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1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. DEFINITION OF SEMANTICS: discipline which studies the meaning of words, sentences, the whole text. Discipline which studies the meaning of languages. Semantics is the scientic study of the meaning of language. There are di!erent models. Di!erence between semantics and semiotics. In semiotics you study images (in advertisings), signs (tra"c signs). Semiotics is also about meaning but is a more general study. Gestures too. Pragmatics: relationship between context and language; is about contextual meaning. Emerges in 1970. Implicatures, inferences, deixis: studied by pragmatics. Di!erences between what is said and what is meant. You say something (its cold) and someone interpret it, it is understood as a request. Semantics: what is said; pragmatics: what is meant. Meaning is always contextualize (according to studiers). -How did you get to the airport? -I waived down a taxi/I stepped into my canoe. Pragmatitian: clear case of pragmatics. But by a semantic point of view its possible to answer the question. We have a prototypical knowledge. 1.2. OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT MODELS IN SEMANTICS - Historical philological model: 1830- 1930 Plato: rst philosopher of language (probably). Meaning of words. Etymology. The idea that arises in Platos work: words have intrinsic meaning. Words specically real meaning. Scholars tend to study the meaning of words. 1830 1930 Michel Breal, Hermann Paul: two scholars of historical philological tradition. They occupied with the historical, see how meaning changes. Kind of diachronic perspective. Word meaning, identication, classication, explanation of semantic changes. Period in which a lot of descriptive work is carried out, a lot of documentation. Comparative method. - Structuralism: 1916 Ferdinand de Saussure Cours de Linguistique Gnerale. Father of Structuralism. Synchronic aspects of meaning. He used the trunk of a tree, you can see how the tree grew. You can cut and study a part (metaphor). Red ! " blue; young ! " old; run !" walk. You would analyze the meaning of the word in contrast. Semantic eld. A concept as oppose to other. Structuralism: structure. Language is conventional. Linguistic side arbitrary. Dont focus in etymology. Parole- langue. Parole: speech. Langue: system. They are at di!erent level. Langue is a generalization. Structuralism studies the system of a language. 1960s sociolinguistics. W. Labor founded sociolinguistic. Structuralism focus is on langue, on system. Sociolinguistics as a reaction against the dissocialize a kind of linguistic. - Generativism: 1950s Chomsky and Italle. 1956 The Sound Patterns of English. Father of Generativist. Language is an innate ability. We are born with

linguistic capacities. Chomsky argued that language is an innate capacity. Innate means we are born not just the ability, we have structures in the brain. Deep structures. Social dimension not real important. Everybody against Chomsky. Deep structures, surface structures. New sound generated. - Cognitivism: 1970s. Birth of pragmatics. But another discipline emerges: cognitivism. Cognitive linguistics. Two generations. The second its a way of doing linguistics that draws on notions and knowledge from cognitive science in general. Interdisciplinary. Cognitive: philosophy, psychology, neuroscience. Eleanor Rosch, Langacker (Ronald), Geroge Lalco!, Fauconnier, Mark Turner, Dick Geeraerts. Prototype theory (Eleanor). Prototypical meaning. Di!erent from generativism, sociolinguistics and structuralism. Fundador Langacker of cognitivism. 1987 published a book. Lalco! in this year published his book women, re fauconnier with Mark Turner developed a theory of blending Lalco!: metaphor theory. Dirk Geeraerts lexical semantics (1980s) on the point of view of prototype theory. # # # # # # # # # # 21/02/2011

1924. Odgen and Richards. The Semiotic Triangle

Trigger: some kind of form. We dont have a sign if we dont have a trigger (encadenar). Triggers of meaning. Ex: tra"c science. /tri:/ <tree>. Saussure: signied (the image of tree) / signier (/tri:/). Language is symbolic. There is a conventional, arbitrary link between signied and signier. We can call elephant, it has no connection. Referent is the real world. There is no real link between the referent and the form/trigger. We are going to see how disciplines deal with concepts. How do we reach the concept? Di!erent modes of references. Symbolic because the relationship between trigger and concept is arbitrary/conventional. Monotony: I own a Picasso. We go from the signier to the concept. Its not symbolic but indexical (to point)

relationship between Picasso and his paints. Its not arbitrary, it is a relationship, it is not symbolic any longer, its motivated. Indexical = motivated. Contiguity/inclusion: contiguity: relation; inclusion: one includes the other. Cause e!ect relationships. He is the sunshine of my life: metaphor. How this works? Iconic (irony, sarcasm): also motivated, less than index. Its not motivated by contiguity or inclusion: similarity. Categorization and linguistics relativity. Concepts going inside with categories. When we speak about for example, trees, babies, rings Baby is a categoy in which goes other babies. We dont categorize in the same manner: debate. Some scholars adopt a universal lists and clame human being have same physical brain categorize in the same manners. Other scholars adopts the opposite position. Trees, bushes. Many languages the term bush dont exist, it is only a category. Relationship between language and thought? # # # # # # # # # # 28/02/2011

We categorize everything. When I talk about reality we categorize things. Do we categorize in the same way in di!erent languages? We can think about linguistic relativity. Linguistic relativity: we go to Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Sapir American linguistic, anthropologists too, was interested in relationship between language and culture. One of his pupils, Whorf, studied a number of American Indian native languages (Hopi Indians) and concluded that is a language that doesnt have the same grammatical categories as other languages of Europe. He couldnt nd categories that have action. Whorf came up with claims that refer to Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. There is a weak claim and strong claim. Weak claim says that language is inuenced by culture di!erences. Culture di!erences are reected in language. Strong claim: language does not inuence thought, is determined thought. We think as we speak (idea). Whorf reduced thought to language. Eleanor Rosch: linguistic and psychologist who began to develop prototype theory in 90s. 1974 published a paper: Linguistic Relativity. In that paper she questioned Whorf hypothesis. She suggested that we do the same with a language we are familiar with (French) ant take a Whoran view of this language. Le chat gris: the gray cat. According to Whorf the French think of a kind of abstract catness, they applied the color in catness and then they individualize. Whorf: di!erences in thinking, because the grammar is di!erent. Rosch: it is not possible. Universalist ideas: variationist ideas. Whorf was variationist. Rosch is somewhere in the middle.

Universalism is the idea that humans have similar brains and the world is a real world that humans perceive and we set up the same categories. Objectivism. Experimental realism. Universal links with objectivism. This is the most philosophical part. According to objectivism the real world is objectively structure. Structure divides in categories. Humans observe that this category exists. Passive role to human. Rosh: we should rather think about experimental realism (suggestion). It is in between universalism, object and variationist approach. Depends also of our experiences as human beings. There are languages with just two names of colors. We can categorize but not entirely free. Rosch: more active role than Whorf. Lexical semantics NIDA # Componential Analysis Meaning from two di!erent perspectives. Structuralism (Componential Analysis). -Componential Analysis (how is meaning analyze?) E. Nida. Two questions: I. Di!erent meanings of simple terms. II. Related meanings of di!erent terms. # Word forms that are not the same have related meanings? # Word form expresses a di!erent sense/meaning? I. Di!erent meanings of simple terms Nida, rst, observes that a single word can have a number of di!erent senses or meanings (ex: chair). In most instances a word seems to have a central meaning from which a number of other meanings are derived. Before prototype theory. He sat in a chair, He has a chair of philosophy. Chair as a verb. We will chair at the meeting. First chair violin. Nida then observes that sometimes the meanings can become so remote thatn we can badly see the link anymore. Nida uses the example of bar: as a restaurant; as a longest object (barra); as barrote; as division of areas (estrado, barrera). The prototypical meaning is barra. Homonym, homophone, homograph, polysemy. If two forms have the same sounds but completely unrelated meanings, we call them homophones. School as an educational institution, school as a school of sh (banco de peces) " they are unrelated, written in identical manners, pronounced in the same way. They are homophones. And homographs: they are spell in the same manner.

Pare, pair, pear: homonym: they are homophones but not homographs. Root and root: (lower part of plants; pig puts his mouth in ground). They are not related: homonym. Two or more entries: # # # # Root Root

Polysemy: one entry in a dictionary.

Duck (bird), duck (sumergir). Polisemy: meanings are related. Two entries: noun and verb. Semasiology (sense), onomasiology (name). Concept, word. Relationship words and meaning: semasiology perspective; onomasiology perspective. Semasiology: meaning. The word form is our point of departure and we study the di!erent senses the word evokes: polysemy. The word form chair:

Onomasiology: is the opposite perspective. You starting point is not the word form but the concept. Then you study which word forms can be used to refer to the concept.

Concept: starting point. We look at related meanings: synonyms. # # # # # # ! ! ! ! 01/03/2011

II Related meanings of di!erent forms Just as a single term can have related meanings. Some times di!erent forms have meaning that they are more similar than those of the same word. Run is polysemy. The central sense of run is physical movement faster than walking. In the horizontal sense using our times.

Run is more related to di!erent terms that relationship between these di!erent run. Onomasiologic point: run is closed related to other verbs of movement that has little di!erences. Walking, jogging, jump. Semantic domain with very similar senses. Semasiologic: run polysemy. Onomasiologic: run forms part of a semantic domain. Physical movement in space. It is related to hop, jog, sprint, walk, run.

Di!erent ways in which di!erent forms can relate semantically. 1. Inclusion

Hypernym Hyponym Is not a structuralism phenomenon. One meaning is included within the meaning of the other. The wider areas of meaning need fewer semantic components to identify the bases for class membership for a great number of references. In term, each included element has all the features of the including meaning plus at least one more feature which serves to distinguish the more restricted area. Animal: alive (semantic component); movement; human: 3 features to dene animal. You need to add features to distinguish mammals from other animals.

Hypernym: including area. Animal hypernym of dog. Hyponym: included area. Dog hyponym of animal. Super ordinate categories: vehicle. 2. Overlapping Give/bestow # # # Possess/own Ill/sick Answer/reply

Meanings can overlap. Thats what we get in synonyms. Meanings are not identical. You never use the terms in the same register. If you are ill is worst than be sick. Sick is often referred to problems of stomach. 3. Complementation

As the terms implies, involves complementary relations, and Nida mentions 3 (Opposites; reversives; conversives). -opposites: involve polar contrast. For instance, good vs. bad; tall vs. short; dead vs. alive -Reversives: more events, semantic relationship such as tie, untie; connect and disconnect; alienated, reconciled. -Conversives: are involved reciprocal meanings. Example: buy and sell (if someone is selling, someone is buying), borrow and lend. 4. Contiguity

It is a complex picture of overlapping relationships. Contiguity represents the relations between closely related meanings occupying a well dened restrictive semantic domain exhibiting certain well marked contrast. So, each meaning is distinctly set o! from other related meanings by at least one important feature. It is a cluster of contiguous meanings sharing a series of common features. So that they constituted a single semantic domain. Key works here are components features, common features. At least one important/distinctive feature: distinct/diagnostic feature. Components of meaning: those necessary-and su"cient features that se meanings o! as distinct i.t.c other senses. They have common features but di!erent meanings:

Father: we compare with something similar: Gender Father Mother Grandfather Uncle + + + 1Generation + + + Direct line of descedent + + + -

Common feature: family relations. Wrong of this type of analysis: to begin with it only considers one type of father model (biological). What about step-fathers, church fathers it assumed that all categories are easily dene in terms of su"cient, necessary features. Structure category is like a box with dget materials. No exibility go between inside the box because you have done features as the other member than we all the same.

Some categories or components as in the box and equal status. # # # Wings # # Eggs # # Feathers # Fly # # Beak 08/03/2011 Sing

Penguin Pelican Hawk Swallow Ostrich Duck Chicken Swan

? + + + + + + +

+ + + + + + + + + +

+ + + + + + + + -

+ + + + ? + + -

+ + + + + + + + + +

+ -

Nightingal + e Kiwi -

?: It is hard to be dened Duck-billed platapus: ornitorrinco (tiene pico, beak). Beak is not an enclosure feature. But birds have beak and eggs. We have groups here. Equal membership status. Some birds are lower birds. Penguin is a bird, but not as much as the nightingale. Di!erent model. Flexible model. Nightingale: central member. Penguin: non central member but still a member. Complemential analysis The alternative model (prototype theory). Prototype theory begins its story in philosophy and psychology. -Wittgenstein: philosopher. He also thought a bit about semantics. He was the rst who came up with the notion of family resemblance. He uses the example of a name. How we call to di!erent activities by that name. Example: chess: tools, board, clock two people, competition, requires skills/intelligence. Card games: together or alone (luck, intelligence no-). Corro la patata: another game. Wittgenstein said that is not possible to nd a common feature. Features are similar but not a common feature as in componential analysis. It seems the members of the game belongs to the family. Not all the members of the family have to have the same color of eyes, for example. He argued in favor absence of common features. Extendable boundaries: he also argued that semantic categories are exible. You can add new members to the category. If a video game comes in to assistance, similar to other games, it has to be with the category. -Austin (1950s) philosopher: chaining relationships. Healthy: body. We also say healthy exercise (meal, complexion). Is it the same meaning. Healthy meal is di!erent of healthy body. Meal is healthy because produces a healthy body. Healthy body, you also have healthy complexion (consequence). 1950s Austin reasons that in polysemy relationships such as healthy, we often get chaining relationship which overlapping meaning.

Maybe E is has not to do with A. -Fillmore gave the example of climb as a chaining relationship. Climb: upward movement, e!ort, hands + legs (4 limbs). The plane climbed up to 10000 feet. Its not the same sense: upward movement, kind of e!ort. Its similar enough. He climbed onto the ledge: no upward movement, kind of e!ort; hands + legs. -Zadeh: fuzzy area. 1960s Fuzzy area: rea difusa. In the classical theory, the categories are like close boxes with structural boundaries, and things inside or outside box (in a di!erent box). From articial intelligence. It is not necessary to have values one or zero but values between them (1 and 0). (Example: 0.3). these are the penguin wings. Classical boxes: wings; not wings . This is now the representation:

Vegetable (lettuce, carrots); fruit (banana, apple). Olive? Its not a prototypical fruit. -Lako! (cognitive linghistics). Centrality gradiance, membership gradiance.

Centrality gradiance. Notion that senses/members can form part of the category to a certain extension. Some members can be very central, prototypical. Central, non central, prototype, non prototype members. Nightingale in the center, penguin non center. Membership gradiance: boundaries are not xed and you can be a member. Flexible thing with no xed boundaries. A lot of exibility without the need of common features to build the thing together. # # # # # # # # # # 14/03/2011

PROTOTYPE THEORY Eleanor Rosch: American psychologist. Her ndings are relevant for linguistic. Her achievement. Late 1960s-70s real empirical experiment challenging the classical theory of categorization (analysis like componential analysis) (category based on necessary and su"cient features). Rosch: this is not how it works.

-Direct rating: is a technique according to which you ask subjects to rate, for example, on a scale from one to seven how good an example of a category various members are. Example: bird, furniture Members of the category: types of birds (penguin, kiwi, eagle). Order good to bad examples. -Reaction time: in psycholinguistics many scholars still used as a method. Subjects are asked to press a bottom to indicate true or false in response to a statement. As for example: A toden is a type. An apple is a piece of fruit. When we have doubt we didnt ask immediately. Conclusion: the shorter the reaction time the more representative and salient the example is. -Production of examples: subjects get a number of categories (color, fruit) and you ask them to give a list of examples or draw examples as well. Again, when people systematically name the same examples rst, there must be a reason why. It goes against of the idea that it should be equal status within a category. Centrality gradiance/salience. Salience: the prototype in this theory is that which is psychologically more salience than other members. If something is salience, you dont doubt. -Asymmetry in similarity rating: is the idea that less representative examples are considered to be more similar to more representative examples than the converse/opposite. Example of illness transmitted by birds.

PROTOTYPICAL EFFECTS Chapter 2 of Reading (rst part). Whats a word? Page 31. Thus centrality Salience and then frequency. Cultural dimension. Depends on time, space, culture. Its not a coincidence. Centrality gradiance: redene our idea of internal structure. A category/notion is not just a box in which you can throw all types of members. RADIAL NETWORK Reading 2. Page 31. Quite simply a stream of changing relationships where certain links in the change are more central/representative than others. School (example): polysemy, link (di!erent senses) in a network. Chair: polysemy: basic notion of chair, but we have to a chair in polysemy. Category of chair. What things we call chair and how are they linked. Example: 1.dentist chair, 2.rocker (mecedora), 3.be an bang chair (pu!), 4.kitchen chair, 5.stool (taburete).

Central point: kitchen chair. If she asks us to draw a chair we draw some kind of kitchen chair. It has more common fatures.

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HEDGES (LAKOFF 1972) A robin is a bird par excellence. *A turkey is a bird par excellence. *Loosely speaking, a six-sided gure is hexagonal. Loosely speaking, France is hexagonal. Hedge: linguistic expression that reveals the internal structure of the linguistic category. The hedges in these examples: par excellence; loosely speaking. One of this sounds strange: those with the asterisk. Is an excellent example of this category: par excellence. A turkey is not an excellent example. It sounds strange. Loosely speaking: you can add things not central. It make no sense to say loosely speaking a six because it is. *She is a housewife, but she is a good mother. She works, but she is a good monster. Social stereotype: housewife are also good mothers. Hedge: but. Strictly speaking, a bat is not a bird. *Strictly speaking, a TV set is not a bird. Bat is not a bird, but its some similarity. Inside of the category or not, it draws a boundary. Categories has some kind of internal structure: Hedges reveal this. BASIC-LEVEL CATEGORISATION Kay y MacDaniel. Brown and Berlin. Rosch 1960s, 1970s colleges began to work on basic levels. Kay and MacDaniel studied color categories. Brown and Berlin biological features, plants. Rosch is the one who works more with linguistic.

We come back to inclusion. We can categorize things at di!erent levels of abstraction. Classication theory: no member has to have a special member status. Prototype theory: certain members have a central status.

Rosch and Mervis: experiment. 1976: superordinate: work with three levels. Superordinated levels are level of animal, fruit, furniture, vehicle basic level categories are level of dog, apple, table, car Subordinate: husky, golden, kitchen table, Volvo Rosch and Mervins wanted to know what level pick up the children rst. Sorting took at level of superordinate categories. Basic level sorting put together two cows that are di!erent. Superordinate sorting put together two di!erent vehicles, a car and a train. At all age levels from three years old up, subjects were virtually perfect on basic-level sorting. The three years old have troubles with superordinate sorting. They were only 55% correct in the experiment. The fourth years old: 96% correct. So, its quite clear that basic level category is mastered before superordinate categorization. Its also clear that the critical period is just between the age of 3 and 4. There are more studies (what they found about basic levels): 1. Basic level is one, the highest level at which category members have similarly perceived over all shapes. Fruit doesnt have a shape. Things are perhaps more di!erent as this level. 2. Its the highest level at which a single mental image can reect the entire category. Elephant (1 elephant) animal? 3. Its the highest level at which a person uses similar motor action for interacting with category members. Gesture, mimic. (show a ower with gestures: motor action). 4. Its the highest level at which subjects are fastest at identifying category members. 5. Its the level with the most commonly used labels for category members. 6. Its also the rst level named and understood by children. The st level they acquired. 7. It is also the rst level to enter the lexical of the language. Logical consequences of what have been said before. 8. Its the level with the shortest primary lexemes. Dog, cat. 9. Its the level at which terms are used in neutral context. Some creature in the room which barks: dog. 10. Its level at which most of our knowledge is organized. We conclude that just as certain items are psychologically more important than others within categories. At the vertical level there is also one specic level of abstraction that seems to be psychologically salient. Thats the basic level.

Conclusions we have to ask. # # # # # # # # # # 21/03/2011

Concepts: *Frames (Fillmore 1976, Minsky 1975). Fillmore observed that a large set of English verbs can be viewed as semantically related because they evoke the same general frame. For example: transaction frame: there is a buyer, the buyer is a person interested in exchanging money for goods. There is a seller, the seller is a person interested in exchange goods for money. Goods: the buyer acquires. There is money. Its a framework in which the verb to buy focuses on the interaction of the buyer with respect to the goods, back grounding the seller and the money. Importantly Fillmore argues that nobody can know the meaning of these verbs without knowing the details of the kind of frame they related to. Fillmore said that using the word frame for the structure way in which the scene is presented we can say that the frame structures the word meanings, and that the word evokes the frame. It is known as frame semantics. We go one step up with respect the word meaning. Buy evokes the whole transaction frame: buyer, seller, goods, money. We go through lexical items: Lako! uses domain instead of frame. Minsky also speaks about frames.

Minsky specic about frames as stereotyped events. Slots and llers. Example: birthday party. Components: balloons, presents, cake (these are slots), guests, games, music Food: sandwiches, sweets, hot dogs the specic food is the ller; presents (slots): videogames, toys (ller). Misnky argues that we have expectations about what real or normal birthday party should be like. That is the power of framework: expectations and the use of default values (valor por defecto). In the sense that if an actual slot or ller is unavailable or missing. The slot is assumed to be there and to be lled by the default. *Scenarios (Sanford and Garrod 1981). Script and schemata are terms that are used as equivalent of frames. In script there is evolution, frames: static. Scenario: a long frame. When there is some type of evolution, we use scenario instead of frame. Life as a journey: scenario. *Image schemas (Mark Johnson, 1980s). Mark Johnson the rst to speak about schemas, philosopher. Image schemas are relatively symbol structures that constantly recur in our every day bodily experience.

Image schemas are very basic notions. Many abstract metaphors are base in those basic simple schemas. There is a container schema, a notion such as in. scenarios are based in the part schema. Force: image schema something makes force in another thing.

Balance; links (something connected to something else). Relationships: basic. All these have an impact in language. METAPHOR AND METONOMY Lako! and Johnson 1980 Metaphors we live by. Lako! and Johnson 1989 More than Cool Realism. Di!erences between metaphor and metonymy. Cognitive linguistic Lako! and Johnson argue that metaphor is far more phenomenon than argued in previous of literature. Example of every day language. In second place is argued that metaphor is not in language, are in the mind. Metaphor: conceptual mapped in the mind. Concern to language. Compare metaphor and metonymy: according to Lako! and Johnson in these two words, metaphors involve two conceptual domains and metonymies only one. In metaphors the structure and the logic of the source domain is mapped (transferido) onto the structure and the logic of the target domain. According to Lako! and Johnson the main function of metaphors is understanding. In general we try to understand something which is abstract of di!erent by using a more familiar example, thats metaphor under. The main function of metonymies by contrast is to establish references to something else. X is Y. X stands for Y. in metaphors the relationship between source and target is X is Y type. Source is target but metonymy is X stands for Y relationship. Metonymies Antonio Barcelona, Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza Ibez, Gnter Radden Hamburg, Ren Dirren, Ralf Prings, Klaus Uwe Panther Hamburg. Ruiz de Mendoza distinguished two types of metonymies. Source: -Domain expansion: source-in-target metonymies. Source: sub domain of target.

-Domain reduction: target-in-source metonymies. Target: sub domain of source. In metonymy we work around one single domain, metaphors two domains.

Shes taking the pill. # # Metonymy: the pill stands for the contraceptive pill.

Contraceptive: smaller notion than pill. Target-in-source (reduction).

Shakespeare is on the top shelf (estantera). Shakespeare: writer, tragedy, theatre, comedy, poetry All hands on deck (cubierta). All hands is the source. On deck: sailors. Expansion (from restricted notion to a wilder notion). Ruiz de Mendoza criticized Lako! and Johnson claim that metonymies are only referential. We need some new faces/hands/brains in this company. Its not the same. Ruiz de Mendoza calls this subsidiary meaning e!ects. When you said brain you refer to intelligence faces: aspect, hands: workers. So, its not the same. # # # # # # # # # # 22/03/2011

Metonymies Nixon bombed Hanoi: reduction (target: army, soldier). The harm sandwich left without paying: Expansion/Reduction?. Mapping: order. Controller (Nixon): controlled (army) metonymy. The target is in the source

-The gastric ulcer wants a glass of water. The client is not bigger than sandwiches. Sandwich and client have the same level. Expansion-reduction distinguishes word when we are into a frame. -The kettle is boiling. He drunk the whole bottle. (container for content). Part whole metonymy. We cant say if its reduction or expansion in some cases. Negotiations between Moscow and Washington. Reduction The White House isnt denying the attack. Mapping: place for institution. Institution for people.

Reduction: institution for people. 1- I want to buy an apartment in Wall Street. There is no metonymy 2- Wall Street will never lose its well-deserved prestige. Mapping: place for institution. Reduction. 3- Wall Street is in panic. Double reduction: place for institution. Institution for people. I washed the car: external part. I serviced the car: mechanical part. I vacuum-cleaned the car: reduction internal part. I bought a car: no metonymy:::::: EXCEPTION. I lled up the car. Reduction. Strictly speaking, you lled up the petrol tank. The rest are whole for part. The choice of the source have an e!ect in terms of high lighting. You high light a particular part of the car.

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A Mercedes rear-ended me. A producer for product. We say me but its the car: controller for controlled. Reduction. The milk tipped over. Content for container. Part for whole. Weep Jerusalem! Place for people. Reduction. Heidegger is though to read. Producer for product. Reduction. Author for work. Paris is introducing short skirts. Place for institution (fashion industry) and institution for people. Double metonymy. Reduction and reduction. The sax has the u today. The object for the person. Expansion (Im bigger). Mary is just a pretty face. Part for a whole. Expansion. Napoleon lost Waterloo. Controller for controlled. Reduction, He sold his old Ford. Producer for product. The gun he hired wants 10.000 dollars. The object for the person. Expansion. METAPHOR Lako! and Johnson 1980. Metaphors We Live By. I just cant swallow that claim. Too many fact for me to digest. It left a bad taste in my mouth. Let me stew over that for a while. Im a voracious reader. Dont spoon feed you students (dont treat them as babies). Thats the meaty part of the paper (important). The idea had been fermenting for years. Examples of the book. Revolution in metaphor studies. Two reasons: 1. The claim was that metaphors are everywhere (title). Everyday language is full of metaphor. 2. Claim is that the metaphor is a mapping up in the mind. Its not in the language. In metaphor is based on similarity, weve a mapping between two di!erent domains, and the mapping is up in our mind (we have established), we can write metaphor form this mapping. Examples are linguistic expression deriving from the same underlying metaphor.

We also have a source and a target but theyre di!erent domains. Target: what we try to understand and explain. Source: domain that we may use to in order to explain. Source: eating (swallow, digest, bad taste in my mouth). Source: domain we make use up: food. In order to understand something. The mapping now is X is Y. We understand X in terms of Y. Similarity between idears and food? There are parts that are no explored in the metaphor. Its a very familiar process. We process food in a similar way at we process idears. Idears coming into our heads. Food in your stomach, you cant digest: you throw it up. Can that knowledge work with the idear domain? Vomitar ideas en un examen. Were o! the track. Were stuck. Were at a crossroads. We cant turn back now. Well have to go our separate ways. Our relationship isnt going anywhere. Our relationship has hit a dead-end street. # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 11/04/2011

Look how far weve come. Target domain: abstract. Source domain: specic or familiar. Metaphor is opened-mind: mapping established; linguistic expressions. These are all linguistics expressing of the same mapping.

In metaphor, structure and logic of source domain is mapped onto the structure and logic of the target domain. Structure mapped onto ontological correspondences. Correspondences of some kind of structure en source domain and some kind of structure in target domain. Travelers: structure feature.

LOGIC EPISTEMIC CORRESPONDENCES Epistemic correspondences are relationships between elements in the source domain and elements in the target domain. In the source domain we have a series of non-metaphorical inferences because we are not speaking metaphorically jet without target domain. The metaphor will not work without epistemic, the logic. 1. We need to buttress the theory with solid arguments. 2. The argument collapsed. 3. A theory without foundation. 4. That needs more support. 5. More facts or your argument will fall apart. 6. A shaky argument.

Fotocopias: written by Lako! and Zoltan Kvekes study on anger going back to 1987. First observed that in everyday language we got an enormous number of

linguistic expressions expressing anger, and they are metaphorical. Emotions are abstract. Expression such as: He was looking daggers at me, etc. Why do they express anger? Interaction between metaphor and metonymy. Underlying metonymies Anger: when we get angry our body reacts to anger in a physical manner: metonymy (cause-e!ect). Body heat: to be a hot head. Our body also experiences internal pressure (metonymy e!ect).: get a hernia. -Redness to be red of angry. -Agitation: shaking with anger. -Normal perception: you can be blind with anger. All these are metonymies. Lako! and Kvekess argue that expression are a combination of: anger is heat, the body is a container (for emotions). Anger is heat of liquid/ of solid (something that can burn).

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Hay que desatascar los juzgados. Sally is a block of ice.

Relation: what happens in fontanera and what happens in juzgados: epistemic correspondences.

Source (temperature), target (feelings/emotions) Plays emotion in the heart. Division between mind and emotions. Abrir el melon: begin to discuss a topic. Melon like a topic. Once you open the melon you have to eat it or not. -Religion is the opiate of the masses (Carl Marx). Religion cannot be opiate literally speaking. XYZ METAPHORS. Mark Turner Language is the mirror of the mind/ Los ojos son el espejo del alma. Why we understand this? Madrid es la cuna del chotis*

Were trying to explain what religion is. Ontological correspondence between religion and opiate. Masses is in the domain of religion (epistemic relationship).

Y is to Z as Y is to ? ?= drug addict

Vanity is the quicksand of reason.

Relation is vanity and reason: go to quicksand domain. Vanity swallows reason.

Quicksand works slowly. It happens to you without knowing, slowly. Vanity happens equally. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 03/05/2011

CLAUSE SEMANTICS Halliday. 1985. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. Downing and Locke. A Univ Diks Functional: School.

Studies in semantic roles/clause semantics began in 1960s. Downing and Locke book is based in Halliday book. Clause semantics: participants, processes, attributes, circumstances. -Processes: a process is that part of the situation which is typically express by the verb. That is to say that syntactically speaking the process is realized by the predicator. -Participants: they may be people, animals, objects or abstractions and syntactically they are realized by categories such as S, DO, IO. -Attributes: are ascribe to the participants and they are typically realized by complement of subject or complement of object (Cs, Co). -Circumstances: are typically optional elements both syntactically and semantically. Typically realized by adjuncts. They are three processes when we start with a semantic analysis: --Material: of doing, of causing. --Mental: of perception, of cognition, of a!ection. --Relational. $ Material process of doing: 1. Bill was swimming. Bill: agent. Was swimming: material process of doing. 2. The manager signed the contract. The manager: agent. Signed: material process of doing. Processes of doing are actions or activities carried out by a participant (agent) who operates on itself or on others to bring about some kind of change in the situation. In 1 there is only one participant and was swimming is a material process of doing. In 2 there is one process and two participants. o Agents: Lyons (Semantics, 1977) discusses the role of agent and observes that agents are typically ad prototypically animate. Agents also have motivation, responsibility and intention (there is

a purpose behind the act). Agents typically use their own energy to bring about the change. The horse splashed us with mud as we passed: not a motivated action: it shows that there are degrees of agents. Anxiety can run your health. The earthquake destroyed the harvest. Two cases where agency is weird. # # Psychological states (no animate, no intention). Natural disasters.

Here we have a separate category. o These are force participants (anxiety, the earthquake). The thunder rolled: the thunder (force). An avalanche burned the climbers. (the avalanche: force; the climbers: a!ected). The manager signed the contract. (the manager: agent; the contract: a!ected). The participants contract and climbers are a!ected by the action carry out by our agent and force participant. The a!ected is not necessarily animate and it can be subjects in passive. # The contract was signed by the manager.

Semantically the contract is the a!ective. They can move around but the function is the same. Was signed: material processes. The manager: agent. Syntactically the contract: S. was signed: predicator. By the manager: adjunct. # # # The lawyer wrote his contract (his contract: e!ected). Mary ate an omelette (an omelette: a!ected). Mary made an omlette (an omelette: e!ected).

Recipient or beneciary?

In ditransitive structures we have three participants (S, DO, I, O). semantically: the recipient, beneciary. Recipient is represented by the prep. G. (to --). They may usually passivized. Normally speaking, they are obligatory. Beneciary takes Prep. G. with for --. Its normally not possible to passivized. $ Material processes of causing. Two main types of material processes of causing: a) SPOd: monotransitive. b) SPOdCo: complex transitive. SPOdCo

Two examples of comprex transitive. Why a material process of causing? Causative agents bring about a change of state in the a!ective. That change of state is expressed syntactically by the complement of the O. and semantically by a resulting attribute.

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Systematic-Functional Clause Semantics Material Processes: -Of Doing # # # # # -Of Causing: -SPOdCo (complex transitive) # -SPOd: SP Monotransitive. Intransitive

Causative agent cause a change of state in the a!ective and it is expanded in the resulting attribute.

A passive is ok in both cases. But we need an intransitive. In the second one you can say The ball rolled. Di!erent structure. Syntactically there is no di!erence but semantically it is. Peter causes the ball rolled. In the rst case is di!erent. Peter rolled the ball: ergative structure. When the a!ected object in a transitive structure can become a!ected subject in a corresponding intransitive structure, without turn it into a passive.

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INSTRUMENT VS. MEANS

Instrument in subject position. Item: expounded: present in linguistic position. Unexpounded: it doesnt appear. The object can be a subject and explain the action. Knife cant be in subject position. If it can: instrument, if it not: means. Mental Processes (three types): 1. Of Perception: experiencer. We will have word such as see, hear, feel, taste, smell. 2. Of A!ection: phenomenom. Words as: love, hate, surprise, please. Verbs of emotion. 3. Of Cognition. Words like thing, believe, realize, understand. In Mental Processes there are two participants: one which is animated and typically human, it could be an animal as well, that feels/sees/thinks which we called experiencer (Hallidays term). Second participant that which is felt/seen/ thought/believed by the experiencer, and this which we called the phenomenom. I believe it is true. I: experiencer; believe: of Cognition; it is true: phenomenom. Verbs of Mental Processes are usually stative verbs, is no volution, not dynamic. Stative verbs do not normally accept the continue tense. I talk (of perception) to you: Im talking, it implies that you are actively carrying out an action. This is not doing something actively.

1. Mental Processes of Perception: See, hear, taste, smell, feel. With these verbs the experiencer is called a recipient experiencer because it receives the phenomenom in a totally involuntary a non-volutional manner. I can hear something. I can see a big lake. I can taste the garlic. Recipient experiencer + mental processes of perception + phenomenom The child feels hot (Recipient experiencer + mental processes of perception + phenomenom). El nio siente/ tiene calor. Another interpretation: relational process. El nio est caliente. # # # # # # # # # # 16/05/2011

Mental Processes of Perfection Recipient Experiencer #

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Agentive Experiencer

Volitional counterparts

See, hear, feel, smell, taste. Corresponding verbs there is no grade of volition. Volitional counterpart of see: look (agent experiencer), stare, watch, glare, observe. Verbs of volitional counterparts. If counterparts are not volitional: state verbs. Watch are dynamic.

: Dynamic Mental processes go with experiencers: agent or agentive. And not with a!ective but with phenomenom. Agentive subject because is a dynamic verb. Stative: recipient; dynamic: agentive: in both cases phenomenom. Volitional counterparts Hear Feel Smell Taste Listen Feel Smell Taste

I felt the sweater. It was soft.

Smell this (experiencer unexpounded. Taste this.

2. Mental Processes of Cognition. Verbs that fell in this category are normally stative. Understand, forget, remember, realize, think, know. Will you remember?: stative. I wont forget: dynamic. Think about it: dynamic. Exp. Unexpounded (agentive).

Remember and forget can be used in English with agentive and recipient experiencer. Its grammatical. Dont forget to buy milk, dont forget buying the milk (already bought it). Participant: expounded or unexpounded. Expounded: present. Unexpounded: not explicit. 3. Mental Processes of A!ection Normally stative. Type: love, likes, dislike, hate, detest, please (normally recipient experiencer), prefer, want, enjoy.

A!ection and emotion. Two types: perception, cognition. Normally stative: enjoy. # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # 17/05/2011

Type II: surprise, dismay, worry, depress.

*Long subject at the beginning: it doesnt sound well in English. Two principles in English to this: end-focus; end-weight. End-weight: principle that sounds estrange elements at the beginning too long. You pout the subject at end (extra posed agent). It: anticipatory. End-focus: new information at the end. Certain verbs more common in a passive construction than in an active construction: prlease, delight. Type II are verbs of emotion such as surprise, dismay, worry, depress Syntactic options of these verbs. # # # # # # # # # ! 24/05/2011

Semantic under specication: semantic ambiguity. 2 di!erent ways of interpretation. It depends on the analysis. Two sisters reunited after 16 years at Checkout Counter: -They reunited at that place: after 16 years at Checkout Counter (in one place). They havent seen and stayed in the same place. As circumstance. -They havent seen each other since for 16 years and they reunited at checkout counter: separate element.

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