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Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the International Impact of Domestic Behavior
MARY CAPRIOLI and PETER F. TRUMBORE Journal of Peace Research 2003 40: 5 DOI: 10.1177/0022343303040001842 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/40/1/5

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 2003 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 1, 2003, pp. 523 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) [0022-3433(200301)40:1; 523; 028842]

Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the International Impact of Domestic Behavior*
MARY CAPRIOLI
Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee

PETER F. TRUMBORE
Department of Political Science, Oakland University
It has been shown in the work of Ted Gurr and others that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion, and that rebellion often leads to interstate conict. The authors seek to discover whether rebellion is the only meaningful link between ethnic discrimination and international violence. Many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence results in a greater likelihood of state use of violence internationally. This argument is most fully developed within feminist literature; however, research in the area of ethno-political conict has also highlighted the negative impact of domestic discrimination on state behavior at the international level. The analysis builds upon the literature linking domestic gender inequality and state aggression to other inequalities created and/or sustained by the state. Using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) and Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) datasets, the authors test whether states characterized by higher levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility or to use force rst when involved in international disputes. Group-level data in MAR are used to create a set of state-level variables measuring the extent of formal and informal discrimination against minority groups. The authors then test whether states with higher levels of discrimination against minority groups are more likely to rely on force when involved in an international dispute, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. Ultimately, the authors conrm their hypotheses that states characterized by domestic inequality with regard to ethnic minorities are more likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility and to use force rst when involved in an interstate conict.

Introduction
Much research in the eld of international conict studies has been predicated on the notion that states duplicate their patterns of domestic political behavior in the international arena (Chan, 1997; Doyle, 1986; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Russett, 1993, 1990;
*

The data used in this article can be found at http: //www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp. Address correspondence to caprioli@utk.edu or trumbore@oakland.edu.

Wilkenfeld, 1973). In particular, the literature on the liberal peace makes this linkage between domestic and international behavior explicit. The liberal peace literature identies a set of benign domestic policies and practices reecting shared norms of peaceful dispute resolution and respect for the rule of law, and emphasizes their pacifying international impact. The literatures on ethnic nationalism and conict from the elds of comparative politics and international

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relations, and on equality from feminist international relations scholarship, however, identify a much darker set of domestic policies and practices whose potential impact is far more malignant when externalized to the international arena. Scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence results in a greater likelihood of state use of violence internationally (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Rummel, 1997; Tessler & Warriner, 1997). This argument is most fully developed within feminist literature; however, theorizing and research in the eld of ethno-nationalism has also highlighted the connections between domestic ethnic discrimination and violence on state behavior at the international level (Gurr & Harff, 1994; Van Evera, 1997). As Kupchan (1995) argues, aggressive ethno-nationalism is predicated on the superiority of an ethnic group and its right to domination. When coupled with control over a state and its institutions, this aggressiveness is expressed domestically as repression and discrimination against ethnic minorities, and internationally as violence against neighboring states (Carment, 1993; Gellner, 1983; Kupchan, 1995). Given this proposition, it is plausible that the international behavior of states may be predicted based on their domestic record of discriminatory policy and practice against resident ethnic minority groups.1 In this project, we attempt to test the general theoretical assertions found in international relations literature identifying domestic factors as predictors of state use of force at the international level. Our analysis draws upon conict, nationalism, and feminist studies focusing on the role of
1 For this article, we use the set of ethnic groups identied

domestic inequality in predicting state behavior internationally. We examine the international behavior of states with varying levels of ethnic discrimination. Our ultimate statistical analysis will examine the impact of domestic patterns of discrimination against ethnic groups on state behavior internationally. Specically, we will use logistic regression to analyze the following propositions based on domestic variations of ethnic discrimination: (1) the likelihood of states to exhibit higher levels of hostility in international disputes; (2) the likelihood of states to use force rst during international disputes. In addition to broadening our understanding of the domestic characteristics affecting interstate conict behavior, this study will inform efforts being made to determine appropriate policy measures intended to minimize violence within the international system.

Domestic Inequality and International Conict

A considerable body of literature has developed linking the domestic treatment of ethnic minority groups and violent interstate conict. In most of this work, it is assumed that ethno-political rebellion is the main causal link between ethnic discrimination at the domestic level and violent interstate conict.2 Exceptions to this are articles by Davis, Jaggers & Moore (1997) and Moore & Davis (1998) in which the authors specically consider the impact of discriminatory state practices on the likelihood of conict between pairs of states. The situational context in
See, for example, edited volumes by Brown (1993, 1996), Brown et al. (1997), Carment & James (1997), and Lake & Rothchild (1998).
2

as at risk by the Minorities at Risk project. See Gurr (1993, 2000) for specic information on the denitions of ethnicity and identity employed by the MAR project team and the criterion used to identify and classify at risk groups.

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which they test the impact of ethnic discrimination, however, limits the generalizability of their ndings. The authors are specically interested in the impact of transnational ethnic ties, particularly ethnic alliances, on dyadic conict and cooperation. They hypothesize that high levels of discrimination against an ethnic group will lead to higher levels of conict between the discriminatory state and a rival state controlled by the ethnic kin of the oppressed group. Moore & Davis nd, however, that the treatment of ethnic minorities has little overall impact on dyadic relations (1998: 98). Several factors lead us to be cautious about drawing general conclusions about the impact of ethnic discrimination on international conict based on the ndings discussed above. First, the authors analysis covers only a single year of dyadic interactions, 197778, and thus their ndings are generalizable only so far as that year is typical. Second, and more importantly, their focus on the impact of discrimination as a trigger for conict in dyads characterized by an ethnic alliance further narrows the general applicability of their null nding. We believe, however, based principally on insights derived from feminist international relations scholarship, that domestic ethnic discrimination may have an independent impact on the likelihood of violent interstate conict, which is both separate from rebellion and not dependent upon the existence of an ethnic alliance between an oppressed ethnic minority and a nearby kin state. It has been argued that hierarchical patterns of dominance and subordination, whether based on class, caste, gender, race, or ethnicity, are ubiquitous across the international system (Tickner, 1992). The norms and patterns of behavior that accompany such relationships of dominance and subordination pose particular challenges for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Some scholars argue that a conception of power as

domination and control is used as the rationale for subjugation, thus leading to greater societal violence, which may in turn lead to greater interstate violence (Iannello, 1992). Indeed, scholars have highlighted the role of structural hierarchies in perpetuating violence against women, and by extension other disadvantaged groups (Almond & Verba, 1963; Gailey, 1987; Eckstein, 1966; Iannello, 1992; Tickner, 1992). Following this logic, a society that arbitrarily discriminates against some of its citizens a state in which political and economic inequalities are perpetuated through policy and social practice should be more likely to exhibit violence in their foreign policy as they externalize a world-view centered on their own sense of superiority and their perception of power as nite. States that are not organized according to strict hierarchical models, whether they are based on class, gender, or ethnicity, should be more likely to treat others, regardless of differences, as equal and due equal treatment. This is more than just an abstract issue of social justice. A domestic political and/or social atmosphere in which formal and informal modes of discrimination are commonplace may translate into higher levels of international violence by states exhibiting such atmospheres, an argument that can be found in some of the feminist and democratic peace literature (Caprioli, 2000; Harrington, 1992; Weart, 1994). Empirical tests of this proposition demonstrate that higher levels of domestic gender inequality are associated with higher levels of interstate violence (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli & Boyer, 2001). This leads us to expect that domestic equality in general will help predict state use of force internationally, thus verifying the theoretical link between domestic discrimination and interstate violence. If our assumptions about the malign effects of domestic inequality are correct,

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other forms of domestic discrimination and inequity beyond that related to gender should produce similar effects on international conict. While a case has been made that gender inequity is the most obvious and widespread manifestation of hierarchical social structures (see Tickner, 1992), discrimination and inequality based on ethnic difference is also commonplace throughout the international system. It has been argued that in many states, if not the majority, it is on the basis of ethnicity that political and economic access and power are limited and inequality is justied and maintained (Bell-Flailkoff & Markovits, 1995; Yack, 1999). Issues of ethnic membership determine access to resources and control in that a persons social and economic position accords not only status but also access to political and economic systems (UN, 1984: 17). Gurr (1993: 34) makes the case that the inequalities dividing majorities from disadvantaged minorities are ubiquitous across regimes, the enduring legacies of historical processes of conquest, state building, migration, and economic development: Every people who established an empire or settled frontiers, who conquered nonbelievers or civilized natives, who built a modern state, did so at the expense of weaker and less fortunate peoples. Patterns of political and economic disadvantage were thus the almost inevitable result of relationships of dominance and subordination established through these processes. Groups that won out in conquest, state building, and economic development established patterns of authority and various kinds of social barriers to protect their advantages, including the policies and practices for which we use the shorthand label of discrimination (Gurr, 1993: 36). At the same time, as many if not most of these groups resisted subordination, their resistance was taken as justication for deeper restrictions, which over time laid the

basis for persistent inequality (Gurr, 2000). While formal state practices of discrimination have become gradually less common in the past thirty years, Group discrimination as a matter of social practice nonetheless is widespread and often persists despite public policies that guarantee freedom from discrimination (Gurr, 2000: 107). Indeed, higher levels of social discrimination can lead to more violent international behavior. Rummel (1997: 170) argues that when political power is centralized, nondemocratic, and highly dependent upon ones social group membership, be it race, religion, ethnicity, or some cultural division, then collective violence is also highly likely. In the light of the above discussion on the links between gender equality and interstate conict behavior, we expect that states that typically exhibit ethnic discrimination and violence in their domestic relations will also externalize those behaviors. Given the above discussion, we contend that the treatment of ethnic minorities by the state is a potentially important predictor of a states likelihood to use force and to use force rst in international disputes. Van Evera (1997: 29) makes this connection explicit when he hypothesizes that the more severely nationalities oppress minorities living in their states, the greater the risk of war. Thus, in keeping with other equality-based explanations for state use of force internationally, we posit that states that repress or discriminate against minority groups within their territory exhibit domestic policies of violence and inequality that are transferred to the international arena. This hypothesized effect of state discrimination and violence against minorities would be an overall greater likelihood of violent international behavior. Such a nding would add further depth to the established literature pointing to the role of domestic political factors in predicting state violence at the international level.

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Hypotheses
Based on our previous discussion of the possible connection between domestic inequality and interstate violence, we have formulated the following testable hypotheses: (1) The higher the level of domestic ethnic discrimination, the greater the likelihood that a state will exhibit higher levels of hostility during interstate disputes. (2) The higher the level of domestic ethnic discrimination, the greater the likelihood that a state will use force rst during interstate disputes.

Research Design and Methodology

Beyond theoretical inquiry, this project uses statistical analysis to test the hypotheses, which will be analyzed using a large N, crossnational, longitudinal study of state behavior, coding for discrimination against ethnic minority groups while controlling for other variables known to predict foreign policy behavior. Our unit of analysis is the state, for we are interested in predicting the behavior of states in interstate disputes. We use a monadic analysis, for theory leads to the expectation that a state characterized by policies of discrimination and violence against its own citizens will be more violent in interstate disputes. In other words, we are testing whether state policies and practices of domestic discrimination have an independent effect on the states international dispute behavior, rather than whether specic characteristics of the target state will inuence the behavior of the actor. We do, however, introduce certain control variables into our models to account for certain dyad characteristics that have been shown to affect a states likelihood of using force in an international dispute. These

control variables are described in detail in the following section. Data for this project come from three primary sources. Measures of domestic patterns of ethnic discrimination, transnational distribution of ethnic groups, and rebellion activity are taken from the current version of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Gurr, 1999). To test the impact of these domestic-level variables, data on international conict behavior is taken from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Bremer, 1996) and a separate dataset on rst use of force in such disputes (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2000). To build the dataset on rst use of force, we began with the set of all MIDs from 1980 through 1992. All states involved in disputes in which violence was not used were coded as no rst use of force. When only one state in a dispute dyad used force, it was coded as rst user of force by default. For those disputes in which both sides used force, rst use was determined by collecting contemporary news accounts using the parties to the dispute and dispute start and end dates as recorded in the original MID data as standard Lexis-Nexis search parameters. Determination of rst use is based on broad agreement on the facts between separate accounts from independent news organizations, or conrmation of the facts of a case from multiple, independent sources within the same story.3 Keesings Record of World Events was used as a secondary resource to help clarify ambiguous cases and to provide information on disputes for which LexisNexis searches returned no matches.
3 For example, a 1983 dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan was coded as Afghanistan rst use of force on the basis of news reports from United Press International and Chinas Xinhua General News Service, which both reported Afghan Air Force attacks on a valley in western Pakistan near the Afghan border. An August 1980 dispute between Israel and Syria was coded as Syrian rst use of force because Associated Press accounts quoted both Syrian and Israeli military sources as in agreement on the details of an aerial clash over southern Lebanon.

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Our quantitative analysis focuses on the period 198092. The time-frame for this study is an artifact of the data used in the analysis. While the Minorities at Risk dataset covers the period 1945 through 1998, and MID includes all militarized interstate disputes from 1816 to 1992, the data on rst use of force is only coded from 1980 to 1992. This is a result of the limitations of the primary database used to construct the rst use of force dataset, Lexis-Nexis, which contains few news accounts from the period prior to 1980. Given this limited temporal domain, caution about the generalizability of any ndings is warranted. In addition to building the dataset on rst use of force, we also adapt the group-level data available from the MAR project to statelevel variables measuring the extent of state policies and social practices of discrimination against minorities. Specic details on how the state-level discrimination variable was constructed appear in the following section. After adapting the MAR group-level data to state-level data and combining those variables with the MID dataset, we add our new variable for rst use of force and several control variables before running our statistical analysis. We add to the analysis controls for other possible inuences on state conict behavior, including ethnic rebellion, democratic homogeneity, major power in dispute, average economic growth, number of alliance partners, single day disputes, transnational ethnic ties, and contiguity. All of the variables appearing in the analysis are described in detail below. Logistic regression4 is performed to test
4 The SAS statistical package is used for the multinomial logistic regression. For those who are familiar with SAS output, it is noted that SAS produces the opposite sign than that produced by all other statistical packages. As a result, we have ipped the signs of all parameter estimates from the raw SAS output so the ndings t with intuitive statistical logic. See Tabachnick & Fidell (1996: 609-633) for a comparison of the logit results from SAS and other statistical packages.

the hypotheses using the MID dataset, which measures interstate conict. MID identies 944 incidences of states involved in interstate disputes in which force was threatened, displayed, or used, representing the total number of militarized, international disputes occurring during the period 198092. There were a total of 139 states that were involved in these 944 disputes. A militarized international dispute between two states would, therefore, be coded as two disputes, one for each country involved. This project tests whether higher levels of domestic ethnic discrimination result in a greater likelihood that a state will employ a higher level of hostility in a dispute and be more likely to use force rst during an interstate conict from 1980 through 1992. Interpretation of the substantive impact of our signicant substantive variables is done using odds as described by Tabachnick & Fidell (1996: 607608). The odds ratio is the increase or decrease of the odds of being in one outcome category when the value of the predictor increases by one unit, adjusting for the impact of other signicant predictors. Increases in the value of the predictor by more than one unit increase the odds of being in one outcome category accordingly. Dependent Variables First Use of Force This is a dichotomous variable generated as described above. It is coded 1 if the state was the rst to use force, and 0 otherwise. Hostility level This variable, taken from MID, measures the highest level of hostility directed toward an adversary by a state in a militarized interstate dispute. This is coded as: (1) No militarized action5 (2) Threat to use force
5 The rst coding of no militarized action does not appear in MID during the time-frame of this study.

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(3) Display of force (4) Use of force (5) War Independent Variables Ethnic Discrimination Index The index variable measures the extent of formal state policies and social practices of political6 and economic7 discrimination, as well as remedial efforts, if any, applied by the state to resident minority groups. This variable is a combination of both the political and economic discrimination variables found within MAR, which uses an identical ascending vepoint ordinal scale for both categories of discrimination. The index was ultimately created by averaging the political and economic discrimination scores. The political and economic discrimination
6 Values for political discrimination are dened as follows (Gurr, 1993: 47): (0) None. (1) Substantial underrepresentation in political ofce, participation, or both, due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve groups political status. (2) Substantial underrepresentation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No protective or remedial public policies. (3) Substantial underrepresentation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral, or, if positive, are inadequate to offset discrimination. (4) Public policies, formal exclusion or recurring repression, or both, substantially restrict the groups political participation in comparison with other groups. 7 The values are dened as follows (Gurr, 1993: 45): (0) No discrimination. (1) Substantial poverty and underrepresentation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the groups material well-being. (2) Substantial poverty and underrepresentation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No remedial public policies. (3) Substantial poverty and underrepresentation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or inadequate to offset active and widespread practices of discrimination. (4) Public policies, formal exclusion or recurring repression, or both, substantially restrict the groups economic opportunities relative to other groups.

scores were rst coded for each state as the highest level of political or economic discrimination for any ethnic group within that state at the time of a militarized dispute in which the state is involved.8 In the Minorities at Risk Project, the extent of discrimination, both political and economic, is determined for each group relative to other groups in society. The pertinent question is whether members of a group are, or have been, deliberately restricted in their access to economic resources or political participation and inuences in comparison to other social groups (Gurr, 1993: 42). It is necessary to note that the ethnic discrimination index is not a proxy for regime type. The correlation between this variable and a states democracy score is not signicant. Control Variables Ethnic Alliance The ethnic alliance variable represents one of two controls for the possible effects of transnational ethnic ties. Scholars who have studied the connections between violent ethnic conict at the domestic level and violent interstate conict have argued that when ethnic boundaries cross state borders, the likelihood of violent conict between states increases (Brown, 1996; Davis, Jaggers & Moore, 1997; Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Moore & Davis, 1998; Stedman, 1996; Trumbore, 2000; Van Evera, 1997). The ethnic alliance variable, derived from MAR data on the geographic distribution of ethnic groups, describes the condition in which the ethnic group controlling one state in a dispute dyad is an at-risk minority in a contiguous target state. In such
This practice is followed for all variables taken from MAR. There is an important theoretical reason for our decision to use the highest level of discrimination recorded for any ethnic minority group within the states population. We argue that these variables reect the upper limit of the types of policies and practices that societal norms present within the state will allow. This is also consistent with the methodology employed by Moore & Davis (1998).
8

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cases, ethnic ties act like an alliance, increasing a states willingness to intervene on behalf of its embattled kin and thus increasing the likelihood that the state will become involved in a conict against its kins oppressors (Moore & Davis, 1998; Siverson & Starr, 1991). It is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if there is an ethnic alliance, 0 otherwise. Divided Ethnic Group This is the second control variable introduced to account for the possible impact of transnational ethnic ties on the likelihood of violent interstate conict. Specically, the likelihood that an ethnic conict will spill over to become an interstate conict is greater when ethnic rebels in one state can seek shelter or establish bases of operation among their ethnic kin in a neighboring state (Brown, 1996; Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Trumbore, 2000). This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if an at-risk ethnic minority group resides in both states of a militarized interstate dispute dyad, 0 otherwise. Rebellion Including rebellion allows us to control for two possible alternative explanations for a states use of force in an international dispute: diversion and conict spillover. Diversionary theories of international conict argue that state leaders initiate international conicts to divert domestic attention from internal problems and rally public support behind the regime (Gelpi, 1997; Haas & Whiting, 1956; James & Oneal, 1991; Miller, 1995; Ostrom & Job, 1986; Wright, 1965). An ongoing ethnic rebellion is the type of internal problem that could trigger such a diversionary use of force. In addition to creating incentives for diversion, prior research also shows that ethnic rebellion can lead to state use of force at the international level through the mechanism of conict spillover (Trumbore, 2000). Thus, including a measure for the presence of ethnic rebellion activity in

the state allows us to control for these two possible alternative explanations for the phenomena we seek to identify, while testing for the independent impact of ethnic discrimination. We create a dichotomous variable from the MAR data9 indicating either the existence of domestic rebellion 1, MAR codes 15, or the absence of domestic rebellion 0. MAR reports group rebellion levels annually from 1985 onward. Prior to 1985, rebellion levels are reported decennially. Dispute dates were checked against the group narratives and chronologies developed by MAR to ensure temporal consistency with the dependent variables. Democratic Homogeneity International militarized disputes involving only democratic regimes are coded into a dichotomous control variable in accordance with democratic peace theory, which holds that democratic states will rarely if ever use force against each other (Benoit, 1996; Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Ray, 1995; Rummel, 1995; Russett, 1993; Small & Singer, 1976). The variable for democracy is rst calculated from the Jaggers & Gurr Polity III dataset (1996) into a continuous term from 10 through 10, with 10 being the highest score for democracy. The continuous score was calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score [(democracy score) minus (autocracy score)]. States with scores of 6 through 10 are considered democracies. Finally, states in disputes exclusively
9 Gurr codes the rebellion variable as follows (1993: 9495):

(0) None reported (1) Political banditry, sporadic terrorism, unsuccessful coups by or on behalf of the group (2) Campaigns of terrorism, successful coups by or on behalf of the group (3) Small-scale guerrilla activity (4) Large-scale guerrilla activity, distinguished from smallscale by a large number of armed ghters (more than 1,000) carrying out frequent armed attacks over a substantial area (5) Protracted civil war, fought by military units with base areas

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among democracies were coded as 1 with all other disputes coded as 0. Major power in dispute Literature on interstate conict shows that disputes among minor powers are more likely to be violent while disputes with at least one major power tend to be less violent (Russett & Oneal, 2001). An additional body of literature argues that satised powers and developed states are less likely to use force internationally (Brawley, 1993; Kacowicz, 1995; Lemke & Reed, 1996; Morgan & Campbell, 1991; Rousseau et al., 1996). Major powers are identied by the Correlates of War data as China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA at various points during the time period (Singer & Small, 1993). As states, not disputes, form the unit of analysis in this project, the major power in dispute variable was coded for each state on the basis of whether a major power was present when the state entered the dispute. For example, MID dispute number 2,347 began in April of 1981 between Honduras and Nicaragua, with the United States joining the dispute in March of 1983. The major power in dispute variable is coded as 0 for Nicaragua and Honduras and 1 for the United States. Economic Growth This variable introduces an additional control for diversionary uses of force. Miller (1995) uses declining economic growth as a proxy for regime popularity and nds that when economic growth declines, states become more likely to use force in the international arena. This variable was calculated based on information found in the PENN World Table by Summers & Heston (1991) and represents the ve-year average percent change in real GDP per capita calculated annually. Number of Allies This variable represents the number of states sharing membership in a defense pact or an entente. These data are

available from the COW Alliance dataset (Singer & Small, 1993). Some scholars argue that alliance ties diminish the likelihood of war (Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Weede, 1983), while others (Rousseau et al., 1996) report that alliance ties do not decrease the likelihood of conict. The number of alliance partners may help deter attack, thereby reducing the number of militarized disputes a state is involved in, or may increase the number of militarized disputes a state is drawn into as alliance partners join an ongoing dispute. Contiguity It is understood that any theory of interstate conflict must control for geographic proximity since the use of force is only possible when at least one state can reach the other with its military assets (Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000; Starr & Most, 1976). Simply put, states are more likely to become engaged in an international dispute with a contiguous state (Bremer, 1992; Diehl, 1991; Gleditsch, 1995; Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Rummel, 1994; Maoz & Russett, 1992, 1993; Siverson & Starr, 1991). This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the states involved in a dispute share a land boundary or are separated by less than 150 miles of water and 0 for noncontiguous states. The data come from the COW contiguity dataset (Gochman, 1991). Single Day Disputes This variable is necessary to control for uses of force by local military units acting on their own initiative or that of individual commanders that may not reect actual government policy to use force within the context of the dispute in question. This is consistent with the practice of those who study war initiation, in which an attack in strength criterion is used to control for the actions of rogue units or small-scale patrols operating outside central

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authority (Small & Singer, 1982). This dichotomous variable is coded 0 for multiple day disputes and 1 for single day disputes.

Results
This project tested the following two operationalized hypotheses with regard to domestic ethnic discrimination both of which were conrmed: (1) The higher the level of domestic discrimination against ethnic minorities, the greater the likelihood that a state will exhibit a higher level of hostility during interstate disputes. (2) The higher the level of domestic discrimination against ethnic minorities, the greater the likelihood that a state will use force rst in interstate disputes. As outlined above, the independent variables were ethnic discrimination index, rebellion, democratic homogeneity, major power in dispute, average economic growth, number of alliance partners, divided ethnic group, ethnic alliance, single day disputes, and contiguity. Although the ethnic discrimination index variable is correlated10 with rebellion (see Gurr, 2000, 1993), the inclusion of rebellion with the discrimination variable does not bias the model. Ethnic discrimination index The results show that domestic ethnic discrimination is statistically signicant, and in the expected direction, for both level of hostility and rst use of force. Proceeding along the ethnic discrimination continuum of no discrimination to public policies of formal exclusion, recurring repression, or both, states at the highest levels of discrimination against ethnic
10 Please refer to the appendices for a table of variable correlations and descriptive statistics. None of the correlated variables introduced autocorrelation into the model.

minorities are six (6.08)11 times as likely to use force rst in international disputes. Similarly, a state with no domestic discrimination against its ethnic minorities is nearly ve (4.84) times less likely to exhibit higher levels of hostility in international disputes than a state exhibiting the highest levels of ethnic discrimination. Control variables Economic growth was signicant in predicting rst use of force and level of hostility during disputes. The results of our tests showed that the lower the level of economic growth or greater the economic decline, the greater the likelihood that a state will use force rst and exhibit higher levels of hostility in interstate disputes. This is also consistent with the diversionary theory of conict literature and echoes Millers (1995) specic ndings concerning economic growth and conict behavior. The major power variable was also signicant, with major powers less likely to use force rst or to be involved in more violent interstate disputes. In addition, the number of alliance partners helps predict the level of hostility a state will exhibit in a dispute and rst use of force. The lower the number of alliance partners, the greater the likelihood that a state will exhibit a higher level of hostility and use force rst in interstate disputes. This is consistent with research arguing that alliance ties diminish the likelihood of war (Bremer, 1992; Maoz & Russett, 1992). The control variable for single day disputes was signicant for rst use of force as well as hostility level, revealing that single day disputes are more likely to be violent in nature. The control for divided ethnic groups was signicant for rst use of force but not for hostility level. This rst nding is
11 This

is calculated by multiplying the odds ratio estimate for the ethnic discrimination index variable, .1879 and .4158, by 4, the number of units of the predictor representing a change from a condition of no ethnic discrimination to the highest level.

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Table I. The Impact of Domestic Discrimination on State Use of Force Internationally, 198092 Models+ Discrimination index Democratic homogeneity Major power in dispute Avg. economic growth No. of allies Contiguous actors Divided Ethnic alliance Rebellion Single day dispute Intercept Intercept 2 Intercept 3 Log likelihood Differential test 2 Model signicance N
+ The

A Level of force .1879* (.0944) .1069 (.3656) .8732**** (.2164) 5.1930* (2.1989) .0191** (.0068) .0177 (.2387) .2478 (.2366) .3533 (.6532) .0380 (.2380) .5738** (.1980) 3.4257**** (.3292) .8831** (.2707) 3.7820**** (.3967) 72.0050 p < .0001 564

B First use of force .4158**** (.0883) .3372 (.3233) .8380**** (.2162) 8.2860**** (2.1465) .0205** (.0073) .1074 (.2209) .4702* (.2285) .4471 (.5407) .3913 (.2247) .4549* (.1828) 1.1119*** (.2986)

141.3266 p < .0001 717

SAS statistical package was used to run the logistic regressions. The table includes parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. To aid in interpreting the results and to conform to other statistical packages, the parameter estimates have been multiplied by 1 (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: 609633, for further explanation of this procedure). * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001; **** p <.0001

consistent with cases of ethnic conict spillover in which an interstate conict is triggered by either hot pursuit, government forces chasing suspected ethnic rebels across interstate borders (Brown, 1996; Lake & Rothchild, 1998), or defensive interventions, aimed at cross-border ethnic enclaves, supply lines, or supporters

(Stedman, 1996). The insignicance of hostility level for divided ethnic groups may be the result of the relatively large number of missing cases for that variable. The remaining control variables ethnic alliance, rebellion, democratic homogeneity, and contiguity showed no statistical signicance.

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Conclusions
As evidenced by the statistical signicance of ethnic discrimination in our analysis, domestic equality should be considered an important predictor of a states likelihood to exhibit higher levels of force when involved in an international dispute, and also use force rst under such circumstances. Our conclusion, therefore, is that higher levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities increase the likelihood of violent state behavior when engaged in international disputes. While controlling for contiguity, alliances, average economic growth, major power in dispute, democratic homogeneity, rebellion, ethnic alliance, divided ethnic group, and single day disputes, those states with lower levels of political and economic discrimination against ethnic minority groups are less likely to use force, or use force rst in international disputes. This study adds additional support to other studies highlighting the malignant impact of gender inequality on international use of force and lends further credence to theories linking domestic and international violence. In general, domestic ethnic inequality is sustained by intolerance and a hierarchical organization, both of which translate into a world-view that necessarily places some people or states as superior to others. The presence of domestic ethnic inequality, therefore, increases the likelihood that states will be more violent during interstate disputes as they project this inequality and hierarchy into the international arena. Thus our ndings complement those of the democratic peace literature. Weart (1994), for instance, nds that states do not go to war with other states that are perceived as equal. Even at the most basic level, domestic ethnic equality impacts foreign policy. Foreign policy goals to minimize interstate violence, therefore, might well be focused on an international agenda aimed at the reduction or elimination of discriminatory

government policies and social practices within states. Earlier research has convincingly demonstrated that domestic ethnopolitical conict results from the accumulation of group grievances rooted in patterns of political and economic disadvantages and discrimination against minority groups (Gurr, 1993, 2000). We also know from prior research that as the severity of ethno-political conict rises, the likelihood of conict spilling over into the international arena to become interstate conict increases as well (Trumbore, 2000). However, our ndings here demonstrate that state policies and social practices of discrimination against minority groups have an independent impact on the likelihood of state violence at the international level. This further claries the range of policy options the international community must be willing to consider in order to preserve international peace and security in the modern era. Our own ndings, as well as those mentioned above which have identied connections between ethnic rebellion and interstate violence, imply a twofold strategy of international intervention aimed at containing ethno-political violence while addressing the root causes of insurgency. Given that deterrence can break down and containment fail, the surest way to prevent domestic ethnic conict from leading to interstate violence is to stop the process before it starts. The only way for the international community to do this, other than by supporting extreme levels of state repression to keep simmering ethnic conict from boiling over into full-scale rebellion, is to address rebellions root causes discrimination and inequality against minorities in ethnically divided societies. That means nding, promoting, and helping to implement effective means of political power-sharing while working to level the economic and social playing eld between disadvantaged minorities and the majorities with whom they live. In short, the

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international communitys best chance to head off the threats to international peace and security that can grow out of ethnic conict lie in pursuing proactive policies of preventative diplomacy (Jentleson, 1998, 2000). The complication is that this course of action is also the most difcult for the international community to accomplish for a host of reasons, not the least of which are persisting norms of state sovereignty that inhibit states from interfering in each others internal affairs. Domestic political constraints also factor into the equation, further complicating the issue. In those countries, such as the United States, which have historically been expected to take a leading role in any international response to ethnic conict, domestic constituents are more likely to support military action aimed at restraining aggression than to support interventions designed to bring about social and political change in other states (Jentleson, 1992). In sum, to deal effectively with the challenge to international peace and security posed by ethno-political conict, the international community will have to overcome not only the constraints of an international system in which state sovereignty remains paramount, but also domestic political resistance to meddling in the internal affairs of other states. However, given the connections between domestic patterns of discrimination and inequality and the likelihood of state violence during interstate disputes revealed here, an interventionist international policy aimed at minimizing and eventually eliminating domestic inequity in ethnically divided societies seems a necessary route towards securing future international peace and stability. References
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MARY CAPRIOLI, b. 1968, PhD in Political Science (University of Connecticut, 1999); Assistant Professor, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth (19992002); Assistant Professor, University of Tennessee (2002 ); most recently published in the Journal of Conict Resolution and Journal of Peace Research; current main interest: conict and cooperation.

PETER F. TRUMBORE, b. 1964, PhD in Political Science (University of Connecticut, 1999); Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark University (19992002); Assistant Professor, Oakland University (2002 ); most recently published in Journal of Peace Research, Irish Studies in International Affairs, and International Studies Quarterly; current main interest: linkages between domestic ethnic discrimination and rebellion, and interstate violence.

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Appendices
Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics N Ethnic discrimination index Rebellion Ethnic alliance Divided ethnic group Avg. economic growth Contiguity Allies Democratic homogeneity Major power in dispute Single day dispute Hostility level First use Valid N (listwise) 907 939 938 940 815 944 881 942 944 944 686 899 531 Minimum .00 0 .00 .00 .200838 .00 .00 .00 .00 0 2 .00 Maximum Mean s.d. 1.3922 .50 .1816 .4834 4.5395E-02 5.7026 13.7251 .2589 .4687 .49 .61 .4741

4.00 2.3363 1 .55 1.00 3.412E-02 1.00 .3713 .18446148 38.00 4.3994 41.00 14.2917 1.00 7.219E-02 1.00 .3252 1 .40 5 3.65 1.00 .3404

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Appendix 2. Correlations

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