Journalism

http://jou.sagepub.com/

Combining the representation approach with the framing concept: Television news coverage of the Arab population in Israel during conflict
Eli Avraham and Anat First Journalism 2010 11: 481 DOI: 10.1177/1464884910367594 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jou.sagepub.com/content/11/4/481

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for Journalism can be found at: Email Alerts: http://jou.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://jou.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://jou.sagepub.com/content/11/4/481.refs.html

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Article

Combining the representation approach with the framing concept: Television news coverage of the Arab population in Israel during conflict
Eli Avraham Anat First

Journalism 11(4) 481499 The Author(s) 2010 Reprints and permission: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1464884910367594 http://jou.sagepub.com

University of Haifa, Israel

Netanya Academic College, Israel

Abstract This article examines the portrayal of Israels Arab population in the Hebrew media, with particular attention to coverage by the national television channels of two violent incidents: events surrounding the first Land Day (30 March 1976) and events of the protests in October 2000, at the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Our purpose is twofold: first, to explore how Israeli Arabs are portrayed during violent conflict, and, second, to examine the means of presentation in terms of a time frame, in accordance with the view that the presentation process is dynamic. The research relied primarily on qualitative analysis of media content, but attention was also paid to the quantitative aspects of the coverage. Here we used two complementary theories the representation approach and the framing concept. At the core of both these theories lies the constructionist approach, which serves as their point of origin. Keywords Arab population in Israel, constructionist approach, media frame, representation, the other, TV news In this article, we examine whether changes in the symbolic reality affect the representation of the other, and whether moving from an environment with one governmental TV channel to a multi-channel environment renders the other more visible. To do so, we compare the representation of Israels Arab population in Hebrew television news coverage
Corresponding author: Eli Avraham, Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel. Email: eavraham@com.haifa.ac.il

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

482

Journalism 11(4)

of two local ethnic conflicts: the first Land Day in 1976, a time when Israel had only one TV channel, and the October 2000 protests, when the multi-channel environment had become a reality. Both events are perceived as milestones for Israeli society in general and for the ArabJewish conflict in particular. As such, they are particularly illuminating, for it is well known that people tend to rely on the media more during times of conflict, and the medias contribution to the social construction of reality is thus enhanced at these times (Avraham and Ketter, 2008; Weimann, 2000; Wolfsfeld et al., 2000). Our investigation attempts to integrate two complementary theories the representation approach and framing theory that have rarely been interlinked. At the core of both theories lies the constructionist approach, which is derived from the phenomenological approach and serves as their point of origin. Both theories are influenced by the input of social-political reality, as well as symbolic reality and the interaction between the two. Moreover, framing is the outcome of modes of representation, and vice versa. Both theories are fundamental parts of a process whereby meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture in these two realities. Despite the two theories similar origins, until now the research dealing with representation has focused primarily on the coverage patterns of minorities and marginal groups in the media content; research on framing, on the other hand, lately relates more to organizational levels (Avraham, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Wolfsfeld et al., 2000). In this article, we combine both of these theories. Based primarily on a qualitative analysis of Israeli television news, the aim of this study is twofold: to examine the representation of the other the Arab population in Israel which in times of violent conflict is perceived as a threat by the Jewish population; and to examine changes in news representation over time, as we believe that representation is a dynamic process influenced by a changing reality, both social and symbolic. Two major events related to Israels Arab population have been chosen as the focus of this study. The first, Land Day, occurred on 30 March 1976, when the Israeli government announced its plans to confiscate land belonging to Arab citizens living in the Galilee in northern Israel. Violent clashes erupted, leaving six Arabs dead and many more injured. In the years since these events, this date has become a symbol of Arab commemoration and unity, and a time in which demands for social, political, and economic equality are raised (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1999; Wolfsfeld et al., 2000). The second event, the October 2000 protests, followed a visit by then Opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, an act that preceded the Al-Aqsa Intifada in the Occupied Territories. On 1 October, the Arab population in Israel commenced protests against that act. Those events quickly developed into widespread, violent clashes that lasted 10 days, leaving 13 Arab Israeli citizens dead and many more injured. During both of these events, the Arab population not only expressed objections to the specific actions of the Israeli government, but also protested against a lack of resources and ongoing inequality and discrimination (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 2002).

Minority representation, stereotypes, and media frames

Representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to Other people Representation is an essential part of a process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

483

(Hall, 1997: 15). Representation is considered both a process of ongoing construction of identities in any given culture, and a stereotyping force (Grossberg et al., 1998). Stereotyping reduce[s] people to a few, simple, essential characteristics, which are represented as fixed by nature (Hall, 1997: 257). Thus, stereotyping fixes differences. Moreover, stereotyping deploys a strategy of splitting: it separates the normal and the acceptable from the abnormal, and then excludes or expels anything that does not fit or is different. Since it tends to occur where there are gross inequalities of power (Hall, 1997), stereotyping is a classification system that also serves as a regulator in the maintenance of the social and symbolic order. The media exercise a regime of stereotyping by distorting the social reality of a certain social group into a media image. Thus, the consequence of stereotyping has real and tangible effects (Grossberg et al., 1998: 224). Researchers investigating media coverage of minority groups have found that, in most cases, these groups have been ignored or portrayed negatively. Such coverage implies that the other represents a threat to the social order. In addition, implicit in this coverage is the notion that minorities are to blame for their economic and social maladies maladies that arise from the fact that they are different from us. The description, coverage, and portrayal of the other in the media, whether based on religious, national, ethnic or other differences, is accompanied in many countries by the widespread use of generalizations and stereotypes, and ignores the background, causes, and social-political context that have led to the difficulties and crises involving minorities (Avraham, 2003; First, 2001; Jakubowicz et al., 1994; Weimann, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 1997). The media help us construct our perceptions of conflicts involving the others, who are a summation of those individuals making up the groups engaged in conflict. Our use of the term construction suggests that news is in fact stories created within a specific narrative frame, which arranges and places daily events in a wider context (Wolfsfeld, 1997). The news constantly presents verbal definitions and graphic images concerning various groups and social identities, and thus constructs for us the viewers our identification with a certain group, our perceptions of us and them (Kellner, 1995), and our conscious grasp of our nationality, which is also an artificial cultural creation (Anderson, 1991). The representation process is influenced by both the social-political reality and the symbolic reality within which the process exists (Adoni and Mane, 1984). The socialpolitical reality is influential in two respects. First, the occurrence of events in a given time and place (for example, the eruption of a conflict) intensifies both polarization between us and them and uniformity within each group (First, 2001, 2002). Second, the relation between the government and the media powerfully impacts on viewers as well (Caspi and Limor, 1999). The symbolic reality, within which the representation process occurs, consists of various methods of expression, among them literature, art, and media including the news, the central site in which our political/social/economic agenda is constructed. Symbolic reality is also influential in two respects. First, the various news channels present a multitude of images. Second, the very process by which the news is constructed, including media routines and processes for encoding information (e.g. who covers the others, who interprets their actions), impacts on the end product.

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

484

Journalism 11(4)

The discussion of media frames constitutes the link between various fields of research regarding representation, or, in other words, between processes and products, because a dialectical relationship exists between the two. While different definitions of media frames exist (e.g. Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980), all suggest that framing involves the placing of facts or components perceived as reality inside frames that provide coherence, through a causal explanation, a moral statement, or a recommendation for a solution. A media frame can be identified through journalists use of metaphors, key sentences, and symbolic verbal and graphic means, with various people and interest groups constantly battling for control over media frames most suitable to their needs. According to Liebes (1997), framing includes the following mechanisms: excising, sanitizing, equalizing, personalizing, demonizing, and contextualizing. The media carry out their role as an ideological instrument by shaping, distributing, and reproducing the limits of legitimate discourse. News people make use of available framing mechanisms and social-cultural codes to turn uncommon, extraordinary events into understandable media events (Gitlin, 1980). Media organizations are constantly involved within a changing social-political environment, making representation a dynamic process. In this environment, cultural suppositions regarding societys central values influence news peoples work patterns, news production processes, and the end result (Avraham, 2002; Gitlin, 1980; Herzog and Shamir, 1994; Wolfsfeld et al., 2000). News people thus prefer stories that are recognized as efficient and receive professional approval, as well as stories that are culturally acceptable. Editors are influenced by the perceptions they hold of their target audience, and they tend to believe that the majority group has little interest in minorities unless their actions might interfere with the majoritys day-to-day life (Avraham, 2002).

From 1976 to 2000: changes in the Israeli landscape Changes in the social-political reality
Israeli society has undergone major changes in the specified time frame (from 1976 to 2000). A review of all of these changes is obviously beyond the scope of this article, but we briefly examine those most relevant for our analysis. On the IsraeliArab front, peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan were signed and mutual recognition agreements were signed with the PLO. However, wars were fought with Lebanon and Iraq, and two Palestinian uprisings in the Occupied Territories erupted. On the local front, the Labor Partys political dominance came to an end in 1977. Various ethnic groups have begun wrestling over their identities, and the first sprouts of a civilian society have sprung up (Timm, 2001). Cracks have begun to appear in the hegemony of secular, western-like Israeliness, and as a result various separatist, nearly autonomous (though co-dependent) cultures have emerged or undergone significant changes. One such culture is Arab Israeli society. The identity of the Arab citizens of Israel comprises two chief components: the civil identity, which derives from the status of being an Arab and a citizen of the state (Israeliness); and the national identity, which is the result of the national belonging of the Arab citizens of Israel to the Palestinian people who live in the Gaza Strip and the

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

485

Occupied Territories (Palestinization) and the Arab world. In view of this aspect the Israeliness of this group has been discussed and rediscussed, and is manifested primarily in their formal status they constitute approximately 18 percent of the population of the citizens of Israel. This means that they are subject to the laws of the state, participate in elections and have a well-developed sense of democracy and civil rights. This Israeliness is also manifested in the Israeli lifestyle. Nevertheless, the Arabs Israeliness is flawed on at least two counts. First, they live on the periphery of Israeli society, and thus constitute a sociological minority, i.e. they have no influence on the majority of consequential spheres of life. Second, their interpretation of their citizenship is incompatible with the accepted Jewish interpretation of loyalty to the State and identification with its character and Jewish symbols (Ghanem and Ositzky-Lazar, 2001). The most significant changes in Arab Israeli society relevant to our discussion include the modernization of education and economics (Al-Haj, 2000; Kimmerling and Migdal, 1999) a deep process of politicization that has included changes in voting patterns and the development of national organizations and political parties and an increasing process of Palestinization. In other words, the Palestinian-national identity has been strengthened among the Arabs in Israel (Al-Haj, 2000). Largely due to Palestinization, the majority Jewish group still views the Arabs as threatening and alien to the state (Ghanem and Ositzky-Lazar, 2001).

Changes in the symbolic reality

Throughout most of Israels existence, the media have acted much like governmental media in non-democratic nations and operated under a variety of self-imposed restrictions (Caspi and Limor, 1999). The main cause of these restrictions has been the ArabIsraeli conflict. In times of war, the media have adhered to national goals and have consistently covered the conflict from a nationalistic viewpoint (Liebes, 1997), taking upon themselves the role of mobilizing and recruiting the nation (Avraham, 2001; Caspi and Limor, 1999). Israeli media have undergone dramatic changes, however, since the 1970s. The first Land Day events occurred when television broadcasting was monopolized by the Israeli Broadcasting Authority (IBA). The sole television channel operated under the guidelines of the Broadcasting Authority Legislation, which, while formally ensuring journalistic independence, meant all broadcasting was in fact conducted under the watchful eye of the government. This fact accentuated the hegemonic nature of the one television channel, which at times earned 90 percent of the market share. In the early 1990s, the global media revolution reached Israel and the one-channel environment transformed into a multi-channel reality. At this time, cable television was first introduced (it did not broadcast news and current events), and in 1993 Channel 2 began broadcasting officially. This revolution changed the viewing habits of the Israeli audience: viewing time increased and there were now more television sets in more homes. The newscasts on Channel 2 became the most popular, undergoing a process of aestheticization and subjectivization and adapting a style that was light, succinct, clip-like, spontaneous and perceived as expressing a new kind of pluralism. The news company responsible for producing the newscasts on the new channel developed the magazine-like aspect of the program on live broadcasts (Caspi and Limor, 1999; Yuran, 2001).

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

486

Journalism 11(4)

The fact that several channels were now competing for the audiences attention meant that they were forced to look for the most significant stories, whereas earlier, unilateral coverage patterns required less ambitious reporting. In addition, the audience became aware of the many different channels of information, and thus expected more diversified coverage.

Method Research questions

Two main research questions lie at the heart of this study: 1 How are Israeli Arabs presented in Israeli television news during the eruption of a national-ethnic conflict? More specifically, how was the Israeli Arab population portrayed on the one existing television channel during the Land Day events, and on the two main channels during the October 2000 protests? 2 Have changes occurred in these modes of representation over the years, and, if so, how can these changes be explained?

Research method
Our original plan was to use both qualitative and quantitative research methods, but since only 10 relevant items were found from TV coverage of the 1976 events, we were forced to diminish the weight of the quantitative component. Quantitative content analysis was conducted only for the 181 items relating to the October 2000 events. The primary methodology used in our analysis was thus qualitative content analysis. Researchers using this method believe that texts reveal general discourse patterns (Pauly, 1991) through the appearance of motifs, characteristics, labels, definitions, stereotypes, and generalizations, presented in the media as exclusively characterizing specific social groups (Dahlgren and Chakrapani, 1982). Using qualitative content analysis, general patterns of discourse characteristic of the Arab populations coverage were extracted from 191 television news items. These patterns were identified on the basis of the theoretical framework already discussed, and concerned questions such as framing, inclusion or exclusion, objectification or subjectification, context, the dominant voice heard, sources of information, and the reporters nationality. The qualitative analysis referred to both text and image, based on the approach that images cannot be understood without their captions (Schudson, 1995). In order to assist with the measurement of representation and framing, a coding system consisting of the following variables was constructed: channel, date, items order in newscast, item type, items presence in the newscast headlines, item length, reporter, reporters nationality, reporters field of expertise, location where the event occurred, events classification, sources quoted, use of the name of the Arab victim, description of the Arab victim, terminology used to identify the group, characterization of the Arabs mentioned in the item, linking of the event to civil protest, terrorist activities, the Arab world, or the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, mentioning the historical background or

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

487

the groups demands, and the main topics of the item. The minimal rate of agreement for all the coding page questions was 85 percent, and the average was 93 percent. In order to achieve this rate of agreement, three judges were trained in advance, and several pre-tests were conducted.

The sample population

1 Media the items analyzed were televised reports from news programs broadcast on Israels Channel 1 (7:30 and A View to the News) and Channel 2 (The News) that directly referred to the Arab population in Israel. Overall, 10 items from Channel 1 were analyzed for 1976, and 181 items from Channel 1 and Channel 2 were analyzed for October 2000. 2 Time frame the analysis was conducted for all items broadcast on news programs during the two weeks following the events, for both television channels in 2000, and for Channel 1 in 1976.

Results
In order to compare the two events, we selected several criteria which serve both theories (framing and representation) on which to focus. These criteria are the salience of coverage, methods for constructing the groups delegitimization, the identity of the sources quoted, the identity of the demons, the reporters nationality, the identification of the victims, and the mentioning of the historical/social context. We believe that the combination of framing criteria and representation criteria significantly improves the research of images of groups, issues and places by making it broader and more practical.

Coverage salience
1976 Land Day. The most accurate term with which to describe the depiction of events on Israeli television is symbolic extinction. In fact, this case can serve as an ideal type of representation theory (Hall, 1997). Only 10 relevant items were broadcast, and the total time devoted to coverage of the day preceding Land Day and the following two weeks did not exceed 30 minutes. Most of the longer items consisted of studio interviews, and the few that involved on-the-scene coverage were extremely short, usually no more than a few seconds long. October 2000 protests. No significant differences were found between Channels 1 and 2 with regard to the nature of coverage. From a quantitative viewpoint, however, 118 relevant news items were found on Channel 1, and only 63 such items were found on Channel 2. As we can see in Table 1, each item averaged approximately two minutes in length. Interviews, known to be the most common format on newscasts (Schudson. 1995), appeared in only one-third (37 of 118) of the items on Channel 1, whereas on-thescene stories accounted for approximately half of the items (63). On Channel 2, the frequency of interviews was even lower, and accounted for approximately one-fifth of the

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

488

Journalism 11(4)

Table 1.The differences between the coverage of the October 2000 protests by channel 1 and 2 Channel 1 Channel 2

Number of news items 118 63 Average item length (seconds) 120 120 Number of items with interviews 37 14 On-the-scene stories 63 32 Items with interpretations and in-depth analysis 11 14

items (14 of 63). Here too approximately half (32) of all items were on-the-scene stories. Items with interpretations and in-depth analysis were twice as common on Channel 2 11 such items appeared on Channel 1 (9%), and 14 such items were broadcast on Channel 2 (22%).

Delegitimization, alienation, and the law and order syndrome

1976 Land Day. The most prominent feature of coverage was the alienation of the Arab citizens and the negation of their legitimate civil right to strike. The news items preceding Land Day cast doubts as to the degree to which the Arabs would participate in the strike, while the causes of the strike were completely disregarded. No mention of the expropriation of land was made, and the focus was on the possible damage the strike might cause and on demonizing the strikes organizers the Israeli Communist Party. Thus, for example, a Channel 1 report from 29 March 1976 described the efforts made by a Communist Party activist to recruit residents for a strike that might or might not take place. The reporter ended his story by describing the suffering that the residents might have to endure and belittling the strikes significance, thereby impugning its legitimacy. The reporter did so by raising two arguments: (1) The planned strike has another side: the question of public services; and (2) The intention is to carry out the strike on the shoulders of women and children, a strike that will be extensive but restrained. The police, in any case, are preparing for other possibilities, for the instigation of emotions. In this case, one can expect the presence of the keepers of the law. The strike was thus framed as an act of disobedience against the public interest, and described as an act by women and children powerless members of society. In addition, the strike was transformed into a standard law and order event one that requires the mobilization of security forces due to the threat it poses. This, too, circumscribes the legitimacy of the event (Levy, 1991). The second report in the same newscast delegitimized the strike by placing it outside the sphere of political consensus. The correspondent conducted a four-minute interview with Shmuel Toledano (Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabins Advisor for Arab Affairs), in which delegitimization was achieved through a double contrast: first, the contrast between the official, state-sanctioned voice (Toledano) and the hopeless attempt by the Communist Party (which is located outside of the Jewish consensus) to take over the Arab street or, as stated by the correspondent: Should we interpret this as a demonstration of political power, whose intent is to demonstrate that there is another body representing Israeli Arabs? The second contrast was made between law-abiding Arabs (Local council

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

489

leaders who have decided by a vast majority to oppose the strike) and those Arabs attempting to harm the government (Tawfik Zayyad spoke of grasping the government by the throat and of some other severe measures). As in the first report, the goals of the strike could not be understood. On the day of the strike, we found four reports. The first stated that Only ten percent [of the workers] did not show up, some of them as a result of the curfew that was imposed on their villages tonight. They were replaced by Jewish workers. Viewers thus learned of the curfew almost accidentally, and there was no indication as to which villages had been placed under curfew or why this step was deemed necessary. Moreover, it was stated that the use of force was not required in cities and that [the police] could mobilize units as reinforcements for distant villages where riots occurred. The media thus enabled the government to place the events in a routine law and order context, eliminating the protest element. This approach was particularly noticeable in a report concerning a speech by Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur, who demanded that we should not overstate what happened, and downplayed the causes of the strike and its results. On the day following the strike, its occurrence and grave consequences (six Arab citizens were killed and many were injured or taken into custody) were barely mentioned. One vague reference was made in a report concerning a funeral march, in which village residents could be seen marching after a coffin calling with spirit and blood we will liberate the Galilee. This item included the following text:
With urgent cries of with spirit and blood we will liberate the Galilee, the residents of Kafr Kana brought Mohsen Hasan Marah to burial. The 15-year old boy was killed yesterday during riots in the village. Eight-thousand residents of Kafr Kana, all of them, circled the streets with the coffin, accompanying their march with calls condemning the expropriation of land. Due to a request by the village elders, and following their guarantee that order would be kept during the funeral, members of the police force or the military were not seen. Except for some inciting calls, there were no disturbances during the funeral march.

The most salient characteristic of this text is its vagueness. It remained unclear how the boy was killed, and hinted that he was not an innocent civilian. The contrast between us (security forces) and them (the rioters) is one of the central principles through which the law and order frame is established (Levy, 1991). This contrast is based on a differentiation between forms of violence: rioting by Israeli Arabs versus deployment of security forces. In this type of discourse, one need not question who should be held liable for the events depicted. The power of the report lies not in its images, but rather in the reporters interpretation as made evident by using terminology such as urgent cries or the conclusion: except for some inciting calls, there were no disturbances. Another means of delegitimization was through the negation of the causes of the strike. In a report broadcast on 6 April 1976, one reporter claimed that the city of Taiybe was flourishing despite having had its land expropriated, because its residents were bringing in money they had earned from working in Jewish cities. While images of residents depositing money in the local bank were shown, with prosperous villas in the background, the reporter proclaimed: The villas at the front of the village may arouse envy in the Jewish, mortgage-paying workers, living on several tens of square meters.

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

490

Journalism 11(4)

October 2000 protests. Most events covered were demonstrations with casualties, demonstrations with damage to property, riots, or funerals. In other words, most cases involved disorder events, with an emphasis on the conflicts gravity. In light of these data, the methods of reporting about casualties are mystifying. Only 14 of the items (11%) on Channel 1 mentioned casualties among Arab citizens, and even fewer (four items, 6%) mentioned them on Channel 2. Moreover, the casualties were commonly objectified, as most reports did not mention any biographical details, including the casualties place of residence, occupation, age, or name. Significantly, the name generally used to describe Arabs reflected the common terminology used by Jewish Israelis: the Arab population or Israeli Arabs. In only 3 percent of the items analyzed were the Arabs referred to as citizens. In general, the terminology used (e.g. curfew, isolation, angry mob, enemy) was reminiscent of that used during Israels War of Independence in 1948, thus framing the protest as an actual threat by the Arab population to the existence of the country. Some illuminating examples include the following statements: The center of Nazareth looked like a battlefield. Curfew on the Jewish cities (Channel 2, 3 October); The Beit Rimon junction was conquered by an angry mob (Channel 2, 1 October); Nazareth Illit is fortified; The war in the Galilee brought a self-imposed curfew on the residents of the nearby towns (Channel 2, 3 October). In order to ensure delegitimization, events were interpreted through the law and order frame. The best example of this was a statement by one of Israels senior analysts, Amnon Abramowitz (Channel 1, 2 October):
The most problematic issue is that of Israeli Arabs. It must be understood that no country, Arab or non-Arab, can allow a violent, incited public to take control of central traffic arteries, to take control of police stations, to set police stations on fire, and to injure law enforcers. I think we cannot live with this in the long term. And I dont even want to think of what methods Israel will have to use in order to curb this phenomenon.

Abramowitz appeared in this case to grant security forces symbolic permission to use any means necessary. Moreover, the Arabs loyalty to the state was questioned:
As to what happened this week, there is no other title than a violent attack on Israeli sovereignty in the State of Israel. When people in Jaffa scream, Go back to the countries where you came from, and in general scream that the Jews should be slaughtered, well thats a new story. (Channel 1, 6 October)

The medias embrace of the security forces viewpoint allowed them to support the suppression of Arab demonstrators and to identify with the difficulties faced by the police in their work. An interview conducted on Channel 2 (9 October) with Knesset Member Azmi Bishara, a representative of the Arab population, following an assault by Jewish residents of Nazareth on Arab citizens, was a clear demonstration of both the law and order syndrome and the tendency to blame the Arabs:
Broadcaster:  You will probably say that rioting by Jews against Arabs and the attacks on Arabs deserve the intervention of the security forces.

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

491

Bishara: You know the answer. What are you asking? Ask a normal question. Broadcaster:  Did you not expect that as a result of the violent riots by Israeli Arabs, including the burning of places holy to the Jews and the causing of terrible damage, there would be a spontaneous public reaction? Bishara:  You continue not to ask. You are justifying the outburst against us. You are blaming and not asking. This is not journalism.

This example demonstrates how the broadcasters Jewish identity led him to express the ideology prevalent among the Jewish target audience, and reflected the general socialpolitical environment. The interviewer attacked the representative of the victims and attempted to delegitimize his claims and demands for protection. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some interviewees did protest the killing of Israeli Arab citizens (e.g. Mayor of Haifa Amram Mitzna on Channel 1, 2 October). Also, some reporters began to link the events to the political and economical situation of Arab citizens.

Who is the speaker?

1976 Land Day. The Arab voice, the initiator of the strike, was completely silenced and replaced by the hegemonic voice of official sources and institutions, such the Prime Ministers Advisor for Arab Affairs, the Prime Minister, or the Chief of Staff. In other cases, the hegemonic voice was replaced by its supporters: Arab council leaders who opposed the strike. Participation in the discussion was limited to members of the political sector, with the voice of civilian society left unheard. Throughout most televised news reports, virtually no mention was made of the causes of the strike or its consequences, because apart from some leaders of the Communist Party, Arabs had no access to television. The few acknowledgments of Arab Knesset Members were insignificant because they were themselves delegitimized and given little time to speak. The obvious conclusion from news reports was that the strike was an attempt by the Communist Party to strengthen its position in the Arab sector and that the strike itself was uneventful, as reporters did not mention its results the killing of (Arab) Israeli citizens. October 2000 protests. Most participants in the news items were Jewish, on both Channel 1 and Channel 2. Thirty-two percent of news stories included statements by Jewish leaders, whereas only 14 percent included quotes from Arab leaders. However, unlike in the past, Arab representatives were noticeable from the beginning. On the Channel 1 newscast of 28 September, the day of Sharons visit to the Dome of the Rock, studio interviews were conducted with Knesset Members Ahmad Tibi (an Arab) and Reuven Rivlin (a Jew). Tibi, the first of the two to be addressed, labeled Sharons visit a provocation. Rivlin was interviewed later, but Tibi was allowed to close. Throughout the two weeks of the uprising, several Arab Knesset Members were interviewed, and all expressed their anger with the government. Thus, for example, Knesset Member Talab El-Sana was quoted claiming:
This is an intentional massacre, which is an expression of the Israeli governments Nazi perception, that it will not stop at anything in its attempt to cause bloodshed and violence and in its willingness to be dragged along after the provocations of war criminal Sharon. (Channel 1, 30 September)

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

492

Journalism 11(4)

On the following day, Knesset Member Hashem Mahameed was interviewed, and after widespread Arab demonstrations, Arab mayors were quoted criticizing police actions. In addition, the sorrow and compassion over the lost lives among the Arab population were expressed not only by Arabs, but also by Jewish artists, writers, and politicians.

Historical context, rings of identity, and the Green Line

1976 Land Day. The complexity of the relations between the Arab population and the State of Israel was an incentive for reporters to transform the discussion of the events into a discussion of the nature of Arab Israelis relations with the Arab world, including the Palestinians. In one news report, the Chief of Staff explained that the strike should be seen as an attempt to deal with the Arab populations identity, as well as their relations with the Arab world and with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. He further suggested that Israel should be concerned about the relationship between Palestinians in the Territories and Arabs within Israel. The same association was made in another report that told of a corresponding strike in the Occupied Territories. This report focused explicitly on putting an end to the unlawful strike, with no attempt to deal with the reasons for the Palestinians identification with the Arab population in Israel:
Within a short period of time, a curfew was imposed [on the refugee camp of Balata], following the burning of tires and the hurling of stones by children at security forces Apparently, the Military Governor of Nablus decided to handle any disturbance.

October 2000 protests. The context or coverage frame was mainly constructed through the use of two methods: 1 A connection made to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the Al-Aqsa Intifada by the broadcaster, reporter, and analyst, or through the use of visuals and wording in the stories themselves (73 items, 38%). 2 A focus on violence, with no causes or historical context given (only 12% of the items mentioned any historical context, for both channels). Arab demands were mentioned in only 11 items (6%). Declarations by Arabs in Israel voicing their identification with Palestinian suffering made it easy for the media to link the two populations. An item from 30 September, which covered the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee, used a quote from one of its members: There is no longer a Green Line separating the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. We are united in our defense of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The report continued with photographs of committee members, and the reporter stated that in the [Arab] villages, flyers were distributed calling on Israeli Arabs to participate in the Intifada. The Israeli Arab identification with Arabs in the Occupied Territories facilitated the duplication and reproduction of the same terminology used in coverage of the Territories for events within Israeli borders. This replication could be seen, for example, in the statement Nazareth this morning: sights that recall the days of the Intifada in the cities of the West Bank (Channel 1, 1 October). On Channel 2, events in Umm al-Fahm were described

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

493

as an Intifada of stones. News analysts also linked the Intifada to the Arab population in Israel, as can be seen in the quote, We are in a state of transition to an Intifada, for three reasons: the first the spillover into the Arab Israeli population, which we did not observe in the (first) Intifada (Channel 1, 1 October). The analysis was not limited to acknowledging the identification of Israeli Arabs with the Palestinians. Israeli events were seen as a triumph for the Palestinians and for Yasser Arafat. Thus, on 8 October, an analyst argued that Arafat is gaining something every day: what we saw in the Galilee over the past few days, not to mention what happened last night in Nazareth. When the inclusion of Israeli Arabs with the Palestinians was not obvious enough from the reporters words, the visual dimension reinforced it. Thus, during an interview with Mohammed Zaidan (Chairman of the Arab Local Councils Committee), he was asked, What are you doing in order to calm the situation?, with televised images of events in Ramallah, Netzarim, and Hebron (all in the Occupied Territories) in the background. Nevertheless, when compared with 1976, differences in the coverage of the Israeli Arab community are evident. In the past, discussions concerning the Arab citizens identification were conducted by Jewish reporters, analysts, and politicians. This time, Arab reporters, politicians, and citizens participated in these discussions as well. Arab interviewees explained the issue of Arab identity to the Jewish Israeli audience, and capable, coherent, and provocative spokesmen were interviewed on both channels.

Reporters nationality Jewish

1976 Land Day. All news items were presented from a Jewish viewpoint and by Jewish reporters. October 2000 protests. A clear majority of the reporters covering Arab Israelis was Jewish. On Channel 1, 12 percent of news items were covered by Arab reporters, whereas on Channel 2, only one item was covered by a non-Jewish reporter. Only Channel 1 had a reporter specializing in Arab issues. The reporters nationalities obviously have implications for coverage patterns (Avraham, 2003; Wolfsfeld et al., 2000). The influence of the reporters nationality on coverage patterns can be better understood if we compare the types of coverage received by similar events carried out by different populations. The most obvious difference is the use of terminology. When violence was perpetrated by Arab citizens, events were described as riots and incitements. When Jews were rioting, events were referred to as spontaneous acts by Jewish citizens or as a clash between Jews and Arabs (Channel 2, 9 October). Nevertheless, occasionally reporters did use the term riots to describe acts by Jews in Nazareth. Similarly, Jewish politicians such as Karmiel Mayor Adi Eldar stated that, Yesterday I was ashamed of our youth, part of the youth of the city who acted like rioters. I couldnt understand them simply vandalism. There is no other word for it.

Who is demonized?
1976 Land Day. In all 10 reports, the Israeli Communist Party was seen as an evil, inciting, and instigating force, with Knesset Member Tawfik Zayyad leading the charge.

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

494

Journalism 11(4)

Both Jewish officials and the Hebrew media agreed that the cause of the unnecessary and provocative strike was the Communist Party. The demonizing process included descriptions of the demon, unable to defend itself because it was not permitted to speak. From the visual aspect, the demonizing process was even more salient, since the absence of any Communist Party members was emphasized by the presence of high ranking Jewish officials. October 2000 protests. While Arab Knesset Members were allowed to talk, they were also accused of inappropriate behavior and of being inciters, initiators, and organizers of the events. This framing was used by Jewish interviewers and interviewees alike. In an interview with Minister Haim Ramon, senior analyst Amnon Abramowitz of Channel 1 asked:
Tell me, why remove Arafat? We have Sheikh Raed Salah, Mayor of Umm al-Fahm, and Arab Knesset Members Dehamshe and Mohammad Barakeh. Does it not worry you that these people act irresponsibly and might force us to use means that they themselves will suffer from?

At the same time, an interview with Arab Knesset Member Abdulmalik Dehamshe was conducted quite differently. In general, the questions posed to Jewish interviewees were open-ended, whereas questions to Arab leaders were phrased in a more closed form. However, it must also be noted that unlike in the past, the studio lineup also included a university professor (Danny Rabinowitz), who was critical of the police and their actions, tried to place some of the responsibility on Jewish citizens, and described the feelings of Arab citizens. While this analyst was himself Jewish (a method of retaining hegemony; see Gitlin, 1980), he referred to the group as Palestinian citizens of Israel, attacked the prime minister, and said that the government was accountable for the events.

The victims
1976 Land Day. Two main phenomena were observed that are in line with common framing strategies of the other: anonymity and sanitation. The burial places of five of the six Arabs killed in the demonstrations were not reported, and neither were their names, ages, occupations, or any other identity markers. In addition, the visual coverage of the events was completely sanitized. Apart from one report, no images of the clashes or bloodshed between demonstrators and the police were televised, and no pictures of those injured or killed were seen. The coverage was a masterpiece of sanitation as described by Liebes (1997). October 2000 protests. Some of the participants in the October events became human subjects: their biographical details were mentioned, as well as their occupations. The victims, however, remained anonymous, at least throughout the first few days of the events. Thus, for example, the Channel 1 newscast of 2 October stated that, after starting in the territories, riots have spread to Israeli Arabs. In Nazareth and Sakhnin several of those killed over the past few days have been brought to burial. The victims anonymity was accentuated by the fact that the most trivial details (those always mentioned in

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

495

reports concerning Jewish casualties) were missing from reports about Arabs the number of those who were buried, as well as their names. On Channel 1, the victims names were mentioned in 14 news items, or 12 percent of the total number of items analyzed. On Channel 2, names were mentioned in only four items (6%). Things did change to some extent as events continued to unfold. On 10 October, the Channel 1 newscast included a report about the mourning over those killed in Nazareth, and the reporter interviewed Dr Mahmoud Yazbek, Deputy Chairman of the JewishArab Peace Center in Haifa University, about Jews fear of coming to Nazareth to console the mourners. Channel 1 News also brought detailed information about one of the victims: Mohammed was celebrating his honeymoon abroad. His brother Issam was supposed to be married here next week. Only some of the funerals were covered, however.

Discussion and summary

In this article we integrated two complementary theories the representation approach and the framing theory in order to analyze the coverage of the Arab population in Israel during times of conflicts. As mentioned, one of the theories relies on the discussion of representation (Hall, 1997), while using the ideological and semiotic analysis of the text; the other uses quantitative indicators to measure the representation (Greenberg and Brand, 1994). The analysis was undertaking with an understanding of the existence of a dialectical relationship between media frames and mode of representation. On the one hand we analyzed the representation modes and on the other hand we reveal which actors stand behind the coverage patterns. Our analysis concentrated on two periods. In one of the periods, Israel only had a single television channel, which was a governmental-public channel, while during the second period there were a multitude of governmental-public and private channels. The use of qualitative and quantitative research methods helped the authors to overcome the symbolic extinction of the Arabs during the first period, during which the single governmental-public channel only broadcast 10 reports about the event. Our multifaceted comparison of media coverage patterns of the Arab population in Israel revealed some strong similarities, as well as some differences. Both similarities and differences correlate with previous research concerning minority group representation and the means of framing social-political conflicts in a symbolic reality. Television coverage of the 1976 Land Day events is a classic example of the symbolic extinction of the other, of its objectification and stereotyping, and of the inequalities inherent in the reciprocal relations between majority and minority groups. Media framing included various methods of representation, all of which served to eradicate the existence of the minority group and its demands, and included the need for the majority to be held accountable for the results of the conflict and to learn any lessons from it. This symbolic extinction was observed quantitatively through the small number of reports concerning the events and through the short length of those reports that did exist. Coverage was congruent with the symbolic reality of Israeli television. At the time, Channel 1 was under government supervision and enjoyed a monopoly status. As such, it completely aligned itself with Jewish Zionist politics. In the political reality, which was a major factor in constructing the symbolic reality, one political party was still dominant and

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

496

Journalism 11(4)

unaware of changes taking place within Israeli society and within the Arab population. In other words, coverage was as expected monopolistic and saw the Arab Israeli other as an enemy within. Indeed, the representation of Arab citizens can serve as a classic test case for representation of the other shortly before a change in the majoritys media. In this case, the national television channel that was formed by Jewish citizens for Jewish citizens (although Arabs watched it as well), and whose discourse reflected a homogeneous Zionist voice, was the dominant voice in the country. Its reporters perceptions of the national landscape were expressed in their uniform understanding of reality and in their dichotomous narrative of good guys and bad guys, with the good guys maintaining law and order despite attempts by the bad guys to unsettle the social order. The descriptions used in coverage were completely devoid of any critical viewpoint concerning this dichotomy. The October 2000 events occurred in a different social-political and symbolic reality, with both Jewish and Arab citizens having undergone major changes since 1976. The Jewish public was not prepared for the eruption of violence in the Occupied Territories, which came at a time of negotiations toward peace. Moreover, throughout the first few days of the events, the Arab population within Israel supported the Palestinians with previously unheard-of determination and resolve (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 2002). For this reason, this population was perceived by much of Israeli society, including many journalists, as part of an all-out threat to the existence of Israel. At the same time, a radical change occurred within the media ecology, which serves as the base for the symbolic reality in which representation and framing processes are formed. While some researchers (Alwood, 1996; Paletz, 1998) suggest that there has been an improvement over the years in media coverage of minorities, we found that some coverage characteristics have remained the same. The delineation of citizens into categories of us and them was still evident, the result of a vicious circle that has yet to be broken: a Jewish reporter, reporting to a Jewish audience from a Jewish perspective. The rigidity of this delineation did change somewhat, however. The Jewish voice has become more diverse and more reflective. The Arab voice has become more salient, and occasional changes can be seen in the terminology used to describe the Arabs, in the nationality of reporters and analysts, in the identification of Arab victims by name, in the diversity of the Arab interviewees, and in the attempt to identify with human suffering, and thus to describe discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel. The similarities in the nature of the coverage between both television channels are the result of two conflicting causes: on the one hand, the desire of Channel 2 to become the central national channel (Yuran, 2001); on the other, the competition for the attention of the television viewer in light of the new multitude of channels. At a time of major crisis, the two competing channels attempted to form a consensus regarding the Jewish collective in Israel through the use of common representation and framing methods. Similar stories were covered because each channel wanted to have the most compelling version. Diverse stories were sought because, in an age of pluralism, the stations were looking to present varied opinions, particularly at a time when ideology has been replaced by the human interest story, with which it was easier to identify both for us and for the other. This plurality means that discourse cannot be completely encapsulated, because stories

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

497

are discussed from various aspects in different newscasts or different genres. Thus, the discussion in one newscast evolves into another discussion on another news show and continues on into the late night and early morning news. Even if an attempt is made to present only one point of view, this attempt fails due to the number of people involved in these discussions. The October 2000 events have caused a major rupture between both sides involved in the IsraeliArab conflict within Israel. The general feeling is that a line has been crossed, beyond which things will never return to the way they were before (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 2002). This change includes the perception shared by many Jewish citizens that the Arab citizens are in fact inseparable from the enemy. This situation contributes to the increased delegitimization of Arab citizens in Jewish politics and among the Jewish public. The Israeli media have complied with these political and public moods. The trauma felt by Jewish society, and among its Jewish journalists, is still present and continues to influence coverage patterns that tend to adopt the official line. We believe that this process deserves further scrutiny, in order to establish the medias exact role in this ongoing conflict. References
Adoni H, Mane S (1984) Media and social construction of reality: Toward an integration of theory and research. Communication Research 11: 32340. Al-Haj M (2000) Identity and orientation among Israeli Arabs: A situation of double periphery. In: Gabizon R, Haker D (eds) The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel: A Reader. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute. (In Hebrew) Alwood E (1996) Straight News: Gays, Lesbians, and the News Media. New York: Columbia University Press. Anderson B (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Avraham E (2002) Social-political environment, journalism practice and coverage of minorities: The case of the marginal cities in Israel. Media, Culture and Society 24(1): 6986. Avraham E (2003) Behind Media Marginality: Coverage of Social Groups and Places in the Israeli Media. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Avraham E, Ketter E (2008) Media Strategies for Marketing Places in Crisis: Improving the Image of Cities, Countries and Tourist Destinations. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann / Elsevier. Caspi D, Limor Y (1999) The In/outsiders: The Mass Media in Israel. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Dahlgren P, Chakrapani S (1982) The Third World on TV news: Western ways of seeing the other. In: Adams W (ed.) Television Coverage of International Affairs. Ablex, NJ: Norwood. First A (2001) The good, the bad and the missing. Panim, 17: 8694. First A (2002) Fluid nature of representation: Transformations in representation of Arabs in Israeli television news. The Howard Journal of Communications 12(2): 17390. Gamson WA (1989) News as framing. American Behavioral Scientist 33(2): 15761. Ghanem A, Ositzky-Lazar S (2001) A Year since the October Uprising What Has Changed? Givat Haviva, Israel: The Institute for Peace Research. (In Hebrew) Gitlin T (1980) The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

498

Journalism 11(4)

Greenberg BS, Brand JE (1994) Minorities and the mass media. In: Bryant J, Zillman D (eds) Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 273315. Grossberg L, Wartella E, and Whitney CD (1998) Media Making: Mass Media in a Popular Culture. London: SAGE. Hall S (ed.) (1997) Representation. London: Open University and SAGE. Herzog H, Shamir R (1994) Media discourse on Jewish/Arab relations. Israel Social Science Research 9(1/2): 5588. Jakubowicz A, Goodall H, Marin J, Mitchell T, Randall L, and Seneviratne K (1994) Racism, Ethnicity and the Media. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin. Kellner D (1995) Media Culture. London: Routledge. Kimmerling B, Migdal S (1999) The Palestinian People: A History. Jerusalem: Keter. (In Hebrew) Levy D (1991) The ideological function of television news: The case of the Intifada on A View to the News. Patuach 1: 930. (In Hebrew) Liebes T (1997) Reporting the Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Routledge. Paletz DL (1998) The Media in American Politics: Contents and Consequences. New York: Longman. Pauly J (1991) A beginners guide to doing qualitative research in mass communication. Journalism Monographs 125: 129. Rabinowitz D, Abu-Baker H (2002) The Proud Generation. Jerusalem: Keter. (In Hebrew) Schudson M (1995) The Power of News. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Timm A (2001) Israeli civil society facing new challenges. Israel Studies Forum 17(1): 4769. Weimann G (2000) Communication Unreality: Modern Media and the Reconstruction of Reality. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Wolfsfeld G (1997) Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolfsfeld G, Avraham, E and Aburaiya I (2000) When prophecy always fails: Israeli press coverage of the Arab minoritys Land Day protests. Political Communication 17(2): 11532. Yuran N (2001) Channel 2: The New Statehood. Tel Aviv: Patish. (In Hebrew)

Biographical notes Eli Avraham is a senior lecturer (US, associate professor) in the Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Israel. He has published articles on a variety of subjects in professional journals, and he is also the author and co-author of eight award-winning books and monographs, among them: Behind Media Marginality: Coverage of Social Groups and Places in the Israeli Press (Lexington Books, 2003); Media Strategies for Marketing Places in Crisis: Improving the Image of Cities, Countries and Tourist Destinations (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008); and America in JeruSALEm: Globalization, National Identity, and Israeli Advertising (Lexington Books, 2009). Address: Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Israel. [email: eavraham@mailng.hevra.haifa.ac.il]

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010

Avraham and First

499

Anat First is Professor of Media Studies at the School of Communication in Netanya Academic College. Her research interests are in the area of representations of minority groups, particularly women and Arabs; Israeli culture in general; and advertising as the locus of the Americanization process of Israeli society in particular. She is a co-author of Coverage of Israeli Arabs in Israeli Media (Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 2004); Communication Research and Teaching (Magnes and Smart Institute Communication, Hebrew University, 2006); and America in JeruSALEm: Globalization, National Identity and the Israeli Advertising (Lexington, 2009). Address: School of Communication, Netanya Academic College, 1 University St, Netanya, Israel. [email: d_first@netvision.net.il]

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com at CAPES on October 14, 2010