BU emu su C mm CS mum EL CRUn Tet Leese 1d Ua ae Mm AOME FROM THE PRESOCRATICS TO PLOTINUSbate RL) - Canada $18.50 opment of philosophy for Catholic seminary students, Frederick Copleston’s nine-volume A History of Philosophy has journeyed far beyond the modest purpose of its author to TTT Testol Cote E-Ten a AOL LUTON atte TSO Copleston, an Oxford Jesuit of immense erudition who once tangled with A. J. Ayer in a fabled debate about the exis- tence of God and the possibility of metaphysics, knew that TENA UM cml R MOLT NMliLe (oie elcome etme mT as ATCT cele MTOM LMT UNE ATO A TULL) ath TES tory’s great thinkers was reduced to simplistic caricatures. Copleston set out to redress the wrong by writing a complete LUCA MAN SM es) AMET mM Vm (el Ula) intellectual excitement—and one that gives full place to each CA CU MUR Ue Ue se Melee eae LOR Lys and showing his links to those who went before and to those who came after him. The result of Copleston’s prodigious labors is a history of philosophy that is unlikely ever to be surpassed. Thought mag- azine summed up the general agreement among scholars and students alike when it reviewed Copleston's A History of Pei eee) ON MM LAOH e (Cee TaLO Me) ey Leathe MmLe LT LeU SN} and scholarly, unified and well proportioned...We cannot rec- ommend [it] too highly.” eaeees originally as a serious presentation of the devel- Dee Ce ary ~~A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHYA HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY — VOLUME I _ Greece and Rome Frederick Copleston, S.J.Aw Ince Boor. ‘alison of Barts Doubleday Dl Poishing rou, 1540 Broady, New York, New Yor 1036 aoe, DousssDay nthe poreayal of der deals ‘om ates ae tademart of Dovey. divin of ‘Bart Doubleday Del Pabshing Grow I= Ft ge Boks ition of Vhane LA Hinry of Posy pobtibd 1962 ypc araneent wth The Nea rs ‘Th nage don ple Ape 1999 De sea Super Ord rcs Magan, Prey, Pow Ane ‘NIM Otwtat Late, 8, Censor Depts mormetur: Tomes, rence Bemngamienas De 1 Mart 1946 Libary of Congres Calagigsn-Fuboton Data Cepenn, Freer Cha Astor of pioep Freer Cope, Inches bib ere a inns content v1 Gree snd Rome huge eae 2 ie Aer and erty amare, 1 tent, Ae Pan He. Fay, 90a) "Saou ‘lame cope 1946 by reer Capleton Ags ReservedPREFACE ‘Twene are so many histories of philosophy already in existence that it seems necessary to give Some explanation why one has added to their number. My chief motive in writing this book, ‘whichis designed to be the frat volume of a complete history of Philosophy, has been that of supplying Catholic ecclesiastical {eminaries wth a work that should be somewhat more detailed 4nd of wider scope than the text-books commonly in use and whieh at the same time should endeavour to exhibit the logical evelopment and interconnection of philosophical systems, Tt is ‘true that there are several works available in the English language ‘which (as distinct from scientific monographs dealing with restricted. topics) present an account, at once scholarly and philosophical, of the history of philosophy, but their point of ‘iew is sometimes very diferent from that of the present writer and of the type of student whom he had in mind when writing this book. Te mention 2 "point of view at all, when treating of the history of philosophy, may occasion a certain lifting of the ‘eyebrows; but no true historian can write without some point of View, some standpoint, if for no other reason than that he must have a principle of selection, guiding his intelligent choice and arrangement of facts. Every conscientious historian, itis true, will strive to be as objective as pssible and will aveid any temptation to distort the facts to ft a preconceived theory o to ‘omit the mention of certain facts simply because they will not support his preconceived theory; but if he attempts to write ‘story without any principle of selection, the result will be a 1mere chronicle and no real history, a mere concatenation of events (or opinions without understanding or motif. What would we {think ofa writer on English history who set down the number of ‘Queen Elizabeth's dreses and the defeat of the Spanish Armada as facts of equal importance, and who made no intelligent attempt to chow how the Spanish ventore arose, what events led to it and what its results were? Moreover, in the case of an historian of philosophy, the historian’s own personal philosophical outlook is bound to induence his selection and presentation of facts of, at least, the emphasis that he lays on certain facts or aspects. To ‘take a simple example. Of two historians of ancient philosophy,tt Peer ‘each may make an equally objective study of the facts, eg. of the history of Platonism and Neo-Platonism but if the one man is convinced that all “transcendentalism” is sheer folly, while the other firmly believes in the reality of the transcendental, i is hardly conceivable that their presentation of the Platonic tradi- tion should be exactly the same. They may both narrate the ‘opinion ofthe Platonists objectively and conscientiously; but the {ormer will probably lay little emphasis on Neo-Platonic metar physics, for instance, and will indicate the fact that he regards Neo-Platonism as a sorry ending to Greek philosophy, asa relapse {nto mysticism’ or “orientalis,” while the other may emphasise the syneretistic aspect of Neo-Piatonism and its importance for Christian thought. Neither will have distorted the facts, in the sense of attributing to philosophers opinions they did not hold ‘or suppressing certain of theit tenets or neglecting chronology or logical interconnection, but all the same their pictures of Paton im and Neo-Platonism willbe unmistakably diferent. This being 5, Thave no hesitation in claiming the right to compose a work (nthe history of philosophy from the standpoint of the scholastic philosopher. ‘That there may be mistakes or misinterpretations ‘due to ignorance, it would be presumptuous folly to deny; but T {do claim that T have striven after objectivity, and T claim at the same time that the fact that I have written from a definite stand point isan advantage rather than a disadvantage. At the very Teast it enables one to give a fairly coherent and meaningfl account of what might otherwise be a mere jumble of incoherent ‘opinions, not as good as a fairy-tale From what has been sai, it should be clear that I have writen not for scholars or specialists, but students ofa cetain type, the ‘reat majority of whom are making their fst acquaintance with {the history of philosophy and who are studying it concomitantly ‘with systematic scholastic philosophy, to. which latter subject they ate called upon to devote the greater part of theie attention for the time being. For the readers I have primarily in mind (though T should be only too glad if my bok should prove of any ‘se to others as well) a series of learned and original monographs ‘would be of less use than a book whichis frankly designed as a text-book, but which may, inthe ease of some students, serve as an incentive to the study of the original philosophial texts and ‘of the commentaries and treatises on thove texts by celebrated scholars. T have tried to bear this in mind, while writing thePREFACE vi t work, for gui vult fnem, el liam madia. Should the ‘work, therefor, fall into the hands of any readers who are well, equtinted with the literature on the history of ancient philo- Sophy, and cause them to reflec that this idea is founded on what Burnet of Taylor say, that idea on what Ritter or Jaeger or Stenzel or Praechter have sad, let me remind them that T am quite well aware ofthis myself, and that T may not have greed uneriticlly or unthinkingly with what the scholar in (question says. Originality is certainly desirable when it means the discovery of a truth not hitherto revealed, but to pursue originality forthe sake of originality isnot the prope task of the Iistorian. T willingly acknowledge my debt, therefore, to those ‘men who have shed lustre on British and Continental scholarship, to men like Professor A. E. Taylor, Sir David Ross, Constantin Ritter, Werner Jaeger and others. In fact, it i one of my exeuses for writing this book that some of the manuals which fare in the hands of those for whom T am writing have paid but seant attention to the results of modern specialist crite. For my own part, T should consider a charge of making in- sfcient use of such sources of light a more reasonable ground for adverse criticism, than a charge of making too much use of them, Grateful thanks are due to the Encyclopaedia Britannica Co,, Ltd, for permission to use diagrams taken from Sir Thomas Little Heaths article on Pythagoras (rth edit); to Profesor ALE. Taylor (and Messrs. Macmillan & Co,, Ltd) for his generous ‘permission to utilise so freely his study on Forms and Numbers in Plato (reprinted from Mind in Philsophical Studies: to Si David Ross and Meats. Methuen & Co. for kind permission to incorporate his table of the moral virtues according to Aristotle (trom Aristotle, p. 203); to Messrs, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, for permission to quote a passage from the English translation of Professor Nicolai Hartmann’s Ethics and to utilise diagram from that work; tothe same publishers and to Dr. Oscar Levy to ‘make some quotations from the authorised English translation of Nietzsche's ‘works (of which Dr. Levy is editor; to Messrs Charles Scribner's Sons (U.S.A.) for permission to quote the ‘translation of Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus by Dr. James Adam (rom Hicks’ Stoic and Epicurean), to Protessor E. R. Dodds and the SP.CK. for permission to utilise translations found in Selec Passages Musiraing Neoplatoniom (SPCK. x23); and tOvii PREFACE Messrs. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., for permission to quote from RIL. Nettleship' Lestares om the Republic of Plato. ‘References to the pre-Socratic philosophers are given according to the fifth edition of Diels’ Vorsokratter(D. intext), ‘Some of the fragments I have translated myself, while in other cases I Ihave (with the kind permission of Messrs A. & C. Black, Ltd) adopted the English translation given by Burnet in his Early Greak Philosophy. The title ofthis work s abbreviated in reference tO EGP,, and Outlines of the History of Gresk Philosophy, by Zeller—Nestle—Palmer, appear generally as Ouine. Abbrevia- tions forthe titles of Platonic dialogues and the works of Aristotle should be suficiently obvious; forthe full tiles of other works referred to recourse may be had to the first Appendix at the end of the volume, where the abbreviations are explained. T have ‘mentioned a few works, by way of recommendation, inthe third ‘Appendix, but I do so simply forthe practical convenience of the type of student for whom I have primarily written; T do not dignity the short lst of books with the ttle of bibliography and T disclaim any intention of giving a bibliography, forthe simple reason that anything approaching a fall bibliography (especially iH it took into account, as it ought to do, valuable articles in learned periodicals) would be of such an enormous size that it ‘would be quite impracticable to include it in this work. For a bibliography and a survey of sources, the student can tuen to eg. Utberweg-Praechter's Die Philasophie des Altrtums. AUTHOR'S FOREWORD. TO REVISED EDITION My thanks are due to the Rev, T. Paine, $.J, the Rev. J. Weodlock, S.J, and the Reader of Mestrs. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Lid, for thir valuable assistance in the correction of misprints and other errors of form which disfigured the rst Impression, and for their suggestions in regard to the improve- ‘ment of the index. Some slight additions to the text have been ‘made, a8 on p. 126, and for these Tam entirely responsible0. a W. vi vu vu x samt xv. xv. xv. xv. xv XC, XXII xa. ro0v, XV, xv, CONTENTS Puce ‘ a i IWernopverion : i Parr T PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY ‘Tae Caaots o” Wesranx Tuoucs: oma . ‘Tar Prowenss: Easy Towtaw Putcosoraess ‘Tue Proaconean Socterr ‘Tue Wono oF Henaccrros ‘Tue Ont oF Panwenines AnD Miuissis ‘Taz Duuseric oF Ze¥0 Eurepocues or Axnacas | ‘Tar Anvawex oF AWAxAcoRAs Tae Arowsrs Par-SocmTie Punosonity Pax 1 THE SOCRATIC PERIOD ‘Tue Sormsrs- Sous Tnorvipoas Sopaiirs Socsarss Miwon Socratic Scnoous Dawocarrus or Ampeaa axe IIT PLATO Lame or Puaro Puaro's Woaxs ‘Taeony oF Kwowizoce ‘Tw Doctue or Fones Zax Prvcrotocy oF Pua Desa Pascs oP Pisro Nore on ‘ra inrinvck oF Paro Tar Ovo ACADchap XXVIL XXVIIL SOUR. 2X XXXL XXX XXXII XXXIV, xX. XXXVI, XXXVI XXXVI 200%, xL. XL XLIL xu XL. XLY, XLV XLVI 0 mr ‘CONTENTS Pas IV ARISTOTLE Lire avo Warrns oF ARISTOFLE [ocre or Aniston. ‘Tae Metarnvstes or AsroT ‘Punosopay oF NATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY Aniston's Brincs Pouities AESTHETICS oF ARssTOrLE ‘Nome on re Onben Penirarerice Pato avo ANTOTLE Paar V Inernopvcrony ‘Tae Eansy S104 Eniconzanisi Nore on Cynic mx the Finer Penop oF Tt Hetursic Broo ‘Te Ocoen Scermics, Te “Mivoue AND ‘New “AcaDEx ‘Tae Minot SrO4 Nore. ov tmz PEnnarene Scoot 1 Te Hinuunnrie ROMAN Penioo ‘Tae Laven S10 Cynics, Eexzcnes, Seernies NeoPrawsconzanisw Note on AroLowios oF Tyaea Mroous Piarowise Jewist-Hauuesisric Paizosorsy Prova Neo Puaroston ‘Ormen Neo-Praroric Setoots CCoxctuone Review Sou Avexzviarions oseD DH raus VOLUME A Nore on Sounces 1A Pew Boous Torx 6 = hy = ae 3st 359 x9 we so se 37A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHYCHAPTER T INTRODUCTION 1, Why Study the History of Philsophy? 1. We would scarey call anyone “educated” who bad no tnowledge whatsoever of history we all recognise tht a man tould Know something ofthe history of his wa country, its Palit socal and economic development, its literary and [istic achiovements—prefraby indeed in the wider seting of ‘European and, toa certain extent, even World history. Buti an cocited and cultured Englihinan may be expected to poses: Some knowlege of Alived the Great and Eliabeth, of Commell fant Marborough and Nelson, of the Norman ‘invasion, the Reformation, and the Industral Revolution, it would seem equally clea tat he should know something atleast of Roger Bacon and Dons Scotus, of Francis Bacon and Hobbes, of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, of J. Mil and Herbert Spencer. Moreover, fan ‘cated man i expected to be not entirely ignorant of Gree nd Rome if he would be ashamed to have to confes that he had ‘ever even heard of Sophocles or Ving and knew nothing ofthe gms of European cts, he might saul be expected 0 now something of Plato and Arstoue, two of the greatest, ‘thinkers the world bas ever Known, two ten who stand a¢ the had of European philosophy. A cultured man will know a ithe oncraing Dante and Shakespeare and Goethe, concerning St Francs of Assit and Fra Angelco, concerning Frederik the Great and Napoleon I: why should he not be expected also to ow something of St.” Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoca, Kant and Hege? Tt would be absurd to suggest that we shoud inform ourtives concerning the great conquerors and. destroyers, but Femaia ignorant of the great creators, those who have realy contrbted to our European calture But its not only the great painters and sculptors who have let us an abiding legacy and treasure tis also the great thinkers, men lke Plato abd Aristotle, St. Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, who have enriched Europe and her eure. Te long, therefore, toa eltored education to know something at leat of the course of European philosophy, frit sou thinkers,a INTRODUCTION ss well as our artists and generals, who have helped to make our time, whether for good or il "Now, no one would suppose that tis wast of time to read the works of Shakespeare or contemplate the creations of Michel- fngelo, for they have intrinsic value in themselves which is not diminished by the number of years that have elapsed between their deaths and our own time. Yet no more should it be con- sidered a waste of time to study the thought of Plato or Aristotle ‘or St. Augustin, for their thought-creations abide as outstanding achievements of the human sprit. Other artists have lived and Painted since the time of Rubens, but that does not lessen the ‘alue of Rubens’ work: other thinkers have philosophised since the time of Plato, but that does not destroy the interest and beauty of his philosophy. ‘But if tis desirable forall cultured men to know something of the history of philosophic thought, so fer as occupation, cast of ‘mind and need for specialisation permit, how much more is this not desirable for all avowed students of philosophy. I refer ‘expecially to students of the Scholastic Philosophy, who study it fas the philorophia perenne. That itis the philorophia ferennis I Ihave no wish to dispute; but it did not drop down from Heaven, 5 grew out of the past; and if we really want to appreciate the ‘work of St. Thomas Aquinas or St. Bonaventure or Duns Scotus, ‘we should know something of Plato and Aristotle and St. Angus- tine, Again, if there is a phiosophia porennis, itis only to be ‘expected that some of its principles should be operative in the ‘minds even of philosophers of modern times, who may seem at fiat sight to stand far ffom St. Thomas Aquinas, “And even if this were not so, it would be instructive to cbserve what resalts follow from fale premisses and faulty principle, Nor ean it be enied that the practice of condemning thinkers whose pesition and meaning has not been grasped or seen in its true historic Setting is greatly to be deprecated, while it might also be borne ‘ mind that the application of true principles to all spheres of philosophy was certainly not completed in the Middle Ages, and it may well be that we have something to learn from ‘modern thinkers, eg. in the field of Aesthetic theory or Natural Philosophy. 2. It'may be objected that the various philosophical systems ofthe past are merely antique relics; that the history of philosophy consists of “refuted and spiritually dead systems, since each haseee eee a ie ad brid the other Did not Kant dere that Meta Bae Sac the baen abd opens vs ahd ae and Yt ae meer fled” fat "ve Ne tes cnlealy sivenng in Meapsyae ee nd tesa rae waa Bee Perey a Patenan, Attclen,” Slaten tect” Kani, Hegde have had. the nioptany dal Nee brn lng: Europe Fee aie he Sepracted ty hntred wilt netehynca Tie elated abe tucoweled "Wy muah eo ase ane of te unter of sn? ae te poses pst had ee ot ly caged wich obo) bet ao rele hh bt a al Sane i i wl tones tre at “ro ae aa Mate caning of case tnt ploy pestle Sits ard ent of fae -newbp. Te tke an eps STRAT ralceale, conch’ tooneh Engr Hibben on neon hd td thous to we Nominal ead Sara et lade et he sso poten of who's we soit ins nes teens he ted oom ee eee ee eae alte tes art nthe Shoo Agia the eet that Abbie Haein fas fund st eye Sf proving ny adequate toplnnton of te teen sa be see dar sone Frenette rape gee reverie thltcry anh rny at kadlg ede See oboe Tv lol, Sse a he extragune owe has ok {tay rte ne eat asta no moe be ede 1s Sbjct than bjt to uber. me Mars, notte, {2 'endementel arom, oil each a not feng the tenes sand ese ur co pet oe teat Caltre Tom cesaly wo doo not touts fan ave ‘pete peony bet apt haps at oe tRestady a the heey of pnp ape theres hel a tne fit fceing do ln and repeating ‘habs af ts pcan, hom foes Sad Pas thought git frp hee eed hi 2 Tha a nny of te hay of lsophy may ted to tee iaouien cen. wteepiennne RS a tr MORE ‘ease aeLd ERECTION {nice a sceptical frame of mind is true, but it must be remem ‘ered thatthe fact ofa succession of systems doesnot prove that any one philosophy is erroneous. 1 X challenges the postion of Y and abandons it that does not by itself prove that the position (of Y is untenable, since X may have abandoned it on insuficient ‘rounds of have adopted false premisses, the development of ‘which involved a departure from the philosophy of Y. The world has ten many religions—Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Mchammedanism, et, but that doesnot prove that Christianity is not the true Religion; to prove that, a thorough refutation of Christian Apologetics would be necessary. But just as itis absurd to speak as if the existence ofa variety of Religions {so facto disproved the claim of any one religion to be the trae Religion, so itis absurd to speak as though the succasion of philosophies ipso facto demonstrated that there is no trve philo- Sophy and can beno true philosophy. (We make this observation, fof course, without meaning to imply that there is no truth of value in any other religion than Christianity. Moreover, there is this great dference between the true (revealed) Religion and the ‘true philosophy, that whereas the former, as revealed, is neces- sacily true in its totality in all that is revealed, the troe philo- Sophy may be trve in its main lines and principles without reaching completion at any given moment. Philosophy, whichis the work of the human spirit and not the revelation of God, ‘grows and develops; fresh vistas may be opened up by new lines (of approach or application to new problems, newly discovered facts, fresh situations, ete, The term “true philosophy” or ‘hilosophia perennis should not be understood to denote a static and complete body of principles and applications, insuseeptible of development or modiseation) 1, Nature ofthe History of Philosophy 1. The history of philosophy is certainly not a mere congeries ‘of opinions, a narration of isolated items of thought that have no ‘connection with one another. If the history of plillosophy is ‘treated “only a the enumeration of various opinions,” and if all, these opinions are considered as of equal value or dsvalue then becomes “an ile tale, or, if you wil, an erudite investigation.” There is continuity and connection, action and reaction, thesis ‘and antithesis, and no philosophy can really be understood fully "Hag oe Pipeee eee 3 unless i it seen in its historical setting and in the light ofits con- ection with other systems. How can one really understand what Plato was gcttng at or what induced him to say what he di, {less one knows tomething of the thought of Heraclitus, Parmen- ies, the Pythagoreans? How can one understand why Kant fdopted such an apparently extraordinary postion in regaed to Space, Time and the Categories, unless one knows something of British empiricism and realises the effect of Hume's sceptical conclusions on the mind of Kant? ‘2 But if the history of philosophy is no mere collection of ‘eolated opinions, it cannot be regarded as a contisual progress for even a spiral ascent. ‘That one can find plausible instances in the course of philosophic speculation of the Hegelian triad of ‘thesis, antithesis and synthesi is true, but iis scarcely the task ofa Scentfc historian to adopt an a ricri scheme and then to St the facts into that scheme. Hegel supposed that the succession (of philosophic systems "represent the necessary succession of Stages in the development” of philosophy, but this can only be So ifthe philesophie thought of man isthe very thinking of the "World Spit." That, practically speaking, any given thinker is limited as to the direction his thought will take, limited by the Immediately preceding and the contemporary systems (limited also, we might add, by his personal temperament, his education, ‘the historical and social situation, ete) is doubtless true; none the Jess he is not determined to choose any particular premistes oF Principles, nor to react to the preceding philosophy in any particular way. Fichte believed that his system fllowed logicaliy on that of Kant, and there is certainly a direct logical connection, 1s every student of modern philosophy is aware; but Fichte was ‘ot determined to develop the philosophy of Kant inthe particular way he did. The succeeding philosopher to Kant might have ‘chosen to re-examine Kant's premisses and to deny that the con- lusions which Kant accepted from Hume were true conclusions; fhe might have gone back to other principles or excogitated new ‘ones of his own. Logical sequence there undoubtedly is in the ‘istry of philosophy, but not necessary sequencein the strict sense. ‘We cannot, therefore, agree with Hegel when he says that "the {inal philosophy ofa period is the result ofthis development, and {s truth in the highest form which the slf-consiousness of spirit affords of itseli."* A good deal depends, of course, on how you6 INTRODUCTION divide the “periods” and what you are pleased to consider the ‘inal philosophy of any period (and here there is ample scope for arbitrary choice, in accordance with preconceived opinion and wishes), but what guarantee is there (unless we fret adopt the ‘whole Hegelian position) that the inal philotophy of any period represents the highest development of thought yet attained? TE ‘one can legitimately speak of a Mediaeval pericd of philosophy, land if Ockhamism ean be regarded as the final main philosophy Of that period, the Ockhamist philosophy can certainly not be regarded as the supreme achievement of mediaeval philosophy. ‘Mediaeval philosophy, as Professor Gilson has shown! represents 1 curse rather than a straight line. And what philosophy of the present day, one might pertnently ask, represents the synthesis ofall preceding philosophies? 3. The history of philosophy exhibits man's search for Truth by the way ofthe discursive reason. A Neo-Thomist, developing St, Thomas’ words, Oma copnosentia comotcunt smplicte Deut fn quaibe copnite; has maintained that the judgment always points beyond itsell, always contains an implicit reference to Absolute Truth, Absolute Being? (We are reminded of F. H. Bradley, though the term “Absolute” has not, ofcourse, the same meaning in the two cates) At any rate we may say that the search for truth is ultimately the search for Absolute Truth, God, land even those systems of philosophy which appear to refute this Statement, eg. Historical Materialism, are nevertheless examples Of it, for they are all seking, even if unconsciously, even if they would not recognise the fact, for the ultimate Ground, the ‘supremely Real. Even if intellectual speculation has at times ed to bizarre doctrines and monstrous conclusions, we cannot but have 2 certain sympathy for and interest in the struggle of the hhoman intellect to attain Truth. Kant, who denied that Meta physics in the traditional sense were or could be a scence, none fhe les allowed that we cannot remain indifferent to the objects with which Metaphysice profess to deal, God, the sou, freedom:* 44nd we may add that we cannot remain indifferent to the human intellet’s search forthe True and the Good, The ease with which smistakes are made, the fact that personal temperament, education {and other apparently “fortuitous” circumstances may 20 often S[DRRRIE e ee efer ts aapage Cai“ sett! ot Ente of te RoanINT RUDUL LU . read the thinker wpa ftellctual cles, the fact that we are wot pure inteligences, but that the process of our minds may Fequently be infuenced by extraneous factor, doubtless shows therned for religious Revelation; but tat should not cause ws fo pai altogether of human speculation nor make us despise the Sonate attempt of past thinkers Co attain Truth "r'The_ present writer adberes to the Thomistic standpoint ta there ies phlouphia porewnt and that tis phesopia fpeonns i Thomam in wide cece. But he would ike t9 make {ovo observations on this matter) To say that the Thomist system is the peremial philosophy does not mean that that ‘sjotem is closed at any given historical epoch and is incapable of {lrther development in any dvecon. (2) The perennial pilo- soph after the close ofthe Mediaeval period dows not develop tmerey alongside of and apart from “oder” pifosophy, but ‘evelops als in and through modera pilesophy. I donot mean {0 suggest thatthe philosophy of Spinoza or Hegel for istance, fan be comprehended under the trm Thomism: but eather that ‘when philosophers, even if they would by no means eal them- Uehves"Scholsti,” arrive by the employment of true principles valuable conclusion, these conclusions must be looked a8 ‘nonging to the perennial philosophy. St.Thomas Aguas extainly makes some statements con- cerning the State for example, and we have no nciation to Squeston his principles; but i would be absurd to expect « developed ‘phlosophy of the moder State in the thirteenth fentury, and trom the practical point of view itis diffcalt to se how a developed and articulate philrophy of the State on ‘cholic principe could be elaborated inthe concrete, atl the modern State had emerged and until modem attudes towards the State had shown themscives. Iti only when we have had experience of the Liberal State and of the Totalitarian State and ofthe coresponding theories ofthe State that we ean realise all the implications contained inthe Ile that St. Thomes says on ‘he State and develop an elaborated Scholastic politcal philceophy ‘ppliable tothe modern State, which wil expres contain all the good contained in the other theories wile renaming the {Tor The renutant State-philesophy willbe seen to be, when Jooked atin the concrete, not simply a evelopment of Scholastic Principle in absolute polation from the actol historical situation Ad from intervening theories, but rather a development oftheseies Pee eee principles in the light of the historical situation, a development Achieved in and through opposing theories of the State. If this point of view be adopted, we shall be enabled to maintain the ‘dea of a perennial philosophy without committing ourselves, on ‘the one hand, to a very narrow outlook whereby the perennial philosophy is confined to a given century, or, on the other hand, to an Hegelian view of philosophy, which’ necessarily implies (though Hegel himself seems to have thought otherwise—incon- sistently) that Truth is never attained at a given moment ams, Hou fo Study the History of Philosphy 1. The first point to be stressed is the need for seeing any philosophical system in its historical setting and connections This point has already been mentioned and does not require farther elaboration: it should be obvious that we ean only grasp adequately the state of mind of a given philosopher and the raison d tre of bis philosophy if we have frst apprehended its Iistrial poi de départ, The example of Kant has already been given; we can understand his state of mind in developing his theory ofthe « priori only if we see him in his historical situation visd-ois the extical philosophy of Hume, the epparent bank- ruptey of Continental Rationalism and the apparent certainty of ‘mathematics and the Newtonian physics. Similarly, we are beter tnabled to understand the biological philosophy of Henri Bergson if we se it, for example, in its relation to preceding mechanistic theories and to preceding French “spiritualism.” 2, For a profitable study of the history of philosophy there is aleo need for a certain “sympathy,” almost the paychologial approach. It is desirable that the historian should know some- thing of the philosopher as a man (this is not possible in the case of all philosophers, of course), since this will help him to fel his vray into the system in question, to view it, as it were, from inside, and to grasp its peculiar favour and characteristics. We have to endeavour to put ourelves into the place of the pil sopher, to try to see his thoughts from within. Moreover, this sympathy of imaginative insight is eaential for the Scholastic Philosopher who wishes to understand modern philosophy. If a ‘man, for example, has the background of the Catholic Faith, the modern systems, or some of them atleast, readily appear to him as mere bizarre monstrosities unworthy of serious attention, but i he succeeds, as far a5 he can (without, of couse, surrenderingINTRODUCTION 9 is own principles), n sting the sjstems fom within, he stands Ich more chance of understanding what the philosopher meant. Smut twee eee pep wih he yehlogy of the philosopher as to ‘the truth oF fal Pit aan in heal or thee conection of System with preceding thought payors may just confine Finslf tothe st viewpoit, bot not an isorian of philosophy For example, a parely poyhologcal approach might lead one to Suppor that the system of Arthur Schopenhauer was the eeation tan embittered, sored and disappointed man, who atthe sane {ime possesed trary power and aesthetic imagination and insight, and rthing more a6 though Ns philosophy were simply the manifestation of certain psychological states. But this view: Dost would leave out of account the fact that his pessimistic otuntaristie system is largely a reaction to the Hegelian opt istic Rationalism, asi would alo Teave out of account the fact that Schopenhauers aesthetic Cheory may have value ofits fwn, independent of the hind of maw that proponnded it, snd ‘oul also neglect the whole probem of evl and safering which is raised by Schopenhauer’ system and which i avery real problem, whether Schopenhaver himself was a disappointed and Ailsoned man or not Sina, although itis great Delp towards th understanding of the thought of Friedrich Nitzche if we know something of the petsonal history of the man, his ‘eas canbe looked at in themselves, apart ftom the man who ‘ought then. 4 To work one's way into any thinkers system, thoroughly to understand not only the words and phrases a8 they stand, bat sls the shade of meaning thatthe sath intended to convey (0 far as this sfeasibe), to view the details ofthe system In thet ‘elation to the whole, flly to rasp its genesis and it implications, allthis is not the work of afew moments. It but natural, then, that specialisation inthe eld ofthe Nstory of pilowopy should ‘be the general rue, a tin the elds ofthe varous sciences A specialist knowledge of the philosophy of Plato, for instance <2auires besides thorough knowledge of Grek language and ilo anor of Ger matheatic, Grek ion science, ete The specialist thus requires great apparatas seinlaritip, ut it esvental, i hei to be ste Ntorian philosophy, that he should not be so overwhelmed with his Scholarly eqtipment and the details of learning, that he fils~” INTRODUCTION to penetrate the spirit of the philosophy in question and fails to rmake it live again in his writings or his lectures. Scholarship is Indispensable but i is by no meane enovgh, ‘The fact that a whole lifetime might well be devoted to the study of one grea thinker and stil leave much to be done, means that anyone whois so bold as to undertake the composition of 2 continuous history of philosophy can hardly hope to produce a ‘work that will offer anything’of much value to Specialists. The author of the present work is quite conscious ofthis fact, and as hie has alreadysaidin the preface, he is not writing for specialists Dat rather utilising the work of specialists. There is no need to repeat aguin here the authors reasons for writing this work; but the would like once more to mention that he wil consider himself well repaid for his work if he can contribute in some small degree, not only to the instruction of the type of scadent for whom the ‘work is primarily designed, but also to the broadening of his outlook, to the acquirement of a greater understanding of and ‘sympathy with the intelectual struggle of mankind, and of course {o- firmer and deeper hold onthe principle of true philosophy. Wy. Ancient Philosophy Tm this volume we treat of the phiotophy of the Greeks and Romans, There can scarcely be much need for dwelling on the importance of Greek culture: as Hegel says, "the name of Greece strikes home to the hearts of men of education in Europe." No fone would attempt to deny that the Greeks left an imperishable legacy of liteatare and art to our European world, and the same is true in regard to philosophic speculation. After its first begin hings in. Asia Minor, Greek philosophy pursued ‘its course of evelopment until it flowered in the two great philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and later, through Neo-Platonism, exercised 8 great influence on the formation of Christian thought. Both in its character as the fist period of European speculation and also for its intrinsic value it cannot but be of interest to every student ‘of philosophy. In Greek philosophy we watch problems come to light that have by no means lost their relevance fr us, we find answers suggested that are not without valve; and even though ‘we may discern a certain nated, a certain over-confidence and ‘recitation, Greek philosophy remains one of the glories of European achievement. Moreover, if the philosophy of the * i Php 2INTRODUCTION: a ests mont be of nee to every student of phioophy fr anes on sabongent spect sod for fi ow le ie ea mere sho beot ners to saent of Sati why, hich owes so moc to Pato and fo Arstte And safely a he Crests wat rally tnt ow chev te Rie of thet vigour ant eines of mind, ut ae the Mesure and rt eth ovm sevens” We us st Uo the Iota eee thing int acme pole none {ek inte to nd we fo eagpctethe importance of tak fence nd fo underestimate te siglo he Grek int Meath that we ave far ote ly fo dete the orig ay ofthe Grecian to eagpente f°" Tae tendency ofthe aldinahape to we fersastrer o coune, pode ot tinck valle crea! investigation, and weld be fly fo eit i butt rata treat the tndeny ane ped tp nore to lng when ec trates obo onger ‘Testi’ For nas one tt tse # pr hat vey Spain of every thnks booed em pedecase i ‘Penne the we shld be ogaly compl fo sau the ‘cicec some eral Cotta, om whom a Stesqeatphloopte gpeaaton & ltmataly Served Nor Can mally tonne tat, wimnevet fe tueatng crater porary tsk or tts of int tld tna dns, on Fa have borowe rom the ote amd an fo Spon that sme Chtan aoa ie pati found (ERS iter ron Genny must have bred hat Custom rite om tt so seid fo oppone hat Oreck ‘pecaaon cnt soe ought sia t nt aperng 22 Gnenal eopby, the later mat be oe tcl sro {i tormer. After a the human itet I que eae st Inerecting sine expentacar na sinat wy, whet be that of Greta sn fd, hot ng cer spp ha sary of ration an etal Poot of Eecreing. These emt re not rent to prec Mor cam ind etch, Do rater to pot oat hsaral ‘Stim mat reat fi culos on tora pots and ot tedae thm om « isp, ging te with Peer Baeur” age Tera etiam won fot aya ests to Sate erty impatedthe da Crinity deo tea of te Grea ene eee Roman philosophy, however, is but a meagre production com- pared with that of the Greeks, fr the Romans depended in large pert on the Greeks for their philosophic ideas, just as they Sepended on the Greeks in art and, toa great extent at last in the fed of literatare. They had their own peculiar glory and Achievements (we think at once of the creation of Roman Law land the achievements of Roman political genius), bat thei glory id not lie in the realm of philosophical speculation, Yet, though the dependence of Roman Schools of philosophy on Greek pe- ecessors is undeniable, we cannot aflord to neglect the philosophy of the Roman world, since it shows us the sort of ideas that became current among the more cultured members of the class that was Master of the European civilised world. The thought of the later Stoa, for example, the teaching of Senece, Mareas Aurelius and Epictetus, affords in many respects an impressive and noble picture which can hardly fal o arouse admiration and tsteem, even if at the same time we are conscious of much that is lacking. It is desirable too that the Christian student should know something ofthe best that paganism had to fer, and should acquaint himself with the various currents of thought in that Greco-Roman world in which the Revealed Religion was im- planted and grew. It isto be regretted if students should be Acquainted with the campaigns of Julius Caesar or Trajan, with the infamous eareess of Caligula or Nero, and yet should be ignorant of the philosopher-Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, of the induence at Rome of the Greek Pltinus, who though not a Christian was a deeply religious man, and whore name was s0 dear tothe fist great figure of Chistian philosophy, St. Augustine ‘of Hippo.PART I PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY CHAPTER 1 ‘THE CRADLE OF WESTERN THOUGHT: 1ONIA ‘Tus birthplace of Greek philosophy was the sea-board of Asia Minor and the early Greek philosophers were Tonfans. While Greece itzet was in a state of comparative chaos or barbarism, consequent on the Dorian invasions ofthe eleventh century b., ‘which submerged the old Aegean culture, Fonia preserved the {pirt ofthe older civlsation,*and it was to the Tonian world that Homer belonged, even if the Homeric pooms enjoyed the patron: age of the new Acharan aristocracy. While the Homeric poems ‘annot indeed be called a philosophical work (though they are, of course, of great value Uhrough their revelation of certain stages ofthe Greek outlook and way of lf, while their educational intu- fence on Greeks of later times should not be underestimated), since the igolated philosophical ideas that occur in the poems are ‘very far from being systematied (considerably les 0 than in the ‘poems of Hesiod, the epic writer of mainland Greece, who por- ‘rays in his work his pessimistic view of history, his conviction of ‘the reign of law inthe animal world and his ethical pasion for justice among men), itis significant that the greatest poet of Greece and the first beginnings of systematic philosophy beth Delong to Tonia, But these two. great productions of Tonian genius, the poems of Homer and the Tonian cosmology, did not ‘merely follow on one another, atleast, whatever view one holds of the authorship, composition and date or dates of the Homeric Poems, it is cleat enough thatthe society reflected in those poems was not that of the petiod of the Ionian cosmology, but belonged to 8 more primitive era. Again, the society depicted by Hesiod, the later ofthe "two" great epic poets is a far ery from that of set id AE pensar ater pre rd ssa Aatit Hy ofthe Now” Bap. i4 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY ‘the Greek Polis, for between the two had occurred the breakdown ‘of the power of the noble aristocracy, 2 breakdown that made possible the free growth of city life im mainland Greece. Neither ‘the heroic life depicted in the Iliad nor the domination of the landed nobility depicted in the poems of Hesiod was the setting in which Greek philosophy grew up: on the coutrary, early Greek philosophy, though naturally the work of individuals, was also the product of the City and reflected toa certain extent the reign of law and the conception of law which the preSocratia sys- tematically extended to the whole universe in their cosmologis. ‘Thus in a sense there is «certain continuity betwoen the Homeric conception of an ultimate Iaw or destiny or will governing gods lard men, the Hesiodi picture ofthe world and the poet’s moral emands, and the early Tonian cosmology. When social life was settled, men could turn to rational reflection, and in the period ‘of philoeophy’s childhood it was Nature as a whole which frst ‘occupied ther attention. From the psychological standpoint this {only what one would expect ‘Thus, although itis undeniable that Greek philosophy arose among a people whose civilisation went back to the pre-historic times of Greece, what we call early Greek philosophy was “early” ‘only in elation to subsequent Greek philosophy and the fowering of Greek thought and culture on the mainlan; in relation to the preceding centuries of Greek development it may be looked on {ther asthe frit of a mature civilisation, marking the closing period of Ionian greatness on the one hand and ushering in on the ‘ther hand the splendour of Hellenic, particuasly of Athenian, culture! ‘We have represented early Greek philosophic thought as the ‘ultimate product of the anclent Tonian civilisation; but it must bbe remembered that Tonia forms, as it were, the meeting-place of West and East, so that the question may be raised whether or not Greek philosophy was due to Oriental infuences, whether, for Instance, it was borrowed from Babylon or Egypt. This view has been maintained, but has‘had to be abandoned. The Greek philosophers and writers know nothing of it—even Herodotas, ‘who was so eager to run his pet theory as tothe Egyptian origins of Greek religion and civlization—and the Oriental-erigin theory {is due mainly to Alexandrian writers, from whom it was taken Bevin gp a There Mpg a Onin, Blt She Wipe ae irae Et seesTHE CRADLE OF WESTERN THOUGH: Juma 15 cover by Chistian apologist. The Egyptians of Helens tines, $ritlancs interpre their myths scoring to the seas of farisphy, and then aserted tha ther myths were the Gee Eth Cre pilosophy. Bot thes simply an iatancs of epson the pact ot the. Alerandiane’ has no more Thfve vale than the Jewish notion that Plato drew his Tam fom the Old Tesiament. There wosl, of coune, be “teas in explaining how Eeyptian thought could be tran ‘fe to the Cases (dere art not the sort of people we would {ipect to convey pilxopic notion), but, a bas been remarked ‘Burnet, ts racoeally waste of Gime to inqir wheter the Zicvophial des ofthis or that Eastern people could be come Tuniated tothe Greck of not nfs ve have fat acertained that te pope in question realy poses pilsopy.* That the Eeyfias had = phlosphy to communicte has never been Shown, and itis oot of the Question to suppee that Greek Philosphy came from India trom Chi ‘Bt there ina frther pont to be considered. Greek philosophy was closely bound up with mathemati, and has ben main {Sind that the Gris Jrived their mathematic fom Egypt and Shr astonomy from Babylonia Now, that Greek mathematics vere infanced by Egypt and Grek stonomy by Babylon is tore than probate: fr one thing Greek since and phisopby tegan to develop in thet very cgi where interchange wth the East wat most to Beexpected. ut that no he sme a ying that Greek scenic mathemati dete from Exypt of tet Asttoncmy fom Babylon. Detaled arguments left ee et Sethe fo point out that Egyptian mathematics conied of erpirial,Fough and ready metho of obtaining «practical fest. “Thus Egyptian gemety largely consisted of practical tethods of mag out atch the felis after the inundation af the river Mie Scentfe geometry was not developed by them, oti was developed by the Grecn Similarly Babylonian ssttonomy was parted with view to vinaton: was manly ‘stoogy, bat among the Greeks became 8 scente posit. Se even it we grant that the practical gardenermathematis of the Egyptians tnd the asronomiealobaevetions of Babylonian eR i 0 — Poteet Bt A ca ew Sema tr caf Ra16 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY astrologers influenced the Greeks and supplied them with pre- liminary material, this admission is in no way prejudicial to the originality ofthe Greek genius. Science and Thought, as distinct from mere practical calcalation and astrological lore, were the result of the Greck genius and were due neither to the Egyptians nor to the Babylonians. ‘The Greeks, then, stand as the uncontested original thinkers and scientists of Europe.t They frst sought knowledge for its fown sake, and pursued knowledge in a scientific, free and un- Prejudiced spirit. Moreover, owing to the character of Greek religion, they were free from any risey clas that might have strong traditions and unreasoned doctrines oftheir own, tenac- cusly held and imparted only to afew, which might harper the evelopment offre science. Hegel, in his history of philosophy, dismisses Indian philosophy rather curtly, on the ground that it {s identical with Tndian religion. While edmitting the presence of philosophical notions, he maintains that these do not take the form of thought, but are couched in poetical and symbolic form, and have, like religion, the practical purpose of freeing men from the lusions and unhappiness of life rather than knowledge for its own sake. Without committing oneself to agreement with Hegel's view of Indian philosophy (which has been far more ‘dearly pretented to the Western world in its purely philosophic aspects since the time of Hegel), one can agree with him that Greek philosophy was from the first shought pursued in the spirit of free science. It may with some have tended to take the place ‘of religion, both from the point of view of belief and condact; yet this was due to the inadequacy of Greek religion rather than to any mythologieal oF mystical character in Greek philosophy. (It js not meant, of course, to belitle the place and function of Myth’ in Gree thought, nor yet the tendency of philosophy at ‘certain times to pass into religion, eg. with Piotinus. Indeed as ‘regards myth, "In the earlier coamologies of the Greek physicists ‘the mythical and the rational elemeats interpenetrate in an a8, ryet undivided unity.” ‘So Professor Werner Jaeger in Arist, Fundamentals ofthe History of His Development, p. 377) ‘Profesor Zeller emphasises the impartiality of the Greeks 25 they regarded the world about them, which in combination with 1 A,r ptt (pa th lon scion of re spe ey a ae Set ye Cra ea at ci cl Sieersteal a eters ewe ice nan poopy ropes I ould te appar to trhr tan tbe Eo‘THE CRADLE OF WESTERN THOUGHT: IONIA 17 nei seas ofreity and power of abstraction, "enabled them at thei sereiy date ta reoguse thei oligos ideas for what they Sly were creations of an artistic magination"* (This, of see! would srcely hold good forthe Greck people a arge—- ‘he nompilosphicl majority) From the moment when the 1 ol wndom ofthe Wie Men andthe myths ofthe poets Peer rareeded by the hallseietifc, hall philosophic reflections [a nvestigations of the Tonan cosmologis, art may be said te'have been stcceeded fopcaly, at any rate) by philosophy, Sih was to reach a aplendh olmination in Pato and Arstote Indie length in Plotinos to reach ap to the heights where Pilsopy ie transcended, notin mythology, ut in mpi Fe there was no abrupt transition fom "myth to philosophy cee might even ty that the Hesodic theogony, for example, ound Scaler ta onan cosmopentespectlston, te mythelement feteating belore growing rationalisation yet not dsappearog. Ta- “ee it present in Gres phonophy even in port Scrat fines “The splendid achievement of Greck thought was cradled i Joni and if Tonia was the cradle of Gres phsopby, Mile tras the cradle of Tontan philwophy. For it wae at Mets that Thales the reputedly earest Ionian philcsopher, fouled. The Tonian philosophers were profoundly impresed withthe fact of change, of bth snd growth, Gey ad deat Spring and ‘Aotumn inthe external world of natute childhood and ld age {nthe lie of man, coming to-bing and pasing-avay —there we the Svs ti inp as ofthe aera {eat mistake to sappose thatthe Gresks were happy and cares fhilren ofthe san, who only wanted to lounge inthe portico of the cities and gaze atthe magnificent works of at or a the Achievements of thelr athletes They were very consctous ofthe dat side of our existence om this plant, or agunst the Beek {ound of sun aod joy they saw the uncertainty and insecurity man's lie, he certainty of death, the darks of the future ‘The best for man were not to have been orn and not to have seen the light ofthe sun; but once bor (the second bet for ‘im is) to pas through the gates of death ax specdly a may be” declares Theogns*eminding ws ofthe words alderé (ao dear to Sehopenhaver, "El mayor dele del hombre, Es haber nacido ‘And the words of Theogis re reecheed inthe words of Sophos Sans of he Hstry of re Paspty by Eder Zl, 108 wt. ‘eve ty Nite amas 97 Palle fp To Wass PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY in the Oadipus Colonns, "Not to have been born exceeds every reckoning’. get sb Eee wa ou! Moreover, although the Greeks certainly had their ideal of ‘moderation, they were constantly being lured away from it by the will to power. The constant fighting of the Greek cities among themselves, even at the heyday of Greek culture, and feven when it was to their obvious interest to unite together ‘against a common foe, the constant uprisings within the cities, ‘whether le by an ambitious oligarch ora democratic demagogue, ‘the venalty of 0 many pubic men in Greek political life~even| ‘when the safety and honour of their city was st stake—all mani {est the will power which was so strong in the Greek. The Greek admired efficiency, he admired the ideal of the strong man ‘who knows what he warts and has the power to get it; his con- ception of dpe was largely that of ability to achieve success, ‘As Profesor De Burgh remarks, "The Greek would have regarded ‘Napoleon as a man of preeminent areté"» For a very frank, of rather blatant, acknowledgment of the unscrupulous will to ‘power, we bave only to read the report that Thucydides gives of ‘the conference between the representatives of Athens and thote fof Melos. ‘The Athenians declare, "But you and we should say ‘what we really think, and aim only at what is posible, for we ‘oth alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the ‘question of justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is ‘equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak {gant what they must” Similarly inthe celebrated words, "Por Of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of ‘heir nature wherever they can rule they will’ This law was not made by us, and we are not the Grst who have acted upon it; we 4d but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to al time, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong a8 we are, would do as we do."* We could hardly ask for a more unashamed vowal of the will to power, and Thucydides gives no indication that he disapproved of the Athenian conduct. It isto be recalled ‘that when the Melians eventually had to surrender, the Athenians put to death all those who were of military age, enslaved the ‘women and children, and colonised the island with their own ES jin jn alae ft Ba *‘THE CRADLE OF WESTERN THOUGHT: IONIA 19 In close connection with the will to power stands the conception cof ove. The man who goes too far, who endeavours to be and to fave more than Fate destines fr him, will inevitably incur divine Fesloosy and come to main. The man or the nation who is by the unbridled lust for selassertion is driven head Pong into reckless self-confidence and so to destruction. Blind ‘breeds self-confidence, and overweening self-confidence Ends in ruin. "tis as well to realize this side of the Greek character: Plato's condemnation of the "Might is Right” theory becomes then all the more remarkable. While not agreeing, of course, with [Nietzsche's valuations, we cannot but admire his pespicacity in seeing the relation between the Greek culture and the will to power. Not, of course, that the dark side of Greek culture x the nly side—fa from it. Ifthe drive ofthe will to power is a fact 0s the Gretk ideal of moderation and harmony a fact. We must ‘realise that there are two sides tothe Greek character and culture: there isthe side of moderation, of art, of Apolo and the Olympian deities, and there is the side of exoess, unbridled self-asertion, of Dionysian frenzy, as seen portrayed in the Bacchae of Euripides, ‘As beneath the splendid achievements of Greek culture we see the abyss of slavery, so beneath the dream-world of Olympian religion and Olympian art we see the abyss of Dionysian frenzy, of pessimism and of all manner of lack of moderation. It may, ater al, not be entirely fanciful to suppose, inspired by the thought of Nietzsche, that there ean be seen in much of the Olympian religion a self-imposed check on the part of the Dionysian Greek. Driven on by the will to power to sel-destruc- tion, the Greek creates the Olympian drearm-world, the gods of which watch over him with jealousy to see that he does not tranagress the limits of human endeavour, So does he exprest his consciousness thatthe tumultuous forces in his soul would be ‘ultimately ruinous to him, (This interpretation is not of couree (fered a8 an account ofthe origin of the Greek Olympian religion from the scientific viewpoint of the historian of religion: itis on ‘eant to suggest psychological factors—provisons of Nature.” 41 you tike—that may have been operative, even if unconsciously, in the soul of the Greek) ‘To return from this digression. In spite ofthe melancholic side of the Gree, his perception of the constant process of change, of transition from life to death and from death to life, helped to lead0 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY ‘him, in the person of the Tonian philosophers, to a beginning of philosophy: or these wise men saw that, in spite ofall the change and transition, there must be something permanent. Why? [Because the change s from something into something else. There ‘must be something whichis primary, which persists, which takes various forms and undergoes this process of change. Change cannot be merely a condict of opposites; thoughtful men were convinced that thee was something behind these opposites, some- thing that was primary. Tonian philosophy or cosmology i there- fore mainly an attempt to decide what this primitive element or {Trstoff ofall things i, one philosopher deciding for one element, another for another clement. What particular element each ‘Philosopher decided on as it Uriaf is not so important as the fact that they had in common this idea of Unity. The fact of change, of motion in the Aristotelian sense, suggested to them ‘the notion of unity, though, as Aristotle says, they did not ‘explain motion ‘The Tonians difered as to the character of their Ursfof, but ‘they all held it to be materal—Thales_plomping for water, Anaximenes for air, Heraclits for fre. ‘The antithesis between spirit and matter had not yet been grasped; so that, although they were de facto materalsts—in that they assigned a form of ‘matter asthe principle of unity and primitive stuft ofall things they can scarcely:be termed materilists in our sense of the word.” It is not a6 though they conceived a clear distinction between sprit and matter, and then denied it; they were not flly See eee aie renee eee ‘One might be tempted, therefore, to say that the Tonian thinkers were not philosophers so mich as primitive scientist, ‘tying to account for the material and external world. But it ‘must be remembered that they did not stop short at sense, but went beyond appearance to thought. Whether water or air or fre be assigned as the Orsi, it certainly does not appear as such, ie. as the ultimate element. In order to arrive at the conception ‘of any of these a the ultimate element of all things its necessary ‘to go beyond appearance and sense. And they did not arrive at ‘their conclusions through a scientife, experimental approach, but ‘by meang of the speculative reason: the unity posited is indced & sel opie tnt a a nore soe ert‘THE CRADLE OF WESTERN THOUGHT: IONIA ar nate unity, but unity ponited by thovght Moreover, it Fence stacting that say, from the ata of appear cn if materials Conequeily we might pape call $oSfonan comvologes instances of alaact mateo we can {te oy ducerm in them the notion of unity in diferece and of ‘athe a entering into ony and this plop notion ecGation the Tonia thinkers were convince ofthe eign af hws the universe. In the le ofthe individ! fr, the ore: epping of wha right and proper for man, brings rnin tram the redrening of the Baler. a0, by” extension {0 the {vee omni lave egy, the preservation of balance and the jrevention of chaos nd anarchy. This conception of law. verned univers, «universe tha so plaything of mere caprice Gr laws spontaneity, no mere Sid for lawless and "episte™ Gomination of one element over another, formed a bass for 8 ‘enti cosmology a8 opposed to facia mythology. From another pont of ew, however, we May ay that with the Tonians science spd. philosophy are not yet atingsihed ‘Theary Tonia thinker or wae men pursed allsort of stent Considerations, astopomizal for instance, and these were not Slay separated from phloophy, They were Wise Men, wo tight make astenemicl obertations forte sake of aviation, {ry tnd oat the one primary element ofthe anivene plan oat feats of engineering. ee, and al withot making any cea 3 tinction between ther various activites, Only that mixtre of toy and geography, which mas known a lop wa separated ‘off from the philosophico-scientific activities, and that not always ‘ery clearly" Vet a rel pilsopic notions and rel spcatve Ablity appear among them, as snce they form a sage ithe evelopment of the cases Geek philosophy, they cannot be ented from the history of phlesophy e6 though they were ere children whee innocent babbling are unworthy of tris ‘Menton. ‘The fat beginnings of European philosophy cannot be mater of indiference to the historianCHAPTER TI ‘THE PIONEERS: EARLY IONIAN PHILOSOPHERS 1. Thales ‘Tue mixture of philosopher and practical scientist is seen very clearly in the cate of Thales of Miletus. Thales is said to have predicted the eclipse of the sun mentioned by Herodotus! as, ecurring at the close of the wat between the Lydians and the Medes. Now, according to the calculations of astronomers, an ‘eclipse, which was probably visible in Asia Minor, took place on May 28th, 585 sc. Soif the story about Thales is true, and ifthe eclipse which he foretold isthe eclipse of 585, then he must have fourished in the early part of the sixth century B.C. He is said to have ded shortly before the fal of Sardis in $4615 8c. Among other scientific activites ascribed to Thales ae the construction ff an almanac and the introduction of the Phoenician practice of Steering a ship's course by the Little Bear. Anecdotes narrated about him, which may be readin the life of Thales by Diogenes Latrtus, eg, that he fel into well or ditch while stargazing, or that, foreseeing a scarcity of olives, be made a comer in ol, are probably just tales ofthe type easly fathered on a Sage or Wise Man? In Maps sl et tn arg to Thal wt eth ep apn ete pac eng 2s tag) Ba he oe Gert pit it ae deel pinay st ofa geo Sete ‘ite ab rae the goto te One "hee Gretsch ny hte ed Tha th com Sitting he tn peo sng tot nnd ange ot at lente os then and et ane by a tnt fom wc ty came torts pe a Het ton rm ne ‘tia latte tater hve a ane {Si atropine mateo at hinge Aree Se Tapes hog wh inn, ober he Tae a ‘emt by hele tholpen we atrmag eS then thd oan smog te gi, Howe "BS LAT PTL Ts‘THE PIONEERS: EARLY IONIAN PHILOSOPHERS 23 this may be, it is clear that the phenomenon of evaporation i eh water may become mist or ar, while the pheno: Sm eering might sgget tat if the proctn were cared pete ater could become earth In any Cae the importance Sart early thinker lis in the Tact that he raed the gosto, thats the uate aatore of the world; and not inthe anewer The actly pre ota gut oro hi ren, be ey wnat statement tested to Tales by Aristotle, that all tags ae fallof gots, that the magnet has oa becatse it moves © canot be istrpreted with cetanty. To delae hat this Statement aserte Te existence of 2 wrldosl, and then to {tent ths worlésoul with God or withthe Platonic Demiarge? ‘eS though the latter formed all hinge ot of water—is to 60 joo arin freedom of interpretation, “The only certain and the ‘nly relly important pik about Thal’ doctrine is that he oncened “thing as varying forms of one primary and ultimate element, That he assigns water as this element is his distinguishing Stoncl characters, 2 t0 sped, but he ares hi lace at the int Greek pilosopber from the fact that he fat conc'es the notion of Unity in Difrence (even if he doesnot olte the totionon tothe lg plane, and, while holding fst othe des ‘of unity, endeavours to account for the evident diversity ofthe Teany. Phiosophy natorally ti to understand the platy that we experene, existence and nature, snd to andes ‘inthis connection means, for the philosopher, to dacover an drying arity ost principle, The complet ofthe problem not be gasped wnt the tail distinction tetween matter fd spirit has been cleanly apprbende before this has been ‘Spprehended and indeed tven after ts apprehension, if, once ‘ppchende,” it is then dened), simple sotions of the ‘problem are bound to suggest thessves reality wil be con ete aca material unity fan inthe thought of Tals) ora Hen (in eatin modem phosphie) Janice can be done tothe corpleity ofthe protiem ofthe Ont andthe Many eny if he tszatal dares of realty andthe doctrine of the analogy of bing are clearly undersoed. and. unambiguously maintained: ‘tberwie the richness of the manifold wil be steric oa false sd more or les arbitrarily conceived nity "Ore A HEALS SO AIO Aa“4 PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY Tt is indeed possible that the remark concerning the magnet being alive, attributed by Aristotle to Thales, represents the lingering-on of a primitive animism, in which the concept of the anima-phantasma (the shadowy double of a man that is perceived in dreams) came to be extended to sub-human organic life, and ‘even to the forces ofthe inorganic world; but, even if this sso, itis but a reli, since in Thales we see clearly the transition from ‘myth to science and philosophy, and he retains his traditional character as initiator of Greek philosophy, a4 80g uly 8c sacs db eorelag* 1, Anaximander ‘Another philotopher of Miletus was Anaximander, He was apparently a younger man than Thales, for he is described by ‘Theophrastus as an “associate” of Thales? Like him, Anaxi- smander busied himself with practical scientific pursuits, and is credited with having constructed a map—probably for the Mesin sailors on the Black Sea. Participating in political life, 3550 many other Greek philosophers, he led a colony to Apollonia. ‘Anaximander composed a prose-work on his philosophical ‘theories. ‘This was extant in the time of Theophrastus, and we are indebted to the latter for valuable information as to the thought of Anaximander. He sought, ike Thales, forthe primary and ultimate element of all things; but he decided that could rot be any one particular kind of matter, such as water, since water of the moist was itself one of the “opposites,” the conits and encroachments of which had to be explained. If change, birth and death, growth and decay, are due to confict, to the ‘encroachment of one element at the expense of another, then— fon the supposition that everything isin reality water—itis hard to see why the other elements have not long ago been absorbed in water. Anaximander therfore arrived atthe idea, the primary clement, the Ursof, is indeterminate. Tt is more primitive than ‘he oppoites, being that out of which they come'and that into which they pass away.* This primary element (grt) was called by Anaximander— and, according to Theophrasts, he was the Sst so to call it—the ‘material cause. "It ismeither water nor any other of the so-called * Map ob TEQZOMRNE To. a oh cha. Showa Oa A‘THE PIONEERS: EARLY IONIAN PHILOSOPHERS 25, i ges a os eye eas ba tr ty ton he mit, fom Se ee ata ete cad age’ ee ae wee j ee ee et a ee tak th cll a weer The Juerminate elements make reparation for thei injustice by being. ee te iaSbemnbate Bondo The ok et the cose la hors haan ee ee ee ae ee nT DELS. wet ee Toss ote os abel sa a Tetaancea tac nee ws oe Hane nah cel ston Shoe i une a et eS aT hates aa bene Te Gee tee sree cance cei ae Sern Tihiginc were ee tage ts riage Se Secnel a he Tininw Bute Dee ag he ben ee oe Uelsthccnee in woe fe pg inseam teeieanieie ces atenht ne coe uer ter seca are ey Scant ce ad nea mnt ie fra of tare cote hain fake te tenis ee dengee nae she er eee ae pattern peta siento nn engy poo a cling at ede ttn agains he @ ow, ke tod soe Rave se weed Se Gay ene emnl gete atc per atari ae ‘Anaximander aon ‘an advance, then, on that ec eee determinate element an primary to the conception of an Tndeter: ‘le nti ote ral ag ome Mareeba USE LE om Sh Someta idk |6 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY some attempt at least to answer the question how the world Aeveloped out ofthis primary element sm, Anasimones ‘The third philosopher of the Milesian School was Anaximenes. “He must have been younger than Anaximander —at least Theo- Dhrastus says that he was an “associate” of Anaximander. He ‘wrote a book, of which a small fragment has survived, According to Diogenes Laértivs, "he wrote in the pure unmixed Tonic dialect” “The doctrine of Anaximenes appears, at first sight at any rate, to be a decided retrogresson from the stage reached by Anaxt ‘mander, for Anaximenes, abandoning the theory of = daupr fellows Thales in assigning a determinate element 2s the Ursif. This determinate element is not water, but Ai. This may have been suggested to him by the fact of breathing, for man lives so long as he breathes, and it might easly appear that alr i the principle of life. Tn fact, Anaximenes draws a parallel between ‘man and nature in general. “Just as our sou, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world."" Air then isthe Ursag of the world, from which the things that are and have been and shall be, the gods and things divine, arose, while other things come from its aspring."* ‘But there is obviously a dificulty in explaining how all things ‘came from ai, and iti in his proffered solution to this dificulty that Anaximenes shows a trace of genius. In order to explain ‘how conerete objects are formed from the primitive element, he introduces the notion of condensation and rateaction. Ait in itself is invisible, but it becomes visible inthis process of con- Most probably, then, he was a monist and not a monotheist, and this interpretation of hie “theology” would certainly be more ‘compatible with the Elatic attitude towards him than a theistic interpretation. A really monotheistic theology may be a familiar «enough notion to us, but in the Greece of the period it would have ‘ben something exceptional ‘But whatever the opinions of Xenophanes may have been, the real founder of the leatic School from philosophical and historical viewpoint was undoubtedly Parmenides, a citizen of Elea. Parmenides seems to have been born towards the close of the sixth century ,, since round about 451-449 8.c., when 65 years old, he conversed with the young Socrates at Athens He is said to have drawn up laws for his native city of Elea, and Diogenes preserves a statement of Sotion to the effect that seo Siar ans daewoo Sete reese ; aap R988 ae PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY Parmenides began by being a Pythagorean, bt afterwards aban- done that ploophyin foo of his own. Parmenides wrote vers, most of te fragments we poses ‘ing preserved by Simplus in his commentary. His doctrine In bf isto the fect that Beng the One, i, and that Becoming ‘change, is illusion. For if anything comes to be, then it comes. Sither oot of being oF out of nteng” Ifthe former, then it Steady bin whith cae it doce not come to bey i he late, then ts nothing, since oot of nothing comes nothing. Becoming fs, then ilsion Being simply i and Beng One, since platy 5 as isin. Now, this dcrine is obwicusy ot the type of theory tht res immediately tothe mid of the man in the ‘rev and so its not sorpsngt0 id Parnes insisting on the radial distinction between the Way of Truth and the Way Beet or Opinion. Its very probable thatthe Way of Opinion ‘xpeed inthe second prt ofthe poem, represents the comleey ‘of the Pythagoreans; and since the Pythagorean philosophy would Ste scan ocrar to the man who went meray by sense- lenin, it should not be maintained that Parmeids”Atine- tion betwen the two Ways has all th formal generality of Pato’ Inter distinction Setween Knowledge and Opinion, Thoogt and Sera Itis rather the ejection of oe dente phesophy in {avocr of another dfnite philosophy. Yet its te that Par- ‘mene rejects the Pythagorean piesophy—and,inded, every ‘lop tha agrees with ton the point—becatse it amish Ehange and movement. Now change end moverent are most fertaniy: phenomena, which appear to the bem, so tha in ‘ejecting change and movement. armen ie eeting the way tf sense appearance. Tt, thereloe, not cot to say that Parmenidesintrodoces the most Important ditintion between ‘Reason and Sense, Truth and Appearance. It iste of couse, that even Ties recognised ths istincton toa certain extent for his suposed rth, that all ia Water, i scarcely perceptible immediatly to the ene it needs reason, which par beyond appearance, in order to be conceived The central “rth of ‘tractor, guna trathof eon and far exceeds the common nin of men, who tit in everything to sense-apparance It ao tr that Heractos even males the dstaction prtly ‘xpi for does he not dstingush between mere common sest SnU his Word? Yet itt Parmenides who Sst ayy peat and Veg Ears‘THE ONE OF PARMENIDES AND MELISSUS 49 explicit stress on the distinction, and it is easy enough to under- Stand why be does so, when we consider the conclusions to which be came. In the Platonic philosophy the distinction became of cardinal importance, as indeed it must bein all forms of idealism. "Yet though Parmenides enuncates a distinction which was to become a fundamental tenet of idealism, the temptation to speak fof him as though he were himself an idealist is to be rejected ‘As we shall see, there is very good reason for supposing that in Parmenides' eyes the One is sensual and material, and to tum him into an objective idealist of the nineteenth-century type is tobe guilty ofan anachronism: it does not follow from the negation fof change that the One is Idea. We may be called upon to follow the way of thought, but it does not follow that Parmenides the One, af which we arive by this way, as actually being Thought itself. 1f Parmenides had represented the One as sal-subsistent Thought, Plato and Aristotle would hardly have failed to record the fact, and Socrates would not have found the frst sober philosopher in Anaxagoras, with his concept of Mind ‘or Nous, The truth really seems to be that though Parmenides does assert the distinction between Reason and Sense, he asserts it not to establish an idealist system, but to establish a system ‘of Monistic Materials, in. which change and movement are ‘dismissed as lsory. Only Reason can apprehend Realty, but the Reality which Reason apprebends is material. This is not ‘lealism but fnaterialism, To turn now to the doctrine of Parmenides on the nature of the world. His fist great assertion is that "It i.” Realty, Being, of whatever nature it may be, is, exists, and ‘cannot not be. I i, and tis impossible for it not tobe. Being can be spoken of and it can be the objet of my thonght, But that Which T ean think about and speak of can be, “for its the same thing that can be thought and that can be.” But if Tt" cam be, then itis, Why? Because if it could be and yet were not, then it would be nothing. Now, nothing cannot be the object of speech or thought, for to speak about nothing is not to speak, and to think about nothing i the same as not thinking at all. Besides, it it merely could be, then, paradoxiealy, it could never come t0 be, for it would have to come out of nothing, and out of nothing comes nothing and not something. Being, then, Reality, “It” was not frst posible, ie. nothing and then existent: it was always, existent—more accurately, "Iti"2 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY Why do we say “more accurately, It is?" For this reason: 1 something comes into being, it must arise either out of being ‘oF out of not-being. If it arises out of being, then there is m0 teal arising, no coming-to-be; for if it comes out of being, it already is If, however, it arises out of not-being, then not being ‘must be already something, in order for being tobe able to arise ‘out of it. But this isa contradiction. Being therefore, “It” arises ‘either out of being nor out of not-being: it never came into being, Dt simply 4. And as this must apply to all being, nothing ever becomes. For if anything ever becomes, however trifing, the ‘sume dificalty always recurs: dots it come out of being or out of not-being? Ifthe forme, then it already i; ifthe latter, then you fall into a contradiction, since not-being is nothing and cannot be the source of being. Change, therefore, becoming and movement are imposible. Atcordingly “It i." “One path only i left for 1s to speak of, namely, that Jt js, In this path are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, for it ‘complete, immovable and without end ‘Why does Parmenides say that “It is complete, Le. one Realty, which cannot be added to? Because if itis not one but divided, then it must be divided by something other than itsel. ‘But Being cannot be divided by something other than itelf, for besides being there is nothing. Nor can anything be added to it, since anything that was added to being would itself be being Similarly, itis immovable and continuous, forall movement and ‘change, forms of becoming, are excluded, Now, of what nature is this “It,” Being, according to Par- rmenides? That Parmenides regarded Being as material, sems to be clearly indicated by his asertion that Being, the One is Snite Infinite for him must have meant indeterminate and indefinite, and Being, as the Real, cannot be indefinite or indeterminate, fannot change, cannot be conceived as expanding into empty space: it must be definite, determinate, complete. Tt is tem= porary infinite, as having neither beginning nor end, but ‘spatially finite, Moreover, itis equally real in all directions, and ‘50 is spherical in shape, “equally poised from the centre in every ‘rection: for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another.”* Now, how could Parmenides possibly think of Being ‘a spherical, unless he thought of it as material? Tt would seem, then, that Burnet is right when he aptly says: “Parmenides is png 8 cesTHE ONE OF PARMENIDES AND MELISSUS 51 ‘ot, a8 some have sui, ‘the father of idealism’ on the contrary, {i materialism depends on is view of relity.”* Profesor Stace basta ht “Parenies Nels and ie Eats eeally id regard Being as, in some sense, material”; but he sil tres to fake out that Parmenides was an iealist in that he held the ‘cardinal thesis of idealism,” “thatthe absolute reality, of which the world is a manifestation, consists in thought, in concept.”™ Tis perfectly true that the Being of Parmenides can be grasped only by thought, but so can the reality of Thales or Anaximenes| be grasped only by thought, in concepts. But to equate "being ‘eusped in thought” with “being thought” is surely 8 confosion 'Av an historical fact, then, it would seem that Parmenides was a materialist and nothing else. However, that does not prevent ‘there being an unseconcled contradiction in Parmenidespilo- sophy, as armed by ProfetorStace,*o that, though a material- ist his thought contains also the germs of idealism, or would at any rate form the point de départ for idealism. On the one hand Parmenides asserted the unchangeability of Being, and, insofar ‘she conceived of Being as material, he asserted the indestructi- Daity of matter. Empedocies and Democritus adopted this position and used it in their stomistic doctrine. But while ‘Parmenides felt himself compelled to dismiss change and becoming 4 iksion, thus adopting the very opposite postion to that of Heraclitus, Democritus could not reject what appears to be an inescapable fact of experience, which needs more explanation ‘han a cart dismistal. Democritus, therefore, while adopting Parmenides’ thesis that being can neither arise nor pass amay— the indestructbiity of matter—interpreted change as due tothe sgrregation and separation of indestructible particles of matte (On the other hand iti an historical fact that Plato sized on the ‘hais of Parmenides concerning the unchangeabiity of Being, snd identified the abiding being withthe subsistent and objective dea. To that extent, therefore, Parmenides may be called the father of idealam, in that the Sint great idealist adopted cardinal tenet of Purmenides and interpreted it from an idealistic Standpoint. Moreover, Pato made great use of Parmenides’ dis- lncton between the world of reason and the world of sense or ‘ppearance. But if in that bistoral sense Parmenides may ightly be described as the father of idealism, through bis un Aoubied infiuence on Plato, it must be understood at the same SBOP. pita, "Cnt Mi, ppq7and gh On. it Bp 9-02 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY time that Parmenides himself taught a materialistic doctrine, and that materialist hike Democritus were his legitimate children Heraclitus, in his theory of the iv 4, laid stress on Becoming, Aa we have seen, he did not assert Becoming to the total exclusion of Being, saying that there is becoming, but nothing which becomes. He affirmed the existence of the One— Fire, but held that change, becoming, tension, are eentia to the teistence of the One. Parmenides, on the other hand, asserted Being even to the exclusion of Becoming, affirming that change and movement are usory. Senge tells us that there is change, ‘but trath i to be sought, notin sense, but in reason and thought. We have, therefore, two tendencies exemplified in these two philosophers, the tendency to emphasise Becoming and the ten- Sency to emphasise Being. Plato attempted a synthesis of the two, a combination of what str in each He adopts Parmenides Aistincton between thought and sense, and declares that sense- objects, the objects of sense-perception, are not the objects of true knowledge, for they do not possess the necessary stability, being subject to the Heraclitean fox. The objects of true know: ledge are stable and eternal lke the Being of Parmenides; but they are not material, ike the Being of Parmenides. They are, on the contrary, ideal, subsistent and immaterial Forms, hierarchi- cally arranged and culminating in the Form of the Good ‘The synthesis may be said to have been worked out further by Aristotle. Being, in the sense of ultimate and immaterial Reality, God, is changeles, subsistent Thought, wong whom. As to rmateral being, Aristotle agrees with Heraclitus that it subject to change, and rejects the position of Parmenides, but Aristotle accounts better than Heraclitus did for the relative stability in things by making Plato's Forms of Ideas. concrete, formal principles in the objects of this world. Again, Aristotle solves the Gilemma of Parmenides by emphasising the notion of potentiality He points out that i is no contradiction to say that a thing eX actually but Y potentially. Te és X, but is going to be Y in the future in virtue of a potentiality, which is not simply nothing, yet isnot actual being. Being therefore arises, not out of not” being nor out of being precisely as being actu, but out of being considered as being fotenia, Nome. Of the second part of the oem of Parmenides, The Way of Beli itis unnecessary to say Anything, but i sax well to say afew words concerning Melissus, as he supplemented the thought of his master, Parmenides‘THE ONE OF PARMENIDES AND MELISSUS 53 armenides had declared that Being, the One, is spatially finite; ‘bat Meliss, the Samian disciple of Parmenides, would not accept this doctrine. Tf Bein is finite, then beyond being there must be pothing: being must be bounded or limited by nothing. But if being is limited by nothing, it must be infinite and not finite ‘There cannot be a void outside being, “for what is empty is sothing, What is nothing cannot be.” "Arettle tells us that the One of Melissus was conceived as materia Now, Simplicius quotes a fragment to prove that ‘elssus did wot look upon the One as corporeal, but a8 in poreal. “Now, if it were to exis, it must needs to be one; but if fis one, it cannot have body; for if it had body, it would have parts, and would no longer be one."* The explanation seems to be {Indicated by the fact that Melisus is speaking of an hypothetical case, Burnet, following Zeller, points out the similarity of the fragment to an argument of Zeno, in which Zeno is saying that if the uhimate units of the Pythagoreans existed, then each would have parts and would not be one. We may suppose, therefore, that Meliss, too, is speaking of the doctrine of the Pytha- ‘oreans, is trying to disprove the existence of their ultimate units, {indie not talking of the Parmenidean One at all. Sing 7, TMMaph, 86 at "Pg 9, (Sime. Phy, 1093.CHAPTER VIE ‘THE DIALECTIC OF ZENO Zexo is well known as the author of several ingenious arguments to prove the impassiblity of motion, such asthe riddle of Achilles and the tortose; arguments which may tend to further the ‘opinion that Zeno was no more than a clever ridder who delighted {in using his wits in order to puzale those who were les clever than ‘himself, But in reality Zeno was not concemed simply to display his cleverness—though clever he undoubtedly was—but had a serious purpose in view. For the understanding of Zeno and the appreciation of his conundrums, it is therefore essential to grasp ‘the character ofthis purpose, otherwise there is danger of alto- gether misapprehending his postion and aim ‘Zeno of Elea, born probably about 489 2. was a disciple of Parmenides, and it is from this point of view that he is to be understood. His arguments are not simply witty toys, but are ‘alculated to prove the pasition of the Master. Parmenides had combated pluralism, and had declared change and mation to be ‘tusion. Since plurality and motion seem fo be such evident data of our sense-experiene, this bold postion was naturally such as to induce a certain amount of ridicule. Zeno, a firm adherent of the theory of Parmenides, endeavours to prove it, or at least to demonstrate that it is by no means ridiculous, by the expedient of showing that the pluralism ofthe Pythagorean is involved insoluble dificultis, and that change and motion are impossible ‘even on their pluralistic hypothesis. The arguments of Zeno then fare meant to refute the Pythagorean opponents of Parmenides by 4 series of clever reduciones ad absurdum. Plato makes this quite Clear in the Parmenides, when he indicates the purpose of Zeno's (lost) book. "The truth is that these writings were meant to be some protection to the arguments of Parmenides against those who attack him and show the many ridiculous and contradictory Fesulls which they suppose to follow from the afirmation of the ‘one. My writing isan answer to the partisans of the many and it return their attack with interes, with a view to showing thatthe hypothesis of the many, if examined sufficiently in deal, leads ‘to even more ridiculous results than the hypothesis of the‘THE DIALECTIC OF ZENO 8 One." And Proclus informs us that "Zeno composed forty proofs to demonstrate that being is one, thinking ita good thing to come to the help of his master."" 1, Proofs against Pythagorean Plural 1 Let us suppose with the Pythagoreans that Reality is made op of units, These units are either with magnitude of without ‘agaitude Ifthe former, then a ine for example, a8 made up of ‘nite possesed of magnitude, will be infinitely divisible, since, however far you divide, the units will still have magnitude and so be divisible. But in this case the line will be made up of an {nGaite number of units, each of whichis posessed of magnitude The line, then, must be infinitely great, as composed ofan in ite ‘number of Bodies. Everything in the world, then, must be infinitely great, and a fortiori the world itself must be infinitely (reat. Suppose, on the other hand, that the units are without ‘aguitode- In this case the whole universe will also be without ‘magnitude, since, however many units you add together, if none of them bis any’ magnitude, then the whole collection of them will abo be without magnitude. But if the universe is without any magnitude, it must be infinitely small. Indeed, everything fu the universe must be infinitely small ‘The Pythagoreans are thus faced with this dilemma. Either in the universe is infinitely great, or everything inthe universe is infinitely small. The conclusion which Zeno wishes us to draw from this argument is, of course, that the supposition from which the dilemma fows is an absurd supposition, namely, ‘that the universe and everything init are composed of units. Tf the Pythagoreans think that the hypothesis of the One is absurd ‘and leads to ridiculous conclusions, it has now been shown that ‘the contrary hypothesis, that ofthe many, is productive of equally ‘idiculous conclusions, 2. If there is a many, then we ought to be able to say how many thereare. At least, they should be numerable;if they are not ‘bumerable, how can they exist? On the other hand, they cannot ‘Possibly be numerable, but must be infinite. Why?’ Because be- ‘tween any two astigned units there will always be other units just ‘saline is infinitely divisible. But it isabsurd to say that themany ‘re finite in number and infinite in number at the same time.* Tesi erences oan6 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 3. Does bushel of com make a noise when it falls to the ground? Clearly. But what of a grain of con, or the thousandth [art of grain of corn? Tt makes no noise. But the bushel of com [5 composed only of the grains of com or of the parts ofthe grains fof corn. If, then, the parts make no sound when they fall, how fan the whole make 2 sound, when the whole is composed only of the parts? 1M. Arguments agent the Pythagorean Doctrine of Space ‘Parmenides denied the existence of the void or empty space, and Zeno tries to support this denial by reducing the opposite view to absurdity. Suppose for a moment that there is a spice in which things are. Ifitis nothing, then things cannot be in it HW, however, itis something, it wil itself be in space, and that space wil tet be in space, and so on indefinitely. But this isan absurdity. Things, therefore, are not in space or in an empty id and Farmenes was quite right to deny the existence of Im. Arguments Concerning Motion ‘The most celebrated arguments of Zeno are those concerning motion. It should be remembered that what Zeno is attempting {show is this: that motion, which Parmenides denied, is equally impossible on the pluralistic theory of the Pythagorean. 1. Let us suppoae that you want to cross stadium or race- course. In order to do so, you would have to traverse an infinite ‘Bumber of points—on the Pythagorean hypothesis, that i £0 sa. Moreover, you would have fo travel the distance infinite time, if yyou wanted to get to the other side at al But how can you ‘averse an infinite number of points, and so an infinite distance, in a finite time? We mast conclude that you cannct cross the stagium. Indeed, we must conclude that no object can traverse any distance whatsoever (for the same difficulty always recurs), ‘and that all motion is consequently impossible 2, Let ub suppose that Achilles and a tortoise are going to have a race. Since Achiles is a sportsman, he gives the tortoise a start. Now, by the time that Achilles has reached the place ‘rom which the tortoise started, the latter has again advanced to 1 At, Be H,s.gn to: Spt, 8, 8 (D9 2) TASES BME: Bae eons ot ge ae 8.2 44) SASaE Pie: dane ba nana st Tape hee 8‘THE DIALECTIC OF ZENO ” another point; and vthen Achilles reaches that point, then the {ortose will have advanced stil another distance, even if very Short. Thus Achilles is always coming nearer to the tortoise, but fever actually overtakes it—and never can do 20, on the sup- postion that a Line is made up of an infnite number of points Jor then Achiles would have to traverse an infinite distance. On the Pythagorean hypothesis, then, Achilles wil never eatch op the tortoise; and so, although they assert the reality of motion, they make t impossible on their own doctrine. Fort follows that the slower moves as fast as the fat "}. Suppose @ moving arrow. According to the Pythagorean theory the arrow should occupy a given pastion in space. But to fccupy a given postion in space is to be at rest. Therefore the fying arrow is at rest, which isa contradiction * if The fourth argument of Zeno, which we know trom Aristotle? is, as Sir David Ross says, “very dificalt to fllow, partly owing to use of ambiguous language by Aristotle, partly ‘wing to doubts as to the readings."* We have to represent 0 ‘uraeves three sete of bodies on a stadium or race-course, One fet i stationary, the other two are moving in opposite directions toone another with equal velocity. ae Bs [S[pTe[statsiae] —> +— GEGBTse7Ts) cs Fig. The A's are stationary; the B's and C’s are moving in opposite Aliections with the same velocity. They will come to occupy the following position: as (TTS TaTsTeT7 78} Bs [Bi[eistatstale es [reTstasiei7181 Fig. 1 la Be 2 9 4. Ria ies 8 BSS8 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY In attaining this second position the font of Br has passed four of the A's, while the font of Cx has passed all the B's. Ifa unit of length is passed ina unt of time, then the front of Bx has ‘taken half the time taken by the front of Cr in order to reach the position of Fig. 2. On the other hand the front of Br has passed All the C's, just asthe front of Cx has passed all the B's The ‘me of thie passage must then be epual. We are lft then with ‘the absurd conciasion thatthe half of certain time is equal to ‘the whole ofthat time. How are we to interpret these arguments of Zeno? It is portant not to let oneself think “These are mere sophistries on the part of Zeno, They are ingenious tricks, but they err by supposing that a line is composed of points and time of disrete moments.” It may be that the slution of the riddles is to be found in showing that the line and time are continuous and not diserete; but, then, Zeno was not concerned to hold that they are iscete. On the contrary, he is concemed to show the absurd ‘consequences which fow trom supposing that they are decrete Zeno, as a disciple of Parmenides, beheved that motion is an ilsion and is impossible, but in the foregoing arguments his aim is to prove that even on the pluralistic hypothesis motion is equally impossible, and that the assumption of its possibility leads to contradictory and absurd conclusions. Zeno's psition was as follows: "The Reali plenum, a complete cootinum and ‘motion is impossible. Our adversaries assert motion and try to ‘explain it by an appeal to a pluralistic hypothesis. I propose to ‘how that this hypothesis does nothing t0 explain motion, but ‘only lands one in absurdities.” Zeno thus reduced the hypothesis ‘of his adversaries to absurdity, and the real result of his dialectic was not #0 much to establish Parmenidean monism (which is ‘exposed (0 insuperable ebjections), as to show the necesity of ‘admitting the concept of continuous quantity ‘The Eleatics, then, deny the realty of multiplicity and motion. ‘There is one principle, Being, which is conceived of as material ‘and motionless. They do not deny, of course, that we sense ‘motion and multiplicity, but they decare that what we sense i ‘usin: it is mere appearance. ‘True being is to be found, not by sence but by thought, and thought shows that there ean be no plurality, no movement, no change.‘THE DIALECTIC OF cow ” ‘The Eleatics thus attempt, as the eatlier Greck philosophers attempted before them, to discover the one principle ofthe world. ‘Tne world, however, as it presents itself tous, i clearly a ploral- {ste world. The question i, therefore, how to reconcile the one Principle with the plurality and change which we find in the Perl. the problem ofthe One and the Many, which Heraclitus hhad tried to solve in a philosophy that professed to do justice to both elements through a doctrine of Unity in Diversity, Identity in Difference. The Pythagoreans asserted plurality to. the cal exclusion ofthe One—there are many ones; the Elatics RSerted the One to the exclusion of the many. But if you cling to the plurality which is suggested by tenee-experience, then you ‘must also admit change; and if you admit change of one thing into another, you cannot avoid the recurring problem as to the character of the common element in the things which change Ion the other hand, you start withthe doctrine of the One, you ‘must—unless you ae gong to adopt a one-sided postion like that of the Eleatics, which cannot last—deduce plurality from the One, or at least show how the plurality which we observe in the world is consistent with the One. In other words, justice must bbe done to both factore—the One and the Many, Stability and Change. The one-sided doctrine of Parmenides was unacceptable, 5 also was the one-sided doctrine of the Pythagoreans. Yet the philosophy of Heraclitus was also unsatistctory. Apart from the fact that it hardly accounted suficiently forthe stable element in things, it was bound up with materialistic monism. Ultimately it was bound to be suggested that the highest and truest being is immaterial. Meanwhile iti not surprising to find what Zeller cals “compromise-systems,” trying to weld together the thought of their predecessors. [Note om "Pantheiom’” im preScratc Greek Philosophy () Ia Pantheist isa man who has a subjective religious atti- tude towards the universe, which later he identies with God then the PreSocratis are scarcely tobe called panthests. That Heracitas speaks ofthe One as Zeus is true, but it doesnot appear that he adopted any religious attitude towards the One—Fire (i) Tf panthest is aman who, while denying a Transcendent of the universe, makes the universe to be ultimately Thought (unlike the materialist, who makes it Matter alone), then ‘the Pre-Socratics again scarcely merit the name of pantheist, for~ FIKE-SUURATIC PHILOSOPHY they conceive or speak ofthe One in material terms (though iti trve thatthe sprit matter distinction had not yet been so cleaely conceived that they could deny it in the way that the modern ‘materialistic monist denies i) (ii) Tn any cave the One, the universe, could not be identified with the Greek gods. It has been remarked (by Schelling) that there is no supernatural in Homer, for the Homeric god is part of nature. This remark has its application in the present question. ‘The Greek god wat finite and anthropomorphiealy conceived; could not possibly be identied with the One, nor would it occur to anyone to do so literally. The name of a god might be some- times transferred to the One, eg. Zeus, but the one is not to be thought of as identifed with the “actual” Zeus of legend and mythology. The suggestion may be that the One is the only "god there is and that the Olympian deities are anthropomorphic ‘ables; but even then it seems very uncertain ifthe philoeopher tree worshipped the One. Stcca might with ust be called panthests; Dut, as far as the early PreSocratics are concerned, 1 seems decidedly preferable to call them monists, rather than pantheists.CHAPTER VII EMPEDOCLES OF AKRAGAS Eurepocuss was a citizen of Akragas, or Agrigentum, in Sic is dates cannot be fixed, but it appeacs that he Visited the city, of Thuri shortly after its foundation in 444-43 Bc. He took part in the politics of his native ety, and seems to have been the leader of the democratic party there. Stories were late circulated about Empedocles’ activities as magician and. wonder-worker, land there i a story that he was expelled from the Pythagorean (Order for “stealing discourses”) Apart from thaumaturgic activities, Empedocles contributed to the growth of medicine proper. The death of the philosopher has been made the subject of several entertaining fables, the best known being that he jumped into the crater of Etna inorder to make people think that fhe had gone up to heaven and esteem him as a god. Unforts- nately, he left one of his slippers on the brink ofthe volcano, and, st he tsed to wear slippers with brazen soles it was eaily recog: nised.* Diogenes, however, who recounts this story, also informs tus that “Timaeus contradicts all these stories, saying expressly that he departed into Peloponnesus, and never returned at all, fon which ‘account the manner of his death is uncertain.”? Empedocles, like Parmenides and unlike the other Greek piloso- ‘hers, expressed his philosophical ideas in poetical writings, more oF les extensive fragments of which have come down to as Empodocies does not 90 much produce a new philosophy, as ‘endeavour to weld together and reconcile the thought of bis redecesors, Parmenides had held that Being is, and that being ' material, Empedocles not only adopted this positon, but also the fundamental thought of Parmenides, that being cannot arse or pass away, for being cannot arise from not-being, nor can being pass into not-being. Matter, then, is without beginning and without end; i indestructible, "Foois!—for they have no fa Feaching thoughts—who deem that what before was not comes into being, or that aught can perish and be utterly destroyed, For t cannot be that aught can aise from what in no way is, and SBOE LIE #2 cue cat Gnomai tien pont at pom en Lig Latet. 8,71, (The gront Germanic classical post HaMd-rlin wot@ PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY itis impossible and unheard of that what és should perish, for it will always fe, wherever one may keep putting it." And again: “And in the All there is naught empty and naught too full,” and “In the All there is naught empty. Whence, then, could aught ‘come to increase it?"™ ‘So far, then, Empedocles agrees with Parmenides. But on the ‘other hand, change is a fact which cannot be denied, and the Aismissal of change as illusory could not long be maintained. Tt remained, then, 10 find a way of reconcling the fact of the ‘existence of change and motion with the principle of Parmenides, ‘that Being—which, be it remembered, is material according to Parmenides—neither comes into being nor passes away. This reconciliation Empedoctes tried to elect by means of the principle ‘hat objects as wholes begin to be and cease to be—as experience shows they do—but that they are composed of material particles, which are themselves indestructible. There is “only a mingling nd interchange of what has been mingled. Substance (®eq) is ‘ut a name given to these things by men. ‘Now, though Thales had believed all things to be ultimately water and Anaximenes as, they believed that one kind of matter ‘ean become another kind of matter, at least in the sense that, ‘eg, water becomes earth and air becomes re. Empedoces, how ‘ever, interpreting Parmenides' principle of the unchangeabilty ‘of being in his own way, held that one kind of matter cannot become ancther kind of matter, but that there are fundamental land eternal kinds of matter or elements—earth, air, Gre and water. The familiar classification of the four elements was there- fore invented by Empodocles, though he speaks of them, not as cements bat 25 “the roots of all"* Earth cannot become water, zor water, earth: the four kinds of matter are unchangeable and ‘ltimate particles, whieh form the concrete objects of the world by their mingling. So objects come into being through the tingling of the elements, and they cease to be through the separation of the elements: but the elements themedves neither come into being nor pass away, but remain ever unchanged. Empedoces, therefore, saw the only possible way of reconcling the materialistic position of Parmenides withthe evident fact of change, the way of postulating a multiplicity of ultimate material particles, and may thos be called a mediator between the system (of Parmenides and the evidence ofthe senses, Ning tt mg 14 Fg. Pig 7 Utne a roteEMPEDOCLES OF AKRAGAS 83 ‘Now the Ionian philosophers had failed to explain the process cof Nature. If everything is composed of air, as Anaximenes fhoaght, how do the objects of our experience come into being? What force i responsible for the cyclical process of Nature? ‘assumed that air transforms itself into other Kinds fof matter through its own inherent power; but Empedocles saw that itis necessary to postulate active forces. These forces he ound in Love and Hate, or Harmony and Discord. tn spite of their names, however, the forces are conceived by Empedocles ts physical and material forces, Love or Attraction bringing the particles ofthe four elements together and building up, Strife ot Hite separating the particles and causing the cessation of the being of objects ‘According to Empedoces the world-process is circular, in the sease that there are periodic world-cyces. At the commence: iment of a eyele the elements are all mixed up together —not ‘separated out to form concrete objects as we know them—a general mixture of particles of earth, ai, fre and water. In this [primary stage ofthe process Love isthe governing principle, and the whole is called a “blessed god.” Hate, however is round about the sphere, and when Hate penetrates within the sphere the process of Separation, the disunitng of the particle, is begun Ultimately the separation becomes complete: all the water particles ae gathered together, all the fie particles, and 60 on. Hate reigns supreme, Love having been driven out, Yet Love in tam begins its work, and so causes gradual mingling and uniting Of the various elements, this proces going on until the element- Particles are mixed up together as they were in the beginning, {tis then the turn of Hate to start its operations anew. And so the Process continues, without fist beginning and without last end.* As to the world as we know it tis stands ata stage ha-way between the primary sphere and the stage of total separation Of the elements: Hate is gradually penetrating the sphere and Ariving out Love as it does so. As our earth began to be formed ut of the sphere, air was the first element to be separated eff ‘his was followed by fr, and then came earth. Water ie squeezed out by the rapidity with which the world rotates. The primary Sphere, i. primary in the cyclical process, not primary in an Abrolute sense, is described in what appear to’ us somewhat Lig thee of a sarang eric pracn egos i te ply of ‘Nitanhe der Whe Sano Baral Races ee4 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY amusing terms, “There” (Le. in the sphere) “are distinguished neither the swift limbs of the sun; no, nor the shaggy earth in its might, nor the sea—so fast was the god bound inthe close covering fof Harmony, spherical and round, rejoicing in his circular sli tude." The activity of Love and Strife is ilustrated in various ways, “This” (Le, the contest between them) “is manifest in the ‘mass of mortal ibs. At one time all the limbs that are the body's portion are brought together by Love in blooming life's high eeseon; at another, severed by cruel Strife, they wander each alone by the Breakers of life's sea. Tt isthe same with plants and the fish that make their homes in the waters, with the beasts that have their lair on the hills and the seabirds that salon wings "* ‘The doctrine of transmigration of souls is taught by Empedocies fn the book of the Purifations. He even declares: "For T have already been in the pasta boy and a gil, a shrub and a bird and {fish which lives inthe sea Tt can scarcely be said, however, that this doctrine fits in well with the cosmological system of Empedocle, since, ial things are composed of material particles which separate at death, and ifthe blood round the heat is the thought of men," there is little oom lft for immortality. But Empedocles may not have realised the discrepancy between his philosophical and religious theories. (Among the latter are Certainly some very Pythagorean-sounding prescriptions, suchas “Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans!”)* Aristotle remarks that Empedocles made 0. distinction between thought and perception. His actual theory of vision is given by Theophrastus, a theory used by Plato in the Timaeus.* In sense-perception there is a meeting between an element in us and. similar element outside us, All things are constantly giving off efuences, and when the pores ofthe sense-organs are the right Size, then these eMluences enter in and perception takes place. In the case of vision, for example, effuences come to the eyes from things; while, on the other hand, the fe from inside the eye (the eye is composed of fire and water, the fire being sheltered from the water by membranes provided with very small pores, ‘which prevent water getting through, but allow fre to get out) goes out to meet the abject, the two factors together producing Sant Sime ay (tae set Pag yt Fae not +P ta be EE SER Bane PEE, 1kEMPEDOCLES OF AKRAGAS 4% {In conclsion, we may remind ourselves that Empedocles tried to econcile the thesis of Parmenides, that being can neither come to be not pass away, with the evident fact of change by postu- ating ultimate particles of the four elements, the mingling of which forms the concrete objects of this world and the separation of which constitutes the pasing-away of such objects. He filed, in how the material cyclic process of Nature takes place, but had recourse to mythological forces, Love and Hate. It vas left to Anaxagoras to introduce the concept of Mind as the original cause of the worl-proces.CHAPTER 1X THE ADVANCE OF ANAXAGORAS Awaxaconas was born at Clazomenae in Asia Minor about 500 BC, and, although a Greek, he was doubtless a Persian Citizen, for Clazomenae had been reduced after the suppression fof the Ionian Revolt; and it may even be said that he came to Athens in the Persian Army. Tf this is so, it would certainly explain why he eame to Athens in the year of Salamis, 480/79 8. He was the first philosopher to settle in the city, which was later to become such a flourishing cenre of philosophic study. From Plato? we lern that the young Pericles was a pupil of ‘Anaxagoras, an association which afterwards got the philosopher into trouble, for after he had resided about thirty years in the city, Anaxagoras was brought to trial by the political opponents of Pericles, ie. about 450 8. Diogenes tll us that the charges were those of impiety (he refers to Sotion) and Medism (eelerring to Satyros). As to the fist charg, Plato relates, it was based on the fact that Anaxagoras taught that the sun is a redhot stone land the moon is made of earth These charges were doubtlee trumped up, mainly in order to get a hit at Pericles through Anaxagoras. (Periles” other teacher, Damon, was ostracised.) ‘Anaxagoras was condemned, but was got out of prison, probably bby Pericles himsell,and he retired to lonia where he settled at Lampsaces, a colony of Miletus. Here he probably founded 2 school. The citizens erected a monument to his memory in the marketplace (an altar dedicated to Mind and Truth), and the aniversary of his death was long observed asa holiday for school ‘hildren, at his own request, it said ‘Anaxagoras expressed his philosophy in a book, but only frag- ments ofthis remain, and these appeat to be confined to the frst part of the work. We owe the preservation ofthe fragments we ‘possess to Simplicius (a. sixth century). Anaxagoras, like Empedocs, accepted the theary of Par rmenides that Being neither comes into being nor passes away, haw ad oh id poner tC ch eager So Pein 08 reece * Ape 209,THE ADVANCE OF ANAXAGORAS & but is unchangeable. "The Hellenes do not understand rightly ‘Coming into being and passing away, fr nothing comes into being for pastes away, Dot there isa mingling and a separation of things twitch are” (be. persist). Both thinkers, then, are in agreement {sto the indestructibility of matter, and both reconcile this theory srth the evident fact of change by posting indestructible material particles, the mingling of which forms objects, the separation of which explains the passing away of objects. But Anaxagoras wil not agree with Empedocles that the ultimate units are particles corresponding to the four elements earth air, fire and water He teaches that everything which has parts qualitatively the ‘same asthe whole s ultimate and underived. Aristotle calls these wholes, which have qualitatively similar parts, ot tuomyot = Aacpece being opposed to ob tmpomyete. This distinction is ‘ot difcalt to grap if one takes an example. If we sappoce that 8 plece of gold is cut in half, the halves are themselves gold. The parts are thus qualitatively the same asthe whole, andthe whole fan be suid to be tunnels. If, however «dog, a living organism, be cut in half the halves are not themselves two dogs. The whole {sin this case therefore dmompkc, The general notion is thus clear, and it i unnecessary to confute the lssve by introducing considerations from modern scientific experim.at. Some things ‘have qualitatively similar parts, and such things are ultimate and underived (as regards hind, that is to say, for no given con- lomeration of particle is ultimate and underived). “How can hair come from what is not halt, or flesh from what is not flesh?” asks Anaxagoras." But it does not follow that everything Which seems to be time is really so. Thusit is related by Aristotle that Anaxagorss did not hold Empedoces’elements— ‘arth, air, fire and water—to be really ultimate; on the contrary, they ‘are’ mixtures ‘composed of many qualitatively diferent Dattiles* Tn the beginning, partcles—there is no indivisible particle, according to Anaxagoras—o all kinds were mingled together. “Al things were together infinite both in number and in small- ‘ess; for the small too was infinite And, when all things were together, none of them could be distinguished for thir small ess." “AI things are in the whole.” The objects of experience arse, when ultimate particles have been so brought together that SBE ems De Cada 3. gerea TPEJ PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY in the resulting object particles of a certain kind predominate. ‘Thus in the orginal mixture particles of gold were scattered about and mixed with all sors of other particles; but when particles of (old have been so brought together—with other particles—that the resultant visible object consists predominantly of gold- particles, we have the gold of our experience. Why do we say. ‘with other particles"? ‘Because in concrete objects of experience there ace, according to Anaxagoras, particles of all things: yet they are combined in such a way that one kind of particle pre- ‘dominates and from ths fact the whole object gets its denomina- tion, Anaxagoras held the doctrine that "in everything there is a portion of everything."? apparently because he did not see how the could otherwise explain the fact of change. For instance, if {grass becomes flesh, there must have been particles of fsh i the {grass (for how can “Besh” come "from what isnot flesh’), while fon the other hand in the grass the grasspartcies must pre- dominate. Grass, therefore, consists predominantly of grass, but it alzo contains other inde of particles, for "in everything there {is a portion of everything.” and "the things that are in one world fare not divided nor ext off from one another with a hatchet, ‘either the warm from the cold nor the cold from the warm."* Ta this way Anaxagoras sought to maintain the Parmenidean doctrine concerning being, while at the same time adopting a realist attitude towards change, not dismissing it as an illusion of, the senses but accepting it as a fact and then trying to reconcile it with the Eleaie theory of being. Later on Aristotle would ‘attempt to solve the dificulties raised by the doctrine of Parmen- ides in regard to change by means of his distinction between potency and act. Burnet does not think that Anaxagoras considered, as the Epicureans supposed him to, "that there mast be minute particles ‘read and water which were ike the particles of blood, fesh ‘and bones."? Im his opinion it was of the opposites, the warm and the cold, the dry and the moist, that everything Contained @ portion according to Anaxagoras. ‘Burnet’s view has certainly ‘uch to support it. We have already sen the fragment in which ‘Anaxagoras declares that “the things that are in one world a fot cut off from one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold, nor the cold from the warm.” Moreover, since according to Anaxagoras, there are no indivisible particles, there Vag ‘ng Sor. Lee 78‘THE ADVANCE OF ANAXAGORAS: oy cannot be any ultimate particles in the sense of what cannot be farther divided. Bot it would not seem to follow necessarily from {the indvisiblity ofthe particles that, inthe philosopher's opinion, there were no ultimate hinds which could not be qualitatively resolved. And does not Anaxagoras explicitly ask how hair can ‘ome fom what is not hair? In addition to this we read in fragment 4 of the mixture of al things—of the moist and the dry, and the warm and the cold, andthe bright and the dark, and ‘of much eatth that was in it, and a multitude of innumerable ‘sted in no way lke each other. For none of the other things either {Bike any other. And these things being so, we must hold that all things are in the whole.” This fragment scarcely gives the Jmpression thatthe “opposites” stand in any pecaliar positon of privilege. While admitting, therefore, that Buret's view has Ich t be said for it, we prefer the interpretation already given the text So far Anaxagoras’ philosophy is a variant from Empedoces’ interpretation and adaptation of Parmenides, and offers no particularly valuable features. But when we come to the ques. {on of the power or force that is responsible for the forming of things out ofthe frst mass, we arrive atthe peculiar contribution ‘of Anaxagoras to philosophy. Empedocles had attributed motion in the universe tothe two physical foees of Love and Strife, but ‘Anaxagoras introduces instead the principle of Nous or Mind. "With Anaxagoras a light, if stil a weak one, begins to dawn, because the understanding is now recognised as the prncipe.”* “Nous,” says Anaxagoras, "has power over all things that have lie, both greater and smaller. And Nous had power over the ‘whole revolution, so that it began to revolve at the start. ‘And Nous set in order all things that were to be, and all things ‘that were and are now and that will be, and this revolution in ‘which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon and the fir and the aether which are separated off, And the revolution ftset caused the separating off, and the dense is separated off from the rare, the warm ftom the cold, the bright from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in ‘many things. But no thing is altogether separated off from any- thing ese except Nous._ And all Nous i alike, both the greater and the smaller; but nothing else i ike anything else, but eich (pi Fler, tins, Stan ot Map. 99 8 Ct, "ge HP, 0.~ PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which there are most in i"™ ‘Nous "is infinite and self-uled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by its” How then did Anaxagoras conceive of ‘Nous? He call it “the finest ofall things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest power He also speaks of Nous being “there where everything else i, in ‘the surrounding mass."* The philosopher thus speaks of Nous ‘or Mind in material terms as being "the thinnest ofall things, fand a8 occupying space. On the strength ofthis Burnet declares that Anaxagoras never rose above the conception of « corporeal principle. He made Nous purer than other material things, Dut fever reached the idea of an immaterial of incorporeal thing Zeller will not allow this, and Stace points out how “all philosophy labours under the dificulty of having to express non-sensuous thought in language which has been evolved for the purpose of ‘expressing sensuous ideas.”* If we speak of a mind as'"clear” or ‘as someone's mind as being “greater” than that of ancther, we fae not on that account to be called materalists, That Anaxa- sgoras conceived of Nous as oocupying space isnot suficient proof that he would have declared Nous to be corporeal, had he ever conceived the notion of a sharp distinction between mind and matter. ‘The non-spatialty of the mind is a later conception Probably the most satistactory interpretation is that Anaxagoras, in his concept ofthe spiritual, did not suecsed in grasping clearly the radical diference between the spiritual and the corporeal ‘But that e not the same assaying that he was a dogmatic material: ist. On the contrary, he first introduces a spiritual and intellectual principle, though he falls to understand fully the eatental dif nce between that principle and the matter which it forms or sets in motion, ‘Nous is present in all living things, men, animals and plants, and isthe same in al. Diferences between these abject are due, ‘then, not to essential diferences between their souls, but to diferences between ther bodies, which facilitate or handicap the faller working of Nous. (Anaxagoras, however, doesnot explain ‘eterna, and the function of Nous sems to be to set the rotatory ‘movement or vortex going in part of the mized mass, the action tinge Pagan Pag tq tnt isa omTHE ADVANCE OF ANAXAGORAS nm of the vortex itsel, as it spreads, accounting for the subsequent ‘potion. ‘Thus Aristotle, who says in the Metaphysics that Anaxa- igoras "stood out like a sober man from the random talkers that faa preceded him," also says that "Anaxagoras uses Mind as a deus ox machina to account for the formation of the world; and trhenever e iat a loss to explain why anything necessarily is, he drags it in. But in other eases he makes anything rather than Mind the cause."* We can easly understand, thea, the dis- appointment of Socrates who, thinking that he had come upon th ently new approach when he discovered Anaxagoras, found “ray extravagant expectations were all dashed to the ground when T went on and found that the man made no use of Mind at All He ascribed no causal power whatever to it in the ordering of things, but to airs, and aethers, and waters, and a host of other Strange things."* Nevertheless, though be failed to make full use of the principle, Anaxagoras must be credited with the intro- ‘ction into Greek philosophy of a principle possessed of the (greatest importance, that was to bear splendid frit inthe future. " aaph A 9848 atph, A 4 o8s2 whan Pita o7CHAPTER x. ‘THE ATOMISTS ‘Tas founder of the Atomist Schoo! was Leucippus of Miletus. Tt has boen maintained that Leucippos never existed, but Aristotle and Theophrastus make him to be the founder of the Atomst ‘Philosophy, and we can hardly suppose that they were mistaken. Tt is not possible to fix his dates, but Theophrastus declares that LLeveippus had been a member of the School of Parmenides, and Wwe readin Diogenes’ Life of Leucippus that he was a disciple of Zeno (rs one hee). Tt appears that the Great Diahosmes, subsequently incorporated in the works of Democritus of Abdera, twas really the work of Leucippus, and no doubt Burnet is quite Fight when he compares the Democritean corpus with the Hippo- Ccrtean, and remarks that in neither case can we distinguish the futhors of the various component treatises" The whole corpus {s the work ofa School, and tis most unlikely that we shall ever ‘be ina positon to assign each work to its respective author. In ‘eating of the Atomist philosophy, therefore, we cannot pretend to distinguish between what is due to Leucippus and what is due ‘0 Demoeritu. But since Democritus i of considerably later date and cannot with historical accuracy be classed among the Pre- Sccratics, we will leave to a later chapter his doctrine of sense- perception, by which he attempted to answer Protagoras, and fis theory of human conduct, Some historians of philosophy, Indeed, teat of Democritus’ views on these points when dealing with the Atomist philosophy in the section devoted to the Pre Socratis, but in view of the undoubtedly later date of Democritus, i seems preferable to follow Burnet in this matter ‘The Atomist philosophy is really the logical development of the philosophy of Empedocles. The latter had tried to reconcile ‘the Parmenidean principle of the denial of the passage of being into not-being or vice versa, with the evident fact of change by postulating four elements which, mixed together in various proportions, form the objects of our experience. He didnot, however, really work out his doctrine of particles, nor did he " Epeah, or nage, denied extance, ut Ba ene raged tat oOTHE ATOMISTS B cay the quantitative explanation of qualitative differences 0 {erga concssion. The philosophy of Empedoces formed ‘Eusnlional stage tothe explanation of al qualitative diferences {p's mechanical jostapontion of material particles in various Beem Moreover, Empedocie' forces Lave and Strife-—were etaphorical powers, which would have to be eliminated in a thorough going mechanical pilsophy The fra step to complete tmecanism was atempted by the Atoms. ‘According to Levcippus and Democritus there are an infnite umber of indivisible units, which are called atoms, ‘These are Inpercepible since they are too small to be perceived by the Seis The atoms ifr in sae and shape, bu have no quality Save that of solidity or impenetrablty. Infinite in number, they tnove in the void. (Parmenides had denied the cealty of space ‘he Pythagorens had admitted a void to keep their wits apart, but they identified it with the atmospheric ai, which Empedocles Showed to be corporeal. Leacipp, however, atirmed at the Same time the noteality of spice and its existence, meaning by non-eality, non-corprety. This potion is expressed By Saying that what not" i jst an fuch real ae “what i Spice, then, or the void, is not corporeal, but i as real a8 body) The inter Epicuenns held thatthe atoms all move down- wards inthe woid through the force af weigh, probably infiuenced by Aristotle's idoa of abeolate weight and lightness, (Aristotle Says that none of bis predecsors bad eld this notion) Now ‘Ati expresaiy says that while Democritus asebed sie and shape to the atoms he didnot acre to ther weight, but that Epicurs added weight inorder to acount for the moverent of the atoms, Cicero relates the same, and also declares that tceordng to Democrite thee was no "top" or “bottom” ot "middle" in the void? It this 8 what Democritus held, then he was of course quite sight, for there is no absolite up or down: tht how inthis case did he conceive the motion ofthe atoms? In the De anima? Aratotie atributes to Democritas «comparison ‘between the motions of the atoms of the soul and the, moter, in sunbeam, which dart hither and thither in all dietians, ven ‘when there le no, wind, It may be that thie was al the Demecsitean view of the original motion of the atoms However, in whatever way the storms orginally moved in the Bp nad BP (00 at” PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY void, at some point of time collisions between atoms occurred, those of iregular shape becoming entangled with one another ‘and forming groupe of atoms. In this way the vortex (Anaxa- {oras) is set up, and a world isin process of formation. Whereas ‘Anaxagoras thought that the larger bodies would be driven farthest from the centre, Leucippus said the opposite, believing, wrongly, that in an eddy of wind or water the larger bodies tend towards the centre. Another effect of the movement in the void {that atoms which are alike in size and shape are brought together as a sieve brings together the grains of millet, wheat and barley, or the waves ofthe sa heap up together long stones ‘with long and round with round, Tn this way ae formed the four "elements”"—ft, air earth and water. Thus innumerable worlds arise from the colliions among the infinite atoms moving in the void Tis at once noticeable that neither Empedocies’ frees, Love and Strife, nor the Nous of Anaxagoras appear in the Atomist Philosophy: Leueippus evidently did not consider any moving force to bea necesary hypothesis. In the beginning existed atoms in the void, and that was all: from that beginning arose the world ‘of our experience, and no external Power or moving Force is assumed as a necessary cause forthe primal motion, Apparently the carly cosmologists did not think of motion as requiring any ‘explanation, and in the Atomist philosophy the eteral movement fof the atoms is regarded as sellsuficient. Leucippus speaks of everything happening & diy wat be dpe! and this might at first sight appear inconsistent with his doctrine of the unexplained original movement ofthe atoms and of the colisions ofthe atoms. ‘The latter, however, occur necesarily owing to the configuration of the atoms and their iregular movements, while the former, as.a self-sufficient fact, did not require further explanation. To 15, indeed, it may wel seem strange to deny chance and yet 0 posit an eternal unexplained motion—aristotle blames the ‘Atomists for not explaining the source of motion and the kind of mmotion’—but we ought not to conclude that Leucippus meant to ascribe the motion of the atoms to chance: to him the eternal ‘motion and the continuation of motion required no explanation Jn our opinion, the mind boggles at such a theory and cannot rest content with Leucippus” ultimate; but it is an interesting Be cave 2.30088 Aap A 4985 19-30.‘THE ATOMISTS Pp ical fact, that he himself was content with this ultimate ny sought n0 “First Unmoved Mover.” it to be noted that the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus are the Pythagorean monads endowed with the properties of Parmenidean being-—for each is as the Parmenidean One. And inasmuch as the elements arte from the various arrangements ‘and postions of the atoms, they may be likened to the Pytha- "numbers," ifthe later are to be regarded as patterns ePisggurate numbers.” This can be the only sence to be attached to Aristotle's dictum that “Leucippus and Democritus virtually ‘make all things number too and produce them from numbers." Tn hs detailed scheme of the world, Leueippos was somewhat reactionary, rejecting the Pythagorean view of the spherical character of the earth and returning, like Anaxagoras, to the view of Anaximenes, thatthe earth is like a tambourine Beating in the air. But, though the details ofthe Atomist cosmology do not indicate any new advance, Leucippus and Democritus are noteworthy for having cartied previous tendencies to thei logical ‘conclusion, preducing a purely mechanical account and explana- tion of reality. The attempt to give a complete explanation of the world in terms of mechanical materialism has, as we all know, reappeared in a much more thorough form in the modem er ‘under the influence of physical science, but the briliant hypothesis ‘of Leveippus and Democritus was by no means the last word in Greek philosophy: subsequent Greck philosophers were to see ‘that the richness of the world cannot in allt spheres be reduced to the mechanical interplay of atoms * Decal 4 23,CHAPTER x1 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 4. I is often said that Greek philosophy centres round the problem of the One and the Many. Already in the very earliest, Stages of Greek philosophy we find the notion of unity: things change into one ancther—therefore there must be some common substratum, some ultimate principle, some unity underlying diversity. Thales declares that water is that common principle, ‘Anaximenes air, Heraclitus fe: they choose different principles, ‘Dut they al three believe in one wltimate principe. But although the fact of change—what Aristotle called “substantial” change— may have suggested to the early Cosmologats the notion of an “underlying unity in the universe it would be a mistake to reduce this notion to a conclusion of physical science. As far as strict Scientific proof goes, they had not sufficient data to warrant thelr assertion ‘of unity, still less to warrant the assertion of any particular ultimate whether water, fre or air. The fact Is, that the early Cosmologsts leapt beyond the data to the intuition of universal unity: they possessed what we might call ‘the power of metaphysical intuition, and this constitutes their lary and their claim to place in the history of philosophy. If ‘Thales had contented himself with saying that out of water earth is evolved, “we should," as Nietewche observes, “only have a scientific hypothesis: false one, though nevertheless dificult 10 refute” But Thales went beyond a mere scientie hypothesis: he reached out to a metaphysical doctrine, expressed in the ‘metaphysical doctrine, that Everything 1s One. Let me quote Nietzsche again. "Greek philosophy seems to begin with a preposterous fancy, with the proposition that water {s the origin and mather-womb ofall things. Ie it really necesary to stop there and become serious? Yes, and for three reasons: Firstly, because the proposition does enunclate something about ‘the origin of things; secondly, because it does so without figure and fable; thirdly and lastly, because ini s contained, although only in the chrysalis state, the idea—Everything is one. The frstimentioned Teaton leaves ‘Thales stil in the company of religious and superstitious people; the second, however, takes =PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY ” tim out of this company and shows him to us as a natural phil topher; but by virtue ofthe third, Thales becomes the first Greek lowpher."" This holds true of the other early Cosmologst; Bren ite Anaximenes and Heraclitus alzo took wing and flew Shove and beyond what could be verifed by mere empirical Sbeervation, At the same time they were not content with any ‘mythological assumption, for they sought areal principle of unity, the ultimate substrate of change: what they aserted, they asserted jn all seriousness. They had the notion of a world that was 2 whole, a system, of a World governed by law. Their assertions tere dictated by reason oF thought, not by mere imagination or mythology; and so they deserve to count as philosophers, the fst plllosophers of Europe. ‘2 But though the early Cosmologists were inspired by the ea of cosmic unity, they were faced by the fact of the Many, of ‘multiplicity, of diversity, and they hal to attempt the theoretical reconeilation of this evident plurality with the postulated unity in other words, they had te account forthe world as we know it While Anaximenes, for example, had recourse to the principle ‘of condensation and rarefaction, Parmenides, in the grip of his, (reat theory that Being is one and changeless, roundly denied the facts of change and motion and multiplicity as illusions of ‘the senses, Empedecles postulated four ultimate elements, out of which all things are built up under the action of Love and Strife, and Anaxagoras maintained the ultimate character of the atomic theory and the quantitative explanation of qualitative Aifference, thus doing justice to plurality, to the many, while tending to rlinguish the eatier vision of unity, in spite of the fact that each atom represents the Parmenidean One. We may say, therefore, that while the Pre-Socratics struggled with the problem of the One and the Many, they did not succeed in solving it. The Heracitean philosophy contains, indeed, the Profound notion of unity in diversity, but itis bound up with an ‘verasertion of Becoming and the diffcuties consequent on the Aoctrine of Fire. The Pre-Socratis accordingly failed to solve the problem, and it was taken up again by Plato and Aristotle, who ‘brought to bear on i thee outstanding talent and genius. ‘3 But if the problem of the One and the Many’ continued to exercise Greek philosophy in the PostSocratic period, and Feecived much more satistactory solutions at the hands of Plato * Pisephy ring ihe Tage Ao te Gah seh 38 PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 8 Aisle, if obvious that we cannot chartterse Pre- Sceratic pisophy ty reference to that problem: we require some other net of characterisation and distinction Where st to'be found? We may say that PreSocatie plwophy centres round the extemal world, the Object, the otsell Man, the Subject, the sll of cour not excloded from consideration, buat the intrest in the notes predominant. Tas canbe seen trom the question wbich the soccesive Pre-Socratic thinker set themselves fo answer "Ol what the word timstly com: used?” in their answers to this question the early Ionian Philosophers certainly went beyond what the empirical data Sarraned, but at alfeady rematied, Vey tacked the question inva pilnophic spt snd nt inthe pit of weavers of myto- logit fancies Tiny had not ierentaed between physical ence and pilosophy, and combined "scientie™ observtions ots purely practi carate with piosphie speslatons; bt St mtat be remembered that a dferentation between physi Scimce snd phesophy was hardly posible at tht ery atge-~ ten wanted t0 ow something more about the wor, and i fas but natural that sientifle questions sd philosophical ques {ios ahold be mingled together. Since they were concerned with the ulimate nature of tbe wold thee theories rank a0 plo. Septal bat sine they had not yet formed any ie itntion ‘lween spirit and mtr, and ce ther queoton vas lrgly prompted bythe fact of material change, ther answer was coed forthe most part in terms and concepts aken fom mater, They found the akimate “atu” of the tiers to be some Kind of tmater—aaturaly enough-vhether the mater of The the Indeterminate of Anzaimander, the air of Anaximence, the fre ‘of Heracite, or the toms of Lescppis, and so» ge part of thei aubjetimater would be claimed by pyc! setts of {osday aa belonging to ter province “The early Greckpienoiers are then rightly called Cosmoo- fits, for they wee concerned with the nant of the Cones, {he objet of our hnowsdge, and man Nima considered in his objective spect, as one em inthe Cosmos eter than in is Subjective aapect asthe sbjet of knowiedge o a the morally tring and ating subject Inthe coniertion ofthe Crane, they didnot rath any fal conlasion accounting for ll the factors involved and this apparent bankruptcy of Comoogy, togster with ther eases {0 be consiered presently, natsrahyPRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY n ted to & swing-over of interest from Object to Subject, from the Exsmes to Man himself, This change of interest, as exemplified in the Sophists, we will consider inthe following section of this book. “s although it is true that PreSecratic philosophy centres round the Cosmos, the external world, and that this cosmological Interest is the distinguishing mark of PreSocratic as contrasted with Socratic philosophy, it must also be remarked that one problem at any rate connected with man as the knowing subject ‘Was ralsed in PreSccratic philosophy, that of the relation between ‘sense experience and reason, Thus Parmenides, starting with the notion ofthe One, and finding himself unable to explain coming- torbe and pussng-away—which are given in senseexperience—set aside the evidence of the senses as illusion, and proclaimed the ‘ole validity of reason, which alone is able to atain the Real and Abiding. Bot the problem was not treated in any fall or adequate rmannes, and when Parmenides denied the validity. of sense- perception, he did so because of a metaphysical doctrine or sumption, rather than from any prolonged consideration of the nature of senseperception and the nature of non-sensuoas thought, 5. Since the early Greek thinkers may justly be termed philo- sophers, and since they proceeded largely by way of action and reaction o thesis and antithesis (eg. Heraclitus over-emphasising Becoming and Parmenides over-stresing Being), it was only {0 be expected that the germs of later philosophical tendencies and Schools would already be discernible in Pre Socratic philosophy. ‘Thus in the Parmenidean doctrine of the One, when coupled with the exaltation of Reason at the expense of sensepereeption, we can see the germs of later idealism; while in the introduction of Nous by Anaxagoras—however restricted his actual use of Nous smay have been--we may see the germs of later philosophical ‘theism; and in the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus we may see an anticipation of later materialistic and mechanistic plo- Sophies which would endeavour to explain all quality by quantity and to reduce everything in the universe to matter and its Products. 6. From what has been sad, it shoul be clear that Pre-Socratic Philosophy is not simply a pre-pilosophic stage which can be ‘scounted in a study of Greek thought—so that we should be Justied in starting immediately with Socrates and Plato. The Pre-Socratic philosophy is wot a pre-phlosophic stage, Dut is theto PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY fist stage of Greek philosophy: it may not be pure and unmixed philosophy, but it i philosophy, and it deserves to be studied {forthe sake ofits own intrinsic interest asthe frst Greek attempt ‘to attain a rational understanding of the world. Moreover, iti not a selfcontained unit, shut off fom succeeding philosophic ‘thought in a watertight compartment; rather is it preparatory to the succeeding period, for init we see problems raised which ‘were to occupy the greatest of Greek philosophers. Greek thought develops, and though we can hardly overestimate the native genius of men like Plato and Aristotle, it would be wrong to imagine that they were uninfuenced by the past, Plato. was profoundly influenced by Pre-Socratic thought, by the Hera- ‘itean, Eleatic and Pythagorean systems; Aristotle regarded his 3y as the heir and crown of the past; and both thinkers took up philosophic problems from the hands oftheir predecessors, giving its true, orginal solutions, but atthe same time tackling the problems in ther histore seting. It would be absurd, there fore, to start a history of Greek philosophy with a discussion of ‘Socrates and Plato without any discussion of preceding thought, for we cannot understand Socrates or Plato—or Aristotle either without 2 knowledge of the past ‘We must now tum to the next phase of Greek philosophy. which may be considered the antithesis to the preceding period ‘of Cosmological speculation—the Sophistic and Socratic period.PART IT ‘THE SOCRATIC PERIOD ‘CHAPTER Xt ‘THE SOPHISTS “Tae eatlier Greek philosophers had been chiely interested in the Object, trying to determine the ultimate principle ofall things. ‘Thee success, however, did not equal their philosophic sincerity, and the suocessive hypotheses that they advanced easily led to ‘certain scepticism as to the possibility of attaining any certain knowledge concerning the ultimate nature of the world. Add to this that doctrines such as those of Heraclitus and Parmenides ‘would naturally result im a sceptical attitude in regard to the ‘validity of sense-perception. If being is static and the perception of movement isan illusion, or if, on the other hand, alli in @ state of constant change and there is no real principle of stability, cur sense-percetion is untrustworthy, and so the very foundations fof Cosmology are undermined, The systems of philosophy hitherto proposed excluded one another: there was naturally truth to be found in the opposing theories, but no philosopher had yet arisen ‘of sufficient stature to reconcile the anticheses in a higher sya thesis, in which error should be purged away and justice done to the truth contained in rival doctrines, The revult was bound to bea certain mistrust of cnsmologies. And, indeed, a swing-over to the Subject as point of consideration was necessary if real advance was to be made, It was Plato's consideration of thought that made possible a truer theory in which justice should be done to the facts of both stability and mutability; but the reaction from Object to Subject, which made possible the advance, frst appears among the Sophists, and was largely an effect of the bankruptcy of the older Greek philosophy. In face of the daletie ‘of Zeno, it might well appear doubtfal if advance inthe study of cosmology was realy possible, Another factor besides the scepticism consequent on the former Greek philosophy, which directed attention to the Subject, was the growing reflection on the phenomena of culture andcf THE SOCRATIC PERIOD Civilisation, due in large part to extended acquaintance on the part of the Gresks with foreign peoples. Not only di they know Fomething of the civilisations of Persia, Babylon and Egypt, but they had also come into contact with people of a much les advanced stage, such a8 the Seythians and Thracians. This being ‘0, it was but natural that a highly intelligent people like the Greeks should begin to ask themselves questions; eg. Are the various national and local ways of lf, religious and ethical codes, merely conventions or not? Was Hellenic culture, as contrasted ‘with non-Hellenic or barbarian cultures, a matter of vos, man= sade and mutable existing wing, or did it rest on Nature, existing ‘ion? Was it a sacred ordinance, having divine sanction, or could it be changed, modified, adapted, developed? Profesor Zeller points out in this connection how Protagotas, most gitted of the Sophists, came from Abdera, "an advanced outpost of Tonic calture in the land of the Thracian barbarian”* ‘Sophism,* then, diflered from the older Greek philosophy in regard to the matter with which it dealt, namely, men and the ivlisation and customs of man: it treated of the microcosm rather than the macrocosa, Man was becoming self-conscious: as Sophocles says, “Mirecles in the world are many, there is no greater miracle than man." But Sophism also differed fom previous Greek philosophy in its method. Although the method ‘of the older Greek philosophy by no means excluded empirical observation, yet it was characterstcally deductive. When a Philosopher had settled on his general principle of the wot, ite ‘timate constituent principe, it then remained to explain partic calar phenomena in accordance with that theory. The Soph, Dowever, sought to amass a wide store of particular observations and facts; they were Encyclopaedists, Polymaths. Then from ‘these accumulated facts they proceeded to draw conclusions, partly theoretical, partly practical. Thus from the store of facts ‘hey accumulated concerning differences of opinion and belie, ‘they might draw the conclusion that i is impossible to have any catiain knowledge. Or from their knowledge of various nations and ways of life, they might form a theory as to the origin of civilisation or the beginning of language. Or aguin they might gebliahine Se eet we ewe Eck soe hating pet Ons of tay ae a pos 2 Btn ete onary en ra ‘or movement, not a school. eat iilgoe 3328‘THE SOPHISTS a spruce conons og, tat soety would be not Sr a gana toa ramet ne ee es Te en nim ihe erates coat wo cumislaoess an ee ae eu ds he pee ae gtd ee cue ada ose Coat sesso. ee pany tT oe mene en Feo pecergreaemre ieee id ae re ince taal ero my et eRe iil tod ous pasa ud bat ote ee ete tee arenes el hota ad ees ee ee es se easel arthe rebocuie soe es SR pay ain ea nog ne ah sar eee meee ee ae a ete wn tery snail "tnd a wer aes he oe Or ae ‘inn The Recies pafedoom far tay pail pape Tigetewgeupiyes wiry a'yaletageen Sere ree oe cen a oe oe ec eae ‘Sopa otettne te deness Dados niet ne Svc: Ee meee eens ce ee Ene acs ye ta ane t Reoclet ratings cers ote tet wate ang ach tek fa aay tee cocci Scere ey af ey in en Poa aeneT ie Was cone et oc inate sopint av wd oes i ns Shy woe Mata oles wha ned soothe oy rae en pre ve eae sont fs oy tcl uatees Soca es cea mee tee Seer tec tetera Spice sang Sad fous Bette a tay ale ete a ot Bar saa re re eh Serpette he Socata abe aacemnen& ‘THE SOCRATIC PERIOD his mark as & politician unless he could speak, and speak well ‘The Sophiste profeaed to teach him todo So taining him in the chief expression of political “virtue.” the virtue of the new rstocray of intellect and ability. There was, ofcourse, nothing ‘wrong in this in itself, bt the obvious consequence—that the art of rhetori might be used to "get across a notion or policy ‘which was not disinterested or might be defintely harmful to the city or merely calculated to promote the politician's career— helped to bring the Sophists into bad repute, This was particu. larly the case with regard to their teaching of Erstc. Tt man wanted to make money in the Greek democracy, it had to be done mainly by lawsuits, and the Sophists profesed to teach the right way of winning these lawsuits. But clearly that might easly ‘mean in practice the art of teaching men bow to make the unjust appear the just cause. Such a procedure was obviously very “iferent from the procedure of the old truth-seeking attitude of the philosophers, and helps to explain the treatment meted out ta the Sophists st the hands of Plat, ‘The Sophists carried on theit work of instruction by the educa tion of the young and by giving popular lectures in the cities; ‘but as they were itinerant profesor, men of wide experience snd representative of a, a5 yet, somewhat sceptical and superficial reaction, the idea became current that they gathered together ‘the young men from their homes and then pulled to pieces before them the traditional ethical code and religious belies. Accordingly the strict adherents of tradition regarded the Sophists with some suspicion, though the young were their enthusiastic supporters. Not that the leveling-out tendencies of the Sophsts were al weakening to Greek Iie: their breadth of view generally made them advocates of Panhellnism, a doctrine sorely needed in the Greece of the city-state. But it was their sceptical tendencies that attracted most attention, especially as they did not put anything really new and stable in place of the old convictions Which they tended to unsettle. To this should be added the fact that they took payment forthe instruction which they imparted. ‘This practice, however legitimate initsell, was at variance with the practice of the older Greek philosophers, and did not agree with the Greek opinion of what was Biting. Tt was abhorrent to lato, while Xenophon says that the Sophists speak and write to deceive for their guin, and they give no help to anyone. Xan, Cer 8 (7028.‘THE SOPHISTS a5 From what as been sid tis clear that Sophism does not daciove any sweeping condemnation. By tuning the attention {P&inkers to man hint the thinking and wiling subject, i Meds a transition stage to the great Platoni- Aristotelian ‘hevement. In allrding’s means of training and instruction, {failed s necessary task inthe politcal feof Grece, whe {fs Panbelenistic tendencies certainly stand to its credit “And vents sceptical and relativit tendencies, which were, aftr al, {Srgy the result of the breakdown of the older phosophy on the ove hand, and of a wider experience of human life on the tier, at least contributed to the raising of problems, even if Sopbiom itt was unable to solve these problems. Tt i not fap to discern the influence of Sophism in the Greek ama, €f, in Sophocles hymn to human achievement in the Antigone {Sin the theoretical discussions contained in play of Earp, fd in the works of the Greek historians, eg inthe celebrated Han dialogue in the pages of Thucydides. The term Sanur took some tine to acquire ts daparagng connotation, ‘The name pli by Herodotus to Solon and Pythagoras, by Androtion to the Seven Wise Men and to Socrates, by Lysis to Plato. Moreover, the older Sophists won for themselves general respect and ester, and, as historians have pointed out, were not inre- auetly selected a8 “ambassador” of thee respective cite, 2 fact which hardly" points to thir being or being regarded a= harlatans, Tt was oaly secondarily that the term "Sophist™ Secquired an unsavoury avout as in Plato; and in later times the tem seems to have reacqured a good sense, being aplicd to the profesor of rhetorie and prove water of the Empire, without the signfcance of quibbler or cheat. "tis particularly through the opposition to Socrates and Plato that the Sophist fave come into such depute thatthe word now usually ignies that, by false reasoning, some truth i iter refuted and made Aubious, or someting fle is proved and made plasible”” ‘On the other hand, the relativiom of the Sophiss, thei en- couragement of Eris, their lack of stable norms, ther acceptance of payment, and the hairepliting tendencies of certain Inter fs, justly to a great extent the disparaging signification of the term. For Plato, they are “shopkeepers with spiritual Yareand when Socrates is represented inthe Prolaoras® as ‘king’ Hippocrates, who wanted to receive intrtion fom "Me Mi Pa a86 Pras 8 tg 88.%6 ‘THE SOCRATIC PERIOD Protagoras, “Wouldn't you be ashamed to show yourself to the Greeks asa Sophist?”, Hippocrates answers: "Yer, truly, Socrates, Tam to say what Ithink.” We must, however, remember that Pato tends to bring out the bad side of the Sophists, largely because he had Socrates before his eyes, who had developed what was good in Sophism beyond all comparison with the achieve- meats ofthe Sophists themselvesCHAPTER XII, ‘SOME INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS 1, Protagoras ProraconAs was born, according to most authors, about 481 ‘ative of Abdera in Thrace," and seems to have come to Athens About the middle of the century. He enjoyed the favour of Pericles, and we are told that he was entrusted by that statesman with the task of drawing up a constitution for the Panhellenic ‘colony of Thur, which was founded in 444 2.0. He was aguin im Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 43t and. during the plague in 430, which caried off two of Peicies’ sons Diogenes Latrtus relates the story that Protagoras was indicted for blasphemy becaute of his book on the gods, but that he ‘ecaped from the city before tral and was drowned on the crossing to Stell, his book being burnt in the marketplace. This would hhave taken place at the time of the oligarchic revolt of the Four Hundred in qr1 nc. Bumet is inclined to regard the story a5, dubious, and hols that ifthe indictment did take place, then it smust have taken place before 42z, Professor Taylor agrees with Bart in rejecting the prsestion tory, but he does o because hae also agress with Burnet in accepting a much earlier date for the birth of Protagoras, namely 500 3.c. The two waiters rely on rato’ representation of Protagoras inthe dialogue of that name saan elderly man, atleast approaching 6s, in about the year 435. Prato “must have known whether Protagoras really belonged to the generation before Socrates, and could have no motive for imisrepreeatation on such a point” If this is correct, then we lught also to accept the statement in the Meno that Protagoras died in igh repute. The best-known statement of Protagoras is that contained in 1s work, “Adfier | KemsOaore: (ly), to the effect that "man isthe measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that they are not.”* There has been a con- siderable controversy a8 to the interpretation which should be Bt on this famous saying, some writers maintaining the view that by “man” Protagoras does not mean the individval man, lg 3095p es Dip Lats 8 $e" Pla 926 te8 ‘THE SOCRATIC PERIOD but man inthe specific sense. Tf this were so, then the meaning of the dictum would not be that “what appears to you to be ‘roe is true for you, and what appears to me to be true is true for me,” but rather that the community or group of the whole ‘human species isthe criterion and standard of truth. Controversy ‘has also turned round the question whether things—Xytpem— should be understood exclusively ofthe objects of sense-perception ‘or should be extended to cover the field of values a8 well This i dificult question and it cannot be discussed at length haere, but the present writer is not prepared to disregard the testimony of Plato in the Theaddis, where the Protagorean dictum, developed iti true, as Plato himself admits, i certainly Interpreted in the individvalistie sense in regard to sense- perception * Socrates observes that when the same wind is one of us may feel chily and the other not, or one may feel slightly chily and the other quite col, and asks if we should agree with Protagoras that the wind is cold to the one who fels hil and not tothe other. Iti quite clear that inthis passage Protagoras is interpreted as referring to the individual man, and not at all fo man in the specific sense. Moreover, it isto be noted that the Sophist is not depicted as saying that the wind merely appears chilly to the one and not to the other. Thus if T have ‘come in from a run in the rain on a cold day, and say that the ‘water is warm; while you, coming from a warm room, fel the sme water as cold, Protagoras would remark that neither of us {5 mistaken-the water is warm in reference to my sense-org3a, and is cold in reference to your sense-organ. (When it was objected to the Sophist that geometrical propositions are constant for all, Protagoras replied that in actual concrete realty there are ‘no geometrical lines or circles, s0 thatthe dificulty doesnot arise) ‘Against this interpretation appeal is made to the Prolegoras of Plato, where Protagoras isnot depicted as applying the dictom in an individualistic sense to ethical values. But even granting that Protagoras must be made consistent with himself, ts surely not necessary to suppose that what is true of the objects of ‘sense-pereeption is ipso facto true of ethical values. It may be ‘pointed out that Protagoras declares that man is the measure of sire are (all hing), otha if the individu fate pretation be acepted in regard tothe objects of Ft should also be extended fo ethical values and jodginents, and Sint agie1gha. Anat, Math, Ba, 97 grat a‘SOME INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS by that, conversely if itis not accepted in regard to ethical values ed juaements, it should not be accepted in regard to the objects Gf sense-prception: in other words, we are forced to choote between the Thesdetus and Protagoras, relying on the one and ‘ejecting the other. But in the frst place it is not certain that ‘rer zpnsémo is meant to include ethical values, and in the {cond place it might be well that the objects ofthe special senses tre of such character that they cana! become the subject of trae 4nd universal knowledge, while onthe other hand ethical values ire of such a kind that they cam become the subject of true and “iiversal knowledge. This was the view of Plato himself, who ‘connected the Protagorean saying with the Heraclitean doctrine of fx, and held that true and certain knowledge can only be had of the supersensible, We are not trying to make out that Protagoras held the Platonic view on ethical values, which he 4id not, but to point out that sense-prception and intuition of values do not aecssarly stand or fll together in relation to certain knowledge and truth fo all ‘What, then, was Protagoras’ actual teaching in regard to ethical judgments and values? Ta the Theaeetus he is depicted assaying both that ethical judgments are relative “Por I hold that what= fever practices seem right and laudable to any particular State ‘are 30 for that State, s0 long as it holds by them") and that the ‘wise man should attempt to substitute sound. practices for tunsound.! In other words, there is no question of one ethical View being true and another false, but there is question of one lew being “sounder,” ie, mote usefal or expedient, than another. "In this way itis true both that some men are wiser than others and that no one thinks falsely." (A man who thinks that there {sno absolute truth, is hardly entiled to declare absolutely that “no one thinks falely.") Now, in the Protagores, Plato depicts ‘the Sophist as maintaining that «la and Ab, have been bestowed ‘on all men by the gods, ‘because cities could not exist if, ax in the case of other atts, few men only were partakers of them, 1s this at variance with what is said in the Theaeteus? Tt would Appear that what Protagoras means is this: that Law in general {s founded on certain ethial tendencies implanted in all men, Dat that the individual varieties of Law, as found in particular States, ae relative, the law of one State, without being “truer” than that of another State, being perhaps “sounder” in the sense~ THE SOCRATIC PERIOD ‘of more useful or expedient. The State or city-commanity would be the determiner of law in this case and not the individual, but the relative character of concrete ethical judgments and concrete determinations of Nomos would be maintained. As an upholder ‘of ‘tradition and social convention, Protagoras stresses the importance of education, of imbibing the ethical traditions ofthe State, while admitting that the wise man may lead the State to “better” laws. As far as the individual citizen is concerned, he should cleave to tradition, to the acepted code ofthe community and that all the more because no one “way” is truer than fapother. ig and Bin incline him to ths, and if he has no share in these gifts of the gods and refuses to hearken to the State, the State must get rid of him, While at fist sight, therefor, the “relativistic” doctrine of Protagoras might seem intentionally revolutionary, it turns out to be used in support of tradition and, authority. No one code is “truer” than another, therefore do not fet up your private judgment against the law of the State Moreover, through his conception of aidic and Mey Protagoras gives at least some hints of the unwritten or natural law, and in this respect contributed to the broadening of the Greek outlook. ‘In a Work, Map ein, Protagoras said" “With regard to the sods, T cannot fel sure either that they are or that they are not, for what they ate like in Sgure; for there are many things that the obscurity of the subject and the This is the only fragment of the work that we possess. Sach a sentence might Seem to lend colour to the picture of Protagoras as a sceptical and destructive thinker, ‘who turned his critical powers against all established tradition in ethics and religion; but such a view does not agree with the impression of Protagoras which we reeive from Plato's dialogue fof that name, and would doubtless be mistaken. Just as the ‘moral to be drawn from the relativity of particular codes of law is that the individual should submit himself to the traditional ‘education, so the moral to be drawn from our uncertainty con- cerning the gods and their nature ie that we should abide by the religion of the city. If we cannot be certain of absolute truth, ‘hy throw overboard the religion that we inherit from our fathers? Moreover, Protagoras’atitude isnot so extraordinary or destruc tive as the adherents of a dogmatic religion might naturally ‘suppose, since, as Burnet remarks, Greek religion did not consist vg‘SOME INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS ow vig theological affrmations or negations” but in worship! The cect ofthe Sophists its true, would have been to weaken men's {rast in tradition, but it would appear that Protagoras personally fas conservative in temper and had no intention of educating ‘evelotionaries; on the contrary, he professed to educate the good Guzen. There are ethical tendencies in all men, but these can ‘evlop ony inthe organised community: if a man isto be a good citizen, therefore, he must absorb the whole social tradition of the community of which he is a member. The social tradition is fot absolote truth, but itis the norm for a good citizen "From the relativistic theory it follows that on every subject more than one opinion is posible, and Protagoras seems to have ‘developed this point in his"Awdori. The daletician and ehetori- ‘dan il practise himself in the art of developing different opinions and arguments, and he will shine most brightly when he fceseds ie frou Myon sptr mes. The enemies of the Sophists interpreted this in the sense of making the morally worse cause to prevail? but it does not necessarily possess this morally destructive sense. A lawyer, for example, who pleaded with success the just cause of a client who was too weak to protect Iimelf or the justice of whose cause it was dificult to substan- tiate, might be said to be making the “weaker argument” preva, though Be would be doing nothing immoral. In the hands of ‘nserupalous rhetorcans and devotees of eristic, the maxim cexally acquired an unsavoury favour, but there is no reason to father on Protagoras himself a desire to promote unscrupalous dealing, Still it eannot be denied that the doctrine of relativism, when linked up with the practice of dialectic and eristic, very naturally produces a desire to succeed, without much regard for ‘truth or justice. Protagoras wat a pioneer inthe study and science of grammat. He is said to have casified the diferent kinds of sentence? and to have distinguished terminologically the genders of nouns.* In fan amusing passage of the Clouds Aristophanes depicts the Sophist as coining the feminine ‘aecplave from the masculine "wea (cock) 1. Prodicus Prodicus came from the island of Ceos in the Aegean. The GPL pay AAienh nds eB, $e ants@ ‘THE SOCRATIC PERIOD inhabitants of this sland were sad to be pessimistially incline, and Prodicus was credited with the tendencies af his countrymen, for in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Ariochus he is credited with holding that death is desirable inorder to escape the evils of life Fear of death isirational, since death concerns neither the living nor the dead-—the frst, because they are stl ving, the second, Decause they are not living any more. The authenticity of this Quotation isnot easy to establish Prodicus is pethaps chiefly remarkable for his theory on the covign of religion. He held that in the beginning men worshipped as gods the sun, moon, rivers, lakes, fruits, etein other words, ‘he things which were useful to them and gave them food. And he gives as an example the cult of the Nie in Egypt. This prii- tive stage was followed by another, in which the inventors of various arte agriculture, viniulture, metal work, and s0 on— were worshipped as the gods Demeter, Dionysus, Hephaestus, ete. On this view of religion prayer’ would, he thought, be Superfivous, and he seems to have got into trouble with the authorities at Athens.* Prodicu, like Protagoras, was noted for Tinguistic stdies* and he wrote a treatise on synonyms. He seems ‘tw have been very pedantic in his forms of expression.¢ (Professor Zeller says* “Although Plato usually treats him with irony, st nevertheless speaks well for him that Socrates ‘occasionally recommended pupils to him (Theat, x5tb), and that his native city repeatedly entrusted him with diplomatic misions spp. Maj., 282 0." As a matter of fact, Zeller seems to have ‘missed the point in the Theadtetus passage, since the young men that Socrates has sent to Prodieus are thove who, he has found, have not been “pregnant” with thoughts when in his company” Hr has accordingly sent them off to Prodicus, in whose company they have ceased to be "barren.") im. Hippias Hippias of Elis was a younger contemporary of Protagoras and was etlebrated particularly for his versatility, being acquainted with mathematic, astronomy, grammar and rhetoric, hythmics and harmony, history and literature and mythology —in short, he was a true Polymath. Not only that, but when present at a certain Olympiad, he boasted that he had made’all his owa Vysen nes AEE Cay HCL Pte a7‘SOME INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS 3 cdothes. His list of the Olympic victors laid the foundation for {he later Greek system of dating by means of the Olympiads (rst Ieodced by the historian Timaeus). Plato in the Protagorat, fuakes him say that “law being the tyrant of men, forces them {o do many things contrary to nature."* The point seems to be that the law of the eity-atate i often narrow and tyrannical and ft variance with the natural aw (tyme). 1, Gorgias Gorgias of Leonia, n Sil, lived from aboot 483 375 Be, and in the year 427 he came to Athens as ambassador of Leotin in order toa fo help against Syracase On his travels he di hat he could to spre the spit of Penhellesism Gocpas sums to have ben at fist a pupil of Empedocles, and tohave busied himself with question of natral scene, ahd may avewritena book on Optics. He was led, however, to serpicism ty the dalectic of Zeno and publiahed a work entitled Ox Not Being er Nature (Ue ro wh be tina), the chet ideas of which can be gatheced from Sextus Empircus and from the pendo-Aristotlan writing On Mais, Xenophanes and Gorgias From these accounts ofthe contents of Goria’ work ft clear that he reacted to the Bleatic dialectic somewhat diferenty to Protagors, since while the later might be sid to old that cverything ite, Gorgias maintained the very opposite. Accord ing to Gocpan, () Nothing exit, for if there were anything then it would have either to be ete or to have come into being. Buti cannot have come into being, for nether out of Being nor out of Not-eing can anything come to be. Nor can it be eternal, for if were eteraa then it would Bave to be {nfite. But the infinite is impossible for the following reason 1K could not bein another, nor could it be in itself therefore it would be nowhere. But what i nowhere, is nothing” (i If there vere anything, thn it could not be known. Fer if there s know ledge ‘of being, then what is thought most be, and Novbeing could not be thought at al Tn which ease there could be no itor, which is absurd (il) Even i there were knowledge of bring, this knowledge could not be imparted. Every sign i diferent from the thing signed; eg how could we impart lnowiedge of colours by word, since the ear beats tones and At colours? "And how could the sume representation of being on “es” THE SOCRATIC PERIOD be in the two pertons at once, snc they ae diferent from one other? "While some have regarded these astonishing ideas as expressing 4 teriouly meant piowphcal Nilism, other bave thought that the doctrine coetitues a joke onthe part of Gorgias, or Father, that the great rhetoric wanted to\sbow that thelr Or the skilful use of words was able to make plausible even the ‘mort absurd hypothesis. (Se H. Gompere) ‘But this ater vew Hardly agrees withthe fst that Tocrats seta Gorgias’ opiions {nsdn thove of Zeno and Meliss, nor withthe wring Tp st Tap, hich treats Gorgias’ opinions as worth « phiesophical Crrucam-* Ta any ease a treat on Natore would scarcely be the place for sich thetoricalturs de fre On the other and {tis ical to suppose tht Goria held in ll seriousness that othing exist It may be that he wished to employ the Eleatie dialectic inorder to rede the Eleatie phlsaphy € abeurdty.* Afterwards, renouncing philosophy, he devoted himself to thetoric. ‘oetorcl art was feared by Gorgias asthe mastery ofthe artof persuasion, and this neessarly led hi to 8 atody of Practical payehlogy. He deliberately practised the art of foge feston ern which cou be aed bor fr practical ends, fed and bad, ad for artic purposes. tn convertion with the Inter Gorgas develope the aft of junifiable deception (te “ent, ealing a tragedy “a deception which i better to exec ‘Saavot to eae fo succumb fo it shows greter powers of attic epreiation than not to."" Gorgias’ comparon of the tet of tragedy to those of purgatives reminds sof Araote's ‘och-dsconed doctrine of te slnne "he fact that Plato places the mightevight doctrine in the south of Calls * wile another dine, Lycopron, asserted {bat nobility isa sham and that all men ate equal, and that the law isa contract by whic right is mutually guaranteed while Yet another cp demanded the iteration of slaves in the ane of ratral lw? we may ascribe with Zeler to Gorgas! Teaupdiation of philosophy, which led him to decline to answer of erath and morality* ‘Other Sophias whom one may briefly mention re Trasymachus Epa coon "ete ome RR Ba ht a 9 MS‘SOME INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS: 5 cof Chaleedon, who is presented in the Republic as the brutal ‘champion ofthe rights ofthe stronge,t and Antiphon of Athens, Grho asterts the equality of all men and denounces the dis. {inction between nobles and commons, Greeks and barbarians, a5 fist a barbarism. He made education tobe the most important thing in Ie, and created the literary genre of Teg Slag Mrs ‘eonufnewa, declaring that he could [ee anyone from sorrow by oral means.* vy, Sophism In conclusion I may observe again that there is no reason for accribing to the great Sopbists the intention of overthrowing ‘eligion and morality; men like Protagoras and Gorgias had no such end in Indeed, the great Sophists favoured the ‘conception of @ “natural lw,” and tended to broaden the outlook of the ordinary Greek citizen; they were an educative fore in “Ellas. At the same time it is true that “ina certain sense every opinion is true, according to Protagoras; every opinion is false, according to Gorgas."* This tendency to deny the absolute and objective character of truth easily lads tothe consequence that, instead of trying to convince anyone, the Sophst will try t0 fersuade him or talk him over. Indeed, in the hands of lesser zen Sophism soon acquired an unpleasant connotation—that of “Sophistry.”” While one can only respect the cosmopolitan and broad ontlook of an Antiphon of Athens, one can only con- demn the “Mightis-Right” theory of a Thrasymachus on the cove hand and the hair-splitting and quibbling of a Dionysodorus fon the other. The great Sophists, as we have said, were an ‘educative force in Hellas; but one ofthe chief factors in the Greek ‘education which they fostered was rhetoric, and rhetoric had its ‘obvious dangers, inasmuch a the orator might easily tend to pay ‘more attention to the rhetorical presentation of a subject than to the subject itself. Moreover, by questioning the absolute foundations of traditional institutions, beliefs and ways of lif, Sophism tended to forter a relativistic attitude, though the evi latent in Sophism lay not so much in the fact that it raised Problems, as in the fact that it could not offer any satisfactory Intellectual solution to the problems it raised. Against this rla- tivism Socrates and Plato reacted, endeavouring to establish the ‘Sure foundation of true knowledge and ethical judgments. Sips a98e. | ACL Pat apd Dale Prag 4 and B76 1 Ussecueg recepCHAPTER XIV SOCRATES 1 Early Life of Socrates Tne death of Socrates fell in the year 399 B.C, and as Plato tells us that Socrates was seventy years old or a litle more at the time of his death, he must have been born about 470 9.6 He was the son of Sophroniseas and Phaenarete of the Antiochid tuibe and the deme of Alopecse. Some have said that his father was a worker in stone,* but A. E, Taylor thinks, with Burnet ‘that the story was a misunderstanding which arose from a playful reference inthe Euthyphro to Daedalus a the ancestor of Socrates In any case, Socrates does not seem to have himself followed his, father’s trade, ift was his father’s trade, and the group of Graces ‘on the Akropolis, which were later shown asthe work of Socrates, ae attributed by archaeologists to an easier sculptor. Socrates Cannot, however, have come from a very poor family, as we find bim later serving as a fullyarmed hoplite, and he must have been left sufcient patrimony to enable him to undertake such 4 service. Phaenatete, Socrates’ mother, is described in the Theactetus' as a midiwife, but even if she was, this should not be taken to imply that she was a profesional midwife in the modera sense, as Taylor points out.* Socrates’ early life thus fll in the (eat flowering of Athenian splendour. The Persians had been defeated at Plataea in 479 and Aeschylus had produced the Persae in 472: Sophocles and Euripides were still boys.’ Moreover, ‘Athens had already laid the foundation of her maritime empire In Plato's Symposium Alcibiades describes Socrates as looking like a satyr or Silenus* and Aristophanes said that he strutted SEES te cm rei ty or BEDE nuts hat “ame yt te note Abo we‘SOCRATES 7 suc wel nd tee at fling pe Ba we Shaheed af pr eo iy ooo oleae ia 2 entree het 2 elt nds sn ote he bat gang Enea cis Alege td et kN ea es patent gy SuSoerr Pow me th pen ar he ea STyettesy menage ena om ha mets" Pe ee Spin ate wae age fiefs oe ig ew aya ng aha orn tpg tee a wae Ts hn sate stn fp St wel ‘isin ity a ty rege se cco ae ‘Siem onan oat poten penne SESE ec me ct Caen penn SLSST ue sey eg athe "eat mento Se Syoti wold Ska at ap a gfe rapture in the mystico-religious sense,* though such a prolonged: ef tatacton wo sb cron hee Sens mm ly hit a we ave sgt elt oye Se enol eons henson al, er an at Sica an tpg bel deol Est Wat Oe pulaoplaot achat rg of apna, Epics en Tp tit Scr ot dey t meme! he Se Aco he cao Heston i any cue Sat aly sed 2p ens tae. Popeye dee mer he ns pnp Serre 2 se ight he pe he Asg 9p Mid isnt cue of sta ard oe Deh Se ge, Sue anes nota of Spe the ir wei hw Mad won vera Stina gr het What scaly oun a Aras cd Med ery mer oe te ven vent ngs danppnt Scat on wm Sinai unto i nd Pry eh cond toad tens eet cnn peopl Gece rte ye yaeesaneyre ee ro SY Raratrreanp et se- ‘THE SOCRATIC PERIOD A. E. Taylor conjectures that on Archelaus’ death, Socrates, was to all intents and purposes his successor." He tries to support this contention with the aid of Aristophanes’ play. The Clouds where Socrates and his associates of the notiontactory of Spnmainan are represented as addicted tothe natural sciences and 4 holding the air-doctrine of Diogenes of Apollonia * Socrates Gisclaimer, therefore, that he ever took "pupils"? would, if ‘Taylor's conjecture be correct, mean that he had taken no paying pupils. He had had tiga, but had never had yabyat Against this it may be urged that in the Apology Socrates expressly declares: "But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that T have rothing to do with physical specuations."« Te true that at the time when Socrates was depicted as speaking in the Apology he had fong ago given up cosmologieal speculation, and that his ‘words do not necessarily imply that he never engaged in such “Speculations; indeed, we knov fora fact that he did: but i seme to the present writer that the whole tone of the passage militates Againat the idea that Socrates was ever the professed head of a ‘School dedicated to this kind of speculation. What is said in the Apology certainly doesnot prove, n the strict sens, that Socrates Gras not the head of euch @ School before hie “conversion,” but, it would seem that the natural interpretation is that he never occupied such a postion ‘The “conversion” of Socrates, which brought about the definite change to Socrates the ironic moral philosopher, seems to have ‘been due to the famous incident of the Delphic Oracle, Chaerephon, a devoted friend of Socrates, asked the Oracle if there wat any ‘man living who was wiser than Socrates, and received the answer "No." This set Socrates thinking, and he came tothe conclton that the god meant that he was the wisest man because he recognised his own ignorance. He then carne to conceive of his ‘mission as being to seek for the stable and certain truth, true ‘wisdom, and to enlist the aid of any man who would consent to listen to him.* However strange the story of the Oracle may appear, it most probably really happened, since itis unlikely that Plato would have put a mere invention int the mouth of Socrates In a dialogue which obviously purports to give an historical account ofthe trial of the philosopher, expecially asthe Apology is of early date, and many who knew the facts were sil living Socrates’ marriage with Xanthippe is best known for the stories Srp 67 "Clade 26. Af 9. Apo 19 Apa, 208