The Guatemalan Civil War

Despite being a small nation, territory wise, Guatemala has played a very important role in the hemisphere in particular in the saga of the United States-Latin American relations. Described as the key to Latin America and the source of great lessons painfully learned1 , Guatemala has portrayed the extent to which the United States, early on characterised by the dominance of the United Fruit Company (UFCo), influenced the region both politically and economically. Having the biggest majority of indigenous population, as well as the longest and bloodiest Civil War in the region, this Central American country has provided ample and important lessons to the rest of the hemisphere. The United Fruit Company Having arrived in the country in 1901, the UFCo, an American company, became the largest landowner in the country; at the height of its power, the company behaved as a State within a State, arranging its contracts to the government in a fashion that would always be advantageous for them, as well as dictating transport tariffs; the latter was possible as the company had sole ownership of the railway services and actively stopped all projects involving the building of roads which in any way could hamper its monopoly. As the US rose as a world power so did its influence in domestic Guatemalan affairs. In alliance with the local oligarchy, the US government supported dictatorships which maintained the status quo so beneficial for both parties and so detrimental to the majority of the population. This model worked for some time until as a consequence of the Great Depression hundreds of thousands of rural workers were made unemployed. Thus creating fertile grounds for an organised insurrection.

Eduardo Galeano, Las Venas Abiertas de Amrica Latina, http://stella.psuv.org.ve/wpcontent/uploads/2009/05/las-venas-abiertas-de-america-latina.pdf

Revolution, the CIA intervention and its aftermath 1944-1970 In the aftermath of the Great Depression and mainly as a response to the economic and social crises it created in the country a coalition between the middle and working class was formed. This group, which included army officers, overthrew the Ubico dictatorship 2, in a Revolution lasting ten years. Juan Jos Arvalo (1945 1950) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951 - 1954) were to be the rulers of this period, both implementing several reforms, being the most relevant: Introduction of basic democratic liberties, abolishment of forced labour, establishment of minimum wages and basic organisation and bargaining rights for both workers and peasants, establishment of basic institutions of social welfare and the undertaking of modernising capitalism, particularly boosting national enterprise and regulating foreign investment. Arbenz went one step further, and in 1952 his government established an Agrarian reform. This reform entailed the expropriation of unused land in exchange of payment. The aim of this reform was to provide land to the peasants (over 100,000 were benefited) so not only could they have some disposable income but also boost the domestic market and in time reduce the dependence on foreign products. Top of the list of affected landowners was the UFCo3 who to add insult to injury received as payment a compensation which was calculated on the basis of the value of the land declared for tax purposes, a much lower amount of what the land was actually worth. The company made a formal complaint to the US government, who responded in a bellicose manner, not only due to the complaint made, but more so because to the US (which at this time we must point out was in the middle of the Cold War) the fact that the
2

Jorge Ubico ruled from 1931 to 1944, and was to be the last dictator previous to the Revolution, his rule was supported by the US and the UFCo. 3 At the time the company, the largest landowner in the country, was only using 15% of its holdings.

Revolution had triumphed in Guatemala meant that its ideals could easily spread throughout the region loosening the control it had over it. Under the argument that Guatemala was aiding Soviet expansion the US launched a CIA4 lead offense aimed towards the deposing of Arbenz. In mid 1942, the CIA joined forces with rightist groups in the country in what was to be the first covert intervention of the US in Latin America5. The CIA funded, trained and provided weapons to the anti-Arbenz army which was lead by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas. It also worked closely with the anti-Arbenz members of the Guatemalan army, neutralising those loyal to the President. In the international sphere in 1954, the US government managed to get a resolution passed by the Organisation of American States (OAS) condemning Guatemala for posing a communist threat to the hemisphere. Which provided international legitimacy to the operations being carried out. When Castillos army reached the border with Guatemala6, the US army started bombarding the country in an effort to persuade President Arbenz to resign, which he did leaving Col. Carlos Castillo Armas as president with complete support from the US government. The new regime immediately started the reversal of all legislation which had been passed during the Revolution, being the most important that pertaining to the land reform 7. This was followed by new legislation decreeing all pro-Revolution organisations or political parties as illegal. Having declared these groups illegal it became easier for the government

The CIA director at the time was Allen Dulles. Mr. Dulles was particularly interested in giving back the land to the UFCo as it had for many years worked with them as a head lawyer and had remained close to it. 5 Some of the CIA agents who took part in this operation were later to also partake in operations in Cuba (1961), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (1980s). 6 The training had taken place in neighbouring Honduras. 7 The reversed legislation covered everything from land reform to workers rights and education. In this last area the literacy programmes were all but cancelled as they were deemed to be communist indoctrination which meant the modest advance made was undone.

to start a harassment campaign against those supporters of the Revolution 8. Despite the repression that followed the counterrevolution, it was impossible for the underlying structural dynamics which had caused the revolution to be forgotten. Guatemala, as well as the rest of Central America experienced three decades (1950 1980) of economic growth due to the diversification and expansion of its agricultural exports, however this did not mean the population in general bettered its livelihoods. If anything, this growth only served to further expand the income distribution gap. Land tenure was the main issue behind it, having put into effect the reversal of the land reform only 2% of the population controlled over 60% of arable land. This was further worsened in the 1970s, when as a result of growing demand of agricultural goods the government expropriated land which more often than not ended in the hands of military men looking to accumulate personal wealth. The growth experienced by agricultural diversification and industrialisation was not only scarcely perceived by the common Guatemalan but it created a subgroup among agricultural workers due to the redistribution of land. This new group was made up of landless people from the highlands who worked as seasonal migrant workers in the southern coastal plantations. It also swelled the number of rural to urban migrants. The effects the counterrevolution had both in economic and social terms fostered social movements, lead by students, workers and indigenous people, among others. Although all these movements were stopped in its tracks, very often in a brutal manner, it did not prevent new groups appearing, particularly since no efforts were made by the government to provide social services, or meet in any way the needs of indigenous groups or other sections of the populations relegated by the regime. Protests took a violent turn in the 1960s when the guerrilla insurgency appeared, they called themselves the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR). These groups were mainly located

In a McCarthy style persecution, thousands were arrested, tortured and in some cases killed. It is estimated 8,000 supporters of the Revolution were killed, while thousands more were forced into exile or hiding.

in the eastern region of the country and since they were mainly made up of ladinos9 they did not have a strong indigenous support. However it was only after a major operation of counterinsurgency, organised, financed and directed by the US in 1968, that it could be contained. This first appearance of the FAR made Guatemala and the US think about the state the army was in, and so it started training special forces to deal with this problem. The Guatemalan army was to be known during the 1970s and 1980s as the most brutal army in the whole of Latin America. The Kaibiles10, as these special forces were known massacred entire communities, they were a veritable killing machine. Counterinsurgency became institutionalised when Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, known as the butcher of Zacapa, became president in 1970. During his tenure semi-official death squads were created and people started disappearing. The civilian population lived in fear but nobody more so than the indigenous people who in the eye of the government were all categorised as potential communists and insurgents. Insurgency and counterinsurgency 1970 - 1980s Both economic and political transformations had made the Mayan people redefine their identities11. This particularly had to do with them having to move from their regions of origin in the highlands to the southern coast and major cities. Despite the increased contact they had with ladinos, the Mayan people rather than acculturating, formed a stronger sense of their identity, as Ricardo Falla12 described it, they discovered new ways

Ladino is the term commonly used in Guatemala to refer to mestizos or hispanicised people. The Kaibiles, as they are commonly known are an elite group within the Guatemalan Army. They first received training from the Rangers, however they then took more specialised training according to the terrain where they were working. They were responsible for massacres during the Civil War; however they are now deployed in peace keeping operations and the war against drug dealing. Their motto "Kaibil, si avanzo, sgueme. Si me detengo, apremiame. Si retrocedo, mtame." For further information, the following article refers to the training received by this elite group. http://joseluiscastillejos.com/2007/03/25/kaibilesun-entrenamiento-en-el-infierno-guatemalteco/
10
12

Ricardo Falla is a Guatemalan Jesuit priest, scholar and activist. For further information on the author as well as his work: http://www.opuslibros.org/Index_libros/Recensiones_1/falla_mas.htm

of being indigenous. This increased sense of their own being, as well as their newly found identity as a group helps explain the force they later achieved as an insurgent group. Organised Mayan groups were seen with suspicion by the government, who defined all of them, as subversive and acted against them in consequence. However, this repressive strategy only further radicalized the indigenous people, who started considering taking up arms as the only effective way of self protection against government abuses. The first tangible result of this radicalisation was the formation of the Comit de Unidad Campesina (CUC) in 1976. The group was made up not only of Mayans, although they were the ones leading, but also of poor ladinos. The organisation first came to the limelight after the massacre in the town of Panzos in Alta Verapaz13. The second instance in which the CUC made itself present was the protest at the Spanish Embassy in 1980, event in which activist Vicente Mench, father of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Rigoberta Mench was killed14. Both incidents were the basis to a massive worker strike in the coastal lands, making the worst nightmare of both landowners and government come true. These events were to mark a defining moment in the insurgency movement as organisations such as the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) and the Organizacin del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), who had previously dismissed the indigenous population came
13

People arrived to the square of Panzos looking to meet with the Mayor in search of answers regarding land distribution. He agreed to meet with four representatives, however due to number of people this was not possible. The protesters remained in the square, which was guarded by police and military. Shots were fired and people responded with machetes, there are conflicting versions as to who started aggressions. It was after minutes of shooting that the government forces blocked all exits from the town square and from the town itself, people flee for cover. It is estimated there were 53 people dead and 47 injured, none of the deceased were soldiers. Apart from these victims there still remains an unaccounted number of people who were never found and presumed dead. 14 On January 1980, a group of protesters entered the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City. Their protest had to do with the forceful disappearance and murder of activists in the region of El Quiche. Despite pleas by the Spanish ambassador the police surrounded the building and entered. A fire started, it remains unclear how this happened, killing not only the protesters but also diplomatic personnel, including the Consul, and local staff, as police blocked all exits and prevented firemen from stopping the fire. The Guatemalan government issued a statement arguing that the police had entered by petition of the Ambassador and with the intent of rescuing the staff from the hands of terrorists. Who in turned had killed the staff and immolated themselves. As a response, and after denying having asked the local government to intervene, Spain broke diplomatic relations with Guatemala, they were to be reestablished in 1984.

to see them as a necessary support basis if success was ever to be achieved. Leaving behind decades of divisions they came together to form the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). At the same time this was happening, the army launched a counteroffensive which entailed a genocidal campaign directed towards indigenous communities in a so called scorched-earth strategy15. This took the insurgents by surprise, as most of its supporters and leaders were kidnapped, tortured or killed16. As a result, the insurgents were to lose its momentum and were not to recover it until the latter part of the decade. The counterinsurgency plan was conceived to be carried out in two parts. The first (19811983) was the scorched earth strategy; the second (from 1983 onwards) was to institutionalised the military dominance over the population in particular the Mayan communities17. The latter was possible due to a new Constitution drafted in 1985. This same year elections were held and for the first time in 15 years non military candidates were allowed in the ballot. Vinicio Cerezo, of the Christian Democratic party, won the elections. Cerezo had been by far the most progressive of the candidates and he raised high hopes among the population who expected a transition towards democracy to happen. Unfortunately this was not be, Cerezo never fully detached its rule from that of the counterinsurgents and so little was done to control the army, to better the underlying social, economic and political

problems in the country or put an end to the Civil War. New elections were held in 1990, this time abstention was high, with only 30% of the population participating, the winning candidate was Jorge Serrano. The changes however
15

The scorched earth strategy did not stop at killings and its following displacement. It also entailed the destruction of the entire indigenous identity and its environment, the latter was achieved with the burning of forests and rainforest causing major and irreversible damage to the environment. 16 It is estimated that between 1981 and 1983 alone, 440 villages were completely wiped out, over 150,000 civilians were killed or disappeared and over one million were displaced. In Mexico, this period is known as the Refugio Guatemalteco, the country received approximately 200,000 people. For further inf ormation visit the following link http://www.comar.gob.mx/es/COMAR/El_refugio_guatemalteco 17 This was attained by the creation of paramilitary civilian self defense patrols and of rural forced settlement camps which were run by military personnel.

where not happening within the actual political sphere but within the Guatemalan civil society. It was clear now, that for Guatemala to have any kind of economic growth or international credibility, the Civil War had to end through political means rather than by a military victory of either side. The Peace Process 1990-1996 In 1989, the URNG called for a National Dialogue in an attempt to commence talks which in time could bring about an end to the Civil War. The Dialogue was boycotted by the government, the army and business elites, however it set a precedent of the desire civil society had for an end in hostilities. In 1990, the URNG managed to hold a meeting with CACIF, beyond this meeting which years earlier wouldve been unthinkable the Dialogue created spaces within a repressive regime for public discussions of subjects which had been vetoed for decades; thus starting a real democratisation process in Guatemala. Newly elected President Jorge Serrano, managed to openly negotiate with the URNG; for the first time, the armed forces had agreed to sit down to negotiate leaving aside the condition of demobilisation. Partial agreements on human rights were made along with agreements in principle of democratisation. The process was still at a very precarious state which was to become evident when in late 1992 it stagnated, only to be completely derailed by the coup in May 1993, known as the Serranazo.18 The new government, headed by Ramiro de Len Carpio was closely related to the armed forces, who consistently maintained the peace process stagnated by making completely unrealistic proposals which not only invalidated the previously signed agreements but also brought back the condition of disarmament. This situation and in particular the proposals were widely discredited by the Guatemalan society and the International community.

18

The Serranazo is the name given to the attempted self coup in 1993 against President Serrano, it lasted seven days, after which Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de Len Carpio was designated President.

Peace talks were at last resumed in 1994, this time the United Nations was the sole moderator which not only meant a greater involvement of the international community but also less room for the armed forces to go back on their word. In 1994, the Framework Agreement was signed signalling the official restart of negotiation; in it were contained an agenda and a clear timetable for the process, as well as the participation of the newly formed Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC). The ASC was to play a very important role in the negotiation process, it was an association which included every sector of the Guatemalan society, with the exception of the big business sector who had decided not to join; and not only that but its work was not only to participate as an observer of the process but to also bring forward initiatives which had been made through consensus of the society they represented. That same year the Global Agreement on Human Rights was signed, this was a veritable breakthrough. It called for the establishment of international verification mechanisms to monitor human rights. These mechanisms provided a much more open environment for the negotiations as well as a start to the ending of the systematic human rights violations the Guatemalan people had endured for decades19. Later that same year two other accords were signed, the Resettling of displace population and the Truth Commission. This last one was conceived as a mechanism with which people would learn the truth about past crimes relating to human rights violations, however the Commission did not have any judicial power and actually prohibited the people responsible for carrying out such acts to be named. Needless to say the Commission was repudiated by Guatemalan society as well as human rights organisation throughout the world. The next accord to be signed was the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 1995. This accord was not only on discrimination but it went as far as to reform

19

Not less important is the empowerment it gave a once fearful society to denounce human rights violations.

the Constitution redefining Guatemala as a multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual nation20. The presidential elections of 1995 were to be another catalyst towards peace. The URNG ran an unprecedented campaign for people to vote, this time the candidates were not only going to be from right wing parties but they would include candidates closer to the URNGs ideals, in particular the newly created Frente Democrtico Nueva Guatemala (FDNG). This party was a left-of-centre electoral front which included popular and indigenous organisations. At the elections the FDNG did better that expected, winning six seats in Congress and several important mayoralties, particularly Quetzaltenango, the second largest city of the country with a 50% indigenous population and 50% ladino. In terms of the actual presidential election, the candidates in the second round were Alvaro Arz of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and former dictator Efrain Ros Montt of the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG). Arz won the election but only by the smallest margin. This however led to the reinstatement of the Peace Talks. It was in 1996, when the peace process managed its biggest achievement, with the signing of the Firm and Durable Peace Agreement21. The preamble to this document stated the ending to three decades of armed conflict. It called for a cease fire, and mandated constitutional reforms on the role of the armed forces, civilian participation 22 and the rights of indigenous people, the matter of displacement and the return of those displaced. It also included electoral reforms and a timetable for the fulfilment of all accords. Despite a crisis towards the end of the year, which threatened to derail the entire peace process, talks were resumed and operational considerations ironed out and signed by December of that same year.
20

To read the Constitution in full refer to the following http://www.tse.org.gt/descargas/Constitucion_Politica_de_la_Republica_de_Guatemala.pdf 21 http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=143449 22 Civilian participation not only included civil society etc, but also the creation of a civilian police which was to be the sole responsible for matters of internal security.

Conclusions The United States intervention, in the persona of the United Fruit Company, was to play a very important role at the beginning of the conflict, not only by instating regimes but also by supporting them and its brutal policies. Ironically, when the peace process started it was also foreign involvement which secured its success. The participation of the United Nations as observer, as well as what was to be known as the Group of Friends of the United Nations in the Guatemalan Peace Process 23, made it difficult for any of the parties to backtrack on what was decided during the negotiations. This gave an enormous boost to the talks particularly in terms of credibility at a national and international level. It took over three decades for Guatemala to have an Agreement which could restore peace and give democracy a real opportunity to develop in the country. It turned out to be just as difficult drawing up and signing the accord as it was to implement it. Even to this day, there are still some reforms in particular with regards to indigenous rights which have not yet been fulfilled. After years of Civil War, today Guatemala is in transition, although the reforms on electoral and political matters have been observed, social questions remain unattended. As the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean, the country faces poverty and general social inequality, as well as problems with violence, drug dealing, and the economy in general. The second round of this years presidential elections will be a race between the candidate of the Partido Patriota (PP), Otto Perez Molina, and Manuel Baldizn, candidate to the Libertad Democrtica Renovada (LIDER). Surprisingly, given the history of the country, both candidates are right wing, one of them Perez Molina, an ex military. Both

23

The Grupo de Amigos de la ONU para el Proceso de Paz de Guatemala, was made up of Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, United States and Venezuela. The following is a speech given by then Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo on the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1996. http://zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/pages/disc/dic96/29dic96-2.html

have promised zero tolerance to violence, one, Baldizon, going as far as promising to reinstate the death penalty. The second round will be carried out early November, although both candidates have a similar percentage of votes Perez Molina has been markedly the favourite in polls, etc. It remains to be seen if all this rhetoric on how to deal with the current violent environment is only a campaign gimmick or if it will be indeed carried out. If so, it begs the question, how much, of the maybe somewhat modest democratic advances are going to be backtracked? In particular in terms human rights protection24.

24

There has already been events of human rights violations to indigenous communities. On September 2, 2011, it was reported 91 families were seeking refuge in Mexico. They arrived to Tenosique, Chiapas after the Guatemalan army and police allegedly burnt the community charging the people living in it of being part of drug dealing cartels. http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa.aspx