Studia Politica

The Avatars of Virtual Representation
Romanian Political Science Review

vol. XI, no. 1 2011
Acest volum a fost publicat cu sprijinul financiar al FUNDAIEI KONRAD ADENAUER

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011
CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PRVU
STUDIA POLITICA
The end of the Cold War, and the extinction of communism both as an ideology and a practice of government, not only have made possible an unparalleled experiment in building a democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe, but have opened up a most extraordinary intellectual opportunity: to understand, compare and eventually appraise what had previously been neither understandable nor comparable. Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review was established in the realization that the problems and con cerns of both new and old democracies are beginning to converge. The journal fosters the work of the first generations of Romanian political scientists permeated by a sense of critical engagement with European and American intellectual and political traditions that inspired and explained the modern notions of democracy, pluralism, political liberty, individual freedom, and civil rights. Believing that ideas do matter, the Editors share a common commitment as intellectuals and scholars to try to shed light on the major political problems facing Romania, a country that has recently undergone unprecedented political and social changes. They think of Studia Politica. Romanian Politica Science Review as a challenge and a mandate to be involved in scholarly issues of fundamental importance, related not only to the democratization of Roma nian polity and politics, to the great transformation that is taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, but also to the make-over of the assumptions and prospects of their discipline. They hope to be joined in by those scholars in other countries who feel that the demise of communism calls for a new political science able to reassess the very foundations of democratic ideals and procedures.
UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH
STUDIA POLITICA
vol. XI, no. 1 2011
BUCURETI
STUDIA POLITICA
(ISSN 1582-4551)

is published quarterly by the Institute for Political Research of the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest and is printed and mailed by the C.H. Beck Publishing House
International Advisory Board Daniel BARBU (Bucharest), Mauro CALISE (Napoli), Dominique COLAS (Paris) Jean-Michel DE WAELE (Bruxelles), Jean-Michel EYMERI-DOUZANS (Toulouse) Raffaella GHERARDI (Bologna), Guy HERMET (Paris) Hans-Dieter KLINGEMANN (Berlin), Marc LAZAR (Paris) Ronald H. LINDEN (Pittsburgh), Pierre MANENT (Paris) Leonardo MORLINO (Roma), Gianfranco PASQUINO (Bologna) Cristian PREDA (Bucharest), Antoine ROGER (Bordeaux) Giovanni SARTORI (New York), Daniel-Louis SEILER (Aix-en-Provence) Editor Alexandra IONESCU Editorial Board Andrei NICULESCU, Mihai CHIOVEANU, Ruxandra IVAN Caterina PREDA, Matei DEMETRESCU Editorial Staff Oana DIMITRIU (executive editor) Ctlin MANTU (manuscript production), Anca VASILE (manuscript processing)
Institutul de Cercetri Politice
Contents
ARGUMENTUM DANIEL BARBU, Spiritul mpotriva politicii. Despre intelectuali, Biseric i integrare european .......................................................................................................................... 9
ARTICULI ALEXANDRA IONACU, Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008. Les voies daccs au pouvoir excutif .............................................................................. 27 ION ENACHE, Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania..................... 51 DRAGO DRAGOMAN, Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict. The Ethnicisation of Public Space in Romania .............................................................................................. 105 SONIA CATRINA, Limaginaire paysan comme mmoire historique. Patrimoine et construction de lidentit nationale par le biais des muses centraux .......................... 123 ALEXANDRA ILIE, Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust? ..................................................... 137
RECENSIONES
IOAN STANOMIR, Aprarea libertii. 1938-1947, Curtea Veche, Bucureti, 2010 (RADU CARP) ................................................................................................................................. 157 DAVID A. BLUMENTHAL, TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK (eds), The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance?, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2008 (CRISTINA MANOLACHE) ................................................................................................................ 159 NORMAN M. NAIMARK, Stalins Genocides, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2010 (ALEXANDRA ILIE) ................................................................................................................. 162 BOGDAN MURGESCU, Romnia si Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice, Editura Polirom, Iai, 2010 (DAN-ALEXANDRU CHI) .................................................................................................... 167 SERGIU GHERGHINA, SERGIU MICOIU (eds.), Partide i personaliti populiste n Romnia postcomunist, Institutul European, Iai, 2010 (CODRIN TUT) ............................................... 172
NICOLETA IONESCU-GUR, Dimensiunea represiunii din Romnia n regimul comunist. Dislocri de persoane i fixri de domiciliu obligatoriu, Corint, Bucureti, 2010 (MONICA ANDRIESCU) ...... 174 GIOVANNI SARTORI, Ingineria constituional comparat. Structuri, stimulente i rezultate, Romanian transl. by Gabriela Tnsescu and Irina Mihaela Stoica, Institutul European, Iai, 2008 (DRAGO DRAGOMAN).................................................................................................................... 177 DANIELA PIANA, Construirea democraiei la frontiera spaiului public european, traducere de Raluca Popescu, Institutul European, Iai, 2009 (CORINA TURIE) ..................................................... 180
ABSTRACTS...................................................................................................................... 185
AUTORES........................................................................................................................... 189
ARGUMENTUM
Spiritul mpotriva politicii
Despre intelectuali, Biseric i integrare european

DANIEL BARBU
Odat cu prbuirea comunismului n 1989, [a]a cum prezisese [] Constantin Noica, timpul n care Vestul Europei i va recunoate spiritul mai degrab n pstrtorii si din Est dect n prezentul su cotidian venise1. Extras dintr-un eseu despre valorile europene publicat de un renumit intelectual public n onoarea altui intelectual public proeminent, aceast constatare poate servi drept nceput de rspuns la cteva ntrebri menite s surprind natura i modul de funcionare a spaiului public romnesc: cum se autoidentific astzi intelectualii romni din mainstream, care este genealogia intelectual pe care o asum i care sunt credinele pe care le profeseaz n raport cu procesul de modernizare a societii exprimat instituional de integrarea european. Aa cum se ntmpl n cele mai multe contexte naionale, intelectualii romni alctuiesc o populaie divers de individualiti care dispun n comun n ochii media i pentru o audien general de o autoritate cultural generic, implicit i de obicei necontestat, ce se ntemeiaz pe o performan (real sau presupus) obinut n practica filosofiei, literaturii sau, mai rar, a tiinelor sociale. Printre ei se afl un grup relativ coerent n formularea de poziii publice, ce revendic o continuitate explicit cu viaa cultural a anilor 1930. Membrii acestui grup tind s frecventeze relativ regulat o platform metafizic pe care s-ar afla depozitat, la adpost de raiunea individual i de mecanismele de producie social a cunoaterii, un spirit european ai crui acionari majoritari se consider a fi chiar ei nii. Istoria recent a acestui spirit este paradoxal: n timpul Rzboiului Rece, acesta ar fi disprut aproape cu desvrire din prospera Europ occidental, unde gnditorii autentici au fost marginalizai, dac nu de-a dreptul sufocai de o societate orientat cu precdere ctre bunurile politice i obsedat de bunstare i de egalitate, n timp ce ar fi reuit s strbat neatins este adevrat c n clandestinitate i ntr-o manier profetic i ne-politic timpurile ntunecate ale comunismului. Cderea regimului ar fi dezvluit nu numai supravieuirea acestui spirit, dar i misiunea lui viitoare: s iradieze dinspre Est spre Vestul epuizat spiritual. Spre deosebire de intelectualii cehi sau polonezi, care s-au adresat comunismului n limba dizidenei politice, intelectualii romni au fost simultan tcui i publici. Au fost intelectuali publici sub socialismul de stat n msura n care au publicat cri i eseuri, au confereniat pretutindeni n ar, n universiti, case de cultur i alte instituii, au fcut lungi stagii de pregtire n universiti occidentale i au fost invitai (mai rar totui) n emisiuni de radio i televiziune. n toate mprejurrile, au pstrat tcerea asupra chestiunilor politice i de societate i nu au invocat drepturile omului dect, incidental, n situaia n care oamenii lipsii de drepturi au devenit ei nii. Ei au vorbit cu precdere limbajul culturii, idiomul naltei tradiii culturale europene. Unii dintre ei au mrturisit
Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Valorile Europei, in Mihail NEAMU, Bogdan TTARUCAZABAN (ed.), O filosofie a intervalului. In honorem Andrei Pleu, Humanitas, Bucureti, 2009, p. 245.
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ulterior c erau animai de certitudinea c o discuie despre Platon sau un citat din Heidegger constituiau, n ordine intelectual, acte mai duntoare pentru regim dect orice form de protest politic fi i explicit. Dac acesta poate fi un raccourci al zonei centrale a peisajului intelectual al Romniei postcomuniste, unde se situeaz intelectualii n raport cu procesul de integrare european? Punnd la contribuie o literatur influent, nrdcinat n opera a dou figuri iconice ale culturii romneti, Mircea Eliade i Constantin Noica, vom constata c Europa a fost i nc este privit, aproape canonic, ca fiind n acelai timp o utilitate n termeni economici, de libertate de micare i de exprimare, dar i ca un risc intelectual. Pe aceast linie de gndire, creia i fac ecou, cu unele inflexiuni particulare ale vocii, i purttorii de cuvnt ai Bisericii Ortodoxe Romne, prin intermediul garantismului constituional, al practicilor democratice i al afirmrii drepturilor omului, Europa ar ncuraja apariia unui om recent gata fcut, dup cum ideologia socialismului de stat ncercase cndva s impun modelul unui om nou standardizat dup regulile colectivismului. Privind napoi dinspre momentul fuziunii dintre democraiile occidentale i cele aspirante din Europa Central ntr-o Uniune lrgit, vom deconstrui n paginile care urmeaz cteva din transformrile suferite de limbajul asentimentului intelectual dat procesului de europenizare de ctre intelectualii publici romni. i o vom face plecnd de la dou observaii elementare i, probabil, incontestabile. Vom remarca mai nti naltul grad de unanimitate al opiniei iniiale potrivit crei integrarea va face s circule mai liber o seam de bunuri sociale de tipul prosperitii i pluralismului. Se poate apoi constata c procesul era vzut mai ales sub chipul unei tehnici istorice menit s extrag consensul unei societi caracterizate nu numai de o economie napoiat, dar i de o identitate anistoric ce traversase netulburat att liberalismul secolului al XIX-lea, ct i comunismul veacului trecut. A doua zi dup demisia socialismului de stat aceiai experi, intelectuali organici i specialiti n tiinele sociale care obinuiau n vremea Rzboiului Rece s califice regimul comunist ca fiind opusul simetric al democraiilor europene bazate pe constituionalism, cetenie i drepturile omului, i-au nchipuit c experiena lor trecut de competiie ideologic i de confruntare politic era irelevant pentru prezenta transformare democratic, tratat mai degrab ca o colecie disparat de ateptri instituionale i discursive1. Pe cale de consecin, o literatur mai mult sau mai puin academic consacrat Europei a aprut tot att de spontan i firesc pe ct nfloriser cndva scrierile consacrate socialismului tiinific, autorii fiind n general aceiai sau mcar provenii din aceleai centre de formare. Aproape inevitabil, Europa era conceput mai ales ca o surs de reglementri literare (acquis communautaire) i mai puin ca un nou tip de aranjament politic i de structur de civilizaie pe care romnii trebuiau s i-o nsueasc i, cu timpul, s o ajute s se consolideze2. Fapt deloc surprinztor ntr-un asemenea context, proza academic dedicat politicii i politicilor europene este pur descriptiv i adopt fie o perspectiv mprumutat din studiul relaiilor internaionale, socotind Uniunea o organizaie
1 Daniel BARBU, The State vs. Its Citizens. A Note on Romania, Europe and Corruption, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VII, no. 1, 2007, pp. 9-12. 2 Negociatorul ef mrturisete ca a fost interesat exclusiv de aspectul formal al negocierilor, Vasile PUCA, Romnia spre Uniunea European. Negocierile de aderare, 2000-2004, Institutul European, Iai, 2007, p. 7.
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internaional de tip interguvernamental1, fie o perspectiv comparativ, explicnd Uniunea ca pe o entitate supranaional dotat cu cteva trsturi federaliste2. Dei au fost publicate zeci de manuale i eseuri despre politica, politicile, dreptul i lrgirea Uniunii Europene, puine dintre aceste lucrri conin elemente de reflecie original. i chiar atunci cnd se afl ntr-o asemenea situaie, aa cum se ntmpl cu propunerea de reform n cheie federalist a Uniunii avansat de un fost ministru de externe i de un militant civic3, astfel de ntreprinderi ignor rdcinile intelectuale romneti ale proiectului federal al Europei unite, sintetizate de George Ciornescu4, membru activ al Micrii Europene i al Nouvelles Equipes Internationales5 i, n aceast calitate, participant marginal la fondarea Comunitilor Europene alturi de ali proemineni politicieni, universitari i intelectuali n exil gzduii de cercurile democrat-cretine6. Numai c acest efort al unor oameni politici i universitari din prima jumtate a secolului al XX-lea de a schia, sub semnul federalismului, o teorie normativ asupra Europei rmne fr motenitori la nivelul discursului intelectual dominant. n anii 1990, privirea politicienilor i a experilor a fost aproape exclusiv comandat de interesul pragmatic pentru dezvoltare economic i consolidarea statului de drept ntr-o ar post-socialist ce tnjea dup credit internaional, de ordin att politic, ct i financiar. Dac Europa avea, pentru acest public, o trstur dominant, ea nu trebuia cutat ntr-o experien intelectual consumat n trecut i nu putea fi cutat altundeva dect n actualitatea abundenei:
Aceast structur [Uniunea European] asigur unul dintre cele mai ridicate niveluri de trai din lume. i, ceea ce e important, ntr-o lume democratic i deschis. Pentru o ar care nu a cunoscut dect chinul i strnsul curelei, abundena Uniunii Europene s-ar putea s fie chiar un oc cultural i material,
observa n 2004, n timp ce negocia cu Comisia harta itinerariului integrrii, primul ministru Adrian Nstase7. Sedus ntr-o prim etap de promisiunea prosperitii, opinia public a nceput treptat s devin contient de pericolele ce puteau sta ascunse n strfundurile
E.g. Iordan Gheorghe BRBULESCU, Uniunea European. Aprofundare i Extindere. Cartea I. De la Comunitile Europene la Uniunea European, Editura Trei, Bucureti, 2001. n nomenclatorul oficial al specializrilor universitare exist o diplom n relaii internaionale i studii europene. 2 E.g. Nicolae PUN, Ciprian Adrian PUN, Georgiana CICEO, Radu ALBUCOMNESCU, Finalitatea Europei. Consideraii asupra proiectului instituional i politic al Uniunii Europene, Editura Fundaiei pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 2005. 3 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Adrian SEVERIN, Un concept romnesc al Europei federale, in Renate WEBER (ed.), Un concept romnesc privind viitorul Uniunii Europene, Polirom, Iai, 2001, pp. 17-54. 4 George CIORNESCU, LEurope unie. De lide la fondation, dition soigne par tefan Delureanu, Paideia, Bucureti, 2005, reeditare a tezei din 1946 Les Roumains el lide fdraliste i a articolelor i studiilor scrise n exil. 5 tefan DELUREANU, Le Nouvelles Equipes Internationales. Per una rifondazione dellEuropa (1947-1965), Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2006, mai ales pp. 181-240. 6 IDEM, Uniunea European a Federalitilor i promotorii romni ai Europei Unite. Mrturie i memorie (1947-1957), Paideia, Bucureti, 2007. 7 Adrian NSTASE, De la Karl Marx la Coca-Cola, dialog deschis cu Alin Teodorescu, Nemira, Bucureti, 2004, p. 114.
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proiectului integrrii. Un studiu consacrat dezbaterilor publice avnd ca tem central Europa, aa cum acestea s-au desfurat mai ales n pres1, a stabilit c atitudinea fa de Uniunea European a avut iniial un public format din experi, ulterior a devenit o chestiune de identitate colectiv, pentru a se transforma n final ntr-o problem de poziionare politic. La nceput, n anii 1990, tonul l ddeau experii, birocraii i politicienii care fceau exact portretul acelei Europe la care visaser ndelung cetenii obinuii: o societate a abundenei, un supermarch gigantic (cu vorbele ironice ale unui intelectual care ncerca s rezume succint opinia general2) n care romnii vor ajunge i ei la un moment dat s-i fac cumprturile, cu condiia ca anumite proceduri complexe s fie duse la bun sfrit de ctre cei n drept s o fac. Atunci cnd, n anul 2000, Parlamentul a decis s dezincrimineze homosexualitatea ca gest sinonim cu europenizarea culturii penale motenite de la socialismul de stat, s-a deschis prima dezbatere cu adevrat contradictorie asupra semnificaiei proiectului european pentru o societate creia prea s i se cear s renune la ceva ce avea aerul c face parte indisolubil din identitatea sa colectiv. Contururile discursive ale acestei identiti au fost atunci creionate cu vigoare de arhiepiscopul Bartolomeu Anania. nvatul ierarh al Clujului i-a ntrerupt lucrul la noua versiune romneasc a Bibliei pentru a-i pune compatrioii n gard cu privire la preteniile reale ale Europei. Aceasta le-ar fi cerut romnilor, ca pre al aderrii, s considere acceptabile social sexul, homosexualitatea, viciile, drogurile, avorturile i ingineria genetic, din pricin c, fiind srcit spiritual i ntemeiat exclusiv pe politic i economie, Europei i lipsete orice urm de spiritualitate, cultur sau religie3. Deoarece avuia afiat a Europei ar putea fi doar o masc sub care risc s se ascund mizeria duhovniceasc, teologii romni au ales s se ocupe relativ sistematic i admonitoriu de amnezia european4, adic de relativism, secularizare i nstrinarea de tradiie ca maladii nrdcinate n reeta de fabricaie a Uniunii Europene, construit voluntar n aa fel nct amnezia i neutralitatea axiologic s prevaleze asupra culturii i identitii5. Din acel moment, integrarea european a rii a fost cntrit nu numai ca un fapt relevant doar pentru expertiza tehnic i birocratic, dar i ca o alegere de civilizaie sau, cu formula unui distins crturar de sensibilitate mrturisit conservatoare, ca o tensiune ntre dou tipuri de societate, unul ancorat n solidaritile organice ale vieii private, innd nc mpreun familiile i comunitile locale, iar cellalt generat de solidaritile organizate de sus n jos de ctre puterea politic6. Desigur, tipologia comunitar nu se potrivete doar Romniei, unde ar fi mai vizibil dect n alte
1 Camelia BECIU, Lespace publique des dbats sur lEurope. Traitements mdiatiques et modes de gnralisation, in Silvia MARTON (ed.), Europe in Its Making. A Unifying Perception on Europe, Institutul European, Iai, 2006, pp. 195-214. 2 Adrian MARINO, Pentru Europa. Integrarea Romniei. Aspecte ideologice i culturale, ediia a 2-a, Polirom, Iai, 2005, p. 134. 3 Citat de Lavinia STAN, Lucian TURCESCU, Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2007, p. 177; evoluia acestei dezbateri este urmrit la pp. 171-198. 4 E.g. Radu PREDA, Amnezia unui continent. Raportul Biseric-stat ntre laicism i relativism, in Miruna TTARU-CAZABAN (ed.), Teologie i politic. De la Sfinii Prini la Europa unit, Anastasia, Bucureti, 2004, pp. 309-359. 5 Radu PREDA, Semnele vremii. Lecturi social-teologice, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, p. 296. 6 Alexandru DUU, Ideea de Europa i evoluia contiinei europene, All Educational, Bucureti, 1999, p. 9.
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locuri de pe continent, ci poate servi drept model alternativ pentru ntreaga Europ, pus instituional n micare pn acum doar de individualismul liberal1. Filosofi i intelectuali publici, nu ntotdeauna conservatori, tradiionaliti sau cretini, dar deopotriv suspicioi fa de autonomia politicului i nencreztori n exclusivitatea normativ a raiunii, au formulat judeci similare. O astfel de poziie intelectual, destul de larg rspndit, nu trebuie ns interpretat ca o critic adresat Europei ca atare, n versiunea sa instituionalizat, ci are mai degrab rostul de a aproxima, cu alte mijloace dect cele ale politicilor publice i actelor administrative, care este pn la urm poziia politic a Romniei n Europa. i, mai important nc, de a hotr cine este ndreptit intelectual s dea seama despre aceast poziie i s-i fixeze coordonatele culturale. Aceste precizri pot servi drept cadru de contingene pentru o naraiune ce ar putea dezvlui autoritatea cultural ce spune istoria Europei i povestea europenizrii n beneficiul societii romneti. Pe 11 mai 2008, un sobor de episcopi ai Bisericii Ortodoxe Romne a svrit un lung ritual solemn pe o cmpie din nord-estul Transilvaniei. n prezena a zeci de mii de credincioi, arhiereii au celebrat canonizarea a patru rani romni executai chiar n locul respectiv n anul 1763. n prealabil, Sfntul Sinod le atribuise calitatea de martiri ai credinei strmoeti. Cine au fost cei patru noi sfini i ce au fcut ei anume pentru a se nvrednici de o asemenea recunoatere public i, n al doilea rnd, de ce a ateptat Biserica att de mult pentru a le valida meritele? Cu excepia celui mai n vrst dintre ei, un centenar ce cltorise pn n Rusia n dubla sa calitate de osta lefegiu i de clugr (poate doar improvizat), este vorba despre rani iobagi analfabei din partea locului, care se opuseser ns violent militarizrii regiunii lor de grani. Operaia, parte a unui vast proces de construcie statal (Einrichtungswerk), includea scoaterea din iobgie a locuitorilor din satele de la frontiera cu Moldova otoman. n schimbul noului lor statut social, de oameni liberi, ranilor li se cerea s se lase nrolai n regimentele grnicereti nsudene. Numai c, aa cum mrturisea cel mai nalt funcionar al provinciei2, obligaia de a sluji sub arme pentru a garanta securitatea militar a teritoriului locuit de ei (der Sicherheit des Landes) nu era primul obiectiv al autoritilor imperiale: misiunea lor de cpti era mai degrab una de factur politico-administrativ, i anume aceea de a contribui la sporirea puterii efective a statului (Vermehrung der wirklichen Macht des Staates) prin acceptarea unui efort de Umbildung, prin transformarea comportamentelor lor individuale i colective i prin asumarea unui rol social difereniat, specializat i cu vocaia utilitii publice. Guvernul le punea la dispoziie drepturi civile, echipament militar, coli elementare cu nvtori flueni n latin i german i o perspectiv clar de mobilitate social ascendent. Eliberai de cele mai multe legturi feudale, ranii trebuiau s accepte s-i serveasc mpratul i regele apostolic, fiind ncurajai (dei deloc obligai) s se uneasc cu Biserica acestuia, cea catolic, pstrndu-i ns netirbit ritul bizantin. Un aranjament echitabil, s-ar spune, cel puin ntre limitele pn la care luminatele Staatswissenschaften de la sfritul secolului al XVIII-lea erau dispuse s mearg. Cei patru sfini retroactivi nu au acceptat ns tranzacia i i-au instigat i pe ceilali steni s refuze s ias de sub jugul iobgiei, s poarte arme, s se comporte ca supui loiali i utili, s-i trimit copiii la coal unde s nvee graiuri strine i s
Ibidem, p. 138. Raportul baronului von Brukenthal citat de Carol GLLNER, Regimentele grnicereti din Transilvania 1764-1851, Editura Militar, Bucureti, 1973, pp. 26, 196.
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DANIEL BARBU
se mprteasc n biserici n care numele pontifului roman era pomenit la liturghie. ranii erau ndemnai s urmeze n continuare vechile obiceiuri tradiionale, s respecte ierarhiile locale, s struie n religia lor popular, protejat de la mare distan de suveranul tuturor Rusiilor i al tuturor pravoslavnicilor, s rmn n afara oricror repere oferite de cultura juridic a epocii Luminilor, nchii ermetic n micro-universul lor rural caracterizat de napoiere, analfabetism, autarhie economic i dominat de oligarhii rurale tradiionale. Condamnai pentru sediiune i incitare la rebeliune mpotriva statului, cei patru au fost executai chiar pe locul n care porniser rzvrtirea. Documentat amnunit de birocraii monarhiei administrative1 ce tindea s se manifeste ca o putere de hrtie (eine papierne Gewalt), cu formula unui observator contemporan din Ardeal2 incidentul a fost ulterior uitat de toate prile ce ar fi putut fi interesate s-i pun n valoare posibilele semnificaii pn n clipa cnd Romnia a semnat hrtiile de aderare la Uniunea European. Aceast povestire poate prea prea lung i n orice caz deconectat de la dezbaterile zilelor noastre. Cu toate acestea, dei evenimentele n cauz s-au petrecut n ultima parte a secolului al XVIII-lea, datarea lor politic trebuie fcut indubitabil n anul 2008. La urma urmelor, de ce ar fi ales Biserica dominant dintr-un stat membru al Uniunii Europene s sanctifice o reacie mpotriva modernizrii i a europenizrii ce trecuse neobservat, n ochii istoricilor naionaliti3 i ai credincioilor deopotriv, vreme de aproape dou veacuri i jumtate? n plus invizibilitatea micrii sociale din 1762-1763 pentru istoria ecleziastic pare pe deplin justificat de lipsa de relief a dimensiunii confesionale a faptelor. Oficialii militari i civili cu pregtire superioar n tiinele statului care au avut de nfruntat, soluionat i evaluat criza nu au considerat-o mai mult dect manifestarea incidental a unui conservatorism popular i reacionar, strnit de o msur luminat de reformism social i alimentat de ignoran, fanatism i xenofobie. Nu doar strinii i puteau ns forma o asemenea impresie. O parte din notabilii valahi nutreau, chiar de la nceputul secolului, sentimentul urgenei unei alegeri de civilizaie. Iat un exemplu. ntors de la Viena, unde se angajase n numele su i al romnilor ardeleni s primeasc unirea cu Biserica Romei, episcopul Athanasie convoac n anul 1700 un sobor la Alba Iulia. Incitai de Constantin Brncoveanu, popii, negustorii i boierii braoveni i fgreni nu accept s se uneasc cu npratul, Vldica i ara, adic cu romnii care puteau avea, n temeiul mecanismelor reprezentative recunoscute de constituiile transilvnene, o voce legal. Athanasie ia act de refuzul lor cu aceste cuvinte: Voi nu sntei din sborul nostru s v ducei la ara Turcului4. Episodul nu este relevant doar pentru istoria ecleziastic. Reperele elementare ale urgenei intrrii n modernitate erau deja limpezi n mintea ierarhului ardelean. Pe de o parte Roma, Viena, limbajul dreptului i o serie
Relatarea evenimentelor pe baza actelor procesului pstrate n arhivele imperiale la Mathias BERNATH, Habsburg und die Anfnge der Rumnischen Nationsbildung, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1972, pp. 158-160 i la Carol GLLNER, Regimentele grnicereti...cit., pp. 44-46. 2 Mathias BERNATH, Habsburg...cit., p. 45. 3 Silviu Dragomir, n a sa monumental, apologetic, patriotic i anti-catolic Istorie a desrobirii religioase a romnilor din Ardeal n secolul XVIII (dou volume de aproape 700 de pagini, Editura i Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, Sibiu, 1920, 1930) abia dac menioneaz evenimentele. 4 Nicolae IORGA, nsemnri de cronic ale clericilor din cheii Braovului, Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a Romniei, vol. XII, 1933, p. 75.
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de privilegii pentru elit ce promiteau s se transforme n drepturi universale. Pe de alt parte, ara Turcului, Balcanii altfel spus, celebrai ulterior de Mircea Eliade ca o punte ntre culturi, dar pn la urm doar un trm al dominaiei din care dreptul era exclus i n care drepturile, pe msura apariiei lor, vor fi exercitate sub form de privilegii ale elitei. Cu toate acestea, revolta celor patru rani mpotriva puterii impersonale de hrtie a statului modern n versiunea sa austriac nu a interesat nici istoriografia romantic i nici cea comunist, att insuficient informate asupra faptelor, ct i probabil suspicioase fa posibila lor inspiraie ruseasc, dar deopotriv nclinate s pun n valoare revoltele naionale mpotriva stpnirilor strine. Cei patru au trebuit s atepte anul 2008 pentru a le fi recunoscut calitatea de sfini martiri ai neamului i mrturisitori ai credinei ortodoxe. Siluetele lor se profileaz de fapt n filigranul unui manifest al Bisericii naionale ortodoxe cu privire la integrarea statului naional al romnilor n Uniunea European. Dar ce fel de credin putem spera s tim c au mrturisit cei patru rani de la sfritul secolului al XVIII-lea dintr-un col ndeprtat al unui imperiu ce ambiiona s administreze potrivit aceleiai tiine a statului nu numai Transilvania, dar i Bruxelles? Oricare ar fi fost inteniile lor, observatorul educat din secolul al XXI-lea, indiferent de credinele sale personale sau de orientrile sale politice, ar ajunge probabil la o concluzie asemntoare celei trase de funcionarii austrieci: ei s-au ridicat, cu preul vieii, n aprarea unei tradiii locale i rurale caracterizat de analfabetism, superstiii, suspiciune fa de strini, nencredere n productivitatea social a normelor scrise, ca i n capacitatea administraiei statului de a pune n legtur oamenii i lucrurile potrivit unor reguli raionale i impersonale. Dac aceasta este situaia, nseamn c Biserica a oferit susintorilor si din anul 2008 o contra-naraiune a integrrii europene, ca i un numr de indicaii cu privire la felul n care romnii ortodoci ar trebui s se poarte n faa Europei, privit ca un imperiu de tip nou, care adun nc o dat laolalt, ntr-un cadru normativ comun, att Transilvania, ct i Bruxelles. Ct de semnificativ ar putea fi un asemenea manifest i care ar fi audiena vizat? Nu cumva avem de-a face cu o ntreprindere mai degrab periferic i anecdotic, fr nici un fel de ecou ntr-o opinie public ale crei valori sunt modelate de imperativele secularizrii ce au unificat i lrgit Europa? Pentru a rspunde la aceste ntrebri, ar trebui s cntrim mai nti, lund n calcul profunzimea istoric a fenomenului, greutatea politic i cultural a Bisericii n viaa public romneasc i, pe cale de consecin, s estimm i ponderea pe care lurile ei de poziie ar putea-o avea n formarea unei imagini generale despre soarta, menirea i locul romnilor n Europa. Unele anchete de teren oarecum confideniale preau s indice c, chiar i sub comunism, practica religioas tradiional nu numai c nu dispruse, dar i pstrase un oarecare relief social1. Cum Biserica se afla ntr-o legtur vizibil cu statul (care i salariza clerul, i numea episcopii prin decret i i includea n reprezentana naional i n organizaiile de mas i obteti), apartenena la comunitatea ecleziastic dominant i nc privilegiat instituional avea un caracter voluntar extrem de discret2 i nu trecea dect n mod accidental i numai printr-un cumul de factori exogeni drept o form de diziden fa de socialismul devenit doctrin oficial a statului.
1 Mlina VOICU, Romnia religioas. Pe valul european sau n urma lui?, Institutul European, Iai, 2007, p. 27. 2 Cf. Peter BERGER, Orthodoxy and Global Pluralism, Demokratsiya. The Journal of PostSoviet Democratization, vol. 13, no. 3, 2005, pp. 441-442.
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DANIEL BARBU
Societile postcomuniste s-au dovedit apoi reinute n a-i estima i a-i mrturisi propria laicitate, atta vreme ct aceasta putea fi interpretat drept o dimensiune inoportun i indezirabil a motenirii ideologice a marxism-leninismului. Acesta este de altfel motivul pentru care fenomenul lepdrii publice de ateism pare s fi fost mai semnificativ statistic dup 1989 dect cel al abandonrii formale a cretinismului sub socialismul de stat1. Nimic surprinztor atunci n faptul c recensmintele postcomuniste indic, la rndul lor, c aproximativ 85% dintre romni se identific ca aparinnd Bisericii Ortodoxe. De asemenea, n toate sondajele, Biserica se bucur de un nivel de ncredere nu numai n cretere constant, dar i mai nalt n comparaie cu cel de care beneficiaz instituii de tipul armatei, guvernului, Parlamentului sau presei2. Aceste date aeaz Romnia n Europa alturi de Italia, unde cota de ncredere n Biseric este invers proporional cu cea n instituiile politice, dar la mare deprtare de Germania, unde ncrederea n instituiile politice este mai mare dect cea n Biserici3. n plus, Biserica Ortodox pare s exercite o influen suficient de mare asupra factorilor de decizie politic pentru ca, n anul 2007, Ministerul Educaiei s elimine din manualele de liceu orice referin la teoria evoluionist. Cu toate acestea, proporia celor care frecventeaz regulat Biserica pare, la o privire capabil s treac de prima impresie, s nu fie spectaculos superioar mediei europene4. La nivelul conduitelor individuale, aa cum pot fi surprinse statistic, romnii probabil c triesc ntr-un mediu relativ, dei nemrturisit, secularizat. De aceea, influena Bisericii n spaiul public ar putea fi lmurit cel mai bine cu ajutorul conceptului, greu traductibil, de vicarious religion, propus de Grace Davie5 pentru a descrie situaia n care o minoritate organizat de profesioniti ai cultului ndeplinete acte i gesturi religioase n numele i n locul unei majoriti care nu se comport de obicei aa cum este instruit de aceti practicieni calificai, dar este contient de activitatea desfurat de acetia n contul comunitii i i aprob rostul. ntr-un asemenea cadru conceptual, angajamentul personal fa de valori i practici religioase poate s fie lipsit de densitate statistic i s devin socialmente irelevant. ntr-adevr, nu spre instituie ca atare i ndreapt atenia romnii n cutare de instruciuni cu privire la conduitele lor publice. De pild, n alegerile prezideniale din anul 2000, candidatul Mugur Isrescu, susinut pe fa de nalta ierarhie ortodox (ntr-un spot electoral, mitropolitul de atunci al Moldovei l prezenta pe candidat cu
1 The lapsed Christians are being outnumbered by the lapsed atheists scrie cu maliie Ivana NOBLE, Theological Interpretation of Culture in Post-Communist Context, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2010, p. 4. 2 Dumitru SANDU, Spaiul social al tranziiei, Polirom, Iai, 1999, pp. 74-84. 3 Mlina VOICU, Romnia religioas...cit., pp. 128-138. 4 Sondajele realizate n Romnia ncepnd cu 1990, inclusiv Eurobarometrele, atunci cnd sunt interesate de comportamentele religioase ale respondenilor, ncearc s afle ct de des au acetia obiceiul de a vizita o biseric (sptmnal, lunar, sezonier etc.), nefiind de fapt curioase cu privire la participarea regulat, pe baze duminicale, la serviciile religioase. Din aceast pricin, datele culese de aceste sondaje nu sunt comparabile cu cele produse de cercetrile efectuate n ale societi europene. cf. Grace DAVIE, Religion in Modern Europe. A Memory Mutates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 61-81. n schimb, runda a patra (2008/2009) a European Social Survey Data plaseaz participarea duminical la acelai nivel cu Grecia, puin peste Frana, dar mult sub Irlanda, Portugalia sau Italia. 5 Grace DAVIE, Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge, in Nancy T. AMMERMAN (ed.), Everyday Religion. Observing Modern Religious Lives, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2007, pp. 21-35.
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cuvintele iat omul!) nu a obinut dect 9% din voturi, n vreme ce candidatul care a ctigat scrutinul din 2004 se remarcase printr-o rsuntoare (dei de scurt durat) apologie a drepturilor homosexualilor, ca i printr-o opoziie hotrt (dar nici ea de lung durat) fa de proiectul construirii n Bucureti a catedralei mntuirii neamului. n schimb, cele mai multe aspecte ale culturii politice par s poat fi citite cu ajutorul unui cod de lectur inspirat de ethosul ortodox. Sau, relund cuvintele unui reputat eseist i administrator cultural,
dac prin Biseric nelegei instituia cu clerul ei eu am puine legturi cu Biserica [] Dac ns prin Biseric nelegei comunitatea credincioilor n jurul oficierii tainelor i a pstrrii acestei tradiii [] atunci voi declara cu toat simplitatea c sunt n ea1.
Stilul, uneori chiar i coninutul dezbaterilor post-comuniste pe teme politice i de societate, nelegerea comun a responsabilitii personale i colective, a imputabilitii actelor private ori publice, modelul vieii de familie, cstoria la biseric i nmormntarea cu preoi, percepia asupra diviziunilor funcionale din societate, toate au fost plmdite ntr-un context religios nc fertil i care nu i-a pierdut productivitatea nici mcar sub comunism2. i din acest motiv, societatea romneasc pare s fi ieit din comunism cu un grad relativ nalt de omogenitate cultural3 i las impresia c a rmas in continuare relativ coerent i consensual n opiniile sale de-a lungul procesului de integrare european. Ca i cum prbuirea unei ideologii unanimiste i necontestate ar fi cerut o nou homonoia, o alt form de asentiment colectiv cu privire la norme i valori. Prin simpla, dar monumentala ei prezen (n media, n armat, n spitale i nchisori, n coli, cu toate ocaziile festive civile i militare)4, aprobat formal sau tacit de ctre stat, Biserica dominant a oferit spontan oportunitatea consensului i a satisfcut nevoia unei autoriti culturale de nlocuire. Politicienii i experii au fost nendoielnic protagonitii integrrii europene, dar nu au fost constrni de universitari sau de intelectuali s acioneze n calitate de subiect al propriilor lor aciuni. Ei au articulat n scris, n discurs i n formularea deciziilor ceea ce nu erau pregtii nici s fac i nici s gndeasc. De aceea, Biserica Ortodox naional, privit ca un depozit de sensuri, ca i motenirea intelectual a lui Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran i Constantin Noica, gnditori reacionari anti-moderni i, pentru un timp, naionaliti i-au unit neprogramat forele pentru a-i impune dominaia asupra discursului public. Cum a fost oare posibil o asemenea ntlnire, oarecum improbabil n cadre seculare? S lmurim aici o singur posibil cauz. Procesul continuu de raionalizare a sferei publice, considerat de Max Weber ca fiind principalul impuls pentru transformarea societilor n timpurile moderne, poate fi anevoie observat n Romnia,
Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Politice, Humanitas, Bucureti, 1996, p. 241. Cea mai clar prezentare a relaiilor ambigue dintre Biseric i statul communist la Olivier GILLET, Religion et nationalisme. Lidologie de lEglise Orthodoxe Roumaine sous le communisme, ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1987. 3 Daniel BARBU, The Burden of Politics. Public Space, Political Participation, and State Socialism, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. II, no. 2, 2002, pp. 329-346. 4 O prezentare analitic a acestei prezene publice la Iuliana CONOVICI, Ortodoxia n Romnia postcomunist. Reconstrucia unei identiti publice, vol. I-II, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 20092010.
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DANIEL BARBU
chiar i atunci cnd toate faptele i cuvintele imaginabile sunt luate n calcul. Egalitatea politic nu numai c a fost afirmat ca un principiu de import, pe care elitele dominante nu au tiut s l explice i s l garanteze, dar apariia democraiei electorale n anii 1920 i 1930 a fost mai nti amnat, apoi condiionat de un stat liberal incapabil s-i imagineze cum reprezentarea egal a unor ceteni incompeteni politic (din dublul motiv al analfabetismului i lipsei proprietii) ar putea fi organizat1. Mai mult, o via cultural oarecum original s-a nfiripat n perioada interbelic sub forma unei critici multiple a secularizrii, democraiei parlamentare, culturii occidentale, Luminilor, europenizrii i egalitii politice2. De la sfritul anilor 1930, Mircea Eliade3 este socotit a fi nu numai un martor de excepie al perioadei de nflorire i vitalitate a culturii romneti interbelice, dar i cel mai influent intelectual romn din toate timpurile. Opera sa, academic, eseistic i literar, ca i viziunea sa teoretic cu privire la autonomia politicului dau nc tonul produciei culturale romneti. De unde ncepe misiunea Romniei? Un articol publicat n 1937 de Mircea Eliade4 a fixat termenii unei dezbateri ce nu i-a pierdut nc suflul: istoricul debutant al religiilor i ziaristul de extrem dreapt observ n respectivul text c procesul de modernizare a Romniei poate fi socotit un eec tocmai pentru c a fost pus n oper dintr-o perspectiv politic; voga primatului politic n societile liberale i democratice i, prin imitaie, n Romnia, s-a dovedit ineficient atta timp ct ara a rmas o periferie a Europei protestante i catolice, o naiune nensemnat, animat de o cultur minor; numai printr-un primat al spiritualului, att anti-democratic, ct i religios, ar putea att Ortodoxia, ct i Romnia s ajung s domine ntreaga Europ. Romnii, locuii de o colectiv sete de sfinenie vor aduce pe lume un om nou, dar nu pentru a face politic, ci pentru ca s fac istorie prin valori supraistorice. Pe scurt, misiunea Romniei ar fi aceea de a face istorie, nu de a face politic. Ce fel de istorie ns? Precizarea vine n 1943 de la Constantin Noica: Nu mai putem tri ntr-o Romnie patriarhal, steasc, anistoric. Nu ne mai mulumete Romnia etern; vrem o Romnie actual5. Istoria care trebuie fcut este cea a prezentului. A prezentului continuu al spiritului. Cnd a cobort pentru prima oar n spaiul public, Eliade avea nclinaia de a se considera un discipol indirect al lui Ren Gunon6. Cu acest titlu, pentru el lumea occidental estompase identitatea real a societii, ce rezid n tradiie.
1 Daniel BARBU, Cristian PREDA, Building the State from the Roof Down. Varieties of Romanian Liberal Nationalism, in Ivn Zoltn DNES (ed.), Liberty and the Search for Identity. Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York, 2006, pp. 367-382. 2 O introducere solid n aceast chestiune este ofiert de Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995. 3 Dei lipsit de cadru teoretic, este util biografia ntocmit de Florin URCANU, Mircea Eliade. Le prisonnier de lhistoire, La Dcouverte, Paris, 2005. 4 Vremea, X, no. 477, 28 februarie 1937, p. 3, reluat in Mircea ELIADE, Texte legionare i despre romnism, ediie de Mircea Handoca, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, pp. 47-49. 5 Constantin NOICA, Ce e etern i ce e istoric n cultura romneasc, Revista Fundaiilor Regale, X, nr. 9, septembrie 1943, p. 528. 6 La crise du monde moderne a lui Gunon a fost publicat ntr-o ediie romneasc n 2008 alturi de alte scrieri ale autorului francez, scoase n mai multe tiraje, de Editura Humanitas al crui animator este Gabriel Liiceanu, principalul depozitar al motenirii intelectuale a lui Mircea Eliade; prefaa declar c opera lui [Ren Gunon] are astzi nu numai o valoare
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Autonomia politicului i invenia Sinelui au pervertit natura uman ca atare, cel mai bine i mai autentic definit de figura lui homo religious, un om nu numai organic ataat de comunitate, dar legat natural de o autoritate superioar, normativ i explicativ n acelai timp. Att proiectul Luminilor ct i triumful tiinei politice de tip hobbesian s-ar cuveni de aceea considerate operaiuni intelectuale nstrinate de o tiin autentic a spiritului, ce nu poate fi experimentat cu titlu individual i n condiii de egalitate a celor implicai, ci trebuie ntrupat n comuniti naionale unificate, purificate, organizate ierarhic i nsufleite de vocaia universalului. Pe cale de consecin, naiunile au misiuni. Ele domin sau sunt dominate. Pentru motive evidente, ncepnd cu anii 1950, Eliade i-a adpostit doctrina n disciplina academic a istoriei religiilor, care l-a ajutat s obin recunoatere internaional. Dar muli intelectuali rmai acas i-au pstrat atenia treaz la aspectul holistic i politic al ntreprinderii intelectuale a lui Eliade. n 1988, un membru al generaiei lui Mircea Eliade, filosoful Constantin Noica1, a publicat n german, la o editur socialist, o colecie de eseuri traduse n romnete cinci ani mai trziu2. Volumul se deschide cu o foarte comentat ulterior Scrisoare ctre un intelectual din Occident, ce cuprinde, printre multe alte consideraii, o caracterizare a Europei ca o bye-bye society3, ca o civilizaie caracterizat de multiple deconectri i partiii. n 2003, cnd iminena integrrii europene devenise o certitudine politic, arhiepiscopul Bartolomeu Anania a reformulat tema separrii, afirmnd c Noua Europ (adic Uniunea European) are doar dou dimensiuni, politic i economic, amndou importante, dar insuficiente, deoarece att economia, ct i politica au n comun faptul c sunt menite s-i despart pe oameni; Noii Europe i-ar lipsi tocmai acele dimensiuni de natur s-i aduc mpreun pe oameni, cea cultural i cea religioas4. n ceea ce-l privete pe Noica, acesta a continuat s caute o Europ a originilor i a autenticitii i a schiat un model cultural european ce ar fi rezumatul unui soi de gramatic performativ a istoriei spiritului european: Evul Mediu ar fi fost o perioad a substantivului, interesat s numeasc substana fiinei; de la Renatere i Reform pn la Romantism, Europa a trecut de la o cultur adverbial la una pronominal, explornd mai nti modurile i modalitile mai degrab dect esenele i sfrind prin a inventa pronumele personal Eu rostit de individul solitar; Europa contemporan era pentru Noica o er a conjunciei, preocupat s afirme relaii modale de tipul i, sau, dac, atunci; Noica i ncheie argumentaia prin chemarea la via a timpului prepoziiei, un timp al unei corelaii autentice ntre oameni i ntre oameni i lucruri, timp ce ar putea deveni actual dac ar fi bine pregtit de heralzi competeni5. Pe scurt, tot ceea ce s-a ntmplat n Europa n vremurile recente, incluznd durata construciei europene, ar trebui considerat, n viziunea lui Constantin Noica, ca un proces de nstrinare treptat de metafizic.
doctrinar, ci i una profetic, Ren GUNON, Criza lumii moderne, traducere i prefa de Anca Manolescu, Humanitas, Bucureti, 2008, p. 18. 1 Cea mai util monografie consacrat filosofiei lui Noica este Laura PAMFIL, Noica necunoscut. De la uitarea fiinei la reamintirea ei, Biblioteca Apostrof & Casa Crii de tiin, ClujNapoca, 2007. 2 Constantin NOICA, De dignitate Europae, Kriterion Verlag, Bukarest, 1988 i IDEM, Modelul cultural European, Humanitas, Bucureti, 1993. 3 n englez n textul romnesc, Constantin NOICA, Modelul cultural European, cit., p. 9. 4 Citat de Lavinia STAN, Lucian TURCESCU, Religion and Politics...cit., p. 207. 5 Constantin NOICA, Modelul cultural European, cit., p. 92 i passim.
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DANIEL BARBU
O asemenea reflecie a declanat un efort intelectual de dez-raionalizare, un fel de tur ghidat nspre rdcinile religioase ale omului modern, o ncercare de a re-vrji lumea (Wiederverzauberung der Welt)1 ca metode de a trata dezafectarea metafizic a spiritului contemporan. De pild, Horia-Roman Patapievici, probabil cel mai bine vndut autor de non-ficiune din anii 2000, cheam la o reafirmare i chiar la o reinstituire a exploatrii premoderne a spaiului, ce ar fi fost trecut pe planul doi de experiena modern a timpului: incitat de o lectur oarecum oblic a lui Carl Schmitt, el crede c tradiia cretin este dependent de materia solid a uscatului i de alte substane eseniale2, n vreme ce iudaismul pribeag i lipsit de Centru, citat n calitatea acestuia de ferment al lumii contemporane, se bizuiete pe timp i pe fluiditatea politic a mrii, fiind astfel mai potrivit pentru modernitate, care nelege existena nu ca pe un substantiv, un obiect i o prezen, ci ca pe un mod al verbului, o trecere i o pierdere3. Dac entuziatii rentoarcerii metafizicii au sperat s fac istorie n anii 1930, participnd la micarea fascist i mprtindu-i planurile pentru unificarea unui Raum european, n vremea comunismului i dup 1989 ei s-au angajat ntr-o critic a istoriei politice moderne n numele unor valori supra-istorice. Ei se strduiesc s scape de rigorile vrstei democratice prin aciune cultural. n folosul societii, votul universal trebuie, prin urmare, limitat: dar nu prin restrngerea dreptului de a vota, ci prin calificarea voturilor4, mai precis printr-o clasificare ierarhic a voturilor n temeiul fluenei culturale a votanilor, conchide Patapievici. Cultura devine remediul pentru aceast ndeprtare a Europei de nucleul su metafizic originar i atemporal, situat la mare distan de practica egalitii. Dar despre ce cultur este vorba i, mai ales, despre a cui cultur? Inspirat fr echivoc de Mircea Eliade, un membru de vaz al cercului lui Noica definea cultura ca fiind calea cea mai recomandabil ctre ceva situat dincolo de ea i altfel de neatins, ca fiind o metod optim de a subzista n timp, de a te aeza n poziia cea mai just ntre viaa real i sacru5. Dac cultura corespunde cel mai bine metaforei drumului, nseamn c ea are nevoie de cluze. Trimind implicit ctre un rspuns deja formulat de Eliade n 1937, filosoful i eseistul Emil Cioran6 i sugereaz lui Constantin Noica n august 1980 cine ar putea fi aceste cluze: Sleirea Occidentului este un fenomen indubitabil i iremediabil, n vreme ce oamenii din sud-estul Europei (ca i din America Latin) sunt mai interesani, mai compleci, mai surprinztori i au
1
Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Omul recent. O critic a modernitii din perspective ntrebrii Ce se pierde atunci cnd ceva se ctig?, ediia a 5-a, Humanitas, Bucureti, 2008, p. 7, n german n text. Noiunea (re-enchantment) pare mprumutat din limbajul ortodoxiei radicale i al teoriei critice, unde este ns utilizat ntr-un sens contrar, de fetiizare a obiectelor de consum, cf. Graham WARD, True Religion, Blackwell, Oxford, 2003, p. 129. 2 Patapievici este departe de a fi singur n nelegerea spaiului ca o dimensiune mai important dect timpul n reeta identitii naionale: Horia Bernea, important artist plastic i director fondator al Muzeului ranului Romn, nu numai c a pictat cu obstinaie acelai deal mistic i aceeai grdin paradiziac, dar i-a conceput muzeul ncredinat spre administrare de ctre autoritile guvernamentale ca pe o recreare a unui spaiu tradiional, atemporal, omogen, continuu i intens religios, populat de artefacte extrase din cronologia i utilitatea iniiale. 3 Ibidem, p. 196-197. 4 Ibidem, p. 390. 5 Andrei PLEU, Minima moralia, Cartea Romneasc, Bucureti, 1988, pp. 107-110. 6 O analiz a scrierilor romneti ale lui Emil Cioran la Marta PETREU, An Infamous Past: E.M. Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania, Ivan R. Dee Publisher, Chicago, 2005.
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mai mult vitalitate, probabil pentru c nu sunt stupid de politizai, asemeni intelectualilor occidentali1. n pofida (dac nu chiar datorit) experienei comuniste, Romnia ar putea constitui un refugiu pentru esena culturii europene, aproape disprut din Occident. Sub socialismul de stat, intelectualii grupai n jurul lui Noica au afirmat, ntr-o formulare din 1986 adresat deschis ideologiei totalitare, c sunt ei nii avocaii unui totalitarism cultural, unul al valorilor, sinonim cu ideologia lucrului bine fcut2. Poate prea astzi surprinztor c n decada ce a precedat demisia comunismului o poziie relativ central pe scena intelectual a fost ocupat de un filosof format n anii 1930, marcat de o istorie de asociere personal cu micarea fascist naional i teoretician, n anii 1980, al contrastului ntre domeniul spiritului, pentru care Romnia continua s depun mrturie i domeniul untului ce ar fi luat iremediabil n stpnire Europa apusean3. ntr-o discuie ce aparent a avut loc n 1983, Constantin Noica l-ar fi ntrebat pe un intelectual ce-i mprtise intenia de a emigra n Occident n ce Germanie vrei s pleci? n Germania untului sau n Germania culturii? adugnd imediat c, paradoxal, [Germania culturii] o poate gsi mai lesne aici [i.e. n Romnia socialist]4. Printr-o distorsiune ulterioar a acestei interogaii formulat cu ironic precauie, aluzia istoricist a lui Noica la un faimos clieu din deceniul al patrulea al secolului al XX-lea a trecut imediat n dialectul intelectual cel mai utilizat sub forma standardizat Europa untului, interpretat ca un diagnostic pus ambiiei statelor membre ale Uniunii de a fi societi ale prosperitii. La aceast formul vor recurge ulterior att partizanii cosmopolitismului i europenismului5, ct i tradiionaliti apropiai de ierarhia ortodox6. Pn la moartea sa n 1987, Constantin Noica reuise s devin, n ochii discipolilor si, o instituie naional7, o figur ndreptit s reprezint[e] cultura nsi8. Istoria transformrii unui intelectual, fie acesta cu totul excepional, ntr-o instituie s-a petrecut, cum se ntmpl adesea, chiar pe msur ce aceast istorie era consemnat i povestit n succesivele ediii ale Jurnalului de la Pltini, publicat mai nti n 1983 cu aprobarea autoritilor comuniste competente. Gabriel Liiceanu va relata ulterior c, n iarna n care povestea unui nelept trind pe un munte izolat i educnd pentru metafizic un numr de emuli mai tineri a ieit de sub tipar pentru prima oar, bunurile de consum erau rare i greu de procurat. Cu toate acestea, un
1 Emil CIORAN, Scrisori ctre cei de-acas, editate de Gabriel Liiceanu i Theodor Enescu, Humanitas, Bucureti, 1995, p. 311. 2 Scrisoare a lui Gabriel Liiceanu ctre Ion Ianoi din noiembrie 1986, in Gabriel LIICEANU (ed.), Epistolar, Cartea Romneasc, Bucureti, 1987, p. 291. 3 O explicaie parial a acestui caz curios in Katherine VERDERY, National Ideology under Socialism. Indentity and Cultural Politics in Ceauescus Romania, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles and London, 1991, pp. 256-301. 4 Gabriel LIICEANU, Jurnalul de la Pltini. Un model paideic n cultura umanist, Cartea Romneasc, Bucureti, 1983, p. 136. 5 E.g. Adrian MARINO, Pentru Europa...cit., p. 135. 6 E.g. intervenia teologului Costion Nicolescu, director de relaii publice al Muzeului ranului Romn, la o coal de var organizat de Departmentul pentru romnii de pretutindeni, reluat de un ziar local, Adevrul Harghitei, XX, no. 2501, 23 august 2000, p. 4. 7 Gabriel LIICEANU, n loc de prefa Ce nseamn a fi european n Estul postbelic?, prefa la a doua ediie a Jurnalului de la Pltini, Humanitas, Bucureti, 1991, pp. 5-16; toate citatele din acest paragraf sunt extrase de aici. 8 Andrei PLEU, Minima moralia, cit., p. 97.
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exemplar al crii era schimbat pe piaa neagr pentru patru pachete de unt. Cineva ar putea comenta c, sub socialismul de stat, suportul imprimat al culturii autentice valora de patru ori greutatea sa n unt. n viaa real, spune Liiceanu, societile totalitare sunt ne-politice. Prin urmare, cultura (dac este bine fcut de persoane selectate cu grij i atent formate) poate frnge monopolul pe care o ngust minoritate l are asupra politicii. n fapt, comparat cu ideologia socialismului tiinific, cultura nalt european (n stare de extincie n Europa nsi) era un scenariu alternativ i avea, cu acest titlu, o semnificaie politic, era de-a dreptul o form de rezisten politic. Prin cultur, indivizi educai i nsingurai ncercau mai puin s evadeze pe cont propriu din absurditatea i mizeria discursului public, ct s participe din umbr la destinul comunitii, la o atemporalitate cultural menit s dea suflet naiunii sau, mai heideggerian, s pstoreasc acest suflet. Mircea Eliade spusese deja acest lucru cu alte cuvinte, dar cu acelai miez: naiunile au misiuni. i pentru a le duce la bun sfrit au nevoie de o ndrumare intelectual de felul celei de care Romnia a beneficiat n anii 1930 i din nou n 1980 cnd Eliade, Cioran i Noica au funcionat ca instituii naionale, proclamnd mizeria politicului (deopotriv a politicii democratice i a celei comuniste) i vestind primatul spiritualului i al culturii. Astzi, tocmai absena unei asemenea autoriti legitime, bazat pe premise normative pre-moderne i metafizice, poate fi considerat drept cauz principal pentru neputina cea mai radical a democraiei, ntemeiat pe drepturi i indiferent la datorii1, insist Patapievici. Cultura, continu el, este prin firea lucrurilor o form de inegalitate ncrustat n vechea tradiie european a ierarhiei valorilor; de aici, riscul culturii de a fi distrus de figura omului recent, conceput ca o combinaie ntre colectivismul chinez i corectitudinea politic american, ca un produs al unui egalitarism triumftor2. Spre deosebire de omul nou al spiritului, nsetat de sfinenie ortodox, anunat cndva de Eliade, omul recent occidental nu are dect o singur valoare, prosperitatea material urmrit cu preul sacrificrii libertii i culturii3. Pus n micare de politic i economie, Europa nu este numai un loc al separrilor, aa cum Noica i Anania observaser, dar i unul din care au fost excluse religia i cultura, ca expresii ale unui spirit ne-politic, adaug Patapievici. Dac aa stau lucrurile, cum s-ar situa Romnia ntr-un asemenea peisaj geo-politic. Theodor Baconsky admite (fr s-l citeze explicit) c viziunea lui Eliade potrivit creia ortodoxia va deveni [] alternativa spiritual a Occidentului excesiv secularizat supravieuiete nc ca o visare luntric, ca un ideal sau o utopie pozitiv a credincioilor ortodoci4. Aceast geopolitic a spiritului, ce opune o Europ politizat i secularizat unei Romnii pasionat ortodox i struitoare n excelena sa cultural reprezint punctul de ntlnire dintre contra-naraiunea istoricist a Europei creat de autoritile bisericeti n jurul unor martiri din secolul al XVIII-lea i proiectul de resuscitare a metafizicii propus de intelectualii din mainstream care continu reflecia lui Noica fr a declina explicit o identitate confesional sau mcar o afiliere generic
Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Omul recent...cit., pp. 94-95. Ibidem, pp. 254-246. 3 Ibidem, p. 216. 4 Theodor BACONSKY, Decadena etatismului i renaterea ortodox, in Ioan I. IC Jr., Germano MARTINO (ed.), Doctrina social a Bisericii. Fundamente, documente, analize, perspective, Deisis, Sibiu, 2002, p. 355.
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la cretinism1. Dac, aa cum crede Jrgen Habermas2, modelul post-secular european i gndirea post-metafizic sunt inseparabile, atunci Romnia ar trebui tratat ca un caz deviant. Ierarhia Bisericii poate fi, aa cum a fost acuzat adesea de susintorii si cei mai luminai, angajat n politici anti-intelectualiste, de felul canonizrii mai multor sfini hotrt nefamiliari cu Platon i Augustin i oricum lipsii de orice capacitate de a contempla posibilitatea ca gnditori precum Hegel sau Heidegger s sar ntr-o zi n ajutorul metafizicii. Intelectualii publici, prin definiie oameni de cultur au tocmai rostul de a completa ceea ce clerul ignor sau abhor. A spus-o Andrei Pleu imediat dup cderea comunismului:
ntr-o societate normal, Biserica are rol de direcie de contiin, iar cultura se hrnete din ea ca dintr-un temei sigur. Acum la noi situaia e de aa natur, nct cultura trebuie s-i asume temporar rolul de a iradia pozitiv asupra Bisericii din punct de vedere moral i intelectual3.
Punile alpine de la Salva, unde patru rani au contestat tiina statului aa cum Europa Luminilor era dispus s o practice i muntele Pltini, de unde filosoful Constantin Noica a invalidat Europa untului din a dou jumtate a secolului al XX-lea, aparin unei geografii spirituale complementare. Religia i cultura sunt mobilizate, fie mpreun, fie pe rnd, pentru a pune din nou pe harta continentului spiritul european pe care numai romnii s-ar ncpna s l in viu. n plus, religia i cultura mai au ceva n comun, n dimensiunea lor instituionalizat. i Biserica i oamenii de cultur au tcut sub comunism. i Biserica i cultura prezint dup 1989 aceast tcere ca pe o form metafizic de rezisten. ntr-adevr, o asemenea complex ntreesere a religiei i culturii ntr-o ordine de civilizaie n care se gsesc fuzionate o Biseric naional, un sens tradiional al familiei, o respingere cultural a modernitii i o nencredere vdit n egalitate seamn retrospectiv cu cteva din trsturile pe care Charles Taylor le-a atribuit vrstei mobilizrii ce a precedat vrsta secularizrii4. Dac secularizarea implic n chip necesar ndreptirea egal a tuturor indivizilor de a formula i reformula argumentele publice fr a recurge ns la alte resurse dect cele puse la dispoziie de raiunea natural, cultura politic romneasc nu a fost niciodat secularizat, atta timp ct autonomia politicului trebuie socotit drept pivotul secularizrii. Parlamentarismul liberal din veacul al XIX-lea i din prima parte a celui urmtor credea c politica este o variabil dependent de destinul naiunii, n vreme ce socialismul de stat a tratat politica ca un efect tranzitoriu de suprastructur dependent de sensul implacabil al
1 Un teolog cu frecvente contribuii n magazinele culturale i reproeaz lui Patapievici lipsa unei atitudini confesionale explicite: Mihail NEAMU, Bufnia printre drmturi. Insomnii teologice n Romnia postocmunist, ediia a 2-a, Polirom, Iai, 2008, pp. 185-215. Ct despre Constantin Noica, filosoful a fost de o discreie aproape desvrit cu privire la poziia sa fa de credina cretin. 2 Jrgen HABERMAS, Religion in the Public Sphere, European Journal of Philosophy, XIV, no. 1, 2006, pp. 1-25. 3 Citat de Ioan I. IC Jr., Dilema social a Bisericii Ortodoxe Romne: radiografia unei probleme, in Ioan I. IC Jr., Germano MARTINO (ed.), Doctrina social a Bisericii...cit., p. 550. 4 Charles TAYLOR, A Secular Age, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2007, pp. 445-472.
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istoriei, cu putin de citit mai ales n procesele economice i sociale. Postcomunismul a tratat politicul ntr-un mod asemntor1. ntotdeauna rmnea ceva, o esen mai profund i mai semnificativ, dincolo de politic, dei acest altceva al politicii nu a fost ntotdeauna acelai. Prin urmare, spaiul public romnesc poate fi considerat post-secular numai n msura n care, n cursul integrrii europene, comunitatea politic romneasc a devenit contemporan cu ora european. Este un spaiu postsecular i pentru c intelectualii din mainstream i-au organizat carierele i i-au ctigat autoritatea cultural afirmnd c Uniunea European poate fi un risc pentru Europa. Pentru ei i pentru audienele lor, Uniunea s-a artat a fi, n lungul proces al facerii ei instituionale, o ntreprindere politic i birocratic post-modern construit la mare distan de spiritul european ce i-ar fi nsufleit de fondatorii Comunitilor, educai ntr-o tradiie n care cretinismul i umanismul erau nc mpletite. ntre timp,
repudierea umanismului, uitarea cretinismului i relativismul ideologic pot ucide Europa: nu doar cultural, ci i politic, i economic, i militar2.
Desigur, intelectualii romni nu sunt foarte originali n tratamentul critic la care supun construcia european, dar sunt probabil nclinai s simplifice i s dea un plus de ascuime unor poziii formulate, cu nuane de sensuri uneori delicate, de puinii autori contemporani pe care sunt dispui s-i citeze accidental (printre ei Pierre Manent, Roger Scruton sau Joseph Weiler). Aceast abordare contondent a proiectului politic european este poate i o metod de a evita s produc o explicaie cu privire la neasemnarea durabil dintre societatea romneasc i modelul social european. Este probabil nendoielnic c naraiunea integrrii europene aa cum este elaborat de intelectualii romni ar putea fi sintetizat dup cum urmeaz: n domeniul spiritului, Europa supravieuiete mai ales n Est, ngrijit de intelectuali precum cei romni; n termeni economici i politici, Uniunea European este cluzit de o birocraie secularist i relativist. Tot ceea ce s-a realizat n cursul construciei europene i al procesului de integrare a Romnei nu este suficient de semnificativ pentru intelectualii publici. Profesioniti ai culturii aparinnd clasei mijlocii sub comunism, ei au cptat n 1989 o deplin liberate de expresie i de micare. Ei se afl acum angajai ntr-o operaiune ce ar fi trebuit s-i defineasc ca intelectuali sub socialismul de stat: s ncurajeze non-conformismul n raport cu discursul public dominant. i fac acest lucru cu aceleai mijloace narative pe care le folosiser ca s pstreze tcerea sub comunism: spun povestea preeminenei culturii i a spiritului asupra politicului.
1 Exceptnd entuziasmul electoral al anului 1990, rata participrii la alegerile naionale i locale este mai apropiat de cea din America mai puin secularizat dect de cifrele oferite de intens secularizata Europ occidental. 2 Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Valorile Europei, cit., p. 259.
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ARTICULI
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DANIEL BARBU
Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008
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Les voies daccs au pouvoir excutif
ALEXANDRA IONACU
Loin dtre nouveau, le dbat portant sur les lites au sommet de ltat sinscrit dans une longue tradition de la littrature scientifique. Contestes et disposant de moins de confiance de la part des lecteurs1, les lites constituent, dans une perspective traditionnelle de la science politique, des miroirs de la reprsentativit du rgime politique en place. Les carrires politiques, les voies daccs vers une fonction publique furent ainsi considres en tant que fondements dans lanalyse de la lgitimit dun rgime2 ou dune organisation politique3. Certes, mme dans les dmocraties stables, les lites politiques ne prsentent pas de configurations uniques et limportance de certaines ressources menant des slections successives dans des positions de pouvoir varie en fonction du contexte historique ou de ldifice institutionnel du pays4. Cependant, durant les dernires dcennies, le dveloppement des mdias, la polarisation des lections, la personnification croissante des campagnes lectorales ont contribu, partout en Europe, un phnomne de convergence des formes de dlibration et de dcision qui suggrent un renforcement des excutifs5. Dans ce contexte, la nomination dans
1 Mattei DOGAN, Erosion of Confidence in Thirty European Democracies, dans IDEM (ed.), Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2005, pp. 13, 18-19. 2 Richard KATZ, Party in Democratic Theory, dans Richard KATZ, William CROTTY (eds.), Handbook of Political Parties, Sage, London, 2006, pp. 34-47; Kenneth PREWITT, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis and New York, 1970, pp. 205-217. 3 Gideon RAHAT, Candidate Selection: The Choice Before the Choice, Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, no. 1, January 2007, pp. 157-170; Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, Candidate Selection Methods and Consequences, dans Richard KATZ, William CROTTY (eds.), Handbookcit., pp. 109-122; Lars BILLIE Democratizing A Democratic Procedure? Myth and Reality? Candidate Selection in Western European Parties, Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2001, pp. 363-380; Krister LUNDELL, Determinants of Candidate Selection. The Degree of Centralisation in Comparative Perspective, Party Politics, vol. 10, no. 1, 2004, pp. 25-47. 4 Mattei DOGAN, Introduction. Diversity of Elite Configurations and Clusters of Power, dans IDEM (ed.), Elite Configurations at the Apex of Power, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2003, pp. 1-17/ p. 6. 5 Jean Michel DE WAELE, Paul MAGNETTE, Introduction, dans IDEM (eds.), Les dmocraties europennes. Une approche compare des systmes politiques nationaux, Armand Colin, Paris, 2008, pp. 3-9. V. galement Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialisation of Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
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une position politique lintrieur de lquipe gouvernementale1 a t considre comme un sommet dune carrire politique2. La concentration du pouvoir au sein des gouvernements aurait donc conduit les partis politiques vers la nomination dans ces fonctions publiques des acteurs centraux dans leur conomie organisationnelle ayant aussi une vaste exprience au niveau de la prise de dcision3. Visant, au moins dun point de vue idal typique, la fois lexistence dune comptence minimale de lacteur tmoigne lintrieur de lorganisation politique et une certaine loyaut par rapport la politique gnrale du parti4, le choix des acteurs gouvernementaux constitue un fondement dans larticulation des mcanismes dcisionnels et de la nature mme du systme politique en place5. De la sorte, ltude de ltape la plus importante de la promotion
Cette tude reprend une dfinition large de la notion dlite gouvernementale en incluant les ministres, le premier chelon de pouvoir de lexcutif, mais aussi la population excutive du second chelon de pouvoir, les secrtaires dtat qui sont nomms sur les critres politiques. V. Jean BLONDEL, Introduction, dans Jean BLONDEL, Maurizio COTTA (eds.), The Nature of Party Government A Comparative European Perspective, Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, 2000, p. 14, or Alain ERALY, Le pouvoir enchan tre ministre en Belgique, d. Labor, Coll. La Noria, Bruxelles, 2002. Cette dfinition plus large est rencontre dans ltude des lites et elle a t consacre par Mattei Dogan qui considre comme faisant partie du cabinet non seulement des ministres mais aussi les secrtaires et les sous-secrtaires dtat. V. Mattei DOGAN, Sociologia elitelor politice, dans IDEM, Sociologie politic. Opere alese, Ed. Alternative, Bucureti, 1999, p. 60. 2 Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, Sage Publication, London, 1986, pp. 16, 24 et aussi JEAN BLONDEL, Maurizio COTTA, Conclusions, dans IDEM (eds.), Party Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting Parties in Liberal Democracies, MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 249, 252. 3 Mattei DOGAN, Peter CAMPBELL, Le personnel ministriel en France et en Grande Bretagne, Revue Franaise de Sciences Politiques, vol. VII, no. 2, avril-juin, octobre-dcembre, 1957 pp. 313-345, 793-824/p. 326. 4 Jean BLONDEL, Nick MANNING, Do Ministers Do What They Say? Ministerial Unreliability, Collegial and Hierachical Governments, Political Studies, vol. 50, no. 3, 2002, pp. 455-476. V. aussi Rudy ANDEWEG, Collegiality and Collectivity: Cabinets, Cabinet Committees, and Cabinet Ministers, dans P. WELLER, H. BAKVIS, R. RHODES, The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in the Core Executive, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997; Rudy B. ANDEWEG, Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process between Cabinet and Ministers, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, no. 3, 2000, pp. 377-395. 5 Plusieurs tudes ont mis en avant les effets du recrutement des lites tant au niveau du fonctionnement institutionnel, Thomas SAALFELD, Members of the Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, no. 3, 2000, pp.353-376; Antoni Z. KAMINSKI, Joanna KURCZEWSKA, Strategies of Post-Communist Transformations: lites as InstitutionBuilders, dans Bruno GRANCELLI (ed.) Social Change and Modernization : Lessons from Eastern Europe, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1995, pp. 131152; tout comme au niveau des organisations des partis, Jean BLONDEL, Party Government, Patronage and Party Decline in Western Europe, dans Richard GUNTHER, Jose Ramon MONTERO, Juan J. LINZ, Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 233-257; Richard KATZ, The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy, Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2001, pp. 277-296; R. MONTERO, The Limits of Decentralization: Legislative Careers and the Territorial Representation in Spain, West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 3, 2007, pp. 573-594; Pippa NORRIS, Introduction : Theories of Recruitment, dans IDEM (ed.), Passages to Power. Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 1-15 etc.
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en politique1 visant le processus par lequel un parti dcide qui parmi les personnes lgalement ligibles pour obtenir une position lective sera dsigne (la slection des candidats2) ou la question plus large concernant le dcryptage des processus par lesquels les individus sont introduits dans des rles politiques3 (le recrutement politique) dpassent les simples considrations visant la reprsentativit des acteurs pour sinstituer comme possibles facteurs explicatifs de linstitutionnalisation du pouvoir4 ou encore de la professionnalisation politique. Cette grille interprtative portant sur le rle des lites politiques se trouvant au gouvernement semble tre dautant plus importante dans le cas des nouvelles dmocraties o les lites mergeantes ont bnfici dune importante marge de libert dcisionnelle5. Le centralisme dmocratique et la politique de patronage qui caractrisent les pays de la rgion6, la sparation des pouvoirs favorisant nettement le volet excutif7 et un pouvoir administratif unifi et dcrit par la politisation excessive8 transforment les dirigeants gouvernementaux dans des acteurs cls de la dmocratisation. Dans ce contexte, au del des procdures classiques visant linvestigation du profil des lites, ltude du remplacement des anciens membres
1 Moshe CZUDNOWSKI, Political Recruitment, dans Fred GREENSTEIN, Nelson POLSBY (eds.) Handbook of Political Science, vol. 2, MicroPolitical Theory, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975, pp. 155-242/p. 219. 2 Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, Candidate Selection Methodscit., p. 109. 3 diffrence des analyses portant sur la slection des acteurs politiques (qui sont les lites politiques, quels sont les critres de leur slection et qui est le principal dcideur dans la slection) le processus de recrutement prend galement en compte lanalyse des conditions qui rendent possible la promotion en politique (les cadres institutionnels, la culture politique ou dautres facteurs de socialisation extrieurs la politique sont de tels exemples), V. Dwaine MARVICK, Continuities in Recruitment Theory and Research: Towards a New Model, dans Heinz EULAU, Moshe CZUDNOZSKI (eds.), Elite Recruitment in Democratic Polities. Comparative Studies Across Nations, Halsted Press, Sage, New York, 1976, p. 29. 4 Il nexiste pas beaucoup dtudes mettant en relation dune manire longitudinale les processus de linstitutionnalisation dune lite politique avec le processus dinstitutionnalisation du systme politique dans un contexte de dmocratisation. Pour un exemple assez singulier v. Robert ROBINS, Political Institutionalisation and the Integration of Elites, Sage Library of Social Research, Beverly Hills, London, 1977. V. aussi Lester G. SELIGMAN, The Presidential Office and The President as a Party Leader, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 21, no. 4, 1956, pp. 724-734. 5 Anton STEEN, Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-Communist Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Ashgate, Aldershot, Bookfield USA, Singapore, Sidney, 1997, p. 2. 6 Klaus H. GOERTZ, Helen Z. MARGETTS, The Solitary Center: The Core Executive in Central and Eastern Europe, Governance. An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol. 12, no. 4, October 1999, pp. 425-453/p. 445; Oleh PROTSYK, Andrew WILSON, Centre Politics in Russia and Ukraine: Patronage, Power and Virtuality, Party Politics, vol. 9, no. 6, 2003, pp. 703-727/p. 708. 7 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Roumanie, dans Jean Michel DE WAELE, Paul MAGNETTE (eds.), Les dmocraties europennescit., p. 356. 8 V. Anna GRZYMALA-BUSSE, The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions. Postcommunist Party Competition and State Oversight, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, 2006, pp. 271-300/p. 273; Conor ODWEYER, Runaway State Building. How Political Parties Shape States in Post-communist Eastern Europe, World Politics, vol. 56, no. 4, 2004, pp. 520553.
30
ALEXANDRA IONACU
de la nomenklatura et du profil des nouveaux acteurs ont t considrs comme des conditions ncessaires dans la comprhension des alas de la transition1. La courte priode dmocratique de ces pays soulve dune manire saillante la problmatique de lexistence dune comptence dcisionnelle minimale au niveau des leaders politiques, tout comme celle de la capacit des nouveaux dirigeants dincorporer les pratiques europennes. En considrant que la dlimitation et lexplicitation des grandes filires daccs dans une fonction excutive peuvent rendre compte des stratgies de valorisation des privilges dj dtenus par les acteurs politiques2 ainsi que des possibles freins dans le processus de dmocratisation, on procdera donc une investigation des trajectoires gouvernementales des lites roumaines de la priode 1990-20083. Dans ce qui suit, on essayera donc de fournir des rponses la question portant sur lorigine et le profil de ces acteurs politiques4, mais aussi nous esquisserons quelques remarques quant la thse de la professionnalisation des dirigeants roumains postcommunistes.
1 Michael G. BURTON, John HIGLEY, Elites Settlements, American Sociological Review, vol. 52, no. 3, June.1987, pp 295-307/p. 297. V. aussi John HIGLEY, Gyrgy LENGYEL, Elite Configurations after State Socialism, dans IDEM (eds.), Elites After State Socialism, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2000, pp. 1-21. 2 Gil EYAL, Ivan SZELENYI, Eleanor TOWNSLEY, Making Capitalism without Capitalists. Class Formation and Elite Struggles in PostCommunist Central Europe, Verso, London, New York, 1998, pp. 1-17, v. galement David STARK, Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, no. 4, January 1996, pp. 993-1027. 3 La base de donnes rsultante comprend 1544 nominations des acteurs politiques portant sur 327 nominations ministrielles et 1218 nominations des secrtaires dtat (faisant rfrence 1032 gouvernants 245 ministres et 787 secrtaires dtat), portant sur la priode dcembre 1989-septembre 2008. Les bornes temporelles choisies recoupent les gouvernements ayant fini leurs mandats. 4 Nanmoins, il faudrait prciser que la dmarche de reconstruction des trajectoires des acteurs de la scne politique roumaine est loin dtre non problmatique, car les informations existantes quant au personnel gouvernemental sont fragmentaires et parfois contradictoires (notamment pour le cas des secrtaires dtat). Afin de reconstituer les filires excutives, on avait procd lentrecroisement de plusieurs sources et documents. Une liste non exhaustive de nos sources comprend: ROMPRES, Protagoniti ai vieii publice, 3 vol., Agenia Naional de Pres Rompres, Bucureti, 1994; ***, Personaliti publice, politice 1992-1994, Ed. Holding Reporter, Bucureti, 1994; ***, Personaliti publice, politice 1995-1996, 3e d., Ed. Holding Reporter, Bucureti, 1996; ***, Personaliti publice, politice 1996-1997, Ed. Holding Reporter, Bucureti, 1997; Gheorghe CRIAN, Piramida puterii Oameni politici i de stat, generali i ierarhi din Romnia (decembrie 1989-10 martie 2004), vol I-II, Ed. Pro Historia, Bucureti, 2004; ***, Whos Who in Romania 2002, Pegasus Press, Bucureti, 2002, mais aussi ***, Cartea albastr a democraiei. Un ghid al instituiilor publice centrale din Romnia, Asociaia Pro Democraia, Bucureti, 1997 ainsi que le volume publi pour 2001. Les sources lectroniques se sont aussi avres utiles. Des sites comme celui de Whos Who: http://romania-on-line.net/whoswho; le site de la Chambre des Dputes www.cdep.ro; ou le site du gouvernement www.gov.ro etc.
31
LES FONDEMENTS DES NOUVELLES CARRIRES POLITIQUES: LES LITES POLITIQUES ET LES HRITAGES DU PASS
La polysmie mme qui accompagne le terme de rvolution en Europe Centrale et Orientale sous-tend toute une srie dattributs1 impliquant une certaine vision sur la configuration des lites mergentes et sur leur comportement. Le succs des transitions a t souvent associ
lexistence des groupements et des mouvements dissidents [avant 1989] qui taient capables dexprimer les aspirations populaires et proposer dalternatives politiques et conomiques par rapport lancienne politique dfaillante2.
Le pass communiste des leaders devenait ainsi une idiosyncrasie de la rgion qui pourrait engendrer des freins dans lautonomisation dune prise de dcision similaire aux dmocraties stables. Dans le cas roumain, la cooptation dans des fonctions politiques importantes danciens membres de la nomenklatura3 avait t considre comme le principal ressort dans lexplicitation des retards dans la dmocratisation du pays4. Dailleurs, diffrence dautres pays de la rgion qui enregistrent une circulation des lites par remplacement5, lexemple roumain sarticule comme un cas part, suite des taux trs hauts de reproduction des anciennes lites communistes dans des fonctions publiques6.
1 Pour une discussion sur les diverses formules employes afin de dcrire les vnements de lanne 1990, v. Drago PETRESCU, The Collapse of Communism in Hungary and Romania: A Comparative Analysis, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 1, 2003, pp.163-183, Jacques BREILLAT, Du communisme au postcommunisme, les intellectuels interpells par la politique, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Bruylant, Bruxelles, Athnes, 2002, pp. 25-27. 2 V. Vladimir TISMNEANU, Reinventarea politicului. Europa rasariteana de la Stalin la Havel, Polirom, Iai, 1999, p.162; John HIGLEY, Judith KULLBERG, Jan PAKULSKI, The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites, Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2, 1996, pp. 133-147. 3 Nous incluons dans les positions de nomenklatura les postes concernant la prise de dcision dans la socit communiste tels quils taient tablis par les hautes autorits du Parti Communiste. V. Mihail VOZLENSKY, Nomenklatura, Doubleday&Co Inc., New York, 1984, p. 75. 4 Une telle explicitation aurait la base la thse de linfluence du pass dans le prsent partir de la difficult de penser la ngociation et ltablissement du consensus lorsquon est en la prsence des taux considrables dacteurs politiques du pass qui gardent intacte leur capacit dinfluencer la politique. V. George SHOPFLIN, Postcommunism: Constructing New Democracies in Central Europe, International Affaires (Royal Institute of International Affaires 1944), vol. 67, no. 2, April 1991, pp. 235-250; V. galement John HIGLEY, Judith KULLBERG, Jan PAKULSKI, The Persistence of Post-communist Elites, cit., pp. 133-147. 5 Eva FODOR, Edmund WNUK-LIPINSKI, Natasha YERSHOVA, The New Political and Cultural Elite, Theory and Society, vol. 24, no. 5, 1995, pp.783-800; Ivn SZELNYI, Szonja SZELNYI, Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Post-communist Transformation of Eastern Europe, Theory and Society, vol. 24. no. 5, 1995, pp. 615-638. 6 Klaus VON BEYME, Regime Transition and the Recruitment of Political Elites, Governance An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol. 6, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 409425/p. 415. Si en 1993, 21,9% des lites politiques hongroises et 27,5% des lites polonaises taient des membres de lancienne lite communiste, le profil des acteurs postcommunistes en Roumanie se rapprochait plutt de lexemple de la Russie o au dbut des annes 1990, 67,7%
32
ALEXANDRA IONACU
Rsultat de la configuration politique qui prend naissance aprs les premires lections libres, gagnes par le parti successeur (le FSN/PSD), mais aussi leffet de labsence des ppinires permettant lmergence des nouvelles lites, au dbut des annes 90 la continuit des acteurs politiques dcrit le premier plan de la scne gouvernementale en Roumanie. Au niveau des ministres, le pourcentage danciens membres du Parti Communiste Roumain varie ainsi entre 65,22% dans le cas du gouvernement de droite Isrescu (2000) et 95,65% pour lexcutif dirig par Vcroiu (1992-1996) (ou encore 88,8% dans le cas de lquipe Nstase [2000-2004])1. En contrepartie, une investigation visant la prsence des anciens membres de la nomenklatura dans les quipes gouvernementales dvoile un processus graduel de diminution du poids de ces acteurs la direction des ministres. Si le premier gouvernement form en dcembre 1989, le gouvernement provisoire, comptait en proportion de 64,5% des membres appartenant lancienne nomenklatura, en 1992, dans le 44,2% des membres de lquipe gouvernementale prsentaient le mme profil. Aprs la premire alternance au pouvoir et la domination dune coalition de centre-droite, en 1996, les taux sont beaucoup plus diminus: car 7,9% des ministres du gouvernement Victor Ciorbea (1996-1998) avaient occup une fonction dirigeante dans lancien rgime. La prfiguration dun dclin des ressources qui relvent de la priode communiste, qui commence durant la priode 1996-2000, avait men un renouvellement des lites ministrielles et elle fut ultrieurement continue, en 2001, par lquipe dAdrian Nstase (2000-2004) 16,7%2. De plus, il faudrait noter que cette tendance saccompagne aussi par une diminution encore plus rapide du rle des leaders qui se trouvaient dans les positions de haute visibilit pendant le communisme. En 1989, immdiatement aprs la chute du rgime, 22,9% des membres de lquipe gouvernementale taient danciens ministres communistes et autres 28,6% du personnel ministriel avaient occup des positions de ministres adjoints ou secrtaires dtat avant 1989. Or, aprs cette date, toutes les autres quipes gouvernementales ont choisi dexclure ces lites de leur composition. Ds lors, lexprience excutive rcupre au niveau ministriel est plutt celle des chelons bas des gouvernements communistes, phnomne qui joue un rle important jusquen 1996. On pourrait donc affirmer que le grand enjeu du renouvellement des lites navait pas vis llimination des anciens membres du PCR de la sphre publique, mais il avait port sur la marginalisation de ceux qui ont dtenu des positions de pouvoir qui impliquaient lavant scne du rgime communiste. Sujets de contestation aprs le changement de rgime, beaucoup de nomenklaturistes ont quitt ainsi la scne
des lites provenaient de lancienne nomenklatura, v. Ivn SZELNYI, Szonja SZELNYI, Circulation or Reproduction of Elitescit., p. 626. 1 Marius TUDOR, Adrian GAVRILESCU, Democraia la pachet. Elita politic n Romnia postcomunist, Compania, Bucureti, 2002, p. 152. Cette situation nest pas une spcificit de llite excutive, une enqute mene sur les parlementaires de la lgislature 2000-2004 identifie toujours 83,6% des parlementaires en tant quanciens membres de parti. V. Laureniu TEFAN SCALAT, Patterns of Political Recruitment, Ziua, Bucureti, 2004, p. 121. 2 Les taux pour les autres cabinets sont: 44,8% dans le cas du cabinet Petre Roman (19901991), 38,1% le gouvernement Theodor Stolojan (1991-1992), 6,9% Radu Vasile (1998-1999) et 8,7% le cabinet Mugur Isrescu (1999-2000). V. Raluca GROSESCU, The Political Regrouping of the Romanian Nomenklatura during the 1989 Revolution, Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 4, no. 2, May 2004, pp. 97-123/p. 120.
33
excutive. Cependant, lorsquon regarde les chelons infrieurs du pouvoir excutif, la conclusion laquelle on arrive est, au moins quon puisse dire, tonnante. En principe, le second chelon du pouvoir excutif, dcrit par une visibilit publique rduite, mais qui permet un rel pouvoir dcisionnel, pouvait constituer le refuge parfait pour les anciens membres de la nomenklatura. Or, en analysant les taux concernant la prsence de cette catgorie lintrieur de la population des secrtaires dtat, on peut dceler plutt un comportement similaire celui de lchelon ministriel. Les deux premiers gouvernements Petre Roman (1990-1991) prsentent des taux quasi similaires quant au poids des nomenklaturistes tant au niveau des ministres quau niveau des secrtaires dtat. Cest uniquement, aprs la premire alternance gouvernementale (1997-1999) que le poids des personnes du second chelon de pouvoir ayant des relations au pass communiste devient suprieur celui rencontr au niveau ministriel et cette situation est plutt le rsultat de la faible reprsentation de cette catgorie lintrieur du personnel politique des excutifs. De plus, lorsquon compare strictement lexprience excutive communiste des acteurs gouvernementaux des deux chelons de pouvoir, la situation est pratiquement inverse par rapport ce quon pouvait anticiper dun point de vue thorique (v. Figure 1). Mme si en valeurs absolues il existe un nombre suprieur des secrtaires dtat (par rapport aux ministres) ayant une relation avec lancienne nomenklatura, durant toute la priode postcommuniste, sans exception, le poids des secrtaires dtat prsentant de telles ressources du pass reste infrieur celui des ministres prsentant le mme profil. La diffrence entre la continuit des lites sur les divers chelons du pouvoir gouvernemental est surtout visible pour les gouvernements forms par le parti successeur PDSR-PSD qui ne procde pas une stratgie de conservation des leaders du pass sur des positions de secrtaire dtat. Au contraire, il parat que mme si lexposant par excellence de la politique de la reproduction des anciennes lites communistes au dbut des annes 90, le FSN/PDSR avait plutt men, dun point de vue quantitatif, une politique graduelle de remplacement des lites par le biais dune stratgie de marginalisation. De la sorte, les portefeuilles centraux1 dans les gouvernements socio-dmocrates ont t graduellement occups par des personnes nayant pas de relation directe lancienne nomenklatura ( lexemple 76,3% des anciens nomenklaturistes reconvertis dtenaient des portefeuilles centraux durant le gouvernement provisoire, mais aprs cette date le pourcentage est de plus en plus bas: 55,7% pour le gouvernement Petre Roman II et 40,4% lors du mandat de Theodor Stolojan). De plus, un quart des secrtaires dtat du gouvernement Stolojan
Conformment cette perspective, il existerait une hirarchie des prfrences constantes des partis par rapport certains portefeuilles cl. V. Mattei DOGAN, Peter CAMPBELL, Le personnel ministrielcit., pp. 334, 314. De lautre cte, Jean Blondel utilise 9 domaines: Affaires trangres, Dfense, Justice, Finances et Commerce (y compris les ministres pour la planification), lIndustrie et le Transport, lAgriculture, la Sant publique et la Protection Sociale, le Travail et lEnseignement en tant que positions cls lintrieur des excutifs. La diffrenciation entre des portefeuilles centraux et marginaux des gouvernements a t reprise au niveau des thories portant sur les coalitions V. Michael LAVER, W. Ben HUNT, Policy and Party Competition, Routledge, New York, 1992, Wolfgang C. MLLER, Kaare STRM, (eds.), Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. Au niveau de notre tude, nous avons retenu suite une srie dinterviews menes avec le personnel gouvernemental en tant que ministres centraux: Affaires trangres, conomie et Finances, Dfense, Intrieur et Administration, Justice, Industries, le Secrtariat Gnral du Gouvernement.
34
ALEXANDRA IONACU
(1991-1992) qui avaient bnfici dune exprience excutive durant la priode communiste dirigeaient un ministre important tandis quun seul secrtaire dtat pendant le mandat de Mugur Isrescu disposait dune exprience excutive acquise durant la priode communiste. Forts importants durant les premires annes aprs la chute du communisme, les taux gnraux danciens nomenklaturistes quon puisse remarquer au niveau ministriel, mais surtout les comportements observs dans le cas des secrtaires dtat nous racontent plutt lhistoire dun chec dun processus de conversion des ressources politiques acquises durant le communisme. Dcrivant dailleurs plutt des stratgies individuelles de conversion quun phnomne systmatique portant sur un effort de recrutement1, les succs initiaux des lites politiques ayant leur disposition une expertise gouvernementale communiste furent remplacs par dautres ressources qui relvent de la trajectoire des acteurs politiques dans le postcommunisme. Mme sil est vident que ces rsultats doivent tre lus avec une certaine prcaution, vue la prcarit des sources existantes mais aussi la possibilit dune influence informelle que certains leaders ont au niveau de lactivit gouvernementale, il existe nettement dans le cas roumain un changement visible dans les logiques de recrutement des leaders politiques, toute comme une refonte des principes et des critres de slection dans les fonctions publiques. Dailleurs il faudrait spcifier que la transformation dans le profil des lites ne doit pas tre interprte uniquement dans la perspective de la volont politique assume de rompre avec le pass communiste, mais elle peut tre perue aussi par rapport aux volutions dans lhistoire du communisme roumain. Durant la dernire dcennie de la priode communiste en Roumanie laccs aux fonctions gouvernementales fut de plus en plus limit pour les jeunes du parti2. Cette politique engendra automatiquement un vieillissement accentu du personnel gouvernemental durant la dernire tape du communisme, menant par la suite un remplacement plutt naturel des lites aprs 19893.
Dans un autre article nous avons montr la pluralit des ressources qui se trouvent lorigine des trajectoires des leaders politiques communistes reconvertis en suggrant plutt lexistence des rseaux individuels de socialisation et damiti qui assurent leur promotion en politique. Pour plus de dtails v. Alexandra IONACU, Le passe communiste entre permanence et oubli. Les cabinets roumains postcommunistes et leurs lites, Transitions, vol. XLVII, no. 2 (12/2007), 2007, pp. 105-145. 2 De la sorte si en Roumanie durant les annes 1950-1965 les nouveaux ministres nomms en fonction taient en grande majorit gs de moins de 50 ans, aprs cette priode jusquau dbut des annes 1980 la balance tourna vers un quilibre entre les deux catgories. Dailleurs la Roumanie ne fait pas exception dune tendance plus gnrale des pays communistes. lexception de lURSS o ce processus est plus diminu, les autres pays de la rgion tels que la Bulgarie, la Tchcoslovaquie, la Pologne ou lYougoslavie prsentent durant 1950-1965 une tendance de nommer des personnes plutt jeunes dans des fonctions gouvernementales, tandis quaprs 1965 cette tendance change. Dailleurs le profil des ministres se plie ainsi sur les modifications des politiques des partis communistes de la rgion dj mentionnes (Pour les proportions exactes v. Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministerscit., p. 39) 3 Si on regarde le profil des membres du gouvernement qui intgrait aussi danciens ministres communistes dans sa composition, on saperoit que 52,9% des ministres nomms avaient plus de 60 ans.
35
LE TABLEAU GNRAL DES ACTEURS GOUVERNEMENTAUX

Linfluence directe du pass dans larticulation des trajectoires gouvernementales semble disparatre aprs les premires annes du postcommunisme roumain. Dautres logiques commencrent sinstaurer en tant que mcanismes de promotion des acteurs en fonctions publiques. Certes, dans un contexte de transition, il est vident que le facteur conjoncturel ou la chance jouent un rle quon ne peut pas nier. Cependant, au-del des accidents de trajectoire, de nouveaux mcanismes de promotion sont censs dapparatre, permettant la conscration des leaders politiques1 et soulevant la fois, comme dans le cas dautres dmocraties stables, des interrogations quant la reprsentativit et le savoir faire dcisionnel de ces lites2. Si on connat dj le fait que dans la plupart des systmes politiques la base sociale des acteurs politiques nest jamais trs large3 et que la permabilit des structures de pouvoir apparat surtout dans des cas prcis de reconfigurations sociales, politiques ou conomiques4, il faudrait donc investiguer quels sont les modles de promotion en politique qui dcrivent le cas roumain. En dpit du fait que les tudes menes visant dtablir une relation de convergence entre le profil des lites et les reprsentations quant la prise de dcision ont fini dans une impasse5, car trs souvent, lhomme politique, ds quil parvient des positions leves, cesse de partager les sentiments du groupe social do il sort6, on soutient que cette difficult analytique peut tre dpasse lorsquon formule le questionnement portant sur linfluence des trajectoires des lites en termes de conditions de possibilit daccs une fonction publique. Dans ce qui suit, on considre que lge des dirigeants,
Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministerscit., pp. 11-13. Robert PUTNAM, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, PrenticeHall, New Jersey, 1976, p. 44. 3 En partant des propos des pres fondateurs du domaine et indiffremment de lapproche prise en compte le verdict est tout fait clair. Les diffrences entre les diverses tudes visent plutt lidentification quant au locus o les distorsions apparaissent. Par exemple Prewitt identifie dans son tude que la plupart des lites locales du cas analys proviennent dun couche sociale moyenne ou moyenne suprieure et non pas des catgories les plus avantages ou les moins dsavantages. V. Kenneth J. PREWITT, The Recruitment of Political Leaderscit., (chap. 2. The Social Bias of Leadership Selection), pp. 23-53. V galement David BUTLER, Howard R. PENNIMAN, Austin RANNEY (eds.), Democracy at the Pools, American Entreprise Institute, Washington SC, 1981; Gerhard LOEWENBERG, Samuel C. PATTERSON, Malcom E. JEWELL (eds.), Handbook of Legislative Research, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma, 1985. 4 Lester SELIGMAN, Presidency and Political Change, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol. 466, Implementing Governmental Change, 1983, pp. 179-187. 5 Samuel J. EDERSVELD, Political Elites in Modern Societies. Empirical Research and Democratic Theory, Empirical Research and Democratic Theory, (chap. 1), Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor, 1986. Dailleurs les tudes menes en Europe Centrale et Orientale semblent suggrer la mme disjonction qui apparaisse mme plus accentue, car ici on avait remarqu la tendance dun schisme entre les reprsentations politiques en tant que telles des acteurs politiques et la manire dans laquelle les lites envisagent les principales mesures gouvernementales entamer. V. galement Anton STEEN, Between Past and Futurecit., p. 318 ainsi que Bogdan MACH, Wlodzimierz WESOLOWSKI, Poland: The Political Elites Transformational Correctness dans John HIGLEY, Gyrgy LENGYEL (eds.), Elitescit., pp. 87-102. 6 Mattei DOGAN, Lorigine sociale du personnel parlementaire dun pays essentiellement agraire: la Roumanie, Revue de lInstitut de Sociologie, nos. 2-3, 1953, p. 179.
2
36
ALEXANDRA IONACU
leur reprsentativit territoriale, leur exprience politique ne sont pas censs permettre destimer dune manire directe des effets sur laction politique en tant que telle, mais ils se prfigurent en tant qulments tmoignant une certaine capacit dcisionnelle et de la cration dun systme dopportunit menant la fondation dune nouvelle lite politique. Quelles sont donc ces ressources qui recommandent les nouveaux leaders politiques du postcommunisme roumain?
Un profil sociologique des acteurs ministriels

Tout comme dans les dmocraties stables, le portrait du gouvernant roumain dvoile lexistence dune logique ingalitaire dans la slection, mais aussi des variations importantes dans le profil sociologique de ces acteurs (selon la priode prise en compte). Plusieurs principes dans la slection peuvent ainsi tre identifis durant les vingt dernires annes: 1. Les lites ministrielles roumaines souffrent un changement de gnration. Mme si les valeurs moyennes de lge des dirigeants gravitent entre 42 ans durant le mandat de Triceanu (2004-2008) et 57 ans immdiatement aprs la chute du communisme, il existe une grande variation lintrieur de chaque cabinet. Au dbut des annes 1990 environ 10% des ministres gs moins de 40 ans faisaient partie de lquipe gouvernementale. Ultrieurement leur nombre fut doubl durant la priode 1996-2000, pour que durant 2000-2004 on arrive un pourcentage record de 42% des membres de cabinets qui ont moins de 40 ans. Le souci pour le rajeunissement du sommet dcisionnel est conu ainsi en tant quune pratique ncessitant la modification du visage des lites politiques. Cette pratique, identifiable pour tous les partis qui ont form des cabinets, mais caractrisant surtout les formations politiques de droite, constitue plutt une rponse aux dfis soulevs par le contexte politique interne quune option inspire du fonctionnement des partis dautres pays europens. 2. Un autre point o le profil sociologique des acteurs subit dimportantes transmutations vise le milieu dextraction des nouvelles lites. Au-del du fait de la non-reprsentation croissante de la zone rurale, quon peut identifier aussi dans le cas de la population parlementaire1, il existe un changement de perspective dans le recrutement des lites originaires des diverses rgions gographiques du pays. Le tableau qui se dresse ainsi est un gomtrie variable. La capitale reste le principal basin de slection durant toute la priode, mais le nombre des bucarestois qui font partie des gouvernements varie de 19% dans la priode Triceanu 43% lors du mandat de Victor Ciorbea. En contrepartie, dautres rgions telles que lOuest du pays et la Moldavie semblent devenir des centres dintrt pour les gouvernants partir de 1999. Cette diffrenciation est dautant plus importante, vu le fait qu diffrence des priodes prcdentes la slection visa des personnes qui vivent dans leurs rgions dorigine. La reconfiguration des rapports la territorialit peut avoir des significations diverses portant sur la mobilit des acteurs politiques, mais elle peut tre vue aussi en tant que possible changement des rapports de force lintrieur des partis avantageant certaines filiales locales.
Laureniu TEFAN SCALAT, Rzvan GRECU, Cariere politice i reprezentare parlamentar 1990-2004, Rapport de Recherche, Casp, Bucarest, Mars 2004.
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3. tre ministre ncessite, au moins dans limaginaire du public, toute une srie de comptences dcisionnelles. Le profil non-politique des ministres renvoie souvent lide dune personne trs duque ayant non seulement un certain profil politique, mais disposant dautres attributs qui relvent de leur formation. Les ministres roumains postcommunistes ne sloignent pas de cette tendance gnrale, car plus de deux tiers dentre eux ont suivi au moins une forme denseignement postuniversitaire. Ce premier aspect tmoigne dailleurs une tendance cvasi-gnrale daccumulation des diplmes. Soit quil sagit dune tendance de reprofessionnalisation par loctroi dune autre formation universitaire (27,91% des ministres du gouvernement Vcroiu, 15,63% des acteurs excutif du cabinet Vasile ont opt pour une seconde formation initiale) ou encore de la valorisation dun prestige externe, les ministres roumains ont utilis la ressource ducationnelle en tant quinstrument de lgitimation de leur comptence. Dailleurs les simples accrditations nationales ne semblent pas tre suffisantes pour la nomination dans un portefeuille gouvernemental, la rfrence aux formations internationales sinstitue comme une pratique partir de lanne 2000: 45,65% des ministres du cabinet Nstase et plus dune moiti (64,15%) de lquipe gouvernementale du cabinet Triceanu ont poursuivi une forme de formation ltranger (le plus souvent des cours de courte dure). De fait, lapothose de cette reprsentation portant sur la politique comme espace de la lgitimation par les diplmes se situe au niveau des formations doctorales. Environ un tiers des ministres du postcommunisme roumain dtiennent le titre de docteur. Nanmoins, la recherche avance ne constitue pas, comme lon pourrait croire, un point de dpart pour les ministres qui vont ultrieurement poursuivre une carrire politique. Au contraire. Phnomne qui caractrise la priode postcommuniste, mais qui revte un plus dimportance durant les dernires annes, la galopade forcene pour un titre de docteur touche mme les ministres durant lexercice de leurs fonctions (vu quenviron une cinquime des ministres roumains sont considrer comme des ministres doctorants). Ainsi, lorsquon cumule les taux des doctorants aux diplms, le profil ducationnel du personnel ministriel semble tonnant. Moiti des ministres du postcommunisme roumain ont suivi dans une mesure ou dans une autre des tudes doctorales. lexception de lquipe Vcroiu, o on retrouve les taux les plus diminus de telles pratiques (37%), les pourcentages touchent lexemple 62% des ministres du cabinet Adrian Nstase. Les trois quarts des ministres qui ont choisi de suivre ces formations Bucarest ont opt principalement pour lcole Polytechnique, LAcadmie des Sciences conomiques et la Facult de Droit de Bucarest, mais aussi vers lUniversit Babes Boyai de Cluj (pour ce qui est ltude des sciences sociales), centres qui devinrent ainsi les principaux fournisseurs des dirigeants ministrables du postcommunisme roumain. 4. Le fait que les ministres poursuivent des formations doctorales, surtout en certains centres universitaires, certes leur fournit (en principe) un plus de comptence dans lanalyse des dcisions entamer, mais il suggre aussi le dveloppement dune relation troite entre lespace universitaire et le monde politique. De la sorte, il nest pas tonnant le fait quun quart des ministres roumains sont la base des enseignants dans les universits ou des chercheurs. Les autres occupations surreprsentes au niveau ministriel sont: les ingnieurs (28,9%) et tandis que 14% des ministres exercent avant lentre en politique des professions conomiques. En dpit de la prfrence pour les spcialisations juridiques seulement 7% dentre les principaux acteurs des excutifs ont exerc des professions dans ce domaine avant leur nomination. La prvalence de tels profils occupationnels ne constitue pas une exception, car elle recoupe dans
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une certaine mesure le profil gnral des ministres quon peut retrouver ailleurs1. Le droit, lenseignement, ou encore les professions techniques constituent en gnral les principales occupations de base des acteurs politiques europens. De cette faon, dans les dmocraties occidentales, les professions juridiques constituent souvent le mtier de base pour les acteurs politiques, suivies par le domaine de lenseignement (cependant un pourcentage beaucoup moins important touchant que 16,2% des cas). Dailleurs, il faudrait noter que mme dans le cas roumain les ministres sont pourtant des personnes qui ont connu une ascension fulgurante dans le politique postdcembriste. En grande majorit et dans une proportion qui touche 70%, ces personnes ont dtenu des fonctions de direction dans la sphre non-politique. Loin de disparatre, ce modle de promotion la base des performances dans dautres domaines dactivit semble sinstituer en tant que rgle daccession dans les fonctions publiques. Les chefs dinstituts, les directeurs dentreprises ou les dirigeants des universits arrivent mobiliser leurs positions non-politiques et de les transfrer en politique. En outre, lhirarchie des professions de base nest pas le simple exemple de lhasard. Au dbut du postcommunisme, la prsence des ingnieurs dans des positions ministrielles sexplique par un certain souci de lgitimation du nouveau rgime qui produit la mobilisation des professions qui en apparence taient le moins politises. Vers la fin des annes 1990, les professions universitaires sont surreprsentes dans lespace politique roumain, car elles rendent possible, dans des degrs distincts, dune part, la prservation dune activit professionnelle en parallle aux fonctions politiques et de lautre, la continuit fonctionnelle des ressources quelle suppose. Ce modle institu semble seffacer partir de 1999 pour faire place aux ressources dordre conomique et de lentreprenariat. La tendance de renversement des priorits dans la slection est facilement discernable. Le dveloppement des entreprises prives mne un accroissement apprciable dans lexploitation des ressources conomiques de lacteur au dtriment des ressources de prestige qui relevaient du milieu universitaire.
Les fondements politiques de la promotion en fonctions excutives

La fonction ministrielle conue en tant quaboutissement dune longue carrire en politique, supposant la fois un enchanement des fonctions dans les institutions dmocratiques de ltat, mais aussi au niveau dun parti, ne peut pas objectivement dcrire les premires annes du postcommunisme roumain. Au-del du phnomne de reproduction danciens dirigeants communistes, mais aussi de la tendance de cooptation des nouveaux acteurs disposant des ressources dans lespace non-politique, on assiste graduellement lmergence dun principe politique dans la slection des gouvernants. Le processus dinstitutionnalisation des nouveaux modles de slection qui perdurent caractrise surtout les tapes de changement majeur politique ou social et le temps quil ncessite pour sa conscration peut tre considr relativement court2.
1 On reprend dans ce qui suit les profils gnraux dcrits par Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministerscit., p. 48. 2 Mattei Dogan estime pour le cas de lItalie une priode de six ou sept ans. V. Mattei DOGAN, La slection des ministres en Italie. Dix rgles non-crites, International Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 2, 1981, pp. 189-209/p. 189.
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De cette manire, les gouvernements roumains sadaptrent trs rapidement une logique diffrente dans la promotion dans les fonctions publiques. Si en 1997, durant le cabinet Victor Ciorbea, un acteur politique avait besoin denviron 3,62 ans de carrire dans la politique avant quil soit nomm dans une fonction ministrielle, il aurait eu besoin en moyenne de 5,96 annes dexprience pour quil devienne membre du cabinet Nstase et de 7,2 ans afin de faire partie de lquipe Triceanu. Malgr la diversit des trajectoires individuelles et laccumulation des ressources de prestige individuel, le premier souci dans la slection des lites vise cependant laccumulation de lexprience et dun savoir faire politique suivant comme notre tude relvera les voies classiques daccs dans une fonction gouvernementale: le local, la filire parlementaire, la voie excutive et le creuset administratif1. 1. Le plan local est souvent peru dans les dbats publics en tant quun niveau infrieur au niveau national, prsentant des logiques daction qui lui sont spcifiques. En ce contexte, un hiatus entre les deux dimensions de la territorialit est cens dapparatre. Cette perspective nest cependant que partiellement vraie pour les lites parlementaires. peu prs la moiti des parlementaires de la lgislature passe avaient dtenu des responsabilits au niveau local (la plupart dentre eux tant danciens conseillers locaux ou dpartementaux (environ 44,6%)2. En mme temps, lorsquon regarde la population ministrielle, la division entre le local et national induit lide dune sparation quasi-totale. Au total 13,3% des ministres avaient dtenu des fonctions dcisionnelles dans le territoire, la plupart dentre eux au niveau des conseils dpartementaux (11%). Malgr, le fait quen moyenne 22% des ministres occupent aussi des fonctions de direction au niveau des organisations locales du parti, trs peu dacteurs politiques prsentent dans leur profil un attachement concret par rapport la prise de dcision dans le territoire. Nanmoins, le rle que le local joue dans la promotion en politique semble avoir des statuts diffrents selon la priode et le parti quon prend en compte. Si jusquen 1996 les pourcentages des ministres impliqus dans le local sont infimes, la situation changea partir de 1996, quand on observe pour la premire fois lmergence parmi les membres des excutifs des acteurs politiques qui avaient droul une activit politique dans le local. Changement de perspective institu principalement par le Parti Dmocrate qui privilgia la promotion politique des gens ayant des racines dans le territoire cette tendance fut prserve, lors de larrive au pouvoir du Parti Social Dmocrate en 2004 (surtout partir de 2003). Le point maximal de cette croissance est visible durant le mandat Clin Popescu-Triceanu (26,4% des ministres avaient une exprience dcisionnelle au niveau local tandis que 42% des ministres nomms
Lorsquon regarde les trajectoires en politique du personnel ministriel, on peut dceler la base dune analyse de la composante principale quatre grands facteurs structurant le processus de slection (variance explique de 73%) qui recoupent dailleurs les modles consacrs dans les dmocraties stables. Les grandes dimensions orthogonales dlimitant les trajectoires des acteurs sont les suivantes: (1) une composante visant lextraction parlementaire et le rle du parti (anciennet et position de leadership dans la direction centrale du parti) expliquant 29% de la variance; (2) une composante portant sur les valeurs locales (intgrant des positions de direction au niveau local ainsi que les fonctions dirigeantes au niveau du leadership local) expliquant 20% de la variance; (3) un troisime facteur portant sur lexprience excutive au niveau politique et les fonctions de direction non-politiques (13%) de la variance (4) enfin, une composante visant lexprience administrative (11% de la variance explique). 2 Laureniu TEFAN SCALAT, Patterns of Political Recruitment, cit., p. 179.
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ALEXANDRA IONACU
sont aussi des leaders des organisations locales du parti). La convergence entre laccroissement du rle des dirigeants des filires locales et lexprience dcisionnelle effective ce niveau pourrait tre lue, comme un modle concourant celui de lItalie de la priode 1954-1980. Le dosage gographique pourrait en ce cas prendre laspect dune rpartition entre baronniers, impliquant le fait que les leaders rgionaux deviennent galement des chefs de faction lchelon national1. 2. La fonction parlementaire est gnralement un tremplin pour des fonctions ministrielles, ainsi quun endroit important dapprentissage pour une carrire politique. La Roumanie postcommuniste ne fait pas dexception cet gard. 46% des ministres (50,21% si on limine le cabinet provisoire) avaient dtenu avant leur nomination au moins une fonction parlementaire. Malgr le bicamralisme parfaitement galitaire du Parlement roumain (qui caractrise le Parlement roumain avant 2003), les futurs ministres sont principalement des anciens membres de la Chambre des dputs (35,65% des ministres ont t des dputs). Limportance gnrale dune exprience parlementaire est indniable pour la promotion en politique de certains acteurs ministriels. Elle connat un essor partir de 1996 et reste constante dans les cabinets ultrieurs. En outre, les futurs ministres ne sont pas de simples parlementaires. Une fois entrs au Parlement, la plupart dentre eux dtiennent toute une srie de fonctions (30,13% de tous les ministres) dont la plus importante semble tre, pour une carrire ministrielle, celle de prsident ou de vice-prsident des commissions parlementaires (20%). Le creuset des commissions parlementaires se constitue ainsi dans une ressource politique dans larticulation des trajectoires ultrieures des parlementaires roumains, apportant une logique de prdictibilit de la slection des ministres, spcifique aux dmocraties parlementaires2. La mme tendance de normalisation des trajectoires, selon les principes du parlementarisme porte sur laccroissement du rle dune carrire lintrieur du parti. Dailleurs les deux types de ressources sont corrls (coeff. Pearson .555**).La nomination dans une fonction gouvernementale semble tre relie ainsi la fois une position centrale dans les structures excutives du parti et aux expriences de lacteur lintrieur du lgislatif. 3. Lappartenance une quipe excutive donne une garantie quant la capacit dcisionnelle de lacteur et favorise la nomination ultrieure dans une fonction analogue. Par la suite, comme dans le cas dautres dmocraties stables, le niveau ministriel est caractris par un phnomne accentu de reproduction des acteurs politiques en fonctions excutives. La nomination dun ministre au niveau dun cabinet facilite ainsi une nouvelle slection. De la sorte, malgr linstabilit du personnel gouvernemental3, un phnomne
1 Mattei DOGAN, La slection des ministres en Italiecit., p. 199. Cette perspective est partiellement confirme dans le cas roumain au moins en ce qui concerne les reconfigurations de forces lintrieur des partis gouvernants. Au niveau de la population ministrielle, la valeur de la corrlation entre le fait de dtenir une fonction la direction centrale du parti et la direction du niveau local reste trs rduite (Coeff. Pearson .218 **)*. 2 IDEM, Introduction: la slection des ministres dans divers rgimes politiques, International Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 2, 1981, pp. 125-129. 3 Dailleurs une tude visant le personnel ministriel de la priode 1990-2003 dans les pays postcommunistes (qui ne dcoupait pas artificiellement les mandats des ministres en fonction du cabinet dans lequel ils faisaient partie) montrait que la dure moyenne des mandats de ces acteurs de deux ans, moiti par rapport leurs correspondants des dmocraties occidentales.
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qui vise la mise en balance de ces dynamiques, la reproduction du personnel excutif sinstaura en tant que procdure menant la cration des noyaux dcisionnels stables au sein des gouvernements roumains1. Dans cette logique, on arrive dans le cas des cabinets tels que Theodor Stolojan davoir plus dune moiti des ministres qui ont t galement membres dans lun des cabinets antrieurs. Des taux encore plus levs, caractrisent les quipes diriges par Radu Vasile, avec deux tiers de ses membres anciens ministres, ou par Mugur Isrescu avec 77,27%. Au total, lorsquon prend en compte les diverses formules de promotion lintrieur de lexcutif (soit des anciens ministres qui occupent de nouveaux portefeuilles ou encore des secrtaires dtat qui deviennent ministres) on arrive la conclusion que 46,51% de la population analyse prsente un certain type dexpertise de la mme nature avant la nomination lintrieur du gouvernement. De cette manire, mme si la valeur moyenne de la dure des mandats dun ministre reste au dessous des valeurs identifies dans les dmocraties stables2, nous pouvons isoler un facteur clair portant sur la valorisation de lexprience excutive pour la nomination dans des fonctions politiques. Dans cette perspective, lexemple roumain semble obir ainsi une des dix rgles non crites que Mattei Dogan observait pour le cas italien visant la ncessit dun passage du futur ministre par une fonction excutive pralable (de sous-secrtaire dtat pour le cas italien)3. Si cette pratique semble dcrire, suivant des logiques diffrentes, toute la priode postcommuniste, un point de rupture quon puisse cependant observer est intervenu durant le mandat de Triceanu. Les partis gouvernants durant la priode 2004-2008, malgr le fait quils ont opt pour des taux trs bas de promotion des anciens secrtaires dtat dans des portefeuilles ministriels (11,3%), ont dcid galement nutiliser que partiellement le personnel ayant acquis une comptence dcisionnelle dans les quipes gouvernementales prcdentes. 4. Lexprience excutive semble constituer en soi un facteur de promotion en politique inaugurant des tendances de reproduction au niveau de la population gouvernementale postcommuniste. Au-del de ces taux de rotation politique, on
Dans ce contexte gnral, la Roumanie ne ferait pas de figure part. une moyenne de 1,8 ans pour un mandant dun ministre, le cas roumain sintgrerait dans un tableau plus large. La Pologne (1,6 ans), la Rpublique Tchque (2,5 ans), la Lituanie (1,57 ans) ou encore la Bulgarie (1,5 ans) dcrivent galement, dans des proportions diffrentes, de tels types de comportements. V. Ferdiand MULLER ROMMEL, Jean BLONDEL, Darina MALOVA, Governing New European Democracies, Palgrave Macmillan, March 2007, pp. 78-79. 1 Pour plus de dtails sur les taux dinstabilit du personnel gouvernemental tout comme sur les niveaux de la reproduction des lites gouvernementales en Roumanie postcommuniste (lapplication de la thse de la stabilisation du fonctionnement des gouvernements suite des continuits du personnel prcise pour la premire fois dans Mattei DOGAN, Peter CAMPBELL, Le personnel ministrielcit., pp. 313-345, 793-824), v. Alexandra IONACU, Instabilit du personnel gouvernemental et continuit dcisionnelle en Roumanie postcommuniste, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VI, no. 2, 2006, pp. 319-356. 2 Cela reprsente dailleurs la principale critique dresse par John D. Huber et Cecilia Martinez par rapport la thse de la stabilisation dcisionnelle partir des expriences des acteurs, suite un processus de rotation des cadres lintrieur des excutifs. Pour plus de dtails v. John D. HUBER, Cecilia MARTINEZ, Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience in the Cabinet the French Fourth and Fifth Republic in Comparative Perspective, British Journal of Political Science, Ie partie, vol. 34, January 2004, pp. 41-46. 3 Mattei DOGAN, La slection des ministres en Italiecit., pp. 195-196.
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ALEXANDRA IONACU
pourrait anticiper linstauration dun principe de slection et de spcialisation centr sur lchelon bureaucratique, visant une des plus anciennes mthodes de recrutement: la voie mandarinale. Cette mthode de promotion en politique a constitu la principale voie de slection dans les pays communistes, lquivalent de la slection de lintrieur du Parlement des dmocraties occidentales1, mais elle peut tre rencontre galement dans les dmocraties consolides, surtout dans le cas franais. En Roumanie, 20% des ministres prsentent une certaine exprience dans les excutifs postcommunistes sur les chelons infrieurs, tels que ceux dhautes fonctions publiques ou des conseillers. Nanmoins, ce quon appelle une filire mandarinale classique, dcrite par la promotion des hauts fonctionnaires dans des portefeuilles politiques, celle-ci est identifiable dans 12,6% des cas. Force de ladoption tardive des rglementations quant lappareil administratif, mme la dlimitation de ce que signifie le mandarinat savre difficile dans ce contexte. La dpolitisation de la haute fonction publique est un phnomne plutt rcent et inachev. Au-del de ces difficults interprtatives part les cabinets de la priode 1996-2000 qui utilisent moins ce type de ressources (7,9% des ministres du cabinet Ciorbea et 16,5% des ministres du cabinet Vasile prsentaient un tel profil), la tendance gnrale dans la slection ministrielle tourne vers une valorisation de lexprience accumule sur des positions dexpertise dans le cadre des cabinets 22,3% des ministres du cabinet Nstase et 28,3% du cabinet Triceanu exhibent un tel profil.
ADDENDA: UN PORTRAIT FUGITIF DES SECRTAIRES DTAT

Par contraste la population ministrielle dont le profil reste assez connu, le niveau des secrtaires dtat nous apparat plutt comme difficilement identifiable. Labsence darchives visant cette population durant les premires annes du postcommunisme fait quon ait accs uniquement des listes informelles et fragmentes. Si au dbut de la priode postrvolutionnaire, les nominations de ces dignitaires avaient t publies dans les dcisions gouvernementales parus dans le Journal Officiel du pays, trs rapidement, au dbut des annes 1990, ce personnel politique commence dtre nomm par un ordre du Premier ministre qui nest plus accessible au grand public. Cest seulement partir de lanne 2005 quon entame un processus de publication en ligne de ces dcisions du Premier ministre (mais linitiative ninclut pas de regard rtrospectif). Les trajectoires politiques compltes peuvent tre reconstruites surtout par lexclusion, en confrontant la liste des secrtaires dtat aux autres inventaires des acteurs dtenant des fonctions publiques (telles que les conseillers dpartementaux ou encore la population parlementaire). Malgr tous ces efforts et vu la multitude des prsences pisodiques de certains secrtaires dtat dans les cabinets postcommunistes avant de disparatre de lattention publique, trs peu dindicateurs portant sur le profil de cette population prsentent des taux danalyse valides. part labsence dun certain sens de la mmoire institutionnelle, la pnurie des donnes visant les secrtaires dtat comporte des raisons objectives. Lorsquon regarde le profil gnral de ces acteurs on peut observer que plus de moiti dentre eux (53,1%) reprsentent de nouvelles entres en politique. La plupart des membres des excutifs des seconds chelons nont occup dautres fonctions en politique ni au niveau central, ni dans le local. Si cette premire image peut infliger lide dun
Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministerscit., p. 58.
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manque de personnel politique ayant une expertise qui peut remplir toutes les positions de ltat, une analyse en dtail nous offre plutt une image diffrente. De cette manire, contrairement aux pratiques dcrivant le niveau ministriel, durant la priode postcommuniste on remarque plutt une institutionnalisation des pratiques de cooptation au niveau du second chelon du pouvoir et non pas une stratgie de valorisation de lexprience excutive dj acquise. La tendance croissance dans les procdures de cooptation est constante: 43,08% des nouvelles entres 1990, 56,49% en 1992, 75% en 1996. Les taux sont explicables au dbut des annes 1990: le parti successeur hritant tout un patrimoine de personnel ayant une certaine expertise de lancien rgime a pu mobiliser ces acteurs dans le processus dcisionnel, tandis que la coalition de droite arrivant pour la premire fois au pouvoir en 1996 dploya le personnel ayant dj acquis un profil politique dans des portefeuilles ayant un plus de visibilit. En revanche, les taux de cooptation qui sensuivent aprs cette date ne sintgrent pas dans une logique dinstitutionnalisation des lites politiques. Tant le cabinet Adrian Nstase que le cabinet Clin Popescu-Triceanu ont choisi dans des proportions sensiblement gales denviron 70% dintroduire sur ces chelons des personnes nayant pas dexprience politique pralable, en transformant les chelons secondaires de lexcutif dans une porte dentre en politique au lieu de constituer un cheminement dune trajectoire de longue dure en politique. Au-del de cette image gnrique il y a bien videmment toute une srie de stratgies des partis politiques gouvernants. Lide que lchelon secondaire de lexcutif constitue un endroit dapprentissage en politique qui ultrieurement constitua un tremplin vers une fonction ayant un plus de visibilit ne retrouve pas de fondement solide lorsquon regarde les trajectoires gnrales de ces acteurs. Si on superpose la population des secrtaires dtat la population parlementaire ou ministrielles les chiffres sont plutt sans relevance dans lconomie gnrale de cette lite politique. De la sorte, part le cas des premires quipes gouvernementales qui semblent avoir utilis cette procdure dune manire plus applique, les autres gouvernements ne rcuprent pas lexpertise acquise au niveau des secrtaires dtat. Valorise au niveau de la slection ministrielle constituant une des grandes voies daccs un portefeuille ministriel, le passage par une fonction de secrtaire dtat est loin de sinstituer en tant que rgle gnrale de promotion en politique. Le profil politique des secrtaires dtat est, comme on lavait dj prcis, marqu par de faibles ressources dcisionnelles des acteurs concerns. Les taux sont rvlateurs cet gard. Malgr une certaine croissance dans limportance des ressources locales de ces lites durant les deux derniers cabinets pris en compte ainsi que de limportance de la trajectoire parlementaire, le profil politique des secrtaires dtat reste trs peu significatif1. Ainsi, lexprience politique joue un rle marginal dans la promotion dans une position lintrieur du gouvernement et tonnamment, la fonction excutive ne sert pas de tremplin que dans peu de cas pour dautres fonctions politiques au niveau central. Ainsi la population des secrtaires dtat semble tre constitue, en grande partie, par des marginaux, reprsentant souvent des fidles des leaders politiques et illustrant plutt lapplication dun principe de
lexemple, en ce qui concerne lexprience locale on peut identifier uniquement quatre secrtaires dtat du gouvernement Ciorbea (3,96% du total) et 13 personnes de lquipe Nstase et de Triceanu ayant un tel profil). Des chiffres semblables sont identifier dans le cas de lexprience parlementaire pralable: 11 secrtaires dtat du gouvernement Vcroiu (7,14%), 5 du gouvernement Ciorbea (4,95%) et 15 du gouvernement Nstase (7,14%) prsentaient un tel profil.
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ALEXANDRA IONACU
patronage. Nanmoins, une infime partie de ces leaders russit sinstituer en tant quacteurs stables de la scne politique. Cette perspective trompe lil est cependant outrepasse lorsquon prend en compte la tendance gnrale de reproduction de ces acteurs dans des fonctions publiques. Toute comme la population ministrielle, la voie royale vers une nomination future dans une position excutive ce niveau constitue justement le fait davoir accd un tel poste dans les gouvernements antrieurs. Mme sans prendre en compte la rotation interne des secrtaires dtat, moins de moiti dentre ceux-ci (48%) on dtenu un seul mandant. 25,9% autres secrtaires dtat sont prsents au moins dans deux gouvernements, et autres 14,8% ont dtenu au moins trois mandants diffrents. Il est intressant spcifier galement que 138 personnes, donc environ 10% de la population totale, russissent dadditionner quatre mandants ou plus. Certes, cette caractristique dcrit plutt les gouvernements forms suite un changement du Premier ministre et non pas les quipes rsultantes dune nouvelle chance lectorale. Les secrtaires dtat semblent ne pas tre des hommes politiques par profession tant donn le fait quils ne prsentent pas de continuit dans la sphre politique dcisionnelle. Reprsentants dune section de la scne politique qui dans les meilleurs des cas sautonomise, il existe trs peu de ressources politiques menant leur nomination. Alors comment arrivent-ils devenir des secrtaires dtat? La rponse cette question tire forcement ses sources des formes de ressources non-politiques que ces acteurs dtiennent. Trois grands types de ressources peuvent ainsi tre identifis. Tout dabord, les secrtaires dtat disposent dune exprience dans la haute administration publique au niveau excutif. Au total 27,5% des secrtaires dtat ont parcouru une filire mandarinale qui leur a permis une cooptation ultrieure dans des fonctions publiques. Caractristique originaire du comportement du PDSR avant 1996, cette tendance est retrouvable surtout dans les deux derniers cabinets analyss (2000-2008). La carrire mandarinale est dailleurs le principal lment de convergence entre le profil de ces acteurs politiques gouvernementaux par rapport aux modles institus dans dautres pays. Cependant cette filire npuise pas expliciter la promotion en politique des nouveaux acteurs sur lchelon second du pouvoir. Dautres ressources sajouteront afin dexpliquer cela: la position de lacteur dans le soi-disant champ de la socit civile (catgorie intgrative qui runit lactivit dans les associations, instituts, mais aussi lespace acadmique) ou les ressources conomiques (qui durant les premires annes visent les positions de direction dans lconomie dtat et ultrieurement portent surtout sur lconomie prive). Les deux types de ressources semblent substantiellement importants indiquant un certain processus de conversion des ressources non-politiques en atouts pour la promotion politique. Pour ce qui est de la premire forme de ressource, visant lactivit des acteurs dans la sphre publique, on peut observer que 30,4% des secrtaires dtat disposaient dune telle exprience avant leur nomination. Professeurs universitaires, chercheurs ou encore des membres des associations, fondations ou des divers centres de recherche semblent tre des personnages prfrentiels pour la slection dans une fonction excutive. Leur exprience qui porte sur les comptences dtenues, mais galement sur laccs qui leur est offert un savoir faire technique et dautres catgories de personnes dans lespace civique instituent ainsi la pratique de leur cooptation dans le monde politique. Aux ressources acadmiques qui peuvent justifier le choix de certains acteurs au dtriment dautres sajoute limplication des lites dans lespace conomique. Des patrons ou des managers trouvent leur chemin vers une promotion politique. Mme si la prsence des ressources conomiques est plus rduite par rapport aux deux premiers types dexpriences (18,9%), elle prsente une certaine constance
45
sur la scne politique roumaine postcommuniste. Les taux les plus importants relis lconomique sont dcryptables aux extrmits temporelles des cas cits: ainsi les secrtaires dtat des deux premiers cabinets Roman avaient dtenu des fonctions de direction dans le cadre des entreprises dtat (surtout durant la priode communiste), tandis que lautre cabinet qui prsente dailleurs les plus hauts taux des gens provenant des sphres conomiques, Clin Popescu-Triceanu, valorise cette fois-ci les entrepreneurs de la sphre prive. Des fonctionnaires publics, des figures emblmatiques de la socit civile ou encore des entrepreneurs tel est le profil qui se dresse lorsquon analyse les secrtaires dtat des cabinets roumains postcommunistes. Leurs ressources politiques sont plutt limites et leurs perspectives de poursuivre une carrire politique sont plutt lies une reproduction au mme niveau de lexcutif. De cette manire, le personnel politique du second chelon de pouvoir semble diverger par rapport au personnel ministriel. diffrence des ministres qui adoptent peu prs immdiatement un comportement quon retrouve dans la plupart des dmocraties parlementaires essayant substituer labsence dune longue tradition politique par un recrutement de lacadmique ou des professions techniques, lchelon secondaire souffre des reconfigurations continuelles introduisant de nouveaux acteurs en politique. La valeur attribue aux ressources non-politiques ne constitue pas une idiosyncrasie des premires annes du postcommunisme mais un fondement constant du recrutement. Ce fait ne serait pas exceptionnel si on ntait pas en la prsence dune ressource unique qui naccompagne pas en parallle un enchanement des fonctions politiques comme cest le cas des lites ministrielles. Il paratrait ainsi que les gouvernements roumains exhibent des comportements ayant des rfrentiels politiques contradictoires. Les trajectoires ministrielles sapprochent du modle franais ou du modle italien qui favorisent la ppinire du parti ou le vivier de la haute administration publique, tandis que le niveau des secrtaires dtat tend vers une amricanisation de la politique1. Les acteurs du second chelon de pouvoir sont ainsi plutt recruts parmi les gens ayant de belles carrires dans le priv o ils rentreront une fois le mandat achev.
EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION
La concentration du pouvoir au niveau des excutifs roumains postcommunistes, ainsi que la grande diversit des stratgies adoptes par les cabinets en place quant aux politiques adoptes, soulve en premier lieu un questionnement sur la capacit dcisionnelle des acteurs individuels. lites institues aprs la chute de lancien rgime, la population gouvernementale roumaine serait ainsi enclenche entre les particularismes historiques et rgionaux et aurait pu justement engendrer par son profil toute cette grande diversit au niveau des rsultats visibles des politiques. Dans cette perspective, la question portant sur les trajectoires des acteurs en politique, leur exprience acquise dans les cadres dmocratiques, constituent une pierre angulaire pour la comprhension de lactivit gouvernementale. Une analyse porte sur le profil des gouvernants nous offre parfois une image contre-intuitive par rapport la perception publique. Linfluence du communisme,
Pour la diffrence entre les divers modles v. Mattei DOGAN, Introduction: la slection des ministres dans divers rgimes politiques, cit., pp. 125-129.
46
ALEXANDRA IONACU
si importante durant les premiers moments de changement semble svanouir du portrait gnral des ministres et des secrtaires dtat. Certes, la prsence du pass dans le prsent peut revtir de nombreuses facettes plus subtiles que la simple reproduction des anciens leaders et elle peut mener lencombrement de laction gouvernementale. Nanmoins, la disparition de limportance de cette ressource du pass dans la slection des acteurs gouvernementaux est indniable. sa place sinstaurent toute une srie des logiques divergentes. La diffrence institue entre les ministres et les secrtaires dtat postcommunistes, qui en principe font rfrence un mme type de comptence dcisionnelle, est incontestable. Au niveau ministriel les modles de promotion certifient une convergence aux autres dmocraties parlementaires europennes. Disposant des ressources qui relvent de lactivit dans le parti et dans le Parlement, petit petit, les ministres deviennent dhommes dtat. Il ne sagit pas ici dapprcier lthique des acteurs ou encore leur capacit dentamer un projet politique clair. Cependant ces lites deviennent des acteurs centraux de la scne politique postcommuniste. En contrepartie, le niveau des secrtaires dtat semble soumis dautres logiques visant principalement la cooptation. La maximisation des ressources non politiques tout au long du postcommunisme fait penser un chelon technique qui se rclame plutt dune vision lamricaine sur limplication pisodique en politique des gens dont la propre profession et performance constituent la principale ressource de promotion. Cette diffrence entre les niveaux est tout fait remarquable et elle acquiert plus de poids durant les dernires annes. En fait dune perspective longitudinale, il est clair que lanne 2000 reprsente un moment de scissure par rapport aux premires dix annes du postcommunisme. La rupture quant une rfrence au pass est quasi-totale, les ministres nomms en fonction prsentent dhabitude une longue exprience dans le politique post-dcembriste. En outre, il sagit aussi de la priode o les ressources locales commencent jouer un rle plus important dans la slection amnageant ainsi les possibles bases dune reconfiguration des politiques gouvernementales. Malgr les hauts taux de promotion des secrtaires dtat en fonctions ministrielles, cette pratique ne touche cependant quune section rduite du total des dirigeants du second chelon constituant une caractristique spcialement pour les partis de gauche. La nomination des secrtaires dtat semble obir dautres rgles. Si pour tre ministre, les acteurs prsentent dhabitude part des ressources sociales ou conomiques, une biographie en politique qui les recommande, cela nest forcement le cas des secrtaires dtat. Quune partie de ceux-ci russissent devenir ministres ou des parlementaires, tandis quune section plus importante (mais toujours limite) de cette population russit acqurir un nouveau mandat de secrtaire dtat. La dualit des rgles qui rgissent les deux niveaux du pouvoir excutif aurait pu la base instituer des modles spcifiques: dune part une professionnalisation qui se trouve sous le contrle du parti et de lautre, une logique oppose fonde sur un principe de comptence. Cette interprtation gnrale est cependant partiellement infirme lorsquon essaie de dcrypter les logiques sous-jacentes dune stabilisation hypothtique dune lite gouvernementale. Si au niveau des trajectoires la disjonction est nette, en ce qui concerne la volatilit des portefeuilles, les degrs dinstabilit en fonction ne prsentent pas de diffrences notables. Ainsi on pourrait dire quen principe, les secrtaires dtat restent tributaires aux changements du premier chelon de pouvoir et donc dpendants par rapport celui-ci. La logique de dpendance ainsi institue suggre plutt une dimension de rcompense dans la nomination sur le second chelon du pouvoir et non pas une tendance vers un modle technocratique.
47
APPENDICE
Figure 1 Les diffrences entre les ministres et les secrtaires dtat dans la conversion des anciens nomenklaturistes
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1
L'exprience excutive communiste
Ministres
Scretaires d'Etat
Le cabinet
Figure 2 Les taux dexprience politique de parti et excutive des ministres avant leur nomination
Les Bases de la Professionnalisation des Ministes (annes)
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Roman Stolojan Vacaroiu Ciorbea Vasile Isarescu Nastase Tariceanu
Exp Pol
Exp Part
Exp Exe
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ALEXANDRA IONACU
Table 1 Les grands facteurs dterminants du processus de la slection Component 1 Anciennet dans le parti avant le dbut du mandat du cabinet Fonction la direction centrale du parti Fonction la direction locale du parti Exprience parlementaire Exprience dans les fonctions publiques au niveau local Exprience dans ladministration gouvernementale Fonction de direction dans le monde non politique La dure de lexprience excutive dans les cabinets antrieurs -.701 .777 .083 .737 -.106 -.031 .373 -.453 2 -.523 -.049 .878 -.010 .770 -.091 .083 .088 3 .095 -.022 -.056 .161 .347 -.013 .747 .622 4 -.134 .075 -.023 -.219 -.144 .959 -.157 .202
Mthode dExtraction: Analyse en Composante Principale. Mthode dExtraction: Varimax avec Normalisation Kaiser.
Table 2 Tableau des ressources non-politiques des ministres 1990-2008

LE GOUVERNEMENT Roman Stolojan Vcroiu Ciorbea Vasile Fonction direction Oui Non N N N N N N N N 19 70.4% 8 29.6% 1 5.0% 15 75.0% 1 5.0% 1 5.0% 2 10.0% 0 .0% 12 60.0% 8 40.0% 1 7.1% 10 71.4% 2 14.3% 0 .0% 1 7.1% 0 .0% 29 64.4% 16 35.6% 4 13.3% 19 63.3% 1 3.3% 3 10.0% 2 6.7% 1 3.3% 27 69.2% 12 30.8% 5 18.5% 16 59.3% 2 7.4% 4 14.8% 0 .0% 0 .0% 19 59.4% 13 40.6% 3 15.8% 12 63.2% 2 10.5% 2 10.5% 0 .0% 0 .0% Isrescu Nstase Triceanu 17 65.4% 9 34.6% 4 23.5% 8 47.1% 4 23.5% 1 5.9% 0 .0% 0 .0% 37 77.1% 11 22.9% 11 28.2% 15 38.5% 7 17.9% 2 5.1% 4 10.3% 0 .0% 42 79.2% 11 20.8% 20 43.5% 10 21.7% 6 13.0% 6 13.0% 0 .0% 4 8.7%
Profil non conomique politique (lorsquil existe) acadmique administration acteurs soc. militaire autres
49
Table 3 Tableau des ressources non-politiques des secrtaires dtat 1990-2008

Oui Fonctionnaire Non Socit civile Oui Non Oui conomie Non N % N % N % N % N % N % 1 39 30.71 88 69.29 18 14.17 109 85.83 31 24.22 97 75.78 2 33 27.27 88 72.73 31 25.83 89 74.17 27 22.50 93 77.50 3 18 19.78 73 80.22 25 27.47 66 72.53 16 17.78 74 82.22 4 44 30.56 100 69.44 49 33.79 96 66.21 18 12.59 125 87.41 5 17 18.48 75 81.52 34 36.56 59 63.44 14 15.05 79 84.95 6 26 24.53 80 75.47 35 33.02 71 66.98 16 15.09 90 84.91 7 13 19.12 55 80.88 26 38.24 42 61.76 12 17.65 56 82.35 8 58 32.40 121 67.60 57 31.84 122 68.16 28 15.73 150 84.27 9 56 33.14 87 66.86 59 34.91 110 65.09 48 28.4 121 71.59
Note: Pour les trois derniers cabinets il existe un problme quant aux valeurs manquantes: les donnes couvrent 88% des secrtaires dtat du cabinet Isrescu ainsi que du cabinet Triceanu et 85% des secrtaires dtat du cabinet Nstase.
Table 4 Tableau gnral de la volatilit des portefeuilles du personnel gouvernemental Ministres Dure Moyenne 5.20 13.27 12.95 27.71 10.54 13.44 10.32 25.35 22.85 15.74 Ecart-type 0.95 4.32 0 16.72 5.52 6.47 2.87 14.63 15.08 7.40 Rapp. Dur. 0,87 0,83 1,00 0,57 0,66 0,67 0,86 0,53 0.49 0.72 Secrtaires dtat Dure Rapp. Moyenne cart-type Dur 4.05 1.65 0.68 8.71 5.05 0.54 11.34 4.09 0.87 23.21 16.92 0.47 11.71 4.55 0.73 12.66 11.56 0.58 11.45 6.47 0.95 23.59 14.80 0.49 22.40 13.05 0.48 14.35 8.68 0.64
Provisoire Roman Stolojan Vcroiu Ciorbea Vasile Isrescu Nstase Triceanu TOTAL
Table 5 Taux de reproduction du personnel gouvernemental 1990-2008 Ministriel 26.92 55 7.14 12.81 66.67 Secrtaires dtat 46.15 57.29 29.22 15.84 56.14 Promotion 25.11 28,56 26.08 10.35 9.14 Promotion 1 36.12 35 40.48 15.28 16.67 EXP1 48.15 61.9 32.6 20.51 68.75
Roman II Stolojan Vcroiu Ciorbea Vasile
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Isrescu Nstase Triceanu 77.27 10.42 15.1 77.92 15.83 11.22 13.64 23.01 24.53 13.64 43.75 34.12
ALEXANDRA IONACU
80.76 35.42 24.53
Promotion=proportion des secrtaires dtat danciens gouvernements qui sont promus en fonctions excutives: Promotion 1: le poids des secrtaires dtat dans la population ministrielle; Exp1: exprience excutive des ministres sur un des deux chelons du pouvoir excutifs dans les cabinets prcdents; Ministriel et Secrtaires dtat=les taux des ministres/ des secrtaires dtat ayant dtenu des fonctions analogues dans les cabinets prcdents.
Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania
51

ION ENACHE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

It is an extensively accepted truth that parties are the main actors in modern liberal democracies1. However, the last twenty years have seen a number of significant independent actors emerge in more than a few political systems worldwide. In an attempt to investigate the rise of non-party actors we analyse the case of independent competitors in Central and Eastern Europe elections. More precisely, this paper aims to scrutinize the issue of independent candidatures addressed in the specific setting of post-communist Romanian local politics. We intend to explore a topic which has been greatly ignored by scholars, despite its obvious contribution to the modernization of the electoral pace of Eastern European countries. Independents represent more than occasional appearances at various electoral cycles, they offer a measure of the state of the party system at large. This is specifically why an attempt at addressing the presence of independent politicians in the particular situation of the third wave of democratization might give us a better impression of the maturity of the electoral system and also of the success of the democratic changes. Two decades after the breakdown of communist regimes, parties and party systems throughout Eastern European polities still undergo extreme internal transformations. During the period of post-communist transition, many of these traditionally dominant parties have seen their vote shares drop under the weight of accusation of unrepresentativeness and endemic corruption2. Public rejection of party politics created an opening in the electoral market for independent political entrepreneurs, whose points of access in local politics are not dependent on party affiliation, but rather on their ability to present themselves as viable alternatives to the traditional parties by emphasizing local issues and their distinction from party elites. Independent politicians represent a particular manifestation of post-communist politics which deserves further investigation, especially due to their recurrence in the local elections. Commonly, the local office is the first and decisive stepping-stone to higher elected positions of public trust, with local elections profoundly altering the course of national politics; such was the case of the office of the general mayor of Bucharest which served as departing point for various positions in the central
1 Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 2000, p. 25. 2 Tom GALLAGHER, The Balkans in the New Millennium in the Shadow of War and Peace, Routledge, London, pp. 186-187.
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ION ENACHE
administration1. We believe this to be an additional argument for the importance of local level politics and for treating independent candidatures in this specific setting with extensive attention, together with the observations that voters tend to form their political preference at the local level and to maintain it for mainstream elections and also that local elections might be instrumented as barometers of national political trends, because it helps politicians at large determine what matters most to voters2. Despite the vivid importance of local elections in Romanian politics, the local voting literature appears limited, while mostly integrating the national outlook. Similarly, the discipline seems excessively preoccupied with presidential elections and leaves local politics largely untouched in the realm of party studies and electoral politics3. Compiling an orderly review of the literature led us to the identification of only a handful of studies that have attempted to question the elements of local elections and of even fewer that scrutinize the particular place occupied by independents. Still, these studies are rather distant from the Eastern European region and we can hardly say much about what motivates certain politicians to run as independents, or about the value of incumbency over first-time independents, or about the importance of financial support in winning votes, or whether personal qualifications of individual candidates can compensate for the lack of party backing. Another issue we observed during our attempt was represented by the insufficiency of studies which go beyond casual partisan and socioeconomic features of the voting process, or of analyses that follow independent leaders which manage to capture office not only during their electoral effort, but all throughout their mandate. Thirdly, limited considerations exist regarding the voting behaviour for local elections, keeping in mind the basic fact that this problematic has been recursively addressed especially in those studies in which national politics are scrutinized4. Most probably this has happened because of the inadequate amount of existing data and equally because of the preference of numerous authors for solo cross-sectional analysis. Therefore, one purpose of this study would be to address these matters preponderantly from an Eastern European perspective. Namely, this would mean to analyse what motivates certain political actors to run as independents, in what way these types of independent candidatures are different from partisan campaigning and to question how they manage to mobilize the needed support in this particular context. Our main question refers to what fuels independent candidatures in party-controlled political systems? We intend to accomplish this rather daunting task by analysing the recurrence of independent candidacies at local elections which have been organized in post-communist Romania between 1992 and 2008. For that matter, we believe that post-communist Romania represents an illustrative application of independent politics particularly because its particular electoral setting is not directly conducive to independent candidacies. Nonetheless, despite this fact, independent entries have occurred with more or less success during
IDEM, Theft of a Nation. Romania since Communism, Hurst, London, 2005, p. 170. James D. KING, Comparing Local and Presidential Elections, American Politics Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 1981, pp. 277-290. 3 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, Oksana MALANCHUK, Schematic Assessments of Presidential Candidates, American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 2, 1986, pp. 521-540. 4 Craig GOODMAN, Gregg R. MURRAY, Do You See What I See? Perceptions of Party Differences and Voting Behavior, American Politics Research, vol. 35, no. 6, 2007, pp. 905-931.
2
53
the past two decades. Mayoral, local council and county council elections will be our main targets, with special attention reserved for those areas where most independent candidatures were articulated. Similarly, we will not ignore the political trajectories of independents following their election, especially as we believe it to be decisive for depicting the political performance of independent actors. Segments of the population and demands usually excluded from consideration by highly centralized and self-absorbed national parties identified an alternative means to voice their grievances thanks to independent politicians. With questions about roads, schools and trash pickup dominating local elections, local notabilities found it possible to have a say in an area usually monopolized by political parties. This particular setting was intensely exploited by independents during the last two decades. And, despite constrains imposed against them by the party-dominated electoral system, these independent political actors managed to advance their candidatures against party competitors. Here, we need to identify what made this particular situation possible. Was it the personal appeal of independents, the electorates desire for viable alternatives to party politics or it was more of an exceptional setting which favoured independent standings? Essentially, the phenomenon of independent candidatures challenges the commonly accepted concepts in party research and particularly, raises questions about the organizational advantages of parties and doubts the dominant role of party structures as representation mediums. The widely spread belief that parties as organizational vehicles represent the best means for individual actors to obtain electoral gains has increasingly become the subject of critique since both the decline of the party identification model and the rise of anti-party sentiment left established parties increasingly unpopular among electorates1. This is not to say that partisan politics is becoming redundant in the proximity of independence; instead, we plan to investigate what might encourage independents to challenge a political setting otherwise uniformly subject to partisan supremacy.
Research Approach and Strategy

This paper sets out to explore and understand the peculiarities of independent candidatures at local level, in an Eastern European post-communist setting. It focuses on the development of this particular type of politicians in societies that are moving away from the communist derail, and soughs to analyse independents specific place in the post-communist establishment. Through the research, the project aims to highlight the dynamics of local independence by approaching its main actors, the politicians who ran as independents and, using this particular label, managed to get into office. The main objective, as well as providing an insight into the rationale behind the individuals which enter politics on their own, is to deliver an analysis of the local context where independents advance their candidatures and of the general legal framework so as to better discriminate between the advantages and drawbacks of this particular political habitat for independent politicians. For better understanding why politicians chose the independent path to office we interviewed thirty independent politicians who participated in the last local electoral
Diana OWEN, Jack DENNIS, Anti-partyism in the USA and Support for Ross Perot, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996, pp. 383-401.
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moment organized in Romania, namely in the June 2008 elections. We believe such an investigation might offer fundamental insight regarding independents motivation to get involved in local politics without any sort of party support and can provide us with a more general impression on the dimension of political independence in postcommunist Romania. Using political autobiography as main research method, a total of thirty interviews were conducted with independent politicians elected for the office of mayor, selected randomly from within the public database provided by the Electoral Authority. These interviews form the primary empirical data of the study. They took place from April 2010 to May 2010. Particularly, the interviews were open-ended, as this allowed for the interviewers to express their ideas, thoughts, and memories freely, using their own words. The interviews were supplemented by many other informal discussions with those involved in local politics as independents, together with consistent monitoring of existing official sources on independent candidatures. The interview material was thematically approached, the results being analysed in the empirical part of our paper. Our analysis employed as dependent variable the total number of votes received by each candidate and generally his or hers political reach, whereas the independent ones consisted of candidates personal characteristics, political resources and endorsements as well as the political following. Ultimately, the control variables were represented by the number of candidates who run in each election together with numbers that stand for the voter turnout. Electoral campaign served as unit of analysis, data being collected for each election year on the total votes received by independents and translated to the size of their political followership which we measured by the comparing independents scores to the total numbers. Also we employed a variety of personal indicators obtained from the interviews conducted with the candidates, their official profiling on their promotional materials and in the local media. The data are drawn from observing five successive mayor, local council and county council elections between 1992 and 2008. During this period numerous independent candidates participated in local campaigning, with a total of 1229 mayor nominations won, and almost 6000 councillors mandates accorded to independents. A breakdown of these campaigns shows that, despite the decrease of the general scores obtained by independents, independent politicians managed to get re-elected on various occasions. We also met some exceptional situations where independents established a monopoly in those respective localities. In the next parts of our research we will attempt to advance various explanatory interpretations for this precise situation. Our analysis will focus on three different electoral levels with independence occurrences elections for the mayors office and for the local and county councils. Drawing from the existing literature a number of key questions were identified which guided the structure of the interviews and the analysis that followed. Together with the qualitative data we plan to obtain from the interviews, in order to demonstrate the empirical relevance of independents in Romanian local politics we refer to the details on vote, seat and candidate share obtained by independents in local elections held between 1992 and 2008. Observing the often significant presence of independents, with several cases when they won over fifty percent of the vote, we can rightfully asses the validity of our selection. For the purpose of the present examination we start from the basic observation that party supremacy is under serious revision especially at the local level, where ordinary citizens make up their electoral decision based on daily issues, rather than on political platforms. Consequently, independents see their chance of success being
55
helped by both this relative decline of electoral parties, as well by the increased electoral volatility in modern party democracies1. It remains to verify to which extent these presumptions apply as well to the polity under scrutiny here. As architects of electoral system, the dominant political parties made their best to assure their prevalence in the party system. Due to the specific exigencies of the electoral competition the monopoly of political parties is preserved, to the disadvantage of independent interventions2. Nonetheless, despite the allencompassing partisan framework in nowadays politics, independents manage to voice their interests and some succeed to win sympathies of the electorate. In order to take our investigation further, several questions are needed: How do independents manage to convince the voters of their trustworthiness? And what motivates these candidates to choose the independent path to getting in office in the first place? What makes independent candidates prone to survive electoral quarrels, even as they might seem disadvantaged by their initial lacking of a coherent party structure? Is there a direct relationship between non-partisanship and the negative views concerning the parties role in democratic politics? Is winning elections in the particular case of independents more about contextual factors, than actually about attributes inherent to the political system? Similarly, should we expect younger generations to feel more close to independents? One puzzling question which first needs answering would be why do independents basically regard the parties as irrelevant in the search for public office? Can it be because they fail to procure a party nomination or because their political career discriminates fundamentally against partisan affiliation? Certainly independent identifications are motivated by distinct features, but we believe that a focal point exists. Starting from these convergent traits of independent candidatures we intend to identify also how do independents relate to party counter candidates and what sort of rhetoric they employ against them. Another question should also be answered, namely why does the electorate show appetite for a virtually unknown candidate who can hardly compete with the organizational advantages of candidates supported by political parties? Subsequently, some authors argue that independent candidacies seem to be mainly fuelled by party detachment, with voters expressing their grievances mainly against specific parties and not necessarily against the concept of parties per se3. Might this mean that independents have limited electoral resonance in todays politics of post-communist polities? Likewise, what could best explain the variation in the electoral reach of independent candidates? Are independent candidates habitually more circumstance-dependent than party actors? We will attempt to provide these questions with an answer starting from the observation that, unquestionably, the ability of independents to win votes is not carved in stone, facing significant variations not only from one scrutiny to another in different electoral districts, but also within the same constituency. This is especially true as individual politicians dont enjoy a party brand, and manage to obtain at best low scores of the so-called captive electorate4. But despite this obvious drawback of political
1 Michael MARSH, Candidates or Parties? Objects of Electoral Choice, Party Politics, vol. 13, no. 4, 2007, pp. 500-527. 2 Liam WEEKS, Independents: a case-study, in Kris DESCHOUWER (ed.), New Parties in Government: in Power for the First Time, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 143-144. 3 Dawn BRANCATI, Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent Candidates Worldwide, Journal of Politics, vol. 70, no. 3, 2008, pp. 648662. 4 Ibidem.
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independence, there are vivid examples of constituencies lost by political parties in favour of independent contenders. Equally, the unpredictability encompassed in political independence makes our scrutiny as necessary as it can serve as a test of the maturity of our political system. Without the label and without any financial backing of political parties independents face numerous obstacles winning political office. The ability of independent candidates to gather votes varies from constituency to constituency and even within the ranks of the same constituency1. Therefore, one problem would be identifying what might explain this disparity in the electoral potency of independent candidates. A first step in an attempt to address this problematic would be to identify the relevant texts which try to scrutinize the issue of independent candidatures. Studying independent candidatures turns us to reviewing a literature dominated by two-dimensional constructions afar from our region of interest. Most identified approaches draw their conclusions from a biased understanding of independent elites, whose specific characteristics are identified by opposing them to political parties. Or, it is quite difficult to comprehend the true nature of political independence by simply comparing it to its partisan counterpart and disregarding its intrinsic incentives. For that reason, our present attempt will depart from this party-centred understanding of independency so that to reach some appreciations on political independence from a more autonomous outlook. Our attempt at approaching the issue of independent candidatures from a comparative perspective led us to identifying the existing case studies on Australian independents by Elim Papadakis and Clive Bean2, analyses of the British acceptance of independent candidatures, those focused on Canadian politics such as that compiled by ric Blanger3, the Japanese account of Robin Le Blanc4, a Norwegian case5, or some limited examples investigating the Russian situation here we chiefly refer to the leading paper written by Robert Moser6. Many of our available literature targeted peculiarities of independent candidatures within the American presidential competition7 and in the context of minor and third parties8. There are important structural transformations going on in Eastern European politics particularly
1 Susan HERBST, Politics at the Margin: Historical Studies of Public Expression Outside the Mainstream, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 70-71. 2 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, Independents and Minor Parties: The Electoral System, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no.1, 1995, pp. 97-110. 3 ric BLANGER, Antipartyism and Third-party Vote Choice: A Comparison of Canada, Britain, and Australia, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 37, no. 9, 2004, pp. 1054-1078. 4 Robin LE BLANC, Rebuilding the Electoral Connection: An Examination of the Origin and Potential of Anti-Party Electoral Movements in Japanese Local Politics. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004. http:// allacademic.com/meta/p60767_index.html (accessed on 22.02.2010). 5 Jacob AARS, Hans-Erik RINGKJB, Party Politicisation Reversed? Non-partisan Alternatives in Norwegian Local Politics, Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005, pp. 161-181. 6 Robert MOSER, Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics, Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, 1999, pp. 147-165. 7 Steven J. ROSENSTONE, Roy L. BEHR, Edward H. LAZARUS, Third Parties in America. Citizen Response to Major Party Failure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996. 8 William SCHNEIDER, Antipartisanship in America, in Vernon BOGDANOR (ed.), Parties and Democracy in Britain and America, Praeger, New York, 1984, pp. 103-144.
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affecting local political leadership, but we can hardly assess these manifestations by referring solely to the remote examples mentioned before. More than in other fields of political science, we believe that our investigation on the dynamics of independent candidatures in local politics should foremost take into consideration the immediate environment, while make usage of the existing literature as a departing theoretical framework. Reviewing the existing literature on political independence we stumbled upon several approaches. Some scholars view independence from the behavioural point of view, and address voters which ditch their partisan affiliation in order to either split their ticket, or to switch from one party to another partisan formation or independent candidate1. These attempts view independent candidatures highly dependent on the structuring of the electorate, and put great emphasis on the personal traits of independent leaders. Others focus on dispositional provisions influencing political independence, and develop a typology of self-defined independents and independent candidates2. Our present academic endeavour attempts to navigate the elements of independence starting from the advantages presented by the latter approach. We should also keep in mind that, subscribing to the common belief that political parties are indispensable to modern democracy, most scholars consider independents as redundant or even opposing democratic practice3. Some academics such as Robert Moser believe independent candidates are responsible for lowering voter turnout because they fail to present voters with viable alternative policies; at the same time, other authors consider that independents are prone to affect representation particularly for poor and less educated strata4. In one of their common works, Brain Schaffner, Matthew Streb, and Gerald C. Wright agree that non-partisanship might indeed depress turnout and take their argument forward in saying that independent candidates are to be blamed for holding back challengers from defeating incumbents5. Conversely, other scholars think that independents contribute to the electoral success of less preferred candidates and even that they increase the saliency of the electoral race. On a more categorical tone, independent politicians are also accused by the same academics to interfere with the administrations stability to the point that they can induce deadlocks6. But, along with these less fortunate approaches, there is also the so-called half-full view. Scholars which perceive in more bright colours the issue of independent candidates imply that they strengthen democracy by nurturing citizens interest in politics and by voicing critiques, acutely needed for the restructuring of the establishment7. Nevertheless, despite these unilateral approaches on the issue of
1 Walter DeVRIES, V. Lance TARRANCE, The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics, Eerdmans, Michigan, 1972, pp. 67-72. 2 Paul R. ABRAMSON, John H. ALDRICH, Phil PAOLINO, David W. RHODE, ThirdParty and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson and Perot, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 110, no. 3, 1995, pp. 349-367. 3 Ibidem. 4 Robert MOSER, Independents and Party Formation...cit., pp. 147-165. 5 Brain F. SCHAFFNER, Matthew J. STREB, Gerald C. WRIGHT, Teams without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, Political Research Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 1, 2001, pp. 17-30. 6 Arthur LUPIA, Busy Voters, Agenda Control and the Power of Information, American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 2, 1992, pp. 390-403. 7 Shanto IYENGAR, Adam F. SIMON, New Perspectives and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects, Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 51, no. 1, 2000, pp. 149-169.
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political independency, we consider that in order to approach this particular subject we need to assume a less biased viewpoint. On what concerns our particular area of interest, the rise of independent candidates in recent politics of Eastern and Central European states has seldom been accompanied by the development of specific literature. Most contributions on the subject are consumed by depictions of failing candidacies, while more optimistic pieces are hardly to be taken into consideration as they provide an exaggerated account advocating independent politics. In most liberal democracies, almost all voters choose one party or another, with independent candidates receiving minuscule levels of support, if any1. This domination by parties is equally reflected in the literature on voting behaviour, where there has been very little research on why some voters choose to cast their ballot for independents2. Respectively, as independent politics have become fairly frequent after 1989 a new question emerges why do voters show their support for independent candidates? This interrogation is to be addressed both for national politics and at sub-presidential level, precisely where independent candidates have their most significant impact. A possible answer could be the fact that citizens are increasingly searching for alternatives to traditional politics in an otherwise less visible part of politics: independents. Still, what about the motivations and behaviour of independent candidates what makes them seek a highly risky alternative route to office? Scholars such as Timothy Colton argue that, for the overwhelming part of independents, their raison dtre is competing for the spoils of office3. We will further attempt to apply these methodologies to the Romanian case in our analysis of the peculiarities of independent candidatures in local post-communist politics. Nevertheless, we expect that our particular case at hand not to entirely correspond to any of these endeavours, keeping in mind the specific structure and the relative novelty of Eastern European democratic arrangements.
Voting for Independents

The term independent is usually attributed to someone who is not affiliated with a political party4. Primarily, political independence encompasses the lack of the brand, the support and of the resources usually offered by a political party and, at the same time, it means pursuing a political path using own material resources, network of connections, know-how and political abilities5. Despite its underground position, independence responds entirely to the founding values of liberal democracies as it promotes political entrepreneurship and individual achievement to the best interest of the community. And contrarily to its accused centrifugal tendencies, political
Robert MOSER, Independents and Party Formation...cit., pp. 147-165. Donald GREEN, Bradley PALMQUIST, Eric SCHICKLER, Partisan Hearts and Minds Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 2002, p. 26. 3 Timothy J. COLTON, Transitional Citizens: Voters and Elections, in IDEM (ed.), PostSoviet Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 43-59. 4 ric BLANGER, Antipartyism...cit., pp. 1054-1078. 5 Allan G. JOHNSON, Frank BEALEY, The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science, Blackwell Publishing, London, 1999, p. 163.
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independence helps the renovation of the establishment and equally serves the reformation of partisan attitudes by highlighting the often unseen flaws within the establishment. Likewise, independency might vary across circumscriptions, being motivated by numerous different political gains and stimuli, and producing dissimilar political consequences. This is why identifying circumstantial traits of political independence is crucial for better understanding the phenomenon at large within the specific region selected for analysis. From an ideological understanding, independents are not required to assume centrist positions, but simply to develop their own system of political references, liberated from the strains of a political party. In the most basic understanding, independence removes the party label from the ballot, the candidate using his or her name alone for identification, together with the appellative independent candidate1. For what concerns its qualitative attributes, the term independence might be understood as the lack of correspondence with partisan directives and as alternative to party candidacy here, we have to mention that our thesis does exclude these so-called party mavericks that act largely independently from their party machinery2. We consider these party-dependent actors to display a faux type of independence, as it does involve neither the true attributes nor the strains of nonpartisanship. Comparatively, genuine independence might surface as result of internal motivations of the political actor, without much relying on influences coming from the political framework or from the partisan setting. Usually, politicians annoyed by the current state of affairs get involved on their own in politics, attempting to bring their individual contribution to ameliorating the establishment3. Secondly, political independence can be triggered by severe dissatisfaction with the management done by representatives of political parties and in response to the corrupt ways proffered by partisan politicians. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the basic fact that independents candidates can be also recruited from partisan politics. Correspondingly, the literature sees former party members turned independent as representing quite scarce cases and being usually motivated by misunderstandings with former party colleagues4. Typically, these independency-motivating conflicts occur in the immediate period preceding elections being driven by the allocation of party nominations and by personal divergent interests5. It can equally be argued that the magnitude of the conflict helps the independency gather electoral momentum6. Conversely, we cannot overlook these particular recurrences by simply separating from the bulk of per se independent candidatures. Thus, a separate analysis of these so-called recycled independents seems intensively necessary.
Art. 34 Align 5, Law No. 35/2008 on the Election of the Members of the Romanian Parliament. 2 Liam WEEKS, When Parties Are Not the Only Party in Town: Independent Actors in Ireland, paper presented at the joint sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 2006. 3 Liam WEEKS, Independents...cit. , p. 149. 4 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, Independents and Minor Parties...cit, pp. 97-110. 5 James D. KING, Comparing Local and Presidential Elections, cit., pp. 277-290. 6 Brain F. SCHAFFNER, Matthew J. STREB, Gerald C. WRIGHT, Teams without Uniforms...cit., pp. 17-30.
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On the electorate side, a trend toward not claiming allegiance to a political party is visible1. But we should also notice that measuring political independence by research institutes is only one way of tapping partisanship and we also must not ignore the basic fact that partisanship can go hand in hand with non-partisanship in the case of the same voter2. Or, in other words, partisanship is multidimensional and, according to some scholars such as Richard Katz or Arthur Miller and Martin Wattenberg, for a correct understanding of political independence we should employ several partisanship measures and regard national surveys only as one of the needed instruments for that particular affair3. Issue voting is expected to bring independents to the top preferences of the electorate. Together with partisan candidates positions on the broad issues such as economic development and environmental protection, independents often address more topical issues such as controversial reforms or support towards various actions4. Its not simply enough to insulate the native effects of partisan politics such as bribery, inefficacies and rampant corruption in order to turn voter choice to independents. Nonetheless, managing to turn these particular issues into the centrepiece of the local race is vital to independents. Another occurrence, highly visible in the more recent post-communist elections in Romania, is that of the emergence of a significant block of potential voters which are mostly disconnected from politics, and which treat party organizations and party electioneering efforts with great indifference. These voters may thus be less susceptible respond to traditional political mobilization endeavours and, if they decide to get involved in any sort, end up being highly volatile in their electoral choice5. Structurally, this particular stratum of the electorate represents the main target for independents. Correspondingly, it can be argued that stirring the imagination of a substantial number of voters represents a demanding job for independents as compared to the easier path for party candidates who have the entire support of their organization, but, be that as it may, one could ask what makes independent candidates stick even after voters got a close look at them? One explanation might be the fact that they challenge the classical and often grimy understanding of politics6. Taking further the position presented by V.O. Key on the abandoning of established partisanships by unsatisfied voters, we introduce the stance that electoral mobility favours the independent vote7. Especially younger voters seem prone to quit their inherited partisan affiliation and to adopt independent electoral views. And,
ric BLANGER, Antipartyism...cit., pp. 1054-1078. Richard KATZ, The Dimensionality of Party Identification: Cross-national Perspectives, Comparative Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, 1979, pp. 147-163. 3 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, Measuring Party Identification: Independent or No Partisan Preference?, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 1, 1983, pp. 106-121. 4 Liam WEEKS, Independents...cit. , p. 141. 5 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, Independents and Minor Parties...cit, pp. 97-110. 6 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1993, pp. 47-48. 7 V.O. KEY, The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960, Harvard University Press, 1966, in Pierre BRECHON, Partidele politice, Romanian transl. by Marta Nora rnea and Adina Barvinschi, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, pp. 142-143.
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undeniably, conjecture plays a definitive role to all this1. Mainly because of the mobile character of the preferences of the voters, independents are forced to convince the electorate each time they present themselves at the polls. Therefore, winning the elections its more about occasional voters in the case of independents. Still, judging after another component of voting behaviour, such as social category and education, a clear-cut delimitation cannot be easily made. Voting for independent candidates represents a highly volatile experience, which can be equally approached by lowincome middle parts of the electorate as it can by higher-educated conservatives or even by older generations2. This is why voting independents might be rightfully catalogued as a highly circumstantial experience, being not that much about political habits as it can be about incidental decisions. But what motivates less faithful partisan voters to give their vote to independents? Is the political appeal of a particular candidate? Is it some radical transformation of the identity of the voter himself which occurred between elections? Is it the Internet? Or might the answer rely in the influence exerted by the mass-media? Or maybe its more of a combination of all the above? And what can be said the local independent voter? Firstly, we should notice that, because of their critical attitude towards party politics, voters which usually reject independent candidates at the national level might become motivated by more contextual reasoning at the local level and turn to giving their vote to independent runners. This would mean that the local level of politics offers the best chance for independents to win, further potentiated by the legal provisions which make hardly open the national sphere of politics to independent competitors, by the insufficient development of the party system, the widespread distrust in political parties, and also by the negative connotations of party membership maintained from the era of communist dictatorship3. Similarly to other countries which use proportional representation, in Romania independent candidates can run successfully for office, at least theoretically. However, thus far independents have failed miserably to win nationwide elections and independent representatives surface only during the actual term of the Parliament. This was possible for those leaving their original parliamentary group which got them elected in the first place and chose independent path because of different arguments they had with their former partys leadership. Nevertheless, these recycled independents are highly susceptible to return to partisan politics, as their profile is highly prone to become incorporated in one of the competing parties ranks4. Comparatively, it remains a commonly accepted fact that voters are more inclined towards political parties especially as party identification is one of those shortcuts heavily employed in elections. And in the particular case when independence interferes with accessibility, we must expect people to be more resilient to change their habits. Current theory on the matter, however, considers that, in lack of partisan closeness, the electorate will seek out other, more encompassing information on which
1 Phillips W. SHIVELY, The Relationship between Age and Party Identification: A Cohort Analysis, Political Methodology, no. 6, 1979, pp. 437-446. 2 Franco MATTEI, Richard G. NIEMI, Unrealized Partisans, Realized Independents, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Partisan Identification, Journal of Politics, vol. 53, no. 1, 1991, pp. 161-174. 3 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nationcit., pp. 74-79. 4 Daniel BARBU, Republica absent politic i societate n Romnia postcomunist, Nemira, Bucureti, 1999, p. 89.
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to base their decision1. Voter decision making is visibly more difficult to manage for independents and in the case of less informed citizens this might even mean they lose their greatest information shortcut for making a cultivated vote. Some electors are expected to skip the election altogether, when they realise they are unable to determine clearly the differences between candidates or if they are little concerned to invest in time-consuming searches for pertinent information2. Those that eventually decide to express their political option might do that having in mind several other hints such as the politicians familiarity, background and his or hers programme3. For that matter, electoral geography studies underline the strong importance of the social context for the voting decision adopted locally4. Voters actually find out about their options by word of mouth, from their peers at the workplace or during other forms of social interaction. Interpersonal information transfers are complemented by the electoral contamination by which voters match their voting preference to the characteristics of an area, irrespective of their personal characteristics5. Working at a micro-scale such as that of local elections obliges us to better comprehend the basic fact that an important effect is the closeness of voters to candidates. Namely, the nearer one lives to a candidates home or has met him or her personally before, the more likely is one to vote for that candidate. This effect, which has been empirically proven by Liam Weeks and Aodh Quinlivan, might be extended in as much to affect those people that know somebody that have met the candidate6. This behaviour is explainable by admitting the fact that voters prefer someone they trust and from whom they hope to receive support in their dealings with the authorities. Equally, the position of a candidates name on the ballot paper can have a significant effect in terms of the number of vote he or she receives. This is particularly true for low-profile elections where voters are less informed about the background of the contenders and for lowerplaced positioned candidates such as independents. According to the provisions of the Romanian electoral law, independent candidates are placed at the bottom of the ballot following the order their candidatures were registered7. The structuring of the electoral system, the personalization of voting and the particular character of independent candidates contribute to the consolidation of independents as viable alternative to party politics. All the same, independents are considered to be context-driven, as it would be most unlikely for voters to stick to independents the same way party supporters do. Nonetheless, it is hard to assess what does happen to independent preferences, if they fade away during the lifetime of a generation or if they can be transmitted generically as family legacy. Whatever
Stuart ROTHENBERG, The Politics of Independents, The American Enterprise, vol. 1, 1990, pp. 13-15. 2 John ZALLER, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 34. 3 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, cit., pp. 47-48. 4 John Robert Victor PRESCOTT, Political Geography, Methuen and Co., London, 1972, pp. 85-88. 5 Kevin R. COX, The Neighbourhood Effect in Urban Voting Response Studies, in David SWEET (ed.), Models of Urban Structure, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1972, pp. 159-176. 6 Liam WEEKS, Aodh QUINLIVAN, All Politics is Local. A Guide to Local Elections in Ireland, Collins Press, Cork, 2009, pp. 90-92. 7 Art. 34 Align 5, Law No. 35/2008 on the Election of the Members of the Romanian Parliament.
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might be the case, independent voting can be best understood as a deviant political attitude, an assumption recurrent in the literature1.
Partisanship versus Independence

Essentially all governments that have called themselves democracies have incorporated however limited the idea of partisan organization. Equally, when democracy is established, as was the case for Eastern European countries not long ago, what seems a normal initiative of the new regime was to reinstate party activity2. The existence of democracy is directly connected to free and fair elections, with political parties being inherent for a functional democracy. Limited to observance about the changing place of political parties in the political systems of contemporary world, any debate on an eventual restructuring of party systems, even one to incorporate the independent labelling, maintains nevertheless some sort of institutional embodiments of the manifesting party logic. Continuing our argumentation on the idea of systematic interpretation of partisanships, we must take in consideration the most visible feature of partisan change, namely the erosion of partisan attachments among large numbers of citizens. Explanations found in the literature either consider the shifts of voting patterns, or adopt the attitudinal stance, insisting upon the decay of partisan feelings3. Both explanations stand, and both identify the growth of political independence as a reaction. The repercussions of such mounting independence are still under debate. Some authors consider that actually the escalading independence is rather superficial, meaning that many of those that would embrace the independent tag might even end up leaning towards one party or another4. Given their centrality to modern democratic governance, the structuralismdominated literature on transitions has tended to focus on the importance of party system consolidation, emphasizing the importance of the electoral system, that of elections and party building5. In the particular setting of Eastern European countries, their communist rule produced a strong antiparty sentiment among the elites and voters alike. The young Romanian party system makes no difference, as initial partisanships lacked a coherent social base, a firm organizational form and thorough ideological programme6. Especially at local level, the parties penetrated more difficult, and this is highly visible in the enhanced electoral scores obtained by independent candidates in the early years of the transition. On the one hand, parties are accused that they simply aim to increase their electoral score in order to get access to more resources and to satisfy the interests of their supporters. These catch-all parties exhibit
Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, Measuring Party Identification...cit., pp. 106-121. 2 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nationcit., p. 23. 3 Timothy J. COLTON, Transitional Citizens...cit., pp. 43-59. 4 Jack DENNIS, Changing Public Support for the American Party System, in William J. CROTTY (ed.), Paths to Political Reform, Heath, Lexington, 1980, pp. 35-66. 5 Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South Africa, South America and Post-Communist Europe, John Hopkins University Press, London, 1996, pp. 156-160. 6 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nationcit., p. 104.
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an obvious degree of professionalization and find it easy to participate in a highly competitive political market. And especially because political parties which manage to attain electoral relevancy gain access to a series of advantages assured by the state such as public financing, political parties try to incorporate any available electoral entrance1. However, following Georges Lavaus rhetoric we are entitled to argue that political parties, however functional and inclusive, cannot represent and integrate every particularity and social tensions existing within a society2. Here is where independents enter the scene, as they fulfil the need for political variety by speaking on behalf of those excluded by mainstream politics. Despite the prevalence of several main national political parties, the party system does not replicate wholly at all levels of the political competition. Regional specificities are commonly encountered, with numerous regional players having a say in local politics. The level of local politics represents a niche prone to be exploited by independent candidates, especially as the electoral system offers them several concessions to engage in the electoral competition3. Comparatively, at a time when voter turnout continues to decline together with the widespread lack of civic involvement, independent candidates offer the greatest personification of the resentment that many citizens feel toward major parties4. If political parties are universally understood as indispensable institutions for the functioning of democratic systems, one might argue that candidatures of independent politicians diversify the political options and contribute decisively to the maturation of the polity. Going further with our argumentation, dysfunctional parties might favour corruption and stagnation. This is why in any competitive democracy political independency is seen even more as relevant the moment political parties stop acting as regulatory responsible institutions and start affecting the very sanity of the political establishment. This negative approach towards political parties has been challenged by Martin P. Wattenberg, who considers that citizens do not immediately reject partisan structures, but rather they consider them less relevant in solving their uttermost important issues5. Therefore, rising levels of independence are not directly linked to sentiments of mistrust or scepticism expressed by the electorate towards political parties, but rather they are motivated by highly contextual reoccurrences6. Distancing themselves from partisanships, independents are believed to face several obstacles in their efforts of running for office as compared to the widely-accepted advantages enjoyed by party-supported candidates7. In the first place, independents lack any partisan support when they decide to forward their candidacy. Secondly, they rely mainly on a scarce amount of resources originating mainly from own sources and from a handful of supporters. To a similar extent, the voting mechanisms, the electoral context and financial resources play an equally important role in determining how
Pierre BRECHON, Partidele politice, cit., p. 102. Georges LAVAU, Partis et systmes politiques: interactions et fonctions, Revue canadienne de science politique, 1969, in Ibidem, pp. 125-127. 3 Liam WEEKS, Aodh QUINLIVAN, All Politics is Local... cit., p. 112. 4 David SEARS, Nicholas VALENTINO, Event-Driven Political Socialization and the Preadult Socialization of Partisanship, Political Behaviour, no. 20, 1998, pp. 127-154. 5 Martin P. WATTENBERG, The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1980, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p. 89. 6 Ibidem. 7 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, cit., p .19.
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well an independent can do at the polls1. Authors such as Arnold Fleischmann and Lana Stein which drew their conclusions from the national-level politics believe incumbency to be equally critical in local elections as well. Namely, those who have run previously in local races have the first chance in as much as their mandate has satisfied the expectations of their electorate2. But the system can be also forced by new candidates, and one of the main facilitator for new politicians to successfully advance their candidature is money. Spending cannot be ignored for local elections according to a growing number of studies from various countries, which attest the importance of local campaign funding as a determining factor of electoral outcomes, together with local canvassing and volunteer activities3. Though, since independents cannot rely on party funding for their political endeavours, their main sources for financial support are donations, which add to existing personal resources to finance their campaigns and, if legalized, to state subsidies. For example, according to the existing legislation on funding, Romanian independents do not enjoy public financing as they are not allowed to receive public budget subventions unlike political parties, their only source being donations4. At the local level the costs of running an electoral campaign are expected to be lower than the sums spent on national campaigns, with the similar predominance of political parties to be manifested. Within this particular setting, independents are expected to have the advantage of a smaller electoral population involving smaller costs. Nevertheless, who contributes financially to an independents campaign, and more importantly, why? Local businesses are identified as the main contributors by most scholars, while small donations are rather limited5. Together with the direct costs of modern politics, so-called administrative resources such as special treatment by the local government, funding provided illicitly from the state budget, free usage of state facilities, help political parties strengthen their position alongside indirect state subsidies such as free broadcasting and subsidies for parliamentary groups. Hence, the lack of a clear set of rules and strict control over political funding favours the incorporation of local political actors to centralized partisan structures and leaves little space for political independence to manifest6. Party affiliation is a highly complex deal, and this was especially true in the first days of post-communism characterized by high scores in party volatility. Especially then the issue of truly admitting partisan status emerged, because not all candidates who belonged to party structures were also formally members of those respective parties, especially in 1992. This situation appeared as some candidates were afraid that openly assuming their party affiliation would alienate potential voters which remembered the rotten nature of the socialist party-state. These candidates enjoyed the support of various political formations, even they ran as independents, and, as soon
Robert MOSER, Independents and Party Formation...cit., pp. 147-165. A. Clarke HAGENSICK , Influences of Partisanship and Incumbency on A Nonpartisan Election, Western Political Quarterly, vol. 24, 1964, pp. 719-730. 3 Caty R. KENNETH, Munroe EAGLES, Do Local Campaigns Matter? Campaign Spending, the Local Canvass and Party Support in Canada, Electoral Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, 1999, pp. 69-87. 4 Law No. 334 from 17 July 2006 on financing the activity of political parties and of electoral campaigns. 5 Caty R. KENNETH, Munroe EAGLES, Do Local Campaigns Matter?...cit., pp. 69-87. 6 Steven D. ROPER, Campaign Finance in South East Europe: The Case of Romania. Paper presented at the Workshop on Party Funding and Campaign Finance in Central and Eastern Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2-3 November 2001.
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as they got elected, they admitted their partisanship by joining the political party who supported them1. Therefore, we should be cautious when approaching independents performance in the early days of post-communism, particularly because this would mean to overestimate the number of independents. The evidence to support this view is quite impressive in present-day Eastern European post-communist politics. Strong partisans are fewer, spilt-ticket voting amplified, and parties lost much of their appeal, while scarce numbers of independents made their presence felt in local and national politics.
The Matter of the Electoral System

Independents face a hard time competing in a dysfunctional political framework, especially if the rules of the electoral technique were set to favour big political runners. Equally, political tradition plays a crucial role, influencing the performance of otherwise marginal contenders such as small parties and nonpartisan players. Because most partisan systems give an extra credit to large parties, the risk of underrepresentation of minor voices and that of affecting independents performances is highly present and forces independent candidatures to adapt2. Every now and then a minor candidate can win the elections. But for most independent adventurers, experience shows that the electoral system in most democratic countries nowadays favours a party-centric competition for national elections combined with candidatedominated elections occurring mostly at regional and local levels3. Of course, exceptions exist and confirm the fact that independent candidates are prone to make the best of all those small opportunities the electoral system has to offer. Though, opening the rigid partisan establishment to small players at the expense of big political interests is not an easy thing to do. This is highly visible for postcommunist politics here, political institutions were designed by plagiarizing Western political practice, but the transformations were accompanied by the incomplete adopting of political pluralism outside the party realm4. Nevertheless, because independents act in the same institutional environment as big parties do we should not ignore the basic fact that institutional mechanisms that regulate political competition and influence the nature of the partisan system were designed with the parties in mind5. Then again, independents depend greatly on various characteristics of the electoral system, such as seats allocation rules or ballot access requirements (e.g. deposits or lists of signatures). Within a highly competitive electoral system, lax ballot access requirements permits independents and small parties to enter the race, while in rigid polities, independents might even be banned altogether for entering certain types of elections6. Together with ballot access requirements, other intrinsic features
Frode BERGLUND, Party Identification...cit.,, pp. 84-105. Hermann SCHMITT, Soren HOLMBERG, Political Parties in Decline?, in Hans-Dieter KLINGEMANN, Dieter FUCHS (eds.) Citizens and the State, cit., pp. 95-133. 3 Stefano BIANCHINI, Political Culture and Democratization in the Balkans, in Geoffrey PRIDHAM, Tom GALLAGHER, Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 67-71. 4 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation cit., p.52. 5 David C. VALENTINE, John R. VAN WINGEN, Partisanship, Independence, and the Partisan Identification Question American Politics Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp. 165-186. 6 Robert MOSER, Independents and Party Formation...cit., pp. 147-165.
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of the electoral system which dominates certain electoral competitions influence the electoral performance of independent candidates. Among these, the extent to which a competition is candidate-centred or party driven is crucial for independents1. We should also notice that the dimension of the electoral district is vital for independents, as large circumscriptions are difficult to cover2. Furthermore, the type of voting system constitutes a major factor in shaping the configuration of any political system and represents one of the most vital institutional features to discriminate against small political actors. According to its design, mechanisms, effects at different levels, one can distinguish numerous variations of electoral systems, each of them developing specific relationships with the larger institutional framework. The same variables which influence the competition between political parties have significant repercussion for independents namely, the electoral formula employed, the ballot structure (whether single or multiple choices can be expressed for candidates or parties) and the district magnitude3. Electoral system design is of critical importance because it influences the way in which constituencies are drawn, the design of ballot papers, how votes are counted, and numerous other aspects of the electoral process. With similar effects can be credited other administrative aspects of elections such as the nomination of candidates or the registration of voters, but their influence is believed to be rather limited for independents. And particularly because the design of the voting system is often chosen at the discretion of established political parties, electoral laws tend to be specially made so that they protect partisan interests. This manipulation of the electoral system by an unscrupulous majority usually encourages the performance of political parties and disadvantage individual candidates. Likewise, despite the fact voting systems are de jure democratic, being guided by key principles such as fair representation, transparency and inclusiveness, the practice shows they actually limit the chances of small political parties and of independents4. Widely encountered throughout Europe, proportional representation systems tend to be more permissive and to encourage a greater diversity of parties and of individual political contenders5. Allowing multiple ballot choices, proportional systems are more likely to facilitate the success of small political formations, and hence open electoral opportunities for independent candidates. This argument is highly criticized by Russian-originating studies which argue that proportional representation systems help party system further consolidate6. Comparatively, majority and plurality systems are expected to decrease the electoral strength of independent candidates and small political formations, due to the way seats are being distributed favouring large competitors and making voters turn away from marginal candidates. Some authors maintain the idea that, because it dampers the connection between parties and voters, and makes voters more candidate-aware than label-dependent, majority and plurality systems encourage independent candidates7. Nevertheless, its hard
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ibidem, pp. 147-165. Dawn BRANCATI, Winning Alone...cit., pp. 648-662. Ibidem. Ibidem. Josep M. COLOMER, Political Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 44. Robert MOSER, Independents and Party Formation...cit., pp. 147-165. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy cit, pp. 141-146.
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to assess the recurrence of these theses, when only relying on single-case studies of independent candidatures. Certain commentaries regarding the confrontation between the dynamics of independent candidatures and that of certain subtypes of electoral systems are well-needed here. We presume that any electoral circumstance which puts a great emphasis on the candidate itself and its personal attributes and neglects the party labelling is creating opportunities for independents. Similarly, threshold is equally important for the electoral performance of independent candidates, with lower electoral threshold helping parties recuperate the disadvantage they face as compared to members of political parties. In the case of local elections, the two-round voting system employs winner-takes-all voting method for the first round of voting, and, if no candidate is able to receive an absolute majority of votes, the two candidates which obtained the highest scores take part in the second round run-off ballot1. As the practice shows it, ballotage has been affected by various practices of tactical voting: voters go for the most popular candidates or, au contraire; they rather support a weak candidate in the first round of voting, so that their real preferred candidate has a better chance in the runoff2. This latter practice might help independents credited by opinion polls with little chance to gain momentum and enter second round. The presence of a distinctive electoral system might provide an explanation for the success of independent candidates in a particular setting according to some scholars3. But this is not entirely true for our case, if we take into consideration the fact that the provisions of the electoral system remained arguably the same since the first local elections, while the vote for independents diminished considerably over time4. One explanation for this brutal decreasing might be the maturation of the partisan system, which managed to capture most of the voting preferences, while limiting the electoral performance of small competitors. We attempted to assess the electoral strength of independent candidates by comparing the percentage of candidates that present themselves using the independent label in elections, the percentage of votes that independents receive and the number of mandates captured by independents. Therefore, facing the numbers in the Romanian case, we end up with these numbers as an average for the past five electoral cycles: out of the bulk successful candidatures, independents won 10.45% of the vote and about 9.58% of the available mandates. Comparing these figures with those Dawn Brancati obtains in his comparative study on political independence we can place Romania on the weaker spectrum of independent politics5. For Romanian local politics a proportional representation voting system was in place since the 1992 elections in the case of local and county councils, while a two-tier majority voting system is used for electing mayors. This inconsistency between the types of elections used at local level was further extended in 2008, when a new electoral law opened to public will the function of president of county council, via a single tier majority vote. And precisely because of the nature of this varied arrangement highly dependent
Dawn BRANCATI, Winning Alone...cit., pp. 648-662. William POUNDSTONE, Why Elections Arent Fair (and What We Can Do About It), Macmillan, London, 2009, pp. 34-38. 3 Dawn BRANCATI, Winning Alone...cit., pp. 648-662. 4 Paul G. LEWIS, Political Parties...cit., pp. 81-83. 5 Dawn BRANCATI, Winning Alone...cit., pp. 648-662.
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on the political colour of the centre majority, numerous vicious situations surfaced among central and local authorities in the past two decades.
Independents by Law
According to the Romanian electoral laws, independents are seen as electoral competitors in legislative, presidential and local elections. Compared to the legal instability which characterizes the concept of political party in post-communist Romania, the legal definition given to independent candidates was rather constant all throughout the period of transition. Nevertheless, political independence is interpreted in legal terms as the monopoly of individuals which advance on their own political candidacies and receive the support of a particular number of voters1. Following this logic independence defines itself using the personal criteria combined with the popular dimension of political support. In line with the Romanian standards, parliamentary mandates are accorded using uninominal majoritarian vote distributed proportionally. At this particular level of politics, independent candidates are allowed to enter legislative elections having them provide a minimal number of signatures from their supporters, number which is decided for each uninominal college, but has to equal at least 4% of the number of the voters registered in their respective college, with no less than 2000 names for the lower chamber and double for the Senate2. Also, the law stipulates that independents running for a legislative mandate, similarly to party-supported candidates, need to make proof of a deposit consisting of the amount of five minimum national wages. If these independent candidates manage to get at least 20% of the total amount of valid votes for the college where they competed, the deposit is returned to them. According to the same piece of law, independents have access to the public services of radio and television, proportionally with their electoral significance, the same being true about their possibility to use the special boards for electoral posters3. In order to obtain a mandate in the legislative, independents need to win the majority of votes in their electoral college and do not benefit from any special treatment as their partisan counter candidates do, such as redistribution bonuses. Despite the fact legislative elections do not represent the focus of our research, we cannot ignore some basic facts regarding the political performance of independent candidates at that particular level. Our first observation would be that independent candidatures were advanced for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. All these independent attempts at winning a legislative seat failed especially as result of the exigent nature of the rules in place at this particular level of politics. With the requirements for both registering a candidature and for covering the circumscription rocketing as compared to the state of thins at the local level, it is no wonder no actual independent candidate
1 Art. 26 Align 1 and Art. 30 Align 1 of Law No. 35/2008 on electing the representatives to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of Romania, together with Law No. 67/2004 on electing the Authorities of the Public Local Administration, the Law of Local Public Administration No. 215/2001 and Law No. 393/2004 on the Statute of Local Representatives with subsequent modifications. 2 Art. 29 Align 7, Law No. 35/2008. 3 Art 38 Align 1, Law No. 35/2008.
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managed to surpass the threshold and to get a mandate. At best, the scores obtained by independents managed to pass the average of three percent. One particular detail not to be ignored is the presence of recycled independents in the Parliament, originating from failed partisanships. Their ranks vary accordingly to the stability of the legislative session, with more castoff independents surfacing in very combative political setting. For presidential competitions, independents need at least 200 000 signatures in order to advance their candidatures, and enjoy similar provisions as members of political parties and of alliances do1. What became highly visible in the past two decades of post-communist politics is the very fact that independent candidatures for the supreme function in state were rare, and most of them can be categorized as fair exceptions. In 1992 and 2004 there was a single independent candidature, while in 2009 we can easily spot no less than three independents running for president, the back-then mayor of Bucharest, a Roma ethnic and a businessman. Among these candidatures we encounter only one woman which presented herself to the polls as independent, a lawyer which ran in the 2000 elections. Similarly, just one independent attempted to run for president more than once, in the 2000 and 2009 elections. In the case of presidential elections the situation for independents is somewhat ameliorated to what we noticed at the parliamentary level. Still, for most occurrences of independence in nationwide politics, these numbers are highly exceptional. For example, during the past two decades and over the past five electoral cycles only one presidential candidate forwarded his independent candidature twice. At the last presidential elections independents failed to raise the interest of the people, with all three independents getting under four percent of the votes2. On the other hand, in the case of the elections organized for the representatives to the European Parliament, independents are permitted to run under the proportional representation formula, providing the fact they raise 100 000 signatures. This number appears to be too exigent, as compared to the requirements parties need to meet in order to forward their electoral lists3. Also, similarly to the other types of elections, independents are placed in the last part on the ballot, after candidatures from parties represented in the European Parliament and other parties and alliances are satisfied. Likewise, independents presence in public media is also subject to party premiership. Nonetheless, independents might get one of the available European legislative mandates if they manage to surpass the national electoral coefficient, established by law as being the rapport between the total number of votes expressed nationwide and the number of mandates attributed to Romania4. For the past European parliamentary elections held in Romania, it was highly visible that independents can hardly penetrate the partisan monopoly. But, similar to other Eastern European polities, Romania was confronted with scarce recurrences of independent players managing to reach needed score, most of which usually emanate from high-profile typecasts within the establishment. One of the most visible electoral settings remains
Law No. 370 on Electing the President of Romania from 20 September 2004. Stan STOICA, Dicionarul partidelor politice din Romnia 1989-2004, Meronia, Bucureti, 2004, p. 83. 3 Art. 12, Law No. 33 from 16 January 2007 on Organizing the Elections for the European Parliament. 4 Art. 20 Align 2, Law No. 33/2007 on Organizing the Elections for the European Parliament.
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Bucharest, retaining a symbolic importance for the state of the entire nation and with capacity to irradiate the remainder of the electoral body. After the first four mayors appointed by governmental decision, since march 1992 Bucharest experienced five mayors belonging to one of the political parties, and an independent1. In 2004 the only independent candidate for the office of general mayor managed to obtain a meagre score of 0.15% of the total vote. Four years later, a former social democrat turned independent as result of internal quarrelling with his party colleagues decide to run as independent for this seat. He obtains 56, 55% of the votes, managing to defeat the representative of the most important political party in Bucharest over the previous years2. At local level, independent candidatures can be proposed for local and country councils, and for the mayors office. Independents which wish to run for any of the available councillor position need to enjoy the support of at least 1% of the total number of voters registered in their circumscription, but at least 50 for communes, 100 for small towns and 1000 for counties, the capital city, Bucharest districts and large towns3. Those who wish to run for mayors office, need to make proof of the support of at least of 2% of the total number of voters registered in their circumscription, but no least than 200 for communes, 300 for cities, 1000 for large cities and districts of Bucharest, while 5000 signatures are needed for the Bucharest4. This particular aspect of the electoral legislation led to discriminatory practices against independents, such was the case of the only successful independent candidate to the office of mayorgeneral, which was confronted with the ultra-correctness of the Municipal Electoral Bureau5. Nonetheless, these numbers do not seem to represent a direct problem for independents; they even appear to be provoking independency at the local level. On the other hand, on what concerns womens participation as independents at local elections is highly dependent on each candidates strength to participate as no gender quotas are in place. The proportion of women competing independently for office is rising gradually, but remains very small up to the present as compared to the experience of Western Europe on the matter. And, this seems especially visible at the regional level, where a more patriarchal understanding of politics seems to remain in place6. The law discriminates against independent candidates in the case when no political formation or independent candidate has managed to pass the electoral threshold, when the mandates are redistributed among these partisan groups, with independents being excluded from the formula from the very beginning, according to the dHondt rules for redistributing unused votes7. Furthermore, according to the
1 Cristian PREDA, Al noulea primar postcomunist al Bucuretiului, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 5, 2005, pp. 503-506. 2 Central Electoral Bureau, June 2008 elections for the authorities of the local public administration, http://beclocale2008.ro/ (accessed on 12.04.2010). 3 Art. 48 Align 1, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public administration, republished. 4 Art. 48 Align 2, Law No. 67/2004 with subsequent modifications. 5 Public Policy Institute, Alegerile locale 2008 organizare inerial, candidai apatici, alegtori indifereni, IPP, Bucureti, 2008. 6 Ionela BLU, Le Parlement roumain lpreuve du genre. Les femmes politiques dans la lgislature 2004-2008, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 2010, pp. 123-151. 7 Art. 96 Align 8, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public administration, republished.
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electoral laws for local elections, electoral publicity is permitted, with independents enjoying free access to the public radio and TV stations as well as to private media station1. Unlike candidates of political parties which benefit of greater airing time for their electoral announcements, independents can dispose of only five minutes for their public broadcasts. Independents can also present their political offer on public places specifically selected for electoral posters. As noticed, independents face several obstacles in winning political office. Though, as we can easily observe, ballot access requirements are pretty permissive at local level, with signature requirements being rather easy to meet, and even without the large infrastructure of a political party independents are able to reach eligible voters. Monetary deposits are omitted for independents that participate in local elections and therefore do not pose any obstacle to independents at this particular level of Romanian politics. Still, compared to other Eastern European countries, ballot access requirements seem rather volatile in the area, ranging from quite burdensome deposit requirements and large signature requirements to exemptions targeting various ethnic or social groups. For example, Hungary, Moldova, Poland and Russia lack any sort of deposit requirements for independent candidatures, while Estonia removed signature requirements as well2. Nonetheless, there are systematic differences in the contexts in which local contests are fought, differences that account for the relative success of an independent candidate in one election and the failure of another candidate four years later. Among contextual factors contributing to the electoral success of independent candidates we identified low levels of partisanships, dissatisfaction with major party candidates, economic discontent, issue preoccupation, distrust towards mainstream politics3. Then again, we consider that electoral performance is not all about the characteristics carved within the electoral system and consequently, that an eccentric candidate can obtain maximal electoral advantage by employing unorthodox campaign tactics. For that reason, in the next parts of the present scrutiny, we intend to evaluate the systematic explanations for independent success in local politics by examining contextual changes that occurred from 1992 until the latest elections of June 2008. We also intend to analyse the bases of independent candidates support, an average profile of the Romanian local independent candidate and the political outcome of independent candidatures.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Local Politics in Romania
At a first glance the last two decades in the history of the Romanian party system can be characterized by great variance in the number of composing political parties, by the numerous alliances and splits which marked the transition from the single
1 Art 65, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public administration, republished. 2 Dawn BRANCATI, Winning Alone...cit., pp. 648-662. 3 John CAREY, Matthey Soberg SHUGART, Incentives to Cultivate the Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas, Electoral Studies, vol. 14, no. 4, 1995, pp. 417-439.
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party to multipartidism1. An obvious place of political volatility, the Romanian party system has been greatly scrutinized by numerous authors, whom mainly approached its dynamics from an institutional perspective, either analysing the parties as organizations, or by approaching their relations to the electorate and to the act of governing2. Few studies have turned their attention to independents within the Romanian establishment, and those which did approach the subject were mostly tributary to the national level of politics3. Manifested mainly through a growing sense of alienation from political parties, the erosion of partisan loyalties within the Romanian electorate represents one of the most obvious political developments characterizing the past two decades4. Fewer citizens identify with either of the major parties, more voters are splitting their tickets on the day of the elections, and generally there is a growing sense of alienation from the political parties5. The capacity of political parties to serve as representative institutions in democratic politics is hardly contested in its entirety; nevertheless the weakening of party attachments is a reality of nowadays post-communist politics. For example, Richard Rose and William Mishler claimed that citizens of post-communist countries approach with scepticism party politics, scepticism caused by the dissatisfaction with the economic situation and by their approval of the perceived benefits of the previous non-democratic era6. Although economy is picking up as compared to the situation at the beginning of the 1990s, trust in political parties remains low as the last Eurobarometer survey shows7. Hence, we find it necessary to overcome Rose and Mishler thesis, and for this matter we suggest two elements which might affect the performance of political parties in most post-communist countries: the limited transparency of the establishment and its reduced pace of incorporating contradictory sentiments. Additionally, we plan to integrate the warning forwarded by Daniel Barbu about the fact that elections provide an incoherent mirroring between popular wishes and political representation, and, instead, each electoral scrutiny is in fact reproducing partisan privileges8. Especially by assimilating this interpretation, we can better understand that independents are severely affected by this inherent component of the Romanian political system and that their political performance is highly dependent on the electoral unattractiveness of the representatives of the main political parties. More precisely, this particular situation is best portrayed by the basic fact that, despite the stigmatisation of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe as corrupt and
Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele i sistemul politic din Romnia, Nemira, Bucureti, 2008, p. 58. 2 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation cit., p. 10. 3 Alexandra IONACU, The Evolution of Parties Supporting Government Forms of Patronage in Post-Communist Romania, Sfera Politicii, no. 123-124, 2006, pp. 62-76. 4 Dawn BRANCATI, Winning Alone...cit., pp. 648-662. 5 Richard KATZ, The Dimensionality of Party Identification...cit., pp. 147-163. 6 William MISHLER, Richard ROSE, Learning and Re-Learning Regime Support: The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 41, no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-35. 7 According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey, political parties ranked next to last in terms of public trust in institutions across most Eastern European countries. http://ec.europa. eu/public_opinion/ (accessed on 15.03.2010). 8 Daniel BARBU, Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? The Intended Consequences of the 2004 Romanian Elections, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 9-17.
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unrepresentative bodies, independents scarcely managed to recuperate the lost ground in the last two decades of democratic transitioning. Correspondingly, the same author defines the Romanian political system as partidocracy, cultivated by the list vote used until recently which rewarded political parties at the expense of small political actors1. At the level of the local administration this is highly visible, with little space left to nonpartisan and opposition actors to exist, despite the variance of electoral tools used here. As already noticed, partisan pre-eminence is highly cherished within the establishment. Resulting from the preferential allocation of resources, this system of patronage produced the migration of local elected representatives accordingly to the best party in power a system which at least formally was stopped by the emendation of the Law 393/2004 on the Statute of the Local Representatives2. Nevertheless, the real power of local administration is given by decentralization; an imperfect one for the Romanian case, as it continues the administrative tradition set by communism which it tries to patch with local autonomy and public services decentralization while neglecting the national setting3. This particular situation made local facilities such as education, public transport, roads, water, and sewerage, landuse planning, cultural and recreational facilities to be highly targeted by partisan interests. Equally, local elections have become especially important in countries that are experiencing, or have recently undergone, transition from authoritarian rule to more open political systems, as the viability of local elections gives an impression on the success of the general process of transitioning. However, how can we rightfully test the efficacy local governance? Some authors propose we should check whether the issues of immediate relevance to citizens are debated and tackled. Equally, others believe minorities inclusion can rightfully serve as an indicator4. For that matter, we consider one indicator that should not be ignored for establishing the viability of local politics is the success of independent candidatures. But instead of formulating any hasty appreciation regarding the independents particular place within the Romanian local politics, we should keep in mind the basic fact that every four years the number of local administrative units increased5. This particular feature promoted to the interests of political parties, helps as well independents competitors in providing them with another chance to advance their candidatures. Yet, before systematically approaching the peculiarities of the Romanian political establishment, we consider utterly necessary to go through the general features of the system, all of which we believe to interfere with the political acceptance and performance of independent politicians. In Romania there are 41 administrative denominations, plus the capital city. Bucharest has a distinct administrative arrangement, being divided into six districts each with its own mayor and local council. The capital city is run by a general mayor and a general council. Each of the 41 counties has a governing body, the county council, with an average of 34 members which are being elected through a proportional representation system since 1996. Starting with the 2008 elections, the
Ibidem, pp. 148-150. Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimulcit., p. 57. 3 Ibidem, p. 54. 4 Samuel HUMES, Eileen MARTIN, The Structure of Local Government: a Comparative Survey of Eighty-one Countries, Internationa Unit of Local Authorities, The Hague, 1969, p. 34. 5 Social-Democratic Institute, Raport supra alegerilor locale din Romnia, SDI, Bucureti, 2004, p. 4.
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president of the county council is elected as well throughout a uninominal scrutiny1. At the locality level, the local council is elected through a proportional representation system. Therefore, getting many votes is useless if not accompanied by belonging to the most significant coalition. Within this particular setting we might argue that political independence is highly damaged, because of the rare occurrence of situations where independents win a majority of seats in the local councils. Consequently, winning a seat in the local council as independent requires significant bargaining skills in order to turn an individual position into that of an indispensible partner in coalitions. Another fair observation would be the basic fact that candidates for councillor positions are visibly more obscure and face a low-profile position in the electoral campaign, despite the importance of this office in forwarding local reforms. Accordingly to the electoral law, the local public authorities which accomplish the principles of local autonomy are the local councils as deliberative authorities and the mayoralties as forms of the executive power2. In each county a council is established with the purpose of cordoning the activities of the local authorities. The vote expressed for local and county councils are considered to be highly political and the results of these particular levels of politics to be highly important for the result of the parliamentary elections, as it provides the main political parties with testing grounds for their electoral reach3. Within this particular setting, independent candidatures are given little chance to occur, especially at the county level where parties make tremendous efforts at pushing their candidates. For example, with the modifications brought to the electoral laws after 2004, the county level was hardly penetrated by independents, with barely one mandate obtained at the last two elections. The examples of the latest elections for county councils show us that only a high-profile independent can successfully met the requirements for competing at this level. Furthermore, the single independent county councillor elected for the 20082012 mandate decided to quit his independent coating and joined the ranks of the main political parties as a natural political move which best responds to his political beliefs4. So, we might rightfully ask why did he run as independent in the first place? According to his own statements independence was the only possible path for him at the time of the elections because his union affiliation interfered with his political calling. In what concerns the recently introduced elected office of the president of county council, it seemed to be virtually impossible for independents to accommodate on a short notice to such a demanding office. Therefore, independents which ran for this seat in 2008 managed to get only 0.61% of the total number of votes and failed to procure any mandate whatsoever. Comparatively, independence has occurred more successfully within a particular local context: the mayoralties. As stated by the law, the head of the local administration is the mayor, which is elected through a popular vote. The local executive is being elected through a majority two-round system, similarly to that applied to presidential elections, with a vivid importance given to
1 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TNSESCU, Drept constituional i instituii politice, C.H. Beck, Bucureti, 2008, p. 86. 2 Art. 21 Align 1, Law No. 215/ 2001 regarding the local public administration. 3 Arnold FLEISCHMANN, Lana STEIN, Campaign Contributions...cit., pp. 673-689. 4 Singurul independent din Consiliul Judeean Covasna s-a nscris n PSD, Cotidianul, http://old.cotidianul.ro/singurul_independent_din_cj_covasna_s_a_inscris_in_psd-90608. html (accessed on 15.03.2010).
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individual characteristics such as the candidates background, social position and personal accomplishments to the disadvantage of political affiliation. These particular features of mayoral competitions make room for smaller runners as compared to those permitted to successfully run in county and local councils. Independency occurred throughout the past five electoral cycles in both urban and rural communities, more developed or poorer localities, within ethnically divided and as well within more homogenous areas. Also, throughout the past two decades, independence candidates running in local elections approached their electorates mentioning primarily some of the following issues on their electoral materials and in their public appearances: the necessity of administrative reforms, social issues, local economic development, and modernization of the infrastructure. Although designed with the immediate interests of the community in mind, the local elections were confronted during the past twenty year with a visible lowering of the electoral presence. With the exception of the first post-communist local elections when almost 65% of the total number of valid voters expressed their political will, for the following four electoral cycles the presence stabilizes around 50%1. At a first sight, the low interest showed by the electorate as compared to the scores obtained for general elections would led us believe that the voters consider local polls to be less important than general elections and ignore that community-level politics might develop unpredictable countless repercussions. But despite the marginalization of local elections, it became obvious after the June 2000 polls that the main political parties rely heavily on local level of politics to test their political strength. In the same way, the enlarging of partisanships at the local level became even more poignant with the stabilization of a few political parties which manage to get the majority of local mandates, at the expense of small political organizations and independents. For example, for the last elections, 90% of the total number of mandates was granted to the main parties, with barely 2 percent of the total number of candidates managing to win office independently. At this point, we consider that several characteristics inherent within the establishment need to be highlighted in order to continue our scrutiny on local independence. One of the most significant influencer was the introduction of the electoral threshold of 5 percent right before the 2004 elections, which led to the reduction of the number of the represented parties at the local level and also to an even more concentrated permeability for independent runner. An equally important modification was the surfacing of the law on financing electoral endeavours and the reduction of the period reserved for campaigning from 45 to 30 days2. We believe that these modifications posed further problems to smaller political actors and especially to non-parliamentary formations, because their reduced size and scarce resources makes it difficult to efficiently reach a vital segment of the electorate. Another highly common practice affecting independence is represented by the luring, blackmailing or even forcing elected officials to abandon their independent stance and to join a political party3. Independents might become subject to political constraining
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Cf. data available on the webpage of Romanian Electoral Authority: http://roaep.ro/ (accessed on 15.03.2010). 2 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TNSESCU, Drept constituionalcit., pp. 63-65. 3 Sorina SOARE, Quels modles partisans pour lEurope Centrale et Orientale? tude des structures organisationnelles des partis politiques roumains, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 21-48.
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especially in regions traditionally identified with partisan politics, where political formations are expected to pressure non-partisan mandate holders to join their ranks and to condition their access to public resources on their partisan adoption. Similarly, weak independent holders of mayoral office can be further affected by the opposition of representatives of political parties, if the latter chose to back the partisan deputy mayor to the disadvantage of non-partisan political actors. During their mandate, independents are highly expected to find themselves confronted with numerous other similar situations that will test the strength of their independence. Several other aspects affecting the recurrence of independency within postcommunist setting are to be discussed further. One of them would be the Hungariandominated regions in Romania. One might rightfully expect that in every locality where a majority of ethnic Hungarians is present, the representatives of Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania to hold the monopoly. Without a clear-cut ideology, this political formation representing the interests of ethnic Hungarians in Romania contains numerous civic and cultural associations and organizations as well as several Christian-democratic political parties. The Union passed all five post-communist electoral tests and was co-opted in all governmental coalitions established after 1996, as result of its successful ethnic mobilization practices. Drawing its substance from the nationalist tensions of the beginning of the 1990s and with a faithful electorate, the Union managed to get about 150 mayors office, 2500 local councillor positions and about 130 county councillors throughout the last five post-communist electoral polls. At its first European scrutiny, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania got 2 mandates and one of its most prominent members running as independent managed to get a nomination for the European Parliament1. With the county councils visibly dominated by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania in Harghita and Covasna, it would seem equally true this control to be maintained for mayors office2. Nevertheless, accordingly to the available figures one can rightfully say that precisely in the regions inhabited predominantly by Magyar ethnic a higher number of independent politicians managed to get into office as compared to the other parts of the country. This observation can equally be applied to other counties where Hungarians are present, such as Mure, Satu Mare, Bihor, Slaj, Cluj and Arad3. Therefore, it is highly necessary to investigate these recurrences further and to find out precisely what motivates independency in this particular area. Another characteristic of the Romanian political system which is present to a higher degree at the local level is clearly the intersection of politics and Orthodoxy. With the clerical structures intertwining with the modern state since the latters inception, the Eastern interpretation of Christianism is a significant public manifestation to be confused with the democratic exigencies4. With structural traces originating in the Byzantine epoch, the Orthodox Church strengthened its administrative connections to the Romanian state up to modern times and developed its institutional strength based on a collective national character5. During the communist era and afterwards, the Church treated
Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimulcit., pp. 223-224. Ibidem, pp. 165-166. 3 Stan STOICA, Dicionarul partidelor politice...cit., pp. 105-108. 4 Daniel BARBU, Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy?...cit., pp. 282-283. 5 IDEM, Etica ortodox i spiritul romnesc, in IDEM (coord.), Firea romnilor, Nemira, Bucureti, 2000, p. 80.
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its followers religious intimacies as if they were of public and even of state interest1. Denying the secular character of the Romanian state, the Romanian Orthodoxy advances its practices in each and every corner of the society and this is highly visible at the local level where the clergy represent one of the main focal points2. And exactly political independence was targeted by the representatives of the Church, especially as they cannot find themselves in any partisan or confrontational circumstances which would lead to the secularization of the religious time and would risk the particular place reserved to the Church within the social order. Precisely because in traditional local confines the priest represents not only a moral authority but also an important local figure, political involvement of the churchs clergy seemed more than a natural outcome. Still, what motivates these priests political independent endeavours in the first place? Is simply a likely extension of the church entanglement with the state? Or is it more about personal motivations of the clergy itself? We will attempt to satisfy these academic enquiries departing from the explanations provided by the protagonists themselves. It is now time to evaluate the performances of independent politicians in the particular setting proposed by the recent local elections in Romania and to assess their evolution throughout the post-communist decades. In the following analysis, we will be guided by the considerations introduced previously, having in mind the theoretical framework proposed in the first part of our scrutiny. Therefore, we shall voice equally the importance of the votes won by independent contenders throughout the past two decades, as well as individual analyses of the independents which engaged in the most recent local electoral competition that took place in postcommunist Romania. A separate focus will be built around independent politicians who ran and managed to win these elections, approached comparatively from the perspective of the previously announced themes.
Current Status of Political Independence in a Post-Communist Setting

Before starting with our analysis on the situation of independents at the local level of post-communist Romanian politics, we should take into consideration several aspects relating to the particular dynamics of our study. Firstly, we cannot simply aggregate the available data as we would mistakenly be led to an improper understanding of independent politics. We also consider that a full evaluation of the recurrences of independency should go beyond the strictly electoral phase and tackle the need for separate approach in the competition for county councils, local councils and mayoralties. Moreover, we should not overrate the predominance of political parties as well as we should escape the attraction towards a heroic interpretation of independent candidacy. And not last, an analysis focused on the local politics is highly dependent on the particular arrangements that are in place at that level, which should be best understood by comparing them with similar institutions active all over Eastern Europe. Having the above-mentioned observations in mind, we should start
1 IDEM, Republica absent politic i societate n Romnia postcomunist, 2nd ed., Nemira, Bucureti, 2004, p. 287. 2 Olivier GILLET, Religion et politique dans les Balkans. Les enjeux contemporains, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 269-277.
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our investigation from the crude picture implied by the popularity of independents in local politics all throughout the country. The appended tables present the electoral performance of independent candidates that won at least one mandate in any of the five post-communism polls organized locally in Romania. What we first observe is the fact that, with every new electoral cycle, fewer independents managed to fruitfully advance their candidature. In 2008 we reached a situation where only 56 mayor mandates were obtained nationwide by independents, 358 independent candidates got a nomination as local councillor, and barely one independent became county councillor whereas no successful independent candidature was possible for the position of president of the county council1. This situation seems somewhat problematic if it were to compare it to the numbers of the first post-communist elections, when 22.4% of mayoralties and 6.54% of the local councils belonged to independents. Some explanations for this situation were advanced previously, when we mainly referred to the certain setting specific to the beginnings of the Romanian democracy and to scarce consolidation of the political parties. In the next segment of our examination we intend to offer further clarifications on the abrupt declining of the magnitude of independence in the local post-communist politics, especially by integrating the views independents themselves have on the matter. Then again, by comparing the latest scores with the ones from the period of democratic stabilization, we can fully assess that independence is degrading with each electoral cycle in Romania. We should now question what truly motivates those scarce numbers of independent to forward their candidacy, even within this restrictive electoral setting. When studying independence at the local level, one has to bear in mind that local elections are chiefly about small electoral competitions. But nevertheless, within this micro electoral setting, a visibly greater importance is given to bigger cities and particularly to residence cities. Unlike smaller political units, independents competing for the open positions in bigger localities need to mobilize a larger number of voters and are more exposed to media and partisan attacks. From our available data it would seem that big local political units represent the most vulnerable spots for local independency, with eight towns, four county residences and one of Bucharest sectors captured in 2004 and barely five cities, one county residence and the office of the general-mayor in 20082. Even as we should expect a worsening of these scores with the coming elections, we consider them being more about circumstantial occurring. By far, the most noticeable incidence of independence at the top tier of local politics is represented by partisan derails. The most striking example of counterfeited independence is that of a former social democrat which ran as independent candidate for the office of mayor of one of the six Bucharest district after his exclusion from his party due to allegations of corruption. After winning the office from the first round, at a comfortable 27% margin he returned to his party3. This example does not entail that in bigger communities independence is less articulate or truthful or that more visible political units might turn into favourable grounds for faade independence. Instead, what we can observe is the smaller penetration of independents in larger localities,
See Appendix: Table 1 Mandates Won by Independents at the Local Elections (1992-2008). See Appendix: Map 1 Political Independence across Romania after June 2008 Local Elections. 3 Mihaela AVRAM, Marian Vanghelie se ntoarce n PSD, BBC Romanian, http://bbc. co.uk/romanian/news/story/2004/06/040629_vanghelie_psd.shtml (accessed on 12.04.2010).
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which might be explainable by the difficulty of covering such a large circumscription. We now consider opportune to propose and test the validity of a differentiation between partisan, intermediate and non-partisan circumscriptions, defining the latter as political places where independents gain from the first electoral turn. Highly partisan circumscriptions can be defined as where either no independent candidature was ever advanced or no independent candidate manages to reach the second round. From observing the available data, we can easily argue that localities in the centre and Northern part of the country are more open to independent candidatures, whereas the Western and North-Eastern parts are generally sporadic hosts for independency, with communities situated in the South-West allowing little penetration. We consider these situations as a measure of the local context and socio-economic attributes, with more developed places showing an increased rate of approval for independents. Also the ethnic component plays an important role, with ethnically divided regions allowing to a greater extent independency to happen. One major observation that is mandatory to be made now would be that, despite its low scores, independence can be characterized by continuity at the local stage of post-communist politics. Palpable manifestations of steady independence can be identified in those regions where the electorate prefers non-partisan actors with each election, no matter their persona. This is the case of several localities in the county of Covasna (Ilieni, Ojdula, and Snzieni) and Harghita (Brdeti, Puleni-Ciuc). Offices repeatedly won by the same independent candidate as is the case of two localities in the county of Satu Mare, Certeze and Livada represent another particular manifestation of interdependencyprone places. There are a number of ways in which independents can be conceptualised and categorized, some of clearly drawing upon and relating to classification of political players at national level such as ideology or electoral magnitude. We purposely ignored such a classification because it little served the interest of our scrutiny of independence understood as purposed avoidance of party labels by politicians. Instead, we proposed a distinct categorization, namely one that would allow us to distinguish true independents, which propose their candidatures autonomous of any external inferences and have no history of partisan activity. Secondly, we can identify recycled independents, a variety more commonly met in post-communist politics as they usually emerge from failed partisanships being former members of political parties which decided to ditch partisan affiliation and pursue their political career solitarily. Another subtype of independence is represented by faux independents, which can be easily distinguished from the other two kinds due to its dependency on outside support. This third variety largely represents a perverted type of independence, and refers to any politician that publicly denies any connection to any political party, but in fact, he or she represents the interests of that party locally. Another variant, that belongs more to the partisan spectre, is represented by party members who distance themselves severely from party line. This last category was essentially ignored by our study, as its members essentially belong to a political party and have fallen out with the party whether over a matter of principle or on other conjectural grounds for short periods of time. These breeds of independence are essentially visible in the Romanian local politics, with certain kinds being more represented than others depending upon the characteristics of the corresponding electoral moment. For example, we might consider that the highest degree of genuine independence occurred after the first post-communist electoral cycle, with more and more recycled independents making their appearance with each new electoral moment. This general overview should
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permit us to advance our analysis to the next step. Our primary findings indicate that independent-driven politics is possible at local level for a variety of reasons. One of them would be the growing discontent with the major parties, manifested particularly through a sentiment that political parties prolong corruption and wastefulness. More than anywhere else in the establishment, voters are in search of more alternatives, as consequence of their discontent in the mainstream parties coupled with a fundamental erosion of faith in political parties themselves. The need to solve pressing issues brings the electorate closer to the person which is best fitted for that job, no matter his or hers political affiliation. Voting mechanisms, electoral conditions and a candidates financial resources play a large role in determining how well an independent candidate can do at the polls. Equally, frustration towards political parties can be observable on the side of the politicians, which might turn to independency as their last resort. On the other hand, independent attitudes can be also favoured by the intrinsic determination of certain political actors to help their community. For distinguishing the impact of political followership we compared the total number of votes expressed in local election with number of votes obtained by independent candidates. We then compared this data with the nationwide performance of independents during the past five electoral cycles. Several implications can be drawn from the figures we analysed. Firstly, it becomes clear that the success of independent contenders diminishes with each election. Hence, there appears the question why this happened and the most plausible explanations seem to be the fact that independence faces financial hardships coming from highly centralized governance. Also determinant for the weakening of independents scores is the further maturing and strengthening of the partisan system. Second, the data at hand suggests that the independent tag has substantial effects on the structure of local vote, which nevertheless remains dependent on the broader aspects populating the establishment. In particular, there seems to be a significant voting bias in favour of medium educated candidates coming generally from technical backgrounds. This situation can be best explained by looking into the broader composition of the local administration, where we could easily observe the recurrence of similar profiles1. Before going further with our analysis, it is necessary to say that exceptions are possible, and might be furthermore promoted by the importance accorded by the voters to the personal criteria. In our attempt to profile independents in local elections we selected several variables to represent personal characteristics (educational level, professional background etc.), political resources (the type of rhetoric employed, incumbency) and political success of this type of political contenders. We further addressed the interview material and additionally available data through the lenses of certain main themes we considered helpful for answering our research questions. Among these themes, we reserved considerable space for clarifying what motivates independence at the local level, what might be the advantages and the disadvantages of independent politics, how independents approach their electorate and manage to sponsor their campaign, their particular situation in office, their relation with partisan politics and their propensity towards re-election. Analysing the data gathered we come to the following candidate profiling of independents in local elections for the period at hand. In terms of personal characteristics, independents tend to be male (95%), mainly Orthodox (70%),
erban OLAH, Elitele locale, Editura Economic, Bucureti, 2004, p. 317.
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middle aged (mean of 54 years), both Romanian and Hungarian ethnics (one third), originating from rural areas of the country (9 out of 10), more likely not to be college educated, nor to hold an advanced degree. By profession independents originate generally from technical specialities, and usually have had their own business prior to advancing their candidacy. He or she is more likely to count the advantages of incumbency, and to have a limited access to financial resources, most of which come from personal sources, and from business partners or close friends. But let us take a closer look at a general profile of independence by going through some of the profiles of independents interviewed. We consider that the best means for approaching individual situations of independence which occurred at the last electoral cycle would be to integrate them within the general framework of this examination. In order to provide this study with the greatest possible perspective on the background of independence in post-communist times and at the same time to better understand how does independence truly manifests itself nowadays, we interviewed independent politicians in office, randomly selected from all over the country. In designing the selections needed for research, we made sure that our choice to represent best how independence is currently distributed across Romania, with more attention given to those spaces where independence is more visible. Firstly, as stated before, what could best motivate politicians to run as independents might be their failure to procure a party nomination. Comparatively, as our findings show, most independent candidates previously did seek for party nomination, this being especially true for politicians in counties controlled by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that independence can also be motivated by the expulsion from partisan ranks. Secondly, as is the case for an equally significant part of independents, independence is expressly preferred in turn to party candidacy. This is largely possible thanks to the electoral system which is in place at local level, which permits independent candidatures. Nonetheless, in order to further approach what motivates independence at the local level, we must turn our attention to what independents themselves say about their particular situation. To begin with, independence can be triggered by the detachment from partisan politics. B.T. from a locality in Covasna said he chose to run as independent because he never felt close to any political party. L.O., running for the first time as independent in 2008 in a locality in the Iasi County, said he sought for change within his community and also wanted that corrupted politics which was proffered by a partisan clan in the last twenty years to stop. The same mistrust in and dissatisfaction with partisan politics was accused by the mayor of an important town in Maramure, P.V., which advanced his independent candidature for the first time in June 2008. Another independent voice originating from the Braov County told us he ran because [political parties] are all the same (I.B.). Originating from a rural community in Satu Mare, C.P. says he seized the opportunity as he saw that the electorate in his locality is disappointed by partisan politics and decided to run independently. Asked what he thinks about his counter-candidate which also assumed independency, he told us that his competitor did it as the last resort, being unable to mobilize the support of any political party. On the other hand, the mayor of a locality in the Covasna County, B.E., said he ran as independent as a measure of his trust in politics: If politics is truly fair, it should not matter if I belong to a party or not. Other type of rhetoric we encountered among independents was one that explains independence in terms of popular demand. For example, L.G. from the Vaslui County considers his independent candidacy to be the result of the wishes expressed by the people in his community. A former member of
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a political party, F.C. agrees with this: It was not me; the community pushed me to run as independent. M.M., after three mandates as mayor of an important city in Harghita, described himself as different from those independents which have passed through seven or eight parties. M.M. also says he feels proud about the fact he never was member of a political party and it was the people that helped him decide to stand as independent. C.B., an independent from Cluj at his first mandate said that his independent candidature was motivated by the annoyance he felt towards the backwardness of his locality. Another independent from Covasna County said he felt he was capable to do something to help his locality, but did not want to work in the interest of the parties. Previously identified as top motivators for political independence, failed partisanships are also recurrent in practice. Several examples are required. F.I. from Covasna ran as independent in June 2008 after previously being vice-mayor of the locality on behalf of a political party. On the other hand, originating from a locality in the Cluj County, another independent considers that unfair politics he experienced during his previous four mandates as representative of a political party made him engage independently (S.I.). He wished to measure his political performance as compared to that of his former party, especially as he lost his support right before the elections. Another example of failed partisanship turned independence is that of S.E., who after previously representing a political party, was not summoned to run again in 2008. Therefore he had to stand as independent. A similar situation was met by M.A., which had two mandates on behalf of a political party before advancing his candidature in 2008 as independent because of a misunderstanding with his former partisan supporters. With a quitted partisan adherence, A.B. thinks that what motivated his independence was the fact he did not wanted to be under the control of a political party. During his partisan experience, A.B. admitted to have witnessed some unfair happenings which provoked his independence. Oppositely, L.Z. from Harghita held the office of mayor as representative of a political party, but decided in 2008 to quit his partisan allegiance: I never dropped my ideological legacy he added. After a failed candidature on behalf of a partisan structure, P.I. admitted his candidature as independent in June 2008 was motivated by the fact he could not get the nomination from one of the political parties. L.S. ran as independent incidentally, as he decided to late in order to procure a partys nomination. Running his campaign he found out that was the best choice, especially as the voters seemed to manifest their disapproval with all political parties. Another frequent situation we met was that represented by politicians who continued to remain in office after the fall of communism as independent mayors, especially because they already accumulated certain renown in their locality and also developed all their needed local connections before 1990s. Ironically, one of them who won in June 2008 his fifth mandate as independent said he was not interested to subsume himself to party politics as he knew what that means and it was the people who asked him to return.
I have a bad opinion about partisan life, they [politicians] follow by all means the interests of the party and their own interests. The moment they get elected they forget what theyve promised because the parties lack the strategies needed to develop local communities
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continued this independent (A.C., Clrai County). Another case of communistsupported independence is that of P.R., who considers that, because he was a highprofile figure before 1989 in the locality, he won the mandate as vice-mayor in 2004 and the mayors office in 2008. Other politicians chose independence as their only available alternative this being the case of B.D., a civil servant in Covasna, as the law does not allow civil servants to be part of political parties1. Similarly, following his participation in a non-governmental organization that mediated between centre politics and local administration, B.B. decided to run as independent, especially as he was unable to identify a political party that could best answer his political plans. Then again, political independence seems to serve as an important political tool in ethnically heterogeneous areas, permitting otherwise marginal voices to successfully forward their candidature. Independent mayor of a city in Satu Mare for the fourth time, S.I. said he chose the independent path as he did not want to hurt the feelings of any of the inhabitants of the locality, no matter their ethnic origin. In the same way, M.R. decided to run as independent in June 2008 because he saw it as the only possibility to get into office in a community controlled by ethnic Magyars:
The people told me that my only chance is to run independent because they were fed up with the promises they received from political parties.
Orthodoxy and independence seems to be highly compatible, with numerous priests and small local clergy getting involved in politics using the independent label. Asking G.B., a priest which got re-elected four times as independent in the Arge County what motivates him to run, we received this blunt answer:
After forty years of service as a priest, I decided in 1996 to continue to work for the people even as a retiree. Everybody asked me to do it and, without thinking, I got elected. Clearly the fact that I was the priest helped my candidature.
He then added that, if he were to run again, he will follow his independency, because he thinks as mayor Im not allowed to get involved in any political party, I play game of the people not that of the politicians. Another priest that ran independently in 2008, N.G., said his clerical belonging does not permit him to participate in any political party. Instead, he also acted as independent local councillor before advancing his candidature for the mayors office. Reaching this point in our analysis, we can rightfully say that, for what concerns the local level of post-communist Romanian politics, independence has multiple motivations. For numerous independents, their particular profile came either because they never identified with a political party, either as reaction to the will of the people, either provoked by quitted partisan allegiance, by mistrust in the political system, either by the ethnical context, either because other options were not possible or as particular manifestation for revamped communist origins.
Art. 40 Align 3, The Constitution of Romania, http://cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339, (accessed on 15.03.2010).
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For what concerns their attitude towards partisan arrangements, independent politicians seem to share the opinion that the party politics are profoundly rotten. One candidate which now is at his fourth mandate considered that its hard, its extremely hard for us [independents], as the others [partisan politicians] know how to lie and steal (G.B., Arge County). Another one added let them fight in their own way (L.O., Iai). L.Z. said that the political system is a chaos at the present moment and the local administration is the worst affected by the lack of vision and improper organization. Also, he believes that repeated conflicts among political parties have deceived and estranged the electorate. On the other hand, P.V. thinks politicians are best examples of dilettantism. Comparatively, N.G. believes that first and foremost the laws need to be respected, and, despite what should ideally happen, political parties attempt to evade the control of lawful institutions by all possible means. P.I. thinks that, in partisan politics, everybody cares about his own interest. M.R. believes [partisan politicians] are all the same, they dont wish to budge a thing. Equally, independents see a minimal role for political parties. Some said political parties should mind their own business, other considered parties to lack clear-cut ideologies leading to political derails. Another voice thinks political parties are cliques brought together by personal interests, where everybody expects something in return. A.C. from Clrai says he feels he doesnt belong to partisan politics, as he despises being controlled by and serving the interests of political parties. The same independent told us that political parties are determined by vanity and he provided us with the example of the local council in his locality where an independent was chosen as vice-mayor only because political parties could not agree whom to name from their own ranks. B.E., an independent from Covasna at his first mandate, considers political parties should rethink their role within the society because theyre getting more and more irrelevant by the day. Likewise, after a previous experience with a political party and from his position as independent, F.I. considers that parties should reform their current place within the society and start to promote in the first place correctness, Christian values, and morality. B.D., another independent from Covasna, said he sees the main political parties as being extremely powerless and inefficient in their efforts to serve the citizens. Coming also from a Hungarian-dominated locality, A.B. said it more bluntly:
Present-day politics is a disaster, and this is why I believe the role of the independents to grow with the passing of time, especially because of the weak political performance generally displayed by the Romanian political class.
A rare independent voice in the Sibiu County, B.B. considers that our political system is still in its infancy, as they [political parties] yet have to define their long-term intentions and values. Similarly, S.E. thinks political parties should quit developing their clientele and instead support the growth of local communities. P.R. said that political parties grow interested only before electoral moments, and thereafter they ignore local politics until next elections. N.G. admits he is quite upset on the political parties because politicians are not taking their job seriously and they only criticize and blame one another without providing any solutions. Henceforth, because partisan politics is seen as corrupt, lacking long-term vision, being characterized by frail organization, internal conflicts, clientelism, inefficiency, independents associate it with a marginal role within the society. In the same way, sympathizing with political
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parties seems to remain generally a taboo for local independents. Among those who agreed to convey their political preferences, one priest elected as independent said humorously that he does sympathize with other politicians, because I baptized them all (G.B., Arge). Another independent from Cluj admitted his sympathy for the ecologist movement (C.B.). Similarly, one independent from a traditionally Magyar majoritarian county, admitted straightforwardly his sympathies (F.I., Covasna). Another ethnic Magyar, S.E., admitted his partisan sympathy, but accuses that party to have ignored him. Most independents consider that electoral campaigns are highly problematic events for their independency, especially as they lack the professional and material contributions a party usually provides its candidates with. Nevertheless, some also accuse political parties of interfering with the electorate in an illegal manner, by attempting to change their political will via bribes, and various other small gifts. In general, electoral campaigning at the local level poses smaller problems, especially as the financial effort is expected to decrease accordingly to the size of the circumscription. Mayor of a small city in Harghita, M.M. said he ran all his three electoral campaigns without much effort, with just few banners and posters, despite the heavy mobilization of the political parties against him. Similarly, F.C. said his posters kept disappearing, and he believes political parties are to be blamed for that. Also at his first mandate, N.C. admits to have faced a difficult campaign due to the unfair fight waged by the former mayor. L.S. faced in the second tour of the elections the opposition of all local political parties. Similarly, P.I. said advancing his candidature was highly difficult because of the attacks coming from political parties. Then again, P.V. believes the attacks he was confronted with originating from political parties are natural, as everybody wishes to win. Oppositely, C.B. admits he escaped any interference from the political parties basically because nobody expected him to represent a threat. He adds to be honest, my campaign was quite obscure, just a few posters. Nevertheless, I had a close relation with most of the people here. B.D. admits he underwent a similar path, as he invested little in his campaign and relied greatly on his familiarity with the people. Others used their quitted political colouring hoping to impress the electorate. For example, owing his fame to his former three mandates as representative of a political party, one candidate did not even displayed electoral posters in June 2008 (S.I., Satu Mare). M.R. admits he was known by many people in the community because he had the advantage to have previously worked in the mayoralty since 1995 as a civil servant. Formerly a member of a political party, S.E. believes that the most difficult of the campaign was to raise the signatures. On the other hand, he enjoyed the support of some small businesses which paid for his campaign materials. As a matter of fact, most rurally-based independents did not procure professional services for promoting their image during the electoral campaign and simply limited to printing their own posters and leaflets. N.G., a priest from Maramure, said he ran his campaign without telling any bad words about his counter candidates. N.G. further added that he financed his campaign himself with the help of some close friends as he did not wish to become tributary to others. Nevertheless, during the 2008 electoral campaign he spotted material bribes coming from political parties, especially targeting poorer people easily to persuade: The voters are selling their vote because they are hopeless about their situation. A.B. acknowledges as well to have enjoyed the support of some local sponsors, specifically because the independent candidate has to do everything, nobody helps him. Enjoying the support of his friends, B.B. raised the needed signatures and
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distributed his electoral materials. Comparatively, B.B. considers that the greatest cost of his campaign was the time spent meeting the electorate. P.I. said the highlights of his electoral campaign were represented by two gatherings, together with the classical means of campaigning (banners, posters, leafleting etc.). Mainly, local electoral campaigning in the case of independents is characterized by the little importance accorded to political label as compared to the personal traits of candidates, by the reliance on private contributions, limited inference of professional techniques, together with bonuses accorded by incumbency and by a previously established high-profile presence. For independents, the problems involved with financing their electoral campaigns differ accordingly to the independents personal material power and to the level and magnitude of the circumscription; with larger ones being more difficult to cover and requiring added investments. One candidate previously supported by a political party said he feels the lack of party money, as nobody is willing to contribute to an independents campaign (S.E., Satu Mare). On the other hand, F.I. adds that he financed his campaign from half of his monthly salary. B.T. thinks that in small localities independents are helped by the fact everybody knows everybody else and do not require large investments in the electoral campaign. F.C. said something similar, considering that money was not that important for his campaign, instead what he believes to have been crucial are the personal contacts he established with the voters. Most of the independents interviewed which originate from the business environment face an easier challenge, as they can finance their campaign themselves. For example, L.O. said he financed his campaign from his own pocket. P.V. did the same, being an administrator of a private business. B.E from the Covasna County identified close friends with businesses as his main financial supporters, whom contributions added to the money he invested personally. Especially those with numerous mandates won as independents say they do not need an expensive campaign, as they proposal is simple, being centred on their familiarity: This is me; this is what I can do said proudly A.C. from Clrai. Being largely known in the locality, M.A. admits he only copied few of his old posters and distributed them. L.Z., a former mayor on behalf of a political party now turned independent admits he continues to somewhat enjoy the support of that party, but the money needed for the electoral campaign were provided from his own personal savings. Hence, financing independents campaigns is largely characterized by the lack of public subsidies, which are compensated by donations originating from private supporters such as friends, small businesses and business partners. Equally, we should notice that incumbency lowers the costs involved with running local campaigns, and also in the case of local independents money can be less important than personal contacts. Few independents seem to really understand the advantages of their position. Some consider themselves exceptions: I.B., an independent at his first mandate having scarce partisan background, thinks that, because of the instability of the general establishment, independency offers added stability and autonomy during party reshuffling. Being in normal relations with everybody else seems to be highly needed for the performance of independency as the same politician thinks, because otherwise [belonging to a political party] might imperil the access to information and funds at times. Similarly, B.B., L.G., and C.P. consider that independents bear the advantage of being able to address any institution and political party, as long as he presents himself as somebody who wishes to do something for his community. Not being under the control or at the command of anybody is seen as the main advantage by one independent originating from partisan politics. Originating from Covasna, B.D. provided us with an extremely positive outlook on independence after two years
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of his first mandate as independent mayor, saying that he found no disadvantage to independence and added he received all the needed funds, despite his lack of partisan allegiance: I cannot say that being independent is helping me as I cant say it affects my mandate. Still, it might be argued that this particular case, the independent benefited from his ethnic common denominator with the representatives of the dominant party in the county. With a similar optimist stance, M.M. considers that independents are more credible in the eyes of the electorate. Additionally, L.Z. considers that in local politics, the party matters less, and the electorate is mostly interested in the personal traits of the candidate, and this particular situation helps independence. All in all, independence offers politicians constancy no matter the partisan coating of the governing body, it gives the ability to equally address institutions indifferent of their political fidelities, and might proliferate electoral trustworthiness. The political allocation of money is seen as one of the top disadvantages by our interviewed independents. This situation was radically described by one independent previously elected four times on behalf of a political party, as he compared his current situation with the period when he was aided by his party: If you dont belong to a political party, nobody takes you serious (M.A., Timi). But for other independents, this is hardly the case as they might find themselves under the spotlight; either as this would mean accusations coming from partisan competitors. A conflicting county council endangers even more independency, as it can interfere with the allocation of resources. P.V. believes that the main problem faced by independents is that they hardly can make themselves heard, because administration is highly politicized. S.E. agrees to this position, as he believes independents are highly dependent on the will of the governing party and that of the president of the county council. The lack of the support of a political party is accused by B.T. as one of the most important shortcomings independents have to face, especially as he needs to accommodate the interests of various representatives of political parties. M.M., a Romanian mayor in Harghita believes the disadvantages of independence are even worst in his case, as the particular arrangements of the area act against him: Its not easy to work with a council entirely subsumed politically, and it requires compromising, diplomacy and patience. On the other hand, another independent from Covasna considers that the local council poses little problem to independent as long as everybody acts to the best interest of the community (F.C.). An independent mayor from the Clrai County sees no major advantages in assuming independence, but he believes independents continue to be treated as pariah (A.C.). C.B. accuses interference from top politicians, as he received numerous calls to mind his own business. Comparatively, S.I. from the Cluj County remains confident about the disadvantages of independence as he considers good politicians can turn them to their own advantage. He tells us that the only problems he met when forwarding his projects were caused by incomplete papers, which he later remediate. Discriminated against when they need to receive public funds, more prone to partisan attacks and encountering difficulties in accessing highly politicized structures are seen as the main disadvantages of independency nevertheless, independents managed to survive them while, even more, being able to complete their projects. The success of their projects depends on whether they are at their first mandate or they enjoyed re-election. In rural areas, most independents take pride in their ability to complete projects such as water supply, ecologic trash management and disposal, sewerage systems, infrastructure, tourist and leisure zones, modernization of roads, schools, gas supplies, control of pollution in agriculture and rehabilitation of green spaces, whereas independents which serve as mayors of both
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small towns and municipalities believe restoration of historic buildings, parking spaces, expansion of touristic places, ameliorating of existing infrastructure to be among their top achievements. Most of the independents we interviewed said they rely greatly on attracting European funds for completing their projects, and equally feel the interference of parties which hope to control as much funds as possible for helping their own members. G.B., an independent at his fourth mandate, said that I have too many projects to count, all totalizing about 30 million euros. Also at his fourth mandate as independent, S.I. said he never asked for the help of political parties, but he nevertheless got numerous sponsorships through various sources such as Sapard or Phare. In completing their assumed projects, independents usually are confronted with a partisan-dominated local council, with scarce cases when an independent mayor is able to cooperate with an independently-driven local council. For example, M.A. said he feels the lack of independents in the local council, and he blames this situation on the electoral law which favours the candidates of political parties: Independents had 70-80 votes and those who won a mandate as local councillors on behalf of political parties had barely 30. Others admitted bluntly the fact that their independence is provoking the opposition of local councillors, which refuse to cooperate. P.V. says he believes that the difficulties he faced were provoked by the fact he lacks the party brand. M.R. highlights an aversive situation within the local council, with his opponent from the second round of the 2008 elections provoking numerous fights. He believes that with the next elections, people will elect more independent local councillors, in order to avoid such situations. In contrast, one mayor with a history of no less than five mandates told us he manages to limit the local council by explaining each project in detail and making them realise it has to be made for the interest of the people (A.C., Clrai). Similarly, F.I. considers that his relations with the county and the local council were aided by his previous participation in local partisan politics. Three of the interviewed mayors from Covasna told us that they equally enjoy the help of independents and that of partisan representatives in the local council, especially thanks to the heterogeneous composition of the council. A.B. thinks that thanks to his previous experience as member of a political party he collaborates quite well with the local and county institutions. N.G. said he did not feel to be put aside as independent, and he maintains a good relation with the president of the county council and with the central administration. Also, P. I. said that what matters most in developing good relations with the political parties is the way the problems are being addressed: Talking nicely helps a lot. Asked if they sought re-election, independents provided us with contrasting answers. Some said they barely wait to finish their mandate and escape the pressures of independency. For example, one independent said that he spends the greatest part of his mandate in courts and paying administrative penalties, as he is being sued by the local councillors belonging to the political parties (G.B., Arge County). L.O., an independent which managed to obtain an office in a locality that belonged for the past twenty years to various representatives of political parties, said that the former mayors have filled trials against him. Therefore, he added he barely wishes to finish his mandate because he feels he cannot handle it anymore. Also disappointed with the way independents are seen in Romania, several other independents (M.A., P.R.) confessed they will not attempt re-election. Faced with the burdens of independence, one independent with deep partisan legacies admitted that he will most probably return to party politics, but this time as part of another formation (M.A., Timi). I.B., an independent from Braov County, said that depending upon the general situation
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near the time of the elections, he will decide if he maintains his independent label or will go for a partisan ticket. Others said that, keeping in mind their success as independents, they will most probably maintain their label. Confidents in their political future as independents, B.D. M.R. and P.I. said they will most probably run again in 2012, particularly as they already have some finished projects to take pride in. We encountered this belief in the reconfirmation of their independence mostly from politicians originating from Covasna, Harghita, Mure. L.Z, A.B, and F.C. from Harghita, and B.B. from Sibiu also believe they will ran again in the 2012 elections, as long as they manage to successfully finalize most of their political promises. All things considered, the label of political independence will most probably stick to those politicians that were most successful in advancing their political programmes, and to those which will run in those places predisposed to independence, whereas failed partisanships turned independent will most probably generate future partisanships. Partisan reconversion is therefore a matter of circumstantial occurring, with independence diminishing with each election its desirability. Despite their dominance of the establishment, political parties seem to continuously make efforts to attract independents within their ranks. Several voices, especially those who failed to catch a party nomination in the first place and those who have encountered resilient partisan pressures during their mandate admit not to exclude the possibility to ultimately enter a political party. A.B., former member of a political party, elected as independent in June 2008 admits that political parties have made him some offers, and now after half of mandate has been consumed and thinking in perspective, its highly probable I will join their ranks again. L.O. on the other hand admitted directly he wishes to join a certain party, especially as he feels the need to receive protection from unfair attacks. I sell myself for the community I dont believe this would mean deceiving their belief in me especially if this helps us reaching visible results argued one independent from Cluj. B.E., an independent at his first mandate from Covasna, P.V., mayor of an urban locality in Maramure, P.I. from the rural parts of Maramure, S.E. from Satu Mare and C.B. from Cluj say they were approached by several political parties, but they thought that none was tempting enough for them to make the move. F.I. admits that indirectly, through conditioning local funds, he was influenced by political parties to join them. An interesting observation came from one independent originating from Braov county, which assumed independency for the June 2008 elections after reaching the conclusion that within the party he formerly belonged to he has no future: I.B. feared that independents are forced to jump into the boat of political parties due to the lack of resources, and added that political parties take advantage of this situation, and even they dont need to invest much resources in that politician. Then again, M.M. said that he was never approached by political parties because they knew he would never agree to join their ranks. Similarly, independents such as B.B. and F.C. admitted they were never approached by political parties. On the other hand, S.I. declared he refused to join political parties as he did not want to offend nobody: The people dont care about political parties, as long as you do something for them. Thus, maintaining political independence becomes a matter of resisting the conditions imposed by political parties, a matter of personal belief, and also directly linked to what serves best the immediate electoral interests of the political runner. For that reason, comparing the available data with the observations made by independents themselves, independence seems to remain highly volatile at the local level.
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Faced with the decreasing of the scores obtained by independents nationwide, an overwhelming part of our interviewed politicians consider that one cause for this is represented by the efforts made by political parties to dominate the establishment and to integrate more and more political actors. N.G. believes than every political party, whether in office or not, wishes to incorporate as many independents as possible, and this particular situation leads to the declining of the scores obtained by independents. Equally, he considers that, despite the formally assumed independence, this category of politicians is highly dependent on those in power to receive their funds. Correspondingly, I.B. considers that the most striking aspect of the Romanian establishment which affects independence is the allocation of public funds discretionary, following a strict partisan command: The Governmental measure No. 322 distributes the money coming from the European mainly on political terms. C.B. agrees to this, saying that, despite his efforts to obtain highly needed European money, he faced numerous obstacles during the first two years of his mandate, particularly because of the opposition of political parties. B.E. from a locality in Covasna and L.O. from Iai County had also problems with the Measure No. 322, as their communities were denied the funds. Others see the dropping of independency as consequence of the high cost it involves if one wishes to candidate he is highly dependent on his own financial power, and nobody wishes to support him in any way (S.I.), its costly adds another one (B.E.). A.B. considers that the political parties have certain advantages hard to compensate the financial part, their power to organize adding that belonging to a political party which is in power you get the best chances to finance your projects. L.Z. thinks that the political parties developed a greater capacity in attracting the electorate and that the individual is usually ignored because the system is controlled by partisan entities. In the same way, N.C. said that one explanation for the decreasing of independents scores might the fact that some independents which fail to advance their own interests through the mayors office join political parties or exit politics altogether. Other interpretations were provided as well: F.I accuses for the dropping of independents scores the fact that mayors are badly prepared and depend greatly on the partys support while lacking any sort of political vision. On a similar tone, F.C. believes that politicians hide in the ranks of political parties as they lack motivation: They [partisan mayors] simply wait for governmental programmes and remain under the protective wing of their party. M.R. considers that with a political party a candidate doesnt need to raise the signatures and receives with little effort whatever electoral material he or she needs. M.M. and B.B. take the idea even further, saying that our society is highly politicized and also that the mayors office is not that attractive as it was before because of the struggles, vulnerabilities and responsibilities it encompasses. On the other hand, L.S. believes that independents in Romania are affected by the mentalities that are active within the political system: Whenever someone gets into power, everybody else thinks how to get rid of him and nobody makes any effort to show support. Furthermore, he considers that the scores obtained by independents are hampered especially of the economic situation and of the limited available public funds. Oppositely, B.D. offers us a more positive outlook on the matter, considering that, since starting 2008 the funds are distributed differently according to a particular fiscal algorithm, independence is susceptible to strengthen itself once more, as it should not be necessary anymore to depend on the discretionary distribution of funds operated by the parties. Hence, in order to better understand why independency occurs with each election more and more scarcely we came across several explanations: mostly giving credit to the
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growing consolidation of the establishment around political parties, to the financial practices discriminating against independents, the poor administrative performance of independents themselves, the political culture which favours high dependence of politicians on organized partisan structures. Running our interviews we stumbled upon several cases where politicians which initially got elected as independents in June 2008, through their secretary or other staff, refused to answer our questions. As we considered this occurring rather strange, we insisted with our efforts and ended up learning that these politicians were recruited by political parties in the meantime. Cross-referencing the data with their declarations, we reached several observations on what motivates some independents to quit their label in favour of a partisan coating, especially visible for those areas where the dominance of one of the main political parties is substantial. For some cases its about the material benefits and support of a party. Numerous examples arise throughout the post-communist decades, with the most recent ones confirming the tendency of independents that assume a partisan coating to be mostly captured either by the party in power or by that one which controls regional politics. Also, we came across cases where independence was assumed only for participating in elections by a former party member in order to return to his originating party soon after getting in office. This situation is highly recurrent in some parts of Moldavia and Transylvania. A particular situation is that of the counties controlled by representatives of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, where independence occurs either as the only viable alternative to the dominant party of the Hungarian minority, either as the best chance for Romanians to advance their candidature in those areas intensively inhabited by Hungarians. For example, F.I., an independent which managed to win a mandate in a Magyar dominated region thinks the high scores of independents in that particular region is a consequence of the particular internal atmosphere within the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. Similarly, M.R. says that, despite the fact that Magyars are united, their electorate is faced with the same faces again and again: The same actors distributed with different parts. Moreover, A.B. thinks that twenty years after the fall of communism ethnic Hungarians feel a certain tension towards the main party representing their interests: Little of what was expected was achieved and the people became more sceptics towards them. B.E., an independent in Covasna says this path was more about personal choice, adding that he will most probably run again, but he remains unsure if he will prolong his independence or choose to join a political party. L.Z., an ethnic Magyar elected for the office of mayor in the Harghita County, considered that more than ever the issues of the minority are less important than administrative ones and the electorate already started acting accordingly. S.E. believes that independence is greatly cherished in these areas because it has the highest electoral efficiency both Romanians and ethnic Hungarians can vote for independents. On the other hand, M.M., a Romanian mayor in Harghita believes the high numbers of independence in that region are produced by a faked form of independence, as many running independently represent in fact the interests of the Civic Magyar Party, but refuse to assume their partisanship due to the problematic situation of this political organisation in the region. Often an overlooked phenomenon and treated in the footnotes of political science papers, independent candidatures can provide an impressive account at how modern politics are directly affected by individual political entities and how the latter choose to manifest themselves. And especially because it offers estranged voters an open platform to voice their heterogeneous thoughts and expectations, political
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independence cannot easily be ignored. Even more, the political developments visible in Central and Eastern Europe during the last two decades make the scrutiny of this phenomenon seem even more imperative. Besides, as current practice shows, independence has reached a critical point: fewer candidacies are being advanced, even fewer manage to get into office and, generally, the establishment seems to be forcing a monopolistic integration of outcasts. Therefore, treating independence at the local level in the particular context of post-communist politics is not only a matter of academic outlook, but it represents a democratic urgency above all. Our attempt to better understand the specific characteristics of non-party actors in Eastern European local politics represents only a first step. Nonetheless, in order to achieve a broader approach on independent candidatures, future research needs to expand the presented framework to a cross-national level in order to assess the motivation and the activity of independent politicians throughout the area, and also to further investigate the response of the electorate towards the manifestations of local independence.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present study began as an effort to understand the dynamics developed by independent candidatures within the particular setting of post-communist local elections. Observing the lack of any similar approach and, moreover, the scarcity of examinations on the Eastern European space, our study was intended not only at filling a gap in the domain, but also at opening new paths for the study of independence within a previously-neglected space. We started our observations from acknowledging that, in the case of Romania, the scores obtained by independents decrease with each electoral cycle and also that, despite this problematic situation of independence in the past two decades, independents continue to advance their candidatures. Therefore, our inquiry of the incentives which allow local political independence to surface within an unfavourable political situation clearly subject to partisanships aimed to better understand what makes independents ignore political parties in their search for office and to explore the dynamics related to independence. Additionally, we attempted to provide some insight into the often contrasting profiles of independents, into the actual obstacles they face, the type of rhetoric they promote, their actual path to office and also regarding their political performance thereafter. Most importantly, despite the particularities of the subject analysed, this paper tried to provide a multidimensional outlook on the matter, severely limiting the heroic interpretation of political independence. To address the above mentioned issues related to independence we analysed the figures regarding independent candidatures advanced at local level in Romania between 1992 and 2008 and we interviewed thirty independent politicians which managed to get into office after the latest local polls. In applying existing theories on party systems, political independence, local politics and voting behaviour to the available data we explicitly assumed that independent candidatures and political performance are largely determined by several factors: independents social standing within the community, their incorporation of issues stringent to the circumscription and the political mechanisms and processes that legitimate or limit this particular type of candidacies. Namely, independents are favoured by the salience of interparty competition, by the liabilities encountered in the organizational strength of parties, the characteristics of the electoral provisions, by electoral turnout and precedence.
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What about the immediate political profiles of independents? Many enter politics as outsiders, with no previous experience in the administration. Others engage independently in the electoral race being motivated by issues they feel passionately about and that they find corresponding to their professional background. Still, others decide to run independently after previously having been members of political parties; following the failure to acquire an office as party representatives, controversies with other party members, or dissatisfaction with the direction of the party politicians might decide to pursue their political career independently. Approaching closely the various backgrounds of local political independence, we also acknowledged that independence requires solid political determination in order to compensate for the absence of partisan support. As noticed, independents have the flexibility to adapt their political persona to the different situations which might arise and to adopt a variety of issues usually ignored by the representatives of the political parties. Also observed during our study was the distinctive recurrence of independence among several political backgrounds: the church, the minorities and the local inheritors of communist benefits. By far, a particularly interesting occurrence of independence was that noticed among Magyar-dominated areas, where it seemed to be driven by the wish of political actors for maximum gains, irrespective of their ethnic roots. For the most independents cases we have dealt with, overcoming their outcast situation was realised thanks to previously accumulated professional and social resources, which were further employed for gaining political support and raising necessary political funds. On the other hand, from our compilation of a general typology of independence we observed that local independents hardly differ from mainstream candidates representing political parties. If in general elections higher status candidates are most favoured, middle-educated candidates do fairly well in local elections. Also, similarly to nationwide politics, a bias against younger and female candidates is in place for the local level. Hence, rather than being a likely emanation of the establishment, the politicians who assume the independent label are decisively influenced by circumstantial impetuses, with a similar situation being observable on the voters side, whose propensity to go for independents seem to be less about longstanding enthusiasm. In our analysis we equally saw that it is clearly easier for independents to contest local polls than general elections, especially thanks to the lack of any substantial barrier to their candidatures. Among the benefits of local candidacies we notice there is no need to forfeit a deposit, or to raise vast political resources. But, despite these positive outlooks on independence, the scores obtained by independents at the past five electoral movements made us question what might affect their performance. We ended up identifying several characteristics that confirm the manifesting marginalization of independence, among which we consider the most important to be the discriminatory allocation of political resources within the establishment, low access to highly politicized structures, the maturing of the political system, the centrality of partisan structures, and the costs of independence itself. We began our analysis with some basic numbers in order to assess the performance of independents for the selected period. In terms of shares of votes, independents enjoy decent scores in the first electoral cycle, with visibly lower numbers of mandates being captured with each new electoral cycle, with the most mandates won by independents in the case of mayoralties and the local council. Respectively, due to the problems that arise in covering large political units, independence has the lower representation in the county councils and no participation for the office of president of the county council. We have also identified that a geographic preference for independents is in place, with
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independence being more visible in the central and northern parts of the country. In the rural versus urban debate, we can easily observe that local independence mostly occurs in small communities. Equally, we saw independence to be little dependent on electoral campaigning, with word of mouth representing by far the most import electoral activity at the local level. Classical campaigning techniques were also present, but their influence decreased the more the candidate was familiar to the electorate. Also, we further noted that money seems to be retaining a similarly low importance over local independence, with spending being proportionally influenced by the magnitude of the circumscription. On the other hand, independents that manage to get into office face a similarly difficult task in convincing partisan-controlled councils and higher structures of the necessity and usefulness of their projects. Particularly, the implementation of their political programmes remains at the discretion of partisan bodies, and obtaining an approval or access to public funds require additional efforts to be made. Nevertheless, despite this uneasy situation, political independence managed to survive all five post-communist electoral cycles. The failure of national political parties to respond to the demands of local constituents made room for the emergence of various independent outsiders. Independent politicians can be seen as providing new channels of engagement and participation. Arguably, independents fill the openings left by the major parties in their failure to completely reflect the views of the public, and enable individuals which do not have a direct affiliation to a political party to engage politically. Nevertheless, political parties are recuperating the lost grounds with each election, either as consequence of the more rigid electoral provisions favouring partisanships or as result of their numerous attempts at integrating independent players into party politics. Many states are experiencing a considerable growth of electoral activity outside the multi-party system that would make one believe that politics independent of party structures will become a more common denominator in future politics. Independents, unlike party candidates, are not directly tied to the fate of other candidates and cannot draw on party resources to run their electoral campaigns but this does not mean that they will soon represent an equivalent alternative to political parties nor that they will wholly emulate partisanships as key organizational forms of modern democracies1. This trend is equally valid for Eastern European politics, and especially for the local politics of Romania, where we observed that independent politicians depend greatly on circumstantial predispositions of the electorate and on the particular arrangements of the establishment. In relation to such arguments, independent candidatures are an interesting phenomenon. Although it has not resulted in any signi cant improvement in the number of offices won, the recurrence of independent candidacies during the post-communist transition suggests that the party system in Romania is expected to continue its internal restructuring and that it has a potential for such independent voices in the future. For the time being, Romanian politics leaves little space for independent political voices to manifest. Political parties make their best to assure their monopole over existing political offices and public finance sources, and their structures remain extremely competitive2. However, political independence represents a complex occurrence highly susceptible to further contest partisan politics, especially at the local level.
1 2
ric BLANGER, Antipartyism...cit., pp. 1054-1078. Daniel BARBU, Republica absentcit., p. 172.
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Keeping in mind its particular pioneering character, we believe that this study serves only as a starting point in the investigation of political independence at the local level, within the particular confines of the post-communist space. Further debate should be ignited regarding the characteristics of that part of the electorate which might become prone to support independence, concerning a broader view on political independence throughout the rest of the Eastern Europe, and a further emphasis on the actual contribution of local independence to the maturing of the post-communist system at large. In the same way, it remains to be seen to what extent the suppositions advanced within this paper will be matched in practice and, correspondingly, to further examine the strength of local independence with the next electoral cycles.
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APPENDIX
Table 1 Mandates Won by Independents at the Local Elections (1992-2008)*
Mayoralties Mandates 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 659 251 159 82 56 % of T Mandates 22.4 15.79 5.38 2.61 1.75 % of T Votes N/A 16.48 7.27 2.924 1.598 Local Council Mandates 2684 1727 422 503 358 % of T Mandates 6.54 4.33 1.06 1.26 0.88 County Council Mandates N/A 61 0 1 1 % of T Mandates 1.36 3.55 0 0.07 0.07 President of the County Council Mandates N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 % of T Mandates N/A N/A N/A N/A 0
*Source: The Official Gazette of Romania
Figure 1 Evolution of Local Independence between 1992 and 2008
Table 2 Voter Turnout in the Romanian Legislative and Local Elections: 1992-2008 Local Legislative 1992 65 76.29 1996 56.47 76.01 2000 50.85 65.31 2004 54.23 58.93 2008 48.99 39.26
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Table 3 Distribution of Independent Candidatures after the June 2008 Elections

County Urban Rural AB AR AG BC BH BN BT BV BR BZ CS CL CJ CT CV DB DJ GL GR GJ HG HD IL IS IF MM MH MS NT OT PH SM SJ SB SV 1 0 0 3 2 1 0 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 5 2 1 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 6 15 6 9 4 4 4 1 1 1 4 12 0 16 10 3 1 4 0 21 5 1 6 3 7 0 19 7 5 3 6 3 5 12 Candidatures Mandates Available (U+R) won mandates 3 0 78 6 15 9 11 5 4 5 1 2 4 4 13 1 19 11 4 1 4 0 26 7 2 6 3 11 0 21 8 5 3 7 3 6 13 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 3 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 6 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 2 4 78 102 93 101 62 78 58 44 87 77 55 81 70 45 89 111 64 54 70 67 69 66 98 40 76 66 102 83 112 104 64 61 64 114 % of Mandate 0 0.025641 0.0098039 0.0107527 0 0 0.0128205 0.0172414 0 0 0.012987 0.0181818 0.037037 0 0.1555556 0.011236 0 0 0 0 0.119403 0 0 0.0102041 0 0.0789474 0 0.0098039 0.0120482 0 0 0.046875 0.0163934 0.03125 0.0350877 Coefcient* 0 0.333333 0.066667 0.111111 0 0 0.25 0.2 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.230769 0 0.368421 0.090909 0 0 0 0 0.307692 0 0 0.166667 0 0.545455 0 0.125 0.125 0 0 0.428571 0.333333 0.333333 0.307692

TR TM TL VS VL VR RO B 0 2 0 0 0 0 39 1 0 12 4 7 3 8 240 0 0 14 4 7 3 8 279 1 0 4 0 2 1 1 56 1 97 98 51 86 89 73 3177 6 0 0.0408163 0 0.0232558 0.011236 0.0136986 0.0176267 0.1666667
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0 0.285714 0 0.285714 0.333333 0.125 0.200717 1
*Coefficient obtained by dividing the number of mandates won by independents to the number of mandates available per county.
Figure 2 Independents after the June 2008 Elections
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Map 1 Political Independence across Romania after June 2008 Local Elections
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Table 4 Profiles of the Respondents No. Name County Type of Locality rural rural rural rural rural rural rural rural rural urban urban rural rural rural rural rural urban rural rural rural rural rural rural urban rural rural rural rural rural Number of mandates 4 1 5 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 1 3 1 1 Former partisan allegiance no yes no no no no yes no no yes no yes yes yes yes no yes no yes no no no no no no no yes yes no Occupation
1 2 5 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
G.B. I.B. A.C. C.B. S.I. B.E. F.I. B.D B.T. N.I. M.M. L.Z. F.C. A.B. B.B. L.O. P.V. G.N. P.I. L.V. M.R. S.E. C.P. S.I. B.B. L.S. M.A. L.G. P.R.
Arge Braov Clrai Cluj Cluj Covasna Covasna Covasna Covasna Covasna Harghita Harghita Harghita Harghita Harghita Iai Maramure Maramure Maramure Mure Slaj Satu Mare Satu Mare Satu Mare Sibiu Timi Timi Vaslui Vaslui
Priest Businessman Veterinary technician Engineer Salesperson Computer specialist Professor Civil servant Mechanic Businessman Jurist Engineer Economist Engineer Engineer Electrician Businessman Priest Engineer Social worker Civil servant Civil servant Economist Topography technician Non-governmental Mathematician Accountant Teacher Engineer
Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict
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The Ethnicisation of Public Space in Romania

DRAGO DRAGOMAN
Following decades of communist rule and social atomization, Romania faces today numerous challenges in the process of rebirth of the public space. Whereas public space is defined as an autonomous space of dialogue, free of all kinds of constraints, a space of equality and commitment1, we try to assess the importance of an essential factor that burdens the process of democratization in the region, namely ethnic nationalism. We are interested here in a special component of nationalism that is ethnic symbolism. The use of ethnic symbols by the two largest ethnic segments in the multiethnic province of Transylvania, ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians, ranges from the public use of Hungarian to the requirements for the Romanian citizenship and the special ties between the Hungarian diaspora and the kin state. The most striking symbolic crises that influence on ethnic relations in Transylvania are related to the naming of localities and the use of Hungarian in public local administration, to the education in Hungarian language, to the management of a multilingual university and even the creation of a separate Hungarian language university in Transylvania. But the struggle to symbolically dominate the public space is also visible in mixed urban areas. Street names and statues in Transylvanian cities stand as ethnic markers in ethnically divided areas. As we will underline below, although essential for the democratization process in Eastern Europe, ethnic conflict has been initially neglected by the early transition literature. By comparing Eastern Europe to Southern Europe and Latin America, it soon become obvious that stateness and nationhood issues are to be added to the more classical earlier transitions that encompassed democratization and marketization2. Those factors could, in fact, more appropriately explain the slower democratization progress made by different societies in the region, especially emphasizing on the inchoate public space. In this respect, ethnic symbolism is a major obstacle in generating a neutral public space. Whereas recurrent crises between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians stand upon a widespread use of ethnic symbols, the subsequent ethnicisation of the public space undermines the efforts made in setting up limited power-sharing agreements and, as some optimist scholars expect, in fostering a transethnical identity that enables a future peaceful cohabitation of ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania.
1 Jrgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 1989. 2 Taras KUZIO, Transition in Post-communist States: Triple or Quadruple, Politics, vol. 21, no. 3, 2001, pp. 168-177.
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ETHNIC CONFLICT, SYMBOLIC POWER AND THE PUBLIC SPACE

Despite their own definition of ethnicity, many researchers consider ethnic segments to be constantly in competition1. Though some early scholars of nationalism believe that ethnicity is a natural, organic, perennial, unitarian and culturally defined category2, many other scholars contested this view and developed a constructivist conception of the nation as it is the outcome of the modernization, and therefore should be defined as a modern, mechanical, divided, crafted by cultural elites, mainly through mass communication mechanisms3. However nations are defined4, they are competing entities. This is especially obvious in urban contexts5. As Bollens emphasizes, although we recently experienced an unprecedented economic integration with globalization and mega-narratives of modernization (high technology and education), we also bear witness to subversive micro-narratives that fuel oppositional movements6. It seems that social fragmentation has been a common companion alongside the economic integration, which is most visible in the inter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist urban fractures. In disputed cities ethnic identity and nationalism combine to create pressures for group rights. Sharing the same urban space generally forces the ethnic segments to adopt different strategies of coexistence: to try to dominate the public space when they consider powerful enough or to negotiate the division of the public space and the preservation of their community autonomy when they feel threatened by other ethnic groups. Though ethnic conflict and the effort to dominate the public space are not confined to urban areas, we will mainly focus on urban settings because cities are focal points of urban and regional economies dependent of multi-ethnic contacts, social and cultural centers and platforms for political expression, and potential centers of grievance and mobilization7.
1 Rogers BRUBAKER, David LAITIN, Ethnic and Nationalist Violence, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24, 1998, pp. 423-452; M. BANTON, Racial and Ethnic Competition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983; Ernest GELLNER, Culture, Identity and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; David HOROWITZ, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985. 2 Hans KOHN, The Idea of Nationalism, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1967; L. SNYDER, The Meaning of Nationalism, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1954. 3 Elie KEDOURIE, Nationalism, Hutchinson, London, 1960; Ernest GELLNER, Thought and Change, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964; Reinhard BENDIX, Nation-Building and Citizenship, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1964; Gabriel ALMOND, Lucian PYE (eds.), Comparative Political Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965; Karl DEUTSCH, Nationalism and Social Communication, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1953; Karl DEUTSCH, Willam FOLZ (eds.), Nation-Building, Atherton Press, New York, 1963. 4 Anthony D. SMITH, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism, Routledge, New York, 1998. 5 S.A. BOLLENS, Urban Peace-Building in Divided Societies: Belfast and Johannesburg, Westview Press, Boulder, 1999; IDEM, City and Soul: Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, Nicosia, CITY: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, vol. 6, no. 1, 2001, pp. 169-178; IDEM, Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict, in R. HAMBLETON, H.V. SAVITCH, M. STEWART (eds.), Globalism and Local Democracy: Challenge and Change in Europe and North America, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2002; IDEM, Urban Governance at the Nationalist Divide: Coping with Group-based Claims, Journal of Urban Affairs, vol. 29, no. 3, 2007, pp. 229-253. 6 S.A. BOLLENS, Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict, cit., p. 109. 7 Ibidem, p. 109.
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The symbolic domination of the public space relates, as we conceive it, to mechanisms of differentiation and power1, as well as to banal nationalism2. In fact, those efforts of domination are banal nationalism, in the way it differs from hot, hard nationalism, based on violent and bloody conflicts3. In the same time, they are not material, but symbolic conflicts, as they tend to spatially mark the dominance of ethnic groups and by that to strengthen their very identity in a perpetual manner4. Our approach tends to combine these two perspectives as it takes into account the mechanisms of differentiation and power, largely invested by ethnic groups elites, and soft, everyday nationalism, backed up by banal items as road signs and street names. The domination of the public space could therefore range from street names and road signs to flags and more specific buildings, such as churches, museums or foreign embassies5. In this respect, we are close to Brubakers definition of ethnic groups as practical categories, classificatory schemes and cognitive frames and would like to unravel the work done by nations as competing actors in urban settings6. Therefore, the aim of our paper is twofold. First, we intend here to unravel the symbolic, nonmaterial and power-marking elements of more broader conflicts in Transylvania, i.e. those over territorial design, linguistic rights and education, and not only to focus on more classical symbolic issues as buildings and statues. In fact, all of these symbols are parts of the effort made by national elites to consolidate national identity and to claim national hegemony in disputed territories7 and to generally invent a tradition and elaborate a language of symbolic practice and communication8. Second, we intend to broaden the framework of the symbolic conflict and to stress on a new approach, which is the consequence of ethno-symbolism, namely the ethnicisation of public space. According to Habermas9, the public sphere, or
1
Pierre BOURDIEU, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Routledge, London, 1984; IDEM, The Field of Cultural Production, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994. 2 M. BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, Sage, London, 1995. 3 M. IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Verso, London, 1994. 4 Anthony GIDDENS, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction. Macmillan, London, 1979. 5 J. BORNEMANN, Belonging to Two Berlins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992; M. AZARYAHU, The Power of Commemorative Street Names, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 14, no. 3, 1996, pp. 311-330; B.S.A. YEOH, Street-naming and Nation-building: Toponymic Inscriptions and Nationhood in Singapore, Area, vol. 28, no. 3, 1996, pp. 298-307; M. AZARYAHU, German Reunification and the Politics of Street Names: The Case of East Berlin, Political Geography, vol. 16, no. 6, 1997, pp. 479-493; Duncan LIGHT, Political Change and Official Public Landscapes: Renaming Streets in Bucharest after 1989, Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, 2003, pp. 106-131; R. JONES, P. MERRIMAN, Hot, Banal and Everyday Nationalism: Bilingual Road Signs in Wales, Political Geography, vol. 28, no. 3, 2009, pp. 164-173. 6 Rogers BRUBAKER, Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as an Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event, Contention, vol. 4, no. 1, 1994, pp. 3-14. 7 B. GRAHAM, C. NASH, A Shared Future: Territoriality, Pluralism and Public Policy in Northern Ireland, Political Geography, vol. 25, no. 3, 2006, pp. 253-278; J. NAGLE, The Right to Belfast City Centre: From Ethnocracy to Liberal Multiculturalism?, Political Geography, vol. 28, no. 2, 2009, pp. 132-141. 8 Eric HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1870, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 9 Jrgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation of the Public Spherecit.
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the public space, is the environment accepting the public political reasoning, an environment in which the individual can speak freely and where the arguments are not influenced by any political or social power. It makes possible for everyone to express itself regardless of any constraints on time, resources, participation or themes. It is the space created by the discursive interactions between private people willing to let arguments, not status or authority of tradition, to be decisive1. Thus, public sphere is a medium for political justification, for putting the decision-makers to account, as well as for political initiative, the mobilizing of political support. The public sphere not only enables autonomous opinion formation, but also empowers the citizens to influence the decision-makers2. Although public sphere is an essential feature of democratization, one of the main challenges is the definition of the community and of the public space itself. Deeply divided societies have, in this respect, greater difficulties in assessing the common grounds for political institutions and practices that rule society. Even democracy, as one might define it as majority rule, is questionable in these settings3. Finally, our approach intends to integrate a spatial perspective into the analysis of the public sphere and to unify the range of ethnic symbolic domination mechanisms in Transylvania. The ethnicisation of the public space that we unravel here is made by mechanisms of spatial domination that encompasses the use of spatial symbolic markers, but also by more subtle elements as citizenship and language. From a broader perspective, the way citizenship is conceived or minority linguistic rights accepted also defines the public sphere. In fact, nation can be broadly viewed as primarily defined by culture or by territory. The cultural or ethnic nation has ethnicity as the basis of membership and emphasizes on culture as its cohesive component. By contrast, the civic nation has territory as the basis of membership, while citizenship is the cohesive component. The civic nation is therefore a community relating to a given territory, the universal law and the broad political participation turning the community into a nation. In this respect, many new democracies have greater difficulties in both promoting equal rights and liberties and strengthening the ethnic cohesion of the dominant group4. These regimes are only selectively open regimes: they possess a range of partial democratic features that are political competition, free media and significant civil rights, although they fail to be universal or comprehensive in that the political regime refrains from interfering with the ongoing ethnicisation project of the ethnic dominant group. Defining nation and the use of ethnic symbolism in Romania largely impact on the construction of the public space, on what we have called the growing ethnicisation of the public sphere.
P. JOHNSON, Habermass Search for the Public Sphere, European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 4, no. 2, 2001, pp. 215-236. 2 E.O. ERIKSEN, An Emerging European Public Sphere, European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 8, no. 3, 2005, pp. 341-363. 3 Arend LIJPHART, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968; IDEM, Consociational Democracy, World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2, 1969, pp. 207-225; IDEM, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977. 4 Sammy SMOOHA, The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, pp. 475-503.
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SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND THE ETHNICISATION OF THE PUBLIC SPACE IN TRANSYLVANIA

Before focusing on symbolic conflict, let us briefly present the ethnic context in Transylvania. Although it is a Romanian province today, Transylvania broke up from the Habsburg Empire in 1918. Even when it was a former Habsburg province, Transylvania was numerically dominated by ethnic Romanians, their ethnic group representing in the 19th century more than half of the provinces population. At the age of the European nationalism, Romanian elites formed a strong political movement claiming cultural and political rights for the Romanian community1. The one hundred years struggle ended in Transylvanias secession in 1918 and the subsequent union with the Romanian national state. On the other hand, Romania proclaimed earlier its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1877 and obtained the recognition of its independence and full sovereignty the following year, during the Peace Congress held in Berlin2. Excepting the Jewish and Gipsy communities, Romania was at that time almost ethnically homogeneous. The integration of Transylvania would reveal much more difficult, because it brought in large ethnic and religious minorities, with their own active and well-organized elites3. This time the struggle for nation-building was between Romanian rural background and Western urban modernity, since the provinces cities were largely dominated by ethnic Hungarians and Germans. As Bollens emphasizes, cities are suppliers of important religious and cultural symbols, zones of intergroup proximity and intimacy, and arenas where the size and concentration of a subordinate population can present the most direct threat to the state4. This is exactly the case of urban communities in Transylvania, after its union with Romania in 1918. These cities become the arena of harsh conflicts between local German and Hungarian elites and Romanian elites, strongly backed by Romanian central state authorities. Whereas the latter tried to bring under control and culturally homogenize the urban areas, the former made huge efforts to preserve their cultural institutions and identity5. This contradiction is to be found during the entire 20th century, regardless of the political system that ruled Romania. During the 1930s, the struggle between Romanian rural background and the Western-style urban modernity shaped the political activity and lead to the rise to power of the Romanian extreme-right6. Although the first decade of communist rule proclaimed itself as internationalist, the last two decades of Romanian communism turned into a fierce nationalist regime, which resembled more to inter-war public discourse and political
Keith HITCHINS, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; IDEM, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1860-1914, Editura Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 1999. 2 IDEM, Romania, 1866-1947, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. 3 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995. 4 S.A. BOLLENS, Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict, cit, p. 112. 5 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romaniacit. 6 Francisco VEIGA, La Mistica del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierro, Rumania, 1919-1941, Publicacions de la Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra 1989; Leon VOLOVICI, Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1991.
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activity that to internationalist communism1. Yet nationalism was a suitable political vehicle even after the fall of the communist regime in 1989, as it was used by its successors in order to consolidate on power2. The claimed threat to state unity and sovereignty then was the ethnic conflict in Trgu-Mure, where ethnic clashes could have triggered an ethnic disaster, more or less similar to those who have ravaged the former Yugoslavia. Since these events, ethnic politics strongly marked the political dynamics of Romania3. Although Romania followed a different path of exit from communism than Yugoslavia, post-communist transition did not exclude the use of ethnic tensions and of subsequent mechanisms of accommodation of ethnic segments in most of its heterogeneous urban contexts, like Cluj, for example. The economic and cultural capital of the Hungarians in Transylvania during the 19th century, Cluj was among the largest and most important cities of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. After the First World War and the union of Transylvania with the kingdom of Romania in 1918, Hungarians remained the majority of the city until the 1960s, when ethnic Romanians began to outnumber ethnic Hungarians. This was mainly due to the forced industrial and demographic policies of the communist regime that favored Romanian population influx into the city. After 1989, the city was ruled for 12 years by a Romanian nationalist mayor that raised the tensions between ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians by numerous acts of ethnic provocation4. But all major cities in the region, like Trgu-Mure, Oradea, Timioara, Arad or Braov turned into ethnically Romanian cities during communism and minorities demographic share is still dropping5.
Street Names and Statues in Ethnically Polarized Towns

The domination of public space is mainly related to symbolic items as street names and statues, but also to symbolic issues that can be analyzed from other perspectives, as linguistic issues by linguistic nationalism. Items as street names and statues generally stand for identity markers and express the willingness of ethnic groups to appropriate urban space6. Additionally, street names evoke specific historical eras by expressing
1 Elemr ILLYS, National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1982; Catherine VERDERY, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauescus Romania, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995; Juan J. LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996. 2 Tom GALLAGHER, Nationalism and Political Culture in the 1990s, in Duncan LIGHT, David PHINNEMORE (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001. 3 M.E. MCINTOSH, M. ABELE MAC IVER, D.G. ABELE, D.B. NOLLE, Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria, Social Forces, vol. 73, no. 3, 1995, pp. 939-967. 4 Rogers BRUBAKER, Margit FEISCHMIDT, John FOX, Liana GRANCEA, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006. 5 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Schimbri n harta etnic a Romniei, Ethnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2005. 6 B.S.A. YEOH, Street-naming and Nation-buildingcit..
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the ideological dominance of political rulership1. Moreover, street names and statues commemorate past events and heroes, and therefore strengthen collective identity by constructing and reconstructing history and tradition2. In particular settings, they help strengthen the feeling of belonging to the urban space, thus they are a key element for identity politics. As Transylvania moved from a given sovereignty to another and often switched the main ideology, few streets kept their names during the 20th century. As soon as the regime has changed in 1989, Hungarian community expressed his willingness to restore lost symbols, including street names, in a period marked by a general process of renaming streets in Romania. Changing street names was not a general purpose of the Hungarian party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), participation in central government between 1996 and 2000, yet achieving this goal in various local settings had to follow a complicated negotiation mechanism between Hungarian and Romanian parties. In the case of Trgu-Mure, an ethnically mixed town in Transylvania, although DAHR councilors dominated local council, renaming streets and putting in place statues evoking Hungarian cultural heritage was subject to negotiation and approval of Romanian political parties in the city. On the other hand, putting in place the statue of the Romanian prince Michael the Brave, who conquered Transylvania for a short period of time at the end of 16th century3, was conditioned by putting in place the statue of the Hungarian prince Francis II Rkczi, crowned in 1704 in the city as prince of Transylvania4. The same symbolic conflict is to be noticed, on a larger scale, in Arad, another ethnically mixed town. The willingness of the Hungarian community to restore an ancient statue in town triggered one of the most vehement disputes during the governmental cooperation between DAHR and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The dispute concerned the renovation and public exhibition of the statuary raised by the Hungarians in 1880 in order to commemorate the 1948-1849 Hungarian uprising against the Habsburgs5. The monumental statuary, also known as the Liberty Statue, represents the 13 Hungarian revolutionary generals executed for mutiny by the Austrian imperial army. Dismantled in 1924 by the Romanian authorities, it was deposited for decades inside the local city fortress. The restoration of the statue was paid by the Hungarian local community, yet the replacement was contested by the Romanian community, because during the 1848-1849 civil war there were numerous clashes between Hungarian and Romanian nationalists in Transylvania, who generally remained faithful to the Austrian emperor. Although the Hungarian community demanded that the statuary be replaced in a city square, the Romanian authorities refused as long as Romanian national symbols would not accompany
Duncan LIGHT, Political Change and Official Public Landscapescit; M. AZARYAHU, German Reunification and the Politics of Street Namescit; IDEM, The Power of Commemorative Street Names, cit. 2 E. HOBSBAWM, T. RANGER (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983; J.R. GILLIS (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996. 3 P.F. SUGAR, P. HANK, T. FRANK, A History of Hungary, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994. 4 Paul LENDVAI, The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004. 5 I. DEK, The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979.
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the restored Hungarian statuary. Following years of political negotiations between DAHR and SDP local branches and the intervention of central government run by SDP, the common solution was to place those ethnic symbols into a RomanianHungarian Reconciliation Park in the city, which was finally inaugurated in August 2005. An arch of triumph now stands alongside generals statuary and symbolizes the Romanian revolutionaries in Transylvania. Moreover, some of the Romanian local parties in Arad would love to expand and to turn the park into a Park of Ethnicities, diluting further more Hungarian symbolism.
Ethnic Commemorations in Transylvania

One of the most striking symbolic issues in Transylvania are ethnic commemorations. Every March the 15th, the commemoration of the 1848 Hungarian revolutionaries in Transylvania reminds ethnic Hungarians of their natural ties with the whole Hungarian community in the Carpathians Basin and the Hungarian state. Though commemorations are a special ingredient in recent Hungarian tradition and politics1, Hungarian commemorations in Transylvania are a very sensitive issue for ethnic Romanians, as they raise not only Hungarian flags, but symbolic questions of belonging, allegiance, solidarity and national unity, because commemorations are rituals that remember fundamental myths and symbols to a given community. In return, Romanian parliament decided in 1990 to celebrate Romanias national day every December the 1st, in symbolical remembrance of the secession of Transylvania from Austria-Hungary at the end of the First World War and its subsequent integration into the Kingdom of Romania. As emphasized by Schpflin, the myth is one of the ways in which collectivities (e.g. nations) establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own system of values, as it is a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative, held by a community about itself2. Myth provides the means for the members of a community to recognize that, broadly, they share a mindset. Through myth, boundaries are established within the community and also with respect to other communities, in a constant effort of imagining the community3. The myth acts as means of standardization and of storage of information4 and, therefore, it is one of a number of crucial instruments in cultural reproduction5. The endless question of nationhood, combined with daily nationalism and symbolic struggle in urban areas, might affect the rebirth of the public space in terms of neutral political institutions and practices that rule society. In fact, in socially
1 B. FOWLER, Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politics: the Case of the Millennial Commemorations, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 2004, pp. 57-83. 2 G. SCHPFLIN, The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths, in G. HOSKING, G. SCHPFLIN (eds.), Myths and Nationhood, Routledge, New York,1997, p. 19. 3 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London, 1983. 4 Norbert ELIAS, The Symbol Theory, Sage, London, 1991. 5 Pierre BOURDIEU, Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power, in N. DIRKS, G. ELEY, S.B. ORTNER (eds.), A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994.
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and particularly in ethnically divided societies, the use of myths almost invariably enhances the division, unless there are myths that unite the groups across the divide. It is possible to conceptualize myths of citizenship that transcend ethnicity, underlines Schpflin1, but these are rare (e.g. the Swiss case). Generally the myths of collective existence within the ethnic group are emphasized and a harder boundary is drawn against outsiders. This process is dynamic, imitative, and hard to break. If one group feels that it has to rely more and more heavily on myths of collective existence, the other will generally do the same. And on both sides symbolic politics fuel political discourse. The opposition between those two types of myths is best exemplified by the debate over the Romanian territorial design.
Ethnic Identities and Regional Design in Transylvania

The current debate on regional design opposes two main arguments: a transethnical regional identity and a clear-cut ethnic regional divide. The first argument is strongly emphasized by the Romanian proponents of regionalization, a handful of Romanian and Hungarian intellectuals from Transylvania who, back in 2000, triggered the debate on a new territorial design and new political relationship between centre and periphery. Their prior arguments are not economic, but political and cultural. According to them, the existing local political organization and centralization in Romania come from an ethnic Romanian definition of the state, which is strengthened day-to-day by the Romanian-Hungarian conflict in Transylvania. Fearing the Hungarian threat to Romanian statehood, Romanian nationalists and centralists, those who support the second argument, always invoke the conflict as the perfect argument for hard centralization. Therefore, the key for building up a peaceful and prosperous region of Transylvania would be a trans-ethnic party, composed by the political elites of Romanian and Hungarian ethnic groups and motivated by a kind of civic regionalism2. Romanian regionalists strongly believe that assuming regional identities on a civic basis contributes, in a multi-ethnic region like Transylvania, to the development of a trans-ethnical identity, through which it is possible to transcend extremist-nationalist nostalgia, fears or escalation, as well as the veiled nationalisms that often make use of a civic and democratic phraseology3. Regional design was, in fact, a key issue in ethnic relations between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania during the past century. The integration of new provinces in Greater Romania following the First World War brought in large ethnic and religious minorities. Thus organizing political space was a serious matter for Romanian elites who aimed to consolidate the new national state and unify the national culture4. The territory was then divided in 71 one counties that lasted until 1948. During the Second World War, parts of Transylvania were attached back to the Hungarian state, only to be recovered by Romania at the end of the war. In 1948, Romanian communists reformatted for the first time the territorial administration in districts and oblasts, having in mind the soviet-type of organization. By this type of
1 2 3 4
G. SCHPFLIN, The Functions of Mythcit., p. 24. Gusztv MOLNR, Regionalism civic, Provincia, vol. I, no. 2, p. 7. Tom GALLAGHER, Nationalism and Political Culture in the 1990s, cit. Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romaniacit.
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administrative organization, Hungarian minority in Transylvania enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in the general framework of an autonomous region. The 1968 reform of Romanian administration, that still works today, eliminated such autonomy and tried to homogenize again the territory according to nationalistic purposes1. The current regional design is today challenged by Hungarian nationalists in Transylvania. They oppose the Romanian unitary and centralized state by claiming the rights to self-govern in the framework of an autonomous region called Szeklerland. The Civic Hungarian Party (CHP), a political organization of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania which opposes to the moderate DAHR that successfully represented the ethnic community during the last two decades, settled a Szekler National Council as a representative body of Szeklers in Transylvania. Its goal is to define the autonomy of the Szeklerland, including the use of ethnic symbols like the anthem, the flag and the arms of the county. Szekler National Council also intends to propose a law regarding the autonomous region of Szeklerland. Moreover, the Council already proclaimed a declaration on the regional design, stating that Szeklerland is a distinct and indivisible territorial unit that can not be merged into another territorial unit. Therefore, state authorities should take care when it comes to reshape territorial design in Romania and fulfill the distinct Szeklerland with greater autonomy. The reaction of Romanian nationalists was instant. Romanian hard-line nationalists demanded a national referendum with compulsory voting, which clearly shows the dominance and the willingness of ethnic Romanians. The opposition of those two political projects, the regionalist and the ethnic nationalist ones, clearly demonstrates the importance of ethnic symbolism. The regionalists seem to conceive ethnic groups as largely constructed, while Romanian and Hungarian nationalists take them as natural entities in conflict. We think regionalists project rely more on idealistic political models, like the working consociational democracies in place in Belgium or Switzerland, than on ground realities. The growing ethnic symbolism in Romanian turned into a large ethnicisation of the public space, since ethnic segments constantly struggle to dominate each other. Therefore, it seems unlikely for Transylvania to build up a trans-national regional identity, since more modest power-sharing arrangements are missing. In fact, there is no general legislative framework for the status of ethnic minorities in Romania, and therefore ethnic segments are forced to defend their interests in every separate area, ranging from education to public administration. Moreover, extended rights and liberties largely depend on political coalitions in Romanian parliament and government, forcing DAHR to strengthen its ethnic profile when it comes to negotiate with Romanian parties. Yet painful negotiations tend to maximize ethnic opposition between groups and to extend the ethnicisation of the public space on an unprecedented scale. For a cross-national identity to arise on the basis of a civic regionalism, as Transylvanian regionalists dream to, it is first necessary for ethnic groups elites to settle a pact on minorities rights and to refrain from the use of symbolic power. Otherwise, public space, especially in ethnically divided cities, will finally completely turn into a battle ground marked by the imposing symbols of ethnic groups, like the city of Cluj in the 1990s. The elected Romanian mayor, an outspoken nationalist,
C. CHEN, The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Leninist Legacy, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2003, pp. 166201; Catherine VERDERY, National Ideology under Socialismcit.
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made then everything possible to assert the Romanian character of the city-center and to neutralize the Hungarian and Habsburg past1. He has threatened to move the historical equestrian statue of a Renaissance-era king of Hungary that dominates the central square, sponsored archaeological excavations in the square, designed to assert Romanian priority in Cluj, and erected towering flagpoles and flying Romanian flags on either side of the equestrian statue. Later he would replace white benches in the square with new ones painted in the Romanian national colors, in an endless effort to symbolically dominate Cluj city-center. Multiplying such symbolic battle ground at a larger scale in Transylvania could be a threat not only to a still idealistic civic regionalism that encompasses and levels ethnic identities, but it could be a direct threat to the previous efforts made for the minimum trust and cooperation between ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians in the region.
ETHNIC STRUGGLE AND THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE

The issue of language is a key issue of a special kind of nationalism that is linguistic nationalism. This doctrine that originates in the late 18th century, states that the promotion, development, enrichment and standardization of national language is an essential political concern2. In the same time, language is a very sensitive symbolic issue. As national identity is an imagination of belonging to a larger community, as emphasized by Anderson3, the formation of language identity largely helps to strengthen the sense of national identity in many parts of the world4. As we are interested here in focusing on symbolic dimension of nationalism, we will not stress on other features of linguistic nationalism. Because issues of language cannot be easily accommodated within the standard framework adopted by western liberals in dealing with diversity, there is not a proven solution for the question of language, emphasize Kymlicka and Grin5. Whether western liberals solved the religious conflict by separating state and church and by privatizing religion, they have hoped to apply the same model to other areas of diversity, in particular to ethno-cultural diversity. There should be no official or established culture, no public support for the culture, practices or identity of any particular group; this is the liberal project of coping with ethno-cultural diversity. While this is an attractive model in theory, it cannot work in practice. There is no possibility of privatizing language issues. Therefore the state will always decide which will be the official language, which language will get the primacy and which one will be relegated to private life, and this fact is obviously in conflict with the liberal conception of freedom and equality6.
1 Rogers BRUBAKER, Margit FEISCHMIDT, John FOX, Liana GRANCEA, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicitycit., p. 3. 2 A. PATTEN, The Humanist Roots of Linguistic Nationalism, paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004. 3 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communitiescit. 4 C. HARVIE, Scotland and Nationalism: 1707 to the Present, Routledge, London, 1994; R. JONES, L. DESFORGES, Localities and the Reproduction of Welsh Nationalism, Political Geography, vol. 22, no. 3, 2003, pp. 271-292. 5 Will KYMLICKA, Franois GRIN, Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries, in Farimah DAFTARY, Franois GRIN (eds.), Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2003, pp. 1-28. 6 IDEM, Assessing the Politics of Diversitycit., p. 9.
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The use of native language in Transylvania relates to public and road inscriptions, to teaching, as well as to the language to use when dealing to local administration. The use of native language is part of minorities cultural rights, yet the implementation of these rights unravels subsequent ethnic tensions. According to surveys on ethnic issues conducted in Transylvania and the whole Romania1, many ethnic Romanians disagree with the public use of Hungarian language. Though many of them consider that those of their friends who decided to learn Hungarian in order to keep in touch with ethnic Hungarian acquaintances are not to blame, they declare themselves offended by the public use of Hungarian and still believe that ethnic Hungarians willfully refuse to speak Romanian, despite the fact that, as Romanians think, they are fully capable to do so. In early 90s, the new Romanian constitution, the Local Administration Act and the Act on Education clearly reaffirmed the official unilinguism in a period marked by ethnic tensions2. The debate then concerned teaching in Hungarian and the restoration of educational establishments to the Hungarian minority, involving removing Romanian pupils from ethnically mixed schools. In fact, it was the reluctance of the Romanian government to negotiate a compromise with the Hungarian minority over education that contributed to a sharp polarization of both ethnic groups and the outbreak of street violence in Trgu-Mure on 18-19 March 19903. Despite high ethnic tensions, concessions have been made only following 1996, when DAHR was part of the Romanian governing coalition. The linguistic policies then shifted from linguistic hegemony to an accommodation model, allowing the expansion of minorities language use, but keeping intact the primacy of the official language and stating the use of minorities languages as acceptable exceptions4. Romania now allows full education in minority languages, but also provides a minimum education in Romanian. Despite official unilinguism, the use of minority languages is allowed in local public institutions where the concerned linguistic minorities surpass a 20% threshold and encompasses official communication in Hungarian between local institutions and citizens and between elected officials themselves during local meetings, although official acts of those authorities continue to be issued in Romanian.
Language and Citizenship

Language is also related to citizenship, and citizenship shapes the way people conceive community, liberties and equality5. In a way, community is the object of
Gabriel BDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (eds.), Barometrul relaiilor etnice 1994-2002. O perspectiv asupra climatului interetnic din Romnia, Ethnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2005. 2 Catherine KETTLEY, Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania: the Hungarian Minority in Context, in Farimah DAFTARY, Franois GRIN (eds.), Ethnicity and Language Politicscit., pp. 243-266. 3 Ibidem, p. 251. 4 Istvn HORVTH, Evaluarea politicilor lingvistice din Romnia, in Levente SALAT (ed.), Politici de integrare a minoritilor naionale din Romnia. Aspecte legale i instituionale ntr-o perspectiv comparat, Ethnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2008. 5 Charles TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in A. GUTMANN (ed.), Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992; B. BARRY, Culture
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struggle in which different moral geographies are imagined, since community is negotiated as particular constructions of citizenship are put forward1. In this respect, the Romanian Constitution reflects the ethnic tensions from the first years of postcommunism by the willingness of the dominant group to express the dominant position of the Romanian demographic majority and language. Kettley stresses that some disputed points in the text of the Constitution, namely the proclamation of Romania as a national state, the subsequent sovereignty based on the unity of the Romanian people (as an ethnic definition of the community) and the mono-linguism, generated the protests of the Hungarian political elites2. In fact, the use of Romanian language proves to be an essential requirement for citizenship in Romania. When compared to other requirements for citizenship in Europe, the Romanian peculiarity lies in the lack of distinctiveness between the origin, the ethnic aspect and the civic aspect of citizenship and also in the emphasis on the language requirements3. Therefore, the claim of the Hungarian ethnic community to openly use Hungarian language in state administration and education is one of the most sensitive issues for Romanian ethnic majority. Hungarian-Romanian political and ethnic relations have been seriously challenged in 2001 by an incident that unraveled the symbolic stake of ethnic nationalism in Transylvania. That was the Hungarian law designed to give a series of rights (seasonal working permits, social security provisions, travel, education and health benefits) in the kin country to Hungarian minority abroad4. The Hungarian law was received with fierce nationalist criticism by Hungarys neighbors5. Although the law explicitly stated practical issues, it was considered by Hungarys neighboring states rather a symbolic issue, an attempt to symbolically expand the boundaries of the Hungarian nation6. The political motivations of the Hungarian law are questionable. On the one hand, political parties in Hungary exacerbated the references to the past in their political rhetoric, the emotional appeals and the use of political identity campaigns and therefore encouraged symbolic populism in government7. Using Rajacics
and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2001; Will KYMLICKA, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; G. VALENTINE, T. SKELTON, The Right to Be Heard: Citizenship and Language, Political Geography, vol. 26, no. 2, 2007, pp. 121-140. 1 L.A. STAEHELI, Citizenship and the Problem of Community, Political Geography, vol. 27, no. 1, 2008, pp. 5-21. 2 Catherine KETTLEY, Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romaniacit.. 3 Drago DRAGOMAN, National Identity and Europeanization in Post-communist Romania. The Meaning of Citizenship in Sibiu: European Capital of Culture 2007, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 2008, pp. 63-78. 4 L.J. KULCSR, C. BRADATAN, Politics without Frontiers: The Impact of Hungarian Domestic Politics on the Minority Question in Romania, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, 2007, pp. 301-314. 5 K. DEEGAN-KRAUSE, Uniting the Enemy: Politics and the Convergence of Nationalisms in Slovakia, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 18, no. 4, 2004, pp. 651-696. 6 S. DEETS, Reimagining the Boundaries of the Nation: Politics and the Development of Ideas on Minority Rights, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20, no. 3, 2006, pp. 419-446. 7 B. FOWLER, Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politicscit.; A. RAJACIC, Populist Construction of the Past and Future: Emotional Campaigning in Hungary between 2002 and 2006, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 21, no. 4, 2007, pp. 639-660.
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formula, this kind of national-populism was seeking the emotional mobilization of the electors by a cultural redefinition of the past1. On the other hand, contrary to the opinion that emphasizes on the symbolical willingness of the Hungarian political elite to strengthen the ties with Hungarian diaspora and symbolically unify the nation, other scholars argue that Hungarys decision was driven not by a growing ethnic nationalism in society, but by the party competition and especially by the partybuilding strategy of right-wing elites2. In fact, by creating and distributing Hungarian certificates, a sort of ethnic identity cards, the law made the Hungarians living outside the borders legal subjects of Hungarian legislation and authority. Yet the motivation of the law, despite the growing desire to protect the Hungarian diaspora from assimilationist pressures, can be fully explained only by the willingness of political elites affiliated with the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) government (19982002) to utilize the Hungarian diaspora issue as a political resource to further their own ideological, organizational and long-term strategical political goals3. Despite the compromise between the Hungarian and Romanian governments that put an end to Romanian official criticism4, namely the application of the law to Hungarian state territory only, eliminating ethnic discrimination in granting the working permits and removing visual highly symbolic items from the Hungarian certificates that could remind of the special political ties between ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and the Hungarian state5, the incident fully reveals the ethnic symbolic tensions ongoing in Transylvania.
Public Inscriptions in Hungarian

Public inscriptions are, alongside street names, one of the most salient ethnic markers. And the language alone is not the main problem, but the specific contents, since the use of ethnic Hungarian geographical denominations symbolically question the Romanian domination of the public space. As soon as new regulations were adopted in administration area following 1996 elections that brought DAHR into the governing coalition, Hungarian community claimed for widespread public inscriptions in Hungarian (road inscriptions, public institutions as schools, libraries, police departments), which triggered the response on nationalist Romanians who made great efforts to suspend the regulations6. The effectiveness of posting bilingual inscriptions varies from one district to another. On the one hand, many on the road inscriptions in Hungarian, for example, have been destroyed during night-time, but
Ibidem, p. 642. M.A. WATERBURY. Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion: Diaspora Politics and PartyBuilding Strategies in Post-Communist Hungary, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20, no. 3, 2006, pp. 483-515; A. BATORY, Kin-state Identity in the European Context: Citizenship, Nationalism and Constitutionalism in Hungary, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 16, no. 1, 2010, pp. 31-48. 3 M.A. WATERBURY. Internal Exclusion, External Inclusioncit., p. 484. 4 C. IORDACHI, The Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation Process, 1994-2001: From Conflict to Cooperation, Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 88-133. 5 M. CHIRIAC, Provocrile diversitii. Politici publice privind minoritile naionale i religioase n Romnia, Etnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2005. 6 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Ruleta. Romni i maghiari, 1990-2000, Polirom, Iai, 2001.
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some Romanian inscriptions have been destroyed too. On the other hand, the lack of cooperation of many local elites and inadequate funding remain constant pitfalls. The responsiveness of local leaders generally depends on their political affiliation and on the degree of cooperation between Romanian and Hungarian political parties elites and central leaderships1. The legal disposition was generally implemented only in the areas where Hungarians formed a majority or which had DAHR mayors at the time2. Local authorities refuse sometimes to put in place legal requirements, claiming that minorities do not trespass (anymore) the 20% threshold, and do not replace the bilingual inscription that have been destroyed3. Another highly symbolic issue in Transylvania are road touristic inscriptions that mark specific ethnic geographies. Covasna county-council, the governing body of Covasna county in Transylvania, decided to set up eight road touristic inscriptions at the county borders, marking the entry into the so called Szeklerland (Szekelyfold in Hungarian and inutul Secuiesc in Romanian). The denomination recalls the medieval administrative organization of Transylvania, when Szeklers, a Hungarian population defending the Eastern borders of the Hungarian kingdom, benefited of full autonomy4. The decision of the county-council, dominated by ethnic Hungarian elected officials, was criticized by local ethnic Romanian elites because of its symbolic ethnic connotation and the advertising panel was quickly removed by the Romanian State Road Company. Subsequently, the road company refused to deliver the compulsory technical documentation for the advertising panels demanded by Covasna countycouncil and blocked any other attempt to set up similar advertising panels. The official motivation of the state road company was largely symbolic, meaning that the advertising panel was set against the principles of the Romanian unitary state.
The Use of Hungarian Language in Public Schools and Universities

Hungarian communitys willingness to benefit of separate schools after decades of forced ethnic cohabitation during communist rule is not easy to accept by ethnic Romanian community in Transylvania. On the one hand, new schools have to be built, especially where old public buildings have been returned to one community or another according to the property restitution act. This is often the case of old buildings in Transylvanian towns that have been returned to Hungarian churches. They are generally situated at the center of historical towns like Timioara, Cluj, Arad, Braov, Oradea. Moving Romanian schools to city periphery would mean to accept the symbolic primacy of Hungarian education. This is so sensitive because ethnic Romanian elites in Transylvania struggled for centuries to promote Romanian culture
Catherine KETTLEY, Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romaniacit.,
p. 259. D. CHIRIBUC, T. MAGYARI, The Impact of Minority Participation in Romanian Government, in Monica ROBOTIN, Levente SALAT (eds.), A New Balance: Democracy and Minorities in Post-Communist Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2003, p. 84. 3 Istvn HORVTH, Evaluarea politicilor lingvistice din Romnia, cit. 4 G. KRIST, Histoire de la Hongrie mdivale, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2000; Paul LENDVAI, The Hungarianscit.
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and to equal other national cultures in the region, especially Austrian and Hungarian ones1. On the other hand, ethnically separating the mixed schools is often seen by ethnic Romanians as granting too much autonomy for the Hungarian education in the overall framework of the unitary and national Romanian state, as well as an inadequate measure to support multiculturalism. Thus, one could notice frequent protests from Romanian teachers and pupils when it comes to start using separate school buildings in various towns in the region. Yet the willingness to keep linguistic mixed universities often triggers the protests of Hungarian ethnic students and teachers, as it occurred at the bilingual state university Babe-Bolyai in Cluj. This modern Transylvanian university was founded in Cluj by the Hungarian state, following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the formal political unification of Hungary with Transylvania. The end of the First World War led to the dismantling of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the unification of Transylvania with Romania. One of the top priorities for the new authorities was to take over control of the university. When the university with Romanian language of instruction was established in 1919, the Hungarian university was symbolically and officially transferred to Szeged, in the Republic of Hungary, but all the patrimonial goods of the former remained in Cluj, at the disposal of the new Romanian University. After the Second World War, as a testimony of friendship and cooperation between workers parties from communist Romania and communist Hungary, a state university with Hungarian language of instruction was established for a brief period of time under the name of the illustrious Hungarian mathematician Janos Bolyai. In the aftermath of the Hungarian anti-communist revolution in 1956, the Romanian communist regime decided to merge the Hungarian university with the Romanian university Victor Babe in a mixed university called Babe-Bolyai University (BBU). Since that institutional merger, the Hungarian speaking students and teachers benefit only of specific chairs inside mixed faculties, and not of fully autonomous departments and faculties. The possibility of self-organization for Hungarian speaking faculties or even the creation of a separate university is a constant debate inside and outside BabeBolyai University. Despite political negotiations between DAHR and the Romanian political party in government, the ruling body of the university, dominated by ethnic Romanian professors, rejected the autonomous organization of two faculties that encompass the current Hungarian chairs. The main argument of BBU ruling body is, except the threat to the scientific competitiveness, the preservation of multiculturalism, which is said to be better promoted by the current organization of chairs and faculties. The institutional pitfall thus triggered the response of Hungarian teachers and students from BBU, who protested on the streets of the city. Moreover, in response to the official argument of BBU regarding its multicultural identity, two young Hungarian professors demanded that bilingual plates be installed inside BBU buildings that really express the willingness of Romanian teachers and students to share the public space with their Hungarian fellows. After being dismissed by the universitys governing body, the Hungarian teachers were symbolically awarded a prize by a Hungarian foundation for their particular contribution in keeping the identity of Hungarians in Romania.
Keith HITCHINS, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvaniacit.
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CONCLUSION
Ethnically mixed areas are generally subject of ethnic conflict. Despite the progress made in the last two decades and the success in avoiding open conflict and bloodshed, ethnic struggle between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania lately became symbolic and non-material. It now uses mechanisms of differentiation and power in order to spatially mark the dominance of ethnic groups by items as flags, road signs, street names, churches and statues. Yet there are new symbolic issues, like territorial design and linguistic nationalism that overpass this spatial framework and affect the overall ethnic climate. Although the symbolic weight of ethnic issues in Transylvania is overlooked by scholars and the general public, it could actually be the key in comprehending and (partially) solving the conflict. Moreover, the ongoing symbolic struggle has important consequences for the democratization process in Romania in terms of the consolidation of an autonomous and neutral public space. As it is a space of freedom, equality and dialogue, the public space is an essential feature of democratization, because it enables ethnic communities and citizens to find the common grounds for political institutions and practices. In this respect, the Balkans are marked by a slower democratic transition, as it is complicated by cultural, religious and linguistic pluralism that affects state-building and nationhood. Despite the reconciliation process between Hungary and Romania following their equal accession into NATO and the European Union, political relations are still marked by recurrent crises that relate rather on symbolic issues than on practical matter. The controversial Hungarian Status Law designed to give a series of rights in the kin country to Hungarian minority abroad raised the question regarding the symbolic relationship between language, citizenship and privileged ties between ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and the Hungarian state. Although ethnic relations in Transylvania have made an important progress since 1989, a step forward would be to agree on an overall power-sharing arrangement that guarantees significant minority rights, but also undeniable minority integration and loyalty. Until today, Hungarian minority had to defend its rights in every specific area by negotiating with various Romanian parties on power, yet it has no guarantee that already granted minorities rights will not be restricted for the future. The Europeanization of Eastern Europe seems to signify for many optimistic scholars the end of ethnic conflict. Salat and Enache even raised the question if one could compare the Romanian-Hungarian relations to the historical French-German Reconciliation1. We think that this optimist perspective largely overlooks the power of ethnic symbolism in the region and the current mechanisms of ethnicisation of the public sphere that are generally kept in a long-term status-quo, only for breaking out from time to time and returning to a precarious standstill. Taking them into account might help us to better estimate ethnic struggle and democratization in this complicated region of Transylvania.
Levente SALAT, Smaranda ENACHE (eds.), Romanian-Hungarian Relations and the French-German Reconciliation, Ethocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2004.
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Limaginaire paysan comme mmoire historique
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Patrimoine et construction de lidentit nationale par le biais des muses centraux

SONIA CATRINA
Introduction
Nous proposons dans cette tude une analyse des formes dinstitutionnalisation de lidentit nationale1. Notre problmatique interroge les actions patrimoniales relevant de la sphre savante et le sens que le patrimoine2 revt selon la qualit des acteurs qui dtiennent la contrainte mmorielle, dsignant, conservant et valorisant comme patrimoine ce quils considrent comme bien commun. Nous nous proposons donc danalyser les assises de la mmoire officielle/savante, ainsi que les fonctions de la slection patrimoniale par rapport la construction dune identit nationale. Dans cette perspective, nous saisissons le patrimoine dans ses attributs de bien collectif3, incarnant des attributs identitaires de ltat-nation. Comment ralise-t-on la patrimonialisation en Roumanie lpoque des idologies nationalistes4? Que dsignent les catgories dobjets et mmoire retenus? Quelle
On reprend lide formule par Cristian PREDA, La nation dans la constitution, in Nation and National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects, New Europe College, Bucarest, 2001, pp. 390-445/p. 414, selon laquelle le concept didentit participe dcisivement la dtermination de ltat comme tat national. 2 Dans la lgislation relative au patrimoine, la notion de patrimoine culturel se rfre un inventaire de structures matrielles et immatrielles qui doivent tre collectes, inventories, examines, prsentes au public, conserves dans des institutions spcialises lgifres par ltat, telles les muses. Le patrimoine est ainsi assimil aux objets du pass, conservs pour ne pas tre oublis. tant un instrument de reconstruction de la mmoire identitaire, il simpose une tude des productions patrimoniales en rapport avec les diffrentes temporalits (notre choix mthodologique concerne le XIXe-XXe sicle qui correspond lpoque de constitution et consolidation de ltat-nation) et en fonction des diffrents territoires (conus au niveau national), mises en perspective avec le jeu dacteurs, dans ce cas institutionnels et politiques. Notre approche savre fidle la conception de Michel RAUTENBERG, Lmergence patrimoniale de lethnologie: entre mmoire et politiques publiques, in Dominique POULOT (dir.), Patrimoine et modernit, d. Harmattan, Paris, 1998, pp. 279-289, selon laquelle le patrimoine rsulte de la relation que lhumain entretient avec le temps et lespace. 3 Michel RAUTENBERG, Lmergence patrimonialecit., p. 282. 4 Le nationalisme est une idologie ne en Europe dans la premire moiti du XIXe sicle. En 1882, Ernest RENAN, Quest-ce quune nation!?, et autres essais politiques, textes choisis et prsents par Jol Roman, Presses Pocket, Paris, 1992 [1882], dfinit les normes de fonctionnement dune nation constitue et consolide. Selon lui, la Nation sappuie sur le partage dune langue et des valeurs culturelles, la conscience dune histoire commune. La Nation est laboutissement dun
1
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est la fonction du discours patrimonial cette poque-l? Ces questions de la recherche nous encouragent formuler notre hypothse principale de travail: nous supposons que les muses nationaux constituent des surfaces privilgies dinscription1 de la mmoire-nation2, rvlant dun certain genre daccumulation qui fait sens pour ltat-nation sous laquelle une mmoire officielle prend corps. Diffrents concepts nous ont permis dapprhender le thme de la construction identitaire laube de ltat-nation. Tout dabord, Les lieux de mmoire (1997) de Pierre Nora nous ont aid concevoir le cadre thorique appropri cette recherche. Le passage par la notion de mmoire-nation, marquant le moment de prise de conscience de ltat (comme nation) dune identit roumaine, est incontournable, de mme que la rfrence un ouvrage tout aussi important selon lequel la longue dure est constitue de diffrents rgimes dhistoricit3. Ces rfrences nous aident interprter la fonction assure lpoque par les muses nationaux, un des instruments dexploration et de conservation de sa propre mmoire [il sagit de la mmoire de ltat-Nation]4. La slection patrimoniale entreprise lors de lavnement du nationalisme roumain, nous intresse en tant que projet qui lie la mmoire historique5 lespace (conu au
long pass; ses membres possdent en commun des souvenirs de solidarit: avoir souffert, joui, espr ensemble. 1 Nous avons repris le syntagme surface dinscription de Franoise PAROUTY-DAVID, Mmoire et mdiation paysagre. Nouveaux Actes Smiotiques [en ligne]. Actes de colloques, 2005, Paysages & valeurs: de la reprsentation la simulation. Disponible sur: <http://revues. unilim.fr/nas/document.php?id=2384> (consult le 13.01.2011). 2 Pierre NORA (dir.), La nation-mmoire , in Les Lieux de mmoire, vol. 2, Gallimard, Paris, 1997, pp. 2207-2216/p. 2208. 3 Mme sil sagit de lidaltype des rgimes dhistoricit au sens wbrien, la classification de Franois HARTOG, Rgimes dhistoricit : Prsentisme et expriences du temps, Seuil-La librairie du XXe sicle, Paris, 2003, nous aide extrapoler et couper la temporalit qui nous sert dans lanalyse: ce rgime dhistoricit correspond grosso modo lavnement du nationalisme roumain. La priodisation propose soppose au prsentisme dbusqu par Hartog qui prend en compte le souvenir individuel comme forme dinvention de soi ou la mmoire de la mmoire (p. 138) en tant que manire de se dfinir et se raconter individuellement. Nous avons analys certaines formes de cette mmoire de lindividu dans une tude des micro-muses relevant de la sphre prive (v. le chapitre consacr au paysan musographe, intgr dans larticle Les Muses: alternative dmocratique lintolrance culturelle, in Georgeta GHEBREA (dir.), antiere de cercetare n tiinele politice, Ed. Universitii din Bucureti, Bucureti, 2010, pp. 11-48). Cette problmatique, traite aussi de faon transversale dans la thse de doctorat (Sonia CATRINA, Nouveaux paysans et pratiques touristiques dans les communauts rurales de Maramure. Enjeux identitaires, recherche centre sur ltude du phnomne identitaire dans le contexte des pratiques entreprises en prsence du touriste, par la thtralisation de la figure du paysan traditionnel, autrement dit par la rcupration dune identit mythologise, et sa prsentation mimtique devant les touristes) a rcemment fait lobjet de la journe dtude Communication et identits: (en)jeux des reprsentations organis le 7 mai 2010 au sein de la FMSH dAquitaine, o nous avons prsent la communication: Le Paysan-musographe: le cas des micro-muses. 4 Pierre NORA, La nation-mmoirecit, p. 2209. 5 Lusage de la notion de mmoire historique implique le rejet de la notion de mmoire sociale. Les deux termes sont utiliss par Michel RAUTENBERG, Lmergence patrimoniale de lethnologiecit., p. 282, qui, en ayant comme point de dpart de sa rflexion le discours de Maurice Halbwachs, fait cette distinction et prend en compte ct de lide du patrimoine comme catgorie dfinie a priori par la science ou ladministration, le point de vue des indignes (acteurs locaux) dans le choix des lments patrimonialiser. Pour cette analyse,
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niveau national) et aux objets (qui mritent dentrer dans le champ patrimonial du construire de lidentit collective), ensuite comme vision de lhistoire qui dsigne les reprsentations officielles relatives une identit commune aux Roumains lintrieur de leur tat-nation1. Notre choix concernant la circonscription de lanalyse des enjeux du patrimoine relevant de la sphre savante dans des muses centraux repose principalement sur lide que le patrimoine est une ressource identitaire qui suscite des processus dappropriation. Le choix des deux muses ancrs dans lenceinte du cerveau politique et administratif du pays, donc dans la capitale (Bucarest), savoir le Muse du Paysan Roumain et le Muse du Village Dimitrie Gusti, a t fait en fonction de leur caractre national et de leur anciennet (les deux datent du dbut du XXe sicle), ainsi que de la construction dun patrimoine autour dun mme symbole: le Paysan. Le recentrage sur les muses en question, dont limage commune puise dans limagerie paysanne, cependant recense diffremment selon les logiques patrimoniales de chacune de ces deux institutions de culture, va nous donner une image de la mmoire historique retenue en Roumanie lpoque de formation et consolidation de ltat roumain ayant comme base de fonctionnement une idologie nationaliste. Notre analyse concernant la fabrication dune identit nationale et sa musification sappuie sur lanalyse des logiques patrimoniales savantes en fonction desquelles on procde une slection dobjets patrimoniaux censs reprsenter la Nation. Dans un premier temps, nous prsentons quelques considrations gnrales autour des critres de dcoupage identitaire des Roumains. Ensuite, nous examinons les circonstances de la naissance des projets musaux, de mme que des rflexions savantes autour de la culture populaire. On continue par un examen des assises de la mmoire-nation travers une analyse des lments de la slection patrimoniale entreprise par les deux muses en question. En fin de compte, nous explorons les logiques de cette praxis patrimoniale stant inscrite dans la mmoire collective des Roumains et puisant ses rfrences aux sources paysannes.
Considrations autour de la construction nationale des Roumains

Les critres selon lesquels on a ralis la construction nationale des Roumains dessinent les frontires dun tat-nation qui se cherche des racines et souhaite fonder de lunit. Un premier exemple de construction nationale qui nous vient lesprit fait rfrence au domaine linguistique, la langue tant lun des facteurs essentiels autour desquels se construit le sentiment identitaire2. Le latin, introduit ds le
cest lchelle nationale que le patrimoine est reconstitu pour construire de lidentit, les logiques individuelles ntant pas prises en compte, ce qui nous permet dutiliser la notion de mmoire historique. 1 Les logiques qui prsident la production de lidentit nationale roumaine ont fait lobjet de recherche de plusieurs chercheurs tels que: erban Angelescu, Horia Bernea, Bianca Botea, Otilia Hedean, Claude Karnoouh, Szabo Levente, Marianne Mesnil, Vintil Mihilescu, Irina Nicolau, Ioana Popescu, Anca Stere, Katherine Verdery (cits par ordre alphabtique) etc. 2 Marianne MESNIL, Anthropologie de lEurope et les Balkans, in Maria BULGARU (dir.), Elemente de antropologie, Chiinu, 2007, pp. 15-90/p. 26.
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XVIIe sicle, toutefois dfinitivement adopt au XIXe sicle, suite aux mouvements de prise de conscience dune identit culturelle et politique du peuple roumain (volont de rattachement avec la latinit romaine)1 est gage de lunit nationale. Le rejet du slavon2 (en ralit ayant eu une influence considrable dans la religion orthodoxe pour les peuples de langues indo-europennes, tel les Principauts roumaines, la Moldavie et la Valachie, jusqu la fin du XVe sicle quand lglise grecque de Constantinople prend les relais) ne se justifie que dans la perspective de construction dun tatnation pour lequel la construction identitaire passe par lunification linguistique. Nanmoins, inculquer une conscience nationale renvoie non seulement une unit linguistique, mais aussi au partage dune histoire commune. Lethnogense roumaine, rsultat de la synthse daco-romaine et de lassimilation des diffrents substrats migratoires ( noter linfluence de lEmpire byzantin dont les Roumains ont hrit la foi orthodoxe3, plus de 85%, composante identitaire importante de ltat-nation qui trouve souvent des assises dans la religion), est soutenue par des preuves archologiques, ethnographiques et anthropologiques, de mme que par des mentions documentaires (il faut rappeler au XVe sicle lapport des humanistes rudites occidentaux tels que Poggio Bracciolini et Enea Silvio Piccolomini, de mme que des chroniqueurs roumains tel Grigore Ureche au XVIIe sicle, Miron Costin, Constantin Cantacuzino et Dimitrie Cantemir vers le XVIIIe sicle, tous4 engags dans la dfense de lorigine latine de la langue materne). Un autre exemple dune telle construction nous renvoie aux vestiges archologiques des forteresses daces des Monts Ortie. Tmoins de llment autochtone gto-dace (substrat fondamental de lethnogense), ces vestiges vont dans ce sens de reconstitution des origines dune identit roumaine. Le mythe des Grands anctres, lexemple de Trajan, lempereur romain ayant civilis les gto-daces, fait rfrence la fois cet lment autochtone et lanctre fondateur, un hros venu dailleurs, et qui apporte des biens et valeurs culturelles qui en font un hros civilisateur5. Cette courte incursion dans les assises identitaires de ltat-nation roumain nous indique une construction identitaire vue comme un processus complexe. Ce processus repose grosso modo sur des critres de rflexion autour de la constitution dun territoire, des ascendants dun peuple, des mtamorphoses de sa langue, de sa dimension transcendantale ou son cachet spirituel6.
Ibidem, p. 29. Selon Al. PIRU, Literatura romn veche, Editura pentru literatur, Bucureti, 1962, p. 6, le slavon a t mme la langue officielle dans la priode feudale prcoce qui va du Xe sicle, quand nous avons les premires attestations des matres feudaux sur le territoire roumain, jusquau XIVe sicle, quand se constituent les tats fodaux de la Valachie et de la Moldavie. Vers la fin du XIVe sicle, le slavon nest pas seulement la langue de lglise, mais aussi de la chancellerie des Vovodes et des cours des boyards (p. 7). Le slavon, utilis comme langue de la littrature religieuse du XVe sicle (Filotei, Nicodim, Grigore amblac) sera dlaiss au profit de lutilisation dune langue roumaine dorigine latine vers la fin du XVIe sicle (les impressions Coresi sont les premires attestations de lusage de cette langue). 3 Selon Cristian PREDA, La nationcit., p. 410, limage du peuple roumain comme peuple n chrtien est un discours rcurent de ltat national. 4 Auteurs cits par Maria CVASNI-CTNESCU, Limba romn. Origini i dezvoltare, Humanitas, Bucureti, 1996, pp. 40-41. 5 Marianne MESNIL, Anthropologie de lEuropecit., p. 31. 6 Lucian BOIA, La fin de la Nation, in Nation and National Ideologycit., pp. 16-27/ p. 27.
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Proccupations autour de la question paysanne et naissance des projets musaux

Ayant comme point de dpart de notre analyse lapproche anthropologique du principe nationaliste propos par Ernest Gellner1 selon lequel la constitution de ltat-nation suppose la congruence de lunit politique avec lunit culturelle, nous nous intressons aux formes roumaines de ce principe. Selon Alexandru Zub:
Nation, culture et identit forment [] une triade mise toujours en question, quel que soit lordre des termes, car on peut partir du problme de lidentit pour aboutir la culture et la nation, tout comme on peut prendre la culture pour arrire-plan afin dinvestiguer lidentit nationale2.
On envisage donc un des lments de cette triade, son aspect culturel, sous la forme du patrimoine culturel national, car selon nous le principe nationaliste peut tre atteint au moment de mise au jour de ce patrimoine. Aller au rebours des rflexions autour de la constitution dun patrimoine cens reprsenter ltat-nation signifie sintresser aux formes pionnires de ses articulations. Il est connu quen Roumanie, lide dorganiser un muse en plein air date depuis le XIXe sicle, quand on se rend compte de laffaiblissement de lart populaire et des savoir-faire traditionnels. En effet, on doit le retour la culture paysanne et aux savoir-faire domestiques concurrencs par des produits trangers ( la mode et beaucoup moins chers tant obtenus de faon industrielle), Al.I. Cuza qui donne en 1863 un dcret pour lorganisation dune exposition axe sur des produits de lindustrie domestique paysanne3. En rponse ce dcret, le 20 mai 1863, Obor, voit louverture une exposition nationale sous la direction de Ion Ionescu de la Brad, qui englobe de tels lments4. Cest toujours la russite dAl.I. Cuza davoir organis le Muse National dAntiquits par le dcret de 25 novembre 1864, anctre du futur Muse National dArt dcoratif, lui-mme descendant de lancien Muse dhistoire naturelle et darchologie qui a pris naissance le 3 novembre 1834 par un dcret sign par le Vovode Alexandru Ghica5. En mme temps, cest la priode daffirmation
1 Dans la conception dErnest GELLNER, Naionalimul, trad. roum. Anton Lepdatu, Ed. Incitatus, Bucureti, 2001[1997], p. 11: Le nationalisme est un principe politique qui soutient que la similarit de la culture est le liant social fondamental. Quelques soient les principes dautorit qui existent entre les hommes pour tre lgitimes, ceux-ci dpendent du fait que les membres du groupe en cause appartiennent la mme culture (ou, selon lidiome nationaliste, la mme nation). Dans sa version extrme, la similarit de la culture devient une condition tant ncessaire que suffisante pour la lgitimit de lappartenance comme membre. 2 Alexandru ZUB, Nation et identit ethnoculturelle lpoque de la mondialisation, in Nation and National Ideologycit., pp. 50-61/p. 55. 3 http://www.muzeultaranuluiroman.ro/istoric.html (consult le 25.01.2011). 4 Renseignements recueillis sur le site de prsentation du Muse du Paysan Roumain de Bucarest (MTR): http://www.muzeultaranuluiroman.ro/istoric.html (consult le 25.01.2011). 5 http://www.scritube.com/istorie/Muzeul-National-de-Antichitati15182425.php (consult le 25.01.2011). Il faut toutefois rappeler la contribution de ses premiers donateurs, le Ban Mihalache Ghica dont la collection comprenait en grande mesure des objets darchologie, de mme que le Gnral Nicolae Mavros collectionnant de nombreuses pices antiques (auteurs cits sur le site ci-dessus).
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des premires collections prives, expositions nationales et internationales. En 1864, le Lieutenant-colonel Dimitrie Pappasoglu avait organis un muse modeste dans un des pavillons de sa maison avec des objets qui vont entrer dans les collections du Muse National dArt dcoratif de Bucarest. Un an plus tard, en 1867, Al. Odobescu a particip lExposition Internationale de Paris avec un habitat paysan pour illustrer la faon dont le paysan sest adapt aux conditions du milieu et lhistoire, tout en crant un espace confortable. Le Muse National dAntiquits organisera en 1875, la proposition de Titu Maiorescu, une section o sont exposs des lments dart textile raliss dans le pays: vtements, tapis, tissus en lin etc.. Cette section englobant des costumes populaires, de mme que diffrents produits artisanaux, offre les prmisses dun muse national dethnographie qui voit le jour en 1906 sous la direction de lhistorien dart Alexandre Tzigara-Samurca. Une maison paysanne et un ensemble dobjets domestiques paysans vont constituer lexposition permanente du Muse National dArt dcoratif de Bucarest, prcurseur du Muse du Paysan Roumain daujourdhui. Dans les annes 30 du mme sicle, voit naissance un autre projet musal: Muse du Village Dimitrie Gusti,
rsultat des recherches [ ] thoriques et de terrain, de mme quapport des expriences musographiques, de plus dune dcennie, coordonnes par le professeur Dimitrie Gusti, fondateur de lcole sociologique de Bucarest1.
Lpoque qui voit natre le projet des muses centraux se rattache donc au moment suivant la cration de la tat roumain en tant que Nation2, plus prcisment la priode qui va de la fin du XIXe sicle vers le dbut du XXe sicle, alors que des articulations pionnires autour dun patrimoine rural, ou bien des anctres constituant larbre gnalogique3 de tels muses nationaux, sont situer au dbut du XIXe sicle.
Articulations savantes autour de la culture populaire

Dans la section prcdente nous avons dcrit le cheminement des projets musaux ds formes naissantes (dont lobjet dtude ntait pas clairement dlimit), aux configurations musales bien dmarques par rapport la thmatique retenue. Il sensuit maintenant danalyser les formes savantes des rflexions autour de la culture populaire, dont lintrt nest pas n du jour au lendemain. Un panorama de cet intrt situer dans le temps, nous indique un premier moment, pionnier, selon nous, pour les articulations suivantes de la culture populaire: la mise en forme dune philosophie sociale qui contient des rflexions quant au rural4 vers la fin du XVIIIe sicle5 allant jusquau dbut du XIXe. Ce genre de philosophie va donner naissance au paoptism (1830-1860), courant idologique qui dsigne
http://www.muzeul-satului.ro/muzeu_istoric.php (consult le 25.01.2011). La cration de ltat roumain moderne (ralise en deux tapes) date du XXe sicle quand la Valachie et la Moldavie, anciennes Principauts mdivales runies en 1859, se sont rattaches la Transylvanie en 1918. 3 Selon lexpression dIrina Nicolau cite sur le site de prsentation du MTR. 4 Traian VEDINA, Introducere n sociologia rural, Polirom, Iai, 2001, p. 9. 5 Cest lpoque de la pntration dans les Principauts roumaines des ides illuministes.
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le mouvement dmocratique et rvolutionnaire qui prcde la Rvolution de 1848 et prpare lUnion des Principauts roumaines (1859). Sinspirant de lpoque franaise des Lumires1 et de ses idaux dmancipation et de progrs, cette priode de lhistoire roumaine est marque par laffirmation de lesprit national, la confiance dans les valeurs traditionnelles populaires, dans lhistoire et le folklore roumain. Ce mouvement de prise de conscience dune nationalit roumaine stant alimente aux ides des Lumires en gnral et de la Rvolution franaise en particulier sinscrit dailleurs dans le mouvement dunit nationale en Europe, associ, dans le contexte de lpoque, aux ides dmancipation. Le paoptism, promoteur de telles ides dmancipation et de libration, est suivi par le romantisme littraire, scientifique et militant, moment indissociablement li au processus ddification de ltat moderne fond sur une Nation politique, mais aussi culturelle. La question paysanne sera traite au niveau politique, dans le cadre dune doctrine librale. La figure prminente de cette doctrine appele amliorer la situation des paysans fut Mihail Koglniceanu. Cest le moment de consolidation des philosophies sociales et dapparition des idologies socialistes. Le libralisme et les doctrines socialistes qui lui suivent, telles que le smntorism, construit au dbut du XXe sicle autour de la figure de Nicolae Iorga autour de la valorisation des traditions historiques et folkloriques, des valeurs nationales, de la lutte de libration nationale, et le poporanism, difi en 1890 par Constantin Stere qui a fond toute une idologie autour du concept dunicit de la civilisation roumaine, quil exalte comme authentique, le peuple se confondant avec sa classe la plus nombreuse la paysannerie, contribuent la naissance des rflexions sociologiques. Lintrt pour le rural, la recherche de la culture et la spcificit des paysans du dbut du XXe sicle, lpoque du Printemps des peuples selon lexpression de Marianne Mesnil2, se concrtise au niveau de lethnographie et du folklore, runis au dbut sous le chapeau de la sociologie monographique. La fondation de lcole Sociologique de Bucarest sous la direction de Dimitrie Gusti mne la ralisation de nombreuses synthses caractre interdisciplinaire. Lapproche de ces recherches est holiste, les communauts rurales tant vues comme totalits humaines spcifique local et rgional3. Les premires exgses dHenri H. Stahl, Traian Herseni et Mircea Vulcnescu ont comme principe de travail la mthode monographique et les campagnes de recherche empirique4. Selon Gusti, la mthode de la monographie sociologique devait recueillir les caractristiques nationales, fondement de la politique de la culture et dun tat culturel. Lethnographie et le folklore, sciences du peuple, ont eu un rle important dans la production, la dfinition et ltiquetage dune identit collective roumaine. Leur approche se superpose sur la dfinition nationaliste des identits politiques comme identits culturelles5 fondes
Certaines uvres de Voltaire sont traduites et rpandues en Moldavie et Valachie ds 1772 (v. Al. PIRU, Literaturacit., p. 541), tout comme le roman les Aventures de Tlmaque (1699) dont Fnelon, son auteur, est considr comme le prcurseur des ides illuministes franaises du XVIIIe sicle par la tolrance et lhumanit promues dans les pages de cet ouvrage (ibidem, p. 542). Enciclopedia, luvre fondamentale de la philosophie illuministe franaise (ibidem, p. 543), ou la philosophie allemande de Baumeister, Wolff et Hellmuth sont rpandues dans les Principauts roumaines sous formes de traductions vers la fin du XVIIIe-le dbut du XIXe sicle. 2 Marianne MESNIL, Anthropologie de lEuropecit., p. 16. 3 Traian VEDINA, Introducerecit., p. 11. 4 V. ce titre lanalyse labore par Traian VEDINA, Introducerecit. 5 Alain BABADZAN, Les usages sociaux du patrimoine in Ethnologie compare, no. 2 - Miroirs identitaires, CERCE, printemps 2001, pp. 1-8/p. 3, http://alor.univ-montp3.fr/cerce/ revue.htm (consult le 15.01.2011)
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sur la folklorisation et la patrimonialisation des cultures populaires. Dailleurs, le XXe sicle1 abonde des recherches des ethnographes, ethnologues et folkloristes, tous cantonns dans la rinvention du village traditionnel par le biais des ouvrages et des muses2. La patrimonialisation de la culture populaire (rurale) trouve des assises scientifiques dans lethnographie et le folklore. On peut donc considrer que les deux sciences sociales en question, tout comme des idologies nationalistes de lpoque, agissent dans cette direction de folklorisation des cultures populaires et musification du Paysan, considr comme dpt dauthenticit et didentit culturelle nationale. En liaison avec cette ide, Vintil Mihilescu considre que:
Lethnographie et le folklore appartiennent historiquement plutt la grande famille des ethnologies nationales, voire des sciences nationales au service de la nation, ayant comme objet dintrt le Paysan3.
Marianne Mesnil, quant elle, considre que:

Les traditions populaires, les croyances et pratiques lies une culture paysanne de type oral, nont t prises en considration quau moment o lide de culture populaire, de patrimoine oral propre un peuple, est apparue comme une ncessit pour mobiliser au niveau politique les spcificits nationales susceptibles de servir darguments aux revendications des nouveaux tatsnations [] La recherche des racines ( travers les cultures populaires) fait alors partie des proccupations de lpoque4.
1 En opposition, le XXIe sicle, marqu par lavnement de lanthropologie culturelle en Roumanie, donne lieu des rflexions concernant les productions culturelles (expression reprise de Maria GRAVARI BARBAS, Philippe VIOLIER, (dir.), Lieux de culture, culture des lieux. Production(s) culturelle(s) locale(s) et mergence des lieux: dynamiques, acteurs, enjeux, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2003, p. 9) paysannes et leur marketisation par la mise en scne et le jeu de se reprsenter (Erving GOFFMAN, La mise en scne de la vie quotidienne, vol. 1-2, Les ditions de Minuit, Paris, 1973; IDEM, Les rites dinteraction, Les ditions de Minuit, Paris, 1974) devant lAutre (le touriste). De plus, lintrt pour le champ du patrimoine donne naissance des proccupations scientifiques dans le domaine de lanthropologie culturelle, pas encore trs rpandues dans lespace roumain des recherches, le thme faisant lobjet de quelques tudes parses de master ou de doctorat. Les appropriations du patrimoine restent donc des territoires encore assez peu explors. Reprsentatif pour lanthropologie culturelle est lanthropologue Vintil Mihilescu qui a fait de lidentit lune des thmes de recherche privilgis. Le projet Patrimoine et identit locale dmarr dans le cadre du Muse du Paysan Roumain de Bucarest sous sa direction, de mme que linitiation des Confrences de la osea, dues raliser une discussion sincre et raliste par rapport ce qui arrive prsentement dans le village roumain au niveau social, conomique, culturel, artistique (Vintil Mihilescu, entretien du 23 septembre 2005, http://www.zf.ro/ziarul-de-duminica/o-traditie-nu-moarepentru-ca-este-prin-definitie-vie-2887380/, consult le 9.09.2010), favorise lentre du patrimoine dans un dbat publique. 2 Traian VEDINAS, Introducerecit., p. 143. 3 Vintil MIHILESCU, Quelle anthropologie pour quelle socit? Socit postpaysanne et ethnologie postnationale en Roumanie, in Anthropologie et Socits: Mondes socialistes et (post)socialistes, vol. 32, nos 1-2, 2008, pp. 217-239/p. 238, http://www.erudit.org/revue/as/2008/ v32/n1-2/018890ar.html#re1no16 (consult le 25.01.2011). 4 Marianne MESNIL, Anthropologie de lEuropecit., p. 16.
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La recherche dune dfinition de son identit, entreprise par ltat-nation roumain, sinscrit dans la marche gnrale de lpoque quand, les tats, en qute dune nouvelle forme de lgitimit, trouvent une rponse dans les racines populaires, production laquelle le Folklore a apport une caution scientifique dcisive1. Lanalyse des productions des identits collectives amne Alain Babazdan affirmer quil sagissait dun phnomne ayant conquis toute lEurope: Dans lEurope entire, de lcosse aux Balkans, on part la recherche de ses racines, celles du Volk ou de la nation. On les trouvera, comme chacun sait, chez les paysans des contres les plus recules promus soudain au rang demblmes vivants de la nation, derniers dpositaires de lauthenticit et de lidentit culturelle nationale. Cette qute romantique, tout dabord littraire, puis scientifique et militante la fois, est indissociable du processus ddification dun tat moderne fond sur la nation comme communaut de culture, indissociable aussi de la volont, politique, de montrer et de dmontrer lexistence ternelle dune nation culturelle dtermine par la possession matrielle de traits culturels objectifs (au premier rang desquels la langue, mais aussi le costume, larchitecture) ou de pratiques chosifiables (danses, chants, etc.). Des choses donc, et des symboles aussi, que des muses dun nouveau genre vont donner voir, nouveaux temples o la nation se rendra un culte elle-mme2. Inscrites dans ce courant idologique europen, les actions de ltat roumain, forg en tant que nation politique et culturelle, font ainsi rfrence un patrimoine national construit autour de limage du Paysan3 qui se constitue donc en racine identitaire de toute une Roumanie. Le paysan, devenu figure emblmatique de la culture nationale roumaine, sera musifi afin que la Nation puisse faire son propre loge. Le processus ddification de ltat moderne fond sur une Nation politique et culturelle, appuye sur la patrimonialisation de la culture populaire rurale4, construit limage de ltat roumain comme acteur principal du champ patrimonial. Il a investi avec de la valeur patrimoniale5 des objets paysans quil a musifis afin de rendre compte de lidentit et de lunit de la Nation.
Alain BABADZAN, Les usages sociauxcit., p. 3. Ibidem, p. 3. 3 Entre parenthses, on se demande pourquoi les autres catgories sociales ne sont pas retenues lpoque comme enceinte de la mmoire-nation? En rfrence avec cette ide, lanthropologue Vintil Mihilescu, Quelle anthropologiecit., p. 220, constate qu laube de la construction nationale, les lites sefforcent plutt de gommer ou de rduire les diffrences entre boyards et paysans libres pour renforcer ainsi limage dune culture nationale unitaire, plus proche dun peuple rural gnrique. 4 lpoque du rgime communiste, socialiste, communiste ou totalitaire, selon les divers adjectifs en cours, le rapprochement entre Nation ou tat et une culture paysanne renvoie un jeu dassociations qui permet dancrer ltat-nation, par le biais dune politique culturelle, dans une essence ternelle et inchangeable. Se profile alors en Roumanie laffirmation dun nationalisme qui, appuy sur certaines dimensions de limagerie paysanne, celles qui ntaient pas obscurantisme et superstition (Direction gnrale des Relations internationales du ministre de la Culture, le Dpartement pour lintgration europenne, La politique culturelle en Roumanie, Rapport national inscrit dans le cadre du Programme valuation des politiques culturelles nationales du Conseil de lEurope, Division des politiques et de laction culturelles, Conseil de la coopration culturelle, Strasbourg, 1999, p. 11), se recentre dans le culturalisme. Cela correspond une conception de la nation et de lidentit nationale qui privilgie une approche dune culture unifie de lhomme nouveau (ibidem) et faonne comme interface de tout un peuple. 5 Cependant, il faut rappeler quil sest la fois investi dans la mise en valeur des monuments comme tmoin historique ou des difices sacrs en tant que symbole de lorthodoxie.
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Du paysan singulier au paysan universel: mme symbole, double vision

Les collections rassembles par le Muse dart national, dart dcoratif et industriel fond par Alexandre Tzigara-Samurca (nomm un moment donn de son existence Muse dethnographie et dart national, ensuite Muse dethnographie et dart national Charles-Ier), seront organises en deux sections, dethnographie et dart religieux1. Alexandre Tzigara-Samurca accorde une importance accrue la dimension religieuse de lhumain reflte dans les objets y ramasss, de sorte quil demande mme que les collections du muse des Antiquits nationales se rattachant la religion chrtienne soient reverses au muse quil dirige2. Alexandre Tzigara-Samurca construit donc une idologie autochtoniste3 autour des objets patrimoniaux censs reprsenter lidentit nationale, qui sorganise sous deux paliers: on retient, dun ct, des objets paysans faisant partie de lespace domestique, de lautre ct, des objets en relation avec lunivers religieux du Paysan. La slection des objets patrimoniaux se ralise selon le critre principal de beaut. En se rfrant la slection patrimoniale entreprise dans cette priode, Isabelle Longuet affirme que:
Lintrt pour la collecte dobjets de la vie rurale appuye sur des lments ayant constitu lunivers domestique paysan, ne reflte pas tant la volont daffirmer une culture populaire face une culture savante que la recherche de traits culturels spcifiquement roumains pour affirmer la nation naissante4.
En effet, les objets patrimoniaux y ramasss se constituent en capital culturel dune Nation, alors que le Muse devient un espace privilgi dinscription de la roumanit. Leur collecte se ralise en fonction des critres scientifiques tels que les valeurs esthtiques (car on distingue entre le beau et le laid, le muse recueillant des objets dart paysanne), lanciennet (lancien construit en opposition avec le moderne), ou les valeurs spirituelles (le Paysan de Tzigara-Samurca tant prsent, travers les objets, comme un religieux). Par rapport au Muse dethnographie et dart national, le Muse du Village roumain, rsultat des campagnes5 de recherche organises dans la priode 1925-1935 sous la direction de Gusti, chef de la Chaire de Sociologie de lUniversit de Bucarest,
1 Isabelle LONGUET, Le muse du Paysan roumain, Terrain, no. 21 - Liens de pouvoir, octobre 1993, mis en ligne le 15 juin 2007. URL: http://terrain.revues.org/index3078.html (Consult le 25.01.2011), pp. 1-6/p. 2. 2 Ibidem, p. 2. 3 Vintil MIHILESCU, Omul locului. Ideologie autohtonist n cultura romn, in O. GROZA (dir.), Teritorii: scrieri i descrieri, Paideia, Bucureti, 2003, pp. 167-212. 4 Isabelle LONGUET, Le musecit., p. 3. 5 Les campagnes telles que les recherches menes dans les villages de: Goicea Mare, Nerej, Fundu Moldovei, Drgu, Runcu, Clopotiva, an, Dmbovnic, Dragomireti, Rueu, se finalisaient avec des expositions, certaines dentre elles dans les villages tudis, certaines dautres dans les salles de cours de lUniversit de Bucarest. linitiative de Gusti et de ses collaborateurs, parmi lesquels H.H. Stahl, Mihai Pop, Traian Herseni, Anton Golopenia, Mircea Vulcnescu, Gh. Foca, ont t organises deux expositions avec des intrieurs paysans orns avec des objets collects dans les villages: lune au sige de la Fondation Royale le Prince Carol (1934), lautre dans le Pavillon Royal du Parc Carol (1935), comme prlude du
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tant install en plein air, la superficie plus large du terrain sur lequel il a t assembl a permis lentier dplacement des foyers domestiques paysans, ainsi que leurs annexes, leur intrieur intgralement reconstitu, et parfois leur accompagnement par des glises, auberges (sorte de crme). tant constitu selon le principe du mtavillage identifier dans son aspect pavillonnaire, le Muse du Village roumain se veut une reconstitution de lespace physique du village traditionnel roumain (dici et dailleurs) regroupant les spcificits locales par rgions. La question de la construction patrimoniale par lintermdiaire de lespace forge une image du patrimoine en tant que notion lie des enjeux dappropriation de lespace. Dautre part, linvestissement identitaire en rfrence au local permet lancrage dans un espace rvlateur dun status. Et le Paysan a t choisi encore une fois comme reprsentant dune Nation. Et avec lui toute une imagerie associe lespace que le Paysan occupe (structur tantt en fonction du statut des membres constituant une famille ou des gnrations y abrites, tantt en fonction de certaines croyances), de mme que le poids statutaire auquel cette catgorie sociale fait rfrence. On est donc devant une mme emblme, le Paysan, devenu symbole de la roumanit, et une double vision: alors que le muse fond en 1906 met laccent sur les valeurs tiques et esthtiques du Paysan roumain, le muse fond en 1936 nous prsente une image particularisante du Paysan roumain selon les diffrentes aires rgionales. Aux valeurs universelles du Paysan de TzigaraSamurca (beaut, religiosit) correspond la vision particularisante du Paysan de Gusti (on restitue le particulier lunit). Lidologie nationaliste de la fin du XIXe sicle correspond donc une vision plus gnrale de lunit: les choix patrimoniaux sont orients de faon effacer les particularits1. En tant que ressource identitaire, le patrimoine permet daffirmer une spiritualit universelle, ce qui nest pas le cas pour lautre discours musographique du dbut du XXe sicle qui conoit lunit dans certaines de ses parties, bien que ce soit une unit rduite une catgorie sociale dominante. Et au-del de toute cette image repose un symbole dominant: le Paysan!
Pourquoi localiser la mmoire collective dans le Paysan?

Arrive ce point de notre analyse du rle des muses nationaux dans la construction dune mmoire collective, nous sommes incite nous demander pourquoi le rcit identitaire musal, tout comme celui des disciplines sociales, estil oriente vers le Paysan? Et comment arrive-il que le Paysan soit-il rig en figure emblmatique du roumanisme? Selon nous, les rponses cette question se trouvent dans lide selon laquelle en Roumanie, la consolidation dun pass collectif et son identification avec ltatnation fait partie du processus dacquisition dune identit sociale. lheure o les Principauts roumaines se cherchaient des racines identitaires communes, ce processus offre la possibilit de localiser lidentit collective de la Roumanie naissante dans la catgorie sociale des Paysans, reprsentative pour un pays majoritairement rural. ce titre, Marianne Mesnil2 considre que:
futur muse en plein air de Bucarest (cf. http://www.muzeul-satului.ro/muzeu_istoric.php (consult le 25.01.2011). 1 Rfrence aux particularits ethniques. 2 Marianne MESNIL, Histoire tourmente dun lieu de mmoire: le Muse du Paysan Roumain avant, pendant, aprs le communisme, Martor. Revue danthropologie du Muse du paysan Roumain, no. 11 - Muses et socit, 2006, pp. 33-48/p. 35.
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Dans la mesure o la paysannerie constitue encore la majeure partie de la population du territoire raison de 90%, cest son image qui est mobilise pour soutenir lide dunit nationale.
Malgr cela, en ce qui nous concerne, la reprsentativit de cette catgorie sociale ne reprsente pas une rponse satisfaisante la question du choix patrimonial dont la source est lhritage paysan. Lexplication doit tre beaucoup plus complexe. Selon nous, limagerie paysanne conue comme patrimoine national est une construction idologique exprimant le rle dune catgorie sociale (effectivement majoritaire), dans le tissu social du pays. Lidentit paysanne affiche et revendique travers le patrimoine reprsente une forme de capital social qui permet son appropriation collective. La reprise du concept de capital social de lapproche sociologique, que lon utilise dans cette analyse, nous permet de considrer les Paysans comme dtenteurs de valeurs similaires et stockeurs dlments positifs institus par la communaut1. Ces valeurs positives, constitues en capital social dune catgorie sociale, entrent dans un enjeu national travers le processus de patrimonialisation et rigent le Paysan en symbole dune Nation, la Nation roumaine. tendre les valeurs dune catgorie sociale la totalit sinscrit dans une conception holiste selon laquelle lindividuel est subordonn la totalit sociale. Nanmoins, au-del de cette vision thorise comme holiste, on comprend bien les connotations associes au Paysan: intgr dans un projet de construction identitaire nationale, le Paysan se doit localiser la mmoire-historique de ltat-nation non pas dans un statut social, mais plutt dans les valeurs associes lui. Son univers domestique se mtamorphose en art paysan, dont les spcialistes de la patrimonialisation apprcient la beaut et lauthenticit, et son thique, telle la religiosit, se constitue en valeur nationale.
Conclusion
Cet article est parti du constat que les politiques mmorielles savantes depuis lpoque de construction, ensuite de consolidation, de ltat-nation se concentrent sur les cultures populaires et limage du Paysan. Il sagissait dtudier comment les muses nationaux bucarestois sinscrivaient dans ce processus de construction dune identit nationale, autrement ancre dans lhistoire (nous rappelons le mythe des grands anctres), la langue (dorigine latine, le substrat slavon tant rejet dans les thses linguistiques qui soutiennent la puret de la langue roumaine), la religion (majoritairement orthodoxe ce qui implique le ngation des religions des groupes ethniques), et contribuait forger le rcit identitaire roumain par le biais des projets patrimoniaux. Nous avons cherch rpondre la question: quelle reprsentation les muses appels dans notre analyse contribuent-ils diffuser dans un contexte dune construction identitaire? Nous avons rattach la naissance des projets musaux la fin du XIXe sicle-au dbut du XXe sicle, plus prcisment le Muse du Paysan Roumain sinscrit dans la priode qui suit lunion des Principauts roumaines (bien que les prmisses de sa fondation aient des racines dans le XIXe sicle), alors que le Muse National du
Dumitru SANDU, Dezvoltare comunitar: cercetare, practic, ideologie, Polirom, Iai, 2005,
p. 12.
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Village, appartient plutt la priode de consolidation de ltat-nation. Dans cette priode de construction nationale, les projets patrimoniaux lient: identit, mmoire et territoire. La mise en forme des lments constituant cette triade correspond la collecte dobjets appartenant la culture matrielle des Paysans. Limaginaire paysan se constitue en capital culturel de ltat-nation, dont la valeur est dtermine et valide par linstitution musale, de mme que la recherche ethnographique. Le Paysan devient de la sorte rfrence centrale de lidentit roumaine, et les muses en question surface dinscription de la mmoire-nation. Cette opration dinscription de la mmoire collective dans la mmoire sociale est le produit dune praxis daccumulation dun patrimoine paysan constitu en rfrence identitaire partager par tous les membres de ltat-nation, au-del de lexistence des autres catgories sociales dont le rle est minimis dans le processus de construction identitaire. Et la sociologie, en tant que science de la nation, ancre dans la connaissance du village, telle quelle tait nomme par Gusti1, y a contribu par son centrage autour des cultures populaires rurales, orientant la construction de lidentit nationale et transformant les populations rurales, qui couvraient lessentiel de lespace national, en paysannerie, tout en limaginant comme sujet unitaire et central de la nation2. Le Paysan sera donc transpos au muse afin que ltat-nation puisse rendre culte lui-mme. La fondation des premiers muses ethnographiques et la construction du discours musographique agissent dans cette direction de musification du Paysan roumain plac dans son univers (matriel et spirituel). Considr comme dpt dauthenticit et didentit culturelle nationale, le Paysan devient, ainsi, figure emblmatique de la culture nationale roumaine. Pass dun enjeu social un enjeu national, le Paysan se positionne comme le reprsentant dune culture nationale. La culture populaire dont il est le dpositaire, est reprsentative du peuple tout entier, qui devient ainsi, dune manire dclarative identitaire, un peuple-paysan3. Ainsi, ltat, bnficiant de lgitimit devant le peuple, a-t-il pu inventer une mmoire collective et transformer les muses nationaux en mmoire localisante dune nation. Ltude du triptyque: identit-mmoire-territoire associ ltat-nation, dtenteur lpoque du monopole des politiques mmorielles, et linstitution musale, surface privilgie dinscription du rcit savant de la culture, vise donc rendre compte de la mmoire-historique retenue par un tat-nation en train de (s)laborer une mmoire officielle qui tmoigne de son unit. Lanalyse des reprsentations relatives lidentit de la Nation par des mcanismes tatiques responsables de la construction patrimoniale en Roumanie nous permet de parler dun centralisme mmoriel4 dont lacteur dominant est ltat5. Notre analyse de slection dobjets
Dimitrie GUSTI, La science de la ralit sociale. Introduction un systme de sociologie, dthique et de politique, Plon, Paris, 1941, p. 41. 2 Vintil MIHILESCU, Quelle anthropologiecit., pp. 220-221. 3 Ibidem, p. 221. 4 Michel JOHANN, Gouverner les mmoires. Les politiques mmorielles en France, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2010, p. 49. 5 prsent, il arrive que ltat roumain, longtemps le seul acteur dans le champ patrimonial, aprs la chute du mur du Berlin et leffondrement du communisme, na plus le monopole de la contrainte mmorielle qui est concurrenc par une irruption des mmoires au niveau local travers les actions individuelles de collecte de mmoire ramasse dans des micro-muses privs. Le rgime dhistoricit, surinvesti par ltat roumain, laisse prsentement le champ ouvert la logique de laction individuelle dont les porteurs de projets sengagent
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censs reprsenter ltat-nation nous a donc permis de rvler les constructions dont la patrimonialisation tait loccasion, ainsi que les enjeux quelle suscitait au niveau de ltat-nation. Sy intresser nous a galement permis de saisir la polysmie des phnomnes de qualification des projets patrimoniaux lheure de la construction dune identit nationale. Lanalyse des modalits de la slection patrimoniale et des diffrentes rflexions autour du patrimoine lintrieur des organismes qui en dtiennent la responsabilit, nous a montr que lindividuel se substitue au collectif, et rciproquement, par un jeu complexe de rfrences. Le Paysan se substitue au peuple roumain, et le peuple devient Paysan, peuple-paysan tel quil est nomm par Vintil Mihilescu. Par consquent, le processus de patrimonialisation fait tat dune construction identitaire dun objet mdiatique, le Paysan, grce auquel la mmoire-nation prend corps au niveau de la rflexion savante.
dans une patrimonialisation prive. Ils rinvestissent ainsi lhistoire dans une perspective interprtative personnelle ce qui, selon nous, ouvre lre de la responsabilisation de lindividu vis--vis du pass qui se construit au-del du rcit savant de la culture.
Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust
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Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust?

ALEXANDRA ILIE
The words Holodomor and Holocaust sound similar. They both translate to grave man made catastrophes in the XXth century. Holodomor took place in 1932/33 and Holocaust followed almost 10 years later. The victims of the Holocaust have been recognized by the international community as being the victims of genocide; the people that died during the Holodomor are just victims of a crime against humanity. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian community insists that Holodomor was genocide and should be treated as such. What would happen though, if one is to compare these two terrible tragedies? Would the similarities between them make matters clearer? Also, is Holodomor, in this sense, the Ukrainian Holocaust? Is the Great Famine a full blown genocide or does it have just a few genocidal characteristics?
Holodomor vs. the Holocaust: International Recognition

The term Holocaust is commonly defined as:
The Nazi German policy that sought the annihilation of European and North African Jews. It comes from the Greek, holkauton, meaning burnt sacrifice. More rarely, the term is also used to describe Nazi German violence in general1.
The Jewish community prefers the term Shoah, meaning catastrophe. Others name it The Final Solution. The name Holodomor is explained as coming from the Ukrainian words holod which means hunger, and mor which means plague:
In the Ukrainian language, the famine of 1932 and 1933 famine is called holodomor, which means extermination by starvation. It is also referred to as the arti cial famine, terror famine and terror-genocide2.
The two tragedies resulted in millions of deaths. Some have tried to link the Holodomor with the Holocaust in what concerns the number of the victims and through this to prove that the Ukrainian Famine is also genocide. The estimations for the two mass killings do revolve around the same number, about 6 million victims, but this is not a valid argument.
1 Rudolph BINION, The Holocaust, in Encyclopedia Of Genocide And Crimes Against Humanity, vol. 1, edited by Dinah L. Shelton, Macmillan Reference USA, 2005, p. 435. 2 A.B. KASOZI, Ukraine (Famine), in Encyclopedia Of Genocide And Crimes Against Humanity, vol. 3, cit., p. 1055.
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The theory that the Great Famine is genocide should focus more on the reasons and intent of the perpetrators and on the course of actions and international context of Holodomor. The comparison with the paradigmatic case of the Holocaust can give the result more credibility. The first logical step is to apply the UN Genocide Conventions definition of genocide to the Holocaust and Holodomor. The definition states that:
Genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world1.
Holocaust is considered from a legal point of view to be genocide, because it had both the mental element, the intent to destroy, proved by signed documents, orders, public speeches etc., and the physical elements, killing members of the group, proved by witness accounts, mass burial grounds and written execution orders. The Holocaust incorporated all the five physical elements2 that make up genocidal acts. Although Holodomor was ruled out as not being genocide because the mental element, the intent to kill, could not be clearly demonstrated, some of the physical elements were nevertheless present: killing members of the group (approximately 6-7 million Ukrainians died between 1932/1933 because of the famine and a significant percentage of them were shot by the soviets under the accusation of being kulaks), causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (most of the Ukrainians in that period died a slow and painful death through starvation, some were buried alive, others were shot, most of the survivors were mentally scarred for life), deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (there is proof that Stalin at that time knew about the situation in Ukraine but did nothing to help the people, moreover, he increased the food quotas to the maximum point possible; he refused to help them; he put a blockade on Ukraine and then on the cities, he instituted internal passports so that people could not escape by any means the famine; he refused external help even though the situation was desperate). With regards to the measures taken against children, it is a well known fact that Stalin had a problem in the mid 1930s with bezpeizornie, which was the generation of orphaned children throughout the Soviet Union. When they became too numerous, they were usually shot3. Despite all this, Holodomor was considered by the European Parliament not genocide, like the Holocaust, but an ineffective economic policy of the Communist governments of the Republics of the Soviet Union and a crime against humanity.
1 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII, http:// www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (consulted on 12.05.2009). 2 (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 3 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film directed by Latvian director Edvins Snore, sponsored by the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) Group in the European Parliament, premiered in April, 2008 at the European Parliament.
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On Thursday, 23 October 2008, at Strasbourg, the European Parliament approved a resolution for the commemoration of the Holodomor, the artificial famine in Ukraine (1932-1933)1. In the resolution, the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is mentioned, but the word genocide is not attached to the Holodomor. Some have speculated that the EU has not labeled Holodomor as genocide in order not to upset Russia. This happened unfortunately because, from the point of view of independence, the European Union is not entirely autonomous from other actors on the international stage. On the basis of the same reasons, Nazism has always been labeled by the EU as a vicious ideology, but communism, although it has also produced millions of innocent deaths all over the world, is not as frowned upon. Being a Nazi fan or praising Hitler is a grave legal offence, but being a communist enthusiast or publicly expressing ones admiration for Stalin has no legal repercussions. This is also related to memory and historical conscience. Some people still see in the former USSR the savior of Europe, the vanquisher of Nazism, although this is hardly so. For example, after liberating the Jewish people, the soviets filled the former Jewish ghettos with their war prisoners2. From a legal perspective, international law stipulates, through the UN Genocide Convention3, that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world4. Article 2 of the Convention describes what genocide is and what it is punishable for in five points of interest, meaning that any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group5 is considered by international law genocide: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group Article 2 implies that genocide has two distinct dimensions in order to be recognized as such, the mental element6 and the physical element7. While the intent to kill can be easily identified when speaking about the Holocaust, in the case of the Great Famine in Ukraine, it is more difficult to prove that there was a clear intent to kill.
The European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the commemoration of the Holodomor, the Ukraine artificial famine (1932-1933), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0523 (consulted on 31.05.2009) 2 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film. 3 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (consulted on 12.05.2009). 4 Ibidem. 5 Ibidem. 6 Meaning the before mentioned intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 7 The five instances mentioned above, points a, b, c, d and e.
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Article 3 of the same convention describes five punishable forms of genocide crimes: genocide, conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity. Nevertheless, many have argued that this definition is too restrictive, limiting the victims of genocide to national, ethnical or religious groups1 although, as Benjamin Valentino notes:
Many of the most infamous and important genocidal events of this century, including the deaths of between 9 million and 32 million people in the Soviet Union, between 5 million and 35 million in China, and between 1 million and 2 million in Cambodia, have not primarily involved a clash between different ethnic or national groups2.
The UN Genocide Convention definition does not include groups defined by their political orientation or class background3. This definition, without the mentioned components, rules out some of the most extensive mass killings that were ever committed, including Holodomor. As Erick Weitz mentions in relation to this definition:
Nearly everyone who considers the definition finds it insufficient for one reason or another. It manages to be at the same time both too broad and too narrow4.
Michael Mann, the author of The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, also argues against the UN definition for genocide, because, he says, it includes too much and too little5. In his view, the definition is too broad because it adds a sub-clause, allowing either total or partial destruction to count as genocide6. The concept of partial genocide is rather difficult to grasp, not knowing whether it has a geographical connotation or not. Weitz also speculates that:
In the negotiations in the 1940s, the Soviet Union and its allies forced the exclusion of these categories for fear that its policies toward the peasantry and political opponents could be considered genocide7.
If these categories were added, then the forced famine imposed to the Ukrainians between 1932/1933 would be legally considered genocide.
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII, http:// www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (consulted on 12.05.2009). 2 Benjamin VALENTINO, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 15. 3 Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocide Utopias of Race and Nation, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005, p. 9. 4 Ibidem. 5 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 21. 6 Ibidem. 7 Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocidecit., p. 9.
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Therefore, Holodomor is not considered genocide form the point of view of the UN Genocide Convention definition. The European Parliament also avoided the use of the term genocide and described Holodomor as a crime against humanity1. Nevertheless, the Great Famine has some undeniable genocidal characteristics.
Holodomor vs. the Holocaust: Ideology

In both cases, the Holocaust and Holodomor, there were some ideological reasons underlying the intention to kill. The Holocaust perpetrators had established their creed on false biology and anti-Semitism, under a national-socialist view of the world. The people responsible for Holodomor, on the other hand, were communist fanatics, believing in false sociology, seeking to eliminate the kulak class but also to bring a nation (Ukraine) to its knees in order to strengthen their influence over it. Although the reasons for committing murder seem very different, the ideology that brought this about contains some common points. Communism was a utopian view of the world, based on Karl Marxs writings. It lobbied for equality and unity for all, an idea which might not appear evil at first, but is clearly evil in the way in which it was implemented and understood. A fundamental step towards world harmony was, in Lenins view, the war of the classes which would be concluded with the victory of the proletariat. Ironically enough, the communists thought the road towards achieving harmony had to start with destruction and death. The Bolshevik revolutions around the world initially killed about 10% of the population2 in order to restructure the basis of society. Their favorite targets were the elites. Of course, not everybody embraced Marxism form the start, so the people in the resistance were usually killed as well. Michael Mann asserts that:
The people were the proletariat, and classes opposed to the proletariat were enemies of the people. Communists might be tempted to eliminate classes through murder. I term this classicide3.
A little known fact is that Marx at some point advanced the idea of genocide. Literary historian at Cambridge University, George Watson, points out that: Marx and Engels called Basks, Bretons, and Serbs racial trash, Voelkerabfall4. Marx and Engels even advanced the idea that, for example, a country like Poland has no reason to exist and that people and races that are too weak to acknowledge the new world order and too backward economically will disappear in the revolutionary holocaust. The terminology racial trash immediately springs into mind Nazism though. This is not as farfetched as it seems because Hitler mentioned in a number of occasions that he learned a lot from reading Marxs works. His party was called The National Social Germans Workers Party, and was based on a socialist ideology as well, but with a national emphasis.
The European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the commemoration of the Holodomor, the Ukraine artificial famine (1932-1933), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0523 (consulted on 31.05.2009). 2 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film. 3 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracycit., p. 320. 4 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.
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The type of socialism that Lenin and Stalin advocated was more international in character, although it sometimes had a few nationalist accents. Its internationalism was advocated by Lenin who thought that:
In the last analysis all nations must merge and lose their national distinctions, including distinctions of culture and language1.
This theory led to the belief that the state was entitled to forcefully deport people and to commit purges, in order to merge the different peoples that inhabited the USSR. On the other hand, at some point in the Soviet history, there was a clear idealization of the Russian culture and an attempt to impose the Russian language and cultural traits throughout the USSR. Weitz observes that, around the middle of the 1930s:
The state [] also asserted the cultural and political superiority of Russia [] Cultural russification, marketed especially by the mandatory teaching of Russian, became the watchword2
and that:
The Russian people and culture were seen as manifestations of primordial being and the model for other nationalities3.
The concepts of nation and nationality have had many interpretations from the Bolshevik leaders. Nevertheless, there has been a common policy of repression:
The tactics of the Bolsheviks in regard to the nationality problem have again undergone changes [] but there has always been a return to the same policy of liquidating nations as such, a policy of deliberate genocide in various forms and of various types4.
Both the communists and the national-socialists had the goal of bringing about the birth of the new man. Communists believed that people are supposed to be differentiated according to classes and that the evil classes will perish or be defeated in the revolution. The proletariat class will prevail and through this social engineering, the new man will be born, according to Marxism. National-socialists believed in separating people according to race. After the extermination of the inferior races will be finished, the Arians will prevail and the birth of the new man will be possible. Both ideologies were at war with human nature5 and looked forward to the birth of this new man. Both ideologies advocated
1 Andrei LEBED, Genocide as a Means of Creating a Unified Socialist Nation, in Nikolai K DEKER, Andrei LEBED (eds), Genocide in the USSR, Studies in Group Destruction, The Scarecrow Press Inc., New York, 1958, p. 4. 2 Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocidecit., p. 77. 3 Ibidem, p. 78. 4 Andrei LEBED, Genocide as a Means of Creating a Unified Socialist Nation, cit., p. 3. 5 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.
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that it was not a question of whether to kill or not, but a question of who to kill, and this is where the difference intervenes. Both the communists and the national-socialists used very harsh and dehumanizing words when describing their enemies. For example, in the 1920s:
Lenin described enemies in terms eerily anticipating the SS: bloodsuckers, spiders, leeches, parasites, insects, bedbugs, fleas, the language suggesting threatening and dehumanized enemies infecting the people, requiring cleansing1.
Similar words were used by Hitler in his autobiographical work Mein Kampf in order to describe the Jews:
Jews were the maggots feeding on a rotting corpse, the parasites that had to be surgically removed, the sexual predators preying on German women, a spider that sucks peoples blood, a plague worse than the Black Death, the sponger who spreads like a noxious bacillus and then kills it host2.
Nevertheless, the communists had a constant problem in defining the kulak, the state enemy, because class is not as obvious as ethnicity or race. Michael Mann underlines the fact that:
During this phase the identity of the enemy broadened uncontrollably [] Since no one knew exactly who the kulak was, official definitions kept changing3.
So from the rich peasants that were initially the state enemy, the definition broadened to the intellectuals, poor peasants that were thought to be under the kulaks and generally to anyone who opposed the regime. Apart from these similarities that seem to have had an influence on both perpetrators, making them believe mass killings were not only normal but also necessary, there are people who believe that Nazism was actually born as a reaction to communism. They also think that the Nazi crimes were a replica of soviet crimes. Ernst Nolte, a famous German historiographer, put forward a mind boggling hypothesis in his work The European Civil War:
The present book starts from the hypothesis that, indeed, the reason for Hitlers feelings and ideology has its root in the relationship of fear and hate against communism, he expressed through this, with a high intensity, the feelings of numerous German contemporaries and foreign people and that all these feelings and beliefs were understandable and up to some point justifiable4.
Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracycit., p. 322. Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocidecit., p. 105. 3 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracycit., p. 324. 4 Ernst NOLTE, Rzboiul civil European (1917-1945). Naional- Socialism i Bolevism, preface by Ernst NOLTE, Romanian transl. by Irina Cristea, Editura Corint, Bucureti, 2005, p. 24.
2
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Ernst Nolte explains the reactive character of fascism towards communism and based on it he defines fascism as a movement of reaction towards the theories and practices of bolshevism1. According to Nolte, fascism could be defined as:
Anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related ideology and by use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy2.
No matter what the correct explanation is for describing the relationship between communism and national-socialism, the undeniable fact is that both ideologies contained the seeds of future genocides. These two ideologies advocated the need for purges, the need to restructure society and the need for a new world order. These ideologies were flawed and ultimately failed, but before this happened their adepts had already done irreparable damages to the word. The murders done by the Nazis do not need to be justified, but by the same token, the world should not feel the need to justify the Soviet killings. The Nazi symbols are considered illegal; the Soviet symbols are just a bad joke. This kind of behavior from the international community succeeds only in paving the way towards closing a blind eye to other political mass killings. Communist ideology included the same amount of deadly potential as the national-socialist ideology.
Holodomor vs. the Holocaust: Ukraine Reasons for Committing Genocide

There are several reasons because of which Stalin might have been inclined to commit genocide against the Ukrainian nation, besides the ideological ones. Ukraine, a country that had 80% of the population working in agriculture, was called Europes breadbasket and was famous for its grains. The country also had a flourishing culture that slowly drifted them away from Russia. Mother Russia, on the other hand, always thought of Ukraine as an inherent part of its sphere of influence and in the 19th century the Soviets were afraid of losing this state:
The idea that this great region which Russian imperialists had always considered a part [] of Russia proper, might indeed wish to be free [] was devastating3.
Ukraine was important for Russia mainly for its agricultural potential and it is a well known fact that Lenin [] regarded Ukrainian resources as vital4.
1 Franois FURET, Ernst NOLTE, Fascism and Communism, Romanian transl. and preface Matei MARTIN, Univers, Bucureti, 2000, p. 12. 2 Ernst NOLTE, Three Faces of Fascism, transl. from German to English by Leila Vennevitz, Reinheart and Winston, Holt, 1999, pp. 20-21. 3 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-famine, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 29. 4 Ibidem., p. 37.
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Attempts to Russify Ukraine were made even before the Bolsheviks came to power. For example, Russians always believed that the Ukrainian language was nothing more than a dialect of Russian language, when in fact the two languages had only a common root, like the Spanish and Portuguese languages. The Ukrainian language was a clear sign of distinction, so for many years Russia had made attempts to diminish its daily use. For instance, in 1883 an edict declared that there was no Ukrainian language [] and banned works in Ukrainian1. After that, a decree issued in 1876 was put into practice forbidding Ukrainian theatrical or musical performances, and closing the main organs [] of the movement2. All these measures led to an unprecedented increase in illiteracy, to some 80% of the population3. What happened after Ukraine claimed its independence in 1917 is not only a large scale man-made famine, but also a full blown war against the Ukrainian elites. Robert Conquest asserts that the famine
was combined with a devastating attack on the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Ukrainian Party itself. In fact, the campaign may be said to resemble the laying waste of hostile subject territories practiced by Jenghiz Khan and other figures of the past4.
Ukraine hoped to regain its independence after the 1917 revolts and fall of tsarist rule and consequently: On 22 January, the Rada declared Ukraine an independent Soviet republic5. Nevertheless, Lenin shattered their hopes after reclaiming all former tsarist territories. The 4 years of resisting the Red Army in war and their nationalistic claims have created tensions between Ukraine and Russia that have not been settled even today. Ukraine was forcefully incorporated into the USSR in 1921 and the people saw that the Bolshevik invaders were accompanied by food detachments [] to seize the grain in the villages, under Lenins instructions6. The first Soviet government suppressed Ukrainian schools, cultural institutions and so forth. In fact, the Russianizing tendency in the early Ukrainian Soviet regime was intensely anti-Ukrainian7, as noted by Robert Conquest in his work The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine. After the war, a national revival began to take place in Soviet Ukraine. The cultural, political and religious life in Ukraine started to develop yet again. Culture was based on western models, thanks to writers like Mykola Khvylovy that started to emerge. Also, the Ukrainian Church was re-established, Ukrainian language was re-introduced into Church services and a Church Council was created. The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church was one of the best organized and most cohesive non-communist centers in Ukraine8.
1 2 3 4
Ibidem, p. 29. Ibidem. Ibidem. Robert CONQUEST, The Great Terror A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, 1991,
p. 51. IDEM, The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 34. Ibidem, p. 35. 7 Ibidem. 8 Alexander V. YURCENKO, The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church, in Nikolai K. DEKER, Andrei LEBED (eds), Genocide in the USSRcit., p. 173.
6 5
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The Bolsheviks were actually astonished by the level at which Ukrainian nationalism had grown and the complexity of their cultural life. After Lenins death, Stalin took over USSR, through the violent elimination of the other candidates. He also took over the task to tame Ukraine and to put an end to its nationalistic manifestations. The national revival of the cultural, economic and political life of Ukrainians led to the great fear of Stalin to lose Russias sphere of influence over Ukraine1 and might constitute the reason why he wished Ukraines Russfication, even if it came at a high price like mass murder. In a famous letter to Kaganovich, Stalin said that:
At this point the question of Ukraine is the most important. The situation in Ukraine is very bad. If we dont take steps now to improve the situation, we might lose Ukraine. The objective should be to transform Ukraine, in the shortest period of time, into a real fortress of the USSR2.
This is an excerpt of Stalins letter to his close associate Lazar Kaganovich, sent on 11th September 1932. In fact, some say that Stalin was from the very beginning against Ukraine as a nation: Academician Sackharov writes of the Ukrainophobia characteristic of Stalin3. Stalin also allegedly said that the great luck of Ukrainians is that they are too many, which makes destroying the whole of them practically impossible:
Of great significance is Khrushchevs speech at the closed meeting of the Twentieth Party Congress, in which he declared that Stalin of course would have liked to destroy all Ukrainians but could not because the size of the group involved4.
After that, Khrushcew went on to say, in the same speech and with the same irony that:
The Ukrainians escaped this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which they could be sent5.
All these possible reasons make plausible the theory of considering the Ukrainian famine genocide. Lenin put communist ideology first, even if it meant wiping out nations, and Stalin feared Ukrainian nationalism and saw in it a sign that Ukraine might be drifting away from the USSRs sphere of influence. Hypothetically, one
1 Harvest of Despair. The Unknown Holocaust The Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933, documentary, Director: Slavko Nowytski, Produced by: Slavko Nowytski, Yurij Luhovy, the Ukrainian Canadian Research & Documentation Centre (UCRDC) in Toronto, Starring: Jon Granik, Joan Karasevych, Eric Peterson (Documentary Film, 55 min., 1985). 2 http://www.faminegenocide.com/kuryliw/quotations_on_the_famine.htm (consulted on 31.05.2009). 3 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 217. 4 Alexander V. YURCENKO, Genocide through Destruction of National Culture and Sense of Nationality, in Nikolai K. DEKER, Andrei LEBED (eds), Genocide in the USSRcit., p. 18. 5 IDEM, The Ukrainians, in ibidem, pp. 145-146.
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might assume that Stalins next logical step, combined with his open hate for Ukraine, would be to bring Ukrainians to their knees by destroying their national identity, their cultural and political life, their religion and their intellectual elite.
Holodomor vs. the Holocaust: Ukraine Crushing Nationalism and Elites

Holodomor, much like the Holocaust, has a number of facts that demonstrate that it had genocidal characteristics. While the history of the Holocaust is widely known, and the reasons why it is considered genocide have been enumerated on a wide range of occasions, the history of Holodomor and the reasons why it might be considered genocide are much less comprehended. Killings in Ukraine have not been numerous only in the 1932-1933 famine. The death roll in Ukraine after the Bolsheviks came to power was also quite high. In the years before the famine, the Bolshevik regime tried to wipe out nationalistic feelings from the Ukrainian people by undergoing purges of the intellectual elite, imposing Russian language and disbanding the national church. The importance of maintaining each countrys national culture is crucial and this aspect
was stressed in the Preamble to the 1954 Hague Convention (paragraphs 2 and 3), where it is stated that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world1.
The fact that the Bolsheviks were trying to destroy the national identity of Ukrainians might also mean that the famine might not have been a failed attempt to force collectivization, but a successful attempt to crush Ukraine as a whole. After the end of the war with the Ukrainian resistance, the Bolsheviks realized that crushing the cultural life and russifying Ukraine was a complex and difficult task. The first step towards achieving this was to increase the number of publications printed in Russian. In fact, during the years of the consolidation of the Soviet regime in the Ukraine there was an increase in the proportion of publications in Russian2 and sometimes the number of publications in Russian exceeded by far those in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language was drastically modified after several attempts of the Soviets to harmonize it with Russian language. Although the Ukrainian language had been recently revised by a Ukrainian commission of linguistic experts,
a linguistic discussion was arranged by the Deputy Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian SSR, who had been entrusted with the liquidation of nationalism in the system of national education and cultural life of Ukraine. The program was aimed at removal of the entire Ukrainian terminology3.
1 2
Encyclopedia Of Genocide And Crimes Against Humanity, vol. 1, cit., p. 312. Alexander V. YURCENKO, Genocide through Destruction of National Culturecit., Ibidem, p. 12.
p. 11.
3
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The campaign was supervised by Portyshev, a special emissary from the part of the Party Central Committee. The outcome of the linguistic discussion was that Ukrainian lost many of its unique features and was Russified to the maximum:
The Ukrainian orthography [] was drastically altered in 1933, when a number of the laws of Ukrainian phonetics and etymology were violated in order to remove the artificial barriers between the Ukrainian and Russian languages. The result [] ended in the Ukrainian language being deprived of freedom to reflect its special feature [] The action taken against the Ukrainian language was [] systematic linguacide, one of the methods of Communist genocide in the field of culture1.
The next step for the Soviets was to crush the resistance of the Ukrainian people by destroying the most active elements, particularly the Ukrainian intellectuals2. A complex campaign of murder and repression was thus initiated by the Soviet leaders. Mass executions took place mainly in the capital on the country:
The mass extermination of intellectuals in Kiev is also confirmed by Hrushevsky, at one time chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada, who admitted that thousands of Ukrainian intellectuals and young people were executed3.
Apparently, the faith of the Ukrainian intellectuals was decided beforehand because:
Stalin ordered the deaths of about 80% of Ukrainian intelligentsia by 1935. Some see his goal as re-Russifying Ukrainian cities and pastoralising the Ukrainians, directly comparable to Hitlers policy in Poland in 19394.
The repression against the intellectual strata was a long spanned action, comprising three different periods in time: the period of War communism and its campaign against the Ukrainian national forces (1918-1921), the period of socialist reconstruction (1929-1938) and the period following World War II5. The liquidation of the Ukrainian intellectuals has had serious repercussion for the cultural life but also for other interrelated domains of Ukraine. It is also a grave fact because there was no military situation to require it and it was a clear intention of the Soviets to crush opinion holders and elites. At the beginning of the 30s a complex campaign was initiated against the intellectuals. In March 1930, a staged trial was organized, which caused much harm to the intellectuals and to the Church of Ukraine. The date of the trial of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU) coincided with the beginning of the agricultural collectivization. This happened because it was a kill two birds with one
1 2 3 4 5
Ibidem. Alexander V. YURCENKO, The Ukrainians, cit., p. 138. Ibidem, p. 139. Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracycit., p. 327. Alexander V. YURCENKO, The Ukrainians, cit., p. 138.
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stone situation, from the Soviet point of view; crushing both the intellectuals and the peasantry at the same time seemed more effective: At the same time that Stalin made his move to crush the peasantry in 1929-30, he resumed the attack on the Ukraine and its national culture1. The purpose of the trail was to weaken the leaders of the Ukrainian non-communist intelligentsia2. Officially, the trial was held because the SVU allegedly attempted to overthrow the Soviet regime. Robert Conquest also notes that From 9 March to 20 April 1930, a whole cycle of faked cases against Ukrainian personalities began3. During the actual trial, only 45 persons were brought to be judged
although in Kiev alone up to 600 persons were arrested [] One of the prisoners in the camps at Solovki during the 1930s stated that students from Kiev and Ekaterinoslav who reached the camp reported that many SVU members had been executed4.
The trial also served the purpose of liquidating the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church had long been under the watchful eye of the Soviets, receiving its first heavy blow in 1927 when Church leaders (were) accused of counter revolutionary activity and the head of the Church, Metropolitan Lipkovsky, was forbidden to take part in religious work5. After that, on 28th January 1930, in an emergency council, the clergy was obliged to sign a document drafted by the CPU, which provided the dissolution of the Church6. Nevertheless, in 1935 the bishops still remaining at liberty were arrested7. The SVU trial also directly targeted the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Other scientific institutes were also affected and became the direct target for repression:
The most prominent actors, artists, musicians, etc., were declared to be nationalist wreckers and were either executed or dispatched to dig canals or work in the taiga forests8.
Education, the core of any independent state, received a deadly blow when:
In the last eleven months of 1933 [] 4 000 teachers were purged and removed from the schools, as well as the entire staffs of the Ukrainian pedagogical institutes, on grounds of nationalism9.
The fact that they were targeted for their nationalism was a clear sign that the Soviets were trying to bend Ukraine.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 217. Alexander V. YURCENKO, The Ukrainians, cit., p. 142. Robert CONQUEST The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 217. Alexander V. YURCENKO, The Ukrainians, cit., p. 142. IDEM, The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church, cit., p. 172. Ibidem, p. 174. Ibidem. Ibidem, p. 143. Ibidem.
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Some of the corpses of the intellectuals that were eliminated around these periods were found when an investigation of communal graves was set up in the summer of 1943 at Vinnitsa, a village near Kiev. There the bodies of 11-12 000 persons were found who had been executed by the NKVD in 1937-1938. Of these it was estimated that 26% were intellectuals1. The Soviets did not offer any explanation for them, or for any other communal graves with suspiciously many intellectuals found in the following years. Stalin was well aware of what he was doing. The campaign against Ukrainian nationalism, directed against the Ukrainian language, religion and intellectuals, combined with the devastating effects of the famine, would make an interesting conspiracy theory aimed at discovering an evil plan behind Stalins actions. This is yet to be proven, but what is certain is that:
Stalin clearly understood that the essence of Ukrainian nationhood was contained in the intelligentsia who articulated it, but also in the peasant masses who had sustained it over the centuries2.
From this point of view, the campaign against the intellectual core of the group might be presumed intentional and thus analyzed within the UN definition of genocide.
Holodomor The Great Famine

The decimation of the intellectual, political and religious elite of Ukraine was followed by the task of crushing the peasantry. The peasantry accounted as the most numerous group of the entire population of Ukraine. After a short period of relative economic freedom, Stalin decided to implement his 5 year plan, starting with the forced collectivization. The famine was caused by the way in which the collectivization was implemented and it was made worse by the Soviet regime, through special measures: instituting internal passports, the interdiction to leave the country, the interdiction to leave famine affected areas (especially the villages), the law for the protection of state property, refusing external help etc. The goal of the Soviets was well planned out from the beginning:
In fact one of the aims of collectivization in the Ukraine had been officially stated as the destruction of Ukrainian nationalisms social base the individual land-holdings3.
Some believe that the idea of staging a famine through collectivization came a short while after Stalin sent the famous letter to Kaganovich, on 11th September 1932, where he complained that the situation in Ukraine is very bad and something decisive must be done or else there is the risk of losing Ukraine4. After a few meetings, a plan of action was decided.
1 2 3 4
Ibidem, p. 144. Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 219. Ibidem. The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.
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When the first measures of collectivization were imposed, the peasants refused to sell their grain: Not unexpectedly, the peasants, the mass of the population, resisted. At first they merely withheld grain, hoping to push up prices1. The situation was made worse because party activists who hoped to be noticed welcomed the task of conducting collectivization:
There was such an enthusiastic response from party activists that the pace and violence of collectivization escalated into the more disorderly categories [] pogroms and wild deportation2.
Deportation in this period escalated to numbers of a few hundred thousand:

Ultimately, the regime deported in horrendous circumstances more than 2 million peasants, accused of kulak status, from their villages into resettlement areas, while millions of others were herded into collective farms. As a consequence of their brutal and radical uprooting in the early 1930s [] perhaps 300 000 died in deportations3.
The number of people that died is so high because of the horrendous circumstances in which the deportations were made:
The manner of deportations bears all the characteristics of other ethnic cleansings in the twentieth century, including the Holocaust4.
The deportations also had nationalistic accents, beginning with the year 1933 when the regime deported Kuban Cossacks en masse, charging them not only with resistance to socialism but with Ukrainian nationalism5, according to historian Terry Martin. The first year of great hardship for Ukraine was 1931, when the quotas were met with great difficulty. The harvest that year was poor and the quotas irrationally high. In order to fulfill the quotas:
Worker brigades extracted the grain by force, killing those who resisted. Peasants starved; others hoarded their grain, ate their animals, or stole collective farm produce6.
The next years harvest was even poorer: The harvest of 1932 was thus even worse, and the procurements worsened suffering7. Stalin knew very well that the harvest was poor when he set the quota for the year 1932. The fact that the famine was staged and done with a clear intent can be deducted from the facts that surrounded Stalins decision in 1932:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracycit, p. 322. Ibidem, p. 324. Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocidecit., p. 71. Ibidem, p. 81. Ibidem, p. 78. Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracycit, p. 322. Ibidem.
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So, on Stalins insistence, a decree went out which, if enforced, could only lead to starvation of the Ukrainian peasantry. This had been made clear to Moscow by the Ukrainian Communist authorities themselves1.
The decree went out and its effects were devastating. The quota that Stalin set was unreasonable:
In July (1932) [] Stalin had again ordered a delivery target of 7.7 million tons (after bargaining, he lowered it to 6.6 million) out of a harvest which the conditions of collectivization reduced to two thirds of that of 19302.
The first grain requisition was made in August and it left the countryside completely exhausted. The only solution for the peasants was to steal grain form the kolkhozes. The situation got even more desperate when the decree On the safeguarding of state property, drafted by Stalin himself, was enacted on 7th August 1932. The decree stated that:
Offenders against such property (like cattle, standing crops and agricultural produce from kolkhozes) were to be considered enemies of the people, and either be shot or, in extenuating circumstances, imprisoned for not less than ten years, with total confiscation of property3.
The decree was carried out with the outmost rigor and sometimes with unnecessary brutality. Another measure that escalated the mortality rates was the decision to implement an internal passport system on December 27, 1932. The passports were given to most of the people living in towns but no passports were given to the peasants. The stamp in the passport (propiska) became a matter of life and death, a novel form of persecution4. The absence of the stamp can be compared to the Jewish star band the Jewish people were forced to wear. The absence of the stamp and the presence of the band meant almost certain death. Many Ukrainians died right in the railway stations, not being able to flee from the famine affected areas. They were not allowed to cross the border to Russia either. What was even more ironical, in a morbid way, was the fact that while millions were starving to death, the state granaries had plentiful reserves because:
Not all grain was exported or sent to the cities or the army. Local granaries held stock of state reserves. These were for emergencies, such as war: the famine itself was not a sufficient occasion for their release. For example, the warehouses in the Poltava Province are described as almost bursting with grain5.
Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 223. Ibidem, p. 222. 3 Ibidem, p. 184. 4 Robert GELLATELY, Lenin, Stalin and Hitler, The Age of Social Catastrophe, published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007, p. 232. 5 Ibidem, p. 235.
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Often, grain was piled up to rot in the middle of the streets, but was guarded under strict surveillance by the OGPU men. The children were also a target of merciless Soviet policies:
A whole generation of rural children, in the USSR as a whole, but especially in Ukraine, was destroyed or maimed [] in the perspective of the countrys future, both the shrinkage of a generation and the experiences of the survivors have effects which are still felt1.
Most children had become orphans because of the famine that claimed their parents. They were called bezpeizornie, wandered the streets of many big cities, including Moscow, and were not a pretty sight for foreign visitors. In order to tackle this problem, Stalin authorized the shooting of children from the age of twelve2. There were also childrens labor camps that is prison camps, to which a child might be formally sentenced3. The Soviet leaders, and even Stalin, knew very well what was happening in Ukraine, but did nothing and even refused external help. For example:
Mikhail Sholokhov, honored author of And Quiet Flows the Don, wrote to Stalin to protest this treatment of the respected tillers of the soil. Stalin riposted: The respected tillers of the soilhave conducted sabotage and would not have any qualms about leaving the working class and the Red Army without bread [] a quiet war against the Soviet power, a war to starve us out, comrade Sholokhov4.
Actually, this is another strategy of the perpetrators of genocide, to place the blame on their victims and claim that they are the ones being persecuted. Extensive measures were taken in order for the word of the famine to not get out. It was forbidden to write in the press about it and:
Doctors, who were state employees, put down all sorts of diseases as the causes of death [] by the winter of 1932-33 death certificates no longer appear5.
Because of these measures, the total number of the victims is very hard to be approximated. Nevertheless, most people agree with Nicolas Werths numbers, who estimates a total of six million deaths in the 1932-33 famine6. Michael Mann observes that:
Killings also contained ethnic undercurrents. Famine and deportations were unevenly distributed by region [] Famine and deportations also fell more heavily on the Ukraine than elsewhere7,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrowcit, p. 283. The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film. Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 290. Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracycit., p. 322. Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrowcit., p. 250. Robert GELLATELY, Lenin, Stalin and Hitlercit., p. 235. Michael MANN The Dark Side of Democracycit., p. 327.
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where the number of victims is estimated to be between 4-5 million. Also highly affected by the famine was the Kuban area, which has a large population of Ukrainians. The fact that the most affected areas were inhabited by Ukrainians can also be considered proof for the intent to crush Ukrainian nationalism through a large scale famine. Kazakhstan lost approximately one million people in the famine, and another million died in the North Caucasus and Black Earth area. Ukraine lost the most people and it is considered a special case among the former Soviet republics.
Conclusion
It is very hard to draw a relevant conclusion on the whole case of whether or not Holodomor should also be considered genocide and should receive the same legal framework as the Holocaust, because there are many more aspects to be considered and more evidence is needed. A proper conclusion on the matter can only be drawn after Russia releases all the documents and statistics related to the 1932/1933 famine. Nevertheless, there are undeniable facts that cannot be overlooked. The Ukrainian famine has received considerably less attention from the international community than the Holocaust, although they have both been large scale catastrophes. The only pressure on Russia to declassify information comes from Ukraine and the Ukrainian Diaspora (notably Canada), and very little from international legal bodies. Maybe it is time to review the UN definition of genocide so as to better reflect the tragedies that left millions upon millions of people dead in the XXth century and it is only fair that Russia makes the first step.
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IOAN STANOMIR Aprarea libertii. 1938-1947

Curtea Veche, Bucureti, 2010, 190 pp. Volumul de fa vine n continuarea altor analize ale lui Ioan Stanomir dedicate istoriei mentalitilor n spaiul autohton care pentru autor are dou ramificaii: cea a evoluiei instituiilor politice i cea a gnditorilor politici. De regul autorii care i-au dezvoltat n timp un aparat critic referitor la analiza instituiilor politice nu au ca obiect i prezentarea gnditorilor, viceversa fiind la fel de valabil. Ioan Stanomir reprezint fericita excepie, exersnd instrumentarul analitic n ambele direcii, cu egal pricepere. Stau mrturie pentru prima direcie Naterea Constituiei. Limbaj i drept n Principate pn la 1866, Libertate, lege i drept. O istorie a constituionalismului romnesc, respectiv pentru cea din urm Contiina conservatoare. Preliminarii la un profil intelectual, Eminescu: tradiia ca profeie politic, Despre sunete i memorie. Fragmente de istoria ideilor, pentru a aminti doar cteva din contribuiile autorului aprute n ultima vreme. Acest volum reprezint o cotitur n tipul de reflecie practicat de Ioan Stanomir, o anumit perioad istoric fiind simultan analizat att din perspectiva evoluiei instituiilor, ct i a gnditorilor care au reflectat la evenimentele cuprinse n cadrul perioadei studiate, o reflecie care pornete de la cotidian pentru a-l deschide nspre marile teme ale filosofiei politice. ntrebarea pe care i-o pune autorul i creia reuete s i dea un rspuns pe msur este n ce fel raportarea la tema libertii a nceput i s-a dezvoltat n condiii istorice precare, marcate de ascensiunea unor regimuri nedemocratice care culmineaz cu instaurarea unui regim totalitar n 1947. Sunt folosite scrieri publicate n acea perioad, precum i scrieri care au putut vedea lumina
tiparului abia dup 1990. Ioan Stanomir creioneaz patru portrete de atitudini intelectuale, reunite sub chipul exemplar al refuzului tiraniei: Iuliu Maniu, Nicolae Carandino, Mihail Frcanu i Grigore T. Popa. Desigur, ne-am putea ntreba cum a fost fcut aceast selecie, de ce doar aceti autori i nu alii, etc. Rspunsul este chiar demersul folosit de Ioan Stanomir pentru a schia profilul unei epoci: numai suma fragmentelor selectate fr a face o ordine auto-impus poate s ofere imaginea n oglind a trecutului. Istoria ideilor politice nu este astfel pentru Ioan Stanomir o sum anodin de evenimente i cri, ci o realitate vie, organic tocmai datorit fragmentaritii sale. Volumul nu prezint gnditorii n ordinea cronologic strict a scrierilor lor, ci intercaleaz prezentarea autorilor cu cea a momentelor decisive care au punctat perioada supus analizei. ntre Iuliu Maniu i ceilali autori exist un capitol intitulat August 1944: Fantasma libertii. Moment decisiv care a creat iluzia restaurrii democraiei i libertii de gndire antebelice, iluzie care nu a contaminat ns dect o minoritate i pentru o perioad de timp limitat. Stau mrturie cronicarii acelor vremi, dintre care exemplificm doar cu nume precum Annie Bentoiu, Pericle Martinescu, Virgil Gheorghiu. Lecturnd capitolul dedicat lui Iuliu Maniu, descoperim cu plcut surpriz n omul politic un gnditor pe msur. Ioan Stanomir a avut rbdarea s se aplece asupra mai multor texte ale lui Iuliu Maniu care au ca numitor comun denunarea defectelor regimului autoritar al lui Carol al II-lea instituit prin Constituia din 1938. Descoperim un Maniu profund ataat democraiei care cunoate i folosete exemplar n scris
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diferenele ntre democraie i un regim autoritar pe care l eticheteaz cu inspirata denumire de stat patrimonial. Reine, de asemenea, atenia felul n care Iuliu Maniu trateaz problema autonomiei locale prin atacul la adresa centralismului promovat de noul pact constituional. Ioan Stanomir consider c articolele publicate de Nicolae Carandino n intervalul dintre 23 august 1944 i instaurarea regimului comunist relev tensiunea dintre dou antifascisme care i disput supremaia n cmpul intelectual: cel al comunitilor i cel democratic. Carandino deplnge absena culturii politice pe care o vede ca fiind opusul politicianismului, o tem rar exploatat n epoc dar mai ales folosete constant, n sensul lor universal admis astzi, noiuni precum libertate sau democraie; o virtute care pare n vremurile noastre a fi demonetizat dar care n contextul epocii marca o noutate de limbaj. Refleciile despre democraie ale lui Carandino au fost la momentul respectiv contra curentului i rezist trecerii timpului, cptnd o valoare de ntrebuinare mereu actual. Referina lui Carandino la Benjamin Constant ntr-un text publicat n 1947 este pus n valoare de Ioan Stanomir, marcnd un destin intelectual singular, constant contra curentului prin afirmarea unor principii. Mihail Frcanu este analizat de Ioan Stanomir mai ales din perspectiva Scrisorilor ctre tineretul romn publicate n 1946. O lucrare care ilustreaz vigoarea noului discurs antitotalitar. O pledoarie pentru libertate, contrapus colectivismului, negrii persoanei. Frcanu dezvolt o teorie a libertii care l situeaz n aceeai linie de gndire cu autorii clasici, iar Ioan Stanomir are meritul de a fi scos la suprafa aceste scrieri i de a le fi pus n contextul mai larg al perioadei istorice respective, privit ca un laborator de creaie prin care istoria ideilor politice ajunge i depete un moment de inflexiune. Remarcabil n acest texte este
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i desprirea de totalitarism, ntr-o perioad n care acest termen nu avea conotaiile exclusiv negative de astzi: Frcanu nu ezit s afirme c postulatul real al totalitarismului este astfel inegalitatea de esen a oamenilor, suprai subordonarea lor potrivit unor criterii tribale. Ultimul autor care marcheaz sfritul acoladei ce premerge instaurarea regimului comunist este n viziunea lui Ioan Stanomir profesorul de anatomie Grigore T. Popa. O alegere care ilustreaz cel mai fidel intenia autorului acestei cri de a creiona profilul unei epoci prin raportri diversificate la tendinele sociale i istorice. Un gnditor pe nedrept ignorat este repus n circuitul valorilor intelectuale care resping colectivismul de orice natur. ntr-o perioad a transformrilor radicale, Grigore T. Popa se ridic mpotriva revoluiilor. n plin ascendent al stngii totalitare, acelai Grigore T. Popa refuz explicit marxismul. Ioan Stanomir reface cu iscusit abilitate stilistic i cu o desvrit rigoare a scriiturii portretul unui personaj care i face o deviz din felul de a se pune contra curentului, prin afirmarea unor valori care transcend orizontul istoric, o dovad a acestui comportament demn i lucid fiind conferina Morala cretin i timpurile actuale din aprilie 1947. ntr-o perioad n care rezultatul deformat al alegerilor din 1946 dovedise falsul ataament la democraie practicat de comuniti, Grigore T. Popa nu ezit s continue a promova aceleai valori pe care le-a afirmat fr rezerve i constant n spaiul public. Patru portrete de gnditori politici care elogiaz virtuile libertii ntr-un timp istoric total nefavorabil. Patru posibiliti diferite de a dovedi puterea cuvntului n contra tiraniei de orice culoare politic. Un numr finit care se contrapune nelimitatelor posibiliti de a nega libertatea. Ioan Stanomir are meritul ca prin aceast carte s fi reuit s arate
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altfel le-am fi ignorat, exacerbnd eronat triumful, fie i temporar, al gndirii captive. RADU CARP
c perioada de tranziie de la democraie la totalitarism a fost marcat n spaiul autohton de numeroase voci lucide care au fcut posibil continuarea gndirii libere n forme de exprimare pe care
DAVID A. BLUMENTHAL, TIMOTHY L.H. McCORMACK (eds) The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance?
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2008, 337 pp. Winston Churchill once stated that the whole history of the world is summed up in the fact that, when nations are strong, they are not always just, and when they wish to be just, they are no longer strong. The case of postWorld War II Germany seems to be an excellent example in point of the former British Prime-Ministers hypothesis, with the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal establishing itself as one of the most significant milestones in the development of public international criminal law, as well as a case of a victorious camp imposing law and justice to the losing camp. It is from this perspective, hence, that the extent to which these contributions can be considered to be entirely positive advancements in the pursuit of justice and law when applied to different contexts than the German one, is one on which some of the contributors to this book remain precautious in assessing. Published in 2008, The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance, originated from a seminar organized by the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, held on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Nuremberg trials which, as all major anniversaries, prompt(ed) particular pause for reflection (p. xxi). The seminar gathered both scholars and
practitioners of law with extensive knowledge and experience in important humanitarian and international criminal trials, such as those of East Timor, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Therefore, the papers submitted as parts of this volume provide the readers not only with historical background information on the context and the implications of the Nuremberg trials, but also with an indepth analysis of its consequences to the subsequent development of international law, to the conceptualization of the war of aggression and to coming to terms with the past through collective memory, simultaneously putting these implications into perspective with a determination to ground [their] evaluations in the present and the future (p. xxii). In order to do, the last two parts of the book are dedicated to examining the impact of the new theoretical and institutional frameworks determined by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal on other significant cases throughout the world, such as the one of Timor Lestes Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, East Timors International Tribunal, Sierra Leones Special Court, the Iraqi High National Tribunal, the International Criminal Court after the entry into force of the
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Rome Statute of 2002 and finally, that of the Australian case of implementation of international criminal law. To begin with, The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance proceeds by encompassing the Nuremberg Trial into a special historical context, with William Maleys rather narrative and descriptive depiction of The Atmospherics of the Nuremberg Trial being one of the most interesting parts of the book, although perhaps disappointingly brief. The Australian political scientist and diplomat not only introduces us to the logics and mechanisms of the legal procedures behind the setting of the trial, but also successfully provides a novel and captivating portrayal of the personalities involved. A second contribution to rooting the Nuremberg trials in a historical context although more retrospectively is this time made by a German author, Susanne Karstedt, who explains and examines the psychological impact of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal over the German public opinion and collective memory, with particular focus on how reconciliation and recovery can be achieved in post-war and post-conflict situation (p. 15). On this note, an interesting remark is that she maintains that the German public found the victors justice just and fair, and supported the way it was done as well as the final outcome (p. 19), basing her assumption on the results of an opinion poll of April 1947, in a statement which is quite contrary to popular belief that the collective German memory after the Second World War may have been resentful to the Nuremberg Tribunal. Finally, she concludes that international tribunals like the Nuremberg Tribunal are extraordinarily important in recovering and clarifying the truth and changing perceptions of identities, in the short as well as in the long run (p. 34), thus
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advocating for the positive, civilizing influence of those trials. The second part of the book is comprised of a series of contributions which all underline the fundamental importance of conceptualizing and institutionalizing criminal responsibility, particularly in and from the perspective of the Nuremberg events. On this note, chapter three focuses on the retributive approach to justice, by evaluating the extent to which reconciliation is actually achieved after a trial. From this perspective, Graham Blewitt, the author, uses his practical experience at the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia and a brief analogy with the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda in order to firmly advocate for the positive legacy of the Nuremberg trials which have contributed to the development of the human race by achieving another step in becoming more civilized (p. 46 ) and thus pleading that the retributive approach to violations of humanitarian international law [is not] incompatible with a restorative approach to justice, but rather complementary to it (p. 46). Another interesting chapter of The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutional Vengeance is the fifth. Written by the Australian journalist, investigator and writer Mark Aarons and provocatively entitled Justice Betrayed: Post-1945 Responses to Genocide this section portrays the attitude of the public opinion and of the international community regarding the events of the Holocaust in rather cold tonalities. The author argues that the immediate postwar discussion about the Holocaust tended to focus on the administrative and technological efficiency of the Nazi state in planning and carrying out the vast enterprise of locating, concentrating and killing its millions of victims (p. 78) while overlooking the responsibility and passivity of the rest of the world. From
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the most significant such contributions was the fundamental principle of individual criminal responsibility [which] has since become an unassailable foundation of international criminal law (p. 103). Quite interestingly, the authors Michael J. Kelly and Timothy L.H. McCormack, also mention that the Nuremberg Tribunal was neither the first such attempt of establishing a specific institution to deal with war crimes the idea was contemplated at the end of the First World War as well nor was it the only post-Second World War time that war criminals were brought to justice the Tokyo Tribunal being a further example in point. Moreover, the second contribution of the Nuremberg trials was a conceptual one, as its Charters article 6 established and declared three categories of international crime: war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace (p. 105), as well as conspiracy and the crime of aggression, therefore making the war of aggression illegal, as opposed to its previous neutral status preserved by the Westphalian Treaty that promoted state sovereignty. Finally, a massive part of the book is devoted to analyzing the Australian implementation of International Criminal Law and to what extent it has been influenced by the procedural standards and legislative conceptualization of the Nuremberg model. Perhaps the most representative example in point is that of the manner in which Australia tried its Japanese war criminals which began in November 1945 and continued until mid 1951 (p. 240). The author, Michael Carrel argues that the Japanese war criminals were guilty of murdering civilians as well as over 8000 Australian POWs and they were prosecuted at an international level at the Tokyo Tribunal for major crimes and at a national level for minor crimes. The influence of the Nuremberg Tribunal is obvious here, as the terminology was adopted from
this perspective of collective memory, he further analyzes the cases of East Timor and Indonesia, which in the aftermath of genocide determined the same passive attitudes he even characterizes as complicity (p. 86) of the international community. Separating himself from the previous stream of writings on the positive legacies of the Nuremberg trials, Aarons states the past six decades were characterized by indifference on the international arena, until the entry into force of the Rome Statute, which subsequently established an International Criminal Court. Nevertheless, in spite of acknowledging the fundamental impact of the International Criminal Court, he identifies some of the weaknesses of the International Criminal Court in the final part of his paper, such as its lack of independence, its limited power of initiative, the veto power granted to the Security Council which enables them to prevent any trials that would be inconvenient to the majority of its members, as well as its rigorous view on the nature of the crimes and criminals which may be brought in front of this court and the ratione temporis regulation according to which all criminal charges must have been committed on or after July 1st, when the Statute came into force (p. 94). Consequently, Nuremberg represented the end of the notion of unlimited national sovereignty, a new international set of norms of conduct becoming applicable, compliance with superior orders ceased to be a defense and after Nuremberg, the illegality of aggressive war was well established (p. xiii-xiv). These are but a few of the crucial changes that the Nuremberg Tribunal brought about and which are further identified and explained in the third section of the present volume, which focuses on the fundamental legal principles that came into being with, and/or after the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. One of
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its Charter the major crimes were referring to crimes against peace and the crime of aggression, whereas the so-called minor crimes were the crimes against humanity, covering a wide range of dreadful crimes (p. 245). It is within this second category that Australia played a significant role conducting 300 trials against 807 individuals, of which 579 were convicted on one or more charges and 137 were sentenced to death and executed (p. 245). A further interesting fragment deals with the allegations that these trials were imposed by the ones who were victorious in the war against those who had lost, under the more commonly referred to syntagm of the victors justice which also implies that justice was militarily imposed and sometimes a mere excuse for institutionalizing vengeance. The Australian case is no exception, as it was also conducted by the Australian Army which investigated, prosecuted and punished the war crimes committed by the Japanese, without any civilian supervision, granting numerous death sentences and suddenly declaring
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that the obedience of superior orders was no longer to be recognized as a defense to war criminal a matter entirely inexistent and contrary to the Japanese military doctrine until that moment. Finally, and in spite of all these limitations and constraints which may be applicable to many of the International Criminal Tribunals established in the after-math of war and/or genocide throughout the world, the authors conclude that the most significant legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal was the establishment of an international rule of law (p. 325), institutionally embodied in the recently founded International Criminal Court. On the whole, The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance stands out as a very thorough legal and scientific analysis, covering a wide range of topics and cases in a neutral, reportorial style, rendering it as one of the most significant contributions to the study of international criminal law. CRISTINA MANOLACHE
NORMAN M. NAIMARK Stalins Genocides

Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2010, 163 pp. Norman M. Naimarks book, is a bold attempt, perhaps the boldest since Robert Conquests ground breaking works, at labeling soviet crimes genocides. Norman M. Naimark is the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies at Stanford University and one of the most respected authorities on the Soviet era. His latest work, Stalins Genocides, is often described as being a lucid analysis of the Stalinist terrors1, a simply outstanding attempt at explaining the most significant aspect of Stalins rulemass terror2 and an overall eye-opening literary experience.
1 Simon SEBAG MONTEFIORE, http:// press.princeton.edu/titles/9278.html (accesed on 14.02.2011). 2 Jan T. GROSS, http://press.princeton. edu/titles/9278.html (accessed on 14.02.2011)
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prove and by the fact that Stalin had a rational motive for the murders5. The first thing that stands out in Naimarks most recent work is the title, Stalins Genocides. Why not Soviet Genocides? Well, as Naimark explains in the introduction of the book, To place Stalin at the center of the genocide question is not meant as a way of excluding social, political, economic, and ideological determinants of mass killing in the Soviet Union in the 1930s (p. 14). Placing Stalin in the position of the main perpetrator is a conscious effort that does not exclude the theory of personal dictatorship or the responsibility of the tens of thousands of accomplices of genocide. It does, however, make a statement on the extensive role that Stalin had in the soviet mass murders: Stalin made a huge difference, and it is Stalins role in mass killing that is essential in understanding the genocidal character of his regime (p. 14). Moreover, As the result of Stalins rule in the 1930s and early 1940s, many millions of innocent people were shot, starved to death, or died in detention and exile. It is long since time to consider this story an important chapter in the history of genocide (p. 2). In his attempt to demonstrate that Stalins crimes were genocide and not mass murder, Naimark describes in the first chapter of his book the events leading up to coining the controversial6
But even more than this, Naimarks book is an undeniable proof that scholars will continue to pressure the Russian nation and even push the international community to acknowledge what has become evident in recent years: Stalin committed genocide and theres no way around it. Nevertheless, the simple act of accepting this phrase as being true will inevitably bring about a whole new set of issues with which the Russian government is not yet, I think, willing to deal with. Why is an international recognition of Stalins crimes as genocidal acts so important? Naimark answers this question himself, in an interview for Stanford University3, regarding Stalins Genocides: Its extremely important, I think, for the health of the Russian nation, the Ukrainian nation, to come to terms with these things that happened in the past so that they can go on and say okay, were not going to those things anymore. In a nutshell, Naimark strives to broaden Raphael Lemkins definition of genocide, as taken from the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide4, in order to include also social and political groups. He states that, although everybody seems to agree that the term genocide applies in the case of the Holocaust, in the case of the mass murders perpetrated by Stalin, very few are keen to accept the same. One of the difficulties comes from the fact that intent to kill a specific group from Stalins part is extremely hard to
3 http://europe.stanford.edu/news/ norman_naimark_redefines_genocide_ 20100928/ (accessed on 14.02.2011). 4 The UN convention defines genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial religious group, as such.
5 Because Stalin killed in the name of the higher ideals of socialism and human progress, it is sometimes argued, his cannot be equated with the base motives of historys other twentieth-century genocidaires, who killed for no other reason than the perceived otherness of ethnic or religious groups (p. 5) 6 Many scholars have argued at some point or other in time that the UN definition of genocide has many flaws. As Erick D.
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definition of the term genocide in 1948. The author argues that The specific language of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 1948 is frequently cited as the reason why Stalins crimes cannot be considered genocide (p. 15), meaning that Stalins victims were neither a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. They were a political, social group, but these groups are not mentioned in the UN definition of genocide, and not because it would make the definition too broad or untrue. The reason behind the omission is that in the negotiations preceding the Convention, the Soviet Union, its allies and some of the other countries7 forced the exclusion of these categories. They feared that their policies toward the peasantry and political opponents could be then considered genocide. The omission of these categories is somewhat ironical in the sense that Raphael Lemkin, who first coined the term genocide, included in his first draft of the definition also crimes against social or political entities (p. 16). In the second chapter of the book, The Making of a Genocidaire, Naimark attempts to shed some light on how and why did Stalin become such a merciless murderer. He uses recent declassified
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Weitz argues in A Century of Genocide-Utopias of Race and Nation, Princeton University Press, 2005, when speaking about this topic, Nearly everyone who considers the definition finds it insufficient for one reason or another. It manages to be at the same time both too broad and too narrow. 7 According to the New York Times, countries like Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Iran, and South Africa were worried that they could be accused of genocide if they fought against domestic political insurgencies by revolutionary groups (p. 22).
documents from the Soviet party and Central Committee and biographies of Stalin in order to explain his mentality, and his willingness to use mass killing to achieve his aims8. Stalins life seems to be marked with grief and losses: he was beaten as a child by both his parents, his first wife, Ekaterina (Kato) Svanidze, died in 1908, soon after the birth of their son Iakov, his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, committed suicide in 1932 (p. 34) and his close confederate Sergei Kirov was assassinated in December 1934 (p. 34). Nevertheless, there is no single key to understanding Stalins violence in the 1930s, but rather as is so often the case in the history of genocide a perfect storm of factors intersected that brought Stalin to engage in the mass murder of millions (p. 35). This perfect storm was a dangerous mix made up by Stalins violent character, his desire to succeed in the Bolshevik party, his belief in the communist utopia and the example he had from Lenin, a violent leader himself. As for the part of responsibility, there is not doubt, in Naimarks view, that Stalin knew, approved and encouraged mass killings, We now have scores of declassified documents demonstrating that Stalin himself signed hundreds of arrest lists, checked off on the death sentences in most of them, constantly encouraged his underlings to carry out the highest penalty (death), and criticized others for misplaced softness and lack of vigilance against so-called enemies of the people (p. 30). The third chapter is a detailed account of the dekulakization campaign of Stalin that left hundreds of thousands of people dead in death camps disguised as forced labor camps. The
http://www.rorotoko.com/index.php/ article/norman_naimark_book_interview_ stalin_genocides/P1/ (accessed on 13.02.2011).
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deportations, the inhuman conditions in labor camps, they all led to full scale genocide against the peasantry. The forth chapter of Naimarks book describes another instance where Stalin made himself responsible for genocide: the Holodomor (the Great Famine). The Great Famine struck at the beginning of the 1930s many areas of the Soviet Union, but fell more heavily on Ukraine and the Kuban area (inhabited also by Ukrainians). This happened because, the Ukrainian peasantry was also doubly suspect to the center: as peasants, who were considered inherently counterrevolutionary and hopelessly backward by the Bolsheviks, and as Ukrainians, whose nationalism and attachment to their distinctiveness grated on Stalin and the Kremlin leadership (p. 72). Millions of people starved to death in 1932-33 because of the high grain requisition quotas imposed by the Russian government. The problem that Naimark rightly identifies is whether Stalin crushed the Ukrainian pesantry because they were kulaks or because they were Ukrainian? Stalin is believed to be responsible for the gravity of the Ukrainian famine not only because he knew about it and did nothing to help, but also, as Naimark points out, because he imposed measures to make it worse: he sealed the borders between Russia and Ukraine so that people were not able to flee from famine affected areas. He also imposed a law that forbid the Ukrainian peasants to go to the cities, where some food still available. There is not a lot of evidence that Stalin himself ordered the Ukrainian killer famine, but there is every reason to believe he knew about it, understood what was happening, and was completely indifferent to the fate of the victims. This may not be enough evidence to convict him in an international court of justice
two major Bolshevik wars against the peasantry (the first in 1919-1922 and the second in 1928-1933) triggered by forced collectivization and expropriation, killed many more. The primary means by which the countryside would be transformed into collective farms was a radical one could maintain genocidal attack on the socalled kulaks (p. 55) because Stalin set out to eliminate them as a group rather than a class. Also, knowledge about what was happening in the countryside was widespread among soviet officials, as Naimark points out, Certainly at the middle level of Soviet officialdom, conscientious observers understood that something was seriously wrong. Kulaks including their families were dying by the tens of thousands from hunger, typhus, and a variety of diseases induced by inhuman living standards and widespread famine (p. 63). As dekulakization has been described by the UN as an ineffective policy of communist government, the question is whether this inaction of the decision making officials can be considered genocidal or not. Naimark suggests that it can, because Stalin surely knew and understood that these conditions were ubiquitous and that the kulak population of the special settlements was being decimated month after month by the horrid conditions in which they lived [] His indifference to this suffering and dying was certainly murderous, if not genocidal (p. 63). The terror by quota9, the Gulag, the infamous Order 0044710, the forced
9 Setting of quotas for arrests and killings in the various regions. 10 Authorized the rounding up of any remaining extraneous outsiders in Soviet towns and cities and socially harmful elements (p. 67) meaning basically anyone who opposed or hindered the system.
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as a genocidaire, but that does not mean the event itself cannot be judged as genocide, concludes Naimark. The Ukrainians were not the only people that would have to suffer because of Stalin. In the fifth chapter of the book, Removing Nations, Naimark describes the Soviet attack and forced resettlement of several nationalities, like the Poles, Germans and Koreans. These attacks also have some genocidal characteristics. Naimark mentions also the Katyn massacre, when 21 857 Polish officers and men were murdered at the orders of Stalin and Beria. He calls the Katyn massacre the most unambiguous cases of genocide in the history of the twentieth century (p. 92). In the case of Stalins attack on the Chechens-Ingush and the Crimean Tatars, Naimark suggests that it should be called, at the very least, a case of cultural genocide. The Great Purge of 1936-1938, detailed in the 6th chapter, is the weakest case for being classified as an act of genocide because no particular ethnic, social, or political groups were attacked (p. 100). Repression was chaotically and sporadically aimed at basically anybody who was considered a real or potential threat to Stalin and therefore to the USSR. Nevertheless, the arrests and mass killing during the purges were driven less by the real threats to Soviet security than by Stalins xenophobia and paranoia. Without Stalin, the genocidaire, it is hard to imagine the Great Terror (p. 120). The Crimes of Stalin and Hitler, the 7th chapter, is perhaps the most illuminating, and from which the international community should take notes. Naimark calls upon a new vision of perceiving and labeling genocide, by seeing beyond the UN definition and letting go of the Holocaust uniqueness syndrome.
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But perhaps it is time to stop asking the question whether the group that is being murdered in whole or in part is a national, ethnic, and religious group, or whether it is a social, political, or economic group. What is, after all, the difference when it comes to human life? (p. 125) says Naimark. As a conclusion Naimark points out what many think but few have had the courage to say: Hitler and Stalin are alike in more than one way. Stalins culpability for mass murder is not unlike that of Hitlers [] Both destroyed their countries and societies, as well as vast numbers of people inside and outside their own states. Both in the end were genocidaires, says Naimark, paving the way, hopefully, for a new understanding of genocide and its makers. Naimarks book is first and foremost a sign that the time might have come to revise the definition of genocide in order to include the soviet crimes. Incidentally or not, a short while after this book was published, the Russian Parliament admitted that Stalin was directly responsible for the execution of approximately 22 000 Polish nationals in the Katyn massacre of AprilMay 1940. As Naimark observes, in a cover interview on November 3rd, 2010, Even the President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, has called for an end to making excuses for Stalins mass killing of Soviet citizens11. Is it enough? No. Is step in the right direction? Yes, definitely. ALEXANDRA ILIE
http://www.rorotoko.com/index.php/ article/norman_naimark_book_interview_ stalin_genocides/P1/ (accessed on 14.02.2011).
11
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BOGDAN MURGESCU Romnia si Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice

Editura Polirom, Iai, 2010, 524 pp. It is always difficult to surmise on what will be a great book judging only by the rumors about it, but Bogdan Murgescus proves the point excellently: not surprisingly, the book we have before our years, and which took twelve of hard work to complete, is perhaps the best Romanian academic writing for 2010. What strikes one first is the sheer scope and seeming broadness of the academic task: to put down on paper the economic history of Romania (or the areas known today under this label) in the last five centuries in a comparative analysis. Although collecting data is sometimes more difficult than statistically handling it, one should give credit to Bogdan Murgescus painstaking effort given the fact that two great economic historians, Paul Bairoch and Angus Maddison, have tried the same quantitative scheme on the whole of Europe for the same period studied by Professor Murgescu. However, the clear hindsight on every particular economic detail is clearly set out from the beginning and highly trustworthy only for the last two hundred years, ever since the unfettered surge of the Industrial Revolution had begun. I have mentioned above the soundness of the comparative analysis: Professor Murgescu pinpoints a number of other states at the periphery of Europe, smallsized in terms of territory and population and none of them ever constituted in a ruling empire, similar to Romania, to offer a good case of comparison: Denmark, Ireland and Serbia. All four of them were basically agricultural societies at the onset of the nineteenth century, all passed through a phase of small-scale industrialization and none of them was massively industrial prior to First World
War. What is Bogan Murgescus trying to achieve in this lengthy book has been mentioned en passant in the very title: how come that, with the advent of modernity and onward, there has been an increase in development levels between a small number of countries, coming mainly from Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, and the rest of the world, the downtrodden many which were not able to pierce through the industrial age and deliver its overt benefits to their whole societies? To this web of queries Bogdan Murgescu sets his analysis as a future example for further interests in the same overall assessment. Before delving into the book, there is one more thing worth articulating: Professor Murgescus neutral and confident-looking style is based on a mountain heap of data, which took a decade to thread together in the fabric of his latest work. This information makes the text look inexpugnable since every line of it carries not a personal reflection or a rhetorical pirouette (which is the case for many other historians), but a solid down to earth analysis which looks mainly at the economic efficiency, the social layers, the educational development of each study-case, mostly using the hermeneutical tools provided by the historians hinted to in the second paragraph. The books is mainly structured in five sections, each taking a quarter of the overall book: the early modern period, that is before the 1800s, the long nineteenth century (1815-1914), the interwar period, the post-1945 age and the time which flowed after the fall of communism (this last section is briefly
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seen through, although extremely well written). The first section is covered in charts, tables and a myriad of other statistical accoutrement, mainly designed to suit any reluctant mindsets. Hence, how did the four countries look like shortly after 1800? Professor Murgescu highlights first and foremost the importance of a readymade state apparatus as a necessary prerequisite of a good development variable. Unfortunately, only Denmark possessed a state apparatus and was not political subject to any overwhelming nearby neighbor. At the same time, the Weberian religious confession is not considered by Bogdan Murgescu as being tantamount to necessary development: the Protestant ethic might have existed, but the Danish large landholders were not capitalist before the nineteenth century. As for the Catholics in Transylvania or the Anglicans in the North of Ireland (Ulster), we should not forget that they benefited from special political protection from the Habsburg Empire and the British one, respectively. Even if religion does play a significant part in the process of development, there are other key issues to be taken into consideration. Among these, the most important is the agricultural productivity, which lies behind the doubling of Europes population between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the extensive character of the development process stood in the way of major breakthroughs, the new agricultural techniques benefited tremendously to the general progress. The population density increased to about 30 or 40 inhabitants on a square kilometer, preparing the way for the future industrial high productivity. Out of the three historical regions of modern day Romania, the most developed was Walachia, while Transylvania, despite being part of a Central European Empire, was one of its
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backward areas, with a city life stuck in the fifteenth century. The Ottoman Empire did not lag much behind the economic efficiency of Western counterparts. As we move on into the nineteenth century, the social landscape changes beyond recognition. The population more than doubles in a century, the technological progress is astounding, new trade routes on the hinterland are opened because of the cobweb of railways eating up time and space across unseen distances, the city life flourishes, while the gross domestic product of Europe was at its highest in the world before 1914. Political independence and the establishment of the nation-state are responsible partly for the success, yet other social institutions, such as private funded universities and technical schools, professional associates and bodies are to be taken seriously as well. Trade is also an important element, while the accumulation of capital due to the increased rates of exports is an adamant condition for the future reshaping of different industrial braches corresponding to the changes on the larger world market (Denmarks case is, again, the best possible scenario for a good development). However, as for Ireland, which lost millions of its folk in emigration leakages to America after the Great Famine of the 1840s, this meant stagnation for many decades to come. In conclusion, the historical determinants accumulated in time had a decisive effect for maintaining Romania, Serbia and Ireland at the economic periphery of Europe; on the other hand, however, the political elites have understood lately and in one perspective the real economic troubles of these countries, while the policies they supported have been in most cases anachronic (too late), inadequate and inefficient (p. 204). After the onslaught of the First World War, which hit most of the countries
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with low rates of productivity (because of low technological input), an urban population below the European average rate of urban dwellers (not more than 21% of the entire population), an infant mortality rate which was the highest on the continent (179/1000 infants died in the first year) and an illiteracy rate of 43% of the Romanian population as of 1930. The services sector was beyond anyones reckoning, since it hardly existed. However, in spite of all these grievances, Romania managed to develop significantly from what was before 1914. Nonetheless, the same situation is to be observed in the rest of countries analyzed by Professor Murgescu, enlarging the economic and developmental discrepancies in the aftermath of the war. One important popular myth debunked by Bogdan Murgescu is the so-called granary of Europe hypotheses, a nickname for the Great Romania of 1918-1939. Not only did Romania produce around 10% of the total agricultural exports of Europe at that time, but its dependency on agricultural products testifies to the existence of a backward agrarian economy and society. This was far from being the case in Ireland and Denmark, but was quite similar to the situation in the more industrialized Yugoslavia (although with differences from the Romania case). Romania was lagging behind in terms of economic development rates even in comparison to the world average of the time. Professor Murgescus overall assessment of the interwar period busts another nationalistic myth which portrays the period in exhilarating rosy colors. As for the long stretch of time which separates our contemporary period from 1945, the economic analysis of the dark totalitarian regimes, Professor Murgescu emphasizes both positive and negative aspects. There was a certain catch-up growth in Eastern Europe due to the massive process of industrialization and
analyzed by Professor Murgescu (with the exception of Ireland) and especially Romania (in terms of resources wasted or human losses), the prospects seemed bleak for Romania and Serbia, promising for Ireland and good for Denmark. The accumulation of development gaps was soon to take its toll on the future course of events. After twenty years of economic development, most of which are wrongly depicted as the golden age in Romanias history, the GDP/per capita of Romanian citizens was twice below the European average and four times lower than the Danish one, making Romania sit at the bottom of the list concerning the level of economic and social development across the European continent. What are possible explanations to this dreary output? The dismal effects are not to be blamed on religious heritages, according to Professor Murgescu, given the fact that the secular tide which pervaded most European societies of the time didnt leave much room for religious traditions. The only positive effect of religious beliefs, which can be computed reasonably by now, is the growing importance of eradicating illiteracy, but this purported to the Protestants strongholds, including Denmark. Otherwise, the state plays much a share in the success or failure of many economic systems. The schooling system together with the openness to world markets are better proofs to an efficient and developed society that the religious variable. Romania scores poorly in many respects: low industrialization, a nationalistic policy of preventing foreign capital into the domestic market (the liberal policy of Vintil Brtianu in the 1920s forced Romania to produce and sell small quantities of cereals when the world prices were going high and, in the years of the Great Depression, when oil and cereals were cheap worldwide Romania was exporting huge amounts, without accumulating much capital), an agricultural system
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basic displacements of populations from the rural to the urban areas, as well as an increase in the level of living, but, after 1970s, the economic rates began to wane and rapidly plummet into recession in the 1980s. The technical progress was essential to the enhancement of productivity rates in all industries. Consequently, the importance of human capital, in terms of the level of education and professionalization, had become more and more significant. As for each country taken separately, there are aspects which are worth considering: Denmark, already above the European development average before 1939, took advantage over its massive literate population and, in the period after World War Two, focused on services as much as on the industrial output. Technology, especially in the industry of wind energy, turned into an essential component of the type of Danish welfare state provided during the first three decades to its population. The naval industry was one of the pillars of Denmarks economy as well. All in all, its performance was at the end better than the European average and Denmark is still today one of the most developed countries in the world, ranking among the highest in the HDI chart. Ireland, on the other hand, was rather stagnating in the first two decades after 1945, but, soon after joining the European Community in 1973, new exports vistas made the balance sheet look promising for the country in the period to come. However, considering the small taxes of the Irish state, as well as its openness to the world markets (especially the United States), Ireland started to develop at an unprecedented rate by the end of the 1980s. Many American grand scale corporations had their headquarters in Ireland. The free exchange of goods with the mature markets of the European Community played also an important part. The services sector skyrocketed between 1987 and 2001, making Ireland
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deserve its title of the tiger economy in Europe. Its annual growth, although not sustainable, was well over 5% in the period. Therefore, Ireland progressed into the small elite of highly developed countries in the world. As for the Communist states, the situation is totally different. Yugoslavia, which represented an apparent middle way between communism and liberal capitalism, increasingly developed in the 1950s and 1960s only to stagnate later, facing the prospects of paying back its huge foreign debts, and in the menacing 1980s to fall, like many other states in the region, into its final recession. The civil wars which dismantled the Yugoslav Federation (which was only held together by the tight hand of Tito), although Yugoslavia was above the rate of development of most socialist countries, including Romania, as far as the tourist industry, overall education and consumption habits are concerned. The services industry was somewhere around 30% before 1989, while most of the economy was industrial. During the 1990s, there was a frightening drop in the level of living of Serbia, mainly due to the war, while other former member countries of the Socialist Federation, such as Slovenia or Croatia, were economically outpacing the others from the distance. Romania, nonetheless, developed after 1945 by means of forced industrialization and it even went upwards in terms of GDP/ inhabitant in the period 1959-1973. Illiteracy almost disappeared, healthcare was distributed widely, the urban population grew by 20-30% in the period (although 15% less than the European average in 1989) and there was a truly reshaping of the backward agrarian society of the interwar period, although at the cost of hectic state economic policies and human losses. Tourism, the car industry, even consumption habits were trademarks of a modernizing society in the 1960s
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Unfortunately, the opening up of the market and the series of state privatizations didnt allow for a serious development of Romania before the 2000s (and not even shortly afterwards). The former nomenklatura members turned into self-appointed businessmen, who became prosperous from illicit takeovers of formerly state-owned companies, while a primitive type of capitalism blossomed under hard circumstances, whereas the overall population was passing through times of financial hardships. Bogdan Murgescu ends his book in the hope that it may be the task (and perhaps crowning achievement) of the European Union to cope with all the legacies of backwardness of the Eastern Europe periphery. Our final remark is that Professor Murgescu goes brilliantly at length to show statistically the visible effects of faulty decision-making and the shabby roots of genuine development, but at times there is this feeling that the same historian who pays great attention to every minor demographic detail perhaps underestimates the cultural understanding, not necessarily going along religious lines, of the major chasms and gaps between the developed Western world and the still developing East. All in all, Bogdan Murgescus latest book paves the way for future quantitative analysis but, however it may turn out to be in the end, the true historian at heart does a great work here. Romnia i Europa is, without exaggerating a bit, the best mirror on Europe our national history ever had. DAN-ALEXANDRU CHI
and 1970s landscape. Most Romanians naturally felt they were better off than any other previous generation. After the oil crisis of 1973, the economic prospects began to shift. As the 1980s approached, Nicolae Ceauescus responsibility for erratic decision-making in the economic policies was more and more evident. The energy crises was translated into a diminishing of the overall level of living of most Romanians, which, along with the state-funded policy to pay back all foreign debts, led to an aggravating economic recession. The political inefficiency and ideological blindness were mixed in the fabric of things. At the onset of the 1990s, Romanias GDP per capita was three fold lower than the European average and six times lower than the Danish one. The discrepancies increased and there no hopes for a stable convergence on the horizon. What the communist brought to the Romanian society was finally a mixture of nineteenth century industrialization (Daniel Chirots famous theory) with a harsh period of economic downturn which dealt a fatal blow to the whole system. Although Romania was a massive exporter of raw material and manufactured goods as well (but of little technology), the society at large didnt benefit (or wasnt supposed to benefit) from the chaotic economic whims of the single partys top echelons. After 150 of years of modernization the Romanian society was significantly behind the accomplishments of the highly developed Western societies of Europe, although many efforts have been made to erase the existing gaps.
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SERGIU GHERGHINA, SERGIU MICOIU (eds.) Partide i personaliti populiste n Romnia postcomunist
Institutul European, Iai, 2010, 319 pp. Une tude sur le populisme en Roumanie doit rpondre, entre autres, trois questions cardinales. En premier lieu, quelle stratgie thorique fautil adopter pour dfinir ce phnomne politique manifestation polymorphe? Deuximement, o placer le populisme sur la scne politique? Et enfin, comment rapporter le populisme la question de la dmocratie? Le volume Partide i personaliti populiste n Romnia postcomunist, dit par Sergiu Gherghina et Sergiu Micoiu assume le pari de rpondre toutes ces questions dans un moment o ltiquette de populisme est utilise le plus souvent pour diaboliser ladversaire. Le livre runit neufs textes qui explorent la question populiste sous quatre aspect: le plan thorique, lvolution des partis politiques aprs 1989, les stratgies lectorales et la mcanique des opinions Dans son chapitre introductif (pp. 11-54), Sergiu Micoiu montre que le populisme est un objet qui rsiste la thorisation. Du point de vue historique, la gnalogie de la notion remonte la tradition politique de lAntiquit et semble accompagner, de prs ou de loin, toute son volution ultrieure. Du point de vue gographique, le phnomne est devenu, dans les annes 60, une marque spcifique de lAmrique latine, mais aujourdhui il a colonis aussi lespace europen. Du point de vue conceptuel, le populisme peut sinscrire toute syntaxe, faisant lobjet dune combinatoire, ou dune relation hgmonique qui articule des lments divers dans une structure politique parfois instable. Il y a bien sur des lments grce auxquelles on peut reconnatre le populisme et Sergiu Micoiu les numre: lexaltation du peuple, lanti-litisme et la propension la dmocratie directe, mais lauteur manifeste une distance par rapport la tentation dessentialiser les termes et de transformer les notions politiques dans des espces naturelles. Cella ne veut pas dire quil faut aborder les questions en postmoderniste vulgaire qui fait de labsence des essences un drapeau, mais de suivre lintuition hglienne des catgories de reflet, notions qui nont pas de sens en dehors du champ conceptuel dont ils appartient. Cest pour cela que Sergiu Micoiu plaide en guise de conclusion de son introduction pour une approche mthodologique qui sinspire de la thorie du discours tel quelle a t formule par Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe ou Norman Fairclough. Le caractre volatile du populisme est confirm aussi par Sergiu Gherghina qui dans son article intitul: Lorganisation des partis populistes et leur succs lectoral dans la Roumanie postcommuniste (pp. 233-267) ajoute la liste des signifiants dresse par Micoiu lusage des dichotomies simplificatrices et le penchant pour lirrationnel, comme marques du populisme. Lauteur constate, aprs une analyse de lvolution lectorale des partis parlementaires, que le populisme ne peut tre identifi dun point de vue formel. Les variables tudies par Sergiu Gherghina montrent quil ny a pas de diffrence entre les partis quon nomme populistes et les autres. Donc, conclut lauteur, le critre pour dfinir le populisme se trouve dans le message politique et dans la construction du leadership lintrieur de ces partis. George Jiglu reprend leffort de dfinir le populisme dune manire
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(pp. 191-231) lanalyse du populisme prsidentiel en montrant que la rforme de ltat qui est devenue la constante rhtorique de Traian Bsescu fonctionne en tant quopration populiste. Dune part, ce discours fonctionne par dpolitisation la reforme de ltat est au-del de tout intrt politique dautre part, il ne cesse pas de politiser tous les compartiments de la vie publique, car tous les adversaires et opposants des politiques prsidentielles deviennent des adversaires de la modernisation. Mais do vient ce populisme qui domine la politique roumaine? Les auteurs du volume proposent deux rponses: lune gnalogique, lautre qui regarde lhistoire du prsent. Adriana Marinescu affirme dans son tude intitul Du mythe la ralit: le discours populiste en Roumanie (pp. 119-158) que celui-ci se nourrit de linconscient collectif propre aux structures de lEurope orientale. Cest pour cela que Adriana Marinescu pense que le populisme reprsente une irruption du social dans la politique. Dautre part Drago Dragoman considre dans son tude intitulePopulisme, autoritarisme et valeurs dmocratiques dans lopinion publique roumaine (pp. 269-309) que le populisme est le rsultat de la dmobilisation gnrale qui est survenue aprs quon a accompli les grands objectifs de la politique etrangre: lintgration europenne et la participation dans les structures militaires de lOTAN. Si les auteurs cits jusquici analysent le populisme en termes de partis ou de leaders. Drago Dragoman dmontre que la monte du populisme naurait pas eu lieu sil ny avait pas dj une disponibilit dans la population envers le populisme. tudiant et interprtant les donns des sondages dopinion, lauteur montre que lespace publique est marqu de plus en plus par lintolrance sociale
rigoureuse. Dans le chapitre intitul Savons-nous de ce quon parle? Une perspective thorique sur le populisme (pp. 55-85), il tablit deux lments distinctifs du populisme: le contact direct avec une masse de citoyens et la contestation du status quo. Mais le style analytique de lauteur entre en collision avec la ralit politique roumaine qui loblige de constater que presque tous les partis importants qui ont marque la scne politique et tous les leaders ont connu la tentation populiste. Cest presque la mme position que lon retrouve dans la contribution de Mihail Chiru (pp. 159-190) qui constate que le discours populiste sest diffus dans tout le corps politique roumain. Les tudes classiques sur le phnomne attachent habituellement le populisme la monte de lextrmisme. Mais, comme le constate Mihail Chiru, en Roumanie, tous les partis politiques importants le Parti Social-Dmocrate, le Parti National Libral ou le Parti Dmocrate-Libral ont us, en toute modration, de la rhtorique populiste Mais si tous les partis ont expriment cette tentation ce nest pas le mme populisme quils ont invoqu. Dans Genre et espces du populisme roumain (pp. 87-118), Sorina Soare en distingue cinq types: le populisme paternaliste du Front du Salut National, le populisme anarchique des minriades, le populisme extrmiste du Parti de la Grande Roumanie, le populisme nationaliste du Parti de lUnit Nationale Roumaine, et le populisme messianique du Parti de la Nouvelle Gnration. Selon Sorin Soare, un autre populisme a commenc rcemment se manifester, cest le populisme discursif du prsident Traian Bsescu. Lucian Vesalon consacre son chapitre Populisme et noliberalisme dans le discours de la modernisation de ltat
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et par les manifestations du nationalisme traditionaliste. Dans les conclusions du volume, Loredana Nabr (pp. 311-315) affirme quil y a trois explications pour la monte du populisme. En premier lieu, la Roumanie a travers une transition incomplte, donc le populisme peut tre analys en tant que contre-courant souterrain du passage vers la dmocratie. En outre, aprs lpoque communiste qui a paralys lintrt des citoyens pour la politique, il est explicable que lexercice
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civique des roumains est encore faible. Troisime lment, peut tre le plus important, est quaprs 1989 la politique roumaine ne sest pas structure sur le clivage fondateur gauche-droite, mais sur un antagonisme de tous contre tous. L devient peut-tre visible lchec de la politique roumaine de transition qui na pas su grer la figure du perdant, ce grand interlocuteur muet du populisme. CODRIN TUT
NICOLETA IONESCU-GUR Dimensiunea represiunii din Romnia n regimul comunist. Dislocri de persoane i fixri de domiciliu obligatoriu
Corint, Bucureti, 2010, 447 pp. Part of a comprehensive series of volumes addressing the repressive dimension of the Romanian communist regime, the reviewed volume tackles the relocation and forced residence measures taken during the 1948-1989 time frame. The second volume of the series intends to focus on forced labour, while the third aims to center on the victims of political detention in communist Romania. On the basis of extensive archival research, the reviewed volume investigates the causes, mechanisms, operations, actors, procedural abuses and misdemeanor involved in the relocation and forced residence procedures, as well as the concrete consequences for the lives of those targeted by the communist repressive apparatus. Throughout its eight chapters, the volume investigates the specifics of the afore-mentioned process while identifying a variety of social categories affected by it at different stages in the regimes evolution: the expropriated landowners, whose estates were confiscated in March 1949 on the basis of Decree no. 83; the peasants who took part in collective protests against the regulations regarding the requisitioning of agricultural products in 1949 (specifically in Arad, Bihor and Timi-Torontal) and in 1950 (in Vlaca and Ilfov counties); the persons residing near the Yugoslav border, who were relocated in the Brgan region for security reasons during the Soviet-Yugoslav crisis (1951-1956); the class enemies of the communist regime (former business enterprisers, political or bureaucratic figures, former military officers etc.); persons released from prisons and work colonies. Furthermore, the volume includes a chapter on the activity of the Unit responsible for relocations and forced residence distribution active within the Ministry for Internal Affairs whcih was operational during 1954-1956. This unit was responsible for tracking the activity of the relocated persons. The chapter analyzing the in fact illegal basis of relocation and forced residence orders is also notable, as it provides the description of the inner workings of the system. The
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The development of these institutions and the different phases of repression were strongly interrelated throughout the entire time span of the regime. Although the costs of noncompliance were high, on a number of occasions the authorities were faced with individual or collective protests against the status quo. Albeit none of them presented a severe challenge to the establishment itself, the weight they carried was not without effect. Illustrating are the examples of the opposition of the largest social category whose traditional lifestyle the communist regime attempted (and largely succeeded) in breaking: the peasantry. The Plenary meeting of 3-5 March 1949 identified the reorganization of agriculture according to socialist standards as one of the key tasks of regime-building. At that moment, emphasis lay on persuading the peasants to join the newly created institutions (i.e. collective agricultural households) as part of what was to become the collectivization process. Throughout the official length of this process (1949-1962), the agricultural policies and procedures oscillated to a significant extent. This included the type of pressures put on the peasants to comply with the official directives, which ranged from persuasion tactics to threats, imprisonment, forced labour, deportations and even on-the-spot executions. The rebellions analysed in the reviewed volume are telling in this respect. Occurring at the onset of the communist takeover, these instances of collective protest exposed, in fact, critical structural weaknesses in the regimes configuration. The peasant rebellions uncovered the poor capacity of the regime to carry out policy directives and effective surveillance operations on the local level. It was, however, also as a reaction to these rebellions that the regime increased its repressive efforts, granting more attention to the local-level regime representatives as surveillance agents. Therefore, while at the ideological and normative level it was clear what
chapter dealing with the consequences of the 1977 miners strike in Valea Jiului and the 1987 workers protest in Braov also invites reflection, as it presents the later stage of regime paranoia and the derivative actions against its citizens. The concluding section addresses the post1989 measures taken by the Romanian authorities in support of the categories of citizens that were exposed to the abovementioned repressive mechanisms. Forced residence was standard practice for the communist authorities on various grounds, such as the need to keep record of persons released from prison or those whom the regime did not imprison. Hostile elements were constantly seen as pervasive by the Romanian communists. Their removal was seen as a stepping stone to regimeconsolidation. To this end, the authorities employed a variety of measures and mechanisms, among which prominent were also relocation and forced residence. The overall purpose was the isolation, submission or even removal from society of those considered as perilous to the regimes stability. Lacking a legal grounding for years, this procedure altered the life course of those whom it targeted: their freedom of movement was restricted to a few kilometers surrounding the residence location (trespassing was punished as a criminal offence), they were carrying out unskilled work, their childrens education was severely affected etc. This as well as the other forms of repression the communists drew on sought to clearly mark out the consequences of disobedience and therefore prevent any form of opposition. As this was one of the marked dimensions of Romanian communism, the institutions that were created and consolidated bore the mark of regime development stages. Repression became structural, as it was delivered by the party, the judicial mechanisms, the police and the military, and ultimately, by the Securitate.
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the regime was aiming at, the pragmatic level was far from being consolidated. As a result of the fact that the regimes intentions were inherently anti-social, the implementation of profoundly illegitimate measures was overwhelmingly aided by the use of repressive mechanisms. As follows, institutional violence (physical and/or psychological) against the peasants as well as against the other social categories targeted by the regime as perilous for its stability became a marker of the communization process of the Romanian society. The repressive dimension grew progressively stronger as it turned into the most effective method of controlling society and masking regime illegitimacy. The fluctuating intensity of the repressive measures attested the incapacity of the regime to meet the challenges of its selfproclaimed omnipotence. Illustrating is again an example of the consequences of communist retaliation against peasant disobedience in the 1950s: the considerable number of arrests carried out until 1952 by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime led to an overcrowding of prisons and also to the drastic decrease in the number of peasants that could carry out the necessary agricultural works. Repressive measures therefore became counter-productive to the effectiveness of regime policies themselves. Almost forty years later, during the 1987 Braov workers protest, the regime was showing restraint in using repressive measures on a wide scale. Instead, only some of those that were part of the protest were put on trial and were singled out as hooligans (p. 271). The authors analysis backed by archival documents substantiates the claim that repression underwent various cycles of development, which were largely determined by variables such as the consolidation and stability of the regime. These are only a few of the aspects tackled in the volume under review, which
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comprehensively reconstructs some of the communist regimes control mechanisms over the Romanian society in its bid for counteracting any real or perceived threat to its stability. Identifying some of the key events that are explanatory for the regimes anti-societal policies, the volume actually indicates the critical phases in its evolution particularly in its repressive dimension. Relocation and forced residence are repressive mechanism distinct is their use to isolate those against whom the authorities could not deliver sufficient evidence in judicial proceedings. The volume lays emphasis on the fact that the regulations approving the use of these measures were kept secret due to their illegal character. The regulations were in fact prescribing measures taken to deprive citizens of their freedom, which contradicted the official provisions of the Constitution. Exemplifying to this end is the following archival reference: [In the cases when] we do not possess valid and concrete evidence, there is a law that allows our ministry to detain all those who incite, conduct hostile activities against our regime which cannot be placed under legal regulations [] Let us send them [in places] where they grow accustomed to labour, to a different life (p. 373). For reasons pertaining to faulty and selective statistical procedures undertaken by the communist authorities, the documents preserved in the archives do not provide a precise image of the total number of persons that were relocated and forcefully allocated to new households in other regions of the country. However, they are a key part of the puzzle that is still being put together by researchers interested in Romanias recent past and more precisely in the evolution of the repressive dimension of the communist regime. To this end, Nicoleta Ionescu-Gurs volume brings a meaningful and refreshing contribution. MONICA ANDRIESCU
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GIOVANNI SARTORI Ingineria constituional comparat. Structuri, stimulente i rezultate

Romanian transl. by Gabriela Tnsescu and Irina Mihaela Stoica Institutul European, Iai 2008, 326 pp. The Romanian translations of seminal works, as I already mentioned on other occasions, are to be acknowledged as essential efforts of bringing the political science up-to-date in Romania. This is also the case with the much awaited translation of Sartoris Comparative Constitutional Engineering1. Yet I cannot begin discussing about Sartoris book without briefly underlying another essential feature, namely the proper translation. It is worth publishing much awaited books, nonetheless you have to provide readers with appropriate translations. And, unfortunately, this is not the case. In too many occasions the translators seem not to have fully understood the logic of the argument and in too many occasions they lack appropriate Romanian terms, though they are already widespread in political science literature in Romania. In fact, many technical terms pertaining to electoral systems and political regimes, for example, have awkward Romanian correspondents that make the lecture abrupt and ridiculous in many ways. Back to Sartoris work, it is worth to state that, despite many technical details, this is far from being a technical book, a practical guideline for constitutional engineering. In the same time, this is not necessarily a scholarly book, as it makes proof of its utility by discussing both general frameworks for analysis and subsequent details in a fully comparative manner. It aims at updating various theories concerning institutional
1 Giovanni SARTORI, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997.
engineering and at providing meaningful insights and solutions for complicated issues. Though institutional engineering mainly refers to the division and balance of power, Sartoris book begins with a necessary update of the discussion about the political consequences of electoral laws. In fact, many early scholars of the political systems have fully understood the political consequences of electoral engineering2. Beginning with Duverger3, they acknowledge that electoral systems are important factors for the overall functioning of the political systems. According to Duverger, electoral systems influence party systems and, through this, governance performance in terms of stability and coherence. Despite many early refutations and critiques, it seems that Duverger was somehow right. Majoritarian electoral systems largely favor bi-party systems, which favors in turn stable single-party governments, whereas proportional representation favors multi-party systems and, by that, coalition governments that bring political instability into action. This
Jean BLONDEL, Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies, Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1, no. 2, 1968, pp. 180-203; Douglas W. RAE, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971; Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976; Arend LIJPHART, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-1985, American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 2, 1990, pp. 481-496. 3 Maurice DUVERGER, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern World, Wiley, New York, 1963.
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direct causality, on the one hand, and the vagueness of Duvergers predictions, on the other hand, caused an ongoing debate. Regarding this two-step of causality for political instability, Lijphart underlines, one has to make a clear distinction between governmental instability and political instability, since governmental instability may go hand in hand with fair political stability of the overall political regime4. A posteriori, this is the argument we can use when we look to post-communist transition. Despite varying degrees of governmental instability5, most of the post-communist countries managed to consolidate democracy and to fulfill important political goals, as NATO and EU membership. Nonetheless, Sartoris clear choice when it comes to choose between types of electoral systems is majority rule, presented as a fair rule for designating responsible, stable and responsive governments. According to Sartori, majoritarian electoral systems reduce the number of relevant parties in the system and thus provide a better chance for a stable government, which may find a strong support into Parliament in order to pass its legislative initiatives. At this point, Sartori feels somehow necessary to emphasize on important developments regarding how one should count parties and define party-systems and to defend its well-known definition stated in his previous book, Parties and Party Systems. For Sartori, a relevant party is a party that has coalition or blackmail potential, in other words, a party that really counts in the formation
Arend LIJPHART, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984. 5 C.R. CONRAD, S.N. GOLDER, Measuring Government Duration and Stability in Central Eastern European Democracies, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 49, no. 1, 2010, pp. 119-150.
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of governing coalitions or a party that can stand alone in government. In fact, the question of counting parties in not an easy task. There are few alternatives to Sartoris solution. On the one hand, Blondel takes into account the number and the size of parties and tries to figure out how combinations of parties and party-sizes work in various partysystems6. Unfortunately, the labels used by Blondel, such as dominant party or half party, when he tries to establish a typology of party-systems are still rather imprecise7. On the other hand, the only option left is to stick to Rae and Taylors index of fragmentation8, and on the subsequent Laakso and Taageperas measure of the effective number of parties9. Despite some merits, both of them emphasize too much on numerical measures, become elusive and seem to ignore the reality they are supposed to express. This could be seen as a wider critique or contemporary political science that largely favors quantitative research methods. Sticking solely to the numbers, which is a general default of our times10, researchers may lose the very logic of the processes they try to describe and explain. In this peculiar case of how one should count parties, it is unclear if this effective number of parties, in fact a quantitative adaptation of Duvergers
6 Jean BLONDEL, Party Systems and Patterns of Governmentcit.. 7 Arend LIJPHART, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Governmentcit., p. 120. 8 Douglas W. RAE, Michael TAYLOR, The Analysis of Political Cleavages, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970. 9 Markku LAAKSO, Rein TAAGEPERA, Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1979, pp. 3-27. 10 Ren GUNON, The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times, Penguin, Baltimore, 1972.
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which focuses on important proposals for making various political systems work, and especially with the texts in the appendix. One of the appendices is a public address on the Romanian constitutional system Sartori made in Bucharest back in 2001 when accepting the honorific title of Doctor from Bucharest University. Despite widespread belief that Romanias constitutional system is based on the functioning of the semipresidential system, Sartori unravels a rather parliamentarian mechanism put to work by the Romanian constitution. Sticking to its provisions, Sartori states that Romanian parliamentary system makes an effort to create a president enough powerful, but not too powerful to change its parliamentary features, despite the popular election of the president. According to Sartori, those features derive from several constitutional provisions (p. 316). In theory, the President works as mediator between state institutions, which really makes him a president from a typical parliamentary system. Additionally, the president does not hold strong powers as he always has to consult parliamentary parties when he appoints a new prime-minister, the Parliament when he intends to dissolve Parliament or to appoint a referendum. Sartori concludes that Romanian president is not powerful enough in order to label the Romanian system as a semi-presidential one, i.e. he has not strong powers (as the veto power) and all significant legislative powers are those of the government. Yet one should not limit his analysis only to the constitutional text. In practice, for example, the current president very quickly abandoned his mediator status and acted much more like a de facto party leader, negotiating with parties for securing its former party (PDL) a safe majority into Parliament and openly attacking opposition parties. His practice of frequently heading PDL meetings is even acknowledged as customary
laws, is itself a law, a hypothesis or purely an adaptation to empirical data, taking into account that its predictive power is no greater than other attempts. The rest of the book relates to more classical issues in constitutional engineering, namely to regime types. Once again, Sartoris preference when comparing benefices of presidential and parliamentarian systems is semipresidentialism. Due to its inner logic of alternative governance between the president, when he is from the same party with the prime-minister, and the primeminister, when he is the presidents rival, the semi-presidential system may offer a suitable solution for deadlock. Such political deadlock can occur in both presidential and parliamentary systems. In the first instance, the president may be in trouble when he lacks the support of inchoate parties in Parliament and feels betrayed by his own deputies, more eager to work in the benefit of their own local constituencies than in the benefit of the country as a whole. When it turns almost impossible for him to put in practice the electoral programme he won with, the president most often abuses of its powers and produces deadlock or pure dictatorship, as it occurred many times in Latin America11. In the second instance, weak governments may feel powerless in overpass parliamentary frequent crises and take to an end their political programmes. Regarding the functioning of the semi-presidential system, I think this is a very insightful discussion when we take into account Romanias own systemic vices and failures. This discussion is in line with the third part of the book,
11 David COLLIER (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979; Juan J. LINZ, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, vol. 1, no. 1, 1990, pp. 51-69.
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by PDL leaders12. Subsequently, he also abandoned his constitutional obligation of consulting parliamentary parties and taking their positions into account when appointing a new candidate for primeminister. Back in October 2009, he refused to appoint the prime-minister candidate supported by opposition parties, the mayor of Sibiu city Klaus Johannis, though the previous PDL cabinet was dropped by the Parliament for the first time since the 1989 political change13.
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12 Top-level Meeting between Bsescu, Boc and PDL MPs, Nine OClock, 28.01.2011, http://www.nineoclock.ro/index.php?issu e=4856&page=detalii&categorie=politics&i d=20110128-512855 (accessed on 01.02.2011). 13 Victor LUPU, Many Things Hard to Understand, Nine OClock, 21.10.2009, http://www.nineoclock.ro/index.php?issue =4856&page=detalii&categorie=frontpage&i d=20091021-501531 (accessed on 01.02.2011).
The president ignored the parliamentary majority, unusually demanding that such an ad-hoc majority be sanctioned by a court decision, and wished to have it his own way by renaming the same prime-minister from PDL. By bending constitutional provisions, the president may turn the system in a semi-presidential one, but the question remains if unconstitutional acts should be taken into account in order to label a constitutional system. In the end, Sartoris proposals for redefining balance of power, the shift from monocameralism to bicameralism, the timing of elections, the re-elections of presidents, are all to be seriously put under scrutiny when discussing about future constitutional engineering. DRAGO DRAGOMAN
DANIELA PIANA Construirea democraiei la frontiera spaiului public european

Traducere de Raluca Popescu Institutul European, Iai, 2009, 257 pp. Care este modelul de democraie pe care Uniunea European l promoveaz? Cum a fost construit acest model i care este plus-valoarea pe care acesta o aduce legitimitii politice a Uniunii Europene? Sunt ntrebrile principale pe care cartea Danielei Piana le lanseaz. Publicat pentru prima dat n 2006 n limba italian, cartea devine accesibil publicului romn odat cu traducerea n limba romn n anul 2009, an ce coincide cu ratificarea Tratatului de la Lisabona care, dup cum vom vedea, vine s confirme trendul trasat de autoare cu privire la construirea democraiei europene. Pe parcursul celor cinci capitole, autoarea expune ideile i argumentaiile care stau la baza politicii de democratizare pe care Uniunea European a deschis-o la sfritul anilor `80, att n interiorul, ct i n exteriorul granielor sale. n primul capitol, autoarea i contureaz cadrul de cercetare i definete conceptele principale cu care lucreaz: democraia i spaiul public. Sarcina asumat de autoare, de a defini democraia cu referire la UE, este una dificil datorit utilizrii la nivel european a unui concept democraie creat pentru realiti politice diferite. Chiar i aplicat statelor naionale, democraia nu s-a artat a fi un concept
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pe dimensiunea discursiv a legitimrii democratice a UE este evident din demersul autoarei de a reconstrui procesul de definire a unui model legitim de democraie european prin analiza discursurilor i documentelor oficiale europene. Construirea democraiei n sine este vzut de autoare drept o problem de policy, iar legitimitatea modelului european de democraie este reconstruit prin raportare la trei politici publice: extindere, relaii externe i politici constituionale. Elementul de originalitate al crii este dat de faptul c Daniela Piana nu se limiteaz la a eticheta democraia european drept o democraie transnaional, sau i mai vag, democraie sui generis, ci re-construiete, utiliznd analiza de coninut, specificitatea acesteia, ca fiind bazat pe trei clustere conceptuale: rule of law, drepturile omului, good governance. Daniela Piana ne ofer astfel sinteza vocabularului european asociat democraiei transnaionale. Sistematiznd discursul european asupra rule of law, Piana identific concepte asociate precum: dreptul la un proces corect, independena i eficiena magistraturii, accesul egal la justiie, absena corupiei, prezena societii civile. Clusterul de concepte generat de dimensiunea drepturilor omului cuprinde: demnitatea uman, egalitatea n faa legii, egalitatea n tratamentul muncii, egalitatea n condiii de risc i de dezavantaj social. Discursul european asupra good governance face referiri la openess, participation, accountability, effectiveness, coherence considerate ancore ale legitimrii democratice a guvernanei UE. Capitolul al treilea dezvolt construirea modelului de democraie european analiznd cele trei domenii de policy. Autoarea disec discursul UE i reconstruiete modelul european de democraie cu referire la tipul aciunilor legitime pe care UE le ntreprinde att n interior, ct mai ales dincolo de graniele
lipsit de ambiguitate, istoria ideii de democraie fiind complex i marcat de concepii contradictorii. Tipologia clasic a lui Robert Dahl1,14introducea pe lng conceptele democraiei directe ateniene i ale democraiei reprezentative moderne, posibilitatea unei a treia transformri a democraiei care s-ar fi referit la apariia unei guvernane democratice la nivel supranaional, iar acesta este nivelul vizat de cartea Danielei Piana. De asemenea, nici conceptul de spaiu public european nu este mai uor de definit. Construirea democraiei se face n strns corelaie cu participarea la sfera public; aceasta din urm, n consecin, este locul de legitimare a coninutului procesului deliberativ. Astfel, procesul deliberativ legitimeaz utilizarea puterii politice n interiorul unui sistem de governance democratic (p. 22). Daniela Piana consider c sfera public este central pentru legitimitatea democratic, ntruct foreaz decidenii s ptrund n aceasta pentru a-i justifica aciunile. La nivelul studiilor europene, deficitul democratic a fost fundamentat pe lipsa unui demos european215iar sfera public a fost interpretat drept locul n interiorul cruia este posibil s se creeze condiii pentru construirea unei identiti colective, element indispensabil pentru legitimarea democratic a Uniunii Europene. Atand semnificaia transnaional democraiei sui generis conceput de Uniunea European (p. 97), cartea Danielei Piana dezvluite, n capitolul doi, o puternic ancorare n viziunea democraiei discursive, conform creia, interaciunile bazate pe proceduri deliberative sunt n msur s rezolve deficitul democratic de care sufer Uniunea. Accentul pus
114 Robert DAHL, Democraia i criticii ei, Institutul European, Iai, 2002. 215 Jrgen HABERMAS, The Postnational Constellation. Political Essays, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001.
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UE, ca model de democraie exportat ctre alte ri n vederea democratizrii acestora. UE este catalogat drept actor al democratizrii, preocupat de promovarea democraiei n ri tere, precum fostele ri comuniste. Perspectiva teoretic asupra procesului de democratizare a rilor tere este una constructivist. Daniela Piana pune n centrul strategiei de democratizare promovat de UE n exterior conceptul de capacity building, care mbin clasica condiionalitate (alocarea de fonduri pe baza ndeplinirii unor criterii juridice sau politice) cu socializarea (implicarea societii civile cu funcia de participare i control politic, de unde i importana think-tanks, advocacy coalitions). n plus, societatea civil organizat la nivel naional i transnaional este vzut drept o surs de legitimare a normelor utilizate de UE pentru construirea democraiei n exterior, dar i ca surs de legitimare n oglind, a regulilor cu care UE intervine n viaa propriilor ceteni. Construirea capacitilor democratice la nivelul UE, ca relaie statsocietate civil-ceteni reprezint tema capitolului patru. Plecnd de la asumpia c modelul de democraie promovat de UE este legitimat nu numai de faptul c este fondat pe o ordine constituional care rspunde preferinelor statelor, ct pentru c este creat prin dialogul ntre ceteni i instituii (p. 163), Daniela Piana se plaseaz definitiv n viziunea strategiei de legitimare discursiv a democraiei europene. Rule of law, drepturile omului i good governance ancoreaz semantic discursul asupra democraiei europene; aceste concepte corespund a trei zone de policy, care contureaz ceea ce Daniela Piana numete modelul de democraie promovat de UE: dimensiunea supranaional a puterii, dimensiunea discursiv a proceselor democratice, un tradeoff ntre dimensiunea participativ i cea reprezentativ n favoarea celui
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dinti (p. 165). Autoarea consider c UE propune o nou versiune de guvernan, n care structurile statelor naionale sunt controlate de societatea civil transnaional, oferind astfel o legitimare bottom-up alegerilor de politici publice. Discursul european asupra democraiei analizat de Piana relev o versiune asupra responsabilitii democratice (accountability) conforme cu concepia deliberativ asupra democraiei: ONGurile supranaionale sunt actori de control al instituiilor politice, drept compensare a lipsei unei legitimri derivate din delegare i reprezentare partinic. Din aceast perspectiv, capacitile democratice ale UE ar consta n deschiderea de arene n care cetenii s poat participa la politica european, s aib loc schimbul de idei i argumente i s se construiasc o identitate european. Concluzia Danielei Piana este c spaiul public european este doar un spaiu de aciune posibil (p. 220), i va rmne astfel, dac nu este pus n legtur cu aciunile care permit organizaiilor societii civile s interacioneze. Mergnd dincolo de concluzia Danielei Piana de la momentul redactrii crii spaiul european nu exist (nc...) a aduga c, odat cu Tratatul de la Lisabona, spaiul public european ncepe s capete contur. Introducerea Iniiativei ceteneti (articolul 11 al Tratatului privind Uniunea European) creeaz o aren de participare, dnd posibilitatea cetenilor europeni i societii civile organizate s joace rolul de agenda setters ai Uniunii. De asemenea, acest instrument participativ vine s confirme perspectiva descris de Daniela Piana, a construirii graduale a unui model de democraie european legitimat prin mecanisme deliberative. n prezent Iniiativa Ceteneasc nu este aplicabil nc, dar este n curs de adoptare la nceputul lui 2011 un Regulament european care s operaionalizeze principiul schiRomanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011
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i dac UE va dobndi un spaiu public funcional dincolo de contururile trasate de Tratatul de la Lisabona. CORINA TURIE
at n articolul din Tratat. Rmne de vzut dac Iniiativa Ceteneasc va democratiza i dinamiza procesul decizional al UE, dac va deveni un instrument participativ utilizat cu succes de ctre societatea civil transnaional
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ABSTRACTS
DANIEL BARBU, Spiritul mpotriva politicii. Despre intelectuali, Biseric i integrare

european (The Spiritual Against the Political. On Intellectuals, the Church, and European Integration). The paper provides the ideal-typical narrative of European integration manufactured by Romanian intellectuals and the official national Church (Greekorthodox), that could be summarized as follows: in the realm of the spirit, Europe would have survived mainly in the East, shepherded by such intellectuals as the Romanian ones and by the spiritual legacy of the Orthodox Church; in political and economic terms, European Union is monitored according to secularist and relativist guidelines by the bureaucracy in Brussels. Whatever the latter, together with their Romanian counterparts, may have realized in the course of European enlargement is of little concern for the former. Both the Church and the mainstream intellectuals are engaged now in an operation that should have defined them long before the fall of state socialism: to boost intellectual non-conformity with respect to the political dominant discourse as a way of refusing the debate by taking it seriously. And they do it by means of the same narrative device that kept them silent under communism: they tell the story of the prevalence of culture and the spiritual over everything political. Keywords: European spirit, European integration, intellectuals, Church, postsecularism.
ALEXANDRA IONACU, Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008:

Les voies daccs au pouvoir excutif (Political Elites in Post-communist Romania 1990-2008: Pathways to the Executive Power). The political regime change that occurred in Romania, along with the dismissal of communism, elicited a process of emergence of new political elites and of new patterns in the functioning of the countrys political institutions. But new political elites do not emerge ex nihilo and institutional changes are slower in practice than the ambition of change. Given the extensive absence of decision-making or technical expertise among the political actors, the new parties in government conducted a policy of cooption of personnel instituting new patterns of selection. The paper will emphasize the fact that, in the Romanian case, the process of professionalization of governmental personnel took the form of a long process, and that the protocols of the reconfiguration implied divergent strategies in what concerns the governments ministers and the secretaries of state. It will be shown that although the ministerial careers suggest the institutionalization of recruitment procedures similar to other European parliamentary democracies,
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ABSTRACTS
the junior ministers level remained dominated by forms of cooption from outside the political realm. Keywords: governmental elites, political recruitment, professionalisation, nomenklatura, postcommunism.
DRAGO DRAGOMAN, Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict. The Ethnicisation

of Public Space in Romania. Although Romanian-Hungarian ethnic relations have been improved during the last two decades, they are still marked by recurrent crises that are rather symbolic. They range from the public use of Hungarian to the requirements for the Romanian citizenship and the special ties between the Hungarian diaspora and the kin state, but they encompass other issues, as the naming of localities in Transylvania, statues evoking national heroes and street names. Although generally overlooked, ethnic symbolism is a major obstacle in generating a neutral public space and a threat for a complete ethnic reconciliation in Transylvania for the decades to come. Keywords: ethnic conflict, symbolic power, public space, post-communism, Transylvania, Romania.
ION ENACHE, Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania.

Aiming at filling a gap in the existing literature, this paper advances the analysis of available alternatives to party representation, namely independent candidatures. For that reason, we consider the context of Eastern Europe, and particularly the last decade when a considerable number of independent candidatures have been advanced. Particularly, the Romanian political system provides one viable example for the examination of independent candidacies, with numerous independents running in the national and local elections which were held after 1989. Therefore, the focal objectives of this text are to identify the peculiarities of this particular breed of politicians, what stimulates them to run independently in elections, and also why certain parts of the electorate choose to vote for independent candidates. Keywords: independent politicians, post-communist elections, local-level politics, party systems, Romanian politics.
SONIA CATRINA, Limaginaire paysan comme mmoire historique. Patrimoine

et construction de lidentit nationale par le biais des muses centraux (Peasant Imaginary as Historical Memory. Patrimony and National Identity Construction through the Central Museums). In this paper, we analyze the relation between the museum and the notion of identity through a study of patrimonial logics which aim at forging an official collective memory. We rely on a study of the mediation function of central museums in building a national identity through an endeavor to shape a nationmemory (mmoire-nation, Pierre Nora) which draws on peasant sources. The stake of this study lies in its ability to bring to light institutional forms of patrimony in the era of nationalist ideologies, of the formation and consolidation of the nation state. In which ways is the relationship between patrimony and national identity embodied in the scientific patrimonial projects of the museums?
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In trying to answer this question, we set out to explore how the patrimony is exploited in order to foster political projects. Addressing the issue of central museums as a kind of surface where the collective identity is scratched will help us shed lights on the metamorphoses of a localizing memory (mmoire localisante, M.M. Carruthers) mobilized to build a shared identity. Keywords: peasant, patrimony, identity, historical memory, Nation-State.
ALEXANDRA ILIE, Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust?

The Holocaust and the Great Famine in Ukraine are two man made catastrophes set in the XXth century. While the first is the most documented genocide in history, the latter tends to be dismissed by the international community as an ineffective policy of the Soviet Union. Having managed to exclude political killings from the UNs definition of genocide, Russia continues to deny the Ukrainian people access to information about the famine that left 6 million people dead of starvation. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian community insists that Holodomor was genocide and should be treated as such. By comparing these two grave tragedies, similarities inevitably surface. These similarities, along with other facts, like the cleansing of the elites in the years preceding and during the famine, Stalins letter to Kaganovich (in which Stalin mentions his fear of losing Ukraine), the differential treatment Ukraine received as opposed to the other Soviet republics, the measures taken to worsen the famine and confine it to specific areas, paint a much clearer picture of what really happened in Ukraine during the Holodomor. Keywords: genocide, famine, communism, fascism, mass killings, crimes against humanity.
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AUTORES
DANIEL BARBU
Professor of Political Science and Director of the Graduate School of Political Science at the University of Bucharest. Recent books: Die abwesende Republik, Frank & Timme, Berlin, 2009 and Politica pentru barbari, Editura Nemira, Bucureti, 2005. (daniel.barbu@icp.ro)
SONIA CATRINA
Associate Researcher at the Institute of Sociology (Bucharest) at the Romanian Academy, Researcher in Francophone network: Savoirs en partage, and Labforculture from the European Cultural Foundation, networking platform for European arts and culture. Ph.D. (2004-2008) in Anthropology, Victor Segalen University of Bordeaux Doctoral school in Social Science: society, health, decision, and Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Bucharest Faculty of Sociology. MA (2003-2004) in Francophone Doctoral School of Social Sciences, Bucharest. Her current project analyses the process of patrimony (re)construction in Romania. He is interested in both the construction of identity and ethnicity (interactions, contact situations), dealing with migration issues (social and cultural transfers between generations). (soniacatrina@gmail.com)
DRAGO DRAGOMAN
Ph.D. in Sociology, and Lecturer of Political Science with the Department of Political Science, International Relations and European Studies, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu. His research interests focus on social capital, ethnic relations, political participation and electoral behavior. Recent book: Capital social i valori democratice n Romnia, Editura Institutul European, Iai, 2010. (dragos.dragoman@ulbsibiu.ro)
ION ENACHE
MA in Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest, BA in Political Science with the same school. His main political research interests are political communication, discourse analysis, party systems, and political anthropology. (ionenache@live.com)
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AUTORES
ALEXANDRA ILIE
BA in Political Science, University of Bucharest, MA in Comparative Politics, University of Bucharest. Three years of journalistic experience with publications like Gndul, Ziare.com. Research interests: genocides in the XXth century, the Great Famine in Ukraine, the Holocaust, fascism and communism. (alexandra.ilie123@gmail.com)
ALEXANDRA IONACU
Ph.D. in Political Science, Universit Libre de Bruxelles/University of Bucharest. Lecturer with the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest. Main research interests: governmental and parliamentary elites, party organisational development in CEE countries, political communication. (alexandra.ionascu@gmail.com)
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Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008

LE TABLEAU GNRAL DES ACTEURS GOUVERNEMENTAUX

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Un profil sociologique des acteurs ministriels

Romanian Political Science Review vol. XI no. 1 2011

Les lites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008

Les fondements politiques de la promotion en fonctions excutives