
alteration
and
if
since,
thesis,
This quantitative
or intensive diminution of being, then, will not explain the apparent fact that so
feel the necessity of
many people do
not
posed necessary
relations.
in
being depends
;
on the number of relations by which it is qualified and in this respect thought also, not less than sensation,
may be
Relations
is,
may
as,
that
may
;
be
than feelings
is
and
not so compared
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.,''
'
'
ici
and classed cannot be an object of thought, cannot be known as a relation, it may be supposed that here
we have
which
is
stage
difficulties.
Every man,
enlightened
may be
said,
by transcendentalism,
to
but he
is
so,
because he has
But
*
if this
be
trye,
*
what becomes
intelligi
'
esse
'
and the
thought,
why
Why should
not the
'
perpetual flux
'
of unrelated
why,
1
have a
real existence
We^
of
it
moments think
it
a kind of unity
may
exist,
but in such
a manner as to
beings,
make
is
it
and
this incapacity
may be
fact that
thought
things.
The
liarly
transcendentalist, then,
to
bound
would be disposed
not
known
rp2-
A;r?5:5EKC,E
of philosophic doubt,
is
[parth.
exist at
all.
He
two
an
alternatives.
it is
error of
memory and
relations, or else
is,
he must hold
is
is
a thinking being
unable to
make
abstraction
is
of.
The
is
first
of these alternatives
somewhat too
which
it
seriously maintained
by transcendentalists.
fact that
Accordnecessary
ingly
we
find
supposed to constitute
in
other
words, accepting the second of the alternatives mentioned above, but at the
The
''
think,"
'
says
Kant
'
(I
am
quoting Proac-
must be capable of
companying
thought
all
my
something
would be presented
;
to
is
my mind
the
and that
same thing
Again,
*
would be nothing
for me.'
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
103
sciousness
....
.
The mere
idea "
I," in
reference
it
makes
This
idea
may be clear (empiric consciousness) or obscure. This we do not need to consider at present, nor even
it
whether
actually exists at
all
it
all
knowledge
on the reference of
faculty!
'
and
this
apperception as a
Professor
is
Caird,
commenting on
Kant
here examin-
how
consciousness of them
is
developed
in the individual,
tJie
The
individual (the
who becomes
the subject of
knowmerely
ledge)
may be
at different stages
on the way
to clear
self-consciousness.
he
may
be conscious
;
of
objects,
or,
he
may be
to have
identity of self in
we may even
period of
all,
whereby
104
[part
ii.
/the object
determined.
self,
would
as
good as nothing."
critical
Though,
all
therefore,
we
can think
of an experience in which
we
cannot
them
in
From
these extracts
latest
it
that
is
required to constitute a
perception
in
be
we
make
it
an
object,
should be
me
to vanish
away.
The
rules
was supposed
to impress
which Nature must be, because without them she would be nothing to us as thinking beings, these
rules
all,
to
be only of subjective
validity.
flective
They
moments unmeaning to us
necessities
in
*
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
conscious,
105
of
To
of things
it
appears that
it
any
intelli-
there
no reason
for
conform to thought.
The
it
is
never recog-
nised
by that philosophy,
exceedingly important.
According
an explicit consciousness
is
a necessary element in
it
without
the experience
would be
it,
'
'
may very
fairly
be said
>^
to
be
constituted.'
relations,
nor can
proves that
it
does not
exist.
If
man
a question,
possible
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
is
io6
[part
ii.
which
him
that
is
proof
is
there.
in
which a transcendentalist
differs
re-
from
;
whereas
relation
all
was required
is
that
required
is
must be capable
It is plainly
'
it
that the capability of being thought under the relation necessarily constitutes
it
;
for,
according to the
'
transcendentalist,
'
esse
is,
'
is
equivalent to
it
intelligi
'
that
is,
an object
as
is
apprehended by a
is
without in
all
cases perceiv-
real.
of re-
seems involved
something
in
make
this
abstraction of
incapacity into
;
a certain
he elevates
intelli-
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
had objects presented
to
107
actually
them without
this
characteristic.
be an objection)
method, and
it is
now time
who employ it, in their special endeavours to show that when the nature of experience Is once brought
to the
rate,
'
clear consciousness
'
pendent, and
all
Critique,'
had changed
that
his
first
world.
understand,
however, that
;
this
is
not
critics
Refutation
'
as
satisfactory In
and as harIts
author's
tained
in
It
and that the proof of realism conIs the one on which they would be
disposed to
to criticise
I
*
rely.
As
such, therefore,
am
forced
It.
It is
somewhat unwillingly
an
is
that
go
to
Kant
any
io8
[part
ii.
particular case
in
system
so great that
standing his
be a philosophic discussion
into a historical one.
sition are so great that
is
danger
for
of
and of which
all
his
own grasp
times perfectly
in
gling to express a
quite clear,
meaning which
it
in
an astonishing
am
is
on
this subject,
;
it
to
Kant himself
formal
is
that
must
of
appeal
refutation
so short (apart
it
runs as follows
can quote
entire.
Theorem.
*
ness
The simple but empirically determined consciousof my own existence proves the existence of ex-
The
is
Mr. Meiklejohn's.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
109
Proof.
'
am
conscious of
my own
existence as deter-
mined
in time.
But
in
this
be something
something.
my
ex-
istence in time
is itself
It
permanent existence
mination of
my
existence in time
possible only
Now,
consciousness in time
is
necessarily connected
Hence
it
existence of things
mination in time.
of
That
is
is
my own
existence
at the
without me.'
This proof,
i.e.,
it
will
be observed,
is
is
transcendental,
that an ex-
its
method of procedure
to
show
[that,
perience which
we
^
certainly
have
167.
namely, of
CritiqueJ
tr. p.
[part
ii.
is
stated (though, as
we
be ad-
mittedFirst,
And
it is
something permanent, or
is
perception of change
the
inconceivable, unless
we
at
change.
And
in
Kant goes on
in this
*
which changes
self),
case
'
since the
things
iwhich succeed
other in
time are
my own
is,
that
must
So
can
Such
is
to Idealism
but
it
is
not in this
way
in his
proof of the
'
principle of substance
'
refu-
tation' in the
arguments which,
any further
'
refutation
superfluous.
For, the
First
in all
;
Analogy of Experience'
asserts this,
is
'That
permanent
and
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
is
m
it is)
neither increased
nor diminished.'
And
if it is
is
as
something which,
not (as
think
exactlyis
equivalent to what
commonly
is
called matter,
is
at
;
any
rate the
this
one species
clearly
absolutely
in
inconsistent
I
with Idealism
term.
If
the
is
sense
which
use the
matter
to be thought of as
permanent
and
indestructible,
we
in nature
something be-
The
I
Caird's,
this
way
:
and partly
*
in
my
in
is
All
phenomena
Change
But
this
time
tion,
is
not,
is
and cannot
be, itself
an object of percep-
but
They must be
all
As
in
all
times
changes must be
one per-
manent
object.
is
The
of the object
implied in
determinations of
its
changes.
Change involves
that one
mode
of exist-
mode
of existence in an object
Critique, p. 136.
'
112
[part
ii.
in its substance.
An
is
hilation or creation
would be an
from each other that they could not even be referred The First Analogy,' therefore, is a to one time.'
*
When
a philosopher
was asked,
'
What
is
the weight of
smoke
?
'
he
wood
will
sumed
of
it
to
undergoes a change.^
reader will at once perceive that .while there
that
is
The
is
*
much
common
to the
Refutation
'
and the
because,
while
it
is
impossible to
it
arguments as
identical,
is
would lead
to a
good deal of
repetition to consider
course,
perhaps, will be
in
is
special to
each of them.
Cf.
Kant, Critique^
p.
136
Caird, p. 453.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
first
113
The
*
difficulty,
then,
to that
which
Refutation
'
and
in the
*
First Analogy.'
Is
it
really
*
is
except
we
conceive
in relation to
?
a permanent and
unchanging substance
I
I
For
clear consciousness,'
For
though change
for
may perhaps be
calls
*
unthinkable, except
combining,' and,
persisting conscious-
out of
^
relation
that which
not-change,' this
not-
On
seem enough
;
to
I
make
cannot
its
change in time
intelligible
by contrast
fact
and
from the
is
that
in
ordinary
;
language permanence
whence
tives
it
is
rashly
assumed
the
system of
nature.
concede
this
is
Only the
permanent
subject to change
I
114
[part
ii.
that
is,
^
when
Now
word
is
there can be no objection, of course, from a philosophical point of view, to an author defining a
in
what
is
not permissible
to
make such a
definition
;
to matters of fact
substance
is
If
(by definition) change can only occur in the permanent, the fact that there is
change
is
is
no doubt a
But\
this
'
permanent.'
in
is
there change
is
sense
How
anything
more than
convince by threats.
say,
'
Allow
my
conclusion,' they
or
will
But
in this
case
timid philosopher.
is
if
we
are
I
the ordinary
To
those
man may very well content himself. who agree with the preceding account
who can
either conceive
Critiqjie, p. 140.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
115
alternation,'
it
will
seem ab-
First
Analogy
and the
it
'
Refutation/
To
those
who do
not agree,
will
only be a difficulty in
mind unconscious of
the
disI
transcendental necessities
transcendental theory,cussed.
is
inconsistent with
point
have already
But
let
us pass over
this,
and
in general,
in
or the
particular,
can
then
is
objection) why, in
something, should
the reader
supplies,
is
we go
'
to external matter
As
*
aware, the
pure
eg-o
of apperception
in refe-
and
it
may
to
Kant
has,
it
and replied
but as
I
understand the
reply,
I
objection
much
better than
do the
latter,
'
will
without para-
own words
We
find,'
he says,
that
we
except matter.
I
In
ii6
[part
ii.
the representation
is
thinking subject.
that this
Its
character of per-
manence, could serve as correlate to the determination of time In the internal sense. In the
as impenetrability
Is
^
same way
empirical intuition.'
Though
'
to
understand
it,
this reasoning,
from
that
the permanent
'
whose existence
;
demonstrated
Is
a fact which
' :
Time
itself
It
follows
in
phenomena,
^
there
It
is
i
difficult to
how
that which
Is
a quantity,
it
I
cannot, at
think,
all
and we may,
assume
from the whole tenor of Kant's argument, as well as from his categorical assertions, that the substance of which he speaks is a phenomenal ^Atng: But If it
be perceived, and
to be found
?
if it
be a phenomenon, where
is It
where
(to all
objects
'
do indeed
where
Critique, p. i68.
Critique, p. 137.
CHAP, vl]
transcendentalism.
is
T17
appearance) nothing
eternal,
who
?
By a dialectical process, probably familiar to the reader, we may with much plausibility reduce what we perceive in an
rience of this unchanging existence
which
is
the object
itself,
but
all
But
of
this
'
substratum
these accidents
at all events,
is
all, or,
only
known
it is
as a relation.
In neither
case can
it
since in the
case
perception
in the
all.
second
'
as an object at
But
(it
may perhaps be
by a remarkable coincidence, science has established by a wide induction the very truth which Kant attempts to prove a priori.
us that matter
that
is
When men
it is
of science
tell
indestructible,
to
be presumed
to the phrase,
and
When Kant
uses the
same phrase,
the
may be supposed that he refers to same object.' For my own part, I confess to a
it
rooted distrust of
these
remarkable coincidences
between the
results
;
of scientific
experiment and
a priori speculation
true,
indestructible
but what
is
ii8
[part
ii.
phrase,
evidence
Can we perceive
all
any thread of
the various
we
may undergo ? To a certain extent science assures There are two, though, so far as I us that we can.
know, only two attributes of matter, namely,
tion to a
its rela-
moving
put
force
and
its
power of
attracting
or, to
it
more
'
we
take a certain
area of observation
cannot
the
this,
two
properties.
But
it
we
can
fact
not, so that
they cannot
we
directly perceive
is
still
we
can
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
119
is
permanent, cannot be an
first
object
of perception.
The
these
alternation
is
in-
admissible,
relations
because
properties
are
merely
between certain portions of matter and The second would seem to be something else.
inconsistent with the Kantian proof.
The
am
not here
is
inconsistent
is
wrong,
is
method or
its
results.
My
point
rather
this
Though
its
Kant does
not, of course,
merely from
theless
to
its
permanence
in
in perception,
never-
permanence
in
be involved
his proof.
so
Now
it
;
assert that
is
what we perceive, in
either not matter or
tain that
scientific
is
far as
is perceived,
not permanent
and
main-
bears on the
may
we
accidents.
First,
But
is
seems
to raise
new
difficulties.
how
z^^//;;^^;/^/
substance which,
be known at
all, is
known
precisely in the
same
I20
[part
ii.
way
or
be
it
in
time
to
be a
quantity
And
how,
finally,
can
we
is
phenomenal
To
in
one sentence
in
when
/
Kant says
all
determination
regard to time
be taken
literally,
is
is
nothing permanent
we choose
and other
first
got
to
show
that the
is
permanent
identical
whose
thus
established
common
be said
and
lastly, to
how we can
which
its
to
be
'
immediately conscious'
through,
of that
we
only
know
and
by means
of,
attributes.
First
Analogy'
and the
any
'
Refutation.'
difficulties,
me
ex-
may be
the
two demonstrations
considered
Critiqtie^ p. 167.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM;
'
X2t
Refutation
'
consisted,
will
be recollected)
in
while in the
argument involved
itself never
changes.
fore,
like
or,
all
other
as they are
;
Refutation,' this
permanent
in
space
in
other words,
propositions
Between
to
them
these
two
would seem
furnish
a complete transcendental
as
mere accidents
far
of a material substance
so that the
empiricism,
critical
methods
The
'
First
Analogy
is
criticism.
were a
which
But
would seem
that a
vacuum
impossible, because
if
matter
is
122
[part
ii.
wherever space
it
than
'
is
to conceive the
'
second
'
in/
crease
ingless
and
in
is
diminution
their
application
amount
held to
necessarily indefinite.
is
therefore,
mean simply
it
portion of
may
vacuum he points out that matter may be a quantity in more than one way, but that neither in the First Analogy nor the Refutation does he explicitly tell us in which way
add, that in his discussion of a
*
'
'
it is
incapable of diminution.
It
would be
interest-
ing to
know
this, in
by very
different
men
I
My
tion,'
Refuta-
and
and
to
must ask the reader to turn back to it, compare the thing which Kant announces his
In the
is
have proved.
demonstrated
in
the
*
space
is
in the
demonme'
strated
the existence of
in
'
that
is,
without
me
'
'
other
than
my
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
these two expressions really meant the
further refutation of Idealism
123
Now
thing,
if
same
any
would be
for a
perfectly superfluous.
No human
moment deny
his body.
in
that there
were objects
space,
and
therefore without
him
in the
The
real question
this-
Does
?
being
The
it
does not
and
to assume, as
is
the other
at
issue.
is,
in reality,
to
extended objects,
which
it
it is
I
must,
suppose, be to
show that
their existence
is
neither
in
beginning with
to
it;
and
order
do
this
two
things.
The
the
first
of these
is,
that the
is
con-
sciousness of one's
possible on
own
i.e.,
existence in time
that
only
supposition
something perindependent
manent
second
thing
exists outside,
is,
that
this
permanent and
identical with
first
is in
any sense
extended matter.
I
The
of these positions
have
is
already considered
124
[part
ii.
nowhere
but
ing (though
omitted to
into
seems scarcely credible) that Kant provide any, though a temporary lapse
that
at
the
'outside'
all
one
sense
is
equivalent
'
to,
or,
outside
'
in the other.^
feel in
With the
understanding
how
which
is
an
immediate
a difficulty which
is
by
no attempt
to deal.
turn
now from
dental proof of an external world to the transcendental proof of the law of Causation.
if
ment
stress
nor with
the
other.
am
unfortunately
discretion as an expositor of
the
Critical
it.
Philosophy, has
will
chosen practically to
ignore
^ I do not of course suppose that Professor Caird and the NeoKanlians are guilty of the confusion of thought which I here attribute
to Kant.
But (as I explained above) since they appear to be content with the argument in the form in which Kant left it since at all events they have not, so far as I know, thought fit to provide a corrected version of it, I am not only justified, but compelled, to
;
treat
it
as
if it
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
125
in so
argument
ask
am
about to
its
non-existence
consult
the
will
him
it
to
the
attri-
Critique,'
may
not be
in
Critique.'
It
runs
as
give
it
partly in
italics
my own
words, partly in
:
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is But sometimes we regard this always successive.' manifold of phenomena as constituting an object
Kant's, though the
'
when a
to
ship
is
seen to float
down a
river).
Subjec-
tively, in
be of the same'^kind
objectively, as every
one
We
no more
if
we
at the top,
is
a phenomenon pre-
ceding
in
is
floor,
than
we suppose
perceive the
the ship
same time
in
at
two
different places
on the
river.
Yet
consciousness
we
ground
perceive
floor
higher up.
is
requires solution
this
1
we down the river after we The problem then that How do we distinguish, as
story, exactly as
seq.
Page 142
126
[part
ii.
in
we
series
And
them
Kant's answer
if
is
that
we
we
regard the
order of the
series as arbitrary,
rule.
'
second as subject to a
my
might begin
or vice versa
and end
at the foundation,
in
or
by going from
right to left
or from
left to right.
which necessitated
in
my
objective
it
in
no way
in
which we choose
if
to repre-
and
this
can only be
we suppose
that
it
And
'
this
becomes
at
once apparent,
if
for
an instant we try
to be the case.
Let us
apprehension, that
tive,
is to say,
would
be merely subjec-
and
it
In such a case
we
should
have nothing but a play of representation, which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would not be possible through perception
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
127
to
distinguish
in
same
in the
phenomenon
And,
render a certain
in this case,
I
sequence
objectively necessary.
phenomenon
follow one
upon the
But
this
is
to
be a cognition
not
even
in
when we know in experience that something happens, we always suppose that someAccordingly,
thing precedes, whereupon
it
follows in conformity
I
with a
rule.
it
For otherwise
follows
;
object that
my
apprehension^ if
it
a rule in
mined
in
as they happen,
by the preceding
under
can
make my
;
subjective
it is
and
only
of an event
possible.'
or the
subjective succession
of phenomena,
Kant had
to distinguish
128
[part
ii.
coexistence
in
space
and
As
he does
not, so far as
Or, to
in
only possible
If
we presuppose
tainly
we
cer-
Now, regarded
causation, the
argument
is
scarcely
worth
after
criticising.
In the
Professor Caird,
is
can be
accordfirst
;
ing to a
rule,'
It
is
arbitrary
is
actually an objec-
that if there
is
an objective sequence,
it
must be
because otherwise
sequence.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
is
129
first
for
purposes of
required.
is
The second
of the
first,
ciple of causality
so hidden
away
in the recesses
that
forward as
The
first
fact that
it is
in direct contradic-
the
proof,
far
but
is
not of
much
importance, as
am more
The
if
it
first
by being according
The second
at-
which
is
universal,
therefore,
be
by
the
it is
first.
It
more
satisfactory.
^
:
give
it
entire in Professor
Caird's
'
words
The judgment
For time
1
of sequence
cannot be
made
I30
[part
ii.
things,
Only when
we have connected
think of
we
them
as in time.
And
different
moments
in
time are
it
determined
But
is
evi-
moments
i.e.,
we can
into
one order
we
Now,
if
or, in
other
when one
thing
is
posited something
in consequence.
in time,
In
this pre^
succession in
we
we suppose
fit
'
that
a necessary order in
phenomena
time.
to enable
into the
the
moments of
Events
same
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
131
moments
But
in
so far as
to these
words
at
all,
really distinct.
'
The
'
order
'
of
moments if we assert that two events succeed each other, we are describing precisely the same relationship between them as when we assert that two moments succeed each other. When, on the other hand, we assert that one event is the cause of another, we assert not only this actual sucorder of
;
and
by
whenever an event resembling the cause or first term But this in the relationship may happen to occur.
relationship
it
is
must occur
it
some time,
it
may
and
in
tween actual successive events or successive moments which can never be repeated, because the related
terms can never recur.
followed by event
Event
B and moment
if
This happens
;
you
please, necessarily
but
it
The
be
moments
little
recalled.
has
What
the principle of
is,
not that
if
event
recurs
it
will
132
[part
ii.
event
but that
If
an event
will
similar to
recurs,
:
an event similar to
this
cer-
tainly follow
and how
sertion
is
my
under-
The
cause there
and
But
there
still
was no
causality at
all,
would
necessary
as the order of
moments.
it
An
does.
it
event
what
is
it
is
because
it is
it
happens when
it
moment
what
because
occurs
when
does.
because by so doing
it
would cease
is
to
be
itself
It is
all
we
same
we make
moment
whereas
consists in
it is
occurs,
is
the least
interesting of
event,
convenient to
make
abstraction.
Nor
is
it
to the
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
133
in rela;
because
in
of particular events,
particular
moments.
If,
deny),
is
it
must necessitate
which
absurd.
transcendental
to
be found
in
own
version of
is
its
That object
succession
is
who
first
regard phenomena
to the principle
of causation
which, again,
is
as
much
as to say that
by
mankind
I
at
it
all.
And when
must be rememall
who do
sation,
those
who do
since
will
make bold to say that the greater number however much they turn their minds to the
principle of cause
of these,
nature of
and
effect.
be of
'
objective
'
application,
all,
and
is
to
have any
philosophic value at
134
[part
ii.
own
be so
on a point which
is
commonly thought
This by
to
itself is
hard to believe
and the
difficulty
does
not diminish
more
closely.
oblige us to
when we come to examine the matter For what does the supposed necessity hold ? That when we perceive two
first
is
second
Not
at
all.
two events
a
are,
we
and
shall
ignorant
So
that
comes
to
is this,
that
we can
is
we
clear conscious-
succession which
of which
is,
or
may
unknown
to us
On
Kuno
has been
on the contrary,
seems
to
me
that
the
difficulties
all
to be
met with
in
^
Fischer's Kant, p.
rS.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
135
and important
that
it
principle.
It
is
commonly
is
asserted
Nature
the result of
habit)
Kant
the necessity of
finding
some more
it
solid basis
is
unfortunate that
proof,
which
it
is
have only
parts as
it
suppose
proved
is
not sufficient
by
itself to
All that
Kant can be
said,
view of
his reasoning, to
have established
that,
own words, 'the phenomena in the past determine all the phenomena in succeeding time
to use his
'
;
or,
it,
'the subsequent
state of the
world
is
phenomena at one instant and the phenomena at the next instant, is required
'
before
we
laws of nature.'
A law of nature
totality of
between the
136
[part
ii.
that totality
and
it
between individual concrete phenomena, but between Now by no known process classes of phenomena.
of logic can
that
'
we
the effect
these exist at
proposition
all;
and what
is
might be perfectly
all
intents
For regula'
is
series,
which there
for
no kind of repetition
and we have
no reason
science
supposing
from the
at
point of view of
we have every
which
it
was
therefore,
we have grounds
believing that
by
means
of
we
could say,
perhaps, that
its
but
it
we
be possible for
its
future from
its
of Professor Caird's,
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
for
137
he appears to think
between individual
phenomena
causal connection
at different times.
between the
'
totality of
phenomena
'
To
find,'
he
says,^
the special
and experiment.
we have
spoken of
neither
transcendental.
Its
nature
is
developed
unas'
by Kant nor by
it
himself,
'
and
my own
in the
clear consciousness
of
But
if it is
I
it is
not empirical.
showed
still
less,
if
we do
prove
It is not,
The
trans-
it
without de-
monstration, since,
if
hard to deny
its
while,
have
essay.
1
p. 459.
138
[part
ii.
CHAPTER
VIL
which
may be
called,
consent,'
the
y
Argument from success in practice,' and the Argument from common sense."' These arguments are not, perhaps, as a general
'
''
rule,
put forward as
final
belief
sophic insight
but they
fill
so important a place
are, as
among
fact,
the reasons
by which men
a matter of
some
made
to
its
It
is
as impos-
not to be accepted as
CHAP.
VII.]
139
one of the ultimate data of knowledge, as to prove This is a point the that it is to be so accepted.
decision of which
must
in
all
cases
be
left
to
make
it
really given
first
at issue, and, in
If the
the
instance
on that alone.
and the
belief in
question
it
is
will
be necessary,
i.e., what conclusions how much ground it covers we may draw from it, and what proportion these conclusions bear to the total number of beliefs we
desire to establish.
let
us discuss in the
which
consent'
that
be admitted,
suppose, at once,
mankind
that
ground of
belief
must
hold,
ist,
some
either are, or
may be deduced
by
Now
I
first
whether he
is
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
[part
140
ii.
as
is
latter alternative,
all
those, namely,
consent
of the
exists.
it
is
to be presumed, are
same general character as those which are required to establish any other historical fact, and
consist in the first place of evidence, oral
and docu-
particulars.
fact
Before, therefore,
(if fact it
be) that
by the generality of mankind are true,' we must both believe a large number of statements because they are assented to, not by
propositions assented to
and and
propositions
proof,
*
for
in
favour of which
be invoked.
So much
'
for what, in
'
formal logic,
is
called the
minor premiss
way
CHAP.
VII.]
141
assented
to,
is
this
an ultimate proposition
one
which we
ing proof
If
any reader
is in
answer which he
feels
disposed to
make
him
to the
to a deci-
Does he regard the argument from general consent as an example, and a specially perfect example, of the ordinary argument from testimony ?
If
he does, and
think he probably
is
will,
then the
proposition
we
are discussing
told,
not ultimate.
We
are
commonly
the assertion
greater
is
we
accept the
testi-
mony.
real
it is
ground of accepting an
asserted.
asser-
is
The
real
ground
formants probably
willing to
know
communicate
all
it.
And
is
one which
Now
tion,
will,
admit that
true, not
only
when we
are
body of
when we
are dealing
with
the united
testimony of mankind.
In other
142
[part
ii.
st,
that the
'
argument from
is
nary arguments from testimony, and, 2nd, that the ordinary arguments from testimony depend on something beyond the
fact
been
stated,
and require us
stating
the persons
them were
and well
informed.
we
are discussing
is
not an ultimate
we might consider
it
may be worth
i.e.,
nearly ultimate
thread of inference
find
much
we can readily
to rest
it.
some
satisfactory
axiom on which
With regard
in their
to
man-
kind as a whole,
on such a
subject.
The
first is,
ages must in
all
probability be in har-
mony
must
*
who
'
;
hold
it
is,
in practice
the other
is
a proof that
'
mind
in other words,
established
by common
CHAP, vil]
143
ambiguous
form
expression.
As
these
however,
part of the
will
main subject-matter of
this chapter,
and
I
be separately discussed
in their
It
proper place,
may for
fore,
remains, there-
some
par;
section
of
mankind on these
is
subjects
in
correspondto
hold
Popes towards
The
only persons,
suppose,
philosophers
conclusions,
and
if
they had
all
to
make
public the
difficult,
perhaps, pre-
to
of their pretensions.
fulfilled
the second of
we
man by
not
his arguments,
the first,
we
should,
to
all.
reduced to beleft
^
lieving only
recommend, be
As
is
remarked
p. 290.
144
[part
ii.
Locke, Berkeley,
to
Hume, Paley, Mill, are quite enough show how much the deepest thought, the most
the most pious feeling, the shrewdest
brilliant talents,
practical sagacity,
conscientiousness
have contributed to a
Sir
practical
is
agreement on
here talking,
this subject.'
I
James Stephen
tions of theology
omission,
is
am
here concerned.
To sum
of
all
up.
The minor
true
of those scientific
which
it is
The major
more than the major premiss of any other argument from authority, be
regarded as an ultimate belief; and (the case of
experts being excluded)
if
given of
it,
we
argument
from success
in practice,' or to the
argument from
common
I
sense.'
turn,
therefore, to the
first
of these
about
'
will suffice.
success in practice
is
no-
CHAP. VH.]
145
to
the
faith
it
is
born of experience.
'
You
assert,'
says,
neither
common
;
Grant that
this is so
it
by
to give
work admir-
ably in practice.
doubts, after
all
However
nor
ingenious
may
be your
substantial foundation
is it
any use
to say that
of
events
true
enough
to give
up on speculative
principle,'
patience lasts
till
with as
much
But
must
is
the
work
in practice
is
any
ground
true.
for believing
is
them
to
be even approximately
illegiti-
This
in reality
an example of the
which we
are
capable of discovering,
it
is
un-
146
[part
ii.
works
in practice,'
i.e.y
a ground
how much
Inductive
confidence
it
is
the
business
of
the
Logician to
tell us.
But the
the
reader re-
is
altogether in-
of these
it
initial
assumptions.
cannot prove
the
wisdom of a
because
Its
much ambiguous
;
in their import,
as altogether
dumb
and
certainly give
no reason-
myself
believe
in)
between
theoretical
a proceed-
be sound, involves a
perience
attacks
;
contradiction.
Ex-
is
idols
which scepticism
to
may be
neglected,
is
same breath
it
reasonmg
proves
and that
it
is not,
sound.
If scepticism
anything,
Similar considerations
show
that no process of
'
CHAP.
VII.]
147
verification
certi-
tude.
verification
say.
It
must
by
possible.
is
But
it
is
a mistake to suppose
distinction
that there
any philosophic
between
on experience plus
I
verification.
fallen in his
He seems
to
imagine
the
*
calls
super-sensible,'
which
is
sensible
and
the
'
extra-sensible,'
in
is
which
is
derived
from
experience,
therefore
it
worthy
of belief
i,e.y
Whether
theology
substantial
I
a knowledge of
the super-sensible,
really rests
and metaphysics,
not argue here
on a
less
will
but at
proof
It is
new
does not
any
essential
particular
L
2
differ
148
[part
ii.
pirical
it
Philosophically speaking,
fall
it
afford
system of
which
I
now come
which
to the
'
sense,'
differs
just
been discussed
least,
constitutes,
nominally at
not
and
reputation.
common
though, as
it
we
are
moment need
detain us.
in
Now
common
when,
is
is
in
accordance with
what
is
frequently intended to be
I
imagine to be some-
'
The
belief in question
we cannot
satisfactorily
support
it
by reasoning
CHAP.
VII.]
149
nevertheless practically
and
all
men
micst assent to
is
it,
men
do assent to
it,
and there
I
nothing
more
plaint
to
have no com-
whatever
make
is.
who
takes
up
this position,
provided
It
is
be understood exactly
not an argument in
is
it
It
is
not a
;
philosophy,
it is
common
all
rather
it
a negation of
that, directly
And
made
therefore
is is
any attempt
to raise
what
is
it
up by various supplementary
principles, which, as
port to
common
it,
have
just described
shows
itself
in
various ways in
discussion.
man why he
and he
is
everybody
does so (which
is
the
argument
he and mankind
is
if,
in
the
'
in practice.'
is
I50
[part
ii.
must be
admitted that he
is
recommended
to
him by
'
his
common
sense.'
is
But there
must be
fore-
gone, which
is
so important that
it
may be doubted
title
whether
it
of the
it
more
especially as
way Human intelligence, like any other may machine, work rightly or wrongly. It may do
'
is
not.
It
may be
stated
somewhat
its
it
may do something
In the former
;
case
error.
we
shall obtain
from
it
truth
in the
latter,
we
common
that.*
arises
'
What
it
is
an
intel-
working normally
such a
It is
is
an intelligence
working
way
the truth,
we
could merely
intelligence
working
when asked what an intelligence working normally was, that it was an intelligence which perceived the truth a pair of
CHAP.
VII.]
151
bring us
sophy.
much nearer to the discovery of a philoNor is it of any use to say that a normal
is
intelligence
; not
intel-
only because,
if
to
be believed, every
that,
but because
we
should then be
ing that
we know what
in
it
means of
yet
is
an intelligence
because
it
Nor
is
what
normal
can be
and therefore
is
:
true,
to
do so would
consent,'
is
be to revert to the
'
If
anything
be made of
it
this principle,
it
menting
design.
in
We
some form or other by the idea of must either presuppose a Creator who
manner
is
that
true,
incline to believe
we must adopt
the
modern
is
substitute for
some process by
to multiply
to die out.
On
either of
fact
all
:
is
undoubtedly the
that
men
but
worthy of
belief
on
of showing, without
2.
petitio principii,
what
It is
that
152
[part
ii.
all
the question
still
remains,
is
true
Nobody
tion
self-evident
absolutely
be
said
common
if
is
desirable to have,
some kind
of proof for
the
in
existence of
a God.
In any case, as
mankind
to
it
more disposed
of
to believe the
fundamental principle
believe the fundais
absurd without
support of the
adduce the
first in
second.
whether depending
the
blind
on an
intelligent
Creator
or
operation
of natural
selection,
is
I
requires
?
I
proof.
And what
kind of proof
possible
imagine any,
which does not depend on those very principles for which proof is required and in support of which the hypothesis of a normal intelligence con;
trived
fore,
by design was adduced. The circle, therein which the argument turns is evident. We
we are required to believe in the existence and testimony of a normal intelligence because intelligence is
the product of design or of something equivalent to
CHAP.
VII.]
design
to believe in design
the propositions
we
prove are
true
judge,
Of the two meanings then, which, so far as I can may be attributed to the argument from common sense as it is ordinarily used, the first is not so much an answer to scepticism as an admission
'
'
that no answer
is
forthcoming
which compose
it is
it
are
brought
it is
into
clear
confused.
154
[part
ii.
CHAPTER
VIII.
The
I
common
sense,
occupies in the
field
of English
will
be Imme-
remedied,
;
been
dictated
by several
the
the
in
reasons
among which is the circumstance that philosophy of common sense is, according to
statement of
reality not
its
founded upon
:
upon consciousness
name given
be such,
that this
'
to the attitude of
It is
This refers to Sir William Hamilton's opinions as expressed in In the Lectures,' see Chap, xxxviii., he gives (after his fashion), a different account of the matter. But whatever version of his opinion be taken, it must, I believe, if clearly expressed, be substantially identical either with the theory criticised at
the
'
Dissertation on Reid.'
i.e.^
Mr.
Mill.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
&c.
155
may
will
we ought
to trust
is
consciousness,
the
consciousness
which we ought to
though
perhaps
fairly
enough
describes
the
is
approached
in the sequel.
*
if
on propo-
own evidence,
necessitate
their
is
own
admission.'^
Nothing can be
in the
is
truer.
This
course of
it
even
But surely
it
a strange assertion
we have
carry their
evidence,
for
believing those
evidence.'
'
propositions
'
which
own
if
If
own
they
necessitate their
own
admission,'
machind
in the
shape of consciousness
in
order to
The
if
reason
is
is
knowledge
and
own evidence
'
necessitate their
own
ad-
mission
Dissertation on Reid,
p. 742.
156
4
[part
ii.
_____
to
is
v^
for
which unfor-
tunately no proof
readily forthcoming.
These two
while
they differ
in
the
somewhat important
sense (as
it.
peculiarity that
of
common
class)
cannot obtain
difficulty,
partially to
honoured name
testify to
consciousness,
which
should
precisely the
same way, or
to precisely the
same
degree,
still
sufficiently in the
our assent.
To my
common
weight of
is
mere
appeared, even
over, which
that, in all
is
metaphysics.
morefact,
it
particularly unfortunate
from the
cases
where
it
is
not superfluous,
is
misleading.
other evidence.
is
clearly superfluous
in
the case
themselves,
'
it
is
also
superfluous
P. 744.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
&c.
157
mislead-
since
it
can, as
shall presently
show, only
simulate
original
I
the appearance
of
an independent and
ground of
belief.
may be
told,
consciousness
which Sir William Hamilton and many other philosophers set up as the
final
arbiter of truth
is
is
no
co-extensive
itself.
If this
were
so, their
theory
it
would be much
it
than
was
before.
They would be
guiltless of
;
founding
but they
their philosophy
on an imaginary faculty
would,
single
it
to found
at
It
may be
a*s
might be used
a general
name
for
;
mental pheno-
but
it
in
that
and
distinct
describes.
'
in relation to
is
which
all
a unity, yet
distinct
and consciousness,
if it
a unity only
in
the
to a great
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
things,
158
[part
ii.
many
and
in this
sense
it
is
evident that
it
This
be,
is
equally true
if
consciousness
is
taken to
as
it
William Hamilton
connection intends
it
to be,
a general name for our acts of intuitive judgment. This use of the word certainly excludes the notion
of consciousness being set up as a kind of separate
faculty,
but then
it
Either there
is
no
judgments,
;
in
which
/
or there
/
criterion,
in
which case
it
must be something
In the
first case,^
much
of Sir William
and some of
it
as erroneous
in the
second case,
to
he
stands
committed
doctrine (which,
to
believe,
he
which consciousness
is
regarded as a kind of
Now,
it is
sort,
by
which consciousness
popular morality
do, just as
what we ought
to
that
tells
us what
we ought
to believe
Cf. Lectures, p.
5.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
:
&c.
159
First,
Second,
Why
it tell
ought
we
it
to
?
beHeve
I
it ?
Third,
first
What
does
us to believe
waive the
raises points of
much might be said, and I pass on to the second. Why ought we to believe Sir William Hamilton is in no way embarrassed it ?
great interest about which
for
an answer, indeed,
five,
in the
Dissertation
is
'
he gives
list
:
no less than
1.
>/Uj
,J^
i
true
till it is
proved to be
false.
V\/
^
2.
Some
The
b,^
/\
itself.^
proof of consistency,
If
deliberately deceived
5.
by a perfidious Creator.^
To
diction.^
With regard
a creed
is
it is
only
The second
'
proof
is
P. 744.
'
'
P. 745-
P- 754.
i6o
[part
ii.
to
be trusted
rather, in so far as
it
is
in
some
not required
that
it
certain of
The
of too negative
at
a character to
make
it
any length
at the best,
thetical objection.
The fourth
imagine, sufficiently
course of
from
will
common
fifth
sense.^
in Mill's
'
Some additional
Examination,'
observations
be found
p. 164.
The
only being
intrinsically
On
p.
when
'
it
testifies
its
what he elsewhere
is
calls
a fact
*
beyond
own
ideal existence,'
last
tantamount to
belief
is
ground of
all
is self -contradictory!
While, on
*
744, he assures
in this
case
refute
itself.
diction!
opinions
on
this
par-
make any
See ante,
p. 151.
Vide
Mill's
Examination of Hmnilton,
p. 158.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
proofs,
it
&c.
i6i
These
will
at the second
carry their
own
and
to
necessitate their
own
admission,'
many
first
We
called
are
called
upon
on the
authority of consciousness
upon
to believe
arises,
By what means
are
we
to discover the
?
ness certifies
question.
Sir
William
Hamilton
answers
quite
What
we may
Whence,
and that
all
original
consciousness.
may have
much
for such
an opinion,
'
original,'
judgment,
two senses,
either
distinguished.
first
may mean
which stands
in
i62
[part
ii.
first
it
more
not a
strictly),
phenomena governed by
a
cause, but
all
is
psychological laws,
product.
rest
may be
When
it is
said that
on
original propositions
is
used
in its first
is
meaning
when
intelli-
is
used in
its
second meaning.
it
Mr.
in the
Mill, as will
appear
second sense,
and seemed
In
I
to think that
this, I think,
he was mistaken.
Hamilton used
it,
more
to
fre-
quently in the
first
On what
original
grounds
then
(to
return
our
definition of
the
word
?
ness
He gives
know
even the
any.
am
unable to supply
But
is
common
sense.
is
shown
to be trustworthy
by the
five
^
''
CHAP.
VIII.J
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
&c.
163
may be
by
unless
how
are
we advanced,
judgments are
we know
Perhaps
I
that
the
original
which are
shall
certified
by consciousemployed
ness
same thing, because the two expressions mean the same thing or to put it techsciousness must be the
;
their con-x\.oX2X\ovi
it
is
identical.
be
so,
is
consciousness
and
original
I
an altogether
different sense
If
have supposed.
'
we
deliverance of consciousness
with what
is
properly
an authoritative faculty
are to identify
'
if,
original
judgment
then
'
with judgment
delivered
by
authority,
original
judgment
must
logic,
signify
ox first in causation.
On
the
first
is
of these
suppositions,
its
consciousness
dethroned from
name
wish to
know what
is
as this
that
consciousness assures us
^
or gives
Dissertation, P 754
i64
[part
ii.
testimony
thing
also to
If this
someis
not
clearly implies
information,
namely,
about
itself,
which he
tells
we can
doubt.
What, again,
is
meant by
telling
must be
any other witness'^ if consciousness be a mere And, finally, what plausibility unity ? fictitious
remains
in the
veracious
If
may be some
But what
known
?
And
why are
till
they are
proved to be
able witness
who
untruth
*
the
P. 749.
common
CHAP,
viii.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
is
&c.
165
sense philosophy
but
if
it
is
not so
think,
even to be specious.
The
ton's
difficulties
He
never scruples
talk
of
fundamental
bases
of
beliefs,^
primary
beliefs,^
original
knowledge,^
original (as
&c.,
opposed
solely
upon the
require
him
to
it
And
all
one of
its
believe,
then,
that
in
his exposition
is
of the
;
common
I
an ambiguity but
is
essential to the
I
system, otherwise
desired
solve
was a
perfectly
legitimate
He
found certain
beliefs,
those
respecting
had questioned.
*
He
P. 743P. 743.
P. 742.
P. 754.
'
i66
[part
ii.
truth
was scarcely
which
beyond
at
?
suspicion,
scepticism
had
made,
to
least
It
theoretically doubtful.
What was
as
it
be done
convictions
was
to give
them up
The Kantian
Locke
which
Ask a common
all
he believes, and he
tells
mankind
tells
ask him
that
It
why
beIt
you
Is
because
some of the
not, considered
original
convictions
of
mankind are
sciousness
by themselves, beyond
authority of con;
invoked
in their behalf
it is
because
no mere
faculty
reflection
can
it
deliver-
ances, that
mankind.
Some
its plausibility.
If
you
his
I
system
as
have repre-
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
&c.
167
sented
it.
On
this point,
however,
admit
it,
may-
Mr.
be,
Mill's version of
which
;
very
to
different,
this,
may
after
all,
and
which,
strange to
he not only
attributed to
now
address myself.
To many the
graph
will
last
seem a paradox.
That Mr.
Mill,
who
and who
Sense
in the chapter
devoted to the
declared
that
Common
he
Philosophy,'
differed
has
and
he
Hamilton
about which
he attributes to
prise.
It
is,
his opponent,
may
nevertheless, true.
He
agreed with
to
and where he
differed
whose
interest,
which
admit to be great,
is
logical.
this.
The
premises^ of
all
intuitive beliefs.
Some
those
we have
1
concerning our
own
actual subjective
Examination of Hamilton,
p. 151.
i68
A. DE:fe:NCE:
^
OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
[part
II.
states
may
worthy of
facts
our original
exist,
beliefs.'^
if
they
are
to
seemed
to him,
have doubted.
The
when
to
what these
and
it
was on
this
point that
intro-
The former of these consists in rejecting from among the list of apparently original beliefs all
those to which the operation
of the law
of the
ness
or
necessity:
in
accepting these
which they belonged were part of the original furniture of the mind.
If the
philosophic
mainly on
to
be surprising.
For,
question
'^
is
one
chiefly of psychological
P.
1.
51.
P. 172.
P. 178.
P. 157.
P. 173.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
little
&c.
i6g
interest,
and has
direct bearing
on philosophy
properly understood.
fact, I
As a
by which
this
is
am
rather con-
so,
or rather in order to do so
As we have
seen,
may
or rather must be
two kinds
the beliefs
we have
respecting our
own
and the
beliefs, if any,
which
He
we
Are we
I
have
I
Hamilton
the
theory,
is
must be distinguished
statements to which
it
from the
think not.
He
in this
respect of the
common
but as the
fiction
suggested
I70
[part
ii.
by
will
is
not in any
way
it
believe In
The
as
I
reason
why an
authoritative con-
sciousness
is
common
sense
philosophy
is,
is
possible.
if
original beliefs,
and
Now
it
is
we
believe that
ness
tells
us that
these two
of,
as
is
obvious that
what
in point of
and thus
In
to
favour of
as
certain
as
our Immediate
Moreover,
not, according to
is
Mill, consciousness
whose
authority
phrases
may imply
'
sciousness
before
Its
original
its
'
consciousness in
P. 171.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
&c.
171
So
the
we
are to credit
'
independent
all
way
be, enumerated,
he would have
Hamilton says
must
lie
recollected that
common
be admitted,
think, that
am
not illegitimately
if I
venture
what he occasionally
*
calls
'
the
or
*
'
revelations
of consciousness,' or the
genuine
original de-
liverances of consciousness.'
The
let
'
value.
first
confirst
we
call external,
what-
first
consciousness would be
(^.e.y
would,
'
and
indeed there
it,
little
possibility of discrediting
2
as our
.
p^ j^^^
172
[partis
sensations themselves.
now
ascertaining
by
evidence whether
we
and
external
objects
when we
first
to the light.
is
That
in
our
now whenever we
for
no reason
concluding that
was
any
there from
we have
settled the
If
question whether
was brought
in since.
mode can be
pass of possibility
the hypothesis
in,
before
tion
is
we
an original deliverance
Common
From
whole psychological
is
clear, as
may
or of no certainty at
according as
it
has or has
:
i.e,,
production.
this
The
grounds,
however,
on
which
very singular
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
is
&c.
173
doctrine
plain.
Why
are our
Why are we
matters of
this
And
infants are to
into
be credited with
unerring
insight
the
we
gift
?
And
we
;
why
are
we
first
are,
it
appears, on a
much lower
level
laws so
much more
Mr.
all beliefs,
Why
their
these laws
so
much more
we
may
having attained
I
'
the cer-
tainty which
we
call perfect.'^
cannot
P. 152.
174
[part
ii.
which according to him shares his opinion on point, appear willing or able to do so.
this
Now
ation of
let
us turn for a
moment from
the consider-
how we know
in the
first
how we come
know
In their
mode
Mr.
which he belonged.
ing to pyschology
'
he thought,
in adapt-
the
bringing
*
as
residual
modes
not original.'
this
when confined
say.
I
to pyschology,
to
all
am
has
may
is,
appertain to the
'
;
'
known and
but what
I
that though
it
may
give us a
In of
place, the
most
is
by
that
method without
if
arguing
in
circle.
some
P. 173.
""
Ibid.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
still
&c.
175
Other means,
no
belief
shown by
us,
this
method
to
simply because
Grant that
it
original,
be,
'
there would be as
as our sensations
little
possibility of discrediting
'
;
It
themselves
that
It
was
fact
If
be,
tions of a creed.
To
But
Mr.
Mill's hypothetical
baby
no doubt
its
first
impressions
to us
ground of belief
of the
circumstance
value,
consolation.
There seem,
original beliefs.
for
of,
In the
first
place, there
no ground
fitted to
in the
purpose
it
Is
Impossible to
many
pro-
this
theory be
shall,
attaches
In
176
[part
ii.
original
yet that
in
practice
he supposed
mind has of
deny that
it
own
states.
admit the
It
fact,
but
any defence.
relieves him,
no
my
He
be
original,
and therefore
method,
in
true,
simply because
opinion,
the psychological
his
showed
His philosophy of
sound
it
My
complaint
That
he speculatively maintained
most press
but
it
is
worse that
And
here
is
greatly his
superior.
Philosophy, whatever
all
be
its
It
recognised,
fact
in
manner, the
truth
that
we
habitually
;
of scepticism
that
some
them
is
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
&c.
177
The
is
hypothesis of a
in
some way
in-
volved
and which
testimony
any
the difficulty.
To
other hand,
there
it
was a
difficulty to
be solved.
Their psycho^
came
to be believed, they
seem comparatively
If only
indifferent as to the
far,
and why,
it
'
ought
be believed.
they
phenomena,
difficulties
which attach
on which
*
approved methods
must
cussed
finally
depend.
One example
of their easy
when
Causation.
difficulties
A still
remains to be treated of
178
[part
ii.
CHAPTER
Berkeleian Idealism
haps, most quickly
IX.
~
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
is
of
all
speculative theories
and
philosophic enquirer.
who dabble
so
in
themselves
idealists,
existence of matter
is
a thing to be believed
it is
in, it
possible to prove.
The
part
its
extreme
plausibility, in part,
is
commonly
For
it
has to be observed,
is
way
common
It destroys,
no doubt, a
is
belief in substance
a meta:
physical
CHAP.
(-
IX.]
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
life it
179
supposes
I
itself to
leave
untouched.
see with
my
eyes
I
my
hands do
make
The
existence
we deny
is
And
it.' ^
'
in
doing of
no damage done
says
to the rest of
I
mankind,
with
who,
affirm,
confidence,'
(i.e.,
Mr.
Mill,
'that
this
conception
by the common world, apart from philosophical and sometimes from theological,
meaning attached
theories.''^
But though
idealist philosophers
have said
Plain
this,
men have
question
is in
know nor
care anything
and that
in losing
scheme
of the universe.
I
This
is
an opinion which
also share
and
it
is
to Idealism considered
this point of
from
and
There
are, there-
shall
i.
35.
Examination of Hamilton^
p. 227,
i8o
[part
ii.
perception, which
what
our
belief
in
matter,
I
which
is
what
especially
am
we know
and senneither a
own
ideas
latter that
any
belief in the
is
the product
is
There
also
shall
mean
keley's philosophy.
As
Mind
this
it,
and found
sought
for in matter.
is
as
does
in this essay
it
the current of
modern English
on one
side,
shall,
and
shall confine
my
Theory, on what
may be
called
its
The
one, and
if
wish to maintain
:
is
a very simple
this
nor
the
;
discrepancy between
is
the
two merely
and can be
verbal
it
fundamental and
essential,
'
ideas.'
CHAP.
IX.]
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
artifices of
i8i
terminology.
I I
That there
no proof.
is
imagine,
am here
of
speaking) assumes
Independent
existence
matter
this
independent existence
undoubtedly therefore
;
the question
we have
to determine
whether under
or
Is
is
not a real
Now we
must beware of
it is
this question
be mixed up
namely, whether
Idealism
is
or
If
is
we admit the legitimacy of the Ideal psychology if we admit that objects as perceived may be resolved
into ideas or sensations, there
last
is
no doubt that
this
That
we may suppose
we should
either see,
and Idealism.
'
for
clares,^
moves or
to wit,
no,
amounts
no more than
this
58.
i82
[part
ii.
"
we were
placed
we
move/'
'
&c.,
much more than this. It tells us not only what we should perceive if we were rightly circumstanced to perceive it, but also how it comes about that we should perceive that particular
does
thing and no other, and what
it is
that
or not.
It tells
and
elements of which
it
is
subtle to be
cases, to
some
it
be represented
In short,
composed
figured,
of that
inert, senseless,
extended,
solid,
to be a contradiction in terms,
infinite
number
of other
our perception of
itself.
If this
be not
asserts
the
existence of no
Principles of Human
K7tow ledge,
67.
CHAP.
IX.]
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
183
But
if
(which
unconvinced on
him
try to state
withThe
mind
*
whom
Berkeley
think, leave
is
no doubt on
his
right
when he
'
declares that
if
(for
Evolution
we may
remarks
in the
read Science)
'
is
a dream.*
Perhaps
I
It
will
be objected that
In these
form
which Berkeley
It
left it
and that
have not
I
done
justice to
even
all
in this
shape, since
have
omitted to consider
though
Its
It
has received
attention subsequently,
I
am
Is
some
force
In these criticisms,
and
of the system
Is
harmony
his
'
regarded
the
*
scientific
hypothesis
'
of
own
to
day
the
corpuscular philosophy
and
the me-
chanical
principles
which
have
been
Mr.
applied
with
to
a very lukewarm
Mill,
above
things
the
philosopher
of
who men of
science,
Principles of Hjiman
Knowledge
50.
84
[part
il-
case
more agreeable
to ordinary science
than that
At
first
sight there
in his
language, for
for
matten
The
external
world which
is
dealt with
by natural science
consisted, according to
to
Berkeley, in ideas.
sists
According
Mr. Mill
it
con-
sation.^
An
;
object
when
it
is
perceived
may be may
an object when
it is
not perceived
possibilities of sensation
What
sensations
mean
is
them
perif
be legitimate or not
sensation
?
possibilities of
And
in
manent
same sense
in
which positive
But
is
this surely is
till
an entire delusion.
actuality.
A
It
possibiHty
nothing
it
becomes an
will be something, or
possibility of
it
But there
this phrase.
*
no
reality in
nature corre-
sponding to
Examination of Hamilton^
CHAP.
IX.
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
;
185
or not be
is not.
and
if it is
only a possibility,
it
certainly
possibilities is
not exist at
it
is
a verbal
fiction,
and cannot
name.
Mill, unfortu*
only
know from
Examitaken,
per-
is
states
the difficulty in
terms
'
:
Your
manent
are not
long as they
nothing actual.
them,
'
taking place in
our consciousness
^
;
and
is
something outside
consciousness
be possible,
science, as
we know
meet
this
'
it,
cannot
?
exist.
How
refers
does
'
Mr.
Mill
objection
to
He
is
his
what
said on the
I
am may be most
what Mr.
his answer.
Mill
'
If
body altogether
is
is
only conceived
as a
power of exciting
one
or,
two
Examination of Hamilton,
p. 251, note.
i86
[part
ix.
make
the
of possi-
Undoubtedly
it
easy to understand
is
this, if
first
by
possibility of sen-
sation
meant
But
(as
the
to
extract
sation.
idealist,
would seem
if
he was not an
but a
He
producing sensations
manent
possibilities of sensation
if
distinguished,
by very subtle
substances
of
certain metaphysicians.
we must suppose
and that
the
'
that
he adopted
this realistic
theory
;
ordinary
'
moments he conceived
possibility
it
that
permanence of a
might
satisfy the
was a permanence,
it
was only
little
Let us look a
more
If
we
a barrel of gunpowder
conditions of an explo-
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
CHAP.
IX.
187
may
at
any moment
be supplied.
It
is
permanent
sensation
same sense
as equivalent, that
to a set of
permanent causes of
But though
Scieruce
teaching
not of the
If
conditions
we
strictly in
we
*
permanent
possibility'
sensation.
For any
which can
in
terms of
is
an equivalent meaning
p. 246.
Examinatio7i of Hamiltoji,
i88
[part u.
in
Here
I
is
a proposition which
:
may The
'
am
looking produces in
me
and shape.'
Stated
would run
duce
this proposition
'
The group
known
as a candle pro-
me
Now
is,
the
like
candle,
which
by two elements
effect
viz.
sensations
of these
not.
and
possibilities of sensation.
Are both
?
necessary
to
produce the
zs
Certainly
One
of them
the
effect.
The
sensations which
What
namely, the
and
to be in
possibilities of sensa-
But the
not in
my consciousness,
we
anybody
else's either.
we
my sensation of
something
out
of,
This
that
^
may be
it is
not Idealism.
I
On
the contrary,
a kind
Of course
am
spch an expression as
not responsible for the psychology which renders sensation of shape ' permissible.
'
CHAP.
IX.
}^
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
Realism
(as
189
of Transfigured
say), of
For we might
would
it
is
sensations
conall
He
way become
clearly
Now
it
would
be erroneous
which constitute
were permanent
hypothesis
actualities)
;
by
the
converted into
and
would
clearly
and
it
would be
any
I
What
am
unable to imagine.
result
:
So
that
we come
to this final
that
if
we
what are
in
commonly thought
the
first place,
to be- such,
it
on mind, we can,
only express
in
terms of possibilities
of sensation
tion
;
by
and
in the
second place
if,
as
we have
a perfect
right to do,
all
we
converted into
we cannot
express the
all.
190
[part
ii.
But,' the
*
say,
expected.
proposition
tion
The
are
absurd,
to start with.'
;
Extremely
but not at
all
absurd
absurd,
admit,
if
Idealism be true
so.
Science be
And
that
is
be allowed
employ propositions of
this kind,
action of
would
identify
it
with
and
make
would
identify the
x
all
any
rate,
Scientific doctrine.
logical school
how they
the x,
we
can
They
and
we
we
CHAP.
IX.]
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
191
most vehement
'But how,'
it
realist
need
desire.
*
may be asked,
if
there
is this
radical
that so
many
first,
upon the
fact
How
a
do you account
that
go no
further) ever
detected
difficulty which,
?
'
if it
exists
at
all,
is
I
sufficiently obvious
One
was
was
of
remote
conclusions
The
sort of objection
who thought
that
and so much of
pends on a gross misconception, that the grain of truth which lies hid in it is easily overlooked.
I
which,
the case
of
Berkeley, go far
towards
deal.
The
first
is,
192
[part
ii.
actual, science of
phenomena, by
In Mr. Mill's
His scienwhile
it
faith
is
ever
its
all
all
our sensations.
Mr.
Mill,
to himself.
As
this
particular
in the
interest
he took
examination into
its
Thus
world
is
showing how a
into existence.
it-
against
mean
must
exist in
CHAP.
IX.]
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
Because
it
193
name.
is
allowable to speak of a
'
per-
manent
possibility,'
permanent,
or, as I
That
this is not so
therefore, only
who
which
is
itself.
shall
examine, so far
is
necessary for
my
a thinker,
who though
I
in
a popular discourse he
is
with which
am
little
in his teaching.
194
[part
ii.
UNIVERSITY
CHAPTER
X.
of belief, like
intimately
bound up
view to
and seems
of,
the proof
For
It
separately,
reserving
till
may. be suggested by the use he has put it supporting the doctrine of what he calls, not
propriately,
'
inap-
Transfigured Realism.'
we have
his
seen, accepts
on
t^ie
authority of Conscious-
Mr.
Mill
again
expresses
readiness to
to
shown
'
have been
until
in
though
own
states
and
In
truly
an empiricist.
It
But Mr.
should be understood
ii.
p. 407, note.
CHAP. X.]
195
an empiricist
the word
;
any but an
esoteric signification of
since even
for facts
given
in
experience
recognised.
whose negative
is
is
inconceivable.^
;
Such, in
one sentence,
but the
capable of
to
interpretation,
and points
*
more
Inconceiv-
begin with,
is
commonly, though
in
in
my opinion
two quite
distinct senses.
may mean
either that
in the first
rightly,
or improper sense
and,
it
if I
understand him
he habitually uses
in the
is
somewhat important,
is
must be
opinion
based.
is
An
inconceivable proposition
one of which
that
relation
^
between them.'
*
It
one of which
the
same
And
as an example,
ii.
'
p. 392.
-^
Ibid. p. 407.
Ibid.
196
[part
ii.
consciousness as
third
becoming equal
side,
in
destroyed.'
easily
perfectly clear
he means that
in the
it
cannot be imagined or
'
re'
presented
is
mind
imagine
this connection.^
On
never
hesitates to use
and unthink'
able' as
synonymes so
;
that, if
interpret
him
rightly,
'unthinkable'
usage.
Again,
he quotes,
as
if
he thought
in
is
certain,
appre-
to
have been,
incre-
The difficulty can scarcely have been to dible. represent men standing head downwards, though it might have been to believe that, when so standing,
they would not
*
fall
off.^
Fortnightly Review,
p. 544.
* *
Principles of Psychology, vol. ii. p. 409. Mr. Mill is not fortunate in his language on this point
am
CHAP.
X.]
igf
word inconceivable
'
is
all
his
explanations, perfectly
less
unambiguous
but neverthe-
we may
refers
is
him
to
some mental
incapacity which
belief,
(he
asserts)
not an incapacity of
and with a
it is
an incapacity of
After
doctrine
this
explanation,
let
us
return
it
to
will
the
states,
be
Now,
its
be accepted, or
is
it
in fact
no others
It will
Is
it
a reason, or
is
it
merely a mark
If
he
selects the
all
to
examine
the
whether
is
it
is
inconceivable.
But even
I
if
the
appre-
hend
it
would
in
no way tend
to invalidate the
his creed rests
;
grounds
it
would
198
[part
ii.
described.
alternative,
first
and means
bility of their
is
to
be given
can be
beliefs
shown
that this
in
reality
far
no reason, the
he
is
themselves must,
so
as
concerned,
be
ob-
having
There
Spencer,
are,
think,
in
especially
version
of his
to
moment
Nevertheless,
shall
first
it
is
ultimate
an argument at
opposite
is
all.
thought to
its
absence
which asserted
fore,
its
universal presence.
and
fact
of
secondary philosophic
interest!
We
the
first
tions
may
serve to
indicate,
undoubtedly
fits
'
in
To
'
CHAP.
X.]
199
assert,'
he
says,
'
at the
same time
to assert
we
Again, ^
the
How
do we know that
to
is
?
impossible for
same thing
be and not to be
impossibility
?
What
same
is
our
criterion
of this
Can
this
Sir William
incon-
Here,
will
application
would
seem
on which
all
propositions,
to
commonly thought
accepted.
be necessary, are
be
This mental
thinking,
is
act,
for
;
will
in
ing in
'
this operation
cannot be performed
persist
in
if
the states of
spite of our
consciousness
efforts
cohering,
then,
in
to
disunite
them,
according to
Mr.
Spencer,
^
we have
'"'
italics
my
own.
p. 344.
Page
425.
Fortnightly Review,
200
[part
ii.
it is
nature,
but
we have we
also
are,
the
it
highest
possible
is
be
so,
satisfactory philosophy
seem
small.
In what possible
it
way can
a psychological fact
'
whether
first
consists in
attempting to
or in anything else
some other
a warrant
fact,
unless
we
of
propositions
?
which
should
Why
world
?
we assume
the
'
this
'
harmony between
'
subjective
and the
objective
Grant
either
some
theological postulate,
or
some law of
it
inherited aptitudes,
be surprising
they
first
obtain
it.
Nor
*
is
this
all.
Not only
for holding
consciousness
no
'
logical justification
a
in
belief, but,
principles, a belief
'
logical
justification' itself
We
is
^
to believe that
to
'
it
be and not to
be,'
how do we know
2
that
we
Psychology,
p. 425.
j^j^j
CHAP. X.]
201
Is this a
?
beHef which
is^
not
If
it
then the
we cannot
;
conceive that
we can
all
its
and as
this belief
and
we
are
committed
hand,
I
to
an
infinite
regress.
If,
on the other
it is
desire to
belief that
'
it is
'
impossible
?
for the
I
same thing
and not
it
to
be
requires one
I
am
I
is
impossible, as
;
that
cannot conceive
it
*
to
be possible
and
'
if I
am am
logical justification
I
for the
I
second of these
beliefs,
see no reason
for the
first.
why
should
On
principle,
indeed,
the
we cannot
can serve as a
final
ground of
certainty,
we
knowledge.
Only,
is
it
appears,
when
the proposition
whose opposite
must be
true.
undecomposable,^ can
we
it
So that before applying his postulate that things which to the proof of some axiom (say are equal to the same thing are equal to one an'
other
this
'
'^)
we have
is
position
we
410.
Ibid. p. 411.
202
[part
ii.
ceive
opposite.
is
set at rest
for
it
my mind
own
men have
These
capacity
'
objections,
will
describes as an
of a proposition.
Though
that,
there
is,
as
before hinted,
some
obscurity
hanging over
this point,
there can be
is,
little
doubt
at all events,
the incapacity
as has been
doubtful
it
is
whether Mr.
to
be
this
it
and
at the
from which
ought carelanguage
to
be distinguished.
Much
of his
of,
or
same
thing,
He
'
An
abortive effort
shows that
Psychology,
p. 425.
Italics are
my
own.
CHAP,
xj
203
we
dis-
and the
we are compelled
incredibility
And
in-
between
conceivability
and
he seems to suggest
strange psychological
is
doctrine
thus
adumany
brated
justified
really
Mr.
Spencer's,
he
is
no doubt
in asserting that
is
inconceivable
is
unimaginable, but
is
and
in
at the
same
time, that
which
absolutely
and
In truth,
which
logy.
(if it
be
on
his psycho-
The
it
statement that
we
may
it,
;
carry with
we must
believe
but
altogether
fail
how
it
we
ought to believe
it
it.
is
axiom
it is
possible to try to
it
Page 408.
204
[part
ii.'
asserts.
doubt,
for
example, whether
we can
and not
be,
and not
filled
by an
this
But however
may
be,
it
is
may
constitute a
'
'
psychological
'
cannot give a
contradictory
logical justification
for
believing
its
and that
if it
be once
commonly thought
to be selfI
we should
require, as
pointed
at
all.
means un-
imaginable, unrepresentable
there
is
such a word),
relation
to the
Under no circumis
inconceivable
by me, be
ing
it.
to
me
that
The moment he
^
asserts
anything
the
Page
407.
CHAP, x.]
205
moment he even gives a reason for his denial, he may be stopped by demanding his warrant. Against therefore " may be because," and every every entered a demurrer, until he has said why this
''
''
proposition
is
to
ter-proposition.
So
towards justifying his scepticism respecting the Universal Postulate without, in the very act, confessing
his acceptance of it'
^
The may
it is
confusion
underlying
these remarks
;
has
if
I
and
this portion of
He seems
it
between founding a
order to demonstrate
upon nothing
puts
at all
and
in
of refuting a
'
theory
'
which he
nothing
Pure Empiricism
which
tacitly
may be
a Philosophy in which
is
proved.'^
Whether
I
this singular
do not know
but
if it
has,
Mr. Spencer
may be
its
allowed
;
absurdity
we must choose
nor can
Page
391.
I
between a philosophy of
the
Page
427,
''^
2o6
[part
ii.
least
Metaphysicians
'
(who
come
in for so
many hard
General
it
convenient to
give
my
idea of
'
Meta-
validity
this
We
must suppose
make some
positive
statement
say
that
Instantly^ Mr.
Spencer demands
his
and
which no proof
is
required.
Mr.
position
Spencer.
is
Still
this pro-
to
proposition.^
Metaphysician.
Perhaps,
Certainly.
2
if
that
is
your opinion,
version
you
will
me your own
of this reason.
Mr.
1
Spencer.
337.
Page
Page 427.
ibid.
CHAP. X.]
207
must
a proposp((^'^
tion of
which
Metaphysician.
that
tion
Then
in
fact
in all cases
^
believing
it ?
Mr.
Spencer.
Well, not
^
exactly.
'
It is sufficient
Metaphysician.
that
all
Then
posable,
true
;
either
be or not be
'
is
such a proposition.
That my opinion. Metaphysician. Without disputing your major premiss which, however, by no means commends am curious to know how you to my mind
Mr.
is
itself
we
are
has
{2)
a negation which
Spencer.
is
inconceivable
first
.'*
Mr.
^I
arrive at the
conclusion^
by
I
itself;
Metaphysician.
feel
more
certainty
accuracy with
I
Page
407.
Page 410.
Pages 394-399.
2o8
[part
ii.
which you
indeed,
I
informed
feel
me
warrant was
required
do not
nearly so much.
Doubtless,
some warrant
for
your opinions
precisely
on these points
it is ?
me
what
shall
it
not continue
is
the
imaginary dialogue,
because
he
will
have no
I
blank
clear
for himself
why
it is
the Universal
my
opinion,
:
and
it
how far
If
his particular
professedly founded on
that be discre-
tenable
This
shall
do
in the
next chapter.
CHAP.
XI.]
209
CHAPTER
I
XI.
HAVE been
In
ought or ought
It
any
criticism
on Mr. Spencer's
gained some
Proof of Realism.
My
have
among English
thinkers,
and
;
to criticise
their
but
though,
is
am
the
first
of the
above confol-
having obtained
any philosophic
metaphysics
lowing.
'
have
commanded much
is
accepted in
its
main outline by
so
many
of general speculation,
Is
importance
may, therefore, be
2IO
[part
ii.
hardly as effective as
it.
more
clearly perhaps
whom
if
he
is
nearly
is
Should the
be
right,'
^
he says,
'
dream.'
cer
had written
think) five
volumes of
'
Philo-
sophy,' which,
the doctrine
of Evolution be a
it
dream, can be
clear that
little
is
he
is
penalties to prove
wrong.
Accordingly, he gives a
some
nine-
favourite
expect,
method of arrangement
into a
will
be prepared to
into
ment (subdivided
more abstruse
Psychology^ vol.
ii.
p. 311.
"^
Ibid. 367.
CHAP. XL]
21
It is
a discussion
in all
The most
them
this, it will
In the
first
place,
we do not
if
directly perexists.
'
such a thing
What we
are conscious
of,'
as
down
weight and
resis-
are but
subjective
affections
produced by
this
permanent
in
possession of
it.
And
subjec
which
it
produces.
to a certain
The thing to be proved being thus extent made clear, let us proceed to the
In doing so
^
proof.
p.
493.
P 2
212
[part
ii.
the
first
four
chapters
My justification
for
doing this
is
of these chapters
is
I
merely to foreshadow
shall
the suc-
ceeding arguments,
to his case
by taking such a
While
my motive
for doing
it is
his
views of other
people's views.
consist in
thinkers
whom
to
'
ing
up
of
name
Metaphysicians
Is,
and though
my
private
conviction
would make
still,
as
am
discussion,
and as
am
in
no way concerned
to the
in
to de-
be to proceed at once
Chapter V.
Is
Priority,'
'
In the history
Realism
1
is
only after
i^j^ p ^74.
it
has
Psychology, vol.
p. 367.
CHAP.
XI.]
213
become
upon the
Realistic
one
and
one
is
taken away.'
With regard
*
to the
converse
which
will
'
rise
he distinctly denies
is
it.'
If the
metaphysical reader
it will, I
cer's
some form of
it
Realism
kind
'
is
relevant,
true.
who supposed
illustrations,
that
the
whom
were either
own
Nor
is
it
easy to
see
Realism
is
nearly as far
it
Realism as
Spencer,^
'
is
from Idealism.
But,'
says
Mr.
And
the
^
p. 369.
Ibid. p. 374.
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
[part
214
ii.
Independent) objects.
if
For
true,
would un-
must
is
to
be regarded as such.
and that
in
the absence of
all
creatures
When
his
make
him understand
this truth
which
is
so clear to you.
bell are
commuthem
waves or pulses
strike the
membrane
It
to vibrate
movetheir
movements vary
him about
air,
in
And now
bell,
ask yourself,
?
What
When
?
you speak
If
to
him of the
of the
so
of the me-
mean
many
of his Ideas
you
do,
you
fall
By
the
bell,
the
air,
the
so
many
objective existences
CHAP. XL]
215
no
possibility can
you present
to
him
this hypothesis,
that
exists in him,
In
and not
with
common
By
no possibility can
sensations,
that he
without supposing
him
this extract,
and especially
I
from the
italics,
which
have put
in
sets to
work
ries,
to
we know
only our
own
sensations,
by showing
of objects In space
by showing,
its
sound
Is
subjective, because
objective cause
is
vibrations,
different
Idealist
any
argued
in this
way,
his
tainly exhibit
a scarcely
an individual, and
representative.
if
he
^
exists,
he certainly
is
not
It Is
true that
many
Idealists
for
example, Mr.
J. S.
Mill
-have
held, in
my
opinion
Psychology
vol.
ii.
p. 374.
Essay.
2i6
[part
ii.
those theories, and whatever be their errors, are certainly not guilty of
' *
unimaginable blindness.'
Priority
'
may
therefore
which
is
consists,
one
is
not true.
It is
and natural
belief of
mankind
is realistic
it is
not
volves Realism.
Chap. VI I. ^ contains
plicity,'
'
which
is
shortly this
Since
the proof of
Realism contains
of Idealism,
it
I
is
much fewer steps than the proof therefore much less likely to be
erroneous.
of reasoning
shall reserve
my remarks
on
this piece
till
we
where
it
is
and
shall
as
to
proofs
be com-
other
'
position of Realism
Is
presented
In vivid terms,
and
each of the
1
many
Psychology, vol.
Ibid. p. 379.
p. 375.
2 4
j^j^j
p ^yj^
Ibid. p. 380.
CHAP.
XI.]
217
ticism
is
is
'
Realism
to
be preferred.
that
the propositions
faintly represented
absurd
it
as this
when crudely
stated,
and
ill
as
fits
in
be accepted
in proportion to the
I
shall content
What,
which
is
then,
is
'
In glancing
Realism,
through
Mr. Spencer's
defence
of
we
come
across a large
highly abstract
He
proof of the existence of the object explanation of the nature of the object none of which can be
omitted without depriving
essential
his
doctrine
of
some
'^
element.
Are
terms
The
is
Here
sets
it
is
put before
These several
is
absolutely inde-
Psychology, vol.
ii.
p. 450.
2i8
[part
ii.
pendent of consciousness
if
fixed in the
midst of changing
indepen-
And
the conception
we
have of
called
matter.'
this
If
ideas
up by
on another occa-
kind.'
The
and
real
truth
is
that,
all
idealists
and defence of
their
are
tity
it
by the opinions of
The quansupport of
in
I
Realism should
his
which
are, in fact, as
shall
The
have been
mode
Psychology^
vol.
ii.
p. 327.
CHAP. XL]
219
both sides
make
(as
on which
belief
and
is,
all
His view
that
conclusion
'
fewest times
I
is
and though
shall for
will
ment which
This argument
piece of reasoning
is
is,
Every
more
proportion to
it is
length.
the
likelihood
some
point in
its
course.
in
argument,
is
if
sound,
can be used
will
favour of Realism
a question which
present
I
be discussed immediately.
At
am
conIt
itself
may be admitted
in
it is
at
true.
It is
undoubtedly the
is
fact that of
any
To
whom
does
it
occur to
know no
So
far as
I
other difference
between two
between
lines of
?
their lengths
two
classes of people
to those
220
[part
ii.
the matter,
history
who
and
to those
the subject,
solid,
worthy of deference.
who
are likely to
are those
who
stupid to
make
These are
not,
whom
but
it is
clear that
only in relation
them
two argu-
of
is,
all
To
all
other people
to
all,
that
worth of the
the
most be only
based
itself
the soundest
To
test of
that,
would seem
2
to
be
Psycholos^yy vol.
ii.
p. 434.
Ibid.
CHAP
XI.]
22r
even
by the
shortest route
to be accepted
a somewhat extrare-
garded as giving
more trustworthy
to
results
than
The
other
opinion
seems
be
that,
though,
things
there of one
of
them being
false
may be
It
indefinitely diminished
by repeated examinations.
in those cases
may be
practically neglected
where
And
this
opinion,
take
it,
one
In itself,
but
is
that which
sanctioned by the
Chapter
general
'
XI 1 1,
contains
established In the
preceding
chapter
to
the
particular
controversy
As, however,
the
'
we
'
test
is
nearly
worthless,
how
far, if
would
tell
;
in
ticular
opinions
not that
It
affords a convenient
222
[part
ii.
will begin, as
realistic
:
'
argu-
ment.
Here^
is
his
own
version of
it
Let him
mstance.
He finds
that he
is
conscious
from
himself.
Does
Not
at all
so
is
Does he perceive
is
conscious of
an image of the
as he refuses
feels
book?
Not
So long
any hypothesis, he
objective
of an
lastly,
and not of a
He
a single indivisible
And,
he
feels that,
do what he
he cannot reverse
this act
he cannot conceive
and feels
as
an external
It
reality
possesses the
Universal Postulate
and
it
assumes the
is
immediately
fol-
Psychology,
vol.
ii.
p.
437
(italics
my
own).
CHAP. XI.]
223
that
we
How
I
this is
to
state-
ment
have
italicised
looking at a book
we
;
are conscious of
as existing
it
how,
in
other words,
can be
do not pretend
slip
:
to say.
I
Possibly
the expression
objections of
I
is
in
any
case,
pass on to
more importance.
first place,
if it
argument above
Spencer thinks
second
even
is
proved
that Mr.
it
proves,
contend,
place,
that the
rests
psychological facts
are,
when properly
And
is,
the argument
subit
is
own
theory of
Transfigured Realism.
What
argument
terms.
'
is
?
it
in
the clearest
While
as an external
= independent)
imme-
so certain and so
224
[part
if-
impotent to shake
it.
But
it,
surely
it
is
If
the
volume
single
some other
to
be looking at
is
it is
mate doubt
So
very
modest a contribution to the Cosmos postulated by Science, Is scarcely sufficient by itself to assure us
that Evolution
this objection,
may
not, after
all,
be 'a dream.'
On
independ-
do not dwell.
second objection to Mr. Spencer's
is,
My
realistic
argument
that he assumes in
It
conclusion can be reached only by either ignoring or doctoring (so to speak) the facts given in percep.*
'
tion
a misconception which
think has
external.
Its
root in
word
self,
In this
connection external
may mean
of)
external to
(=
inde-
pendent
ternal to
is
of) the
perceiving
or
it
may mean
exIt
(= outside
the second, that the sceptic and idealist doubt and deny respectively the existence of an external world
;
but
if
we
are rigidly
to interpret
Mr.
Spencer's
CHAP.
XI.]
225
man
'
cannot con-
ceive that
where he
sees
it
and
nothing!
Idealism,
Nor
that
is
of
he should conceive
feels the
Of
course
;
book there
idealist
is
something
there
this
that,
is
the book.
The
when he does
it is
not
there,,
from
that
I
portion of space.
No
infinite
empty except
to
this,
which happen
if
each
moment
be perceived.
is
But
they do not
maintain
what
them, that
we
we
see
and
feel
a book there
third
is,
nothing
to
My
objection
that
Mr. Spencers
of
refuting
realistic
'
argument
the
mode
meta-
physicians,' for
which
in this chapter
and elsewhere
Like the
he shows a marked
himself as
*
it
is
'
common
call
sense
assumes that
of consciousness (as he
would
I
it),
carries
with
it
some
really
common
sense
'
which he
226
[part
ii.
much
of what he calls
Anti- Realism.'
Throughout the
whole of the Negative Justification of Realism we are allowed to suppose that the errors of metaphysicians are
beliefs
it
aberrations
artificial
produced by
till
and
we come to the Positive Justification of Realism that we discover how different are the
is
not
beliefs
these last
ultimately described
constituting
life,'
*
contempt-
uously
*
if
as
'
a crude realism,'
the
realism of
common
child
and the
rustic'
A
when
striking
example of the
facility
with which
happens
the chapter
we
are considering.
His object
for the
moment
I
is
established.
selects, as
comparison he
a specimen of
I
reasoning,
the
argument
the
quoted above.
*
It
'
would be easy
which
2
in the
interest of the
first
1
metaphysician
to take exception to
of these selections,
ii.
Mr.
jbj^j^ p^
Spencer
^^^^
Psychology, vol.
p. 497.
CHAP. XL]
227
justifies
Realism
of
all
the
but what
wish
more
on now
is
the impropriety
by means of one
His
we know
is
that ^
'
down
to
weight and
produced
in
knowable.'
This,
take
:
it
is
but
it is
man, or of the
whom
at a
realistic
at
some
say the
'
'Psychology'
with
saw)
^
an unbiassed mind.
feels that the
This percontent of
as
sonage
his
(as
we
sole
consciousness
is
the
book considered
reality.'
an
external
(= independent)
is
And
the corre-
sponding belief
has
*
one,
we
the highest
is,
validity possible.'
Now
*
the ex-
ternal reality
and
unknowable' 'a
told,^
mode
all
of being,'
'
unknown as we are
elsewhere
represented to us by
an indefinable
consciousness.'
Putting
Psychology, p. 441.
Ibid. p. 437.
228
[part.
ii.
gether,
unconscious of any
of the properties of matter, and has, as the sole content of his consciousness, an Indefinable conscious-
This
result
;
Is
not a very
It Is
satisfactory
or Instructive
but
who
is
tries to
and natural
beliefs as
when he
all
attempting to establish
To my mind
(whatever these
is
may
be)
as reasonable
world as
it
would be
would be
Freedom
all It
But however
may
is
be,
whether the
applied
must
reject
It will
not do
to
Idealism because
is
to say
mankind
pre-
are sound
convictions of
pared to endorse opinions which are not only unfitted to sustain criticism
but which
CHAP.
XI.]
229
our
judgments are
sufficient to
prove that an
independent object
exists,
they
are sufficient to
prove that
particular
it
is
coloured,
extended,
and with a
texture.
If
weight, configuration,
and
physical science
to
be
believed
perties of matter
Mr. Spencer
'sub-
judgments of
the weight
it
might
otherwise possess.^
* An objection substantially the same as that given in the text has been urged by Mr. H. Sidgwick in the Academy^ and Mr. Spencer has replied to it in an article afterwards re-published in the third volume of his Essays.^ His reply, which he does not, I think, seem to be quite pleased with himself, need not detain us long. It turns essentially on a distinction between the Primordial Judgment, as he calls it,^ of Crude Realism, which informs us that an object exists, and the ^M^r Judgments of Crude Realism which (as he cannot deny) tell us that it is coloured, and so forth. The first we are to believe in, whatever arguments may be brought against it, but not the second. Now on what is this distinction founded He does not formally tell us, but he gives us to understand, by his examples, that it is founded on the fact, that the judgments of the second class are, while the 'Primordial' judgment of the first class is not, capable of an 'interpretation which equally
.''
it
avoids
all
the
diffi-
myself with stating one of the objections to which this doctrine seems open which, if it remains unanswered, will, however, be sufficient. Mr. Spencer admits that, according to the immediate deliverance .of Crude Realism, the external reality has the properties of matter ; but we know that according to him the properties of matter, even down to weight and resistance, are but subjective affections.' * Crude Realism is, therefore, wrong but though wrong, it arrives at its
will content
:
'
Psychology,
Ibid. p. 284.
vol.
ii.
p.
282-286.
"^
Ibid. p. 286.
Ibid. p. 493.
i30
[part
il.
not
indeed
all
that might be
said,
but all
that need
be said
in
answer to the
negative justification
of Realism.
With Chapter
XIV. begins
case.
not,
however,
opinion by a single step. Mr. Spencer shows that it is wrong by a process of ' interpretation,' which is nothing else than an explanation of the usual physical theories of the origin of sensation,^ and which is
to
and complicated argument. How is this be reconciled with that theory according to which results are trustworthy according as they are arrived at by the shortest trains of
therefore an extremely long
reasoning
truth
is,
What becomes
of
'
'
?
'
The
and
think
Primordial
I
perfectly arbitrary, as
he
will
himself see,
if
he
tries to
show reason
of his * General have added, or substituted, are put in italics. The reader looking at a book finds that he is conscious of the book as a coloured extended object apart from himself. Does there enter into his consciousness any notion about sensation ? No Does he perceive that the thing he is conscious of is an image of the book 1 Not at all So long as he refuses to translate facts into any hypothesis, he feels simply conscious of coloured and extended object^ and not of an impression of a coloured and extended object. .... He feels that this recognition of the book as an external coloured and extended reality is a single indivisible act And, lastly, he feels that do what he will, he cannot reverse this act. .... Hence, while he continues looking at the book, his belief in it
XHIth Chapter
I
Analysis
'
The words
'
and extended reality possesses the highest possible has the direct guarantee of the Universal Postulate and it assumes the Universal Postulate only once.' This argument is not, as I have shown, a particularly good one but it is quite as good when devoted to proving that colour and extension (which are both, on Mr. Spencer's theory, subjective affections) are objective realities, as it is when used, as Mr. Spencer uses it, to prove that an object with (I presume) no knowable qualities, has an independent existence.
as a coloured
It
validity.
See Essays,
vol.
iii.
p. 286.
CHAP, xi.j
251
detain us long.
manner
;
in
will
be
show
its
we
find,
that
segregate
into
held together by
it.
some
The
whole
consciousness,
moulding
is
is
and
dis-
Ego
the
the indefind
states.
And we
There are
difficulties in
make
ciples of
continuity
is
'
and there
also
much
p. 487.
arrived
at.'^
But,
Psychology, vol.
Cf. Articles
ii.
1877,
March
1878.
^32
[part
ii.
in truth, the
Psychology, be
it
good or
that the
if
be
it
bad,
is
irrelevant,
own
*
principles.
It is true
'
absolute validity
it
of Realism
will
be shown
we
find
to
by which
he means,
in
Realism
is
universally
But
this,
which
is
persistent error
on Psychology, does
sent Mr. Spencer's
real
fact
understand
it,
repre-
more
deliberate opinion.
'
The
'
mysterious
which
to
out of consciousness,'
it
:
that he
is
obliged
think
therefore
voted
is
obliged to think
it
discuss a question
With regard
last chapter,
It
is
which even
from
his
own
is
interest whatever.
itself, it
'warrant'
at
the
some length
in the
be said about
of the negation
here.
in
the
inconceivability
W
A
'
There
is
feel
in/
Psychology^ vol.
p. 445.
ibid. p. 452.
CHAP.
XI.]
233
clined to touch
final
stage of
the discussion.
inform those
who
do believe
It
it
that
it
'
can-
would be interesting
in
know how
'
far
he can
*
realise
thought the
mysterious
is
it
fact
of
a consciousness of something
?
'
which
people
it,
To
:
ordinary
might be open
to say
realise
but no such
reply
seems possible
to
Mr. Spencer.
He
is
of
opinion that
we
Now
mode
which
of being sepain
rate
my
I
conscious
states,'
one proposition
'
in
understand
it
him
to believe.
is
realised
in
another.
If
its
first
proposition
without
being realised in
must be abandoned.
says he does believe
it is
If
he cannot believe
when he
thought.
1
or he
is
he supposes that
He
would seem
vol.
ii.
be
in the
2
unfortunate
^jj^ jj
Psychologyy
p. 445.
j^j^j
234
[part
ii.
knowledge
in
which
is
That he
we know
the
Unknowable,
successfully,
ciples}
admit
for
to get over
them
First Prin-
as
'
nascent
and
is
'
raw material of
holding these
thought.'
My
complaint
it
that,
opinions, he considers
to
a sufficient answer to
its
make
terms
to-
any
belief of
'
cannot be
realised in thought,' or
'
;
be joined
gether in consciousness
know, any
truly
more
us
be
world,
*
which
Mr.
Spencer assures
have the
We
last,
now come,
more
is.
in
to a
precise account of
what
is
this external
world really
As
the reader
in the
;
already aware,
that
it
first
place,
in
is
unknown and
to
unknowable
and,
the
second
place, notwithstanding
assume that
it
varies in
1
some determinate
Cf. especially, ch. iv.
to the
ii.
known
Cf. ch.
483.
CHAP.
XI.]
235
and knowable.
diately
The
itself
question,
therefore,
to
immehave
suggests
Mill^
how
we come
calls this
what Mr.
somewhere
prodigious
amount of knowledge respecting the Unknowable ? Grant what Mr. Spencer asks and admit that a
independent Universe
for
is
it
valid
is
what grounds
?
have we
supposing that
and
no other
vary at
Why
should
?
it
vary
in
a determinate
it
relation to
phenomena
Why,
will
I
indeed, should
all ?
be inclined to say
that, as
do not know)
on the
Developed
the the
*
Object,
we have
principle of con-
states of consciousness.'
is,
I
principle of continuity
in
varies
itself,
must
'
it
tinuity
to
form
'
into a
whole
'
Furthermore,
?
does
re-
Cf.
e.
g. p. 487.
Psychology, vol.
ii.
487.
236
[part
ii.
reflection
In this
Are we
to
?
regard the
If so,
it
parallel as
particular
accurate
in
Principles
of
Continuity,'
and denies
it
in
the
other.
how
that which
is
neither in
Space nor
Time can be
effects
which are
it,
Time
(it is
as
we
know
in
are
stated
conceptions produced in
Since, there-
us
fore,
is
we
Unknowable
in
Time,
how
we
can imagine
as capable of
change
change
in rela-
us,
except
Time.
after
all,
not identical
Let
seven
a
some simple
scientific pro-
e.g.,
hundred
billions of times
*
a second produce
165.
in us
Page
CHAP.
XI.]
237
in this
connecas
The
it.
particles
it
causes must,
or out of
in
it,
is
plain,
it is
be either
in
consciousness
And
the
faint ag-
in
which condition
As
whence
of
it is
modes
yond consciousness.
first
If
of these alternatives,
desire to
know why he
chooses to describe that which exists beyond consciousness as the unknowable, seeing that most of
we
desire to
know
what proof he can supply of the existence of such a knowable beyond consciousness at all.
difficulty
in
another form.
is
to
have proved
the exis-
tence of matter, which shall be independent of perception and sensation, shall produce perception and
sensation,
solidity,
and
shall
at the
extension,
and so
?
Is this
matter
We
238
[part
ii.
is
decidedly knowable
in the
Mr.
*
Spencer
tells
is
related to the
it,
unknow?
Is
then, the
;
knowable
Again,
to
we must
*
answer.
'
No
because,
'
according
objective agencies
'
which pro-
duce our
*
subjective affections
are in themselves
therefore,
I
In proving
or,
should
wrong
object.
The
is
required by Science
(as
he con'
temptuously
it is
calls it)
than
like that
lism affected
fore, that the
by himself
Even
admitting,
there-
latter are
as unanswerable as he supposes
them
to
be, our
much improved.
world
hardly save us
will
while,
if
unknowable
existence of otium
to Jacobi,
If
^
cum
dignitate, which,
*
is
enjoyed by Kant's
thing in
Psychology^ vol.
ii.
p. 452.
CHAP.
XI.]
239
up
in
to this
to us,
and as
dealt with
as
permanent
is
diate
knowledge consist of
subjective affections,'
When
means
that certain
be in
(human) conscious-
ness,
doing
now
if
What Mr.
is
that a
mode
can
faint
aggregate
the concept of a
of
vibrating particle,
'
is
the
producing cause
'
member
known as
the sensa-
No verbal contrivance
can bridge
phenomenon
is
it
a
is
First Principles^"^^1^^,
240
[part
ii.
an entity possessing none of the attributes of matter, and which, since it is neither in space nor time, must be incapable of vibration.
which assert
different things,
same thing
even
if
in different
is
The
remark
to
is
at all
will
With-
less
child
or the
any of the
metaphysicians
selves in the
*
whom
On
less
For
it is
his singular
ill
which a man
may propose
to justify the
justify
common
sense of
mankind, some to
the
teachings of Science,
a God, some to give free rein to speculation without any secondary object.
*
It
was reserved
for
Psycholo^y^ voU
ii.
p. 300.
Ibid.
CHAP. XL]
241
Mr. Spencer
of science
satisfy the
man
man
Looking back over the nineteen chapters we have been considering, and over the earlier half of
the First Principles,
it
is
System of
Phi-
losophy
'
where
his
Suggestions
to-
his favour
would have
sensi-
had
somewhat blunted
bility in
his extraordinary
range of
in-
become
comparatively use-
by which he
be
ifi
animated, necessary as
admit
it
to
order that he
may be
is
protracted labours
242
[part
hi.
The
we
instance
In point
much
result,
more or
It is
and equally
*
essential
attributes of
what
is
called
now time
and to
it is
external world,' as
by Science
far
not
is
for the
purpose of deter-
mining how
Science
justified in
assuming
its
but
in
order to obtain
some
us ask, in the
first
place,
what
is
its
?
real nature
CHAP.
XII.]
243
Speaking generally,
consists,
we
are told, of
affinity,
and other
called
ether, which,
by means of
perties, transmits
various
from among
to each
number
of which there
is
man
mean
his
own
organism.
The very
interesting class
In
many
differ,
But the
at this
moment
we
the
fact,
beings
who by
its
true nature
and
constitution.
may be as well
to
remind
is
how
to
we
do not of
course
mean
244
[part
hi.
This
When
when chemists talk of elementary substances, they mean things we can touch and handle. But when they go on to
tell
which
(It
may
be either perceived
or Imagined.
for
knowledge
way beyond
more prominently
I
In
Theology perhaps
Is
than In Science.
there
Is
am
because
these
any
arises rather
from the
poses.
It
to a certain
somewhat
our idea
There
other.
are,
why
this side
much
attention as the
One
of
them
is,
think,
that
any person
is
apt to slide
away from
CHAP.
XII.]
245
it
we
are
now
discussing.
be
true,
whether
represented to us by Science can no more be perceived or imagined than the Deity as represented to
us by Theology, and that in the
second,
first
case, as in the
we must
we can most
certainly say
This
on
is
much argument
Its truth is
apparent
simple inspection,
and
it
to
in
it it
To
Science
latter.
all
Force according to
its
the cause of
is
motion, and
amount
any case
a given time.
Now,
see
evident that
we come most
to
when we
one
body foreign
ourselves
exercising
force
upon
we feel
that,
for
ex-
(this
pressure not
246
[part hi.
when we
which pressure
If
is
the
we
can-
apprehend, perceive
it
it
at all
and
if
we we
cannot perceive
at
all, it
it
will
probably be admitted
may be assumed,
that, as a
imagine,
fact,
matter of
so that
mental
in
subject-matter of dynamics.
so de-
The common
only symbolises
it
But this, I apprehend, is incorrect. There can be no resemblance between the mental images, whether of pressure or of effort, and that
external and independent force which they are
em-
ployed to represent.
Why
which pro-
CHAP.
XII.]
247
duces
It ?
not force,
it is
:
one of the
it
effects of
force acting
on our organism
which produces
but de-
Neither
it is
is
Force
set
it
can be
question, which
is
not material to
it
my
argu-
ment,
it
be cause or be
dis-
merely accompaniment,
tinct
must
at all events
it
causes or accompanies.
in
If
we
try
expressed by this
force of
if
taking place,
we form
be entirely
first place,
In the
we
and
muscular
effort,
mate matter
force,
or,
and secondly, we
they were
resembled
force, instead of
being only
now and
as effects, or as accompaniments.
If
turn to Matter,
we
find
248
[part
hi.
somewhat
nation.
powers of imagiformwhile
It is true that
we
find
no
difificulty in
;
never appears to
us,
we
But
if,
instead of framing
it^
we
try to
it
frame
is,
really
we soon become
an impossibility.
kinds or degrees.
conscious that
we
are attempting
Of this
In
two
some
example,
we
may be
because
qualities,
we observe
effects
But
as to
what these
qualities
may
be, apart
from their
we not only cannot imagine, but we do not even know how to try and imagine. We have nothing to go upon. Our senses and our reason alike fail us and it would be more accurate perhaps to say that we
effects,
;
all
than to
What,
for
example,
is
chemical affinity
What
is
along
What
is
magnetism
but
degree of
CHAP.
XII.]
249
the imagination
For exdoubt on
ample,
we
are required
believe (no
sensation of coloured
the eye.
merely the
means
is
trial
a task
alto-
The
we
acquire a
knowledge of material
me and
;
it is
of
we
There
heat.
is
no similar
les's
Heat, no
than
light, exists in
the material
Yet
it is
easy to sepa-
We
of
2SO
[part hi.
light,
to
confonnd the
effect
we
in
our power
will
be observed, our
There
is
not
we
it
really exists
and
about Force
and as
it
can be
made with
still
more
forth),
think
may
I
this
long digression
established.
We
have
the
is
world
(as for
convenience
it
here
it
call
it)
really
It is
is,
what indeed
is
patent to
everybody, that
its real
we arrive
at our actual
knowledge of
minute
by a process of
inference.
particles
;
consist of
is
these particles
as through
an
CHAP.
XII.]
251
what
it is,
far
from being
intuitive,
Men
point,
of science,
who
facts
we
of
can
perceive
of
the
qualities
and
behaviour
objects
whose
we are agreed
of
it
inferred from
what we know
it
imme-
diately
appearance.
Now
ing
is,
seems
no particular ground
while
if
evident that
Unless apbelieve
trust to
Science
If
?
Science
is
appearances
world
is in
part to be trusted
but only
in part.
We
;
know by direct
observation
252
[part iil
which these
extended, resisting,
possess,
action
So
that
a criterion
that which
to be,
is,
Now
pearance,
itself,
that
we do
in practice so
use Science to
reality
and ap-
undoubtedly the
fact.
But taken by
this
we want more
know is, how we can thus legitimately erect Science into a judge of its own cause. The precise question which has to be answered,
and the
Insufficiency
it,
of
this,
the
first
and most
to
natural answer to
will
become obvious
anyone
who
line
reflects
on the following
series of propositions,
1st.
knowledge which
Is
not
imme-
diate
Is
(This
apprehend
Is
taken by
men
of science.)
us
(If
and so
forth.
CHAP.
XII.]
253
3rd.
The
assurance
are
we
coloured,
of precisely the
same kind as is the assurance we obtain from the same source, that they are extended and resisting.
(That
this Is so
will
be evident to everybody on
4th.
While
pure
observation
shows
this,
in-
produced by
In the
uncoloured particles
if
Science
Is
and
If It Is
5th.
From
follows that
in
observation
untrust-
According
to
(4)
there
is
nothing
In
the
to Science
Neither
Is it
distinction should
only
if
be sound that
Science
logically justified.
It is
not admissible to
make Science depend on the principle (whatever it may be), at the same time that we make the principle
depend upon Science.
Stated in this form, the exact nature of the
diffi-
254
[part hi.
culty
is
and
if it
not one
is
on the
attention,
this
because
world (which
is
the one
that
habitually
from empirical data, which is not a subject with which we are usually much concerned. Let me explain. When we are occupied with the consideration of how we come to possess the knowledge we have of the external world, if we are in a scientific rather than in a metaphysical humour, we immediately and naturally look at the
logical deduction
of
scientific doctrine
in its
some
;
definite
change
if
in the
and that
to
will
this
is
occur likewise.
Now
the
same kind of
change may
causes.
If
at different times
have
different sets of
on any given occasion one of the proxithe thing perceived, then percepIf,
is
said to be normal.
is
thing perceived
we
are said to be
an
illusion
of the
senses.
Supposing, for
CHAP. XII.]
255
example, that
see the
moon when
is
she
is
actually in
one of the
my causes of my
to
if
seeing
me
(to
in that act
is
so far accurate.
But
supposition
there
are
no such
things,
am
whatever
may be
results
that
act of perception,
it
cannot at
all
has no existence.
This
is
looked at from
at
Looked
from
its
suggests the
obtains
verse by looking at
five senses,
a medium which
much
not
allows to
am
In
here pretending to
criticise this
theory.
common
I
has a logical
in the
which
It
shall
attempt to explain
next
diffi-
chapter.
has
also,
no doubt, philosophical
But what
am
concerned
to
show here
is,
any
diffi-
culties in
the
way
56
[part
hi.
distinction
is,
it
fore
in
we
I
we should be
to
little
have shown
exist
its
received conclusions.
It
by Science
But
itself,
it
arguing
that the
in
circle.
whole
scientific
come known
to us,
may be
as a hypothesis,
by an appeal
objection
I
to experience
and that
in this
way the
may be
Let
successfully evaded.
me
moment from
I
The
reasoning to which
object
phenomena
that the
given
in
same time
The
reasoning which
it
is
some
in
at
more
especially
the
in perception,
but are
CHAP.
XII.]
257
function which
may be
ac-
intents
is
adoption
is
two
case^.
The
ideas,
phi-
losophers of
whom
we
and
own
The
I
am
It
at present concerned,
introspective
analysis
shows
made
to
depend
solely
on the immediate
not, as a
knowledge given
of
fact,
in perception,
do
matter
Now,
evadedj
the argument
by which
this difficulty is
sought to he
we must
by which perception
s
is
produced.
258
[part
hi.
This
doctrine
on
We
solely
are
on
our percep-
tions, are of
Now
this
undertaking
impossible
matter,
it
;
we may,
and
if
be
there
may be
set at rest
by
ation, that if
effect to
be suggested, there
between them.
revive
an old speculation),
it is
not
the
is
What reply could be made to such a supposition ? The immediate answer that rises to our lips is, that we know that matter exists, and that we have no such knowledge about the Deity. But how do we know that matter exists ? Because we perminds.
ceive
it ?
is
excluded by
hypothesis
nor can
we
are at the
must further be
recollected
moment that we
limits of imagin-
Nor
is it
practicable, as
chapter on Historical
Inference,
CHAP.
XII.]
259
to this that
we
all
are
the
the
causes by which
known or unknown, actually produced it. then, we cannot argue from the mere fact that
exist, neither is
it
corresponding to them
possible to
me
point out
in this In
what
last
it
is
that
have
7tot
attempted to do
it,
argumentative portion of
have not
any
constitution
we
:
are
told Science
must be
either
upon
that experience
which
may be
described as
is
nothing
we have
of these
On
;
the
first
Science contradicted
premises
on the second,
at
showed
draw no conclusions
all.
s 2
26o
[part in.
CHAPTER
Ever
XIIL
on the subject
are very
much
the
That the
much more often Christians, and the sons of Mahommedans much more often Mahommedans, that a man more commonly holds
the opinions of those with
whom
he
lives,
and more
commonly
\j
whom
cases
he
acts,
plain to the
it
most
careless
other words,
known
that there
were causes of
which were
not reasons.
The
The substance of this chapter appeared originally in the FortReview of 1877, p. 698. I have attempted to cure the obscurity which some of my friends professed to find in it, at the cost of
^
nightly
little
amplification,
and
fear a certain
amount of repetition.
CHAt>. XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
261
played
in the
formation of creeds
for
it
has shown
when a man
is
evidence
settled for
control
time.
The
scientific
is
various
and overwhelming.
regard to races
toric
a posteriori with
observation, with
regard to individuals by
common
knowledge.
monstrating
a priori by de-
dependence of
thought
on the
environment, while
finally evolution
binds up these
But though,
doubts the
plate
it
in
fact,
few people,
habitually without
may
so
when they
consider
its
bearing on
own
opinions.
The
for a
262
[part
hi.
as false,
not only
somewhat melancholy
in itself,
but
which
to the
indeed, the
law obeyed
by
this
intellectual
dissolving
view
whose
we
disagreed,
not
so.
We
are
all
involved in
its
most ignorant
The
ex-
Comtism
it
is
explained by
it
that of fetichism,
man
as certainly under
its
is
But
if
these
things
be
so,
wherein
?
lies
is
our
true
It
of
it
knowwere a
resting
tier,
by
Its
predecessors, and
by
its
successors.
But
after
all,
this
metaphor only
It is
represents an opinion
the
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
263
to future
The
suffi-
ground of
faith
is
feet, if
no belief
as a criterion of immutable
truth
and
if
irrational law,
where
is
train of
should
the reader
opinion.
I
when he
propose
I
reflects
on the evolution of
in this
form what
in
such sceptical,
The
case
it
may be
Since
all
beliefs
are caused,
other
first
explained in the
Now
premises of
incapable of proof
So
always non-rational.
life,
when
we
education,
it
as there
may be
for
In
264
[part
hi.
contrast to this,
we may say
all
other
The
any
mental
is
beliefs.
They hold
is
that though
all
opinion
of those forces
gradually to
make
opinion approxi-
mate
are
to truth
commonly regarded as
intuition
'
self-evident
'
and known
'
by
uncontradicted
generations
;
experience
this
acting
on
successive
and that
them
be
true.
This
fest
line of reasoning,
in
argument
circle.
interaction
Or
(to
put
it
more generally) no argument in favour of a system of beliefs can be drawn from the fact that, according to
that system,
its
true.
From
drawn
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
scientific
BELIEF.
It
265
in
favour of any
axiom.
remains to be
less
seen
negative
Now
the
All
phenomena
Among
among
any-
arises. Is there
make them
true
To
to
which
is
gradually
to
make
make
If
is
correspond
with
fact.
in
experiment
certain, this
one
is
so
that
many
in
world
may be
must be
dency.
either
limited
in
their
operation,
or be
Have
w^e
This question,
apprehend, must
266
[part
hi.
be answered
it
At
first sight,
indeed,
would seem as
reasoning.
is
only a pro-
mises,
and
it
is
the
premises of
they,
'
Have
then,
any other
I
Except the
'
ten-
this
we
infer that
beliefs,
and therefore
belief,
must be
is
Now destructive. No
this
is
a position w^hich
beliefs,
self-
system of
giving an account
when
when regarded
I
does
true
system
is
and cannot
is,
What
does follow
that the
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
is
267
and
is
matter
concerned)
consistent with
To
there
this criticism
may
is
no contradiction involved
seems
considering a
from
one of
which
It
it
certain,
fact
if
we had no
better
means of demonstrating
pair of compasses.
it
it
ment of a
it
Geometrical proof, on
absolutely certain.
Will
can
if it
?
be called
Assuredly
But there
is
no parallelism be-
cases.
shown to be merely probable by one set of proofs, and shown to be certain by another. They are not shown to be certain at all. They are assumed to be
so
:
and the
first
dence to be
their origin
certain, the
evidence
we
possess as to
certain.
If this
were
however, the
difficulty
a slight one.
We
original position,
and concede
assurance
we
268
[part
hi.
we
had supposed.
difficulty arises,
It is at the
when we
whole ground
doubtful
tainty.
is
premises
their cer-
founded
is
upon
This
fatal
must be
which
it
to
cannot be removed.
The difficulty only arises, it may be obsei^ved, when we are considering our own beliefs. If I am considering the beliefs of some other person
mediaeval divine
there
I
say of some
I
is
no reason why
should
and circumstances.
a country,
teachers,
fell
in
such
came
and such
incidents,
and
then
infer,
with
much
the general
evolution of humanity.
sider
But when
as
come
to con-
my own
beliefs
a stage
in
the general
mentioned above.
of
If
a stage,
all
them may
be,
be, false.
Why
Evo?
lution
Because
is
scientifically
demonstrated
difficulty
a stage further
must be
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
is
BELIEF.
269
something which
undemonstrated
doubtful
not demonstrated
are
and these
rendered
behefs
necessarily
by the
if this
But
is
all,'
may be
inclined to reply,
We
not at
it
can
that doubt
we
will
go
into
only shows---
Unless you
man,
your arguments
will
be wasted on people
I
;
who
is
in the
you.'
reply that
If
we suppose Evolution
tionist
to
must wish
is
it
to
though
he may admit
demonstra-
that
it
not
namely, a
certain
;
solid piece of
tion resting
ment
its
it
as soon as
is
because,
by the very
fact of
becoming
certain,
we
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
itself, is is
2 70
[part hi.
system
uncertain.
system of which
it is
this
can be said
incoherent.
The
abstract
is
be more clear
its
most
it
taken.
We
may
which,
the usual
human
beliefs, after
have
at length
now
capable of in
by asking
that this development of
limits,
Enq.
beliefs
Do you suppose
now reached
?
has
its
or do you antici-
great
the superiority
of
my
are
those of
my
remote ancestors,
my
contemporaries
tradition, there
who
is
every
duced
and that
we may
mankind
Enq,
when
the opinion of
glorious
hope
One, nevertheless,
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
271
profound modification.
EvL
interesting to
know which
is
of
likely to
be
improved
example,
in this
is
way
For
that
?
is
To
would appear
to involve a contradiction.
is
we assume) development
sible that
truthwards,
it
is
imposin
development
Enq,
belief in
tible,
development is
in this
and that
differs
we
would be important
order
grounds of
see
this distinction, in
it
how
far
application.
j5'z//. Evolution
results of
true,
and
a
be equally permanent.
Enq,
You
talk
of
scientific
methods
but
I
principle or principles.
How
do you get
at these
EvL
The
principles
you speak of
are,
sup-
272
[part
hi.
must
start
from,
ledge.
who
expects to
make any
progress in know-
Enq.
are
These
therefore,
assumptions, as
scientific
understand you,
possible
what render a
method
at
They
cannot,
be
arrived
by a
scientific
EvL
is,
Still
Enq,
that
But
you
seems to me,
if
start
assumptions, like
*
all
may
be,
mere
like
development of opinion,
Nevertheless,
it
is
sumptions that
tion at
all.
In other words,
certain,
when regarded
This
i?z;/. Still)
thing.
^//^.-Nevertheless,
order your assumptions
it
is
as
to
more what
his
self-consistent.
At
to resemble
CHAP, xiil]
the evolution OF
BELIEF.
273
own
planet was at
common with all the others, was Of such a one we should probably say,
were correct
if
in
moif
that
his deductions
his
his premises
So
far
this difficulty as
it
seemed
It is
to
me
that
wished to
call attention
could
raised.
a mistake,
difficulty necessarily
Every theory
all beliefs
is
ob-
noxious to
it
according to which
are sup-
beliefs are
such a manner as to
to
:
make them
uncertain.
Now
it is
be noted that
wide one
For
If
It is
methods can
is
a product.
that.
it
can prove
There
thrown on the existence or non-existence of free will by the real or supposed discrepancy between the
deliverances of Introspective consciousness and the
verdict of ordinary historical
case,
experience.
In this
inter-
whether we consult
statistics,
whether we
^74
[part
hi.
of the matter
doctrine or scientific
method be brought
Is
to bear
on
obtained
beliefs, all
causes,
certain,
and of these
I
alone.
And
since
it
is
no
less
follows
It
must, however,
is
exposition, for
making Evolution
it is
The
special sci-
ences
well
go
even
if
their
it
uniit
if
Evolution
not universal,
are to be
left
it is
If certain
if
it
phenomena
outside
cannot
how
it it
is
follows
was,
certainly
its
appears to
me
its
that
it
methods or
pretensions.
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
275
NOTE.
In the preceding chapter the argument has turned
on the manner
their validity.
in
in part
may
to be
affect
At
first
sight there
may seem
down
reader
may
be tempted to interpret
this
canon into an
is
a matter of
for
absolute philosophic
indifference
offers,
an
is
interpretation
which
my own
language
perhaps,
incorrect.
true
any
ground
having any particular origin can only be shown by inference founded ultimately on these beliefs themselves.
it
But
is
may
be
true,
beliefs as to
their origin
may
this
disbelieving them.
example of
nary instance
still
may
more
forcible light.
We
might imagine
our ultimate
it
to be a
beliefs,
that
were implanted
in us
Now
we should
276
[part
iii.
incoherent, or that
in our
inference
and
this is the
I
a less
obvious shape,
maintain
we
must be
SUMMARY.
"
277
SUMMARY.
I
this
Essay.
if I
some repetition, to show by means of a concise summary the main outline of the argument of which
cost of
However
effect of
will
disjointed
common
first
relation
which
In that
all
is
chapter.
down
before
it
,*
while the
how
by orthodox Science.
appears but
is
little
all
78
rests
and
rational foundation,
else.
seem
unfor-
was a
philosophy, complete in
is,
parts
containing,
was
critic,
that
inference
by which every
scientific
proposition
ultimately established
at least as the
so far
not
so.
They
same portions of the problem differently, but they none of them treat of it in all its parts. Their
attempts are fragmentary as well as inconsistent.
At what
point, then,
is
What
assumed
to
solidity of the
remainder
being
in this
The
course that
have adopted
is
correct,
Now
the external
world.
On
these
founded everything
we know
SUMMARY.
that world, including the fact that
it is
279;
governed by
is
law at
all
given
examined
we have
this
to consider
ticulars alone.
point was to
show that, so
is
no
such inference
its
and
for
a reason which, in
in
the
first
chapter.^
if it is
to
The whole
have
To
shall include
Now,
in-
is
and
maxim above
If
enunciated,
is
it
is
philosophically worthless.
no attempt
made
to
where
it is
legitimate
it is
not,
conclusions.
such an attempt
is
made,
Chap.
i.
p. II.
28o
it
we
arrive at a law of
Nature
The
What is we wish
it
to
examine
we
enquire
how
far
is
possible to arrive
it
at a
knowledge of the
being
The result of this enquiry was to show that, if we take some phenomenon or group of phenomena for investigation, inductive logic is
competent under favourable circumstances to prove,
phenomena preceding it in time mere, and certain of them were noi, causally connected with it. But that, on the other hand, inductive logic could not show
either of these things respecting that indefinite mul-
phenomena which in experience have always been present, both when the phenomenon
titude
of
SUMMARY.
'
2^1
it
we
knowledge of any absolute law of Nature from a knowledge, I mean, of ^// the phenomena required
to produce a given result
:
is
no
and may
of
known cause
any
effect, will
known
tomed
consequents,
seems
in
great
measure
removed.
The
principles
on which
is
this
somewhat
:
unsatis-
factory conclusion
First,
phenomenon may,
trary,
for
we know
to the con-
be part of
its
cause.
past existence of a
for
phenomenon
existence
anticipating
its
the future.
Of
may be
legiti-
mately applied,
ignorance of
all
we
On
the con-
2S2
Nature
start
in
at,
we must
evidently
at yet,
above
seem
to
me hard
I
to refute.
In Chapter IV.
Chapter
III.
the trustworthiness
we
and more
especially to facts
was
effect to
cause
difficulty
attaching to
produce a given
The
problem,
distinguish from
possible, the
this
among
For
is
problem
The
ordinary
to
procedure which
followed by
men
of science
Now
own
this theory, if
of their
torical
proposition,
be
itself
in
the
first
instance
SUMMARY.
founded upon an inference from
this process of resting
effect to cause
effect to cause.
283
But
on
historical
limit.
When
that limit
reached, what
to
On
and we
if
two or more
we
which
as
much
in
as to say, that
less likely
than
seems
comparison un-
a cause could
cadit qucsslio.
at
Supposing, therefore,
could
be shown that
set of facts
we now see
?
it,
we should
It
know
ance.
Can
this
ever be shown
I
It
if
cannot.
restrict
cannot be shown,
attention to those
imagine, even
we
our
acquainted.
less
may be
that
count-
entirely unacquainted,
and by which
If
all
we
see
produced.
we once admit
the
284
We
metaphysical,
theological, or
merely unknown.
more
past
than an Agnostic.
He
solid
grounds
through the
infinite
universe,
but
phenomena capable
all
of acting
and these
all,
from history
but,
if
Here terminated the first part of our enquiry. Its general result is to show (i) that from the particular knowledge obtained by observing the phenomena of a world assumed throughout this part of the Essay to be persistent, no scientific conclusions could be drawn and (2) that even if we suppose these phenomena to be part of a world governed by causation, we were not much advanced, and that therefore, (3) some further principles or modes of
:
SUMMARY.
-285
Of
these
'
further
altogether unknown,
more
The
was
principally
and
With regard
to the
which,
'of it
if true,
unnecessary.
self-evident
at the
according to
its
the other,
it
is
untrue
though
I
same time
untruth has no
iirst
scientific significance
whatever.
The
for
;
of these statements
doubting
the
second
It will
ments by which
now
among English
pretend to furnish satisfactory evidence of the trustworthiness of these two scientific assumptions.
will
It
be
sufficient to
that,
in the
dealt
more or
with
(i)
The Kantian
or
neo- Kantian
2^6
[Ch. VI.]
sets
up an
internal or
subjective authority
final arbiter
called Consciousness
as
the
(3)
The
[Ch. VIII.]
in
seeks either
the
some
selected
[Ch. VII.]
(5)
an
succeeds in practice.'
[Ch. VII.]
(6)
infers
the truth of an
common
sense
'
(in
the
it.
[Ch.
VII.]
(7)
incon-
one devoted
true,
Science must
be
[Ch. IX.].
them on some
particular
SUMMARY.
individual
'
Vgy
^in
all cases,
exponent of
his special
views
because
in
I
this
method
raise a
and
definite issue.
While
have attempted to
of,
on the one
to the
questions at issue.
Assuming
fairly
theii that
present time
ing, as
as
is
is,
think,
the case
and
assumsay
Lam
bound
we may
we
wholly without
arrived at are
rests are un-
proof.
The
;
inferences
by which
it is
erroneous
proved.
it
It
a general system of
task
is
incoherent
and
this
undertaken
in the
The
devoted
first
of these (namely.
is
in the
main
to
a dis-
be
its
(particular)
its
puts forward as
288
shown
incidentally that
the universe, as
is
it
it
is
represented to us by Science,
what
in
anthropomorphic.
is
the
On
the contrary,
all,
it is
the subject-matter of
all,
or almost
by Natural
of what
is
is,
how-
principal
end being
it
and
to
show
which
logically
inadmissible.
The
flagrant
two are
in
contradiction
is
is
really
due
either to the
SUMMARY.
289
confusion
finally,
it
and incoherence
into
the whole
and
scientific
conclu-
must be
Some
from
outline
I
speculative arguments
fail
of their effect
have just
briefly indicated
likely to fail
When once
stated
it is
not
some recognised
difficulty
I
it
may be
disposed
of.
is
If so,
however,
:
do not
on
I
a reply
to be found
I
while,
may
think be
shown
I
(as
why
the
difficulty itself
may
there
we
habitually
:
its
If this theory
intelligible
be true
and
it
as
it is
per-
but that
(to
290
sage sent by the latter should be altered and modified in the course of transmission.
IS
But the
difficulty
on observations
its exist-
for,
yet
it
by no means
justifies
vations
obviate a possi-
way by which
is
it
might be met,
scientific
system by supposing
(which
on the
fact that
such
perceived
crystals, metals,
and
planets.
It
was
and
it
is
this
if
we mean
to justify
would
be
simply to place
it
on a
level with
an indefinite
num-
might be supposed
to
fulfil
same
function.
The
SUMMARY.
but one of a
ter.
291
much more
is
subtle
and
difficult
charac-
This flaw
due ultimately
may be considered from two separate It may be looked upon as a mempoints of view. ber of a logical series, or it may be looked upon as a member of a causal series. If we consider it from
every belief
the
first
it
appears as a con-
clusion, as a premiss, or as
premiss.
If
we
consider
It
view,
it
appears as an
effect,
an
effect
and a
every
cause.
belief,
Now
others depend
these,
is
clusions.
becomes evident
they are in no
Infinite
way
to be distin-
Into
favour,
become the fashion, fall out of and are forgotten by all but the historians
notice,
of
opinion.
effects
of
material
antecedents,
of
But
these,
the
produce much
error,
and which
u
2
It
might be plausibly
292
There
is
though,
results
amount
belief,
be erroneous.
But
if
we
at
it
we
become conscious of a
consists
For
in so far as
of conclusions certainly
inferred
from
certain premises.
certainly
inferred
all
(as
we have
the premises of
so that the
more
certain
we choose
the more
we
we have
If
it
for believing
them
at
all.
be replied that
this
consequence
may be
scientific
it
system
as
all
men do
actually consider
to be merely
were suddenly
tem
to
to
become
would be
self-contradictory,
is
and
therefore impossible.
Such a supposition
absurd.
fact,
No
some fundamental error or omission in the account given by Science, and more especially by the doctrine of Evolution, of the genesis of our
that there
though
SUMMARY.
293
how
this
error or omission
is
to
be corrected or
our
ordinary
I
supplied
theories
without
entirely
altering
am
unable to say.
This discussion
in
the speculative enquiry into the nature and validity of the evidence which can be produced in favour of
the current scientific creed.
results arrived at
It
fails
At every
point,
the
to Science.
and
in its
conclusions.
The
;
first,
are unproved
the third
are incoherent.
Nor am
scientific
suffer.
system of belief
may
not
properly be said to
practical question
chapter), feels
will
be discussed
in
the
next
preceding pages,
in
judge, into
its
servant.
;
It
it
so
now
that Science
place
and
assert with
some
con-
'
394
it
receives at this
moment through
curious to remark
in
how
the
two
cases.
Philo-
Theology
but
in the
it
;
identical with
it
department.
To
one would
really
suppose
more general
in-
by applying the
vestigation
'
'
to mind, or even,
is still
more exad-
It
may be
of these subjects
;
by such
it
though
can
Positive
I
scientific one,
'
could constitute
a rational exposition of
Christian evidences.
only neces-
SUMMARY.
sary to remind the reader of what was
sufficient length in the first chapter,
295
shown
at
namely, that no
progress
research,
made along
however much
may
increase our
know-
Whatever be the
errors
I
preceding discussions,
have,
trust, in
the course
(I
mean
many
The
path of
my
into Metaphysics
and
if
seems
somewhat uninteresting
goal, yet
it,
region,
and
no desirable
I
or
something
like
must,
is
believe,
be traversed before
If speculations
intellectual repose
finally reached.
be, as indeed
and
rational certainty
is
unless
we
first
rational doubt.
296
%%i
\,V
^^y
LI
THE
'
\^
NIVEHSlTYj
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
The
this
reader
who
Its
Essay
to
ceding chapter,
if
may perhaps be
any,
is
character.
is
somewhat
it
English Philosophy,
it
is
what
effect
can
must point
either the
it
scepticism
It
'
ambiguous.
may mean
its
want of evidence, or
may mean
this together
with
critic
consequent unbelief.
Now
if
my
supposed
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
second of these senses,
ask whether
this question
It
297
might be
desirable, to
is
possible
because
in
as
believe,
must be answered
the negative
if
by
we
may make
It
ourselves
easy as to any
ill
effect
which, did
exist.
It
might be
expected to produce.
The
only persons
who might
have so
far
whose devotion
that
we
are in duty
bound
rest.
if it
to
make
this
the strength of
But
maxim, though
In the face
occasionally uttered as
sible, Is
scepticism In the
first
sense
scepticism which
of any
it
At
first
sight
would
belief,
seem
It
not.
Is
This,
how-
ever,
by no means
If in the
estimation of
mankind
little
or no prac-
298
tical result.
have just
But
if in
the estimation of
mankind there
is
systems of
belief, if
now
is
it
plain
that a sceptical
consequences, at
quite
To judge,
arguments
we
at the
arguments themselves,
We
must consider
to act.
What,
then,
is
by
leave
by which
we
find
ourselves
surrounded
Which do they
questions,
it
accept,
altogether
is
is
answers.
But
in
a sentence
or two
can
map
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
or avowedly professed
299
by the two
largest
and
most important
concerned.
classes about
whom we
need be
The
type
that presented
by established
it
science.
The
beliefs
which conform to
would be described
as consistent
and
positive, as arrived at
by recognised
scepticism.
in
whose
certainty
is
An
any
now by
floating
of fanciful ignorance.
form a
mass of
error,
it is
;
inconsistent,
which
gradually to destroy
a duty which
we
are given to
understand
it is
rapidly
and
effectually accomplishing.
Our more advanced thinkers, opinion that they have now reached
from which
the whole
in the indefinite future
be given to
human
of
Everything which has to do with phenomena, everything which they conceive to belong either to recognised science or to scientific conjecture, they put in
the
first class
it is
is
Everything
else they
300
it
is
either a superstition
is
and
beyond
indi-
them of classing Ethics among superstitions. This would be unjust. There is no body of men more careful to let it be understood that the
rectly to accuse
is
or might be
made
so,
in
the
ledge.^
The second
existing beliefs
class of
I
men whose
attitude towards
is
wish to describe
much more
people
numerous
constitute
(in
England
in its opinions.
The
all
'
who
are by no
knowledge
scientific
phenomena is either essentially incapable of proof, or else is mere superstition. On the contrary, they are
inclined to admit the existence of a sort of middle
To
this
dis-
But even of
for
See Appendix,
a more detailed
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
ambiguous position
its
301
tenure
is
insecure.
Should
has
am
describing what
it
long
done
to
the
it
satisfaction
of our advanced
thinkers, should
an essential
Inconsistency between
and
scientific belief
then,
if
and detected
.
superstitions.
I
It is
not to be doubted,
think, that
most of the
persons
who
speculate at
all
now
in
debate
and
in these
more or less in such speculations belong to one of But the point the two classes I have just described.
I
on
Is
first class
those
who
dls-
those
who
believe In
It
may be
infinite),
more
Science supports
It;
no more
fatal
The
tific
result of this
is
we
are ex-
may be
expected to
302
but that
tion
it
logical rela-
science
religion
;
is
a fact of transcendent
theological importance
versies of the
of what
is
called the
conflict
Religion.'
There
is
no
scientific
its
inconsistent
be an
bitter controversy,
more by
by a dispassionate love of scientific knowledge. I might insist on the evil done by such a state of
things both to Religion and to Science, but at this
moment
springs.
my
protest against
Is there
and non-
conformity with
error
?
it
is,
as an
it
unanswerable proof of
If there
We have seen
of
its
preceding pages
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
every possible philosophical defect.
that whether Science
303
We
have seen
its
to give of
its
doctrines
start (as,
how-
we
all
do
start),
which had to
th^e;
is,
be proved.
fidence.
I
am
it.
far
from complaining of
complaint rather
con-
share
My
that of
two creeds which, from a philosophical point of view, stand, so far as I can judge, upon a perfect equality,
one should be set up as a standard to which the
other must necessarily conform.
am not insensible that to some of my readers may now appear to have reached an extremity of
I
paradox
far
beyond the
Even
serious,
may
to convince
them that
am
altogether In earnest.
It
some
excuse.
Its
new worlds
Its
It
the fruitfulness of
which
material results
Its
methods,
may
well lead
men
means
304
by which these triumphs have been attained are above To the reach even of the most audacious criticism.
"be told in the face of facts
to look
in
on as a dying superstition,
may
easily
excite
certain
minds a momentary
Such
But
far,
is
me
so
seriously entertains
he regards
the
fallacies
my
which
reasoning on which
parallel be-
illustrated
by framing
all familiar.
on the
latter with
which we are
We
man, and
In his unreflective
mo-
We
it is
becomes an
unintelligible abstraction.
scientific apologists.
We might We should
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
305
differed
among themselves
tems one
errors In detail
then
after taking
up
their sys-
after another,
and showing
their Individual
we
With
all
we should
sug-
some
of the most
difficult points
with
the
Intellectual
honesty of
the
apologists.
to Individuals,
we should
and
to
of investigation
philosophers, in
ful
many
respects so amiable
and use-
violate principles
tiously
avowed.
we should
who
men
who
3o6
research.
we
it
when they
are asked
some
vital
question
some shreds
is
of
true,
these subjects
we
should
make
the
would be as well
whether such a thing as true Science really existed. This done, we should have to analyse the actual
body of
ance
;
scientific
truth presented
its
for
our accept-
to
consistent,
a meta-
and gratuitous
for
assumptions
after
which
it
the great
that the
who have
it
created
it,
and
to
mourn
left
us no choice but
among
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
307
phantom of
certain knowledge.
Of
parallel
course a parody
of
this sort
reflect
make people
on the boldness of
But
this alone
would be no
Why
should this be so
why
whose know-
ledge of Science
Is
is
Perhaps
shall
a very simple
Is
true.
To
this
I
we
dismiss
all
the reasons
is
have
whom
alone
be
true,
be further sug-
such matters,
answer that
X
2
3o8
always be unerring,
that
it
shows
part
re-
though
after all
it
only
It
moves the
difficulty
may
re-
merely a
of the assumption
rally believed
it is
am
calling in question
is
gene-
constantly asserted
is
This
is
no doubt
accurate,
to a certain point
an
explanation.
There
now
a kind of literature,
by experts
who
desire to be
'generally informed
than follows
it
it.
Of
this,
whether
consists
may
much knowledge
many
:
trouble as possible
purvey
increasing
class of
persons
who
but
for
who
like to
have
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
them.
ductions
309
Now
is
the one
by
scientific
means
is
everything which
is
with
is
Science
is
thereby disproved.
And
'
since
this
a doctrine
in
which
the
'
is
it is
one which
stood
we need
critical
without taking
examine
How
authors
who
by any suspicion as
to understand.
It
to
its
admit, harder
I
should
knowledge
and philosophical acumen than that possessed, for example, by Mr. Leslie Stephen or Professor
Huxley, to suggest to their minds doubts as to the
rational character of the
dogmatic system
;
in
which
other systems of
my
3IO
may
be easily
stated.
The
depends
must
On what
to
frail
does
depend
Are we
suppose that
foundation
they rest
its
we have been discussing through all these chapters ? Or are we to suppose that their belief is a mere
assumption, with no other recommendation than that
it is
Or
are
we
to suppose that
is
established
by some
esoteric
proof,
known only
to the few,
world at large
The
first
whom
when
in singular
is,
think, hardly
worthy of a
class of
appeal so often
and so earnestly
to
who
on
But
if
we have,
practising
to
come
an
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
311
it
literary advocates of
extreme
scientific pretensions,
I
to
on them should
I
be shared by theologians.
scientific
but
the existence of
end of whose
or to
a whole class of
labours appears
apologists,'
the
to
be
to
explain,
explain
two
are
^
facts
which
naturally
suggest
the
made by
the Free-
a legitimate one.
Let
me
not be misunderstood.
Truth
is
one.
not easy to find a single word to describe the opponents of is altogether free from objection. Most of the terms which suggest themselves have either acquired a somewhat offensive connotation, or are inexact. One or both of these defects attaches to the words ^ Infidel,' Atheist/ ' Agnostic,' and ' Sceptic' I have
^
It is
Religion which
'
pitched upon
because, if it suggests comparisons not altogether flattering to the modern assailants of theology, on the other
'
'
Freethinker
hand, this
is
word
credits
made up for by the fact that the strict meaning of the them with a virtue to which they have no exclusive title.
312
in itself legitimate/
and
the
in so far as apologetics
I
aim
at this
and
at nothing
more,
to say against
is
them
but
manner
carried on,
side, occasionally
suggests
both
at
scientific
and
religious doctrines
some time or other, but that it now, and by no process more elaborate than
lopping off from Religion everything which
exactly agreeable with Science.
not
first
to recognise
theological convictions.
justiis
the
But
if
this
?
be
so,
what are
we
Religious mysteries
belief
suppose to be objects of
words
or of such a
terms.
tion,
Brought face
of three courses
is,
he
may
reject both
contradictories that
;
refuse to
he
may
accept one
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
at the cost
(it
3(3
may
be) of completeness
or he may-
fullest
course
is
some
cases
all
It
many
of
them
itself
thinking,
should argue as
if it
ought necessarily to be
may be
its
inclined to object to
if
ever absurd,
or
gross.
by rendering argument against any form of belief Immunity from one kind of criticism is impossible.
obtained only by the costly process of dethroning
de facto authority in the realm of opinion,
all
and
intro-
ducing into
confusion.
it,
must point
I
am
in
no
way
responsible.
They
314
with
the impartiality in
I
my
power
and though
admit that
not hoped
results,
the
no way modified
should
course.
Even, therefore,
if
my conclusions
I
happen
to agree,
shall
expect
absolution from
a body of writers
who have
of mere apprehension of
its
consequences.
itself.
I
To
It
must be
noted, In the
practically
in strict
place, that
when
suggest that
we need
ticism,
I
I
am
It
driven to
make
cause
less freely,
is
but because
have used
freely than
respecting which
people,
as
accept
their
opinion without
much
preliminary examination.
But
attitude of
as a whole,
and
it
by
(or
its
nor
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
even from using
for the
it
315
to
modify
details of the
system
we
happen
to hold.
Any
my
nay
would be bound,
the
in
precisely the
;
same way as
the ordinary
man
of science does
sopher does so
he
is
dealing with
is,
as a whole, incapable of
if
any
rational defence.
Of course,
Religion
is
thought
Science (a
point which
it
my
business to discuss),
the
be applied to
It
draw from a
tendency to
have
little
or no
any actual
or possible creed.
But
it
may
still
be objected that
number
of creeds, no matter
how
foolish or
how
that
contradictory these
may happen
it
to be.
Now
must be recollected
to present
I
any arguments
favour of Theology.
attempted
to
have
the
shown indeed,
or
show,
that
3i6
assailants is
But
after such
demonstration
remain
precisely
they
are
not
proved to be phi-
produced which
this
to-morrow.
attack
The
to
easy to
and Theology,
to be, in
are, as
Theology
is
by some supposed
If there
be
this description,
can
not
my
part, that if
it
exists,
know
where
it
is
to
be found.
There
to
is
may
by
put forward as
it
can,
suppose, be
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
317
Essay goes
to Belief
is
do not
concerned, in reasons.
be,
by
It
their
criticism.
them as a
differing In kind
from
philosophic
certitude, leav-
cause of
belief,
from
released.
not,
The
is
however, as
ought to be
if
which
:
all
Is
it
selected parts of
premises are
;
we have
while
in so far as
known
to but
few persons
is
who
it
fore he thought of
and
such
who would
if
all
his mind.
The
we ought
3i8
as this
is
Impulse.'
If so,
am
;
It
assuredly unsatisfactory
it.
know
of no means,
evil
and
is
am
means tomed
rationality
to
own more
this
*'
limited creed.
But perhaps
pulse
"
it
will
be
said,
is
'
Grant that
im-
stock of
on an
pulse"
equality,
is
is
*'
im-
much more
it
former than
is
impulse
comparative
number of persons who accepted respectively the general body of Scientific and Religious doctrines, I
apprehend that the objection
I
There
it.
is,
We
may
in
conceive the
objection
to
mean
that
that
while
food
nourishes
those
or
among
gion,
we can find plenty of persons who have either never heard of Reliwho have persuaded themselves that
as
burns or
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
Religion
is
319
false
who
The
it
street arabs or
advanced thinkers
undoubted
but to bring
forward as an objection to
error.
my
view implies a
the
double
impulse of which
speak
is
may be
and
it
supposed
ground
name
General Consent.'
supposes that
I
My
imaginary
in
short,
and he supposes
Neither
impulse
'
is
its
influence.
accurate
imply a
total
am
re-
endeavouring
This theory
may be
one
rate,
;
The
is,
any
no worse
off
than
men
320
The
positive side,
to
In
no
way
this
capable of actual
I
demonstration amounts to
that
If
and an
Indefinite
number
of other per-
sons,
we contemplate
Religion and
Science as
unproved systems of
feel
by
side,
Is,
and
If
this
need
in the case of
scientific
truths
actions, of
on
be
rooted as
nature.
Is
Is
in
we
could,
freed.
need or Im-
manifestation.
We are
useless
in this
Reason.
It
must always be
Impulse
discuss
is
whether a particular
towards a creed
of the
be-
strength or whatever
Its
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
quality.
321
On
with
the
other hand,
let
no
man who
*
agrees
cannot believe
know
to
be
feel
a subjec-
need
for
it,'
unless he
is
beliefs to those
detached
I
scientific (or
he must
in practice
or not,
Science which
is
time
is
not a reason.
he
will,
accept
an explanation of his
would be as
were engaged
appropriate
in
or inappropriate
if
he
and
rejected Science.
The
for adopting a
systems of
belief,
depends,
it
we
ground
fact that
we
The
is
Freethinkers
assume
one of dependif
there exist
any reason
for believing
it
at
all,
to be found scattered
trines of Science
;
322
by which
Those,
Religion
these
itself is
historic
however,
of
it,
who make
assumption
I
offer
no proof
nor do they, so
far as
to
be
They
accept
it,
as they accept so
many
dence for
of),
it
whatever (which
evidence whatever
required.
am
as
rest-
So
long,
them can
losophic
probability,
discrepancies
which exist or
may
sidered as bearing
be somewhat
different,
would undoubtedly be
is
creed which
not philosophically
difficult, I say,
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
seem
likely to
323
become a
practical question.
is
What
has to be determined
now
between
systems, neither of which can be regarded as philosophically established, but neither of which can
we
consent to surrender
it
and on
is
only possible to
perhaps
make suggestions which may commend themselves to the practical inthough they cannot compel his
In
intellectual assent.
my
judgment, then,
if
these
away by concessions on
but
if,
either side
which do not
made
which
is
should elect
I
In
favour of inconsistency
not
because
should be
because a logical
destruction of
all
may be bought
and necessary
sacrifice of essential
correctness
case, altogether
Incapable of demonstration)
of
many
I
scientific
philosophers
still
less is
it
likely
that
shall
assailants
of Theology
Y
whom
have alluded
324
the arguments
logical opinions to
effect
which
In
may
ex-
some
alteration
the
mode
Is
In
which a perpresent
fectly
legitimate
disagreement
I
at
do
any
why
ment of which
It
is
by Time,
still
struggling in the
of ancestral
prejudice.
instance,
There need be no
to
their
*
advertising
progress,* the
of
of
'
advanced
thought.*
true,
The
if
But
often
and
less loudly
favour of opinions
very
the
little
to do.
It
would be well
If
an appeal to
call it
religious
will
need, instinct,
impulse
you
were no
in
if
what
argument
favour of Theology so
whole
case,
would be puzzled
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
anything better in favour of Science.
325
And
It
would
be well
If
an examination
were
less
Incumbent
on
all
believers,
by philosophers,
Is
to
whom
at
all,
it
never seems
not
valid
It
is
not necessary,
in
think, that
should add
anything more
explanation of
I
my attitude towards
in
hold
harmony
with,
criticisms
am
painfully
are,
who
As
console myself
by thinking
regards the
end
desire
But as
am
if
afraid that
have said
own
difficulties
respecting
of
They
the absence
which
it
is
by any merely
326
exist,
is
would hinder
its
free development.
Their case
ment is all I have to offer. Even could I command the most fervid and persuasive eloquence, could I rouse with power the slumbering feelings which find
in
could
some
which
on which
to
do
so.
into a controversy
key, thoughts
whose
it
is
In
any
case,
beyond
my
my
suppose
to
be unanswereffect
on those
truth
in
who approach
that indifferent
question of religious
themselves
describe
impartiality.
who would
all
inheritances
if
only
it
were true
who
surrender
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
they can scarcely bear to part
;
327
who,
for the
sake of
wont
hope
life,
their
and
to take refuge in
not impossible
some
may be
of service.
Should
and a
I
utility
tion
and
shall
be more than
328
refer-
supposed to
the
To determine
amount of such discrepancy, or even to decide whether it has any reality or not, was in no way necessary to my main argument but it may be convenient to inactual
;
its
importance
The
ence chiefly,
this discord
scientific
if
may
be
doctrines
we were
I
make
each other.
by
the operation of
common
it
The quesscientific
we have
to ask,
if
is
this
What
do we contradict
we
opera-
We
contradict,'
will
be replied,
329
Is the belief
which
is
?
Science
*
that
it lies
as well as
all
understand
Theology who, so
ject
far as I
namely, the
author of
Supernatural Religion
'
and
The former
hardly
to.
*
Mr.
If
it
may
dead
nomenon
is
that the events had occurred would establish the inference. But, on the other hand,
lieve that the evidence
it
to beis
is
/<?r such
a belief
which
soning.
is the sole
gtiarantee {whatever
its origiii)
is
possible,' &c.^
From
italics, it
holds,
and thinks
that
Hume
of our reasoning.'
doubt whether
incorrect.
was Hume's
opinion
*
in
any case
it is
'English Thought
in the
Eighteenth Century,'
p. 341.
330
be termed the
'
sole guarantee
'
of our reasoning,
is
;
is
that
Nature which
equivalent to
which again
is
followed
by
similar consequents.
But
in
no way
in-
which
is
equi-
is
inconsistent with
in
am
be,
The only
philosophers
on which
scientific
un-
more
sider
special
and derivative doctrines of Science, and conthey are affected by a belief in supernatural
how
far
interference.
In this enquiry
distinction
it
will
be convenient to keep
in
mind a
concrete
drawn
By
meant the general laws by which phenomena are connected by the concrete parts were meant (what may be
;
Does, then. Theology require us to modify in any our beliefs concerning the abstract part of Science
way
t
331
does not.
Such
if
beliefs are in
themselves
and as
fully
proved
if
supernatural interference be
phenomena
If
owing to supernatural
that the
do not
If
occur, the
fact''iv>^^'^?^*>^
phenomena do not
will
of the
we
less
believe that
we
believe so
we
happen
interpose, or has
that result.
is
which
obvious enough in
and on which
believe I
am
in
agreement with Mr. Mill and others who are not commonly
suspected of a theological bias.
the
widest sense,
Now
is
complicated by a considera-
affect us
when we
by the consideration,
namely, that
it
is
compels a
causes
commonly
called Chris-
more than a
detailed
thesis, just as
332
opposite.
the Theologians
are
right
in
their
fact,
Science
itself
and magnitude of
is
growth of myths,
and anti-theological
discussion.
writers
is
with so
much
material for
Such a task
on
of course impossible.
But
it
may
have to be faced
all
known
all cases,
without strain-
ing, to account
facts
some
more abstract
On
such a hypothesis
scientific materials,
may
easily be exaggerated.
Regarded
lation to us as
men, the
facts
Regarded
in
hardly be maintained.
As
and elsewhere
Be-
'
333
for disbelieving
;
any and
'
being few, they are lost in the mass of facts which have
Is
'
the
reader
may
be tempted to exclaim.
is
stood
that this
a subject on which
men
of science pro*
What, then,
.?
belief in Providence,
and
in the possible
interference of Supernatural
Power
in
answer to prayer
They may
cast,
the past
and
if
our actual
scientific inferences
were
(as I
have shown
satisfactory character
on these
I
points, this
might prove a
only
As
it is,
we never have
seen,
hope to
see,
we
leave
to
suflfice
or retrospection an absolute
we take
If the literal interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation be accepted as an essential part of religion, no doubt the discrepancy between Religion and Science will be greater than that stated I have, however, assumed (in accordance with what I in the text.
is
to
is
not
334
Theologians
is
comparatively insignificant
hypothesis
if
most
favourable
to
the
and
many
Science,
know a great deal about and may be supposed to know something about
writers
who
certainly
relation
which Ought
to
subsist
first,
are to be found,
It is not
if
of the second.
hard
on any presupposition of
this sort
is
(combined
philosophically
mere discovery that they are not connected would remove all ground for accept:
since the
As, however,
have
in
suffi-
ciently expressed
my
dissent
from
this
view,
it
is
it.
not
I I
necessary that
occa-
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ETHICS.
335
APPENDIX.
ON THE IDEA OF A PHILOSOPHY OF
In
in this
ETHICS.
apply the
Appendix
first
in general contained
Ethics in particular.
necessary,
an error which,
in these
days
the
Knowable
Ethics
is
the
That
error I
mean by which
or department of Science.
At
many
a fact of
is
my
mental being
and, like
all
dealt with
by Psychology,
also
a branch of science.
all
Physiology,
it
is
some men
have claimed, or seemed to claim, Ethics for their own. To hold such a view would be a most unfortunate error
not to hold clearly and definitely
its
contrary
may
lead to
much
confusion
336
[app,
cal laws,
the truth
remains that
scientific
judgments and
ethical
judgments
Every
have existed, do
simplifications
certain changes
and
were made
in the
phenomena
it
(as in ideal
Roughly speaking,
may
be said to state
An
ethical proposition,
it
like
truth,' for
it
asserts
and
if
some
stated a fact,
'
it is
not certainly a
'
external
or of the
internal
world.
One
between
a proposition as
in the
its
;
and of the
individual,
its
its
its
causes and
truth or
evidence
to
Psychology or Anthropology
for Ethics.
The danger
shown by the
APP
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
:
ETHICS.
is,
337
that
any
satisfactory system
assume, whatever be
its contents.
all
The obvious
itself,
is
truth that
knowledge
is
either certain in
or
is
so,
than sufficiently
insisted
ral, is
on
and
this,
which
is
little
peculiar to Ethics.
must themselves
or metaphysical.
be ethical,
In other words,
a proposition announc-
which
no proof
I
This might be
its first
so,
for all
principles to Science.
A concrete case
and
perhaps
make
clearer this
is
axiom
of ethical philosophy.
man
(let
us say)
not satisfied
a reason,
He demands
society.
He
is
on what
is
But
this
There
is
a suppressed
somewhat
is is
in this
way,
'
And
is
This example
a typical case.
There
is
no
by which an
ethical
scientific or
metaphysical
338
[app.
proposition, or
will
in reality
is
syllo-
seems to
me
to be ob-
at
concerned
it
So far as the proof of a basis of morals is makes irrelevant all discussion on the origin of
on the nature of moral sentiments
;
moral
ideas, or
and
it
pology
all
discussion on
and
evolution, in so
far,
at least,
refer to tiltimate
moral laws.
For
mental phenomenon,
and
my
it
thesis
is,
or
put
positively), if
in
we have
it,
a moral system at
all,
there
must be contained
required.
all
is
'
a priori'
It is not,
be,
founded on experience.
Whether we be
by whatever name
series of experi-
we
call ourselves,
for such
Limited indeed
the
this
App.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ETHICS.
339
not in
its
psychological
adjunct,
but
on
the
And
the necessary
of course, of these efforts to support ultimate princithat they cease to be ultimate, and
ples
is,
expli-
would very
likely
appear
far
less
obvious
than they.
There
is
who
by
as a
is
arrived at
if
who would
regard
it
blow to morality
the process
by which
ethical
common
called
'
to
many
are the
a priori'
Now
if
by
this
but
if it
be meant
a singular misnomer.
For
is
maxims
relation
own
internal
authority, but from the fact that they bear a certain special
to our mental constitution
;
something
validity of
of this sort
We
'
lies
ought to obey
all
laws the
which
is
Now,
do not
deny that from a philosophical point of view such propositions as these are possible foundations of morals
I desire to point out
is
;
but what
crete case) as
'
340
[app.
science
ings,
different
meanand
is
two
different
systems of Ethics,
first
'
not
commonly
distinguished.
'
According to the
an
ought to
do what conscience commands,' and being an inference, cannot obviously be an d priori law. According to the second
'
is
in
on
its
own
in,
and conscience
is
very
unnecessarily brought
or to account for or for
its
either to
general acceptance
some other
is
extra-ethical reason.
views
ethical philosophy
assailable.
so far as form
is
concerned
is
un-
But
who
and
if
ment
is
misleading,
far I
not erroneous.
So
it
have
this
statement
tautological
for if
we knew
in
no
difficulty in
what obligation consisted there would be stating the meaning of ethical. Beyond
this I
Is
it
more than
this
Is
possible to give
shall
any description of
ethical propositions
}
which
their character
On
general grounds
is
them
in
being neither
in
scientific
differ
from them
some other
respect.
myself hold
this to
APR]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
case.
I
ETHICS.
341
be the
monly
shall
henceforward
call
two negative
characteristics
above mentioned
;
common
ethical
depends not on
form
'
but on
'
matter.'
I
shall
Those commonly
;
called ethical I
shall describe as
moral
immoral.
or non-ethical
and every
explain
ethical
judgment
moral
view
or non-moral or immoral.
defined, let
The terminology
and
at the
thus being
me
it,
same time
my
on the subject.
If a
man
or
it
And
similarly, if
or
because
it
may be
is.
In other words,
deliberate action
chosen for
itself
alone
I
which
loosely
something
may
what
term an object.
'end,'
I
An
is
ethical
to
proposition
an
end.
Nobody
deny that
this definition
true of all
it
342
[app.
and say
sitions
is
many
propo-
Now my object
class
to
which
to
And
for this
purpose,
me
(which
is,
I call
ethical)
of
(i)
refer-
(2)
who
itself
as chosen for
of that
{4)
The subordinate
or theological
propositions
means of
scientific
minor premises.
When
fundamental
rests
ends
shall
have precedence.
The
first
sort declares
an end
ends
is
two
final
This second
of course,
one end as
possibly
lie
final.]
(5)
No
at
the
'
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
in so
ETHICS.
343
Now
far as this
is
gram of every
tive
ethical system,
sort of
every impera-
must
rest.
Yet since
it is
(it
former
it
may
The main
And
in
order to illustrate
I
this,
and
at the
same time
to
am
'
may
which
'
Universality
Conscience
My
and
in
position, of course,
is
the reader
taking
Universality
A
It
law
that
all
have
is
a scientific assertion
now
that Morality
is
the
same
and therefore
is
till,
some one
further
found to re-assert
it.
this doctrine,
we need not
discuss
344
[app.
The second possible meaning is, that by a universal moral law we mean one by which all intelligences ought This also we may dismiss to regard themselves as bound.
because
it
amounts
all
is
a moral law
which obliges
laws.
Is
intelligences to be
we
are
discussing?
preceding one.
If
is
can be a moral
law which
not universal.
all
men ought
to obey.
we do
immoral ones,
as
is
tolerably certain.
It
remains to enquire
;
and
this enquiry,
seems to me,
may
sideration.
telligences.
Me
it
and
all
other in-
The
first
Me
it
whether
were universal
not be
(in
bound by a
law held by
not.
this,
Me
whether
were universal
in this sense or
bound
as binding on
else
;
you
it
as binding on
it
someone
and
;
it is
as binding on
you
it
has
and
it
nises
This
may
fact,
and
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
I
ETHICS.
345
it.
What
deny
is,
two
is
has any-
The
to the
fourth and last meaning which I am able to attach word Universal, when used of a law, is that it
signifies
that
all
bound by a law
'
so qualified.
Now,
if
'
well-constituted
is
defined with
reference to morality,
frivolous
and merely
If
it
be
means, for
ground of obligation, as
sense.
For a proposition asserting that any considerable body of men, distinguished from the rest of mankind by some non-moral attribute, hold the same moral code, is
very likely to be questionable, and being a scientific assertion,
is
So much,
science, I
Universality.
As
regards
Con-
faculty which
to
add nothing
if
we suppose
remorse or
authority supported
as
this
self-approval.
Conscience regarded in
way
is
external
authority,
for
it
instance,
is
the Deity,
or the
Now,
plain that
no external
why
should
given.
346
[app.
that
is,
that (through
will
is
Now, the
first
of these
its
viously does
not derive
validity
from
is
the
external
an authority
be said of the
only by means of
it.
And
moral.'
the same
may
moral
'
for the
word
'
is
the
The
tives
sudden
ethical
'
to imperait,
perhaps,
desirable that
All imperatives,
all
:
propositions prescribing
if
actions,
have
this in
common
That
must be
to the individual
or infor
alone.
The number
money
(irrespective of
power of giving
love
of God,
revenge, are
some
is
of the
one of these
to be attained for
own
it
something
else.
Now,
is
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ETHICS.
347
a system of dependent
for instance,
is for
me
an
end-in-itself,
may
dependent
propositions
belonging
indefinite
that
particular system.
number of
form,
it
such systems
is
is
thus characterised by a
common
divided
by ordinary usage
is
which
there
a tolerable
agreement.
It
would be
founded on revenge
this is not
was immoral
and,
though there
a question on which
of
reader.
these
.''
names being
or to limit the
1
presumably
what
is
the connotation
enquiry, what
The
they
may
be,
can
all
re-state
in other
ultimate
of the system,
all.
and
so,
properly
may
simply assert
that
the
of the
If
for
greatest
number
is
for
action.
the countless
If
he attempts to give
any further
who do indeed
348
[app.
the word
it,
but whose
The
sanction
characteristics of
moral actions
to be so,
whether by educait
tion, association
is
habitually misunderstood.
}
is
if
not a single
man
ever had
t
done or could do
right.
Is
valid
same
savage.
money does to the miser, or revenge to the They are the groundwork of an ethical system, and to state them is simply to denote what ethical system it is which is being alluded to. Are they, finally, not ends of action, but merely marks by which certain actions may be known to belong to a particular system ? In that case,
and
for that
am
ethical
'
from the
which
App.]
349
may
The
corollary
is
that
no
in-
the
Good and
subjects of investigation,
and that
'
in
we
'
ought
'
to be performed.
on actual or possible
that they must be
aesthetic systems,
included
either (i)
under
to
Ethics, or
And
The
belongs
first
to,
or
included in Ethics,
mention chiefly
art-critics
for
Even those
whose
our
it
is
If
code stands on a
different,
amount of
possibilities,
namely,
Esthetics
is
merely
certain
the investigation
of the nature
produced
us
by
do with
Ethics, either
by way of resemblance or
350
[app.
contrast, than
which
it
belongs.
The
'
objective standards,'
*
ideas,' or
archetypes,'
the Perception
Taken by themselves,
physics
;
Meta-
but
if
there be added
be either ethical
This
is
From
this concise
analysis then,
would seem
But
clear
^Esthetics.
if
that
how comes
The reply to this is, that there does some theories of Esthetics and
Some
by virtuous
of
these
is
And
if
the
scientific
examination
Good
Again,
if
ethical en-
and
it
is
standard
I
I
of
beauty.
Now
it
pronounce
contend for
all
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
;
ETHICS.
351
is
or,
contend
for
directly to
do with Obligation.
the functions
The second
is
corollary concerns
It
is
of the
it
Moral Philosopher.
clear
collects
around
the
time-
These
is
are' topics
he expected to
at the root of
any system
Nor, for the
same
flict,
which of two
or
ends
of one
is is
how much
Nor,
how much
of
the other.
in reality,
and
form
The deduction
sarily in this
:
is
always necesto be
the happiness of
us say,
: *
mankind ought
promoted
piness of
it
'
(this,
let
is
the ultimate
unprovable
the hap-
monogamy promotes
: '
mankind
is
'
another system
therefore
monogamy
This
is
Now
the only
diffi-
first
principle of
the system
lies in
premiss
in other words,
sociological investigation,
The important
tant duties, arise
in
which the
352
[app.
greater part of
first
principles.
The two
do
I
is
questions each
man
has to ask
himself are
action
I
it
?
What
and
If there
not of law
and the
their throat
by
its
essentially,
all,
and by
Above
he must beware
some rude
may
(as the
when, it
may be,
this principle
by simple
problems
in
practice.
method
It
will
be
casuistical,
may
commenting
at
some length on the prevailing confusion between Ethics and Psychology, I should now have to announce that the
business of the Ethical Philosopher (at least, so far as
principles are concerned)
is
first
as purely
psychological
I
as,
make
it
out
and
it
may
seem, therefore, as
if
the difference
between
my
whom
have attempted to
important.
is
by no means
essential or
This, however,
My
complaint
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
;
ETHICS.
353
an ethical system
I,
on
all
do with
they are
To do
this effectually
work
will, therefore, in
logical.
To make
by
this
should add,
is
my
no absur-
may
new
speculations hit on
some
entirely
principle which
mind
in
as soon as
it is
presented to him.
this
The
third corollary I
draw
is
two senses
means
superior in form,
more
in
sketched out.
the
it
sense,
which
system,
superiority
the
matter of the
is
one of which
if presented
we
we should adopt
is
to us.
The
it
superiority indicated
a hypothetical supe-
riority.
Now
our own,
in
which we.
which we
by no means
speak of our
own
we
perceive a
change and
in the direction
A A
354
[app.
and
if,
this
change we
continue
false
But
we suppose
that
this
improvement
im-
provement certainly
not.
And
the reason
is
clear.
What we mean,
the past,
is
or ought to mean,
an approach to
any change
future
at all corresponding in magnitude to this in the must involve a departure from that standard, it must
In other words,
when we
we speak of a possible system which we should accept if we knew it. When we speak of our own system being superior to that of some other person, we assert the superiority unconditionbeing superior (in matter) to our own,
ally,
it
and quite irrespectively of the possible acceptance of by that other person, supposing him to be acquainted
it.
with
If then
it
we
in the future as
we must suppose
would be as
man.
This
come when the moral ideas of the world much out of our reach, supposing them prealso true of scientific ideas
but there
is
this difTerence
scientific
in
ideas
may be an improvement,
viz.,
that in
moral
ideas
must be a degradation.
The grounds
is,
of this dis-
or
is
supposed to
a conformity which
ideas.
may
change
in the
The standard
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
and
this
ETHICS.
355
ideal,
in the ideas.
as
form
is
concerned, of the
criterion of right,
and
also has
confess
it
it.
LONDON
SPOTTISWOODE
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AND
CO.,
NEW-STREET
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