PEOPLE vs.

FERRER
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 48 SCRA 382, 27 December 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch
I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias
"Taba,"respondents.
Castro, J.:
I. Facts:
On 5 March 1970, respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, allegedly a high
ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), was charged with subversion
before the Court of First Instance Tarlac. On 25 May 1970, a criminal complaint for a violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act was similarly filed before the same Court against respondent Tayag and five
others for allegedly being members and leaders of the New Peoples Army and delivering speeches
instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.
The private respondents moved to quash the information filed against them and impugned the
validity of RA 1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as it partook the nature of a bill of attainder.
The trial court, speaking through respondent Judge Ferrer, in its resolution of 15 September 1970,
declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. Hence, the present recourse in
the form of special civil action for certiorari filed by the petitioner.
II. Issue:
Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law
III. Ruling:
No. The court upheld the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute to
be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) the statute specifies
persons, groups and 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reaches past conduct.
If carefully scrutinized, according the Court, the Act does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. It simply declares said Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition,
stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party
of the Philippines" is issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose
and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, such feature is not
enough to render it a bill of attainder as it does not apply retroactively nor does it reach past
conduct. In this regard, it has been noted that a bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto
law. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable
because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in
one clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.
Based on the foregoing facts, and contrary to the arguments posited by the private respondents, the
Court held that the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957 did not possess the requisites of a bill of attainder.

Furthermore, the Court set basic guidelines that must be observed in initiating prosecutions under
RA 1700. The Government, in addition to proving such circumstances as may affect liability, must
establish the following elements of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or
any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a)
that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and
to establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a foreign power; (b) that
the accused joined such organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts;
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to pursue the
objectives which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow
of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country under the control of a
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by
overt acts.
The questioned resolution of 15 September 1970 was set aside, and the two cases were remanded to
the court a quo for trial on the merits.
SERAFIN vs. LINDAYAG
A.M. No. 297-MJ, 67 SCRA 166, 30 September 1975
AVELINA SERAFIN, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE SANTIAGO LINDAYAG, respondent.
Teehankee, J.:
I. Facts:
A criminal complaint for estafa against complainant Serafin was filed on 21 July 1971 with
respondent judge by then Guiguinto Chief of Police Estrella at the instance of Carmelito Mendoza,
then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza. Said complaint sworn to by said police
chief before respondent judge did not charge any crime but merely recited complainant's failure to
pay a simple indebtedness to Spouses Mendoza in the amount of 1, 500. The respondent judge
admitted said criminal complaint despite being plainly civil in various aspects, as can be easily
assessed from the very face of the complaint and the evidence presented. A warrant of arrest was
issued against the complainant after a rather hasty preliminary examination, which caused her
humiliation of being detained for three days in the municipal jail.
Aggrieved by the injustice brought about by the respondent judges actuations, the complainant filed
with the Secretary of Justice the instant administrative complaint against Judge Lindayag for
capricious and malicious admission in his court of a criminal complaint for estafa against
complainant and causing her wrongful arrest and detention.
Subsequently, despite the complainant Serafins desistance, the administrative complaint was
nevertheless forwarded to the Court and assigned to Judge Echiverri of the Baliwag Court of First
Instance for further investigation.
In the conduct of said investigation, the respondent judge alleged the loss of some o the pertinent
documents and presented instead several pieces of evidence which were found not to be genuine and
authentic parts of the Criminal Case of estafa involving the complainant.

II. Issues
1. Whether or not the respondent judges act was violative of the prohibition against imprisonment
for debt
2. Whether or not the respondents act warrants his dismissal from service
III. Ruling:
1. Yes. It was self-evident from the very face of the "criminal complaint" for estafa, and the
supporting sworn statements filed with and sworn to before him as well as the very notes of
preliminary examination taken by him that the "criminal" charge against complainant showed no
vestige of the essential elements of estafa but simply recited complainant's failure to pay the
creditors as alleged offended parties a simple indebtedness. The respondent judge, in admitting such
a "criminal complaint" and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless
finding, trampled upon the complainants right, as enshrined in the Constitution, against
imprisonment for debt. It is elementary that non-payment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act,
much less estafa; and that no one may be criminally charged and punished for non-payment of a
loan of a sum of money.
2. Yes. Guided by the documentary evidence and established facts of the case, the Court found that
respondent municipal judge grossly failed to perform his duties properly. Not only did he lack the
degree of caution and prudence which could have easily prevented such an injustice and trampling
upon of the complainant's basic rights, he also had the temerity to mislead the Court by submitting
spurious evidence to cover up his liability. Such subsequent crass attempt at exculpation through the
promulgation of incredible evidence, according to the Court, was more reprehensible than his guilt
under the charge and displayed his unworthiness for the office. Accordingly, the respondent judge
was dismissed from service.
US vs Pompeya
G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SILVESTRE POMPEYA, defendant-appellee.
I. FACTS:
The prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charged appellee Silvestre Pompeya with a
violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1914, based on section
40 (m) of the Municipal Code.
Under the aforementioned section, as amended by Act No. 1309, when a province or municipality is
infested with ladrones or outlaws, the municipal council is empowered to require able-bodied male
residents of the municipality, between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, to assist, for a period not
exceeding five days in any one month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers
and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the protection of the municipality, not exceeding
one day in each week. The failure, refusal, or neglect of any such able-bodied man to render
promptly the service may result in being fined or imprisoned.
The information filed against appellee alleged that he illegally, and criminally and without justifiable
motive failed to render service on patrol duty, an act deemed punishable under the
municipal ordinance.

Upon arraignment, however, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts imputed against
him failed to constitute a crime. Furthermore, he impugned the validity of the municipal ordinance
and stressed its unconstitutionality for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which
guarantees liberty of citizens.
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Hence, the appeal filed by the prosecuting attorney before the Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not said law violated the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their
rights therein guaranteed
2. Whether or not there was a cause of action
Ruling:
1. No. The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific
purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages
of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the
maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as
by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a
punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.
The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within
the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the
same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said
Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected
thereby.
2. No. The complaint must show, on its face that, if the facts alleged are true, an offense has been
committed. It must state explicitly and directly every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
an offense. If the statute exempts certain persons, or classes of persons, from liability, then the
complaint should show that the person charged does not belong to that class.
The Court was unable to impose the punishment provided for by law, because the complaint did not
show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied
citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which
justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law.
As such, the judgment of the court a quo was affirmed.
Alcantara vs Director of Prisons
G.R. No. L-6

November 29, 1945

ANICETO ALCANTARA, petitioner,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
FERIA, J.:

I. Facts
Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at
Baguio modified said sentence and sentenced the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from
four months four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and
three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on 12 September 1944,
and 23 June 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.
Petitioner assailed the validity of the decision, contending that the decision of said Court, it being a
mere creation of the de facto government (the so called Republic of the Philippines) established
during the Japanese military occupation in the country, must be deemed invalid. He further
contended that that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold
sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the
decision in question.
Believing that he was being unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent
Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur for aforementioned reasons, the
petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for his immediate release.
II. Issue
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted by the Court
III. Ruling
No. The contention of petitioner is untenable. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern
Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established
by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the court which were continued during the
Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable
even after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have
a political complexion.
In the present case, the petitioner was charged with and convicted of an offense which has no
political complexion and punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised
Penal Code; hence, the judgment against him remains valid.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus was denied.