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Timur Kuran is Professor of Economics and Political Science at Duke University and the author of The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East.
If this proves insufficient to drive Erdoan from power, the arrival of his self -imposed prime ministerial term limit in 2015 will allow the AKP Executive Council to force him to retire simply by holding him to his word. With the AKP having demonstrated its disapproval of Erdoans undemocratic behavior, its new leadership could begin to rebuild its legitimacy as a party that respects minority rights. To keep it from losing its way again, the AKP must also address the root cause of Erdoans metamorphosis into an intolerant autocrat. Early in Erdoans premiership, he was restrained by the president, the judiciary, and the military, which were all committed to upholding the secularism enshrined in Turkeys constitution. As recently as 2008, Turkeys highest court considered shutting down the AKP for violating that principle. But changes in the judiciarys composition, Gls 2008 accession to the presidency, and a 2010 constitutional amendment allowing military officials to be tried in civilian courts contributed to the gradual loosening of restrictions on Erdoans authority. More than 400 generals have been imprisoned for allegedly plotting coups, in many cases on the basis of patently fabricated evidence. Erdoan has also misused the legal system to stifle the media and repress citizens freedom of expression. Clearly, Turkeys political institutions lack adequate safeguards. They have allowed an enormous concentration of power in the hands of one person and the parliamentary majority that he leads. Turkish policymakers must now guarantee the judiciarys autonomy and political impartiality, restore freedom of expression for all citizens, and establish a system of checks and balances to replace the military as the guardian of secularism. Pursuing the latter objective would require the AKP to relinquish some power voluntarily. It might sell the requisite constitutional reforms to its conservative base by conveying that, in the long run, Islamists have as much to gain from effective political checks and balances as do the targets of Erdoans social engineering. After all, as Morsis overthrow demonstrated, public opinion can quickly turn against a ruling party, especially in an economic crisis. Egypts recent experience offers a glimpse into Turkeys potential future should it fail to establish effective political safeguards. Morsi was able to rule without restraint, trampling freely on citizens fundamental rights, because the military regime th at assumed control after Hosni Mubaraks 2011 ouster scheduled presidential elections before a constitution was adopted. The only way the Muslim Brotherhood can hope to regain broad acceptance as a legitimate democratic player is with a constitution that includes credible mechanisms for guaranteeing pluralism and due process. Political Islam has reached a critical juncture on the road toward democratic legitimacy. Its continued progress will depend on the commitment of two of its leading promoters Turkeys AKP and Egypts Muslim Brotherhood to design and implement political systems that safeguard the basic democratic principles of pluralism, freedom, and the rule of law.