Petitioner's Rule 80C Appellate Brief

MICHELE LUMBERT, CLERK
AUGUSTA SUPERIOR COURT

95 STATE STREET
AUGUSTA, MAINE 04330
GINA LYNN TURCOTTE
3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1, Augusta, Maine
July 15, 2013
Re: GINA LYNN TURCOTTE v. SECRETARY OF STATE
Docket No. AP-13-17
Dear Michele:
Enclosed you will find Petitioner's brief under Rule 80C as required to be ftled July 15, 2013
pursuant to Petitioner's motion for enlargement of time which was granted. A copy of the brief has
been mailed or hand delivered to Respondent on this day.
J ; ; t ~ ~
GINA LYNN TURCOTTE
Cc: Assistant Attomey General Donald W. Macomber

KENNEBEC COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

Docket No. AP-13-17

GINA TURCOTTE

Petitioner/APPELLANT

v.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Respondent/APPELLEE

RULE 80C PETITION

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

DUE AND SUBMITTED ON JULY 15, 2013

Gina Turcotte
Petitioner/APPELLANT
3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1
Augusta, Maine
TURCOTTE v SECRETARY OF STATE - RULE 80C APPEAL BRIEF Page 2 of 57

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. TABLE OF CONTENTS

II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

IV. PLAIN MEANING RULE

V. DEFINITIONS

VI. DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER

VII. IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE
VIII. INTRODUCTION
IX. STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED
X. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

XI. ARGUMENT

XII. RELIEF REQUESTED

XIII. CONCLUSION


II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER
Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of Authority,
Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed; Certificate of Live Birth;
Writ of Mandamus and Replevin

BLACKS LAW, 4
th
and 9
TH
Bouviers Law, 6
th

MERRIAM WEBSTER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by
Automobile, 1890-1950, Dr. Roger Isaac Roots, J.D., Ph.D., Oklahoma City
University Law Review, Summer, 2005, 30 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 245

Maine Constitution, Article 1:
Section 1. Natural rights.
Section 2. Power inherent in people.
Section 3. Religious freedom; sects equal.
Section 4. Freedom of speech.
Section 5. Unreasonable searches prohibited.
Section 6. Rights of persons accused.
Section 6-A. Discrimination against persons prohibited.
Section 8. No double jeopardy.
Section 9. Excessive bail, cruel or unusual punishments prohibited.
Section 19. Right of redress for injuries.

Plain Meaning Rule
State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999
Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme Judicial
Court 2000
In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007

Motor Vehicles Rules
29-250 SECRETARY OF STATE BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Chapter 1: Rules For Administrative Suspension Relating To Demerit Point
Accumulation, Convictions And Adjudications
Chapter 2: Rules For Administrative Hearings
Chapter 3: Physical, Emotional And Mental Competence To Operate A Motor
Vehicle
Chapter 13: Rules Governing Driver License Restriction

Maine Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 80C

Maine Statutes
5 MRSA 9052. Notice
5 MRSA 9056. Opportunity To Be Heard
5 MRSA 9059. Record
5 MRSA 10001. Adjudicatory Proceedings
5 MRSA 10003. Right To Hearing
5 MRSA 10004. Action Without Hearing
5 MRSA 11001. Right To Review
5 MRSA 11005. Responsive Pleading; Filing Of The Record
5 MRSA 11006. Power Of Court To Correct Or Modify Record
5 MRSA 11007. Manner And Scope Of Review
29-A MRSA 112. Notice Of Hearing
29-A MRSA 1258. Medical Advisory Board
29-A MRSA 1251. License Required
29-A MRSA 1309. Reexamination Of Incompetent Or Unqualified Operators
29-A MRSA 1407. Change Of Location Or Status
29-A MRSA 2458. Suspension or revocation of license
29-A MRSA 2482. Notice of suspension or revocation of license

29-A MRSA 2485. Decision; Appeal

Maine Cases
Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969).
State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975)
Fickett v. Maine KEN-AP-02-57
Melanson v Secretary of State 2004 ME 127
DiPietro v. Secretary of State, 802 A. 2d 399 - Me: Supreme Judicial
State v. Savard, 659 A. 2d 1265 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1995
Centamore v. Dep't of Human Services, 664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995)
CWCO, Inc. v. Sup't of Insurance, 1997 NrE 226, 6, 703 A.2d 125S, 1261
Imagineering v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991)
Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969)
State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975)
Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012
McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, 896 A.2d 933
Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 55 A.3d 411
Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 896 A.2d 271
Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, 838 A.2d 1157
Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149 957 A.2d 94

Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7
http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm

United States Code
Title 18, 31(6)
Title 18, 31(10)


United States Cases
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886
Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886
Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895
Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944
Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946)
City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 1948
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 1889
City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 1898
Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 1908
Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943
Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1953
Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956
Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958
Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959
United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966
Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1966
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966


STANDARD OF REVIEW
At this stage of appeal, the standard of review is de novo, Because the
Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the
Secretary of State's decision. McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, 5, 896
A.2d 933. We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation
de novo. Id. We first look to the plain meaning of the statute, interpreting
its language "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results," Estate of
Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 12, 55 A.3d 411 (quotation
marks omitted), and attempting to give all of its words meaning, Cobb v. Bd.
of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 11, 896 A.2d 271. When a
statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute directly, without
applying the rule of statutory construction that "prefers
interpretations that do not raise constitutional problems," McGee, 2006
ME 50, 18, 896 A.2d 933, and without examining legislative history, Ashe
v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, 7, 838 A.2d 1157, or the agency's
interpretation, Cobb, 2006 ME 48, 13, 896 A.2d 271. "We look to
legislative history and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute
only when we have determined that the statute is ambiguous." Liberty Ins.
Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, 15, 957 A.2d 94. "A
statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations."
Estate of Joyce, 2012 ME 62, 12, 55 A.3d 411. [emphasis added]
PLAIN MEANING RULE
PETITIONER incorporates the plain meaning rule and consistently
applies it throughout this entire action, as clearly and expressly standardized
by Maine Supreme Judicial Court in:
State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999,
The sole issue before us is one of statutory construction. "Statutory
interpretation is a matter of law, and we review the trial court's decision de
novo." Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524 (italics
added). "If the meaning of the language is plain, we must interpret the statute to
mean exactly what it says." [5] Marsella v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 585 A.2d

802, 803 (Me.1991) (quotations omitted). "Where the statutory language is
plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resort to rules of statutory
interpretation to seek or impose another meaning." Marsella, 585 A.2d at 803
(quotations omitted). "[N]othing in a statute may be treated as surplusage if a
reasonable construction applying meaning and force is otherwise possible."
Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411, 417 (Me.1995) (quotations omitted)."
Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme
Judicial Court (2000), The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is
the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction. See State
v. Harris, 1999 ME 80, 13, 730 A.2d 1249, 1251
In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court
2007, Because the word "knowingly" is defined in the Code and because its
definition is plain and unambiguous, we are not free retroactively to give the
word a different meaning. "Knowingly" is defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct
as "denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question." M. Code of Jud. Conduct
II(3)(J). ... See generally, Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 2000 ME 16,
11, 745 A.2d 378, 384 ("The most fundamental rule of statutory construction
is the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction.").
DEFINITIONS
PETITIONER gives judicial notice that the following definitions are
incorporated as defined herein:
1. administration. The management or performance of the executive
duties of a government, institution, or business.
2. apparatus. See MACHINE. A device or apparatus consisting of fixed
and moving parts that work together to perform some function.
3. CHRISTIANITY. The religion established by Jesus Christ.
Christianity has been judicially declared to be a part of the common
law of Pennsylvania.

4. church. In a moral or spiritual sense this word signifies a society of
persons who profess the Christian religion; and in a physical or
material sense, the place where such persons assemble. The term
church is nomen collectivum; it comprehends the chancel, aisles,
and body of the church.
5. conscience. The moral sense of right or wrong; esp., a moral sense
applied to one's own judgment and actions. In law, the moral rule
that requires justice and honest dealings between people.
6. constitution. The fundamental and organic law of a nation or state
that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government,
defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees
individual civil rights and civil liberties. The written instrument
embodying this fundamental law, together with any formal
amendments. In British constitutional law, the constitution is a
collection of historical documents, statutes, decrees, conventions,
traditions, and royal prerogatives. Documents and statutes include
Magna Carta (1215), the Bill of Rights (1689), and the European
Communities Act (1972). The implied parts of a written constitution,
encompassing the rights, freedoms, and processes considered to be
essential, but not explicitly defined in the written document.
7. corpus. [Latin "body"] The property for which a trustee is
responsible; the trust principal. Also termed res; trust estate; trust
fund; trust property; trust res; trust.
8. deed poll. A deed made by and binding on only one party, or on two
or more parties having similar interests.
9. doctrine. A principle, esp. a legal principle, that is widely adhered to.
10. DRIVER. (Bouviers 6
th
) One employed in conducting a coach,
carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other
animals.
11. driver. A person who steers and propels a vehicle.

12. driver's license. The state-issued certificate authorizing a person to
operate a motor vehicle.
13. driving. The act of directing the course of something.
14. ecclesiastical. Of or relating to the church.
15. fee simple. An interest in land that, being the broadest property
interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies
without heirs; esp., a fee simple absolute.
16. freehold. An estate in land held in fee simple; any real-property
interest that is or may become possessory.
17. Indefeasible: (Of a claim or right) not vulnerable to being defeated,
revoked, or lost.
18. Independent. Not subject to the control or influence of another. 2.
Not associated with another (often larger) entity 3. Not dependent or
contingent on something else.
19. Institution. An elementary rule, principle, or practice.
20. justice. The fair and proper administration of laws.
21. liberty. Freedom from arbitrary or undue external restraint, esp. by
a government. A right, privilege, or immunity enjoyed by prescription
or by grant; the absence of a legal duty imposed on a person.
"[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626 (1923).
22. natural liberty. The power to act as one wishes, without any
restraint or control, unless by nature. 'This natural liberty ... being a
right inherent in us by birth .... But every man, when he enters into
society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so

valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the
advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those
laws, which the community has thought proper to establish." 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 121
(1765).
23. religious liberty. Freedom - as guaranteed by the First Amendment
to express, without external control other than one's own
conscience, any or no system of religious opinion and to engage in or
refrain from any form of religious observance or public or private
religious worship, as long as it is consistent with the peace and
order of society.
24. License. A permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that
would otherwise be unlawful; esp., an agreement that it is lawful for
the licensee to enter the licensor's land to do some act that would
otherwise be illegal.
25. private morality. A person's ideals, character, and private conduct,
which are not valid governmental concerns.
26. OPERATE. (Blacks Law, 4
th
) This word, when used with relation to
automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of
the automobile ; that is, the driver operates the automobile for the
owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he
drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex.Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023,
1025.
27. operate. to perform a function; exert power or influence.
28. privilege. A special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a
person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. _ A privilege
grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It
immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would
subject the actor to liability.
29. public. Open or available for all to use, share, or enjoy.

30. punishment. A sanction - such as a fine, penalty, confinement, or
loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who
has violated the law. "Punishment in all its forms is a loss of rights
or advantages consequent on a breach of law. When it loses this
quality it degenerates into an arbitrary act of Violence that can
produce nothing but bad social effects." Glanville Williams, Criminal
Law 575 (2d ed. 1961).
31. punitive. Involving or inflicting punishment.
32. religion. A system of faith and worship usu. involving belief in a
supreme being and usu. containing a moral or ethical code; esp.,
such a system recognized and practiced by a particular church, sect,
or denomination. In construing the protections under the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, courts have
interpreted the term religion quite broadly to include a wide variety
of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.
33. remedial. Affording or providing a remedy; providing the means of
obtaining redress <a remedial action>. 2. Intended to correct,
remove, or lessen a wrong, fault, or defect <a remedial statute>. 3.
Of or relating to a means of enforcing an existing substantive right
<a remedial right>.
34. absolute right. A right that belongs to every human being, such as
the right of personal liberty; a natural right. 2. An unqualified right;
speci., a right that cannot be denied or curtailed except under
specific conditions
35. secta. Roman law. A group of followers, as of a particular religion or
school of philosophy, law, etc.; a religious sect; a group adhering to
a distinctive doctrine or to a leader.
36. secular. Worldly, as distinguished from spiritual.
37. sentiment. an attitude, thought, or judgment prompted by feeling; a
specific view or notion.
38. spiritual. Of or relating to ecclesiastical rather than secular matters.


IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE

Before PETITIONERs mother conceived and gave life to PETITIONERs
physical body, PETITIONER was I AM; the Divine Spirit, who consciously chose
to inhabit the physical vessel of flesh, blood and bones of the human body to
have an experience as a human being. Each atom and cell of this physical
vessel which PETITIONER inhabits to travel across this land is infused with the
spark of the Creator; I AM one with the light, one with Creator, the Alpha and
the Omega, without beginning nor end, without time.
Natural Order of Law and Authority irrefutably begins with and is
irrevocably governed by GOD and GODS LAW which includes, but are not
limited to, Laws of Common Sense, Truth & Justice, Laws of Grammar and
Proper Use of Words which can be considered by all men and women to be the
higher laws of the universe.
Higher Laws are natural common laws which govern the behavior of
every man, woman and child without exception beholding our allegiance to our
own private Sovereign Ruler of the Universe and only according to our own
private consciences and which our feelings, thoughts, words and beliefs are not
to be regulated or injured by any government, sect or private individual.
PETITIONER, in alliance with every other man, woman and child, are
collectively The People, and in whose authority our government was created
and instituted for our benefit and who have an unalienable and indefeasible
right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same,
when our safety and happiness requires it as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 2
of the Constitution of the State of Maine.
As a cooperative and collaborative group with a specific mutual purpose
and goal, The People create the GRAND JURIES, the TRIAL JURIES and the
ELECTIONS which are some of the tools and machinery by which behaviors
that violate the CONSTITUTION are remedied and by which itself is protected,
enforced, and amended as needed.
The body of the CONSTITUTION articulates provisions which created the

EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE and JUDICIAL branches of government which were
also instituted for our protection and benefit and which each officer is Trustee
of the Public Trust with such power having been bequeathed to them by The
People upon swearing their public oath to uphold and protect the Constitution,
adhering to ethical and moral principles above any private gain.
Within each branch of government are public offices and officers who are
vested with specific legal duties, authorities and rights for the benefit of The
People: the Executive Branch includes PRESIDENT, GOVERNOR, MAYOR and
ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS; the Legislative Branch is divided into the HOUSE
which represents citizens based on district populations and the SENATE which
represents citizens on an equal state basis; and the Judicial Branch which is
divided into the SUPREME COURT, the APPEAL COURT, the TRIAL COURT,
and ALL LOWER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS.
Three branches of government were created with the intention to be a
system of checks and balances to ensure The Peoples representatives act with
ethical, moral and lawful behavior in full adherence and loyalty to The People
in whose power and authority they institute all federal, state, and local laws,
statutes, codes, regulations, rules, orders and ordinances for the purpose of
establishing justice, insuring tranquility, providing for our mutual defense,
promoting our common welfare, and securing to ourselves and our posterity
the blessings of life, liberty and the pursuit of prosperity and happiness, and
with the irrevocable power to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when
our safety and happiness requires it, which is a modern-day human experience
in this third-dimensional world on planet Earth.
PETITIONERs third-dimensional vessel of flesh, blood and bones was
born into the Turcotte family on December 17, 1968, now simply known as
Gina Lynn, who is a freeborn inhabitant, natural heir to the Divine Estate,
Beneficiary to the Divine Trust, freeholder in fee simple absolute, one of the
Posterity expressed in the Preamble of the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the State of Maine, to wit, We the people of Maine, in order to
establish justice, insure tranquility, provide for our mutual defense, promote our

common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of
liberty, acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler
of the Universe in affording us an opportunity, so favorable to the design; and,
imploring God's aid and direction in its accomplishment, do agree to form
ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the State of
Maine and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the government
of the same.
The Constitution for the State of Maine was structured after and in
acquiescence with the Constitution for the United States, each of which are
documents of a dual nature:
1. the Constitution is a trust document, and
2. it is the articles of incorporation which created a unique trust res
and estate of inheritance for each inhabitant.
It is a tenet of law that in order to determine the intent of a writing one
must look to the title, the Empowerment Clause in statute, which in the case of
the Constitution is the Preamble. In writing the Constitution the founders
followed the common law of England which stretches back some 1000 years.
The Preamble fulfills the requirements necessary to establish a trust. It
identifies the Grantor(s), Statement of Purpose, Grantee(s), Statement of Intent,
Written Indenture, and the name of the entity being created and is written and
constructed as a trust so that it would have the thrust of ageless law.
Let us take a look:
WE THE PEOPLE (Grantors) of the United States (from or out of) in order
to form a more perfect union, establish justice, provide for the common
defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty
(statement of Purpose) to ourselves and our posterity (Grantees/heirs
unnamed), do ordain and establish (Statement of Intent) this constitution
(Written Indenture) for the United States of America (name of the entity being
created).
The trust res is in the Articles of the Confederation and the Declaration
of Independence. The intent of the constitution was to bequeath freedom, life,

liberty and the pursuit of happiness to themselves and their posterity. The
founders intended to secure and pass on the sovereignty of the people to the
people of future generations of Americans, in perpetuity.
PETITIONERs rights are derived from the land upon which she stands
and her relation, or status, to that land. In America these rights originated with
the Articles of Confederation and the Declaration of Independence and are
attached to the land called America (The Laws of Real Property). PETITIONERs
status, or relation to that land, is determined by the laws of Descent and
Distribution.
PETITIONERs right to freedom, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness
is her inheritance as bequeathed to her via the Constitution of the United
States of America and upon which the Constitution of the State of Maine was
drafted and enacted.
The constitution granted the government the power and authority to
administrate and to carry on corporate functions. Under the common law,
inherent rights cannot devolve to a 'body politic' through a corporation. Rights
only devolve to human beings as through and by way of a trust. Under the
constitutional law, in order to determine the meaning of a written instrument
the court must look to the title. In this case, once again, it is the Preamble.
Pursuant to the laws of real property that have been in existence from the
beginning, the Preamble clearly shows a freehold in fee simple absolute in it.
Freeholds in fee simple were instruments of trust, not corporate. "Our Posterity"
cannot be speaking of a corporate entity because posterity can only mean a
living man or woman, and only by birth and nativity.
The Articles of the Constitution are the Articles of Incorporation that
established Congress as Trustees of the Trust and defines their power and
authority as well as their limitations. Annexed to the Constitutional Trust is a
will-like structure, the Amendments. The Trust and the trust res were already
in existence when the will/codicil (Amendments) were added some four years
later. The Amendments do not constitute the Trust in fact, they are annexed to
the Trust as a codicil (a supplement or addition to the will, not necessarily

disposing of the entire estate, but modifying, explaining or otherwise qualifying
the will in some way.)
A Trust, once completed and in force, cannot be amended or altered
without the consent of the parties in interest, except under reserved power of
amendment and alteration. An amendment is ordinarily possible by parties in
interest and against parties without vested interest. Prior to enactment of the
14th Amendment, the freeborn inhabitants, citizens of the states, were the
parties in interest.
The 14th Amendment created the 14th Amendment legal fiction citizen
GINA LYNN TURCOTTE who does not have a vested interest in the trust or the
trust res. The 14th Amendment can be viewed as a codicil to the will that
republished the constitution with new meaning, changed the intent behind it and
turned it into a testamentary instrument with capabilities of being used against
the PETITIONER through a seemingly voluntary revocation.
When PETITIONERs mother provided evidence of her birth and applied
for a social security number on PETITIONERs behalf, and when PETITIONER
mistakenly claimed be a United States citizen, who is a party with no vested
interest in a freehold, the trust or the trust res, the PETITIONER was literally
declared to be deceased; therefore, the decedent (PETITIONER) retains no legal
interest in the property and PETITIONER, in her new capacity as a legal fiction
citizen, is then coerced to act as Executor of PETITIONERs own estate.
PETITIONER, a freeholder and Beneficiary to the trust, has been tricked
and coerced by the Trustees into testifying against herself when applying for a
social security number, drivers license, or when signing an IRS 1040 form, and
which the Trustees have mislead PETITIONER into believing are all mandatory.
The Trustees have breached the trust having amended the will for their
own personal profit and gain at the expense of the true heirs. PETITIONER has
unwittingly, without full disclosure, become the Executor; the Trustees have
become the Beneficiaries to the trust through Laws of Donations, effectively
stealing PETITIONERs Divine Inheritance.
A breach of trust of fiduciary duty by a Trustee is a violation of the

correlative right of the Cestui Que Trust and gives rise to any correlative cause
of action on the part of the Beneficiary for any loss to the estate Trust. This
rule is applicable in respect to both positive acts or negligence constituting a
breach of fiduciary duty by the Trustee. A Trustee's breach of fiduciary duty
falls within the maxim that 'equity will not aid one who comes into court with
unclean hands.'
When the Trustee's breach is by an act of omission the Beneficiary can
scrutinize the propriety of the Trustee. A Beneficiary must always have full
disclosure and full knowledge of the material facts and circumstances. A
Beneficiary must also have had knowledge of and understood their rights and
have no obligation to search the public records to obtain said knowledge.
The Trustees have committed acts of omission, misrepresentation, deceit
and deception in order to mislead and coerce PETITIONER into giving up her
beneficial interest in the trust and the trust res. The Trustees have compelled
PETITIONER, a freeholder in fee simple, to accept benefits 'under the will' as
perverted by the 14th Amendment, without freedom of choice for failure of full
disclosure thereby preventing enforcement of contractual rights to property
bequeathed to her by the will. The Trustees are trying to repudiate the Trust,
employing a lifetime of propaganda and programming enforced through threats,
violence and coercion, and failing to provide notice to the Beneficiary of the
repudiation which must now be brought home and lawfully remedied.
The Doctrine of Election dictates, that a party shall not be permitted to
insist at different times upon the truth of two inconsistent and repugnant
positions, according to the promptings of his own interest, as to first affirm and
later disaffirm a contract, or the like Myers v. Ross, D.C., 10 F.Supp. 409, 411,
in connection with testamentary instruments is the principle that one who is
given a benefit 'under the will' must choose between accepting the benefits and
asserting some other claim against the testator's estate or against the property
disposed of by the will. PETITIONERs right as a Beneficiary to elect whether to
take 'under the will' or 'against the will' is a personal privilege to her which may
be controlled by the creditors of the Beneficiary. If PETITIONER elected to take

against the will then creditors can claim no right or interest in the estate
contrary to PETITIONERS election.
Acceptance of benefits 'under the will' constitutes an election precluding
PETITIONER from enforcing contractual rights to property bequeathed by the
will. This rule is subject to the qualification that acceptance of a benefit 'under
the will', when made in ignorance of the Beneficiaries rights or under a
misapprehension or misrepresentation as to the condition of the Testator's
estate, does not constitute an election upon full knowledge and disclosure.
In the beginning God gave men and women dominion over all things, as
Beneficiaries of the Divine Trust. The founding fathers of the United States of
America created the constitution for the United States, an estate trust, to pass
sovereignty of the people onto the people of future generations, in perpetuity.
In America today, upon giving birth, a mother is compelled, under
deceptive coercion and without full factual disclosure, to apply for the creation
of a Cestui Que Vie trust, creating a 14th Amendment paper citizen of the United
States. Upon receipt of the mother's application the Trustees establish a trust
under the error of assumptions that the child has knowingly elected to accept
the benefits which are bequeathed by the will, 'under the will'. The Trustees
further assume that the child is incompetent, a bankrupt and lost at sea and is
presumed to be dead until the child reappears, knowingly reestablishes living
status, challenges assumptions of any acceptance of the benefits 'under the
will' as being one of free choice with full knowledge of the facts and thereby
redeems the estate.
Under the assumption that the child is a 14th Amendment citizen, the
child's footprint is placed by the hospital upon the birth certificate creating a
slave bond which is sold to the federal reserve, who then converts it into a
negotiable instrument and establishes a second Cestui Que Vie trust. The
child's parents are coercively deceived to apply for a social security number for
the child, unwittingly testifying that the child is a 14th Amendment paper
citizen of the United States, not a party in interest to the trust or the trust res,
and assumed to be dead after 7 years, and when the federal reserve cannot

seize the physical child, they file for the issue of the salvage bond and the child
is presumed to be legally dead.
When a child is Baptized by the church, the Baptismal certificate is
forwarded to the Vatican who converts the certificate into a negotiable
instrument and creates a third Cestui Que Vie trust. These three trusts
represent the enslavement of the property, body and soul of the child.
The civil administration, UNITED STATES, continues to operate today
under this triple crown of enslavement based on the error of assumptions that
we are 14th Amendment citizens of the United States based on the breach of
trust by the Trustees.
PETITIONER has been lost in the sea of illusion, her divine estate placed
in trust. PETITIONER has awakened to the truth, so long hidden from her, and
now redeems her estate. PETITIONER hereby acknowledges and accepts the
deed and her right as lawful and proper owner of the estate with exclusive right
of use of all land, tenements and heredimants thereof, to have and to hold in
fee simple forever.
This freehold in fee simple has been held under an assumed lease for
forty-four years. Said fee has been held in abeyance, in expectation,
remembrance, and contemplation in law there being no person in esse, in
whom it can vest and abide: though the law has considered it as always
potentially existing, and ready to vest whenever a proper owner appears.
It is hereby established, in fact, that PETITIONER, who was given the
name Gina Lynn when she was born on December 17, 1968 into the Turcotte
family, is the proper owner of the estate GINA LYNN TURCOTTE in whom vests
and abides to have and to hold in fee simple forever.
Freely born, sovereign people have a common law and constitutionally-
protected right to travel on the roads and highways of this land as maintained
by their government on their behalf and specifically for their use and benefit.
Licensing of private, not-for-hire travelers cannot be required of free sovereign
private people because taking on the restrictions of a drivers license requires
the surrender of and creates encumbrances upon PETITIONERs inalienable

right to travel in her private property.
In England in 1215, the Magna Carta enshrined the right to travel in
Article 42, to wit, It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our
kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his
allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common
good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of
the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who
shall be treated as it is said above.
Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the
State of Maine are involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation that
would abrogate those rights. A claim or exercise of a constitutionally-protected
right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no remedial action, civil
sanction or criminal penalty imposed because PETITIONER lawfully exercised
her constitutionally-protected rights.
PETITIONER has the inalienable right to use public roads unrestricted in
any manner so long as she is not damaging property or violating rights of
others. The government is effectively restricting PETITIONERs freedom of
locomotion by requiring PETITIONER to obtain a drivers license and thus
violating PETITIONERs common law and constitutionally-guaranteed right to
travel upon the public highways and possess and enjoy private property during
her pursuit of safety, prosperity and happiness.
Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion in Shapiro v
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) that the right to travel is a right broadly
assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the
right of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by
the Constitution to us all. The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to
travel; but, holding that the right to travel is so fundamental the Framers
thought it was unnecessary to explicitly include it in the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights.
The PETITIONERs right to travel upon public ways in her private
property is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will,

but a common right which every individual has under their right to life, liberty,
and pursuit of happiness. Under this guarantee, the PETITIONER may, under
normal conditions, travel at her inclination along the public highways or in
public places using her private property in any way she deems suitable while
conducting herself in an orderly and decent manner; thus, the Trustees do not
have the power to abrogate the PETITIONERs right to travel upon the public
roads in her private property by passing legislation forcing her to waive that
right and allegedly converting it into an alleged privilege of a drivers license
which is in fact not a privilege according to 29-A MRSA 1251 which in fact
mandates all Maine residents immediately apply to obtain a drivers license.
29-A MRSA 1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENTs willful
violation of Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 6-A, No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the
equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person's civil
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof.
When PETITIONER registered her automobiles with RESPONDENT or
obtained a drivers license, she did so only reluctantly and under duress,
blatant intimidation, willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated
fraud and governmental corruption in order to preserve whatever minimal
freedoms are remaining.
American history can easily be written in two parts: America before the
arrival of automobiles and America after automobiles. Motorized vehicles altered
everything from the demographic distribution of American society to the ways
Americans live and work to the normative balance of home and family life
Nineteenth century Americans would scarcely recognize the immense quilt of
laws which govern highway travel today. With the exception of the Civil War,
nothing before or since has so fundamentally altered America's scheme of rights
and freedoms as that of the laws now governing highway travel. Today, the vast
majority of Americans voluntarily submit to a variety of registration,
identification, and licensing schemes in order to travel by automobile. Today's
laws [were] once viewed as unconstitutional. The hand of the State now extends

over aspects of travel in ways which would have been impossible according to
common law precedents familiar to earlier Americans.
Prior to the nineteenth century, courts generally held the public roadways
were open to all users without regard to the travelers' methods or means of
transport. Licenses or other indicia of governmental permission were thought
unnecessary or even violative of [constitutionally-protected] rights. But
widespread disdain and fear of the automobile led twentieth century
policymakers to push aside these long-standing constitutional barriers in order to
regulate motorized driving. This new regulatory approach was justified on the
grounds that motor vehicles were too dangerous to operate unlicensed and that
traffic injuries were increasingly on the rise. The Orphaned Right, Dr. Roots
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824, The word "license,"
means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a
permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power
to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to
authorize.
Title 29, Chapter 7: OPERATORS' LICENSES of the Maine Revised
Statutes can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning rules, and
in accordance with Blacks Law, Bouviers Law, and Merriam Webster, as, A
revocable permission given to an individual to exert power or influence over
private property which actions would otherwise be unlawful, later repealed.
The Maine Legislature then enacted Title 29-A, Chapter 11: DRIVER'S
LICENSE, which can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning
rules, and in accordance with Blacks Law, Bouviers Law, and Merriam
Webster, as, A revocable permission given to an individual who is employed by
another in steering or directing the course of a coach, carriage, wagon, or other
vehicle, including horses, mules or other animals, for a fair wage paid to the
driver by its employer for the drivers safe and proper conduct while in control of
the conveyance for which conduct and control would otherwise be unlawful. to
wit: a driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not
operate the automobile unless he drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex. Civ.

App., 83 S.W.2d 1023, 1025.
The Trustees (legislators) who are empowered by, through and on behalf
of the inhabitants of this state, have publicly memorialized a notable difference
regarding the inherent meaning of the words operator and driver by which
they knowingly and intentionally substituted the word driver in place of the
word operator under 29-A MRSA when referring to any drivers license to
control or operate a motorized vehicle on the public highways of this state.
The Maine legislature publicly acknowledged through their intentional
use of the word driver within 29-A MRSA that the action which they feel
requires a drivers license is not that of a private action of enjoying and using
ones personal property on a public roadway, but instead a drivers license for
contractual for-hire employment for the purpose of controlling, steering and
directing the course of a motor vehicle or animal in the drivers employment by
another with a fair wage paid for the drivers time, energy and labor.
United States Criminal Code, Title 18, 31(6) defines motor vehicle
as every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by
mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the
transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.
United States Criminal Code, Title 18, 31(10) defines used for
commercial purposes as the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee,
rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection
with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.
29-A MRSA 1253(2) Compliance with federal law. dictates, The
State must comply with the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Public
Law 99-570, Title XII, the federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999,
Public Law 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 and regulations adopted under those
Acts in issuing or suspending a commercial license. In the case of any
conflict between the federal statute or regulation and a statute or rule of
this State, the federal statute or regulation must apply and take
precedence. [emphasis added]
29-A MRSA 101(42) defines "motor vehicle" as a self-propelled vehicle

not operated exclusively on tracks but does not include:
A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001;
B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the
all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is
operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and
C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device
29-A MRSA 101(42) directly conflicts with 18 U.S.C. 31(6).
29-A MRSA 101(91) defines vehicle as a device for conveyance of
persons or property on a way. Vehicle does not include conveyances propelled
or drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or snowmobiles as
defined in Title 12, section 13001 or an electric personal assistive mobility device
as defined in this section.
29-A MRSA 101(50) defines "owner" as a person holding title to a
vehicle or having exclusive right to the use of the vehicle for a period of 30 days
or more.
29-A MRSA 101(59) defines "public way" as a way, owned and
maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general
public has a right to pass.
29-A MRSA 101(75) defines street or highway as a public way.
29-A MRSA fails to establish any clear difference between a private
automobile and a commercial motor vehicle as required by 18 U.S.C. 31(6);
therefore, 29-A MRSA 1253(2) mandates that 18USC 31(6) take precedence.
It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 is Class C which is
not a commercial drivers license (CDL) and which has never had commercial
endorsements.
It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 shows no offenses
involving intoxication or serious bodily injury.
PETITIONER has been defrauded and coerced ad infinitum since
February 3, 1989 through RESPONDENTs willful nondisclosure effectively
coercing and intimidating PETITIONER to obtain a drivers license whereby she
unknowingly waived her sovereign right to travel without earning a fair wage in

her private property without being restricted by unlawful and unconstitutional
governmental encumbrances.
PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENT has violated her freedom of
religion as protected by Maine Constitution Article 1, Section 3, by coercively
restraining PETITIONER in exercising her personal liberty to worship GOD in
the manner and season most agreeable to PETITIONERs own conscience.
PETITIONERs religious beliefs oblige PETITIONER to reject all external
authorities, both secular and spiritual, which are not aligned with the dictates
of PETITIONERs own conscience and personal sense of morality, including
PETITIONER rejecting all organized, unorganized, incorporated and
unincorporated governmental, political and religious sects.
PETITIONERs religious beliefs prohibit all seizures and conversions of
PETITIONERs natural inherent rights through PETITIONER coercively obeying
RESPONDENTs assumed authority to convert PETITIONERs possession and
use of private property and her right of free locomotion into an alleged privilege,
and an actual statutory mandate to obtain a drivers license which is required
for PETITIONER to use, enjoy, defend and protect her private property.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886, An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Through RESPONDENTs stealthy encroachment through the use of
ambiguous statutes and rigid administrative rules, the corporate state body
politic stole PETITIONERs religious freedom and personal liberty and sold it
back to her as a drivers license. This stealthy encroachment process of the
corporate state against PETITIONER depended on time and propaganda for its
success. Most humans live perhaps 85 years; the corporate state enjoys eternal
life. As each succeeding generation dies off, the next generation fails to
remember the lessons and history of the previous generation which the
corporate state depends upon in order to perpetuate.
Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886, It is the

duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895, We are
bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time
it was adopted
Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944, Constitutional
rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.
Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946),A
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful.
The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without
it.
City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 1948, Specifically or
technically speaking, [a] license means to confer on a person the right to do
something which otherwise he would not have the right to do-a special privilege
rather than a right common to all persons.
By looking back at historical disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other
ways of passage, we clearly see that public property is nothing more than
property held in common tenancy for use by each and every individual.
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 1889, Personal liberty, which is
guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right
of locomotion,-to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may
lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others
may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 1889,"The right to travel is a part
of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of
law...."
City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 1898, A license being
regarded as a privilege can not possibly exist with reference to something which
is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride over the
highways by motor vehicle, or horse vehicle in a reasonable manner.
Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 1908, This Court has said with

respect to an unconstitutional law that the matter stands as if the law had not
been passed.
Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926), it
would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which,
by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by
the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is
accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable
privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to
challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny
a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose.
But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the
limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment
of Constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all.
It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of
the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. [emphasis
added]

Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930, The
right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property
thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he
has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and
to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the
ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing
modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon
thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary
purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of
moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or
transporting persons or property for hire along the street, which a city may
permit or prohibit at will.

The exercise of such a common right the [RESPONDENT] may, under its police
power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not
arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise
it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and
circumstances, to exercise it. Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259; Ex parte
Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 1915-F, 840; Hadfield Lundin, 98
Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516, L.R.A. 1918-B, 909, Ann. Cas. 1918-C, 942.
The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the
streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing,
and revoking, under rules of general application, permits to drive an automobile
on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or
permitted to be held by some and refused to other of like qualifications, under
like circumstances and conditions.
It has been said that when the State or a city has the power to prohibit the doing
of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of the act upon any
condition, or subject to any regulation, however arbitrary or capricious it may be;
and may lawfully delegate to executive or administrative officers an uncontrolled
and arbitrary discretion as to granting and revoking permits or licenses to do
such acts; Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259, 263; State ex rel. Crumpton
Montgomery, 177 Ala. 221, 59 So. 294; State Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 22 Atl. 675;
City of St. Joseph Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31 S.W. 101, 49 Am.St.Rep. 577; Brown
Stubbs, 128 Md. 129, 97 Atl. 227.
This doctrine has been pronounced most often in cases involving the granting,
refusing, and revoking of licenses or permits to sell intoxicating liquors, or to do
other things which because of their character are, or tend to be, injurious, as for
instance keeping a gambling house or a bawdy-house, or operating a junk or
pawn shop; and it has also been applied to cases involving permits or licenses to
transport persons or property for hire along the streets. See Taylor Smith, supra,
and cases there cited. But this doctrine has no application to permits issued for
the purpose of regulating the exercise of the common right to operate a private

automobile on the streets of a city, in the usual and ordinary way, to transport
the driver's person and property.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943, It is
contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this
activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of
this tax. It is a license tax a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a
privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge
for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.
Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit
1956, The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be converted
into a crime.
Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958, The
use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in
modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use
an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within
the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen may not be
deprived without due process of law
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958, No state legislator
or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating
his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous
Court in saying that: If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul
the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired
under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery . . . .
United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136.
United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966, The
constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the
highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so,
occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. In Crandall v.
Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, invalidating a Nevada tax on every person leaving the State

by common carrier, the Court took as its guide the statement of Chief Justice
Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492:
"For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed,
we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United
States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass
and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
States."
Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State," that right
finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested,
is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom
to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right
under the Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 177
(concurring opinion), 181 (concurring opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U. S. 1, 6-
8; 12-16 (dissenting opinion)...
Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the
Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no
need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right
exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the federal rights protected by what is
now 18 U. S. C. 241 goes back at least as far as 1904. United States v. Moore,
129 F. 630, 633. We reaffirm it now.
Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court
1966 The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways
is not a mere privilege. It is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected
by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Arrow Transportation
Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 85 Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963); State v.
Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938); Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262
P. 881, 56 A.L. R. 317 (1927); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922);
Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); People v. Nothaus,

147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1960); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d
620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1952); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52
(1951); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.1951); Berberian v. Lussier, 87
R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966,Where rights
secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them.
Under obligation to RESPONDENTs unconstitutional licensing rules
which violate PETITIONERs freedom of religion, free speech, rights against self-
incrimination and illegal search and seizure, PETITIONER unwillingly reported
the existence of a prior medical condition which she mistakenly thought may
impair her safe operation of her private property in order to prevent being
harassed by RESPONDENTs law enforcement, court and licensing agents.
PETITIONER innocently failed to comply with RESPONDENTs rules by
not promptly and perpetually changing her physical and mailing address each
and every time she changed domiciles, which recently has been every week or
every few months, then when PETITIONER exercised her right of locomotion by
automobile without knowing that the drivers license had been suspended, she
was immediately profiled as an incompetent driver and a criminal and
subjected to excessive police power, coercion, intimidation, prejudice,
harassment, arrest, assault, battery, kidnapping and false imprisonment by
law enforcement, executive and judicial agencies in clear violation of federal
and state constitutions.
PETITIONER has never been accused of operating under the influence of
any intoxicating chemicals nor of refusing to submit to a chemical test nor of
needing to submit to any chemical test nor of any type of negligent, unsafe or
reckless operation since the license was first issued in 1989.
RESPONDENT cannot lawfully require PETITIONER to obtain a license to
exercise a fundamental private liberty to travel in PETITIONERs select method
of transportation on a free, open public roadway because those roadways are

reserved for public use and maintained by sovereign people as tenants in
common. The body politic STATE OF MAINE would not exist without the free
acknowledgement, support and participation by the free sovereign inhabitants.
INTRODUCTION
This action is being brought to challenge the authority of and decision by
STATE OF MAINE, SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE to
mandate, issue and then arbitrarily suspend license #1491178 on January 5,
2010 pursuant to Medical Rules 29-250, Ch. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) and 29-A
MRSA 2458(2)(D) despite RESPONDENTs issuance of three (3) consecutive
years violation free credits for 2008, 2009 and 2010 and without having any
evidence that PETITIONER was incompetent to safely control an automobile or
that she posed any risk whatsoever to the public at large as clearly evidenced
by the administrative record filed by RESPONDENT on May 29, 2013.
PETITIONER does not object to RESPONDENTs filing the administrative
record untimely because RESPONDENTs tardy behavior proves beyond a
shadow of a doubt that RESPONDENT presumes they will receive bias and
favoritism, despite having thirty (30) years practice with Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is prima facie evidence of the basic principle at the crux of
this petition RESPONDENT and their agents routinely and habitually violate
the Maine Constitution and act outside the boundaries of law and fair play
presuming their behavior will be condoned, supported and justified by the
courts.
PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A MRSA 1251(1)
states, Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person commits an
offense of operating a motor vehicle without a license if that person operates a
motor vehicle on a public way or parking area:
A. Without being licensed. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E
crime, which is a strict liability crime
C. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for
more than 30 days but fewer than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is
a traffic infraction;

D. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State
for more than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime,
which is a strict liability crime
E. With a license issued by this State that expired within the
previous 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction.
PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A MRSA 1251
(1-A) mandates every living man, woman and child over the age of sixteen (16)
who [w]ithin 30 days of becoming a resident of this Stateshall apply to obtain
a license in accordance with section 1301. Except as provided in section 510,
subsection 1, a person who fails to comply with the requirement of this
subsection and operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area
commits:
A. A traffic infraction if the person has been a resident for less than 90
days; or
B. A Class E crime if the person has been a resident for at least 90 days.
Evidently as shown by 29-A MRSA 1251, when the word shall is
used without any qualifiers or exceptions, the definition must be taken literally
and within the boundaries of the plain meaning rule which does declares the
possessing and enjoying the use of a drivers license is not at all a privilege as
this court and other courts in this state have alleged and adjudicated.
There exists no absolute right to obtain and hold a driver's license.
Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969). The driver's license is a
privilege to which certain rights and responsibilities attach and for valid reasons
involving public safety may be granted or withheld. State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861,
863 (Me.1975); Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d at 649.
Petitioner claims 29-A MRSA 1251 violates the Maine Constitution,
Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 24 in that mandatory licensing
under 29-A MRSA 1251 prohibits private, unregulated and unalienable use
of private property on all public ways or parking areas without having
physical possession of a proper drivers license, and which applies to all

private property defined as a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on
tracks but does not include:
A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001;
B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the
all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is
operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and
C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device.
Evidently, according to certain sections of Title 29-A of the Maine Revised
Statutes Annotated, it is a traffic infraction or a strict liability crime to obtain
private property as defined to be a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively
on tracks and to use it for its intended purpose outside the physical limits of
the owners private land without a proper drivers license even when that
property is not used for commercial purposes in compliance with 18 USC
31(6).
A public way are roads which are financed by, created by, maintained
for and used by sovereign people of this state by paying certain administrative
fees, taxes, surcharges, and remedial penalties for traffic infractions and
strict liability crimes.
RESPONDENT suspending PETITIONERs drivers license violates her
inherent unalienable right of possessing and enjoying private property in the
pursuit of and attempt to obtain basic safety and happiness into a traffic
infraction or strict liability crime depending solely on the length of time
residence is claimed to be within the boundaries of this state.
The alleged administrative record submitted by RESPONDENT on May
29, 2013 is inconsistent, contradictory and does not justify RESPONDENTs
successive repeated refusals to grant mandatory administrative hearings after
being notified by PETITIONER on March 18, 2013 that required notices and her
actual knowledge of authority and subject matter of the suspension, or her
right to an administrative hearing, did not occur until early March 2013.
RESPONDENTs repeated refusal to grant compulsory pre-suspension
and post-restoration administrative hearings despite the uncontested facts of

the administrative record was contrary to law in that it was based on an
interpretation inconsistent with statutory and constitutional duties, was made
upon unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was
unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was arbitrary
and capricious.
RESPONDENT cannot suspend or revoke any license with arbitrary and
capricious motives without a shred of evidence to support the suspension and
without first following strict procedural due process as strictly required by the
Constitution.
RESPONDENT issuing PETITIONER violation free credits for years 2008,
2009 and 2010 does not justify any type of license suspension because clearly
no evidence exists of unsafe operation, obvious incompetence or of being any
type of danger to the public immediately prior to the administrative suspension
on January 5, 2010.
RESPONDENTs sole purpose for communicating with PETITIONER in
November and December 2009 was to induce PETITIONER to comply with an
obligatory medical evaluation which was not provoked by any adverse reports
of unsafe operation or incompetency and which was a blatant violation of
PETITIONERs freedom of religion, freedom of speech, rights against self
incrimination, illegal search and seizure, due process and equal protection.
The administrative record shows that PETITIONER did not receive two (2)
notices sent by RESPONDENT in November and December 2009 requiring her
submission to the unconstitutional medical evaluation and then initiating an
indefinite suspension for failure to comply with the medical evaluation request.
The administrative record does not indicate RESPONDENT complied with
5 MRSA 9052, 5 MRSA 10003(1), 5 MRSA 10004(3), or 29-A MRSA
2482(1).
RESPONDENT coercively used 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) to compel
PETITIONER to fulfill a compulsory and unconstitutional medical evaluation
and coercively forced her to revise her mailing address which was clearly
contrary to law in that it was a blatant violation of PETITIONERs freedom of

speech, right against self incrimination, illegal search and seizure and equal
protection.
RESPONDENTs actions were based on an interpretation inconsistent
with clearly expressed statutory and constitutional duties, was made upon
clearly unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was not
supported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was clearly
arbitrary and capricious.
PETITIONER affirms that, during a thorough and detailed review of the
record which was filed on May 29, 2013, PETITIONER noticed RESPONDENT
has submitted absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support or defend
their arbitrary and capricious actions suspending License #1491178 on
January 5, 2010 under 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), stating PETITIONER Is
incompetent to drive a motor vehicle.
PETITIONER states that, as a matter of fact and which is abundantly
evidenced within the record as submitted by RESPONDENT, there IS evidence
of one or more of the following:
1. Governmental fraud.
2. Governmental complicity.
3. Governmental conspiracy to deprive PETITIONER of constitutionally
secured rights.
4. Intentionally or negligently falsifying or altering official public records.
5. Blatant incompetence or willful disregard for written laws, rules and
procedures.

PETITIONER outlines the following facts as filed with this court on May
29, 2013 by RESPONDENT,
Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, page 1 of STATE OF MAINEs certification
that the paper to which they attached is a true copy of the records of their office
at the DEPARTMENT OF STATE as sworn to by SECRETARY OF STATE Matthew
Dunlap on May 22, 2013 under the GREAT SEAL OF THE STATE OF MAINE.


DRIVER RECORD REPORT-2 PRINTED 05/22/13 09:18:31

ENTRY
DATE
ACTION
DATE
DESCRIPTION
05/29/07 05/25/07
CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH
ZONE
VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07 (002153985/D-VB)
05/29/07 05/25/07
CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT LAW
01/01/10 12/31/09 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS
03/08/11 12/31/10 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS

PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notification that the line item for
05/22/13 excerpt shows
CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH ZONE
does in fact PRECEDE
and
123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact MISSING.


Tab 3, BMV files, page 3, illustrated BELOW which was excerpted from
the record submitted by the RESPONDENT ,
DRIVER RECORD - REVIEW REQUESTED PRINTED 04/02/13 09:03:10

DELETE
DATE
ACTION
DATE
DESCRIPTION
05/25/07
05/25/07
CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A 65 MPH
ZONE
123108 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS
111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009
122909 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809
030811 010510 DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV)
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL REQ
FL FILE MED EVAL
RESTORED: 03/08/11

and
123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact PROPERLY INCLUDED.


Tab 3, BMV files, page 3, illustrated BELOW which was excerpted from
the record submitted by the RESPONDENT,
DRIVER RECORD - REVIEW REQUESTED PRINTED 03/20/13 09:43:58
DELETE
DATE
ENTRY
DATE
ACTION
DATE
DESCRIPTION
05/29/07 05/25/07
CONVICTION VIOLATION SEAT BELT
LAW
VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07
(002153985/D-VB)
05/29/07 05/25/07
CONVICTION SPEEDING 79 MPH IN A
65 MPH ZONE
VIOLATION-DATE: 05/17/07
(002153985/D-VB)
010109 123108 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS
111009 111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009
122909 122909 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809
030811 110109 010510 DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV)

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL
REQ
FL FILE MED EVAL
RESTORED: 03/08/11
[diagonal line part of official record]
and
123108 ~ VIOLATION FREE CREDITS is in fact PROPERLY INCLUDED.

It should be obvious to the reader that a serious discrepancy and error
has occurred in the maintenance of official motor vehicle records and which
does in fact significantly compromise the integrity of RESPONDENTs evidence
and motivation to prosecute PETITIONER.
It is evidenced within this record under Tab 2, Certified Driving Record,
that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was issued ONLY 2 YEARS
VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2009 and 2010.
It is also evidenced within this record, in two distinct locations under
Tab 3, BMV files, that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was in fact
properly issued 3 YEARS VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2008, 2009
and 2010.
PETITIONER states that she was previously employed full time, in good
standing, by STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE from January
2007 through April 2008 in the OUI/Habitual Offender Unit which did in fact
afford PETITIONER with expertise, a thorough education, comprehensive
knowledge and special skills to expertly and correctly assess a driver record
and its individual line items.
PETITIONER affirms that the information under Tab 3, BMV files, is
perfectly accurate.
PETITIONER alleges that the information under Tab 2, Certified Driving
Record, was intentionally falsified or negligently erroneous in order to weaken
PETITIONERs affirmative defenses and her likelihood of prevailing in this case
and its criminal companion case.
PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENTs efforts to cloud the courts
judgment through filing deceptive and fraudulent records of evidence has been
unsuccessful in spite of their exacerbated efforts to prevent PETITIONER from
exercising her lawful, constitutionally-guaranteed rights.
The alleged administrative record shows that the violation free credit
issued for year 2010 was in fact issued on March 8, 2011 which is the same
day RESPONDENT restored the license without requiring reinstatement fees,
civil sanctions or administrative charges after PETITIONER filed a completed

medical evaluation from PETITIONERs doctor affirming minimal/no risk of
unsafe operation for any medical issues.
RESPONDENT restoring the license without reinstatement fees, civil
sanctions or any administrative charges and immediately issuing violation free
credits on March 8, 2011 for 2010 are two pieces of prima facie evidence that
the medical suspension is not now, and never has been, a traffic violation or
strict liability crime and which has no assigned civil or criminal penalty of
any kind and cannot be used as a prior offense under 29-A MRSA 2412-A.
Upon RESPONDENT restoring the license on March 8, 2011 with medical
affirmation of competency, PETITIONER demanded removal of all medical
restrictions from the license which were revealed to still be active many
months later violating the equal protection clause and requiring a second
demand for removal retroactive to March 8, 2011.
Upon further review, PETITIONER observed that RESPONDENT still has
not removed the medical restriction from license 1491178 and which now
shows a mandatory evaluation date of 2014 in clear violation of PETITIONERs
right to equal protection under the constitution and laws of this state.
An incorrect mailing address is not by itself, and cannot be used as any
evidence of incompetency rising to the level of being a threat to public safety, or
being any type of justification for suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch.
3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) and 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), without being combined
with adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation.
RESPONDENT erred when they knowingly and willfully failed to provide
ample public notice of an alleged threat to public safety, knowingly failing to
consult the medical advisory board prior to suspending the license, nor does
the RESPONDENTs administrative record have any clear convincing evidence
to justify a suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3)
and 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) all of which violated many constitutional
protections.
RESPONDENT violated the Maine Constitution, as well as 5 MRSA
10004(3), by extending the administrative suspension beyond 30 days totaling

427 days and then again violating those same constitutional protections when
it failed to notify PETITIONER on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand
administrative hearings when PETITIONER completed and submitted the
required medical evaluation.
RESPONDENTs decision to illegally extend the January 5, 2010 medical
suspension beyond the clear statutory limitation of 30 days was the direct and
proximate cause for PETITIONER being prosecuted on July 5, 2011 for a strict
liability crime under 29-A MRSA 2412-A with violation dates of February 10,
2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-512 dismissed) and March 7, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-
513 guilty via coerced illegal plea agreement).
PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice of the fact that if the
RESPONDENT had adhered to the strict guidelines of MRSA, and particularly
to 5 MRSA 10004(3) and had released the medical suspension on the 31
st
day,
then PETITIONER would not have been charged and convicted of operating
after suspension in AUGDC-CR-2011-513 nor would the pending companion
case AUGSC-CR-2012-286 be whatsoever pending or in existence.
PETITIONER filed a timely request for post-conviction review of the
coerced plea agreement for AUGDC-CR-2011-513 on July 6, 2012 which was
denied in September 2012; PETITIONER filed an immediate request for
reconsideration which was denied in November 2012.
PETITIONER was not informed by RESPONDENT and was unaware of the
statutory authority for the medical suspension on January 5, 2010, or her
rights attached thereto, because she never received or saw any written notice
from RESPONDENT until March 2013 while reviewing evidence for pending
action AUGSC-CR-2012-286.
PETITIONER instantly demanded proper administrative hearings to
challenge RESPONDENTs statutory authority to suspend the license in
January 2010 under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) and 29-A
MRSA 2458(2)(D) without any clear convincing evidence on the record, nor
receiving adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation.
RESPONDENT knowingly and willfully violated protections of the Maine

Constitution when refusing, three times, to grant administrative hearings upon
PETITIONERs proper written requests in March and April 2013 at all times
indicating PETITIONERs demands were made untimely but without providing
clear and convincing evidence that PETITIONER had received actual notice or
knowledge on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand administrative hearings.
RESPONDENT knowingly violated protections of the Maine Constitution
when suspending license 1491178 for incompetency without clear evidence of
adverse operation, failing to provide notice or preliminary hearing, retaining
suspension beyond clearly stated statutory limitations, and refusing to provide
administrative hearings thrice demanded in March and April 2013.
Double jeopardy was effectively invoked when criminal charges were
illegally filed and successfully prosecuted on July 5, 2011 under 29-A MRSA
2412-A(1)(A) via a coerced plea agreement resulting directly from the medical
suspension of January 5, 2010 and being the direct proximate cause for the
pending action under AUGSC-CR-12-286 and which prompted this 80C action.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED

1. WHETHER 29-A MRSA 1251, 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA
2412(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE
CONSTITUTION.

2. WHETHER THREE YEARS CONSECUTIVE VIOLATION FREE
CREDITS EARNED DIRECTLY PRIOR TO SUSPENSION IS
EVIDENCE OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND
JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3,
5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D).

3. WHETHER INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS CLEAR CONVINCING
EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A
THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER
MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA
2458(2)(D).

4. WHETHER RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO
PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY.

5. WHETHER RESPONDENT CONSULTED MEDICAL ADVISORY
BOARD PRIOR TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES
29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D).

6. WHETHER RESPONDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD HAD CLEAR
CONVINCING EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING LICENSE SUSPENSION
UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-
A MRSA 2458(2)(D).

7. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN
SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5
MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D)WITHOUT ANY
ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF
VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY
BOARD.

8. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 MRSA 10004(3) BY
EXTENDING ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION ON JANUARY 5, 2010
BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427 DAYS ENDING ON MARCH 8,
2011.

9. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS ON MARCH 8,
2011 BY FAILING TO NOTIFY PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.

10. WHETHER RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS
WHEN REPEATEDLY REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.

11. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION WHEN
SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING
TO PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING
SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING
TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS
THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.

12. WHETHER DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL
CHARGES WERE FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON
JULY 5, 2011 RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL
SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT
PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
PETITIONER is one of the freeborn, living, breathing, sovereign
inhabitants of the republic of Maine.
PETITIONER has given lawful and properly certified notice reclaiming
and redeeming her sovereign status effectively nullifying all unlawful contracts
in May 2012, hereby attached to this Motion as exhibits, those notifications
consisting of Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of

Authority, Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed and a certified
copy of the Certificate of Live Birth, to the following governmental and court
authorities:
a. STATE OF MAINE, DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF
VITAL RECORDS, 244 Water Street, STATE HOUSE STATION #11,
AUGUSTA, MAINE
b. Magistrate, Kennebec County Probate Court, 95 State Street, Augusta,
Maine
c. Charles E. Summers, Jr., 148 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333
d. William J. Schneider, 6 State House Station, Augusta, ME 04333-0006
e. Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, 400 Michigan
Avenue, Northeast, Washington, D.C. 20017
f. U.S. Attorney General, Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee, U.S.
Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20530-0001
g. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C
Street NW, Washington, DC 20520
On August 23, 2012, PETITIONER certified mailed Writ of Mandamus
and Replevin, hereby attached to this brief as exhibits, to the following
governmental authorities:
Mike Pool, Director, Bureau of Land Management Washington Office,
1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5665, Washington DC 20240

Carole Carter-Pfisterer, Assistant Director, Bureau of Land Management,
Human Capital Management , 1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5611,
Washington, DC 20240

Department of Health and Human Services, Vital Records, SHS #11,
Augusta Maine
PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since
February 3,1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to

request a drivers license whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to
travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes without
being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.
PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since
February 3, 1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to
request vehicle registration plates whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign
right to travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes
without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.
Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 repeals drivers license
requirements for common law reasons which can be found here:
http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm
11/15/10: House Prefiled; 01/12/2011: House First Readers; 01/24/2011:
House Second Readers; to wit:
Free people have a common law and constitutional right to travel on the
roads and highways that are provided by their government for that
purpose. Licensing of drivers cannot be required of free people because
taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of an
inalienable right;
In England in 1215, the right to travel was enshrined in Article 42 of
Magna Carta: It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of
our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water,
saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short
space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and
outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation
at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above.
Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the
State of Georgia are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
that would abrogate these rights. The claim and exercise of a constitutional
right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no sanction or penalty
imposed upon an individual because of this exercise of constitutional
rights;

American citizens have the inalienable right to use the roads and
highways unrestricted in any manner so long as they are not damaging or
violating property or rights of others. The government, by requiring the
people to obtain drivers' licenses, is restricting, and therefore violating, the
people's common law and constitutional right to travel;
In Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Potter Stewart noted
in a concurring opinion that the right to travel "is a right broadly assertable
against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right
of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by
the Constitution to us all." The Articles of Confederation had an explicit
right to travel; and we hold that the right to travel is so fundamental that
the Framers thought it was unnecessary to include it in the Constitution or
the Bill of Rights;
The right to travel upon the public highways is not a mere privilege which
may be permitted or prohibited at will but the common right which every
citizen has under his or her right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under
normal conditions, travel at his or her inclination along the public
highways or in public places while conducting himself or herself in an
orderly and decent manner; and
Thus, the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the citizens' right
to travel upon the public roads by passing legislation forcing the citizen to
waive the right and convert that right into a privilege.
PETITIONER peacefully asserts her sovereignty and personal liberty to
freely possess private property liberated from all governmental interferences
and encumbrances which is a guaranteed right to every citizen under our
Constitution and common equity laws.
RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a
fundamental liberty of not-for-hire traveling.
fundamental liberty of possessing private property.

fundamental liberty of using ones own personal property as one deems
suitable.
RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise ones right to
use public highways for private non-commercial traveling in ones conveyance
of free choice.
RESPONDENT cannot require enrollment of private data into
RESPONDENTs registration records.
Any person who travels in an automobile which is not registered, without
proper vehicle registration plates, and who uses that private unregistered
conveyance for private travel purposes does in fact put herself at very high risk
for being arrested and imprisoned for failure to do a thing which patently
violates Bill of Rights, 4
th
Amendment and Maine Constitution, Article 1,
Section 5 protections against unlawful search and seizure of persons, papers
and things, The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures.
29-A MRSA 1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENTs willful
infringement of protections under the Maine Constitution.
Any person who registers an automobile or obtains a license with the
RESPONDENT complies reluctantly only under duress, blatant intimidation,
willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated fraud and governmental
corruption.
Any person who innocently fails or knowingly refuses to comply with
registration and licensing rules and who exercises the right of locomotion by
automobile is immediately categorized as a criminal and subjected to
intimidation, harassment, arrest, assault and kidnapping by law enforcement
and judicial agencies in violation of federal and state constitutional protections.
A persons right to locomotion is a sacred right beholden to everyone.
A license is a grant or permission that is often assigned and documented
by way of a piece of paper which affords the licensee to do an act that would
otherwise be unlawful.

Exercising ones right to travel and right to locomotion has never been
unlawful.
Being sovereign has never been unlawful.
fundamental liberty to travel in ones chosen conveyance on a free, open public
way which is reserved for use by the sovereign people as tenants in common.
17-A MRSA 2(19). Definitions state an "organization" means a
corporation, partnership or unincorporated association.
17-A MRSA 2(20). Definitions state a "person" means a human being
or an organization.
RESPONDENT, State of Maine, Secretary of State is a legal corporation
and a registered corporate person.
17 MRSA 2931. Prohibition. A person may not, by force or threat of
force, intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally attempt to
injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or threaten any other
person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that
person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or by the United States
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 2 of the Bill of Rights clarifies that all power is vested in, and
consequently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and
servants, and at all times amenable to them.
Article 1, Section 2 of the Maine Constitution, states, All power is
inherent in the people; all free governments are founded in their authority and
instituted for their benefit; they have therefore an unalienable and indefeasible
right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same,
when their safety and happiness require it.
Article 4 of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Article
1, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution, declares, The people shall be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable
searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person
or thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to be searched,

and the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause -- supported by
oath or affirmation.
RESPONDENT has violated and prevented due process of law.
RESPONDENT has violated PETITIONERs constitutionally protected
rights.
RESPONDENT has unclean hands and cannot prevail pursuant to
maxims of law.
Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals
1959, This Court has held that there is no such license known to Texas law as
a "driver's license". See Hassell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400;
Brooks v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 546, 258 S.W.2d 317.
Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals
1953, The information upon which this conviction was predicated alleged that
appellant did then and there unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon
a public highway while his drivers license was suspended.
In Hassell v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400, 401, we said:
"There being no such license as a `driver's' license known to the
law, it follows that the information, in charging the driving of a
motor vehicle upon a public highway without such a license,
charges no offense." See also Holloway v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
237 S.W.2d 303.
Because the information fails to charge an offense, the judgment is
reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
ARGUMENT
A. 29-A MRSA 1251, 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA 2412(1-A)(A)
AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE CONSTITUTION.
29-A MRSA 1251, 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D), 29-A MRSA 2412(1-A)(A)
AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 violate PETITIONERs rights to possess,
enjoy and protect private property under Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 9, and
24 of the Maine Constitution as well as PETITIONER being required to report
PETITIONERs medical conditions being a violation of PETITIONERs natural

rights as protected by Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-A, 9, 19 and 24 in that
RESPONDENT forces PETITIONER to speak PETITIONERs medical condition
and then RESPONDENT seizes PETITIONERs medical records for
RESPONDENTs review so RESPONDENT can seize PETITIONERs alleged
privilege to drive which is masked as a statutory mandate at RESPONDENTs
command after being required to get a drivers license to use PETITIONERs
private property on public roads which are paid for, maintained and used by
the public (PETITIONER), and when RESPONDENT requires PETITIONERs
medical conditions to be disclosed pursuant to Motor Vehicle Rules as
PETITIONER legally complied with, RESPONDENT then imposes excessive
penalties and punishments outside of the realm of reasonable proportions and
turns the innocent mistake, which does not rise to the offense of a civil action,
into a criminal offense and then denies PETITIONERs right to redress
PETITIONERs injuries with RESPONDENT about the original medical reporting
requirement and basis for their alleged authority for their subsequent
suspension for innocently forgetting to disclose PETITIONERs physical
whereabouts every thirty days while PETITIONER was unwillingly transient.

B. RECEIPT OF VIOLATION FREE CREDITS DOES NOT JUSTIFY ANY TYPE
OF SUSPENSION.

This argument wins on its own.

C. AN INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS NOT CLEAR EVIDENCE OF
INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A THREAT TO
PUBLIC SAFETY OR JUSTIFICATION FOR SUSPENSION UNDER
MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA
2458(2)(D) .

There is no legal precedent supporting a suspension imposed under 29-A
MRSA 2458(2)(D) for innocently forgetting to change an address when

not coupled with other dangerous or negligent actions.

D. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC
NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY.

If RESPONDENT had posted mandatory public notice in November and
December 2009 of the impending suspension of license 1491178 on
January 5, 2010, PETITIONERs family and friends who read the local
news religiously would have promptly notified PETITIONER of the public
notice and PETITIONER would have promptly changed her address and
complied with the medical evaluation request under duress and
RESPONDENTs fraudulent coercive tactics.

E. RESPONDENT DID NOT CONSULT MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD PRIOR
TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5
MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D) VIOLATING THE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

There is no evidence that RESPONDENT consulted with the Medical
Advisory Board or any other medical professional in consultation about
PETITIONERs incompetency prior to suspending the license.

F. RESPONDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD DOES NOT HAVE ANY
CLEAR EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES
29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D)
VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONERs claims
of constitutional violations.


G. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL
RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 MRSA 10004(3) AND 29-A MRSA 2458(2)(D)
WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR EVIDENCE OF
DANGEROUS VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL
ADVISORY BOARD.

The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONERs claims
of constitutional violations.

H. RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 MRSA 10004(3) BY EXTENDING
ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427
DAYS.

The evidence speaks for itself in that the RESPONDENT had no basis to
preserve this suspension for 427 days despite its alleged authority.

I. RESPONDENT ERRED ON MARCH 8, 2011 WHEN FAILING TO NOTIFY
PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.

RESPONDENT had an obligation on March 8, 2011 to verbally notify
PETITIONER of her rights to an administrative hearing and the authority
of the suspension upon their recorded knowledge that postal mail had
twice been returned to them and that PETITIONER had no actual
knowledge of said notices or the contents therein.

J. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN
REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS.

This argument needs no explanation.


K. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION WHEN
SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING TO
PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING
SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING TO
PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS THRICE
DEMANDED IN 2013.

RESPONDENT has no evidence to justify any type of suspension and
then failing to properly notify PETITIONER of her rights and then denying
PETITIONERs rights to be heard after discovering two years later that
RESPONDENT had deemed PETITIONER incompetent without just or
good cause, evidence, facts or opinions to support any such sentiment or
judgment.

L. DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE
FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON JULY 5, 2011 UNDER
29-A MRSA 2412-A(1)(A) RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL
SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT PROXIMATE
CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286.

PETITIONER was prosecuted in separate criminal proceedings on July 5,
2011 under coercive tactics by former A.D.A Steven Parker with full
knowledge that the medical suspension had been DELETED FROM THE
RECORD and continued to intimidate PETITIONER with excessive fines,
an expressed and clear intention to seek imprisonment and punitive
damages if PETITIONER did not agree to a plea agreement, which
PETITIONER unwillingly agreed to and expressly reserved her
unalienable rights on and for the record on July 5, 2011 in open court.

RELIEF REQUESTED
1. Declaratory judgment that RESPONDENT violated PETITIONER's rights
and protections of the Maine Constitution Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 6-A, 8, 9, 19 and 24.
2. Void AUGDC-CR-2011-512/513 and directly refund all related monies.
3. Void all open and closed related companion cases in superior, district
and violation bureau courts.
4. Release bail bond ($300) and bail conditions for AUGSC-CR-20 12-286.
5. Order RESPONDENT to remove and delete the medical restriction on
license # 1491178 which is scheduled for review in 2014.
6. Order RESPONDENT to flag license #1491178ME as "DO NOT STOP"
on the national driver registry on grounds of religious freedom.
7. Give PETITIONER leave to file civil rights suit against RESPONDENT.
8. All other legal, punitive, and compensatory remedies as deemed just.
9. All other equitable remedies as deemed just and appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Common law has returned. Maritime law has gone back out to sea.
PETITIONER stands on solid ground with absolute clean hands, no evidence
of malevolent motives or behaviors, with full transparency and truth, under
GOD's LAW ONLY and rejecting all man-made statutory laws which violate
her natural rights and explicit protections of those rights expressed in the
Maine Constitution.
The time has come for all men and women to speak the truth, honor
the truth, speak only facts with full transparency and complete accountability
when errors and mistakes are committed. When injuries occur, the injured
has full rights to require redress and remedy of those injuries despite the
alleged immunity against prosecution for negligent, capricious, arbitrary and
blatantly illegal use of words under GOD:t':d herein.
DATED: July 15, 2013
Gina Lynn Turcotte

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MICHELE LUMBERT, CLERK

AUGUSTA SUPERIOR COURT

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MICHELE LUMBERT, CLERK

AUGUSTA SUPERIOR COURT

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Petitioner's Rule 80C Appellate Brief