GONZALES v. MACARAIG, JR. G.R. No. 87636 Nov.

19, 1990 Topic: Procedure for the Passage of Bills and Exercise of Veto Power FACTS: Congress passed HB No. 19186 or the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for the Fiscal Year (FY) 1989. It eliminated/decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. The GAB was signed into law (RA No. 6688) by the Pres who vetoed 7 special provisions & Sec. 55, a general provision. Senate, thru Senate Resolution No. 381 then declared the veto as unconstitutional and void and upheld the validity of Sec. 55. A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed, assailing the constitutionality of the Presidential veto. It also sought to enjoin implementation of RA No. 6688. The petitioners are members of the Senate Committee on Finance who filed this case in their capacity as committee members & as taxpayers. Respondents are Cabinet members tasked to implement the General Appropriations Act of 1989 & 1990, who are all being sued in their official capacities. A supplemental petition was filed this time questioning the presidents veto of certain provisions, Sec. 16 of HB 26934 (GAB for FY 1990) in particular. Sec. 55 of GAA of FY 1989 (Prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by Congress) provides: o Appropriations items recommended by the Pres in Budget submitted to Congress w/c has been reduced/disapproved shall not be restored/increased using appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. A recommendation is deemed disapproved if Congress did not provide for a corresponding appropriation for that purpose. The reason for the Presidential Veto was that it was violative of sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of the Constitution in effect disallowing the President, Sen. President, Speaker of the House, SC Chief Justice, and the head of Constitutional commissions to augment items in the GAA for their offices from savings in other items even in cases of calamity or when there is an urgent need to accelerate implementation of essential pub service/infrastructure. Sec. 16 of GAA of FY 1990 (Use of Savings ): Allowed augmentation but 1989s Sec. 55 was attached as a condition/restriction. Same reason was given for the veto along with the fact that a case was

already pending in the SC concerning the validity of the 1989 veto. Petitioners contentions: 1. The president can only veto item/s & not provision/s such as Secs 16 & 55. 2. When the president vetoes a provision, she should likewise veto the entire bill. 3. The item-veto power does not allow Pres to veto conditions/restrictions. 4. Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of Consti has to be provided for by law & Congress has power to impose restrictions on exercise of that pow. Respondents contentions: 1. Its a political question. 2. Petitioners had a political remedy override the veto. 3. Sec. 55 is a rider since its unrelated to the Appropriations Act. 4. Budget Law (PD 1177, Secs. 44-45) allows the Pres to augment items in the appropriations for the exec dept. 5. Consti allows pres to veto provisions or other distinct & severable parts of an Appropriations Bill.

ISSUES + RATIO: 1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case YES. As held in Demetria vs Alba: Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. There is an imperative need for a definitive ruling on the matter in order to avoid recurrences in the future. Taxpayers (Sanidad vs. COMELEC) & members of Senate (Tolentino vs. COMELEC) have the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of issues raised. This is pursuant to the courts power of judicial review. Court took cognizance of cases involving the constitutionality of a Presidential veto such as Bengson vs Sec. of Justice & Bolinao Electronics vs. Valencia. 2. Whether the President has the power to veto provisions of the GAB YES. Sec. 27, Art. VI of the Constitution provides for the veto power of the President. Paragraph 1 refers to the general veto power which results to the veto of the entire bill whereas Par. 2 refers to the item-veto or line-veto power allowing exercise of veto over particular item/s in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. This power does not grant the authority

on the Pres to veto a part of an item & to approve the remaining portion of the same item. o item: particulars, the details, the distinct & severable parts of the bill. Its an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. Its a specific appropriation of money & not some general provision of law w/c happens to be put into an appropriation bill. Petitioners urge a restrictive interpretation of the provision. It disregards the fact that distinct & severable parts of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto & thus eliminating the need of vetoing the entire bill (Sec. 25.2, Art. VI). It likewise overlooks the Constitutional mandate w/c provides that a provision in an appropriations bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to w/c it relates & it does not relate to the entire bill. Petitioners erroneously claim that the veto power of the Pres is legislative & should be strictly construed. In Bengzon, the Court said that the Constiution is a limitation upon the legislative power & a grant of power to the executive and that the courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto as it will presume the constitutionality of a legislative act.

w/in a separate legislation. It must exhibit a connection w/money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Although the provisions were made to appear as conditions/limitations, they were actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and separate legislation. Neither of the provisions show the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The Bolinao case is inapplicable. The veto there was held invalid because it carried with it the approval of the condition attached to it whereas in this case, no condition in the budgetary sense, attached to an appropriation/item in the appropriation bill which was struck out. What we have here is a gen provision of law that happens to be put in an appropriation bill.

3. Whether the provisions are inappropriate YES. These are not provisions in the budgetary sense. Sec. 25.2, Art. VI of the Consti provides that all provisions/enactments shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation & their operation shall be limited to the appropriation to w/c they relate to. But these provisions apply generally to all items disapproved/reduced by Congress & not to a particular/distinctive appropriation. The disapproved/reduced items are not found on the Bill either. One would still need to resort to the Presidents original recommendation to discover w/c items have been disapproved/reduced. These provisions are more of an expression of Congressional policy re: augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. These are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power (Henry vs Edwards). 4. Whether the conditions/restrictions are inappropriate YES. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the powr to specify how money shall be spent. The executive is not allowed to veto a condition/proviso while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. But restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters w/c are more properly dealt

5. WON the veto is valid - YES Provisions are indeed violative of Art. VI, Sec. 25(5) as president argued in his veto. In Demetria vs. Alba, the Court held that heads of different branches of the government should be afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds & resources. They should be allowed to transfer funds for purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch/constitutional body concerned. Such was affirmed in the 73 Consti and in PD 1177, Sec. 44-45. Even the 1989 (Sec. 12) and 1990 (Sec. 16) GAA allow such. The doctrine of separation of powers is not endangered because the transfer is made only within a department. Likewise, it does not vest in the executive the power to rewrite the entire budget since transfers are limited within the department or branch specific appropriation of money. Its a non-appropriation item which has no place in an appropriation measure. They are more of substantive expressions of a legislative object. They are matters of gen law & more properly the subject of a separate legislation that will embody, define & delimit the scope of the special power of augmentation from savings. If, as Congress claims, these provisions were included to repeal PD 1177, then all the more that it should be provided in a separate enactment since implied repeals are not favored. Besides, as the respondents contend, the Constiution has laid down a remedy for the petitioners. They could have overridden the veto by 2/3 votes of its members. But they did not do so. ADJUDICATION: The veto was upheld. Petition was dismissed.