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DAEL CHURCHILL T.

GERONG Criminal Law Review


186 Cal.App.2d 176 (1960) THE PEOPLE, Respondent,v.PEDRO RED, Appellant. Crim. No. 7118. California Court of Appeals. Second Dist., Div. Three. Nov. 4, 1960. No appearance for Appellant.No appearance for Respondent. SHINN, P. J. Pedro Red was accused by indictment of violating Health and Safety Code, section 11502, in agreeing unlawfully to sell heroin to Francisco Lopez and selling Lopez another substance in lieu of heroin. Trial by jury having been waived, in a court trial Red was convicted. He appeals from the sentence. We construe the appeal as one from the judgment. Appellant was represented by a deputy public defender at the trial. Upon his application for appointment of counsel on the appeal, we read the record and denied the application for the reason that the appeal has no semblance of merit and 177*177 appointment of counsel would serve no useful purpose. Appellant was duly notified of our order and his time to file a brief was substantially extended; no brief has been filed. [1] Officer Lopez testified that he was driving south on Broadway in an unmarked car on May 7, 1959. He was accompanied by Officer Quintin Villanueva. Appellant was on the sidewalk in the company of a man who was unknown to the officers; Lopez had met Red on two previous occasions. Appellant waved at Lopez, who waved back; told Lopez to stop at the corner, where Red and his companion got into the car. Lopez asked appellant if he knew where to get some "stuff"; Red replied that he could give him the "stuff." In the opinion of the officer, based upon his experience with the vocabulary of persons dealing in narcotics, "stuff" means heroin. Red told Lopez to drive to the corner of Pico and Olive. Villanueva remained in the car while the others walked toward a parking lot. Red and his companion were walking behind Lopez. The officer turned and saw appellant rise from a crouched position and hand the other man a cellophane wrapper which held five capsules containing a white powder. Lopez gave Red a $10 bill and the other man gave the wrapper to the officer. It was stipulated that the capsules contained quinine, a nonnarcotic substance. Villanueva corroborated the testimony of Lopez as to the encounter with appellant, but he did not witness the exchange of the capsules and the money. Red did not take the stand. The evidence was ample to sustain the conviction. (People v. Shephard, 169 Cal.App.2d 283 [337 P.2d 214].) The officers were cross-examined at length regarding their identification of appellant and the identity of the other participant in the transaction, whom they testified they did not know. There was no error at the trial. Appellant received a vigorous and an able defense. The judgment is affirmed. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.KEWAN BERNARD RED, Defendant and Appellant.No. E055184.Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two.Filed June 21, 2012. Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. OPINION -RAMIREZ, P. J. Defendant and appellant Kewan Bernard Red[1] pled guilty to the sheet as set forth, post, with an indicated sentence of 20 years four months. He was then sentenced to the indicated sentenced of 20 years four months to state prison with credit for time served. Defendant appeals from the judgment, challenging the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea as well as the validity of the plea. We affirm the judgment. I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On April 21, 2011, deputies executed and served a narcotics related search warrant at an address in the City of Perris. Upon entry, deputies found defendant, defendant's wife, another female, and three small children in the residence. A search of the residence revealed approximately three-fourths of a pound of marijuana, baggies, a scale, a loaded semiautomatic handgun, and ammunition. After defendant waived his constitutional rights, he admitted that he made most of his money selling marijuana from his residence, and that he usually kept a gun with the children's clothing in the master bedroom dresser. Prior to a preliminary hearing, on August 22, 2011, a seven-count amended felony complaint was filed against defendant. [2] The amended felony complaint charged defendant with possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359, count 1); possession of hydrocodone (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a), count 2); possession of hydrocodone while armed with a loaded and operable firearm (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.1, count 3); child endangerment (Pen. Code, 273a, subd. (a), count 4); receipt of stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a), count 5); felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 6); and felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, 12316, subd. (b)(1), count 7). The amended complaint also alleged that in the commission of counts 1 and 2, defendant was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that defendant committed count 7 while released from custody (Pen. Code, 12022.1). The amended complaint further alleged that defendant had suffered two prior serious and violent felony strike convictions. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(a)). On November 16, 2011, at the People's request, the trial court dismissed counts 2 and 3, as well as the enhancement charged in count 2.[3] Defendant then pled to the remaining counts and allegations. In return, defendant was promised an indicated sentence of 20 years four months in state prison. The sentencing hearing was held on December 2, 2011. At that time, the trial court struck one of the prior strike allegations pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and sentenced defendant to 20 years four months in state prison with credit for time served as follows: the upper term of 12 years on count 4; the middle term of one year four months on count 1; one year for the enhancement allegation attached to count 1; the middle terms of one year four months on counts 5, 6, and 7; and two years for the enhancement allegation attached to count 7. On December 7, 2011, defendant filed a notice of appeal based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea, as well as challenging the validity of the plea. Defendant also requested a certificate of probable cause, which was granted. II DISCUSSION Defendant appealed and, upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a

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DAEL CHURCHILL T. GERONG Criminal Law Review


statement of the case, a summary of the facts and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court undertake a review of the entire record. We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has done. In his two-page supplemental brief, defendant generally challenges the service of the search warrant by the deputies, claiming the deputies "entered through the garage" without identifying themselves "correctly." He also generally alleges that his Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. We reject these contentions. Initially, we note that defendant's claims are "`perfunctorily asserted without argument in support . . . .'" ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206.) We need not consider mere contentions of error unaccompanied by legal argument since they have not been properly raised. (Ibid.; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 884.) "`[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the search warrant was unlawfully executed or served. There is also nothing in the record to show that defendant's constitutional rights were violated. "[I]f defendants have a specific argument other than the lack of a warrant as to why a warrantless search or seizure was unreasonable, they must specify that argument as part of their motion to suppress and give the prosecution an opportunity to offer evidence on the point. [Citation.] For example, defendants who believe the police failed to comply with the knock-notice requirement of Penal Code section 844 cannot simply bring a motion to suppress alleging a warrantless search or seizure and then wait until the appeal to raise the knock-notice issue. Rather, defendants must specify the knock-notice issue in the course of the trial court proceeding." (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130.) Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we independently reviewed the record for potential error. We have now completed our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues. However, we note that the reporter's transcript indicates that defendant admitted two prior strike allegations at the November 16, 2011 plea hearing, and that the trial court struck one of the prior strike allegations at the December 2, 2011 sentencing hearing. Nonetheless, the November 16, 2011 minute order reflects defendant admitted only one prior strike allegation. In addition, the December 2, 2011 minute order does not reflect that the trial court struck the August 8, 1995, prior strike allegation for attempted robbery. "Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls." (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385; see also People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) When such a discrepancy appears, we have the inherent power to correct clerical errors to make records reflect the true facts. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) III DISPOSITION The superior court clerk is directed to amend both the November 16 and December 2, 2011, minute orders to reflect that defendant admitted two prior strike conviction allegations at the November 16, 2011, plea hearing; and that the trial court struck the August 8, 1995, prior strike conviction for attempted robbery at the December 2, 2011, sentencing hearing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

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