DISASTER CONSEQUENCES & WHY THEY WILL CONTINUE TO RISE

Dennis S. Mileti, Mileti, Ph.D.

Professor Emeritus, University of Colorado, Boulder

Presented to Conference on Catastrophe Modeling 2014: Adapting for Today Preparing for Tomorrow Reinsurance Association of America Annual Meeting February 11, 2014, Orlando, Florida
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INVITATION
Join me on a 1 hour overview of:
Disaster consequence types System trends that foretell their rise Consequence reduction tools Human failures that constrain progress

DISASTER CONSEQUENCE TYPES

CONSEQUENCE BUCKETS
C t i f l Categories, for example:
Economic Health & safety Social, cultural, historical, & institutional

Types, for example:

Direct and indirect Immediate & longer longer-term Local & external
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ILLUSTRATED WITH
New Orleans & Hurricane Katrina (6(6 -8 months post post-impact)

DIRECT STRUCTURAL LOSSES

$21 billion structural damage:
Residential structures Commercial, industrial, & public buildings Half of these losses due to levee failure

DIRECT INFRASTRUCTURE LOSSES

6 7 billion infrastructure damage: $6-$6.7
Roads Public transit Drainage & sewage Potable water service Telecommunications T l i ti Electrical utilities Much lower impact if levees had not failed
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EXAMPLE SECONDARY LOSSES

85 million gallons drinking water/day Loss of electricity: electricity:
Massive food spoilage 300,000 refrigerators ruined

124,000 jobs lost

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CASCADING FINANCIAL IMPACTS

Major impacts included:
Half population gone (about million) Many jobs lost (reduced customer base and employees) Labor force return uneven (highest in low flood lowest in fl flooded fl d areas, l ti d d areas) ) Dramatic decrease in local government revenues (was $3.4 billion before impact)
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DEATH
1,118 confirmed dead ,
Likely closer to 1,500

135 people missing Largest contributors to death: death:

Failure to evacuate before levees broke:
A warning preparedness failure

Failure to rescue people:

An emergency response failure
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CAUSES OF DEATH
Descending order of frequency:
Drowned from flood waters Trying to save victims Waiting to be rescued:
Starvation, dehydration, exposure

Failed rescue attempts Infections from wounds under waters

Sick and elderly hit hardest

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OTHER DEATHS

5 killed in emergency period period: :

1 Murder 4 Killed by police during shoot shoot-outs

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FLOOD WATER EXPOSURES

P l waded d dd d waters t People days i in fl flood Flood waters contained: contained:
Trash and chemicals (cleaners, solvents, gasoline) Output from 7 major oil spills Runoff from over 50 superfund sites E. coli and fecal coliform bacteria above human contact standards
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CLEAN UP EXPOSURES
Low health health-impact exposures from p p contaminated air, air, water, water, and soil One exception was mold: mold:
Grew in most homes U.S U.S. . exposure limits do not exist CDC estimated airborne endotoxins high enough to cause respiratory symptoms & skin rashes
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INJURIESINJURIES -ILLNESSILLNESS-DISEASE
Increased incidence of:
Gastrointestinal illness, skin infections, and upper respiratory iInfections

Victims:
Injuries from breaking through roofs and windows, windows and rashes from waiting on rooftops

First responders: responders:

Infections, rashes from contaminated water, mite bites, excessive chaffing
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INJURIES-ILLNESSINJURIESILLNESS-DISEASE IN EVACUATION SHELTERS

Diarrhea:
1/2 evacuees in Houston

AntibioticAntibiotic -resistant staff infection:

Dallas

Impacted pre pre-existing conditions: conditions:

Diabetes Kidney failure Lack of prescriptions:
Cancer, seizure illness, asthma, psychiatric disorders, medicine in general
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THE SUPERDOME

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PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS
Most victims:
Fear, anger, uncertainty & sorrow

Some victims:
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Psycho Psycho-social stress

Some victims (with trauma):

Depression & substance abuse
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LIKELY HIGH IN KATRINA

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PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS
Mental health impacts:
Not fully observed or catalogued

Observed in remaining population:

Tripled: suicide rate Doubled: calls to suicide hot line

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HEATH CARE CAPACITY

Seriously impacted:
E j h it l crippled i l d Every major hospital

People lost medical coverage:

When they lost their jobs

Come back slow (6 months later):

1/5 hospital beds available acute care facilities open 1,000s of health care providers still gone Physician to resident ratio:
9.6 to 3200 pre impact /1 to 3200 post impact
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POLITICAL IMPACTS

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EVACUATION
1 million p people p displaced p Evacuation destinations: destinations:
369 cities in every state in the nation

Major reception cities cities: :

Houston Atlanta Memphis Baton Rouge
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DESTINATION CITIES IMPACTS

Over burdened services Strain on health care systems Over crowding Increased I d traffic ffi Increased crime
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EVACUATION BECAME MIGRATION

The largest permanent migration of population in United States since the Civil War

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SOCIAL SYSTEM OVERCOME

73 neighborhoods flooded:
Out of 81

34 of these neighborhoods:
Completely inundated

Many neighborhoods:
Remain uninhabited
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SOCIAL SYSTEM BROKE

Everythings Everything s connected Loss tipping point passed with:
Homes, schools, jobs, shops, places of worship, family/friendship networks and more p y Example: you cant return home if:
Job is there, but schools for kids arent House is there, but job isnt Recovery is thwarted if people dont return
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SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS COMPROMISED

E.g., school enrollments dropped dropped: :
52% in the 5 Parish area 82% in Orleans Parish

University enrollment limited: limited:

New Orleans, Dillard, Xavier, Loyola, Tulane

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CLASSROOMS

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SCHOOL BUSES

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COMMUNITY IDENTITY CONTORTED

E.g. New Orleans is food & music:
Many musicians have not returned Many restaurants closed or limited service ability due to lack of employees

Impacts on social norms & group identity unknown

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SCATTERED MUSICIANS

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KATRINA: NO SURPRISES
Happened before:
Same city, intensity & consequences Resulting migration = why Chicago has jazz

Lessons learned before:

Were, Were as they often are, are forgotten

How to reduce consequences:

Well known but rarely used
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COMPREHENSIVE CONSEQUENCE LIST

(conceptual list, not about Katrina)

H. John Heinz Center for Science, Economics and the Environment. 2000. The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards: Implications for Risk Assessment and Mitigation. Mitigation. Washington, D.C.: The Island Press.

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SYSTEM TRENDS THAT FORETELL A CONTINUED RISE IN LOSSES

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1. CHANGES IN THE EARTH

Physical systems are shifting, e.g.,
Climate change

Resulting in more severe:

Storms Floods Droughts Extreme temperatures Hurricanes
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2. CHANGES IN PEOPLE
Size of population:
Continues to grow

Composition of population:
Shifting in ways that make people less resilient to disaster impacts, e.g.,
q y continues to rise ( ) Income inequality (more p poor) Racial & ethnic diversity (more powerless)

Distribution of population:
More people live in hazardous areas, e.g., on coastlines subject to coastal hazards 46

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3. CHANGES IN THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

Built environment vulnerability continues to grow and is becoming more brittle:
Age of public utilities, e.g., electric grid Age of transportation systems, e.g., bridges Density of buildings, e.g., re re-urbanization:
Homes Office buildings Resulting in putting more eggs in the same number of baskets
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FUTURE CONSEQUENCES
Future losses & consequences result from q the interaction of these three systems:
Physical environment Constructed environment Human population characteristics

Foretell a future of:

Increased risk Increased losses Increased consequences
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CONSEQUENCE REDUCTION TOOLS

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SEVEN TOOLS AVAILABLE

S l are available il bl to reduce d l Seven tools losses and consequences:
Different communities use them differently

History teaches:
A mixed & integrated integrated approach is needed to reduce losses and consequences

But experience demonstrates:

The 7 tools are rarely integrated
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1. LAND USE MANAGEMENT

Contains many elements:
Development regulations Critical facilities policies Land and property acquisition Taxation fiscal T ti and d fi l policies li i Planning processes

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2. CONTROL & PROTECTION WORKS

Congress mandates protection:
For category 3 storms in all locations

Standardized approach replaced:

With deferent protection levels based on consequences (what ( h t could ld be b lost) l t)

Psychology of control works: works:

Were totally safe = putting more at risk
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3. BUILDING CODES, STANDARDS & PRACTICES

Quality of buildings and structures Many aspects:
Model codes Local and state codes New construction & retrofits Enforcement Building codes: codes:
Laws & regulations Ordinances and statutory requirements Minimum requirements for preserving public health and safety
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4. PUBLIC EDUCATION
Provide information to upgrade upgrade: :
Risk perception Knowledge about what to do when Motivate public mitigation & preparedness

How to do it known: known:

And based in scientific evidence

Can upgrade public response:

E.g., knowing how high flood waters could be can enhance evacuation planning
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5. PREDICTION PREDICTION, , FORECAST AND WARNING

Public warnings include:
Scientific monitoring of environment Linkage to government organizations Issuing public messages that maximize protective public actions like evacuation

Requires preparedness & training How to do this in ways that work:

Known but not widely used
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6. INSURANCE
Redistributes losses:
Versus avoid losses

Maximizes:
Resources needed for reconstruction Reduces cascading impacts

Requires that:
Individual homeowners decide to purchase
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7. PREPAREDNESS PLANNING & RESPONSE

(focus of emergency management)

Applicable to:
Issuing public warnings, emergency response, recovery & reconstruction

Whats required is known known: :

Plans, Plans implementing procedures, procedures training & exercises

Adequacy of pre pre-event planning:

Determines effectiveness
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THE 7 TOOLS EXPLAINED

Mileti, Dennis S. 1999. Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. States . Washington, D.C.: The Joseph Henry Press.

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HUMAN FAILURES THAT CONSTRAIN PROGRESS

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FEW UNDERSTAND RISK

Most development decisions that put structures and people at risk are local Local decision makers include:
, government g p Public, & private sector

The impact of decisions on future risk can be misunderstood or risk discounted

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PUBLIC SAFETY ISNT A TOP PRIORITY

Even when risk is understood:
Competing values influence risk risk-taking decisions

Economic prosperity and profit making:

Can emerge as the top priority pushing long longterm public safety concerns to the background

Locals rarely consider:

How todays decisions set their community on the pathway to tomorrows losses
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RISKS ARENT QUANTIFIED

Risk in terms of losses from tomorrows disasters is rarely quantified Risk quantifications are needed that:
Target decisions in geo geo-political boundaries And then communicated to decision makers

Risk should be updated Ri k quantifications tifi ti h ld b d t d over time:

Since changes in nature and the human humanmade environment alter risk
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ACCEPTABLE RISK IS UNDEFINED

Risk is rarely communicated to the public:
Nor does the public participate in deciding how much risk is acceptable

Quality public risk communication programs are needed which:

Give the public a voice in decisions about the risk under which they live Keep realistic risk perceptions alive for people Yield acceptable levels of public knowledge & readiness actions 63

PROTECTION WORKS NEED RERE -EVALUATION

Control & p protection works deserve to be reconsidered:
Pre Pre-climate change strategies reconsidered Old infrastructure replacement Redundant protection systems adopted

Correct deficiencies in constructed protection with urgency:

Hardened and new high high-loss constructed protection works need to be considered
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SYSTEMS VIEWPOINT MISSING

Hazards management lacks a systems viewpoint:
All the 7 tools considered simultaneously That views risk as dynamic over time Integrates appropriate disciplines disciplines, professions and approaches

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INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IS ABSENT

H d management needs d i i Hazards integrating:
A unified approach is needed All the different pieces across all 7 tool kits should be managed together y approach pp y Todays is dysfunctional Too many actors, agencies and professions working independently doing too many different things on their own
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NO ONES IN CHARGE
We have all the right pieces:
L d use management Land Control & protection works Building codes, standards & practices Public education Prediction, forecast and warning Insurance Preparedness planning and response

But no one is in charge of integrating them and selecting the right mix in communities
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BETTER INTERINTER-AGENCY COORDINATION NEEDED

Improve inter inter-agency coordination and eliminate inter inter-agency confusion:
Between local, state and federal agencies

Strong and sustainable mechanisms are needed for inter inter-agency:

Communication, cooperation C i ti ti and d coordination di ti

All hazards mitigation, preparedness and response agencies need:

Better coordination and cooperation
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CONTRADICTS CULTURE
(at least for some)

Many of these gaps may never be filled Some examples why:

Agencies limited to 30 year futures in benefit/cost analyses (miss most catastrophic disasters that happen in longer time frames) Theres no such thing as land use in Texas Many dont like to spend money today for a benefit we may not get for 100+ years
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CONCLUSIONS

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AVERAGE ANNUAL LOSSES

The trend of increased losses losses:
Continues to rise and has since the 1940s when it was first estimated Shows signs of accelerating, not slowing

Most losses:
Are not insured Dont happen in events large enough for the political system to label them as disasters
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CATASTOPHE POTENTIAL
Catastrophe potential also on the rise Nature:
Becoming more violent (climate change)

Humanity:
More people (who are less resilient) in a built environment (thats becoming more brittle)
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QUESTIONS?

Dennis S. Mileti
303-520303520-3400 dennis.mileti@colorado.edu de s et @co o ado edu

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