3 Sceptcsm and the Geneaogy of Knowedge: Stuatng Epstemoogy n Tme

Miranda Fricker
1. DIMENSIONS OF SOCIALIZATION
We tend to thnk of the socaness of soca epstemoogy argey n terms of a atera expanson across soca space. The
expanson shfts the phosophca focus from the one ndvdua of so much tradtona epstemoogy-the ndvdua who
wonders whether he reay knows ths s hs hand before hm, and so on-to hs reatons wth hs feow sub|ects, hs epstemc
nteractons wth them, even hs epstemc nterdependence wth them. The nterest n epstemc nterdependence brngs
dvsons of epstemc abour centre-stage (as the exposon n the terature on testmony n recent years bears wtness) and
further estabshes a recognzed theoretca space for nsghts about how |ustcaton (for nstance, |ustcaton for a scentc
theory) mght be dspersed across a whoe epstemc communty, wth the consequence that t makes sense sometmes to
regard that whoe communty as the sub|ect of the knowedge, and perhaps no ndvdua at a.

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For an eary case for the vew that |ustcaton can be dspersed n the scentc communty, see |ohn Hardwg (1985: 335-49). Lynn
Hanknson-Neson (1990) has argued for the vew that the scentc communty s the sub|ect of scentc knowedge.
Ths knd of socazaton of epstemoogy, then, brngs wth t a new, ess ndvduastc concepton of epstemc sub|ects. No
onger conceved as one ndvduas whose nteractons wth other ndvduas are epstemcay ncdenta, we thnk of them as
fundamentay, naturay, paced n reatons of epstemc nterdependence. Let us ca ths socazed concepton of epstemc
sub|ects, the Abstracted 5ocial Conception. It marks the ant-ndvduast moment n epstemoogy.
The concepton s so abeed because t remans hghy abstracted-appropratey for certan purposes. The soca reatons n
whch epstemc sub|ects are conceved as standng are reatons between nte knowers and enqurers conceved as bearers
of reasons, producers of evdence, seekers of nformaton, conveyors of knowedge, and so on. But these knowers and
enqurers are
end p.51
sgnay not conceved as standng n reatons of soca dentty and power-the concepton abstracts away from that grade of
soca deta. Imagne a pantng that represents a puraty of gures engaged n some form of nteracton; but where the
gures are panted abstracty, eavng t ndetermnate whether they are young, od, femae, mae, back, whte, rch, poor,
domnant or subordnate, and so on. The Abstracted Soca Concepton s ke that, and so t does not rase the queston
(beng unequpped to answer t) of how these soca detas mght be ahectng the nteractons we see represented, or whether
there are other knds of nteracton gong on that reate speccay to dentty and power. In order to be open to such
questons, we need a concepton that s more ke a pantng that represents gures n ther fu soca coour; we need to
make avaabe a 5ituated 5ocial Conception of the epstemc sub|ect. It shoud not repace but rather compement the more
abstracted concepton, for both conceptons have a roe. Categores of dentty and power are ony reevant for certan sorts
of phosophca queston, after a, and those operatng wth the Abstracted Soca Concepton are not on the whoe amng to
rase them. (On a hstorca note, however, t must be sad that the Abstracted Soca Concepton doesn't easy allow such
questons to come nto vew as genuney epstemoogca questons, so that questons nvovng dentty and power have
tended to appear as questons for the socoogy of knowedge aone, whch s at east part of the story why tradtona
epstemoogy remaned so thoroughy asoca for so ong.)
The two conceptons are not reay a that far apart, however. A suggestve dstncton often featured n the terature s that
between ayman and expert. One of the thngs that makes ths dstncton nterestng s that t can be taken as a purey
epstemc dstncton, so that we conduct our debates about t n somewhat ratonay deazed terms, yet t can aso be taken
as a dstncton between two soca denttes where there are reatons of power that hod between the two partes. A
ayperson's reatonshp to an expert does not of course have to nvove any sgncant power reaton, n the sense of a
reatonshp of power that ahects ther nteracton or mpnges on the ratonaty of ther exchange. As |ohn Hardwg has
ponted out, n very arge and compex scentc pro|ects where there s a marked dvson of epstemc abour among the
contrbutng scentc communtes, t makes sense to regard a the contrbutng ndvduas as at once experts vs--vs ther
own contrbuton and aypersons vs--vs the contrbutons of others.

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Hardwg (1985).
In such a scenaro, what reatons of dentty and power there may be between dherent groups of scentsts may not gve rse
to any epstemoogcay compeng ssues. But, then agan, they mght. In a scenaro where one set of contrbutors happens
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to en|oy more professona esteem than others (perhaps, smpy, they are operatng under the auspces of an especay
powerfu nsttuton) there coud easy arse the sort of mngng of power wth norms of enqury that s not easy to
dsentange. When ths
end p.52
happens, t becomes part and parce of the scentc enqurer's requste epstemc vrtues-possessed ether by ndvduas or
possby ony by the communty-to reaby succeed n spottng research decsons that are too much drven by professona
or nsttutona power. When soca epstemoogsts tak of experts and aypersons, then, they are aready rtng wth a more
fuy socazed concepton of epstemc sub|ects than the Abstracted Soca Concepton tsef aows for.
If we want epstemoogy to account for the human epstemc predcament, then we need to have avaabe a concepton of
epstemc sub|ects as requred to overcome or negotate certan entangements of reason and power, because t s an
essenta feature of human enqurers that they operate n a context n whch such entangements can arse. Ths s the source
of the vaue of the Stuated Soca Concepton, whch conceves epstemc sub|ects and ther nteractons as stuated n a
context of soca dentty and power, and so makes vsbe the nuence of these factors on our epstemc nteractons. For any
gven pro|ect n soca epstemoogy, then, we need to be reectve about whch concepton suts our phosophca purposes
-reectve, that s, about whch degree of abstracton s approprate for the ssues we want to brng out. Smpy stckng to
the standard Abstracted Soca Concepton may occude ethca and potca aspects of epstemc practce that are worth our
attenton; then agan, sustanng a Stuated Soca Concepton w be pontess f reatons of dentty and power are rreevant
to the ssue we are pursung. It's a |udgement about horses for courses, so, as a matter of good phosophca method, we
need to have the dherent optons reectvey avaabe to the phosophca magnaton. The pcture of epstemc sub|ects
presented by the Stuated Soca Concepton s ess abstract than that presented n the Abstracted Soca Concepton, but t
s st an abstracton, as bets the phosophca purpose. It represents epstemc sub|ects not n ther persona deta
-obvousy not-but as varousy nstantatng one or another more or ess compex soca type. If the Abstracted Soca
Concepton marks the moment of rebeon aganst excessve ndvduasm n epstemoogy, the avaabty of the Stuated
Soca Concepton marks our graduaton beyond the navety of compusory ratona deazaton.
I have argued esewhere for the mportance of the Stuated Soca Concepton for certan phosophca purposes, and n
partcuar I have argued that there are ssues of |ustce and n|ustce n our everyday epstemc nteractons-our testmona
nteractons and our practces of soca nterpretaton-whch cannot come to ght uness we adopt that more fuy socazed
concepton.

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See Frcker (2007).
For present purposes, however, the Abstracted Soca Concepton s approprate, as my am s to show how expandng not
ony across soca space but aso across time can be a powerfu epstemoogca resource. We shoud dstngush between two
sorts of tempora expanson: expanson across rea tme (ncudng hstorca tme), and
end p.53
expanson across the quas-ctona tme that s at work n geneaogca method. I sha make a case for the phosophca
frutfuness of expandng over geneaogca tme, and my specc am w be to show how the geneaogca method can
support and augment certan socazng arguments aganst sceptcsm. The geneaogca story I sha use s that gven by
Edward Crag (1990) n hs book, lnowledge and The 5tate of Nature (hence the approprateness here of the Abstracted
Soca Concepton, for n so far as there are any soca types n the State of Nature, ther soca denttes do not gure n the
expanatory purpose that ths partcuar geneaogy ams to acheve).
I sha make my case by reference to Mchae Wams's dagnostc engagement wth sceptcsm, n whch he crucay empoys
a Defaut and Chaenge mode of |ustcaton. And I w deveop three key aspects of Crag's practca expcaton of the
concept of knowedge so that they may be seen to resonate postvey wth Wams's epstemoogca pcture: the admxture
of nternast and externast features (3.1); the proto-contextuasm (3.2); and, nay, the dstnctvey geneaogca ant-
sceptca mpetus (3.3). In ths way I am to support and augment the socazed ant-sceptca case mounted by Wams. I
aso am thereby to ustrate the phosophca productveness of expandng epstemoogy not ony ateray across the soca
space of other epstemc sub|ects, but at the same tme vertcay n the tempora dmenson.
2. DEFAULT AND CHALLENGE: SOCIALIZING |USTIFICATION
In Responsbty and Reabty

4

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In Responsbty and Reabty
4
Wams's paper was orgnay devered as part of a Symposum on Expandng Epstemoogy, wth Guy Axte and Robert
Brandom, APA Pacc Dvson Meetng, Sprng 2007. The present chapter grew out of my response as Commentator on that occason.
Mchae Wams (2008) expores the ant-sceptca mpetus of a certan mode of |ustcaton that s found n Robert
Brandom's work under the name of Defaut and Chaenge. It s an enttement concepton of |ustcaton, accordng to whch
we may assume our facutes are functonng correcty so ong as there are no reasons to suspect otherwse. Wams's paper
has two ams. Frsty, he ams to ncorporate reabst nsghts wthn a fundamentay deontoogca framework, where the key
reabst nsght he has n mnd s that many accounts of knowedge ncorporate exaggerated, over-nteectuazed
conceptons of what t takes to be epstemcay responsbe, whch smpy do not square wth the spontaneous and
unreectve character of our most basc forms of knowedge, notaby, percepton. If there s to be a satsfactory responsbsm
that presents a uned account of knowedge, t w have to avod such nteectuasm. And, secondy, he wants to show how
such
end p.54
a responsbsm can, by the same token, deect sceptcsm. The probems of nteectuasm and sceptca chaenge, he
argues, have a common souton, for one and the same excessvey nternast, mentastc concepton of |ustcaton s ther
common root.
Wams traces a domnant nternast concepton of |ustcaton back to Chshom, and the mode he nds n Chshom's
wrtng s one n whch |ustcaton consttutes a knd of postve authorzaton whch, n Chshom, s nked to a foundatonast
structure wth error-proof sensory experences at the bottom, so that the whoe structure s desgned n the foundatonast
stye to stave oh sceptca chaenge. Lookng to Sears's crtca anayss of ths sort of vew and ts dependence on notons of
the Gven, Wams argues that the postve authorzaton concepton serousy exaggerates what s needed to vndcate the
dea that epstemc sub|ects acheve |ustcaton by actng in the light of epstemc rues, as opposed to merey conformng to
them. We can acheve a pcture of sub|ects actng n the ght of normatve rues, wthout beng compeed to add that rues
shoud be construed as mperatva n form, or that |ustcaton ows upwards n the system from a foundaton of error-proof
sef-addressed reports' of experence. Wams contnues n the Searsan dom by takng up a dstncton Sears makes
between ought-to-do rues, whch are mperatva n form, and ought-to-be rues, whch are not. These so caed ought-to-
be rues ehectvey set condtons of enttement n the Defaut and Chaenge moud. In Wams's exampe:
For me to see, and not merey thnk that I see, that there s a rabbt n the garden, a sorts of condtons must be
met. Some concern me: I must be of sound mnd, payng attenton, capabe of recognzng what s gong on, and so
forth. Others concern the ob|ect and ts stuaton: the anma has to be a rabbt and not a stuhed toy, the ght must
be good enough to make out the shape of the dark patch n the mdde of the awn, and so on. If these condtons are
not met, I won't be n a poston to see that there s a rabbt n the garden. (Wams 2008: 12-13)
What Defaut and Chaenge acheves for us s the desred admxture of nternast and externast nsghts. In order to count
as actng n the ght of a rue (n order to count as epstemcay |usted) the we-traned sub|ect mght, dependng on the
context, need ony to be counterfactuay senstve to apses n the condtons requred for takng the deverances of her
facutes for granted. As Wams puts t, Our acceptance of an ought-to-be "rue" conssts prncpay n our dsposton to
acknowedge the exceptons, and to respond appropratey (2008: 21). In sum, the we-traned sub|ect may take her sensory
experences at face vaue, so ong as there are no reasons not to. In dong ths she s foowng rues of |ustcaton, actng n
the ght of them but not sef-conscousy. Thus the externast aspect of Defaut and Chaenge that sets t apart from any
postve authorzaton mode. Yet f appropratey chaenged, she does have a standng obgaton to produce a |ustcaton,
and f she cannot, then she s reveaed as
end p.55
ackng enttement to her beef.

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Note that Brandom hmsef s ready to go a step further n the externast drecton than Wams s wng to. In Articulating Reasons
he embraces reabsm's Foundng Insght and aows that, for nstance, an expert n dstngushng Totec from Aztec potsherds can
know whether a shard s one or the other even f she cannot say how she does t. Wams dhers, and so mantans a stronger
nternasm n hs responsbst poston. See Brandom (2000: ch. 3, esp. 98-9).
Thus the nternast aspect of Defaut and Chaenge that quaes Wams's poston as a form of responsbsm.
Wams aso argues that seeng |ustcaton as conformng to a Defaut and Chaenge structure can hep fend oh sceptcsm.
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He nvokes the dstncton between Agrppan and Cartesan forms of sceptca chaenge. Agrppan sceptcsm mposes an
endess demand for further |ustcatons, so that t threatens to expose ether regress or crcuarty n the seres of
|ustcatons we may oher, or ese a pany un|usted assumpton somewhere n our reasonng. Cartesan sceptcsm s
characterzed as expotng ssues of underdetermnaton by postng sceptca scenaros whch he cams, for a we know, we
mght be n.

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Ths s the characterzaton of Cartesan sceptcsm that Wams has esewhere argued to be the ony one to furnsh radca
sceptcsm-the vew that we have no |usted beefs. See, for nstance, Wams (2001: 73-7).
Wams's focus, however, s on the Agrppan stye sceptc, and he argues that the Agrppan s mpcty commtted to the
famar, mentastc and so excessvey nternast mode of |ustcaton that conceves beng guded by norms or rues as
aways a matter of sef-conscous obedence to sef-addressed mperatves-postve authorzaton. What the Defaut and
Chaenge mode furnshes s an account of |ustcaton-enttement-that makes no such requrement. By contrast, what
Defaut and Chaenge obges the ndvdua sub|ect to do s somethng negatve: don't take your experences at face vaue f
the defaut condton s apsed. A sub|ect who s entrey successfu wth respect to that negatve task may we not be abe to
answer the Agrppan sceptc-but so much the worse for the sceptc. The standng obgaton to come up wth reasons when
chaenged ony hods for chaenges to whch one's nterocutor s entted. Brandom, ntroducng the abe Defaut and
Chaenge, puts the pont ke ths:
Cams such as There have been back dogs' and I have ten ngers' are ones to whch nterocutors are treated as
prma face entted. They are not mmune to doubt n the form of questons about enttement, but such questons
themseves stand n need of some sort of warrant or |ustcaton. Enttement s, to begn wth, a soca status that a
performance or commtment has wthn a communty. . . The mode presented here has what mght be caed a default
and challenge structure of enttement.
(Brandom 1994: 177)
The Agrppan sceptc, then, s presentng napproprate chaenges, and so our faure to meet those chaenges sgnes
nothng. The sceptc s thus reveaed as mssng the pont, for she tres to compe the ndvdua sub|ect to dg deeper and
deeper nto hs ndvdua epstemc resources, furnshng reason upon reason for hs beef-but ths s smpy the wrong pace
to ook for hs status as |usted n
end p.56
beevng what he beeves. The Agrppan demands to be shown a |ustcatona stoppng pont somewhere n the depths of
the ndvdua sub|ect, and her mstake s that |ustcaton s not to be found deep n the ndvdua but rather on the surface of
somethng rreducby soca, namey, the sub|ect's abty to meet the chaenges propery brought n that context by others
n the epstemc communty.
Wams focuses on the mentastc nature and extreme nternasm of the mode of |ustcaton that both poarzes reabsm
and responsbsm and hands the sceptc a stck to beat us wth. But I thnk we shoud most of a emphasze ts individualism,
for t s the ndvduasm that underpns both the mentastc and the excessvey nternast character of the mstaken mode
of |ustcaton that Wams rghty dagnoses n the sceptc. Gven a genera assumpton of epstemc ndvduasm, one easy
sees how t can seem natura to assume that the ndvdua s the source of a |ustcaton for her beef, and that the pace to
ook s (where ese?) n her menta states. Thus the mentasm. Further, f even the sub|ect hersef cannot nd a |ustcaton n
her psychoogy, then how can she count as possessng a |ustcaton at a? Thus the extreme nternasm. I thnk, then, that
once we focus on the ant-sceptca energy that Defaut and Chaenge ceary contans, we nd that energy to be derved
most fundamentay from ts sociality (and so, to reate back to the termnoogy I ntroduced earer, from ts mpct
nsstence on the Abstracted Soca Concepton of epstemc sub|ects). For t s the socaty that ehects the cruca shft n
ratona obgaton away from the one ndvdua and nto the epstemc soca body as a member of whch the ndvdua
sub|ect must functon. It s of course ndvduas who bear the responsbty of |ustcaton for ther beefs, but the pont s
they can ony ve up to ths responsbty n vrtue of ther partcpaton n a soca practce of proper chaenge. (I aone bear
the responsbty for payng my bs; but the queston of what I owe s setted as a matter of soca practce.) It s ths soca
dspersa of |ustcatory abour that reeves the ndvdua beever of the burden of accessng the knd of |ustcaton that the
Agrppan sceptc demands.
The Agrppan, who presses and presses for ever more |ustcatons, s thus reveaed as makng a profound mstake at both
the eve of epstemc practce and the eve of epstemoogy. She fas to adhere to socay estabshed norms of chaenge, a
mstaken practce that exposes her fase theory of |ustcaton. But what of the Cartesan sceptc? Wams thnks the
Cartesan, whose sgnature s of course the sort of madcap sceptca scenaros we a know and ove, cannot be conned n
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the same way, but ony ndrecty by way of showng how we can egtmatey set sceptca probems asde (Wams 2008:
26). Why s ths? If the context senstve norms of chaenge can revea Agrppan chaenges as mstaken, then why not
Cartesan chaenges too? Now that we have dented the socaty of Defaut and Chaenge as fueng the ant-sceptca
work, s t not evdent that the Cartesan nvocaton of sceptca scenaros s a stye of chaenge every bt as napproprate as
the Agrppan? The Cartesan, too, seems to press
end p.57
hs case to the ndvdua knowedge-camant n a way that s not sanctoned by socay estabshed norms of Defaut and
Chaenge-the demand to rue out that one s a bran n a vat, or whatever t may be, s obvousy outrageous. I thnk ths
does have some bte as an argument aganst the Cartesan. He, no more than the Agrppan, can |ust assume that hs
chaenges are approprate-on the face of t they certany are not.
It remans true, however, that the Cartesan has a card up hs seeve that the Agrppan acks, n as much as the Cartesan's
chaenge pays speccay on the dea of underdetermnaton n order to spook us wth the possbty that our beefs are not
|usted at a, on the grounds that they are no more |usted than the aternatve theores' of the word cooked up n the
sceptca scenaros. Ths means the Cartesan can be construed as makng a chaenge not necessary to the ndvdua
knower n any way that voates the nsghts of Defaut and Chaenge, but rather as makng a hgher eve chaenge n respect
of what we thnk we acheve by adherng to our precous norms of approprate chaenge-not knowedge, he excams, not
even |usted beefs! Admttedy, then, reveang the Cartesan as havng an excessvey ndvduastc theory of |ustcaton
that shoud be repaced by Defaut and Chaenge st eaves the spooky radca sceptca possbty rather as t s, whch s
why other arguments (aganst epstemoogca reasm and for an antdote contextuasm) need to be brought n. Nothng n
Defaut and Chaenge, after a, drecty addresses ssues of underdetermnaton; whereas, by contrast, the favourabe
dentcaton of Defaut and Chaenge as a rva account of |ustcaton reveas the Agrppan as entrey drven by the
mstaken assumpton that |ustcaton requres an ndvdua capacty to respond to an ndente seres of chaenges, wthout
apse nto regress, assumpton, or crcuarty. Even whe I want to nsst that the socazng move nherent n Defaut and
Chaenge does wn a trck aganst the Cartesan sceptc, then, st t s cear that t cannot on ts own beat the Cartesan's
hand n the way t beats the Agrppan's.
Accordngy, n respect of the Cartesan chaenge, Wams ooks to the centra ant-sceptca argument of Unnatural Doubts
(1991), namey, the argument that the Cartesan sceptc s commtted to epstemoogca reasm and epstemoogca
reasm s fase. The Cartesan sceptc's chaenges concern somethng caed knowedge of the externa word or emprca
knowedge, as f these were respectabe theoretca categores; but they are not. They are far too nternay dverse to be so
regarded, and n fact have no more ntegrty than a category such as knowedge of thngs done on a Wednesday. Crucay,
they are too nternay dverse n terms of the knd of |ustcaton that s requred-somethng we may express n terms of the
Defaut and Chaenge mode by sayng that the norms of approprate chaenge vary from context to context. The Cartesan
sceptc may possby go n for hs pecuar stye of chaenge n the strcty epstemoogca context, but not n other contexts.
To do so woud, as ever, consttute a mstake at the eve of norms of Defaut and Chaenge governng our epstemc practce,
end p.58
but more mportanty perhaps, t woud be an enactment of the fase pece of theory that s epstemoogca reasm. The
Cartesan sceptc wants to move from () dscoverng that, n context C, knowedge s mpossbe, to () dscoverng (n context
C) that knowedge s mpossbe

7

7
Ths s how Brandom (2000b) puts the ssue.
, but f he can ony make that move by way of the fase doctrne of epstemoogca reasm-a stagng post whch woud
ehectvey prvege the so-caed epstemoogca context over a others-then the move s bocked and, qua sceptc, he s
conned to the study. That s, hs eccentrc stye of |ustcatona chaenge s conned to the context of enqury that s
pecuar to a certan stye of epstemoogy.
Thus Wams's fascnatng ant-sceptca case. I have so far dscussed (and sghty eaborated) the use he makes of Defaut
and Chaenge aganst sceptcsm n Responsbty and Reabty; and I have recaed (as he does) the contextuast poston
he rst argued for n Unnatural Doubts, where t functons as the antdote to the sceptc's epstemoogca reasm. My chef
purpose here, however, s to make a case for the expanson of our phosophca concepton of epstemc sub|ects and ther
actvtes aong a certan tempora dmenson, namey, the geneaogca tempora dmenson. So how mght a geneaogy of
knowedge hep boster and augment Wams's ant-sceptca case?
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3. EXPANDING ALONG THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION-GENEALOGICAL TIME
In hs lnowledge and The 5tate of Nature Edward Crag gves what I'm cang a geneaogca account of knowedge. That s,
he tes a State of Nature story about why we have the concept of knowedge-a practca expcaton of that concept. He
envsages a mnmay soca epstemc communty-an abstracton of any rea human communty, though one that non-
accdentay resembes what a rea eary human communty mght have been ke n respect of ts soca smpcty and ts
hand-to-mouth reaton to basc human needs and dangers. The basc epstemc needs that dene the State of Nature are,
rst, the need for enough truths (and not too many fasehoods) for other sorts of basc needs-prncpay survva needs-to
be met. A communty that survves n the State of Nature must operate wth sumcent truths to hunt and/or forage for food,
take care of the young, avod predators, dea wth the dead, and so on. That rst epstemc need mmedatey gves rse to a
second: the need to reaze the epstemc and practca advantages of poong nformaton. Why rey ony on one's own eyes
and ears when you can benet from the eyes and ears of others? From where you're standng you may not be abe to see f
the predator s comng, but that person up n the tree mght, and ths exempes the
end p.59
fundamenta practca pressure to stand n cooperatve epstemc reatons wth feow enqurers. Fnay, ths second epstemc
need spontaneousy gves rse to a thrd: the need to dstngush good from bad nformants, so that t s ndeed nformaton
that gets shared and not msnformaton or dsnformaton. Human bengs, however descrbed, are fabe-hence the rsk of
msnformaton. And human bengs n the State of Nature, as anywhere ese, operate under pressures (such as competton
for resources) that create motvatons for decepton-hence the rsk of dsnformaton. Dstngushng good nformants s
ndeed an essenta capacty.
Ths tro of fundamenta epstemc needs generates a certan pont of vew for our soca epstemoogca pro|ect: the pont of
vew of the enqurer. Ths s notaby dherent from the pont of vew normay taken up n epstemoogy, namey that of the
examner; a pont of vew typed by the epstemoogst's remove from the actua busness of enqury n order to debate
about whether some canddate knower reay quaes.

8

8
Ths dstncton was rst made by Bernard Wams, as Crag notes. See Wams (1973: 146).
The partcuar need to dstngush a good nformant as to a gven queston whether p s a need had ony by someone who
doesn't know whether p but wants to. Accordngy, as we construct the epstemc State of Nature, we nd that gnorance and
the desre to make t good wth good nformaton emerge as our basc epstemc state. In ths sense, Who knows whether p?
s our most basc epstemoogca queston, a queston that presupposes the possbty of knowedge. How far ths broad ant-
sceptca presupposton has any argumentatve force depends upon how convncng the overa story s n terms of ts
expanatory power. In so far as the State of Nature constructon provdes a convncng expanatory story about why we have,
of necessty, the concept of knowedge, then so far may t turn out to gve genune ndependent support to the dea that
sceptca questons are parastc on there beng a functona epstemc practce n whch knowedge s possessed and, n
partcuar, shared or commoned

9

9
Ths s Mchae Webourne's term for t. See hs (2001), especay ch. 6.
n an epstemc communty. (I sha return to ths n secton 3.3.)
So how does Crag's geneaogy expan the advent of the concept of knowedge? We have seen that the enqurer needs to
dstngush good nformants. A good nformant s someone who: (1) s key enough n the context to be rght about whether
p, (2) s communcatvey avaabe and open (ncudng sncere), and (3) bears ndcator propertes so that you can reaby
recognze that (1) and (2) are satsed.

10

10
Here I paraphrase somewhat but ntend to capture Crag's condtons. For hs own formuaton, see Crag (1990: 85).
In Crag's story, ndcator propertes w be a mxed bag, but mght standardy ncude propertes such as havng been ookng
n the rght drecton at the tme, or havng a good track record.

11

11
Propertes such as these bestow what Bernard Wams (2002: 42-3) n hs geneaogy of truthfuness (modeed cosey on Crag's
geneaogy of knowedge) cas purey postona advantage.
Crag's thess s that the
end p.60
constructed concept of the good nformant consttutes the core of our actua concept of a knower. As we mght put t, the
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status of beng a knower starts fe as the status of beng a good nformant. The two concepts are not coextensve of course:
there can be knowers who are not good nformants, for nstance because they ack the requste ndcator propertes, or
because the ndcator propertes (beng ony reabe) unucky msead on that occason. But Crag's proposa s that the
functona orgn of the concept of knowedge s to dentfy good nformants; and that thereafter the constrants of
recognzabty and communcatve openness graduay become reaxed, as certan more sophstcated uses we come to
make of the concept (such as referrng to knowers we cannot ourseves recognze) pressurze t n the drecton of
ob|ectcaton-that s, of referrng to somethng that exsts ndependenty of our powers of recognton. Such pressures
expan how we come to thnk of knowedge as somethng another person can possess, even f we can't recognze t, or they
aren't comng out wth t.

12

12
To be precse, there are three key pressures that push the good nformant's proto-knowedge towards the ob|ectvzed form t
takes as, smpy, knowedge. Frst, sometmes enqurers may not need to recognze any nformant here and now, but ony at some
pont n the future. Second, the enqurer may be aware that there can be good nformants whose ndcator propertes he s unabe to
detect. And thrd, t may not matter to the nformant that he hmsef acqures the nformaton at a, as what may matter s smpy
that someone around here has got t. A three push the dea of knowedge n the drecton of ob|ectvzaton and away from any
dependence on mmedate sub|ectve avaabty to the enqurer.
3.1. The Original Synthesis of lnternalist and Externalist lnsights
Accordng to Crag's geneaogy, then, we start to operate wth the concept of knowedge, of necessty, because at the core of
that concept s somethng that meets the absoutey basc epstemc need to pck out good nformants. Now how does a ths
hep the socazng ant-sceptca case that Wams buds on Defaut and Chaenge? One of the key ant-sceptca features of
Defaut and Chaenge s that t acheves a desrabe combnaton of nternast and externast features. I thnk we can see how
ths s expaned and so renforced f we ook cosey enough at epstemc practces n the State of Nature. In the rst nstance,
the practce of poong nformaton n the State of Nature features peope spottng others as good nformants before askng
them for nformaton. But we can see how the basc need for good nformaton aso drves a modcaton of that practce;
namey, askng canddate good nformants the queston to whch we want the answer, and then, once they have responded,
quzzng them as to ther reasons. The capacty to gve reasons for what one asserts s a supremey mportant ndcator
property, not dscussed by Crag. The person who asserts but does not know may be suspcousy fuzzy on her reasons; the
person who asserts what he knows to be fase may be suspcousy
end p.61
unconvncng when he presents purported reasons for hs pretend beef. The abty to satsfy ths knd of chaenge s a key
ndcator property of good nformants.
Beng abe to suppy a |ustcaton when chaenged s not, however, a necessary condton of beng a good nformant. Rghty
not, for what prmary matters to the enqurer s smpy that the good nformant comes out wth the truth on demand; not
that he comes out wth hs reasons as we. Gven that the enqurer can spot a good nformant to her own satsfacton, she w
|ust take the nformaton and not bother to quz hm further about hs reasons. However, ths basc practce estabshed, we
can mmedatey see how qucky an nformant's capacty to gve reasons assumes mportance, for t s hghy desrabe n a
good nformant that he be abe to produce reasons when chaenged, owng to the fact that ths may be by far the best
ndcator property avaabe to the enqurer. The same pont appes ndvduastcay too, for enqurers n the State of Nature
w often be reyng on the deverances of ther own facutes, and are best construed as entted to trust them uness they
have some reason not to-a foggy day; a foggy memory.

13

13
See Crag (1990: 62-3).
(Here we gmpse the nascent Defaut and Chaenge structure of |ustcaton emergng.) On these occasons, a certan
chaenge to sef s n order, whch amounts to a demand for an after-the-fact ndcator property that one s key enough n
the context to be rght about p. The abty to produce a satsfyng reason s the prme case of such an ndcator property.
The mportance of ths capacty to come out wth reasons when appropratey chaenged, combned wth the fact that t s not
one of the condtons of quafyng as a good nformant, expans what underpns the desred admxture of nternast and
externast features that Wams ams to acheve. The pcture n the State of Nature s fundamentay externast-what
matters s smpy that good nformants come out wth the truth-but then we qucky come to see the orgn of nternast
ntutons about knowedge. On the story I am urgng here, we agree wth Crag that the good nformant's capacty to access
hs reasons s not at the core of the concept of knowedge. But, we add, nor s t a merey perphera feature, resutng from
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some hstorca accdent n how we use the concept. Rather, the capacty to access one's reasons features n a ayer of
content that s cose to the core of the concept of knowedge. The mportance of the capacty to produce reasons n support
of what one beeves ows mmedatey from the basc method of dentfyng good nformants that does consttute the core. I
thnk ths s a good way of substantatng the two-sded thought that t s cose to conceptuay mpossbe that a human beng
who acked the genera capacty to come out wth reasons for her beefs coud count as a knower (or even a beever); but
beng abe to come out wth one's reasons s not thereby requred n every nstance of knowedge, and so not a necessary
condton.
end p.62
Ths combnng of externast and nternast features of the practce of |ustcaton on the part of good nformants n the State
of Nature echoes and substantates the nternast-externast combnaton we nd n Defaut and Chaenge. On that mode of
|ustcaton, the sub|ect can have knowedge even f she has taken the deverances of her facutes entrey at face vaue and
cannot produce any postve reason for her beef. If faced wth an eccentrc chaenge, she may ony be abe to assert that t
never occurred to her to wonder; she may even be a bt thrown by the fact of the chaenge and by her own bewdered
reacton. And yet, accordng to Defaut and Chaenge, the fact that the defaut dd ndeed hod s sumcent. The knd of
responsbsm Wams's arguments are desgned to acheve, I thnk, s one that aows externasm vs--vs the queston
whether the defaut of enttement hods, so that there s no banket requrement that the sub|ect be reectvey aware that t
hods; yet a modest nternast constrant when t comes to the sub|ect's obgaton to respond to contextuay approprate
chaenges. My suggeston has been that a responsbsm of that combnatory sort nds expanatory support n the
geneaogca approach, owng to the non-core yet cose-to-core roe that an abty to produce reasons pays n the State of
Nature.
3.2. Practical Origins of Contextualism
What about contextuasm?-a basc verson of whch mght be consdered part and parce of the Defaut and Chaenge mode
of |ustcaton.

14

14
In Unnatural Doubts (1991) Wams argues for contextuasm ndependenty from consderatons about Defaut and Chaenge,
snce t pre-dates the pubcaton of Brandom's Making lt Explicit (1994)-I thank Aessandra Tanesn for rst pontng ths out to me.
In Wams's ater book, Problems of lnowledge (2001), we see the two n combnaton.
I suggest that ths too nds an orgn n the State of Nature. We have seen that the enqurer s ookng for someone who s
crucay likely enough in the context to be right as to whether p. Ths presents an expcty contextuast pcture of ts own,
accordng to whch what t takes to be a good nformant-what t takes to pay the soca roe at the core of knowng-aters
from context to context. For nstance, f the stakes are very hgh, the good nformant w be amost certany rght about p; f
they are not so hgh, and/or f one needs to act sooner rather than ater, she mght count as key enough to be rght about p
|ust by havng a haf-decent track record and beng the ony canddate good nformant n the vcnty. The State of Nature,
then, expcty mposes the aspect of contextuasm that Wams has esewhere abeed economc:
If t s mportant to reach some decson, and f the costs of error are fary ow, or f we gan a ot by beng rght and
ose tte by beng wrong, t s reasonabe to take a reaxed atttude to |ustcatona standards. If the costs of error are
hgh, more demandng standards may be n order. The opportunty costs of further nqury can aso be reevant.
(Wams 2001: 161)
end p.63
The proto-contextuasm contaned n the State of Nature not ony sgnes a constrant on who can be a good nformant, t
mposes a constrant on the enqurer too. If, n our magned scenaro n whch the enqurer has aready asked a canddate
good nformant for nformaton, the nformant has tod her somethng, and she s chaengng hm for hs reasons, then her
chaenges must be appropratey geared to the context. She s ookng for an after-the-fact-of-utterance ndcator property,
and ths means that f she were to press hm for a |ustcaton that exceeded the contextuay requred eve of probabty,
ths woud mark a dysfuncton n her epstemc conduct from her own pont of vew as an enqurer. Basc practca concerns
generate the context senstve norms of Defaut and Chaenge n the State of Nature, so that enqurers who demand reasons
above and beyond those approprate to the context are makng a mstake at the eve of the (emergent) norms of proper
chaenge. A n a, the State of Nature presents us wth a range of practca contexts such that n some contexts the enqurer
w demand very tte by way of an nformant's keness of beng rght, whereas n other contexts she w demand a good
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dea more, accordng to her practca needs and nterests-accordng, that s, to what t takes for the nformant to be key
enough n the context to be rght about p.
Ths aspect of context s the ony one we nd expcty stated n the formuaton of our State of Nature scenaro, as a
condton of beng a good nformant, though the other determnants of epstemc context can be but n f one s so ncned.
Besdes the economc, Wams ctes four other aspects of context: (1) the ntegbty of error-we cannot make sense of
the possbty of error except aganst a backdrop of gettng t rght; (2) ssues of methodoogca necessty-n order to pursue
any queston we must take some others for granted; (3) daectca ssues-defaut enttements are ost and ganed
accordng to the ongong movement of evdence; and (4) stuatona ssues-camng knowedge commts us to the
ob|ectve we-groundedness of our beefs (ether a defaut enttement hods or t doesn't). Takng as an exampe the ssue of
methodoogca necessty, peope n the State of Nature dentvey don't do hstory, so they don't have to set asde questons
about the reaty of tme n order to do t; but they may we have to estabsh whether a certan water source s cean or not,
and so they do have to set asde questons about the reaty of the externa word.
I beeve somethng smar can easy be sad n reaton to the other aspects of context that Wams argues for, but I do not
want to set much store by t. I dare say an advocate of another stye of contextuasm coud construct a smar support n the
State of Nature for hs partcuar brand of the vew too. Ony the contextuasm we nd expct n the formuaton of the State
of Nature scenaro shoud dene the proto-contextuasm we regard as proper to t, and that s the condton of beng a good
nformant that requres her to be key enough n the context to be rght about p. My pont s that the practca pressures that
generate ths proto-contextuasm end geneaogca expanatory support to the
end p.64
contextuasm that Wams embraces, even whe we can see that they mght aso be abe to support dstnct forms of
contextuasm n whch the economc eement was dherenty embedded. That s entrey as t shoud be, for the State of
Nature scenaro purports to contan ony the necessary features of our practces. We shoud not try to nd anythng besdes
the core eements of our actua |ustcatory practces represented n the State of Nature scenaro, and so shoud not hope to
extrapoate anythng more than a generc proto-contextuast commtment.
3.3. The Un-Originality of Sceptical Challenge
In ths exporaton of the practca pressures that generate contextuasm n the State of Nature, we aready begn to see how
the geneaogy of knowedge provdes ndependent support for the ant-sceptca purpose to whch Wams puts hs own
contextuast poston. There are no sceptcs n the State of Nature-survva requres takng some peope as knowng thngs
one needs to know, and that entas acceptng the possbty of knowedge. Ths underpns my earer suggeston that
Wams's charge aganst the Agrppan sceptc-that he behaves n a contextuay napproprate manner-does have some
force of ts own aganst the Cartesan sceptc. In the State of Nature, t doesn't matter n whch stye sceptca chaenges are
made. The fact that any such chaenges make demands that exceed what t takes for the nformant to be key enough n
the context to be rght about p means the sceptc w fa to dentfy good nformants that are starng hm n the face, and w
ose out on knowedge as a resut. Ths means that not ony the Agrppan demand for utmate |ustcaton but aso the
Cartesan demand that we meet the chaenge of underdetermnaton can ony be a mstake.

15

15
Most drecty of a, our geneaogca story undermnes Cartesan sceptcsm characterzed n the tradtona manner as a demand
for absoute certanty, for that demand s most mmedatey what the proto-contextuasm generated n the State of Nature exposes
as fatay msguded, n as much as there s no practca context where a good nformant woud have to be absoutey certan n the
requste sense of ndubtabty. But the present focus s on the more potent nterpretaton of the Cartesan chaenge as threatenng
radca sceptcsm.
The State of Nature, then, expans the commonsense dea that no one can basically be a sceptc. They must be enqurer
rst, and sceptc second; someone commtted to the practca possbty of knowedge rst, and commtted to undermnng
that possbty second. Ths of course eaves room for the dea that there may yet be a context n whch t is approprate to
mount sceptca chaenges. The present argument shows ony that there s no such context n the State of Nature.
Ths accommodatng thought prompts exposure of the other respect n whch we can see the geneaogy of knowedge endng
ndependent support to Wams's ant-sceptca strategy. The pont of extendng our phosophca concepton over the sem-
ctona tme n whch geneaogca narratves are set, s
end p.65
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that t provdes an nvauabe way of relating core features of a concept to non-core and perphera features. I know of no
other phosophca method that provdes the opportunty to reate orgna, necessary features of a concept to ess basc,
more contngent-hstorcay contngent-features.

16

16
Bernard Wams (2002) expots ths facty by dentfyng n the State of Nature hs two fundamenta vrtues of truth-Accuracy and
Sncerty-and then gong on to expore ther contngent hstorca forms and sgncances.
Accordngy, t devers an entrey dherent mage of concepts than that ssued by the anaytca method. The anaytca
ambton and attendant phosophca magnaton generates an mage of concepts as ke moecues, ready for ther dherent
eementa components to be separated out by the phosopher actng n hs capacty as conceptua chemst. Geneaogca
method, by contrast, brngs wth t an mage of core and perphery, or kerne and outer ayers-the kerne presents necessary
features of the concept, and the outer ayers ncreasngy contngent hstorca features. These ayers may be separated out
from the kerne by the phosopher actng n hs capacty as somethng more ke conceptua hstoran. The necessty of the
core features stands or fas wth how convncngy the story passes muster as a pure constructon out of nothng but
absoutey basc needs. If, however unwttngy, one ncudes a contngent feature n the State of Nature scenaro, perhaps to
sut one's phosophca purpose, then, ceary, the story w ack force. No doubt every story of orgns shoud be
accompaned by somethng of a heath warnng, for t surey s a too easy to portray the State of Nature n one's
phosophcay preferred mage. As Foucaut scomngy warns us, echong what he takes to be Netzsche's own warnng about
the phosopher's fantasy of the orgn:
Hstory s the concrete body of a deveopment, wth ts moments of ntensty, ts apses, ts extended perods of
feversh agtaton, ts fantng spes; and ony a metaphyscan woud seek ts sou n the dstant deaty of the orgn.
(Foucaut 1984: 80)
But Foucaut s wrong f he equates a orgns stores wth ahstorca fantasy. One of the great vrtues of the State of Nature
method s precsey ts separaton of features of a concept that bear the necessty of the orgn, from features that are more
or ess contngent matters of hstory. Far from demandng some dubousy metaphysca fath n the necessty of any gven
practce, t gves us a concrete way of assessng the pausbty of any such cam. When confronted wth a geneaogca cam
that such-and-such a practce s humany necessary or orgna, we must ask, Does ths practce reay quafy as an
ndspensabe feature of human fe? Is t reay requred to meet absoutey basc human needs? Can we not magne a
recognzaby human socety wthout t? Geneaogca cams of necessty, then, are grounded not on dubousy metaphysca
deas or artces of anaytca fath, but rather on somethng fundamentay practca-the practical human necessity of the
materas used to construct the State of Nature
end p.66
scenaro. If we can nd nothng contngent about the posted orgna human need to poo nformaton-f, that s, we cannot
make sense of the dea that there coud be a recognzaby human socety absent ths most basc form of epstemc
cooperaton-then the thess that dentfyng good nformants comprses the kerne of the concept of knowedge possesses
sgncant force. Foucaut seems to regard t as a msuse of the geneaogca method ever to use t to dentfy human
necesstes. But f t were n the very nature of geneaogca method that t coud ony propery be used to nd contngency
and never necessty, then t woud be a ousy, because undscrmnatng, method. Foucaut's bthey expressed wsdom that
when t comes to concepts, a s hstory and nothng orgn, s mere pre|udce.
Crag's State of Nature story reveas that f there s a context of enqury n whch sceptca chaenges are approprate, st
there are nonesuch n the State of Nature. And from ths we have drawn the nference that sceptcs must be enqurers rst
and sceptcs second (or, basically enqurers, and sceptcs ony supercay). Ths, n ts own rght, bocks the sceptc's
coonzng move from () dscoverng that, n context C, knowedge s mpossbe, to () dscoverng (n context C) that
knowedge s mpossbe. What bocks sceptcsm here s the genealogical primacy of practca, knowedge-permttng,
contexts of enqury. These knowedge-permttng contexts are the contexts n whch the core of the concept of knowedge s
dramatzed n practces of good nformng. In ths sense, knowedge-permttng contexts gure at the core of the concept of
knowedge; ndeed they exhaust t, for there are no other contexts n the State of Nature. Thus the possbty of knowedge s
pror to the possbty of sceptca chaenge n the speca sense that can ony be supped by magnatvey stretchng our
concepts of knowedge and |ustcaton across geneaogca tme: even the sceptc cannot escape the cogntve functonaty
of the orgn, for that scenaro s st wth us, st suppyng the core of what t s for us to know.
As n Wams's renc ant-sceptca strategy, ths may st eave some room for a conned practce of sceptca chaenge-t
s ony n the excusvey practca contexts provded by the State of Nature that sceptca chaenge s obvousy never a
proper chaenge. In the rea-tme practces of Defaut and Chaenge there may possby reman a context n whch sceptca
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordschoarshp.com). (c) Copyrght Oxford Unversty Press, 2003 - 2011. A Rghts Reserved.
Under the terms of the cence agreement, an ndvdua user may prnt out a PDF of a snge chapter of a monograph n OSO for persona use (for detas
see http://www.oxfordschoarshp.com/oso/pubc/prvacy_pocy.htm).
Subscrber: Unversty of St. Andrews; date: 09 February 2011
Social Epistemology
Haddock, Adrian (Edtor), Unversty of Strng
Millar, Alan (Edtor), Unversty of Strng
Pritchard, Duncan (Edtor), Unversty of Ednburgh
Prnt pubcaton date: 2010, Pubshed to Oxford Schoarshp Onne: |anuary 2011
Prnt ISBN-13: 978-0-19-957747-7, do:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001
chaenge s approprate, so that knowedge s not possbe n that context. But such an epstemoogca context, f there be
such

17

17
Epstemoogca context aready seems too generous a category, precsey because there are aready approaches (such as
geneaogca approaches) to epstemoogy that pre-empt, or at east do not nvte, sceptca chaenge.
, expots ony aspects of the concept of knowedge that are way out on the perphery. And our geneaogy has exposed the
hstorca contngency of merey perphera practces, so that the sceptc may at any tme nd the ocks to hs study have
been changed and that t s now beng put to a dherent phosophca use. In ths way geneaogca tme
end p.67
has mpcatons for hstorca tme: whe the dagnoss of the sceptca urge goes deep n phosophy, our geneaogy of
knowedge reveas that the queston of the proprety of sceptca chaenge does not go deep. It smpy rests on how much
nurturance we contnue to gve to the context of enqury n whch sceptca chaenge s deemed approprate. That s, t rests
on somethng soca wthn the phosophca communty: namey, how far we contnue to respond to sceptca chaenge n the
epstemoogca context as |usted chaenge, how ong we contnue to sustan somethng caed the epstemoogca
context. Perhaps ony a satsfactory theoretca dagnoss can catayse and |ustfy the hstorca shft that woud render
sceptca chaenges napproprate n a contexts; and that s surey somethng to whch Wams's arguments make a
sgncant contrbuton. For my part, I have tred to show that the geneaogca approach contrbutes an ndependent
dagnostc strategy, whch can be seen to support and augment the man strands of Wams's ant-sceptca case, and aso to
provde ts own dstnctve stye of drecty ant-sceptca argument-one that amrms the geneaogca prmacy of knowedge-
permttng contexts. Most generay, I hope to have thereby shown how soca epstemoogy may be frutfuy expanded not
ony across soca space but aso across tme.

18

18
An earer draft of ths chapter was presented at a conference on Soca Epstemoogy hed at the Unversty of Strng n 2007, and
I am gratefu to a those present for ther nput, ncudng Katheen Lennon, who responded. I aso thank Duncan Prtchard for
subsequent wrtten comments. The present chapter s a sghty revsed verson of an artce that appears n Philosophical Papers.
For detas see the bbographca entry for Frcker (2008). I am gratefu to the edtor of Philosophical Papers for permsson to reprnt.
end p.68
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordschoarshp.com). (c) Copyrght Oxford Unversty Press, 2003 - 2011. A Rghts Reserved.
Under the terms of the cence agreement, an ndvdua user may prnt out a PDF of a snge chapter of a monograph n OSO for persona use (for detas
see http://www.oxfordschoarshp.com/oso/pubc/prvacy_pocy.htm).
Subscrber: Unversty of St. Andrews; date: 09 February 2011
Social Epistemology
Haddock, Adrian (Edtor), Unversty of Strng
Millar, Alan (Edtor), Unversty of Strng
Pritchard, Duncan (Edtor), Unversty of Ednburgh
Prnt pubcaton date: 2010, Pubshed to Oxford Schoarshp Onne: |anuary 2011
Prnt ISBN-13: 978-0-19-957747-7, do:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001