Iraq’s Non-Existent WMDs: Using Human Factors Science to Investigate

Intelligence Failures
By Moin Rahman

The Bush administration has now all but conceded that Iraq didn’t have Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMDs). This was based on conclusions drawn by two highly professional and
respected groups. The first one was the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction consisting of a distinguished group of
experts nominated by President Bush. This commission was charged with the responsibility to
investigate the intelligence collection procedures relating to highly secretive and regimented
societies who actively conceal their conduct through denial and deception; and this list included
Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein. The second one was the Iraq Survey Group made up of
1500 military and intelligence specialists who, among other things, conducted a systematic
search for WMDs in Iraq’s military installations, laboratories and factories. These
investigations were triggered by the colossal loss of lives and money spent in the unsuccessful
search and elimination of what turned out to be Iraq’s non-existent WMDs.

Both the above-mentioned groups have done a thorough job of studying and investigating topics
as varied as intelligence collection procedures, counterintelligence, information sharing, Saddam
Hussain regime’s strategic intent, illicit financing and building of the WMD programs, among
other things. However, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities seems to have missed an
issue close to home. That is, the human decision making process at the higher levels of the U.S.
Government, their [human] psychology, predilections and biases. Why is it one may ask that
the human decision making process regarding Iraq’s WMDs didn’t adhere to the scientific
method and didn’t express a sufficient amount of skepticism and peer review. And is there a
science concerning human behavior that can help us find an answer to this thorny issue that
involves government, politics, elected representatives and the decision to go to war.

Consider the science of human factors (HF). Human Factors is involved in the design of
processes and systems, to match with human capabilities and limitations. HF is utilized in the
design process – say of a car, cellphone or a space shuttle – to optimize the design of the human-
machine interface by making it user-friendly and to prevent failures by taking into account the
way humans perceive stimuli, think and respond both during normal circumstances and when
under stress. HF with its ample amount of peer-reviewed literature, seems to be an appropriate
science, that could have been put to use to unravel this puzzle of the WMD failure, particularly
by addressing the issue of human decision making of people in the government, including
elected representatives.

As a practicing human factors specialist, I think, the groups investigating the issue of Iraq’s non-
existent WMDs have not addressed a critical factor relating to human decision-making
processes. And in a larger sense, the science of human factors, which concerns itself whenever
human(s) are involved in a system or process, doesn’t seem to be sufficiently applied in the
analysis and investigations of failures that arise time to time in our government.

1
Next, I put to work the science of human factors to demonstrate as to why failures in the human-
decision making process in the higher echelons of the U.S. Government may have played a direct
role in drawing the wrong conclusions about Iraq’s WMDs, which resulted in a preemptive war.

To do this human factors analysis I will begun with the 9-11 attacks.

The intelligence failure of 9-11 was blamed on the inability to connect the dots. The prewar
intelligence failure that resulted in the war against Iraq is now being blamed on missing dots
(WMDs).

Congress and two independent commissions (9-11 &Iraq’s WMDs, respectively) appointed by
the president investigated these massive intelligence failures.

To correctly diagnose the reasons for the Iraq WMD failure, it behooves that the investigators
understand the fallibilities and fallacies of humans, when they process information and make
decisions in ominous and uncertain circumstances.

Mr. Tenet pointed out in a speech at Georgetown University that intelligence is “almost never
completely wrong or completely right.” Due to its nebulous nature, it gives the appearance of
not being an exact science; however, a method known as Signal Detection Theory (SDT), which
is part of human factors sciences deals with how humans process information – and make
decisions – in a world that is inexact.

SDT in its essence explains how humans’ process information in an uncertain world and react to
it when there is a need to separate wheat (referred as “signal”) from the chaff (“noise”). Human
Factors engineers utilize SDT to understand human information processing and decision-making
capabilities when designing critical systems, such as nuclear power plant control rooms, where
there is no room for error.

Let us consider the example of a radiologist to understand SDT in detail. When a radiologist
looks at an X-ray and correctly identifies a tumor (signal) it is called a “hit”; if he fails it is called
a “miss”. However, if he falsely concludes that there is a tumor when in reality there was none –
say, due to the fuzziness of the picture – it will be a “false alarm”. Alternatively, if he correctly
rejects a mass that is an integral part of a healthy organ, but gives a false appearance of a tumor,
it will be called a “correct rejection”.

The accuracy of the two correct decisions (hit and correct rejection) could be affected by prior
knowledge of the radiologist. For example, if the radiologist was aware that the patient was
referred because of possible cancer, the radiologist is likely to lower his threshold – or “decision
criterion” in SDT jargon – for detecting a tumor. This may result in the radiologist adopting a
conservative approach and wrongly concluding a normal mass (noise) as a tumor (signal).

As seen with the above example, SDT provides a scientific framework to dispassionately analyze
problems relating to human information analysis and decision making on uncertain terrain. Thus
SDT provides a bipartisan approach, in a scientific sense, to address the intelligence analysis and

2
human decision-making failures pertaining to the Iraqi WMDs in a politically charged
atmosphere.

“Intelligence” as Mr. Tenet explained in his speech, “deals with the unclear, the unknown, [and]
the deliberately hidden”. When intelligence is seen under the rubric of SDT involves identifying
a signal that could be disguised as noise: for example, Saddam Hussein’s deliberate deception
when he constructed dual purpose facilities that produced both arms and industrial goods in the
early 80s and 90s. Furthermore, a smoke and mirror effect could be willfully applied to mislead
observers that could result in mistaking noise for a signal: for instance, even though Saddam
fully disarmed in recent years he kept the world guessing by not showing it to the inspectors, and
was even willing to bear hardships caused by international sanctions and lost oil revenues.

Thus Intelligence analysts have to work in a very complex, confusing, and demanding
environment, where overlooking one thing or falsely claiming something that did not exist can
have severe repercussions (9-11 attack and the Iraq war, respectively). The human factor of
intelligence analysis can benefit by the application of SDT to maximize correct decisions and
minimize error.

The human factor in the decision making phase involves the consumers of intelligence
information, which include the higher echelons of our government. They are charged with an
enormous responsibility of correctly comprehending the information and making the right
decisions to protect the American people.

So the next question is where (and why) did the Bush administration set its decision criterion,
which resulted in a conclusion that war was necessary? But to give this a fair hearing, it is
important to see the decision-making in the light of events following the 9-11 terrorist attacks.

Did the terrible consequences of 9-11 and prior knowledge of Saddam’s WMD capabilities in the
80s and 90s – even if unrelated – result in a jittery Bush administration lowering its decision
criterion? In other words, did they develop a conservative response to wage a war abroad rather
than take American casualties on the homeland? Based on SDT this scenario is plausible, but it
should not be misconstrued as an excuse for the administration’s decision to go to war.

Or as the critics of the Bush administration claim, did the neo conservative ideology within the
administration result in the cherry picking of intelligence information to make the case for war?
If true, this would have biased the decision makers and lowered their decision criterion even
further resulting in a shoot first ask questions later response

The investigations relating to the Iraq’s non-existent WMDs should have utilized SDT to ensure
that the human factors in the decision making process was sufficiently addressed in a fair and
balanced manner. This may have helped the investigators determine if the actual performance of
intelligence analysts, key decision makers, including the commander-in-chief, was a normal
human response given the circumstances. Or did intelligence analysts commit genuine mistakes
trying to tease apart probable proof for WMDs from Saddam’s bluff? Or whether ideology
driven decision makers overruled probable proof that there were no WMDs and rushed to war?

3
The answers to these questions will remain unknown unless an investigation of human decision-
making process – that led to the false conclusion among our elected representatives that Iraq had
WMDs – is done with the science of human factors.

Moin Rahman is a Principal Scientist at Motorola in Plantation, FL. His interests include
Human Factors of mission critical domains (police, fire, etc.), science, and current affairs. He
can be reached at moin.Rahman@motorola.com.