I ' Screened

£v : J d v i d r d /liter Date:
i i h - ,P-, : n ^

Passenger Processing at Ticket Counters

Immediate Actions:

9/11 Classified Information

Strengthen CAPPS criteria to increase selectee pool

•L 9/11 Classified Information

• Extend security provisions over selectee to

Short Term Actions;

• None

Long Term Actions;

9/11 Classified Information

Institute multi-level CAPPS

Details of how this would work are contained in Appendix 1

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Flight Standards Service

9/11 Commission Briefing

Flight Training
January 13, 2004

John Allen
Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service
 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
AND
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
REGARDING RESPONSIBILITIES AND COOPERATION FOR
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY AND COMMERCIAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

1. PARTIES. The "Parties" to this Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) are the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

2. AUTHORITY. .

a. TSA enters into this MOA pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(m), 114(m), and 70103(c).

b. FAA enters into this MOA pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 106(m).

3. PURPOSE. The purpose of this MOA is to delineate clear lines of authority and
responsibility between the Parties based on existing legal authority and core competencies. By
establishing a cooperative interagency relationship emphasizing organizational capabilities, the
Parties intend to improve services to and relationships with each other, other modal
administrations, other federal, state, and local agencies, non-governmental stakeholders, and the
American public. The Parties intend this MOA to define their strategic relationship with an aim
towards identifying and leveraging their respective core competencies, capabilities, resources,
and authorities to enhance the safety and security of aviation and commercial space
transportation in the United States, and to achieve national performance security goals for the
National Airspace System (NAS). To this end, the Parties will cooperate in accordance with the
principles and actions set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this MOA.

4. BACKGROUND.

a. The events of September 11, 2001 significantly changed the Nation's homeland
security posture. Recognizing the importance of transportation security, on November 19, 2001,
the President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. 107-
71,115 Stat. 597 (2001), which among other things established TSA as a new administration
within the Department of Transportation (DOT). In enacting ATSA, Congress recognized the
importance of security for all forms of transportation and related infrastructure. Accordingly,
Congress established TSA and conferred upon the Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security responsibility for security in all modes of transportation, including carrying out
49 U.S.C. chapter 449, relating to civil aviation security, and related research and development
activities, and security responsibilities over other modes of transportation that are exercised by
 Air Transport Association * ata j OF AMERICA
1709 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Phone (202) 626-4000

Mr. Billie H. Vincent

Director of Civil Aviation Security
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
Dear Billie:
I am pleased to transmit herewith the report of the government/
industry bomb threat response task force.
After analyzing a decade of experience, the task force unani-
mously concluded that adoption of a "cannon strategy" as described in
the report will inprove passenger safety, reduce operational disrup-
tions, increase passenger satisfaction and provide for more effective
utilization of aviatxcp/law enforcement resources. One of the most
significant findings of the task force is the fact that there has
never been a barb threat that led to the discovery of a device that
did not involve "positive target identification" (PTi) ~.
It is reoonnendad that you accept the task force conclusions,
circulate the proposed change to the Air Carrier Standard Security
Program establishing the PTI criterion, and comassion the task force
to continue to work with your staff to ccnplete the "canton strategy"
needed^ to inprove practices and procedures relating to barb threats
directed against United States civil aviation interests.
It is hard to believe that a full year has passed since you and
I decided that this project warranted priority attention. I think we
can both take pride in the results, and it is especially gratifying to
me that the effort was launched and this report submitted during my
tenure as Chairman of the ATA Security Comnittee.
The work of every member of the task force is deserving of the
highest praise, but we are particularly grateful for the cooperation
and assistance provided by your staff, most notably Jack Hunter and
Walter Korsgaard.
Sincerely,
RECEIVED
Stephen L. Gardella, Jr. JAR 0 1380
Chairman
ATA Security Caimittee
Enclosure
cc: Task Force Members
\l

AAKEAN COM M 008435

 Risk Analysis/Total Architecture for
Aviation Security (TAAS)

Mike McCormick
Transportation Security Administration
Office of Security Technologies
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER THE
8/1 S /O^ PROVISIONS OF 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
O/ 1 Jl \JJ OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION FOR SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE
MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE
DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00002 Folder: 0025 Document: 8
Series: 9/11 Commission, Team 7, box 2

Copies: 1 Pages: 9

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Johnstone docs-Training & Testing Materials.

Document Date:
Document Type: Memorandum
From:
To:

Subject: "Checked Baggage Scenario Threat Variants"

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 40474
Withdrawn: 01-04-2006 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 40474 00002 0025 8