PHLA10 Tutorial notes Nov.

27, 2013 Daniel Walsh The mind-body problem Mind is supposed to capture certain internal phenomena, e.g., beliefs, desires, ideas and feelings. Matter is supposed to capture the items described by physics. Physical items Spatial / localizable Public (objective) Non-intentional (not about anything) Entirely objective

Mental items Non-spatial / non-localizable Private (subjective) Intentional in character (aboutness) Qualitative in character

Descartes believed that the mind and body are distinct substances that interact. This view is called mind-body substance dualism. Leibnizs Law (LL) o X = Y then if X has a property F then Y has F. o To show that X isnt Y its enough to show that X has some property that Y lacks. An argument attributed to Descartes (in my opinion wrongfully): o 1. I can doubt that I have a body. o 2. I cannot doubt that I have a mind. o 3. LL. o 4. My mind is distinct from my body. Any problems here? If so, what are they? A better argument attributed to Descartes: o 1. My mind is non-spatial. o 2. My body is spatial. o 3. LL. o 4. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my body. What about this one? o 1. I can conceive of my mind existing without my body. o 2. If P is conceivable then P is possible. o 3. Therefore, it is possible that my mind exists without my body. o 4. If my mind were identical to my body this would not be possible. o 5. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my body. What about the second premise?

Perhaps we can distinguish between the meaning of a term and its referent. Perhaps the referent of terms is not always captured by the concepts involved. What is implied by the argument? o If two items are conceivable as distinct, they are distinct. The problem of causal interaction. o Supposing that the mind and body are distinct, how does the mind (being a non-spatial item) causally interact with the body? Against mind-body dualism is materialism. o This is the view that all items are physical items. Three materialist views: o Behaviorism o Identity theory o Functionalism First: Behaviorism o Behaviorism denies mentalism, the view that mental states are internal private states. Rather, they are analyzed as dispositionary states. o To say that Jones believes it will rain is just to say that jones is disposed to behave in certain ways. For instance, should he go outside he will bring an umbrella. o It solves the problem of other minds. o It solves the problem of causal interaction. Some issues: o Super-Spartan/super-actor objection: Is the experiential character of the mental essential? o Circularity Jones believes its raining = If Jones goes out he brings an umbrella. Jones wants to get wet = If Jones believes its raining he goes out without an umbrella. Problem! What if Jones wants to get wet and believes its raining? One way to fix it (perhaps): Jones believes its raining = If its the case that Jones doesnt want to get wet then if he goes out he brings an umbrella and if he wants to get wet then he goes out without one. But now we have a problem. Jones wants to get wet will thus be redefined: Jones wants to get wet = If its the case that Jones doesnt want to get wet then if he goes out he brings an umbrella and if he wants to get wet then he goes out without one, then he goes out without one. Identity theory o The token-type distinction

o The identity here is type identity o Mental states are type identical with brain states just as water is type identical with H2O o This theory explains correlations between mental and physical types. o It also solves the problem of interaction and the problem of other minds. Problems o Multiple realizability: Presumably octopi feel hunger and pain and yet they do not have the same apparata upstairs. o The problem of consciousness (this is a general problem for materialist accounts)