Answering the Call: A study of major contributions to UN peacekeeping missions

The demand for UN peacekeepers has grown in recent years. Consequently, the willingness of states to contribute to peacekeeping missions is an issue of practical importance. A wide variety of explanations have been put forward to account for why some states contribute troops to peacekeeping missions while others do not. This paper develops a mid-range theory, bridging macro-level analysis and micro-level studies, to explain major contributions of peacekeepers. The integrated theory stresses concrete incentives for High Income States but also develops an explanation of peacekeeping contributions among Low Income States, centered on state capacity. The main contribution of the integrated theory is not in incorporating a number of factors but in specifying the conditions under which they are salient to understanding peacekeeper contributions. This theory is tested for its ability to predict major contributors to fourteen UN peacekeeping missions over the last eight years.

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Over the last twenty years, UN peacekeeping missions have become prominent features on the landscape of international security. These new peacekeeping missions often involve a more proactive role for the forces deployed, including peace making and enforcing (Ratner 1995). These missions have also grown in size, many demanding thousands of soldiers. The personnel contributions made by states to peacekeeping eorts are voluntary, and the ability of UN missions to operate depends in large part on the willingness of states to step forward and send their citizens to far o lands for the cause of global stability. Why states volunteer peacekeepers is, thus, a question of practical importance, but it is also one of theoretical interest. The question has been tackled from a number of perspectives. Realists have stressed the narrow self-interest motivating contributions (Neack 1995). The liberal perspective emphasizes a broader interpretation of self-interest rooted in security as a public good (Bobrow and Boyer 1997). Critical theorists have suggested that peacekeeping can be considered a form of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace (Pugh 2004, 41). To supplement these larger theoretical perspectives, scholars have developed other ad hoc explanations. Explanations have stressed the nancial windfall to states for contributing, the quest of middle power states to obtain a place on the security council, or thankfulness for prior UN peacekeeping eorts that beneted contributing states. These explanations are somewhat unsatisfactory or case specic, and these explanations do not always mesh well with the experiences of the post-Cold War world. What is needed is a more integrated theory to explain why states answer the UNs call for peacekeepers. In this study I try to meet this challenge, integrating the various hypotheses on peacekeeper contribution into a single coherent argument. This argument is then tested against contributions to UN peacekeeping operations from 2001 to 2008.

Theoretical Explanations

A recent survey of peacekeeping literature by Bures (2007) reveals a wide variety of case specic work, often oering practical advice for improving peacekeeping missions but a dearth of theoretical literature that is specic to peacekeeping. This is particularly true in that much of the theoretical work done on peacekeeping has been woven seamlessly into the realistliberal debate. Bures argues that what is needed in the peacekeeping literature is a series of mid-range theories to bridge the gap between macro-level theory and micro-level analysis. I begin this process of developing a mid-range theory by working through the strengths and weaknesses of the various macro-level perspectives on peacekeeper contributions. The realist explanation is identied most closely with Laura Neack (1995),1 who argues that the most frequent contributors to peacekeeping are states that have attempted to establish themselves as regional and/or non-aligned or rising global powers. Peacekeeping, therefore, is a way for states to ex muscle and assert inuence on the world stage. Monnakgotla (1996) goes one step further, arguing that peacekeeping is self-interested action to establish, preserve, or increase a states own position and power base in the world. Peacekeeping in the realist view is yet another forum for power politics to play out. Given this view of the world, the realist perspective would predict that major contributors to peacekeeping operations would be powerful states or states seeking to advance their position. States tting this characterization do contribute to peacekeeping operations, yet there are numerous prominent examples that this approach cannot easily explain. States such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Fiji have provided large numbers of troops to peacekeeping operations. These states play a bit part in great power politics and their national interests are only minimally aected by the outcomes of conicts occurring thousands of miles away. Realism has laid claim to the peacekeeping as power politics explanation. Liberal theory has, predictably, taken up opposite position by emphasizing the benevolent action

overtones of peacekeeping. Liberal theory stresses that states have a general interest in seeing the preservation of peace and stability in the system. When violence in some corner of the world threatens the system, the magnifying power of the CNN eect forges a constituency for action. Images of needless suering evoke concern among the public, which pressures policy makers, who then use international organizations to send up distress ares on behalf of the helpless (Jakobsen 1996). At this point, democratic states, an essential leg of the Kantian tripod,2 step forward to defend international stability (Anderson 2000). If this scenario is correct, then sending peacekeepers is idealpolitik at its best (Anderson 2000, 2), as states work collaboratively to provide a global public good. The role of international cooperation in the provision of peacekeepers has been itself a dynamic research agenda among idealist-leaning scholars. Shimizu and Sandler (2002), focusing primarily on the nancing of peacekeeping, argue that in a pure public goods environment the burden of public goods provision will fall to the largest actors. Bobrow and Boyer (2005, 248-249), by contrast, observe that while there is a steady core of states that provide personnel to peacekeeping missions, the burden carried by these states has actually declined as a more diverse pool of states have stepped in to take on the task of providing peacekeepers. The public goods approach is a conceptually useful framework for understanding peacekeeping. However, this approach requires additional renements to oer predictive utility. To hone the predictive power of the public goods approach requires the recognition that states may benet from peacekeeping in ways that are not related to the public good being provided. These country specic benets are important in providing additional incentives to states to contribute peacekeepers. Shimizu and Sandler (2002, 656) suggest that states may benet from prestige, status enhancement, and stability for neighboring countries. They also suggest that when countries have economic links to the state in conict, there may be direct economic benets to a state from successful peacekeeping operations. Bobrow and 3

Boyer (1997) also stress the immediate benets to neighboring countries when a conict ends, but they also touch on the immediate nancial benets to countries that provide peacekeepers. Some countries are able to deploy peacekeepers for less than the stipend oered by the United Nations, which creates the possibility of deploying peacekeepers as a way to make money. Pakistan is often cited as an example of peacekeeping as a for-prot activity. Bobrow and Boyer (1997, 727) identify less direct benets as well. Peacekeeping may be a way for states to provide training and experience to their soldiers, or it may serve the goal of keeping troops busy, far away, and out of trouble. Boyer (1993) has argued that these country specic benets can create opportunities for a division of labor in how public goods are provided, which can lead to greater eciency in public good provisions. Liberal explanations for peacekeeper provision, thus, hinge on a mix of benevolence and self-interest. Realist explanations, however, have also put forward a variation on the benevolent selfinterest position by focusing on the desire of states to protect a system in which they benet. Neack (1995) stresses that peacekeeping, at least during the Cold War, tended to be dominated by middle powers because the middle power states had a vested interest in protecting the existing order. She argues that for these states it is unrealistic to imagine completely revising the world system to better serve their interests (Neack 1995, 184). The benevolent self-interest position is coherent and exible. It is able to incorporate many dierent elements as it ascribes motives to countries that support peacekeeping, but it to is limited in its predictive power. Many states view stability in the current international system as desirable. It is unclear what prompts some states to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers and other states with perhaps equal levels of concern for international stability to free ride or commit only a small handful of peacekeepers. Placing emphasis on the extraordinary benets to contributing states oers a stop gap explanation but raises a new problem. If peacekeeping, with all of its training, equipment, and compensatory benets, is such a protable venture for poor states, why are poor states not clambering to contribute 4

peacekeepers? Why are poor states not demanding more peacekeeping operations to increase the opportunities for states to contribute? Why is peacekeeping not widely seen as a wealth redistribution scheme? This does not invalidate the additional benets argument, which was developed in relation to peacekeeping as a public good, but it does suggest that additional reection is warranted. The next section builds on the explanations put forward by others to hone the predictive power of these arguments.

An Integrated Mid-Range Theory

The development of a mid-range theory requires that the theorys scope rst be established. This explanation of peacekeeper contributions is limited in the following ways. First, this study focuses on the contributions of soldiers (not police) to UN peacekeeping operations. The theory may be less applicable to peacekeeping operations spearheaded by regional organizations, and parts of the theory may have no relevance in attempting to explain foreign intervention. Second, the explanation developed here is focused on explaining major contributions. Major contributions involve a large number of peacekeepers, typically more than 200 to a single mission. The vast majority of states do not deploy peacekeepers, and of the states that do deploy peacekeepers, the vast majority send only a small handful (less than 25).3 Thus, this theory seeks to explain the behavior of a small but important group of states. I argue that the vast majority of major contributions can be explained in terms of two elements: capacity and incentives. Capacity and incentives are umbrella concepts, which can be met in a number of ways. Furthermore, these elements are inter-related, and how they operate is conditional on features of the states themselves. The next section sketches out how these two elements dened and how they are aect contributions to peacekeeping missions. 5

2.1

Capacity

Although the issue of capacity (a states ability to take some action) is not addressed in the above discussion of why states contribute to peacekeeping missions, it is an essential part of understanding the dierence between contributors and non-contributors. We cannot assume that all states are equal in their ability to provide a large number of peacekeepers. States are diverse not only in their levels of power but also in their ability to project power and the cost associated with the projection of power. Thus, when we talk about capacity, we are talking about the conditions that make the provision of peacekeeping by a state possible.4 Capacity, as it is used here, not only involves the ability to do some action, but also includes an element of cost eectiveness of an action given the xed incentives available for an activity. As has been noted in the theoretical debates, peacekeeping oers states a range of incentives. Some incentives are tangible, such as the peacekeeper stipend, while others, like prestige or desire to give back to the international community for past peacekeeping missions, are less tangible. The value of benets from peacekeeping and the provision of peacekeepers can be viewed in terms of supply and demand. When the UN Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping force, the UN eectively issues a want-ad for peacekeepers. To entice potential suppliers of peacekeepers to step forward, a range of incentives is oered. Who answers the call is primarily determined by market forces. Countries that are able to meet the UNs call for peacekeepers in an economically advantageous way likely have a conuence of favorable conditions, including a low cost of supplying peacekeepers, eective military and governmental institutions, and linguistic capacity. Chief among these favorable conditions is the cost of supplying peacekeepers, but this condition is not sucient for a state to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers. As was noted earlier, there are a large number of countries that could eld peacekeepers for less than the UN stipend. Most of the large contributions do in fact come from states in the developing

world, but these states represent a small minority of the states that could theoretically deploy peacekeepers for prot. This prompts consideration of other factors that might explain why some developing states contribute large numbers of peacekeepers while others contribute none.

Military Capacity: The deployment of a small number of peacekeepers is relatively simple. Commercial airlines or a UN cargo plane can deploy a dozen would-be peacekeepers to virtually any location. Command and control, logistics, and training all become more complicated when deploying thousands of troops. At the risk of being tautological, I argue that if a state lacks the military capacity to deploy a large number of troops at great distance, the state will not do so. There are, of course, ways to overcome a decit in military capacity. States with limited force projection capability may be able to deploy peacekeepers if the destination is relatively close (a neighboring state) or if they receive logistical assistance from the UN or from another state, but states that have the necessary capacity already in place are better positioned to contribute to UN missions (Roomy 2004, 124-125). Hypothesis 1a: States that are able to project military force will be more likely to contribute troops than states that are unable to project force. This factor is relevant for all states in the international system; however, it is likely to be more of a factor when looking at developing countries. High Income States tend to have militaries with more advanced technical and logistical capabilities and in most instances should not be constrained by this aspect of capacity. Linguistic Capacity: Linguistic interoperability is a central challenge of multinational military operations. Linguistic interoperability is essential if orders are to be eectively disseminated and if peacekeepers are to be able to communicate with units from other states 7

(Crossey 2005). A military that can operate in a major world language (particularly English) is better positioned to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers than militaries that are only able to operate in local languages with limited speakers internationally. Some countries, for historical and political reasons, are more likely to have large numbers of ocers and enlisted soldiers who are procient in English. English has wide usage internationally due to the legacy of the British colonial empire and more recently because of the pervasiveness of American business, academic, and popular culture (Berger 1997). There are also political motivations for a military to voluntarily adopt a foreign language. Many NATO countries strive to have their ocer corps functional in English to ensure eective coordination of NATO forces. As part of this eort, NATO developed English language training materials specically designed for peacekeepers.5 The British Council has since distributed these materials to help with communication and coordination for UN peacekeeping missions (Crossey 2005). Language is critical factor that aects a states ability to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. While there are many states with incentives to send peacekeepers, some states are linquistically better positioned to deploy large numbers of peacekeepers. These states are the rst to step forward and answer the call for peacekeepers, and they are able to sustain their contributions for longer periods of time. Linguistic capacity helps to create a comparative advantage, particularly for Low Income States, in the provision of peacekeepers. Hypothesis 1b: States that have the linguistic capacity to integrate their militaries into international forces will be more likely to contribute troops than states that do not have the linguistic capacity to support peacekeeper provision.

2.2

Incentives

The previous section stressed that peacekeepers were provided by states who might conceivably nd the UN stipend enticing and who were able to actually eld peacekeepers. High Income States are unlikely to be swayed by the UN stipend, but other factors might create the necessary incentives to make peacekeeper provision a worthwhile activity for High Income States. Both the realist and liberal explanations suggest that contributions to peacekeeping are related to self-interest. How this self-interest is framed and why it is important diers, but contributions seem to be related to the utility states derive from contributing. Rather than trying to plant the ag for realism or liberalism, I attempt to incorporate both perspectives while rening their predictions. The public goods approach argues that states contribute peacekeepers as a way to provide system-wide stability and security or because there are country specic benets. The more cynical realist approach stresses that indeed states have an interest in security, but it is primarily their own security with which they are concerned, rather than the general provision of security for others. Both theories stress dierent aspects of security or selfinterest, which are reected in the three types of incentives outlined below. Backyard Situations: States are not always interested in stability as an abstract concept. Often their concerns are closer to home. Conicts may unnerve neighboring countries that fear refugee ows, regional destabilization, or a loss of inuence over a neighbor. Participation in a peacekeeping mission can help states advance their own immediate security or advance their national interests. Russias stabilization force in Georgia may t this model. Similarly, NATO and later the the European Unions presence in the former Yugoslavia is consistent with backyard motivations. This pattern can be seen in UN peacekeeping missions as well. The UN stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has over 1,000 peacekeepers from Brazil. This is a far greater commitment of human resources than Brazil has made 9

for any of the current UN peacekeeping missions.6 Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that backyard situations are an important driver of peacekeeper provision. Hypothesis 2a: States that have a backyard interest in a conict are more likely to contribute peacekeepers than states that perceive no direct strategic dimension to the conict. The backyard explanation for peacekeeper provision diers somewhat from the other factors discussed thus far. If a conict occurs in a states backyard, the capacity requirement is rendered largely moot. Even states with limited capacity can usually deploy medium-sized forces to neighboring countries. Backyard situations should create important incentives for states to contribute regardless of a states level of wealth or institutional eectiveness. Destabilizing Situations Both realist and liberal theory suggest that states contribute to peacekeeping out of a benevolent self-interest. When the international order is under assault, states that are vested in the systems stability work to restore order. Conicts that spill across borders may create a greater urgency for the international community to act. Thus, a desire to protect the status quo is yet another source of incentives that can induce states to contribute when it is not cost eective. Hypothesis 2b: States that have the capacity to deploy peacekeepers globally (High Income States) are more likely to do so for conicts that are potentially destabilizing to international order than for conicts that do not threaten the status quo. The impact of this factor, may vary from one situation to another. As was noted above, not all states have the minimum capacity to deploy a large number of peacekeepers. Low Income States that are readily able to provide peacekeepers already have a sizable incentive to contribute, thus this factor is expected to have its greatest impact among High Income States, which would include most great powers and middle powers. 10

Protection of Markets: States may need an extra prompting to contribute to peacekeeping. One source of tangible incentives that has been oered by Shimizu and Sandler (2002) is increased opportunities for trade. Stabilizing a trading partner can yield concrete gains for a state. In short, the greater the trade relations between a potential contributor to peacekeeping and the target state, the greater the potential payo if the peacekeeping mission is a success. Hypothesis 2c: States that have the capacity to deploy peacekeepers globally (high income states) are more likely to do so when they have trade relations to protect than when a potential contributor has no economic stake in the success of the peacekeeping mission. As with high prole situations, the protection of markets is expected to matter most among states that could easily contribute but do not nd the xed benets, such as the monthly stipend, to be enticing. High Income States are most likely to increase their willingness to contribute given the additional economic incentives. The argument developed here focuses on two dierent elements, capacity and incentives, but these elements are not equally important for all states. I have posited that the impact of these factors is conditional on a states level of economic wealth. This assertion, however, needs to be tested empirically to evaluate its predictive power.

3
3.1

Research Design
Methodology and Sample

To test the above explanation for the contribution of peacekeepers to UN missions, I employ a series of rare event logistic regression models.7 The analysis looks at major contributions to fourteen dierent UN peacekeeping missions from 2001 to 2008.8 Because the integrated 11

theory argues that the salient explanatory factors for a major contributions to peacekeeping missions change as states become wealthier, three separate models are run, each representing a dierent range of countries. The dierences between the three models are as central to the testing of the integrated theory as are the coecients on any particular variable. The integrated theory is not supported simply by the nding of a statistically signicant relationship in one of the three models. Several aspects of the theory apply solely to high income or low income states, thus it is only in these models that the integrated theory can be tested. Unfortunately, there is no objective standard for dividing states along the continuum of rich and poor. The division adopted here is a slight modication of the World Banks country classication scheme. The World Bank classication system sorts countries as low, lower middle, upper middle, and high income. In 2000 High Income States had levels of GNP per capita starting at $9,361 USD. This reects the top 30% of the worlds states. Low income states are dened here as countries with GDP per capita of less than $3,031 GDP per capita. This includes both the Low Income and Lower Middle Income groups. Approximately 37% of states fall into this group. This leaves 33% of countries in Upper Middle Income range, which I will refer to as Middle Income States in this analysis.

3.2

Operationalizing Motivations for Peacekeeping

To test the integrated model, six dierent aspects of the theory are examined using eight dierent indicators. The following section operationalizes these indicators in a way that will allow for a statistical analysis of the integrated theory. In addition to the various aspects of the integrated theory, several control variables are also discussed. Because the dependent variable was coded by analyzing peacekeeper contributions from 2001-2008, the independent and control variables reect values from 2000. Lagging the independent variables by one year

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ensures that any causal inferences meet the minimum requirement that the posited cause pre-dates the eect being studied. Military Capacity (1 Variable): A countrys ability to project force is assessed using the COW National Material Capabilities Data v.3.02 (Singer et. al. 1972). The approach used to operationalize force projection is to take the product of a countrys relative military size and the relative capital intensity of a countrys military machine.9 The emphasis on relative size is intuitive in that larger militaries are more powerful ceteris paribus. But large militaries are not enough for a state to be able to project force. Fordham argues in favor of weighting relative size by capital intensity because whatever the technology of the time, power projection capability requires a substantial investment in equipment relative to the number of personnel in the armed forces (Fordham 2006, 17). In 2000 the Force Projection Score runs from 0 to 25 with higher numbers corresponding to larger, more capital-intensive militaries. Linguistic Capacity (1 Variable): I argue that language interoperability is an essential feature in explaining peacekeeper provision. In a rough attempt to account for English language usage, a dichotomous variable is employed to identify states with a British colonial heritage. Information on colonial heritage was collected from the Issue Correlates of War Colonial History Data v.4.0. Backyard Situations (2 Variables): A peacekeeping mission is considered to fall within a states backyard if the mission is geographically close.10 This is measured in terms of the distance in miles between the capital of a potential contributor to peacekeeping missions and the capital of the target state.11 Gleditsch and Wards (2001) data on distance between state capitals is used. The second attempt at identifying backyard situations focuses on former colonial relationships. A dichotomous variable was used to identify former colonial 13

powers with historical ties to the targets of peacekeeping operations. As with the variable for British Colonial Heritage, information on Colonial Legacies was collected from the Issue Correlates of War Colonial History Data v.4.0. Destabilizing Situations (2 Variables): For a conict to be prominent enough to warrant a commitment of peacekeepers by High Income States, the conict must capture the attention of policy makers. I attempt to identify attention grabbing conict in two ways. First, international conicts are more likely to draw media coverage and to be seen as destabilizing than conicts that take place within a single country. A dichotomous variable was coded indicating whether the conict underlying the peacekeeping mission was an interstate conict or not. The second approach to identifying destabilizing situations is to examine refugee ows associated with a conict. When conicts spill across borders, they are more likely to incite the international community to action out of concern for a humanitarian crisis or out of concern for neighboring states, which could potentially be destabilized by a large inux of refugees. Data on refugee ows was drawn from the data set Forcibly Displaced Populations, 1964-2006, which was compiled by Monte G. Marshal at the Center for Systemic Peace.12 Protection of Markets (1 Variable): Economic linkages between states are operationalized as the volume of trade (exports + imports) between a given country to the state (or states) involved in the peacekeeping operations. The logic behind this has been laid out in the intervention literature, which argues that economic links between states can provide a motivation for intervention in conicts.13 The data on trade was taken from Gleditschs (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data. Control Variables (2 Variables): In addition to the independent variables needed to test the integrated theory theory, two control variables are also included in this analysis. First, a control is included for the authorized strength of the UN mission, as larger missions 14

require more peacekeepers than smaller missions. Second, the Polity IV score of potential contributors is included to control for level of democracy.14

Evaluating the Integrated Model

Major contributions to peacekeeping missions are rare. For each of the fourteen peacekeeping missions examined from 2001-2008, only a handful of states contributed more than 200 peacekeepers. Among Low Income States (under $3,030 GNP per capita in USD), there were 966 opportunities for states to contribute to peacekeeping. Only 63 (6.5%) of these opportunities resulted in a major contribution of peacekeepers. These 63 contributions were provided by 22 dierent states. A similar pattern is seen for Middle Income States ($3,0319,360 GNP per capita in USD). In these states 3.2% of the 854 opportunities involved a major contribution of peacekeepers. In total, fteen Middle Income States stepped forward to assume this burden. Among High Income States (over $9,361 GNP per capita in USD), twenty states made major contributions of peacekeepers, several making multiple contributions. These major contributions, however, account for only 3.7% of the 784 opportunities for High Income States to contribute to the fourteen dierent UN peacekeeping missions active during this period. A Chi Square test15 shows a statistically signicant dierence between these three groups, with Low Income States contributing more than would be expected if contributions were distributed randomly. While the distribution of these contributions is worth noting, it does not oer new insights into the motivations of contributing states. For that, three rare event logistic regression models are run (see Table 1).

[Table 1 About Here]

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In evaluating the rst set of hypotheses, which argues that Low Income States with the necessary capacity will be more likely to make major contributions, there are two independent variables to be assessed. Military capacity is reected in the Force Projection Score. Linguistic capacity is approximated using the British Colonial Heritage variable, which serves as a proxy for the widespread use of English. In the rst two models, focusing on Low Income and Middle Income States, there is some evidence to support the logic of capacity and comparative advantage as drivers of peacekeeper provision. The Force Projection Score and British Colonial Heritage have a positive and statistically signicant impact on the probability that a state will make a major contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. The expectation of the integrated theory was that capacity would be less of a constrain on High Income States. This also seems to be supported in that the coecients associated with Force Projection Score and British Colonial Heritage are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Taken together, this suggests that while eective military institutions and linguistic interoperability are critical factors in distinguishing major contributors from non-major contributors among Low Income and Middle Income States, these factors are not constraints on High Income States. In total, there seems to be strong support for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. This in turn lends support to the larger argument that among Low Income States a comparative advantage is an important factor in understanding peacekeeper provision. Having addressed the role of capacity, I now turn to the role of incentives as laid out in the second set of hypotheses. For Hypothesis 2a all three models are relevant. Backyard situations are hypothesized to be salient regardless of a states wealth, although for slightly dierent reasons. In Middle Income and High Income States, backyard situations are primarily a function of security. In Low Income States backyard situations involve a security component, but geographic proximity also reduce the challenge of peacekeeper deployment, thus reecting an element of capacity as well as security.16 In all three models, 16

the coecients associated with Miles Between Capitals are negative, suggesting that states are less likely to become involved in peacekeeping missions in distant locations than they are to become involved when the peacekeeping operation is in their neighborhood. Although the coecients are in the predicted direction for all three models, the eect is statistically signicant only in the models for Low Income and High Income states. A second aspect of backyard situations that pertains primarily to High Income States is the presence of a colonial legacy linking the contributing state to the peacekeeping mission. A Prior Colonial Relationship has a statistically signicant positive eect on the probability that a High Income State will contribute to peacekeeping missions. Given the measures for backyard situations were statistically signicant in the appropriate models, it seems that there is support for Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2b proposed that High Income States may be prompted to contribute to peacekeeping missions that address potentially destabilizing situations. Destabilizing situations are dened here as either an interstate conict or a conict involving a large volume of refugees. In the logistic regression model associated with High Income States, neither variable lends support to the destabilizing situations hypothesis. For the Interstate Conict variable the coecient is positive but falls well short of a statistical signicance. For Refugees the impact is statistically signicant, but the negative coecient is in the wrong direction. It appears that destabilizing situations, as operationalized here, do not increase the probability that a High Income State will make a major contribution of personnel to a UN peacekeeping mission. Hypothesis 2c focuses on economic incentives as measured by volume of trade between a contributing country to a state aected by the peacekeeping mission. The expectation was that the incentives from trade relations would be most decisive for High Income States. Based on the results of the three models it appears that this expectation was incorrect. The volume of trade has no statistically signicant impact on peacekeeper provision for High 17

Income States. High levels of trade do, however, appear to provide additional incentives for Middle and Low Income States. For both groups the coecient associated with Trade was positive and statistically signicant. Although Trade was not statistically signicant in the model associated with High Income States, the fact that Trade was signicant among Middle Income States does oer limited support for the idea that additional incentives can make states more inclined to make major contributions. Before moving onto a discussion of the substantive eects of these models, it is worth discussing several of the control variables included in this analysis. Authorization in all three models was positive, which is intuitive. The greater the number of troops needed, the more states are likely to answer the call for contributions. Authorization was statistically signicant for both Low and Middle Income States. The Polity Score partially conformed to expectations. Past research (Anderson 2000) has suggested that democracies are more likely to shoulder the burden of peacekeeping than non-democracies. This study oers some evidence in favor of this nding but also points to a potential limitation. In all three models the Polity Score was associated with a positive coecient, but it was only among Low Income States that the eect was statistically signicant. Although further research is needed, it appears that the impact of democracy on a states willingness to contribute to peacekeeping is conditional on a states wealth.

4.1

Substantive Impact

The argument put forward in this paper is tested using multiple variables. Consequently, it can be dicult to extract the impact of a constellation of variables on the probability of states making a major contribution to peacekeeping missions. To help illustrate how capacity and incentives aect who contributes, I focus in this section on the substantive eects of the various independent variables on the probability of making a major contribution.

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Among ordinary Low Income States (with all continuous explanatory variables set to the median), the probability of states contributing a large number of troops to peacekeeping missions is relatively low (4.8%). Holding all other factors constant, the probability of contributing more than doubles (11.1%) for states with a British colonial heritage compared to states without a British colonial heritage. From this point, the eect doubles again for states that are geographically proximate. The median distance between capitals for Low Income States is 3,267 miles. For states whose capitals are only 500 miles apart, the probability of major peacekeeping operations jumps an additional 5.6% to 16.7% Table 2 attempts to illustrate the importance of capacity in understanding contributions. For states lacking in military capacity, dened as a Force Projection Score of 0.0, and lacking in linguistic capacity, there is only a 4.7% chance that a state will attempt to shoulder a major contribution of peacekeepers. By contrast, when looking at Low Income States for whom capacity issues are not a barrier, as dened as having a Force Projection Score that is two standard deviations above the mean and a British colonial legacy, over 16% will contribute in a sizable way to UN peacekeeping eorts. Capacity variables are powerful predictors of contributions for Low Income States. Among High Income States, Prior Colonial Relationship is the dominant predictive variable. The median High Income State is very unlikely to make a major contribution to UN peacekeeping missions (3.6%). An identical state that has a colonial link to the state in conict is far more likely to make a contribution to UN peacekeeping eorts. With a colonial link the probability that a state will contribute to a peacekeeping operation jumps to 56.1.% This is illustrated in Table 3, which also includes the impact of the conict underlying the peacekeeping mission being an interstate conict.

[Table 2 About Here]

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[Table 3 About Here]

Conclusions

This study has attempted to explain why states might make substantial contributions of human resources to UN peacekeeping operations. Rather than looking for general factors that correlate with contributing states, this study began with the premise that states may have dierent motivations depending on their level of economic development. Low Income States are well compensated for peacekeeping, thus the explanations developed focused on the capacity of these states to actually contribute troops. High Income States are unlikely to be swayed by the xed level of compensation oered by the UN and are less likely to struggle with the issue of capacity. Thus, their behavior must be driven by other factors. In particular, former colonial relationships and geographic proximity seem to be the primary drivers for High Income States. The result is two conceptual models, one largely consistent with High Income States and one largely consistent with Low Income States, that highlight dierent motivations. The statistical analysis lends support to certain aspects of the integrated theory but leaves other parts unsupported. For example, the integrated theory suggested that economic links would provide important motivations for High Income States, yet High Income States appear not to be swayed by the potential economic gains that come from stabilizing conicts. Yet, on further reection this is not entirely unexpected. High Income States tend to have much higher levels of trade than Low Income States. Perhaps the volume of trade in these cases was simply not large enough to provide sucient incentives for High Income States given the greater costs associated with the deployment of peacekeepers from High Incomes States. A preliminary examination of Trade relative to the size of a states economy supports this 20

line of thinking. The Trade variable is on average equivalent to 4.5% of GDP for High Income States. This is roughly half as much as the corresponding percentage for Middle Income States (8.15%) and is a fraction of the percentage associated with Low Income States (16.1%). A second area where the integrated theory failed to nd statistical support is the expectation that destabilizing situations would create incentives for action. The benevolent self-interest explanation, which is found in both realist and liberal explanations for peacekeeping, was unsuccessful in explaining the behavior of High Income States. So what is to be made of this? There are several possible explanations for the failure of this dimension of the theory. First, it is possible that these factors do not drive the behavior of states; this aspect of the theory may simply be wrong. Alternatively, a case could be made that the concept of destabilizing situations was not well operationalized, so the test is inconclusive. It is quite possible that the proxy variables used to identify highly destabilizing situations were too crude. There is, however, a third possible explanation: benevolent self-interest may indeed be relevant but not in the way the original model proposed. High Income States may not be more likely to contribute to destabilizing situations, but destabilizing situations may be more likely to be selected by the United Nations for peacekeeping. Thus, benevolent self-interest is not at work in explaining the question who contributes but may be more relevant to the question contributes to what. Other aspects of liberal theory fare better in the statistical analysis, particularly the strain of thinking on peacekeeping as a public good. The integrated theory suggests that states are indeed looking for country specic benets. For Low Income States the UN stipend may be sucient, assuming the state has the necessary capacity to deploy peacekeepers. High Income States, by contrast, hold back from making major contributions of peacekeepers unless it touches on some larger strategic issue. This of course does not mean that High 21

Income States are not contributing to the provision of global security. High Income States still bear the lions share of the burden in nancing peacekeeping (Bobrow and Boyer 2005, 254-256). Thus, there is a division of labor in peacekeeper provision, which seems consistent with the notion of burden sharing in the provision of a public good. Boyer (1989), building o of Ricardos economic theory of comparative advantage, argues that states may be able to provide public goods in a more ecient way by specializing in the areas in which they are best able to make a contribution. The integrated model developed in this paper is largely consistent with the division of labor and public goods perspective. In all, the integrated theory is an important step in merging competing macro level perspectives into a more actor-centric explanation for why states contribute to UN peacekeeping eorts. This is by no means the end of this discussion. Rather, it is the start of a new discussion that places economic dierences among states at the forefront of how we explain contributions to peacekeeping.

22

Notes
1

Also see Neack (1992) Empirical Observations on Middle Power Behavior at the Start

of a New International System.

2

The Kantian tripod refers to democracy, trade, and international organizations, which

are part of Kants vision for a more peaceful world. For more on this theme see, Russett et. al (1998).
3

Explaining the dierence in behavior for states that make negligible contributions and

states that do not contribute at all is an interesting question, but, ultimately, it is beyond the scope of this project. My own intuition suggests that a norm based approach is perhaps better suited to explaining the behavior of states that routinely make a small contribution of peacekeepers.
4

This parallels what Harvey Starr refers to as opportunity in his discussion of the

various correlates of war. Opportunity, according to Starr, involves technology and geography that make it possible for states to engage in war, irrespective of their motivations for doing so (Starr 1978, 368).
5

NATO developed a CD Rom titled Tactical English for Land Forces in Peace-Support

Operations to help new NATO members prepare for deployment on NATO peacekeeping operations.
6

As of January 2007, Brazil had 1,213 peacekeepers on the ground in Haiti. At the time,

Brazil was contributing to 6 other peacekeeping missions. Of these 6 other UN peacekeeping missions, Brazils largest troop commitment was 27 peacekeepers deployed to Sudan.
7

Because major contributions of peacekeepers is a rare event, standard logistic regression

can provide biased estimates that understate the impact of explanatory variables. To correct for this, I follow the recommendations of King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b), employing an altered version of Statas logit command, relogit (Tomz et al. 1999).

23

During this time period there were many other peacekeeping missions in operation.

These missions were not included in this analysis either because the total authorization for the mission was so low that no major contributions were needed or because the mission was primarily a police operation and did not involve large contributions of troops.
9

The details of how this score was constructed and the logic behind this operationalization

can be found in Bejamin O. Fordhams (2006) paper What Makes a Major Power?
10

While I rely upon geographic proximity as an indicator of Backyard Situations, it also

can be read in terms of capacity. The task of deploying peacekeepers is less challenging when states neighbor each other (Boulding 1963).
11

For peacekeeping involving inter-state conicts, the target state with a capital closest to

the disputed border is used as the target country.

12

This data is available through the Integrated Network for Societally Conict Research

(INSCR).
13 14

See Yoon (1997). The Polity score, which subtracts a countrys Autocracy score from its Democracy score,

is used. This score potentially runs from -10 to 10, with countries considered to be coherent democracies if they score 7 or higher (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 474).
15 2 16

(2, N = 2604) = 13.686, p < .05

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 43) argues that distance is less of a constraint for

powerful states than it is for developing states.

24

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Monnakgotla, Kgomotso. 1996. The Naked Face of UN Peacekeeping: Noble crusade or National Self-interest. African Security Review 5(5):5361. Neack, Laura. 1992. Empirical Observations on Middle State Behavior at the Start of the New International System. Pacic Focus 7(1):521. Neack, Laura. 1995. UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self? Journal of Peace Research 32(2):181196. Pugh, Michael. 2004. 11(1):3958. Peacekeeping and Critical Theory. International Peacekeeping

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Table 1: (re)Logit Analysis of Major Peacekeeping Operations Low Income States Force Projection Score British Colonial Heritage Miles Between Capitals (in 1,000s) Colonial Legacy Interstate Conict Refugees Trade Volume (in millions of USD) Mission Authorization (in 1,000s) Polity Score Constant 0.169 (0.081) 0.869 (0.277) 0.185 (0.075) 1.132 (0.450) 0.000003 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.066 (0.030) 0.110 (0.030) 2.832 (0.457) Middle Income States 0.072 (0.026) 1.210 (0.452) 0.121 (0.102) 2.511 (2.068) 0.122 (0.660) 0.003 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 0.106 (0.051) 0.018 (0.033) 3.643 (0.673) High Income States 0.041 (0.067) 0.401 (0.502) 0.184 (0.083) 3.521 (0.708) 0.402 (0.465) 0.003 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.033 (0.046) 0.097 (0.051) 2.548 (0.820)

N 795 670 583 X2 69.97 25.31 41.59 Sig. 0.000 0.003 0.000 Log likelihood 185.2 94.1 94.5 Asterisks correspond to the following thresholds for rejection of the null-hypothesis in a two-tail test. * p > .05; ** p > .01 ; *** p > .001

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Table 2: Impact of Capacity in Low Income States Scenario Comparative Advantage (x + 2 ) Comparative Disadvantage British Force Projection Heritage Score Yes No 2.81 0.00 Probability of Contributing 16.27% 4.69%

General Note: Probabilities are calculated with all other continuous variables set to their median value and all dichotomous variables set to their mode.

Table 3: Impact of Incentives in High Income States Scenario Strong Incentives Minimal Incentives Colonial Legacy Yes No Interstate Conict Yes No Probability of Contributing 63.9% 3.61%

General Note: Probabilities are calculated with all other continuous variables set to their median value and all dichotomous variables set to their mode.

28