Cultural Sociology

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Serena Liu Cultural Sociology 2011 5: 323 originally published online 30 June 2011 DOI: 10.1177/1749975511401271 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cus.sagepub.com/content/5/3/323

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CUS5310.1177/1749975511401271LiuCultural Sociology

Article

Structuration of Information Control in China

Serena Liu
University of Essex, UK

Cultural Sociology 5(3) 323339 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1749975511401271 cus.sagepub.com

Abstract
This article analyses information censorship in China. It adopts a theoretical approach which perceives rules and resources as the rudimentary elements that constitute social action and comprise social systems. The rules concerning market formation, technological progress and social stability of the most resourceful state elite dominate the information subsystem. Market rules and technology rules result in information growth, but this is controlled to a degree acceptable to the elite through stability rules. Foreign and domestic media corporations adhere to stability rules, which is not conducive to information dissemination. Media workers tend to follow stability rules and contribute to information restriction. Although they increasingly draw on rules regarding professionalism, many seek to balance these with stability rules in order not to lose access to information. Those who disregard stability rules truly promote information freedom.

Keywords
Chinese media, Giddens, information censorship, resources, rules

Introduction
It is ironic that in an era of information abundance, information is still tightly controlled in some parts of the world including China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), though, is not the first ruler in Chinese history to inhibit the free flow of information. From the earliest dynasties, successive rulers deemed a firm grip on the information disseminated to the masses paramount to social and political stability (Chan and Qiu, 2002). However, compared to its predecessors, the CCP is facing an unprecedented challenge. The expansion of the print and broadcasting media, the emergence of market competition and the arrival of the Internet have meant that information is much more readily available to the general population. Nevertheless, the CCP keeps the media, both traditional and new, under scrutiny as strictly as ever. Li Datong, who was purged as the editor of Freezing
Corresponding author: Serena Liu, Department of Sociology, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, UK. Email: serenal@essex.ac.uk

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Point (Bindian), a popular and outspoken supplement of China Youth Daily (Zhongguo qingnian bao), draws an interesting analogy. The growth in information and the corresponding increase in surveillance is like an expanding balloon marked by a design that gets bigger as the balloon gets bigger (Cunningham, 2006: 26). Information growth under state authoritarianism has mixed effects on the audience. National surveys uncover that media consumption has mobilized support for the state while at the same time promoted political liberalization (Tang, 2005). The frequent media consumer is more supportive of the single-party system and official ideologies, yet is also more likely to make suggestions at work and take political action if dissatisfied. Although liberal democracies also contain mechanisms and tools for the state to censor information (Street, 2001), information control is much more institutionalized, extensive and neurotic in authoritarian regimes like China. This article examines how the factors that lead to restrictions on information are produced and subsequently reproduced to ensure control is maintained. It applies a theoretical approach which perceives rules and resources as the fundamental elements that constitute social action and comprise social systems (Liu, 2006). The article first outlines the theoretical framework. It then analyses how the rules of the most resourceful state elite have underpinned the evolution of the media sector in the era of economic reform, and the consequences for information dissemination. It goes on to discuss how international and domestic media corporations and media workers relate to these rules, and the effects this has on information flow. The article contends that the elites rules concerning market formation and technological advancement have led to information growth, but this is capped within what they see as acceptable limits by applying rules regarding social stability. Information is further checked through media corporations and media workers abiding by stability rules. Whereas the existing literature tends to offer a fragmented view of the Chinese media from media studies perspectives, this article contemplates information control in the media as a whole from a sociological perspective.

Rules and Resources as Constituents of Social Action and Social Systems

The basic model of action in Giddenss structuration theory entails actors employing rules and resources in action. Through action, rules and resources are reproduced (Giddens, 1984). Action has unintended consequences events which would not have happened if that actor had behaved differently (Giddens, 1984: 11), but which are not within the actors power to have brought about, regardless of their intent. Rules are the principles that underpin action. They embrace values and preferences and give rise to particular patterns of social activities. Rules pertain to practical or discursive consciousness. Practical consciousness is the state of mind in everyday routine practices during which actors may not be fully aware of the rules they use. Discursive consciousness is the state of mind in which actors account for their acts and interpret the underlying rules. Although Giddens considers unconscious motives as a significant feature of human conduct, their impact on action is mostly indirect. In a comparative perspective, Bourdieu deems the unconscious habitus as the generative principle of social practices. In this view, strategies are formed without strategic intention (Bourdieu, 1977).

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Bourdieus approach is not suitable for the analysis here as the actions under consideration are produced with purpose and intent. Resources enable the exercise of power to influence states of affairs (Giddens, 1984). It is unexplained in structuration theory that this is possible since actors relate to each other by resource dependency (Benson, 1982). They do not have all the resources needed to survive or function (Rhodes, 1988), due to their hierarchical positions (Knoke, 1990) and division of labour (Benson, 1982). Those who have the resources that others require may draw on them to exercise power over the others. Gaining or maintaining resources is an important aim in social interaction, for which specific rules may be drawn. Rules and resources are reproduced through action to become properties of social systems (Giddens, 1984). However, in an interaction, if the rules of the actors are incompatible, the rules of the most resourceful actors who dominate in the course of events are reproduced (Liu, 2006). In a social system, through myriads of interactions in time and space, the rules of the most resourceful actors are reproduced to be the dominant rules. The actors whose rules are compatible with the dominant rules relate to them in terms of duality; they are in cooperation with the dominant actors. On the contrary, the actors whose rules are incompatible with the dominant rules relate to them in terms of dualism; they are in conflict with the dominant actors. The pattern of relationships between the rules and resources furnishes the social system with its characteristics. Bourdieus approach, in contrast, does not allow such an analysis, because the habitus is restricted to be a property of the subject rather than an objective part of the social system (Bourdieu, 1977).

Dominant Rules Market rules

Market rules, or principles of market formation and profit generation, have been fundamental in influencing the development of the media in the past three decades in China. This is crucial since media organizations were previously financed completely by the state. The incorporation of market principles has to be viewed in the broader context of economic reform. Reform was reckoned necessary after the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s in light of stagnant economic growth and poor living standards. The state elite initiated the creation of a socialist market economy in which the market, rather than the state, would play a primary role in the allocation of economic resources, albeit under the states macroeconomic control (Portyakov, 2004). Market rules underpinned the transformation of state work units, including media units, into independent economic entities. They effected gradual reduction and withdrawal of state funds to the media industry. Market principles engendered the reintroduction of advertising, which was banned during the Cultural Revolution, to be a major source of financing (Lynch, 1999). They underlay a proliferation of all media forms newspapers, magazines, televisions, etc., as means of income generation. Operating under market rules, circulation rates, ratings and advertising revenues become determinants in decisions for publication and programme production. Employees of media organizations, who were previously assigned by the state, are now hired through open competition and on a contractual basis, while reward and
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punishment is granted according to performance (Huang, 2001; Li X, 2002; Zhao, 2000b). The unintended consequence of adopting market rules is a marked growth in the availability of news and information. In the print press, a distinction can be made between party newspapers and nonparty newspapers (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). Party papers are directly under the supervision of central or provincial propaganda departments of the CCP and are the mouthpieces of the Party. Non-party papers are published by other government departments, mass organizations and professional associations. The number of non-party papers mushroomed after economic reform began, and could no longer be sustained by the state (Guo, 2001; Wu, 2000; Zhao, 2000a). A policy was issued in 1992 requiring most newspapers, except a few central party organs, to be financially independent. In order to appeal to readers, non-party papers have printed more soft human interest stories and have been sometimes critical of societal ills. Some eligible institutions have contracted out their publishing licences for a fee or a portion of the profit (AkhavanMajid, 2004). This has given rise to de facto privately-run newspapers with little regard for state ideology, such as various commerce newspapers in many localities. Even before the move to financial independence, party newspapers were in financial difficulties as their propagandistic language rendered them less attractive to both readers and advertisers (Guo, 2001). Provincial party papers faced competition in particular from evening newspapers (wanbao) published by municipal governments (Huang, 2001; Zhao, 2000a). At a convention, this special sector has less of a propaganda role, more freedom to cater for readers interests, and a greater focus on soft news and entertainment. In order to generate profit, party papers started to publish reader-oriented subsidiaries in the mid-1980s, usually weekend editions or special interest magazines (Huang, 2001). In the mid-1990s provincial party papers launched their own marketoriented daily newspapers. This new group of papers has taken on the family name dushibao (metropolitan/city news) to distinguish them from the evening newspapers. As challengers in a competitive market, they have adopted a modern management style and a Western approach to journalism. They have used bold layouts and sensational headlines, pursued hot topics despite cost, and not infrequently caused controversy by exposing official wrongdoings (see below). Within a couple of years they have risen to become the most popular daily newspapers. Television broadcasting has come to operate under market rules to boot. In 1983 broadcast organizations were encouraged to obtain other sources of financing instead of state funds, chiefly through acquiring sponsorship and selling commercials and programmes (White, 2005). Meanwhile the supervision of television stations, with the exception of the China Central Television (CCTV), was devolved to local authorities. The number of television stations proliferated by nearly tenfold by 1990 (NBS, 1991). More television stations appeared with the introduction of satellite and cable television in the 1990s. In order to compete for audience, advertising revenues and limited cable channel space, viewers preferences and ratings have become key factors shaping programme production and scheduling (Li X, 2002; Weber 2002; Zhong 2007). In light of such considerations, even CCTV has produced and aired programmes which expose bureaucratic corruption and other wrong doings and which challenge state ideological goals (Li X, 2002; Ma, 1996).

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In book publishing, book numbers have been allocated to state publishing houses, the only bodies authorized to publish books, as a form of publication quota system since the mid-1980s. Driven by financial incentives, state publishers seek collaboration with private book dealers (shushang) and sell them book numbers for a high price (AkhavanMajid, 2004; Xie, 2005). This results in a de facto privatization of the book publishing industry. Private book dealers are much better market competitors than state publishing houses in terms of author rewards, production efficiency and sales capacity (Pei, 1994). With the proliferation of private book stands and book stores, even prohibited books find their way into the market (Chen, 1992; Wu, 2007b).

Technology rules
Technology rules, or inclinations towards technological progress in order to catch up with the advanced technology of developed countries, have had a significant impact on the media sector, and in particular have caused the spread of the Internet. The state elite perceive advancement in technology as vital for upholding the international standing of the country, which was seriously undermined by technological backwardness in the last century (Kluver, 2005). Information technology is seen to impel industrial restructuring, create employment opportunities and strengthen the competitiveness of Chinese businesses (Kang, 2006). Influenced by technology rules, the Chinese government has spent a huge sum of money on building Internet network infrastructure (Kluver, 2005). It has instigated successive projects to encourage businesses, government departments and ordinary people to go online (Lagerkvist, 2005). Unlike liberal democracies where the Internet is another medium for news already appearing in the print and broadcasting media, in China the Internet is a critical driving force for improvements in the availability of news and information. The Internet has seen brisk growth since China was connected in 1994. According to the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC, 2008),1 by the end of June 2008, there were 253 million Internet users, and China exceeded the United States for the first time to become the world number one in Internet usage. However, these accounted for 19.1 per cent of the population, below the world average of 21.1 per cent. Internet users were more likely to be male (53.6 %), under 35 years of age (79.6%), and with at least high school education (70.3 %). Among them 84.7 per cent had broadband Internet connections and 28.9 per cent used mobile phones to go online (in the previous six months). Whilst 74.1 per cent accessed the Internet at home, 39.2 per cent did so at Internet cafes. Obtaining news and information was the second most popular application of the Internet (after listening to music), by 81.5 per cent of users. In addition, 38.8 per cent of users visited, and 23.4 per cent contributed to, BBS forums, while 28 per cent posted on personal weblogs. The Internet offers more desirable news and information than the traditional media. This is illustrated by a comparison of the reportage of the 9/11 tragedy in the United States by CCTV and Sina.com, a major Chinese network (Li Y, 2002). CCTV reported the incident some 35 minutes after it happened, whereas Sina took only 10 minutes to issue the first piece of news. CCTV covered the incident at the end of its news programme throughout the period. The reporting was short, superficial, and incorporated

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only official Chinese reactions. In contrast, Sina covered the incident as a major news event. It issued hundreds of news pieces every day, provided much background material and gave voice to many different perspectives. The Internet increasingly steers the agenda of the traditional media. A famous example concerns Sun Zhigang, a graphic designer and migrant worker who was beaten to death by police during detention for failing to display his temporary resident card (Xiao, 2004; Yu, 2006). Suns parents posted a petition letter on the Internet. The Guangdong provincial party paper Southern Metropolitan News (Nanfang dushibao) picked up the story.2 While the paper is renowned for its investigative stories, more than 80 percent of them come from leads on the Internet (Tong and Sparks, 2009). The news piece was posted on Sina.com (Xiao, 2004; Yu, 2006). Comments and appeals quickly flooded the Chinese networks, from BBS forums, email groups to weblogs. Thousands of people participated in several waves of online protests and petitions to seek justice for the victim. Popular newspapers soon caught the mood on the Internet and reported the incident. The central party controlled national media CCTV and Peoples Daily (Renmin ribao) eventually also adjusted their agenda, followed the story and joined in the debate about Chinas legal system. Suns case was closed with the trial and conviction of 18 people and the abolition of anti-vagrancy laws. The Internet furnishes a platform for news and information unavailable in the traditional media. A case in point is that of Li Siyi, a three-year-old girl who starved to death in her own home after her mother was arrested and sent to a drug rehabilitation centre (Yu, 2006). Li Yaling, a local journalist who first reported the case, was barred from further reporting due to pressure from local government and the police bureau. She turned to the Internet and made an appeal to fellow journalists to help spread the story, despite losing her job for doing so. Within days the incident appeared on all major Chinese networks and caused widespread outrage and disbelief. The local authorities had to bow to public discontent, and so arrested and charged the police officers responsible. As shown in these cases, the Internet permits private individuals to distribute news and information. Messages are often cross-posted in different Internet forums; issues raised in one forum can be brought to the attention of a large number of people in a short space of time (Yang, 2006).

Stability rules
Stability rules, based on the premise that social stability is a paramount precondition for economic growth, modernization and prosperity of the country, are decisive in undermining free and unrestricted flow of news and information. The state elite worry that if the masses knew the truth about what is really going on, they would rise up, riot and cause chaos. They are not willing to take any risks and try their very best to censor information. Issues of particular interest for the media in liberal democracies, like accidents, natural disasters and epidemics, are forbidden territories for the Chinese media. Stability rules underpin the Chinese governments many regulations, guidelines and measures to control the media. They engender punitive actions directed at those who step over the line. Internet service and content providers are required to license and register with network providers, all of whom are state organs, and relevant government departments

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(Shie, 2006). They are obliged to register users with national and local authorities, to obtain details of Internet usage including dial-up telephone numbers and domain names of the websites visited, and to keep the information for 60 days and pass it to state authorities upon request. Self-censorship is expected: Internet businesses have to sign a pledge of self-regulation and professional ethics, while Internet users have to sign an agreement of not engaging in activities online that may threaten state security and public safety. A firewall has been built to block politically sensitive websites based outside the Chinese mainland. All foreign traffic has to pass through the national network of the Ministry of Information Industry, which forms a single location to monitor traffic (Tsui, 2003). Websites covering dissidents and democracy, public health and AIDS, religion, Tibet and Taiwan in particular are filtered (Zittrain, 2004). A core target of filtering are news sites such as those of the BBC, CNN, and Chinese language media based in Hong Kong and Taiwan (SCMP, 25 December 2006). In recent years more subtle filtering technologies have been used; rather than blocking the entire website, web pages containing terms believed sensitive are made inaccessible (Zittrain, 2004). Material posted on websites on the Chinese mainland is checked initially by software which automatically identifies and blocks items containing forbidden keywords (Wu, 2007a). It is then read by censorship editors who look for and delete any prohibited content the software fails to recognize. A third layer of censorship is conducted by Internet police officers and officials from various state authorities. The list of banned keywords, topics and events is frequently updated. Those who are found posting illicit material can be detained and imprisoned. For example, Huang Qi was arrested for putting on the web articles that criticized the mishandling of international aid for the Sichuan earthquake by local authorities (Reporters Without Borders, 10, 24 September 2008).3 About 50 cyber dissidents are in prison at the time of writing. The scope of activities judged to be breaking the law continues to expand. In 2005 it became illegal for Internet search engines and portals to post their own commentary articles (New York Times, 26 September 2005). They are supposed simply to make available those issued by state news agencies and newspapers. Private individuals and groups have to register as news organizations before they can operate email lists to distribute news or commentaries. Since few are likely to be allowed to register as news organizations, the regulation effectively outlaws dispersing information by mass-emailing. In 2007 a law was passed banning unauthorized reporting of sudden incidents such as outbreaks of disease, natural disasters, industrial accidents and social unrest (RWB, 2008). Guidelines are issued regularly to media executives on specific subjects that should be avoided or treated with care, especially at times of major political meetings and international events. For instance, in January 2007, the media was told to ask for permission before covering significant historic events or anniversaries involving important political figures (SCMP, 16 January 2007). In the run up to the National Peoples Congress (NPC) Annual Meeting in March of that year, the press was urged not to publish anything judgemental of the controversial Property Law, and when reporting bureaucratic corruption, was told to emphasize the Partys efforts in combating it (Washington Post, 27 February 2007; SCMP, 9 March 2007). In the following November, the media was ordered to shun

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negative reports on the Olympic torch relay, air pollution and public health issues related to the Olympic Games (RWB, 2008). Those who do not obey orders are penalized. In March 2007, the authorities barred from release an issue of the magazine Caijing (Finance), which carried a cover story on debates over the Property Law and was scheduled to appear during the NPC meeting (SCMP, 9 March 2007). They instructed companies offering news broadcasts over the Internet to either shut down or change the content (SCMP, 20 March 2007). Earlier in the same year they banned eight books by renowned authors and intellectuals reflecting on significant historic and social events in recent decades (SCMP, 8 February 2007). The publishing houses of the forbidden books faced suspension of operations for several months and a reduction in book number allocation by as much as 20 percent (Wu, 2007b; Yang, 2007). When it comes to the reprimanding of individuals, Huang Liangtian, the editor of the magazine Baixing (The Masses), was removed from his post (SCMP, 22 January 2007). Under him the magazine gained a reputation for investigative reporting of serious social issues like bureaucratic corruption, land seizure, home demolition and mass protests. Ching Cheong of Singapores Straits Times was in jail for leaking state secrets (Hong Kong Standard, 20 January 2007). According to RWB approximately 30 journalists are serving prison terms at the time of writing. Reporters can face more sinister reprisals like beatings sanctioned by local officials, as some experienced when trying to cover the story of a bridge collapse which killed over 40 people in Hunan province (RWB, 2008). The movements of foreign journalists are monitored. They are required to obtain approval by local authorities in order to go to a particular location to conduct interviews (SCMP, 10 January 2007). This restriction was temporarily lifted from 1 January 2007 to 17 October 2008, fulfilling a pledge China made when awarded the 2008 Olympic Games. However, foreign reporters continued to meet obstructions or find their sources prevented from talking when trying to cover stories of public discontent (Human Rights Watch, 3 July 2008).4 Even if they can gain access, their reports may not be circulated in China. A regulation was issued in September 2006 prohibiting foreign news agencies from directly distributing news content to subscribers (SCMP, 15 September 2006). They must do so through agents approved by the official Xinhua news agency, giving it the opportunity to censor the content. Xinhua has long acted as the regulator of foreign news agencies in China.

Resources
State actions and decisions concerning the media can be taken by the CCP Central Committee; the State Council; the NPC; the ministries responsible for each of the print media, the broadcasting media and the Internet; the government departments in charge of propaganda and information; and local authorities. The different parts of the state and different state elites may not always agree, especially on specific decisions, which sometimes reflect power struggles within the Party (Zhao, 2004). It is nevertheless the case that market rules, technology rules and stability rules primarily have underpinned the actions and decisions of the state elite in the reform era. These rules dominate the information subsystem due to a concentration of resources in the hands of the elite in a singleparty state, especially as regards authority and organization. Authority gives the mandatory and discretionary rights to carry out functions or services commonly vested
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in and between public sector organizations (Rhodes, 1988: 90). Organizational resources such as the possession of people, skills, facility, equipment, etc., confer the ability to act. Other actors are dependent on these resources of the state elite to be permitted to have access to information and distribute it. The dominant rules have different unintended consequences on information dissemination. Whereas market rules and technology rules predominantly have enhanced the availability of information, stability rules have hampered it. However, this does not mean that these rules are inconsistent and contradictory. They are coherent since they serve the same purpose of boosting the elites legitimacy resources. Legitimacy refers to access to public decision-making structures, which is derived from elections in liberal democracies (Rhodes, 1988: 90). Since the CCP did not come to power by winning an election, it has to acquire legitimacy from popular sentiment. Market reform, economic growth and technological advancement which improve the living standards of the general population may strengthen the legitimacy of the state elite (Kluver, 2005), but social unrest may weaken it.5 Overall, the effect of market rules and technology rules on information growth is controlled within (as the state elite see it) acceptable bounds through stability rules.

Negotiation of Rules Foreign and domestic media corporations

Although the global media is increasingly dominated by a few huge multinational media conglomerates (McChesney, 2004), their presence in China is restricted. They may succeed only if they follow the dominant rules, but can fail if they contest them. Rupert Murdoch, after acquiring the pan-Asian satellite service Star TV in 1993, commented that satellite television was an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere (Curtin, 2005: 159). Murdoch paid a heavy price for this blatant challenge of the stability rules of the Chinese state elite. They swiftly banned satellite dishes and advertising for foreign satellite services, and started to develop local authority-controlled cable systems to provide low cost services, making satellite dishes unnecessary. It took News Corporation many years to repair the damage; abiding by the dominant rules was the key. To conform to stability rules, Star TV dropped BBC News, which was disapproving of the Chinese state, from its programming (NYT, 26 June 2007). The Murdochs spoke publicly in support of the Chinese governments policies, condemning the religious cult Falun gong and the separatism of the Dalai Lama. In accordance with technology rules, teams from News Corporation brought CCTV and Peoples Daily online. However, Murdoch had a major setback in the mid-2000s when attempting to transmit to other provinces programmes of his Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, which has rights confined to cable networks in Guangdong province which neighbous Hong Kong, and upmarket hotels and housing estates catering for foreigners and wealthy Chinese. Phoenix TV covers events mainland broadcasters do not, such as elections in Taiwan (Curtin, 2005), coverage which presents a threat to stability rules. Time Warner sought to provide Internet services and formed two consecutive joint ventures with Chinese partners (Weber and Jia, 2007). The regulators, wary about losing control over AOLs Internet content and hence the potential for it to violate stability rules, did not grant them permission to operate. In comparison, Viacom has cooperated with domestic Internet service provider Netease.com to supply interactive services for
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MTV cable television programmes. Disney has collaborated with another domestic Internet service provider, Sohu.com, to make available mobile value-added services, movie content, online games and activities (Weber and Jia, 2007). These two ventures are successful since they offer entertainment products which are unlikely to endanger stability rules, while the domestic Internet providers shoulder the task of meeting censorship requirements. They espouse technology rules by matching content provision with new media technologies in online and mobile gaming which the Chinese government would like to develop. The effect of foreign dealings on information distribution is insignificant as they provide mainly entertainment rather than news content. Domestic media conglomerates6 were formed in light of Chinas entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, anticipating competition from global media conglomerates (Huang, 2007; Lee et al., 2006; Zhao, 2004). Merging a number of media organizations from the same locality into a media group reinforces party control at the top management level, thereby upholding stability rules. The elimination of rivalry between media outlets which are now members of the same group strengthens the groups profit-generating capability, thus upholding market rules. The consolidation of stability rules together with market rules can result in the prioritization of media content relevant to the wealthy urban consumer, while marginalizing radical perspectives of interest to the disadvantaged and the discontent (Zhao, 2005). Moreover, as a study of the Shenzhen Press Group shows, being a monopoly press organization in Shenzhen city, it is in a much stronger position to drive away outside competitors like the outspoken provincial party paper Southern Metropolitan News (Lee et al., 2006). Because newspapers tend to have more freedom in disclosing official misconduct in a different place or a lower administrative level,7 this in effect prevents criticism of local officials being read by local residents. Therefore the trend of forming media conglomerates is not conducive to information dissemination.

Media workers
Chinese journalists are inclined to subscribe to stability rules, fearful of social disorder triggered by unrestrained news reporting (Latham, 2000). This can be described as practising party journalism collaborating with the Party, promoting its policies and acting as its mouthpiece (Pan and Chan, 2003). Stability rules are embedded in the reporting of the SARS epidemic by China Daily and Peoples Daily (Luther and Zhou, 2005). The news articles tend not to ascribe responsibility for the spreading of the disease, nor do they discuss conflict arising between people or organizations. Instead, they present economic consequences of the epidemic, leadership-related matters and human interest stories in a positive manner. Stability rules are furthermore shown in the coverage of HIV/ AIDS by the Xinhua news agency (Wu, 2006). The reports depict the governments open attitude towards the problem and its commitment and concrete action in tackling it. They are cautious when mentioning the statistics, but emphasize the progress made. Partly promoted by the demands of market competition (Pan, 2000), more and more media workers draw on professionalism rules in their work. Professionalism is the conception of journalism as an institution independent from the control of political and economic powers, and in which practitioners activities are guided by and justified in terms of professional norms and values (Chan et al., 2004: 256). Many media workers are familiar
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with the notion of watchdog journalism and take their social responsibility seriously (De Burgh, 2003; Pan and Lu, 2003; Zhao, 2000b). They report based on what they see as facts and ethical principles, and are not afraid of putting forward their own opinions and judgements. Professionalism rules are reflected in Caijing magazines reporting of SARS. When the government tried to cover up the outbreak and most other media outlets kept silent (Zhao, 2003), the magazine ran many reports of incidents of large-scale infection (Yu, 2003). Its founder and editor Hu Shuli believed that the stories had to be told since they were concerned with government transparency and were of interest to the public. A survey of 30 journalism and communication schools highlights the growing influence of market rules and professionalism rules in journalism education, although stability rules still remain significant (Xu et al., 2002). The state maintains stringent ideological control over journalism, schools whose purpose is deemed to be training politically reliable media workers to do its propaganda work. Subjects such as press freedom, and relations between media and society, and the press and democracy, continue to be taboo in journalism teaching and research. Meanwhile, the commercialization of the media requires journalism, education to contemplate the viability of market principles. Notions of audience appeal and news value and techniques of investigative journalism, have to be incorporated into the curriculum. This promotes a sense of professionalism by a positive correlation between market competitiveness and quality journalism. In the everyday work of media workers, market rules, professionalism rules and stability rules demand a delicate balance. The production of the popular CCTV programme Focus (Jiaodian fangtan), which conducts investigative reporting of problems in Chinese society, is an outstanding example here (Zhang, 2006; Zhao, 2000b). Market rules are at work as the programme depends entirely on advertising revenue; audience ratings are vital for its survival. Professionalism rules are influential, since the production of quality current affairs programmes is essential for CCTV to rise to the rank of an authoritative international television network. However, both rules have to be weighed carefully against stability rules in the selection and framing of the news stories, in order that the programmes do not provoke the audience and displease the censorship officials. The topics chosen have to be of general concern to the public yet within the reform agenda of the Party leadership. The cases reported must have clearly violated existing laws and regulations such that exposing them poses no political risk. The coverage of the 9/11 tragedy by Southern Daily (Nanfang ribao), a provincial party newspaper, also illustrates negotiation between market rules and professionalism rules on the one hand and stability rules on the other (Hsu, 2003). The reporting deviates from the Party stance which considers the event a terrorist attack not warranting military reaction, and an international affair having little impact on China. The news articles describe the incident as an act of war, bring up the possibility of military attack and contemplate the effects on China. They present different aspects of the incident and carry stories of conflict. Hsu (2003) indicates the possible influence of market rules on the deviation from the Party line; I think that professionalism rules would have had a bearing too. However, on the most sensitive issues the reporting adheres to stability rules and follows the Party line. There is no discussion of the cause of the incident which may have been driven by be religious conflict. This is because the Chinese leadership are confronted by their own religious problems including the Falun gong movement and proindependence uprisings in the Islamic Xinjiang region.
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Media workers deploy a number of tactics to extend the influence of professionalism rules and the tolerance of stability rules. They choose safe themes and avoid taboo subject matters. Even forbidden events can be reported this way (Tong, 2007). They do not express values and opinions overtly, but merge the meaning into the depiction of facts. They present constructive suggestions rather than dissenting views, giving the impression that they are friends of the state, not its enemies. They seek backing by quoting from official sources. Journalists conduct anonymous investigations to prevent the authorities from knowing, otherwise bans could be issued before the news piece is released. When a news story is prohibited from circulation, they lobby higher level officials to override censorship or local officials (De Burgh, 2003). The purged editor Huang Liangtian sums up the strategy: the guidelines issued by the propaganda administration were more like a rubber band we needed to expand them to just before breaking point to create space for good stories (SCMP, 22 January 2007). In the event that the rubber band is stretched too far and breaks, the rules of the media workers become incompatible with stability rules, and they come into conflict with the state elite. The elite can make use of their monopoly over authority and organizational resources to remove media workers from their posts, bar their work and even put them in prison. Media workers would then lose access to information which is a resource they can use to challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state elite. Under such circumstances, for some media workers, following stability rules is a tactical choice under the constraint of tight state censorship (Pan and Lu, 2003). However, if they give in too much to stability rules, this can be obstructive to dispersing information which is indispensable to the public good. Such a case is that of contaminated milk in Zhejiang province. Journalists knew about it but did nothing for six months as they awaited permission to report, which is usually granted only after the problem has been resolved (De Burgh, 2003). Information freedom is really upheld by media workers who discount stability rules in the pursuit of what they see as truth and justice. An example is journalist Fang Jinyu who, notwithstanding ruining his career and enduring personal danger, investigated serious embezzlement of funds by top officials running the Hope Project (Xiwang gongcheng), a large-scale charitable scheme aimed at assisting the education of destitute young people (He, 2006). There are media workers who decipher significant historical, social and political issues with integrity. Whether the Chinese government favours or loathes their work is not their concern. Investigative journalists Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao, whose book is banned for making known the plight of the peasantry (Chen and Wu, 2004), are among the examples.

Conclusion
This article analyses information control in China by examining the rules and resources of the actors concerned. The rules of the state elite oriented towards market formation, technological progress, and social stability dominate the information subsystem. Market rules engender the commercialization of media outlets; technology rules bring about the rapid growth of the Internet; and stability rules produce the rigid regulation of the media. The dominance of these rules hinges on the elites monopolistic access to authority and organizational resources, while the rules are deployed to bolster their legitimacy.
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Figure 1. Correlation between Degree of Agency and Relationship with Stability Rules of Media Actors in China
m1 m2 m3 m4 Reflexive object Negotiator leaning to stability rules Negotiator leaning to professionalism rules Reflexive agent

Although market rules and technology rules lead to information growth, this is capped through stability rules. Information control is reinforced through foreign and domestic media corporations and media workers adhering to stability rules, due to their dependence on the resources of the state elite to be allowed to function. Foreign media capitalists abiding by the dominant rules contribute little to information dissemination. The creation of domestic media conglomerates strengthens the influence of stability rules in concert with market rules, which has adverse effects on information distribution. Although media workers mostly follow stability rules and play a part in restricting information, they increasingly employ professionalism rules. Many try to balance professionalism rules with stability rules. If they lean too much towards professionalism rules they would be in conflict with the state elite and lose access to information. However, if they lean too much towards stability rules this would be damaging to spreading information. Information freedom is truly promoted by those who disregard stability rules despite detrimental personal consequences.
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The actors who submit to stability rules, and thus relate to them in terms of duality, can be thought of as reflexive objects with a minimal degree of agency (Hoggett, 2001: 49). They are well aware of their powerlessness in the face of state censorship but cannot do anything about it. The actors who ignore stability rules, and thus relate to them in terms of dualism, are reflexive agents with a maximal degree of agency (Hoggett, 2001: 47). Those who negotiate between stability rules and professionalism rules are between reflexive objects and reflexive agents, with a degree of agency in-between minimum and maximum. Their relationship with stability rules is in-between duality and dualism. If they incline towards stability rules, they are closer to being reflexive objects. If they incline towards professionalism rules, they are closer to being reflexive agents. Figure 1 demonstrates a correlation between the degree of agency and the relationship with stability rules, both of which are perceived through a continuum. Notes
1. CNNIC has conducted surveys on the development and usage of the Internet twice a year since 1998. 2. The leading editors of the newspaper were jailed afterwards, believed to be for the aggressive reporting of Sun Zhigangs case and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic at around the same time (Xiao, 2004). 3. Available at: www.rsf.org 4. Available at: www.hrw.org 5. Market reform has unintended outcomes such as rising unemployment and a widening gap between the rich and the poor which undermine the legitimacy of the state elite. This is outside the scope of the current article. 6. In 2004 domestic private investors were formally allowed to invest in and partly own a media company, but the state must have an absolute controlling stake (Huang, 2007). 7. Responding to appeals by local governments, the central government issued a regulation in 2005 banning cross-regional reporting, although its implementation has been ineffective (Tong and Sparks, 2009).

Acknowledgement
I conducted research and wrote this paper while visiting the Universities Service Centre for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and benefited from the Universitys rich sources on media studies. The reviewers and editors of Cultural Sociology provided useful suggestions for revision.

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