77656423

DOI: 10.
1142/S0218488512400041
June 8, 2012 15:11 WSPC/118-IJUFKS S0218488512400041
International Journal of Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Vol. 20, Suppl. 1 (June 2012) 4966
c World Scientic Publishing Company
A CONSISTENT IMPUTATION GENERATION METHOD FOR
LINGUISTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES AND ITS APPLICATION
TO RISK AVERSION
JIAN LIN
,,
and QIANG ZHANG
,
School of Management and Economics,

Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, P. R. China
College of Computer and Information, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,

Fuzhou, 350002, P. R. China
linjian105@yahoo.com.cn
qiangzhang@bit.edu.cn
Received 29 September 2011
Revised 1 February 2012
Cooperative game theory is very useful to risk aversion problems in economics and
management systems. The existing methods only focus on the situation payos take the
form of numerical values, ones take the form of linguistic labels are seldom discussed. The
aim of this study is to propose the consistent imputation for cooperative games under
a linguistic environment. To support risk aversion, a 2-tuple linguistic representation
is employed to obtain the valid results and avoid the loss of linguistic information.
This paper rstly denes some concepts for linguistic cooperative games, such as
linguistic imputation, carrier, core and null player. A set of their desirable properties
are also discussed. The linguistic Shapley value is then presented based on three axioms.
Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the linguistic Shapley value are discussed
in detail. To adjust the linguistic imputation in accordance with the cardinality of a
given original linguistic label set, an adjustment algorithm for generating consistent
imputation is proposed. Finally, we give the application of linguistic imputation in
solving risk aversion problems to illustrate the validity of the consistent imputation
generation (CIG) method.
Keywords: Linguistic Shapley value; 2-tuple linguistic representation; consistent
linguistic imputation; risk aversion.
1. Introduction
Decision-making is an important part of modern management science. It has been
extensively applied to various areas such as product evaluation,
1
risk aversion
2
and service selection,
3,4
etc. Game theory is a powerful tool in dealing with
decision-making problems and risk analysis. There are two dierent types of games
are developed in the literatures. One is the non-cooperative games,
5,6
the other
49
50 J. Lin & Q. Zhang
is the cooperative games.
7
Since cooperative behavior is ubiquitously observed in
various forms of economics and management systems, cooperative game theory has
attracted a lot of attentions in the last few decades.
810
An important solution
concept for cooperative games is the Shapley value,
11
which has been studied
in detail with crisp payos. Since its appearance, several extensions have been
developed in the literatures. Li and Liang
12
dened a Shapley value index on
the importance of variables under evaluation in DEA models. Aguilera et al.
13
studied the Shapley value for a subfamily of coalitions with no structure. The
Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multi-linear extension forms is
proposed by Meng and Zhang.
14
Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the
proposed expressions are proved in detail. Lucchetti et al.
15
discussed the Banzhaf
and Shapley values on the class of the microarray games, and then the results
calculated by the two indices are compared. Li and Zhang
16
developed a simplied
expression of the Shapley function for games with fuzzy coalition, and compared
the proposed function with two denitions established by Tsurumi et al.
17
and
Butnariu,
18
respectively.
Due to the increasing vagueness in decision and risk analysis in the real world,
the payos are not always given in the forms of numerical values. It is intuitional
for players to describe payos in natural linguistic labels. For example, linguistic
labels like good, poor and medium may be used to evaluate the payos
for players. However, the above-mentioned approaches only focus on the situation
payos take the form of numerical values, ones take the form of linguistic labels are
seldom discussed in the literature. Consequently, it is very necessary to develop
a linguistic Shapley value for cooperative games under linguistic environment.
The purpose of this study is to propose a CIG method for generating consistent
imputation for linguistic cooperative games. Since the original linguistic label set is
not continuous, it is dicult to process the linguistic information in the direct way.
To solve this problem, the 2-tuple linguistic representation model
19
is employed
in this paper. Firstly, some concepts for linguistic cooperative games, such as
linguistic imputation, carrier, core and null player, are dened. A set of their
desirable properties are also studied. Based on eciency, symmetry and additivity
axioms, the linguistic Shapley function is presented for linguistic cooperative games.
Furthermore, the existence and uniqueness of linguistic Shapley value are proved.
An adjustment algorithm for generating a consistent imputation is proposed to
adjust the linguistic imputation in accordance with the cardinality of given original
linguistic label set. Finally, we apply the proposed CIG method to solve risk aversion
problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some basic
concepts of 2-tuples linguistic representation. In Sec. 3, a CIG method for generating
consistent linguistic imputation is proposed. Section 4 applies the proposed method
to solve risk aversion problems. The paper is concluded in Sec. 5.
A Consistent Imputation Generation Method for Linguistic Cooperative Games 51
2. 2-Tuples Linguistic Representation
In the following, some basic concepts on linguistic 2-tuples are reviewed to facilitate
future discussions.
Let S = {s
0
, s
1
, . . . , s
t
} be a linguistic label set with odd cardinality, where
s
represents a possible value for a linguistic variables, M = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t},

and the cardinality of S is t + 1. The linguistic label set S should satisfy some
characteristics as follows
1921
:
(1) S is linearly ordered: s
i
> s
j
, if i > j;
(2) There is a negation operator: Neg(s
i
) = s
ti
;
(3) Minimum operator: min(s
i
, s
j
) = s
i
, if s
i
s
j
;
(4) Maximum operator: max(s
i
, s
j
) = s
i
, if s
i
s
j
.
For example, a set of seven labels can be expressed as S = {s
0
: Very Poor, s
1
:
Poor, s
2
: Slightly Poor, s
3
: Medium, s
4
: Slightly Good, s
5
: Good, s
6
: Very Good}.
It is obvious that the middle label represents an assessment of medium and with
the rest of the labels being placed symmetrically around it. S can be intuitively
shown in Fig. 1 below.
Fig. 1. Linguistic label set with seven labels.
Denition 1.
1921
Let be the operation result of the indexes of a set of labels
assessed in linguistic label set S, 0 t, t + 1 is the cardinality of S. Let
i = round and = i be two values, such that 0 i t and 0.5 < 0.5,
then is called a symbolic translation.
In order to describe and preserve all the linguistic information in operations, the
original linguistic label set S = {s
0
, s
1
, . . . , s
t
} is extent to a virtual linguistic label
set S = {s
0
, s
1
, . . . , s
T
}, where T(T > t) is a suciently large positive integer. In a
general way, the original linguistic label set S is used to evaluate payo of players,
and the virtual linguistic label set S can only appear in operations. Since the
original linguistic label set is not continuous, it is dicult to process the linguistic
information in the direct way. To avoid the loss of linguistic information, a linguistic
representation model is proposed to represent the linguistic information by means
of 2-tuples (s
i
, ), where s
i
S and [0.5, 0.5).
Denition 2.
1921
Let S = {s
0
, s
1
, . . . , s
T
} be a virtual linguistic label set and
[0, T] be a value representing the result of a symbolic operation, then the
2-tuples that expresses the equivalent information to is obtained with the following
function:
: [0, T] S [0.5, 0.5) (1)
() = (s
i
, ) with
_
s
i
, i = round()
= i, [0.5, 0.5)
(2)
where s
i
S has the closest index label to , round() is the usual round operation
and is the value of the symbolic translation.
Denition 3.
22,23
Let S = {s
0
, s
1
, . . . , s
T
} be a virtual linguistic label set and
(s
i
, ) be a 2-tuple, then a function
1
, which returns its equivalent numerical
value [0, T], is dened as
1
: S [0.5, 0.5) [0, T] , (3)
1
(s
i
, ) = i + = . (4)
By Denitions 1 and 3, it is clear that s
i
S can be converted into a linguistic
2-tuple (s
i
, 0). For convenience, we denote the set of all linguistic 2-tuples by .
The comparison of two linguistic 2-tuples is proposed according to an ordinary
lexicographic order, shown as follows.
Denition 4.
1921
Let x
1
= (s
i
,
1
) and x
2
= (s
j
,
2
) be two 2-tuples, then
If i < j then x
1
is smaller than x
2
;
If i = j then
(a) If
1
=
2
, then x
1
and x
2
denote the same information.
(b) If
1
>
2
, then x
1
is bigger than x
2
.
(c) If
1
<
2
, then x
1
is smaller than x
2
.
3. Imputation for Linguistic Cooperative Games Based on
2-Tuples Linguistic Representation
This section denes the concepts of linguistic cooperative games, and the core of
linguistic cooperative games is also proposed.
3.1. Linguistic cooperative games
Suppose N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a nite set of players, and P(N) = {R | R N} is
the family of crisp subsets of N. A linguistic cooperative game with player set N
is characterized as a function v : P(N) with v() = (s
0
, 0). R P(N), v(R)
is called the total worth of coalition R, which can be expressed as
v(R) = (|R|
1
(M
v
(R))), M
v
(R) (5)
where |R| denotes the cardinality of coalition R, M
v
(R) = (s
, 0), and s
can be
see as the averaging evaluation the coalition R obtains, which is assessed in original
linguistic label set S, and then a linguistic cooperative game is denoted by (N, v).
Denition 5. Let (N, v) be a linguistic cooperative game, for all R
1
, R
2
P(N),
R
1
R
2
= , which satises
v(R
1
R
2
) v(R
1
) + v(R
2
) (6)
then (N, v) is called a superadditive linguistic cooperative game.
Equation (6) can be further expressed as
|R
1
R
2
|
1
[M
v
(R
1
R
2
)] |R
1
|
1
[M
v
(R
1
)] +|R
2
|
1
[M
v
(R
2
)] . (7)
It is obvious that coalition R
1
and R
2
can at least as much by cooperating as
by remaining separate. Accordingly, superadditive linguistic cooperative games is
mainly discussed in this paper. Moreover, we denote all the superadditive linguistic
cooperative game by G
s
(N). To facilitate future discussions, the convexity and
imputation for linguistic cooperative games are dened as follows.
Denition 6. A linguistic cooperative game is said to be convex when
v(R
1
R
2
) + v(R
1
R
2
) v(R
1
) + v(R
2
), R
1
, R
2
P(N) . (8)
By Eq. (6), the above inequality (8) can be equivalently written as
|R
1
R
2
|
1
[M
v
(R
1
R
2
)] +|R
1
R
2
|
1
[M
v
(R
1
R
2
)]
|R
1
|
1
[M
v
(R
1
)] +|R
2
|
1
[M
v
(R
2
)] . (9)
Obviously, if (N, v) is a convex linguistic cooperative game, then (N, v) G
s
(N).
Denition 7. An linguistic imputation for linguistic cooperative game (N, v)
G
s
(N) is a linguistic 2-tuple vector

X = ( x
1
, x
2
, . . . , x
n
) satisfying
(1)
1
( x
i
)
1
(M
v
({i})) , (10)
(2)
n
i=1
1
( x
i
) = n
1
(M
v
(N)) . (11)
The set of all linguistic imputation of the linguistic cooperative game (N, v)
G
s
(N) is denoted by E
N
( v).
Denition 8. The core of a linguistic cooperative game (N, v) G
s
(N) is the set
C( v) = {( x
1
, x
2
, . . . , x
n
)
n
|
n
i=1
1
( x
i
) |R|
1
(M
v
(R)) ,
n
i=1
1
( x
i
) = n
1
(M
v
(N)), R N} .
(12)
If

X = ( x
1
, x
2
, . . . , x
n
) C( v), then no coalition S N has an incentive to
split o if

X is the proposed reward allocation in N. It is clear that C( v) is closed,
convex and also known as a polytope. In order to discuss the properties of linguistic
cooperative games, some concepts should be introduced as follows.
Denition 9. Let (N, v) be a linguistic cooperative game, C N is called a
carrier for v in N if
|R|
1
(M
v
(R)) = |R C|
1
(M
v
(R C)), R N . (13)
Property 1. If C is a carrier of linguistic cooperative game (N, v), then C
C
N, C
is also a carrier of (N, v).

Proof. Since C is a carrier of (N, v), for all R N we have
|R|
1
(M
v
(R)) = |R C|
1
(M
v
(R C)) (14)
C C
N, we get (RC
) C = RC, so Eq. (14) can be further written as

|R|
1
(M
v
(R)) = |(R C
) C|
1
(M
v
((R C
) C)) . (15)
Since R C
N, and C is a carrier of (N, v), then we have

|(R C
) C|
1
(M
v
((R C
) C)) = |R C
|
1
(M
v
(R C
)) . (16)
By Eqs. (15) and (16), we have |R|
1
(M
v
(R)) = |R C
|
1
(M
v
(R C
)).
So, C
is a carrier of (N, v).

Denition 10. Let (N, v) be a linguistic cooperative game, i N is said to be a
dummy player when
|R{i}|
1
(M
v
(R{i})) = |R|
1
(M
v
(R))+
1
(M
v
({i})), R N\{i} . (17)
Denition 11. Let (N, v) be a linguistic cooperative game, i N is said to be a
null player when
|R {i}|
1
(M
v
(R {i})) = |R|
1
(M
v
(R)), R N\{i} . (18)
Property 2. Let C be a carrier of linguistic cooperative game (N, v), then for all
i C, i is a null player.
Proof. Since C is a carrier of (N, v), then R N, i C, we have
|R {i}|
1
(M
v
(R {i})) = |(R {i}) C|
1
(M
v
((R {i}) C))
= |R C|
1
(M
v
(R C)) = |R|
1
(M
v
(R)) .
From Denition 18, i is a null play.
Denition 12. Let (N, v
1
) and (N, v
2
) be two linguistic cooperative games, then
for all R N and l
1
, l
2
0,
1
(M
l
1
v
1
+l
2
v
2
(R)) = l
1

1
(M
v
1
(R)) +l
2
1
(M
v
2
(R)) . (19)
It is clear that (N, l
1
v
1
+l
2
v
2
) is also a linguistic cooperative game. In the following,
we will develop a linguistic Shapley value to linguistic cooperative game.
3.2. The Shapley value for linguistic cooperative games
Denition 13. Let (N, v) be a linguistic cooperative game, the linguistic valued
function f : G
s
(N)
n
is called a linguistic Shapley function on (N, v) if it
satises the following three axioms.
Axiom 1. (Eciency) If C is a carrier for linguistic cooperative game (N, v), then
iC
1
(f
i
( v)) = |T|
1
(M
v
(T)) . (20)
Axiom 2. (Symmetry) Let be a permutation of N such that
1
(M
v
(R)) =
1
(M
v
(R)), R N (21)
then
f
i
( v) = f
i
( v), i N . (22)
Axiom 3. (Additivity) v
1
, v
2
G
s
(N) if there exists v
1
+ v
2
G
s
(N) such that
1
(M
v
1
+ v
2
(R)) =
1
(M
v
1
(R)) +
1
(M
v
2
(R)), R N (23)
then
f
i
( v
1
+ v
2
) = f
i
( v
1
) +f
i
( v
2
), i N . (24)
Theorem 1. Let (N, v) be a linguistic cooperative game, the function Sh:
G
s
(N)
n
is dened as
Sh
i
( v) =
_

RN\i
|R|!(n |R| 1)!
n!
[(|R| + 1)
1
(M
v
(R {i})) |R|
1
(M
v
(R))]
_
, i N , (25)
then Sh( v) = (Sh
1
( v), Sh
2
( v), . . . , Sh
n
( v)) is the unique linguistic Shapley value
for linguistic cooperative game (N, v).
Proof. (Existence)
Axiom 1. If C is a carrier for linguistic cooperative game (N, v), based on
Eq. (13), for all i N \ {i}, R N, we get |R {i}|
1
(M
v
(R {i})) =
|R|
1
(M
v
(R)). Accordingly, i N \ T, we have Sh
i
( v) = (0) = s
0
.
Since (N, v) G
s
(N), then we have
1
(Sh
i
( v))
1
( v({i})). Moreover, it
is clear that
n
i=1
1
(Sh
i
( v)) = n
1
(M
v
(N)). Accordingly, Sh( v) = (Sh
1
( v),
Sh
2
( v), . . . , Sh
n
( v)) is a imputation of linguistic cooperative game (N, v). So, we
have
iC
1
(Sh
i
( v))) =
n
i=1
1
(Sh
i
( v))) = n
1
(M
v
(N))
= |T N|
1
(M
v
(T N)) = |T|
1
(M
v
(T)) .
Axiom 2. Let be a permutation of N such that
1
(M
v
(R)) =
1
(M
v
(R)), R N. Since |R| = |R|, and for all i N, R N \ {i} is
equivalent to R N \ {i}, then from Eqs. (21) and (25), we have
Sh
i
( v) =
_

RN\i
|R|!(n |R| 1)!
n!
[(|R| + 1)
1
(M
v
(R {i}))
|R|
1
(M
v
(R))]
_
=
_

RN\i
|R|!(n |R| 1)!
n!
[(|R| + 1)
1
(M
v
(R {i}))
|R|
1
(M
v
(R))]
_
= Sh
i
( v) .
Axiom 3. For all i N, Sh
i
( v) is a linear function of v. From Eq. (19), it is easy
to prove that Eq. (24) holds. To sum up, the existence is proved.
(Uniqueness) The proof of uniqueness of linguistic Shapley value is similar to the
one of classical crisp case, the process is introduced as follows.
For any Q N with Q = , the linguistic cooperative game (N, u
Q
) is
dened as
u
Q
(R) =
_
(s
1
, 0), Q R N
(s
0
, 0), otherwise
. (26)
Obviously, for all constant a 0, a u
Q
= (a
1
( u
Q
)) is a linguistic valued
function. If i N \ Q, from eciency axiom, we have
jQ
1
(Sh
j
(a u
Q
)) = |Q|
1
(M
a u
Q
(Q))
= |Q {i}|
1
(M
a u
Q
(Q {i})) =
jQ{i}
1
(Sh
j
(a u
Q
))
=
jQ
1
(Sh
j
(a u
Q
)) +
1
(Sh
i
(a u
Q
)) .
So, we get
1
(Sh
i
(a u
Q
)) = 0. Namely, for all i N \ Q, Sh
i
(a u
Q
) = s
0
.
i, j Q with i = j, let be a permutation of N, such that
11
(k) =
_
_
j, k = i ,
i, k = j ,
k, k {i, j} .
If Q R, then
If i R, then j R;
If j R, then i R;
If k R and k Q\ {i, j}, then k R.
It is clear that Q R, so we have a u
Q
(R) = s
0
. Since Q R, we also get
a u
Q
(R) = s
0
. Namely, for all R Q, a u
Q
(R) = a u
Q
(R) holds.
If R Q, then Q = Q R, we have
1
(M
a u
Q
(R)) =
1
(M
a u
Q
(R)).
Since |R| = |R|, we can get a u
Q
(R) = a u
Q
(R) = (a).
In all, R N, we have a u
Q
(R) = a u
Q
(R).
Based on symmetry axiom, we can obtain
1
(Sh
j
(a u
Q
)) =
1
(Sh
i
(a u
Q
)) =
1
(Sh
i
(a u
Q
)).
Since Q is a carrier for linguistic unanimity game (N, u
Q
) and a u
Q
(Q) = (a), from
eciency axiom, we have |Q|
1
(Sh
i
(a u
Q
)) = a where can be further written as
Sh
i
(a u
Q
) = (
a
|Q|
).
To sum up, for any Q N with Q = , we have
Sh
i
(a u
Q
) =
_
_
a
|Q|
_
, i Q
(s
0
, 0), i Q
. (27)
In what follows, we will prove that the following Eq. (27) is holds.
1
(M
v
(R)) =
=QN
1
(M
a
Q
u
Q
(R)), R N
where u
Q
is dened by Eq. (26), and
a
Q
=
PQ
(1)
|Q||P|
1
(M
v
(P)) (28)
R N, we have
=QN
1
(M
a
Q
u
Q
(R)) =
=QN
a
Q

1
(M
u
Q
(R))
=
=QR
a
Q
=
=QR
PQ
(1)
|Q||P|
1
(M
v
(P))
=
PR
_

PQR
(1)
|Q||P|
_
1
(M
v
(P))
=
PR
|R|
k=|P|
(1)
k|P|
C
k|P|
|R||P|

1
(M
v
(P)) .
Moreover,
n
i=0
(1)
i
C
i
n
= 0 for any positive integer n. So, P R, we have
|R|
k=|P|
(1)
k|P|
C
k|P|
|R||P|
= 0 .
Thus,
=QN
1
(M
a
Q
u
Q
(R)) =
1
(M
v
(R)), R N
From Eqs. (27), (28) and additivity axiom, the linguistic Shapley function Sh( v)
is uniquely determined by linguistic cooperative game (N, v).
This completes the proof of Uniqueness.
Property 3. Let i is a dummy player, then Sh
i
( v) = M
v
({i}).
Proof. If i is a null player, we have
|R {i}|
1
(M
v
(R {i})) = |R|
1
(M
v
(R)) +
1
(M
v
({i})), R N\{i} .
From Eq. (25), i N we have
Sh
i
( v) =
_

RN\i
|R|!(n |R| 1)!
n!
[(|R| + 1)
1
(M
v
(R {i})) |R|
1
(M
v
(R))]
_
=
_

RN\i
|R|!(n |R| 1)!
n!
[
1
(M
v
({i}))]
_
= (
1
(M
v
({i}))) = M
v
({i})) .
This completes the proof.
Property 4. Let i is a null player, then Sh
i
( v) = (s
0
, 0).
Proof. If i is a null player, we get
|R {i}|
1
(M
v
(R {i})) = |R|
1
(M
v
(R)), R N\{i} .
From Eq. (3), i N we have
Sh
i
( v) =
_

RN\i
|R|!(n |R| 1)!
n!
[(|R| + 1)
1
(M
v
(R {i})) |R|
1
(M
v
(R))]
_
= (0) = (s
0
, 0) .
Theorem 2. Let (N, v) be a linguistic cooperative game, if (N, v) is convex, then
Sh( v) = (Sh
1
( v), Sh
2
( v), . . . , Sh
n
( v)) C( v).
Proof. For all R N, without loss of generality, suppose N \ R = {i
1
, i
2
, . . . , i
m
},
where i
k
< i
k+1
for any k = 1, 2, . . . , m1.
Let y
i
1
=
1
(M
v
({i}));
y
i
k
= k
1
(M
v
({i
1
, i
2
, . . . , i
k
})) (k 1)
1
(M
v
({i
1
, i
2
, . . . , i
k1
})) .
Accordingly, we have
n
i=1
y
i
= n
1
(M
v
(N)). Let W = {1, 2, . . . , i
1
}, then
R {i
1
} = R W, W \ {i
1
} = R W. Since (N, v) is convex, we have
|R|
1
(M
v
(R)) +|W|
1
(M
v
(W))
|R {i
1
}|
1
(M
v
(R {i
1
})) +|W \ {i
1
}|
1
(M
v
(W \ {i
1
}))
which can be further written as
y
i
1
= |W|
1
(M
v
(W)) |W \ {i
1
}|
1
(M
v
(W \ {i
1
}))
|R {i
1
}|
1
(M
v
(R {i
1
})) |R|
1
(M
v
(R)) .
Thus, we get
iR
y
i
|R|
1
(M
v
(R))
iR{i}
y
i
|R {i
1
}|
1
(M
v
(R {i
1
})).
By recursive relation, we can obtain
iR
y
i
|R|
1
(M
v
(R))
n
i=1
y
i
|N|
1
(M
v
(N)) = 0 .
Namely,
iR
y
i
|R|
1
(M
v
(R)), R N .
Denoting x
i
= (y
i
), for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Obviously, linguistic vector
X = ( x
1
, x
2
, . . . , x
n
) C( v). It is cleat that Sh
i
( v) is the combination of
n! elements in C( v). Moreover, since C( v) is a convex set, we have Sh( v) =
(Sh
1
( v), Sh
2
( v), . . . , Sh
n
( v)) C( v).
This completes the proof.
3.3. The consistent imputation for linguistic cooperative games
The linguistic Shapley value given by Eq. (25) is reasonable to represent
the contributions of players to the coalition N. From Property 4, we know
1
(Sh
i
( v)) 0, for all i N. Due to the niteness of cardinality of original
linguistic label set S = {s
0
, s
1
, . . . , s
t
}, however, sometimes
1
(Sh
i
( v)) will fall
outside of interval [0, t]. For example, in a cooperative game (N, v) with four players,
the original linguistic label set S = {s
0
: Poor, s
1
: Medium, s
2
: Good} is employed
Table 1. The amount of money corresponding to players.
player 1 player 2 player 3 player 4
Money (USD) 100 1000 100000 110000
to evaluate the market competitive strength of player i, i N. The money players
had are shown in the Table 1.
According to the linguistic label set S, the linguistic evaluations for player
1, 2, 3 and 4 are poor, medium, good and good, respectively. So we
have M
v
({3}) = M
v
({4}) = (s
2
, 0). Nevertheless, there is still an obvious
distinction of market competitive strength between player 3 and player 4. In this
situation, rational linguistic evaluations of player 3 and player 4 should be dierent.
Accordingly, the linguistic Shapley value is reasonable to represent the players
dierent contribution to the coalition N. In order to adjust the linguistic imputation
calculated by Eq. (25) in accordance with the cardinality of given original linguistic
label set S, an iterative method for generating consistent imputation is developed
as follows.
Let X = (x
1
, x
2
, . . . , x
n
) be the consistent linguistic imputation for players in
coalition N. Denoting
M
0
= max{
1
(sh
0
i
( v)), i N} (29)
where Sh
(0)
( v) = (Sh
(0)
1
( v), Sh
(0)
2
( v), . . . , Sh
(0)
n
( v)) is the linguistic Shapley value
calculated by Eq. (25). In what follows, the adjustment is considered in two cases
to obtain the consistent imputation X.
Case 1: If M
0
t, then the consistent linguistic imputation X is equivalent to
linguistic Shapley value Sh
(0)
( v).
Case 2: If M
0
> t, then U
0
= {i |
1
(Sh
(0)
i
( v)) t, i N} such that U
0
= .
In the following, we analyze this case according to the attitude tendency of players.
This is reasonable because the players attitude can directly inuence the decision.
(1) In order to keep the dominant situation in coalition N, some players in U
0
may
reluct to degrade their superiority. The set of reluctant players is denoted as
U
0
. Accordingly, the exceeding linguistic value (
1
(Sh
(0)
i
( v) t)) of player
j (j U
0
) is not transferred to other players in coalition N. In accordance with
the nite cardinality of original linguistic label set S, we reset the consistent
linguistic allocation of player i as (s
t
, 0), and other players can not get extra
benet from player j (j U
0
).
(2) For the purpose of mutual cooperation, player i U
0
(U
0
= U \ U) willing
to share his/her exceeding linguistic value to other players in coalition N by
providing some resources, such as fund, equipment, human resources and so on.
As a result, the linguistic allocation of player i U
0
will be reduced. On the
other hand, the linguistic allocations of other players in N\U maybe improved.
The rule for transferring the exceeding linguistic value from player j U to
k N \ U is determined by the inuence index
(j)
k
, which can be expressed
as
(j)
k
=
{j}RN\k
|R|!(n |R| 1)!
1
2
n!
[(|R| + 1)
1
(M
v
(R {k})) |R|
1
(M
v
(R))], k N . (30)
The inuence index
(j)
k
represents the marginal inuence player k given to j.
To sum up, in what follows, an adjustment algorithm is proposed to transfer the
exceeding linguistic value from player j U to k N \ U based on the inuence
index
(j)
k
, and the consistent imputation X is obtained, simultaneously.
Adjustment algorithm
Step 1: Let k = 0.
Step 2: M
0
is determined by Eq. (29), and then input M
0
.
Step 3: If M
0
t, then let X = Sh
(0)
, stop and output X; otherwise, turn to next
step.
Step 4: Let Sh
(k)
i
= s
t
for all i U
k
, and U
k
= {i |
1
(Sh
(k)
i
)( v) t, i N},
where U
k
represents the set of reluctant players in U
k
, and denoting U
k
=
U
k
\ U
k
.
Step 5: Find l
k
, such that Sh
(k)
l
k
( v) = max{Sh
(k)
i
( v), i U
K
}.
Step 6: If M
k
=
1
(Sh
(k)
l
k
)( v) = t, then denoting X = Sh
(k)
, stop and output X.
Otherwise, let
Sh
(k+1)
i
( v) = [
1
Sh
(k)
i
( v) +

(l
k
)
i
iN\U
k
(l
k
)
i
1
(Sh
(k)
l
k
( v) t)], i N \ U
k
,
(31)
Sh
(k+1)
j
( v) = Sh
(k)
j
( v), j U
k
\ {l
k
} , (32)
Sh
(k+1)
l
k
( v) = (s
t
, 0) . (33)
Step 7: Let k = k + 1, turn to Step 4.
From the superadditive of linguistic cooperative game (N, v), it is clear that the
consistent linguistic imputation is better than the one without cooperation.
3.4. Description of the CIG method
In sum, we summarize the CIG method in the following stages. Morevoer, the ow
chart of the CIG method is shown in the Fig. 2.
Stage 1: Experts select a linguistic label set S, and linguistic labels in S are
transformed into linguistic 2-tuples respectively.
Fig. 2. The ow chart of the CIG method.
Stage 2: N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a nite set of players, experts evaluate averaging
payo M
v
(R) of players in R ( R N) using linguistic 2-tuples.
Stage 3: By Eq. (25), the linguistic Shapley value Sh( v) is calculated.
Stage 4: Using adjustment algorithm , the consistent imputation X is obtained.
4. The Application of the CIG Method to Risk Aversion
In this section, we use a numerical example to illustrate the application of the
proposed method. Let us suppose there are four companies, which want to avert
risk from the nancial crisis in China.
Stage 1: To obtain the predictive information, the governmental agency has been
invited to conduct the evaluation, and suppose that the governmental
agency uses the following linguistic label set S = {s
0
, s
2
, . . . , s
6
} to express
their judgement on four companies. The ruin probability is presented
corresponding to dierent grades of judgement, simultaneously. In Table 2,
the relationships between probability and linguistic labels are shown in
detail.
Table 2. The ruin probability corresponding to dierent linguistic labels.
Linguistic labels s
0
s
1
s
2
s
3
s
4
s
5
s
6
Ruin probability 0.95 0.80 0.65 0.5 0.35 0.20 0.05
Stage 2: In order to reduce the risk, the four companies decide to cooperate
in human resources, patented technology and equipment. As such, the
capacity of risk aversion of the four companies are improved. Let
the four companies be players 1,2,3,4 in a linguistic cooperative game
({1, 2, 3, 4}, v), and then the evaluation results for dierent cooperative
combinations are given by the governmental agency, shown as follows.
M
v
({1}) = (s
2
, 0), M
v
({2}) = (s
3
, 0), M
v
({3}) = (s
1
, 0) ,
M
v
({4}) = (s
2
, 0), M
v
({1, 2}) = (s
4
, 0), M
v
({1, 3}) = (s
2
, 0) ,
M
v
({1, 4}) = (s
2
, 0), M
v
({2, 3}) = (s
4
, 0), M
v
({2, 4}) = (s
3
, 0) ,
M
v
({3, 4}) = (s
2
, 0), M
v
({1, 2, 3}) = (s
5
, 0), M
v
({1, 2, 4}) = (s
4
, 0) ,
M
v
({1, 3, 4}) = (s
3
, 0), M
v
({2, 3, 4}) = (s
4
, 0), M
v
({1, 2, 3, 4}) = (s
5
, 0) .
Stage 3: For convenience, we denote p
R
=
|R|!(3|R|)!
24
, Z
R{i}
= (|R| + 1)
1
(M
v
(R{i})) and Z
R
= |R|
1
(M
v
(R)). By Eq. (25), the computational
precess of linguistic Shapley value are displayed in Tables 36, respectively.
Based on Eq. (25), the elements of the linguistic Shapley value are calculated
as
Sh
1
( v) = (4.833) = (s
5
, 0.167) ;
Sh
2
( v) = (7.167) = (s
7
, 0.167) ;
Sh
3
( v) = (4.5) = (s
5
, 0.5) ;
Sh
4
( v) = (3.5) = (s
4
, 0.5) .
Accordingly, we have Sh( v) = ((s
5
, 0.167), (s
7
, 0.167), (s
5
, 0.5), (s
4
, 0.5)).
Table 3. The computational process of Sh
1
( v).
R p
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
1
4
2 0 2
{2}
1
12
8 3 5
{3}
1
12
4 1 3
{4}
1
12
4 2 2
{2, 3}
1
12
15 8 7
{2, 4}
1
12
12 6 6
{3, 4}
1
12
9 4 5
{2, 3, 4}
1
4
20 12 8
2
( v).
R p
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
1
4
3 0 3
{1}
1
12
8 2 6
{3}
1
12
8 1 7
{4}
1
12
6 2 4
{1, 3}
1
12
15 4 11
{1, 4}
1
12
12 4 8
{3, 4}
1
12
12 4 8
{1, 3, 4}
1
4
20 9 11
3
( v).
R p
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
1
4
1 0 1
{1}
1
12
4 2 2
{2}
1
12
8 3 5
{4}
1
12
4 2 2
{1, 2}
1
12
15 8 7
{1, 4}
1
12
9 4 5
{2, 4}
1
12
12 6 6
{1, 2, 4}
1
4
20 12 8
4
( v).
R p
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
Z
R{1}
Z
R
1
4
2 0 2
{1}
1
12
4 2 2
{2}
1
12
6 3 3
{3}
1
12
4 1 3
{1, 2}
1
12
12 8 4
{1, 3}
1
12
9 4 5
{2, 3}
1
12
12 8 4
{1, 2, 3}
1
4
20 15 5
Stage 4: If player 2 is reluctant to degrade his/her superiority, then the consistent
imputation is obtained as
X = ((s
5
, 0.167), (s
6
, 0), (s
5
, 0.5), (s
4
, 0.5)) .
If player 2 is willing to share his/her exceeding linguistic value to other players
by providing some resources, then the inuence index is calculated by Eq. (29),
shown as follows.
(2)
1
=
1
6
5 +
1
6
7 +
1
6
6 +
1
2
8 = 7 ;
(2)
3
=
1
6
5 +
1
6
7 +
1
6
6 +
1
2
8 = 7 ;
(2)
4
=
1
6
3 +
1
6
4 +
1
6
4 +
1
2
5 =
13
3
.
From Eq. (30), we have
x
1
= (4.833 +
7
7 + 7 +
13
3
1.167) = (s
5
, 0.215) ;
x
3
= (4.5 +
7
7 + 7 +
13
3
1.167) = (s
5
, 0.118) ;
x
4
= (3.5 +
13
3
7 + 7 +
13
3
1.167) = (s
4
, 0.097) .
Thus, the consistent linguistic imputation
X = ((s
5
, 0.215), (s
6
, 0), (s
5
, 0.118), (s
4
, 0.097)) .
From the above results, two cases all show that the consistent linguistic imputation
is better than the one without cooperation. Moreover, i N, player i can
understands the distance x
i
to the lower (upper) grade, and hence predict the
situation their stand. As a result, the risk can be averted eectively.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposed a consistent imputation generation (CIG) method to linguistic
cooperative games, in which the payos take the form of natural linguistic
information. In the CIG method, the 2-tuple linguistic representation is employed to
obtain the valid results and avoid the loss of linguistic information. Some concepts
for linguistic cooperative games are detailedly dened, a set of of their desirable
properties are also studied. The linguistic Shapley function is then presented based
on eciency, symmetry and additivity axioms, and the existence and uniqueness of
a linguistic Shapley value are proved in detail. The consistent linguistic imputation
is analyzed with respect to the attitude tendency of players. This is reasonable
because the players attitude can directly inuence the decision. To sum up, an
adjustment algorithm for generating consistent imputation is proposed. In order
to illustrate the practicality and validity of the proposed CIG method, we give
an application in solving risk aversion problems. In the practical decision-making
problems and risk analysis, sometimes the experts may estimate payos of coalition
with uncertain linguistic variables due to lack of knowledge, time pressure and their
limited expertise with respect to the problem domain. In that case, the CIG method
is not suitable for generating the imputation of cooperative games. We will continue
working in the extension and application of the CIG method to uncertain linguistic
environment.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
and Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education
(Nos. 70771010, 71071018, 70801064, 20111101110036).
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DOI: 10.

School of Management and Economics,

College of Computer and Information, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,

represents a possible value for a linguistic variables, M = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t},

is also a carrier of (N, v).

) C = RC, so Eq. (14) can be further written as

N, and C is a carrier of (N, v), then we have

is a carrier of (N, v).

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