nuary 19, 1999 (G.R. No.

132601)

PARTIES: Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an

accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

Facts: Respondent Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land in Basilan City in accordance with Republic Act No. 477. The award was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on January 27, 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto, plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 1972, plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated. On August 14, 1968, plaintiff and his wife sold to defendant Luis Pichel all the fruits of the coconut trees which may be harvested in the land in question for the period, September 15, 1968 to January 1, 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the date of sale, however, the land was still under lease to one, Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the sale, in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by defendant directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of the latter. Pending said payment plaintiff refused to allow the defendant to make any harvest. In July 1972, defendant for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, caused the harvest of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land. Alonzo filed for the annulment of the contract on the ground that it violated the provisions of R.A. 477, which states that lands awarded under the said law shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation, otherwise the awardee shall no longer be entitled to apply for another piece of land. The lower court ruled that the contract, which it held as a contract of lease, is null and void. Issues: (1) Whether the respondent had the right or authority to execute the "Deed of Sale" in 1968, his award having been cancelled previously by the Board of Liquidators on January 27, 1965 (2) Whether the contract is one for lease of the land, or for sale of coconut fruits

(3) Whether the contract is an encumbrance as contemplated by R.A. 477 Held: (1) Until and unless an appropriate proceeding for reversion is instituted by the State, and its reacquisition of the ownership and possession of the land decreed by a competent court, the grantee cannot be said to have been divested of whatever right that he may have over the same property. Herein respondent is not deemed to have lost any of his rights as grantee during the period material to the case at bar, i.e., from the cancellation of the award in 1965 to its reinstatement in 1972. Within said period, respondent could exercise all the rights pertaining to a grantee. (2) A perusal of the deed fails to disclose any ambiguity or obscurity in its provisions, nor is there doubt as to the real intention of the contracting parties. The terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. The document in question expresses a valid contract of sale. It has the essential elements of a contract of sale. The subject matter of the contract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land during the years from September 15, 1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject matter is a determinate thing. Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale. Pending crops which have potential existence may be the subject matter of sale. The essential difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things is that the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership, while in lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased. The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits." The vendor sold, transferred and conveyed "by way of absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of his land," thereby divesting himself of all ownership or dominion over the fruits during the seven-year period. The possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees cannot be said to be the possession and enjoyment of the land itself because these rights are distinct and separate from each other, the first pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees) while the second, to the principal (the land). A transfer of the accessory or improvement is not a transfer

of the principal. It is the other way around, the accessory follows the principal. Hence, the sale of the nuts cannot be interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the trees, much less extended further to include the lease of the land itself. The grantee of a parcel of land under R.A. No. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or disposing of the natural and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. What the law expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or any of the permanent improvements thereon. Permanent improvements on a parcel of land are things incorporated or attached to the property in a fixed manner, naturally or artificially. They include whatever is built, planted or sown on the land which is characterized by fixity, immutability or immovability. Houses, buildings, machinery, animal houses, trees and plants would fall under the category of permanent improvements, the alienation or encumbrance of which is prohibited. The purpose of the law is not violated when a grantee sells the produce or fruits of his land. On the contrary, the aim of the law is thereby achieved, for the grantee is encouraged and induced to be more industrious and productive, thus making it possible for him and his family to be economically self-sufficient and to lead a respectable life. At the same time, the Government is assured of payment on the annual installments on the land. We agree with herein petitioner that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to prohibit the grantee from selling the natural and industrial fruits of his land, for otherwise, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein the grantee would not be able to receive and enjoy the fruits of the property in the real and complete sense. FACTS: Petitioner Ceroferr Realty Corporation filed a suit against private respondent Ernesto Santiago for damages and injunction from disputeover the ownership of a land located in Quezon City. The complaint alleged that Santiago was occupying, without any right, a portionof a parcel of land belonging to Petitioner, which was being used by the former as a jeepney terminal. Private respondent, for his part,countered that he had the legal title to the land, thus, he had the right to utilize the land as such. During the trial, it was found out thatthe main issue of the case revolved around the actual bounds of the land owned by Petitioner. It appears that the title held by Petitionermerely referred to the land by its lot number, while the title held by private respondent was replete with technical descriptions and the accompanying metes and bounds of the lot. Private respondent then filed a motion to dismiss Petitioners complaint, on the gr ound thatthe trial court cannot pass upon the issue of damages without first determining the true ownership of the lot in question. The trial court then issued an order denying Petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction, holding that a Torr

ens certificateof title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Petitioner appealed then to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the complaint stated acause of action which was determinable on its face. Such appeal was dismissed by the CA. ISSUE :(1) whether Ceroferrs complaint states a sufficient cause of action and (2) whether the trial court has jurisdiction to determin e theidentity and location of the vacant lot involved in the case. HELD :The Rules of Court require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting theplaintiffs cause of action. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right infavor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the nameddefendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recoveryof damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state acause of action. These elements are present in the case at bar. A defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, as in this case, hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaintas constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same inaccordance with the prayer thereof.The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducibletherefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same shouldnot be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants. In this case, petitioner Ceroferrs cause of action has been sufficiently averred in the complaint. If it were admitted that the right of ownership of petitioner Ceroferr to the peaceful use and possession of Lot 68 was violated by respondent Santiagos act of encroachment and fencing of the same, then petitioner Cerof errwould be entitled to damages.On the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the vacant lot inquestion.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether theplaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.[16] The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined bythe allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by thedefendant.[17]While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the courts jurisdic tion becausethe judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.[18]In this case, respondent Santiago may be considered estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court for he took an active part inthe case. In his answer, respondent Santiago did not question the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the reliefs prayed for in thecomplaint. His geodetic engineers were present in the first and second surveys that the LRA conducted. It was only when the secondsurvey report showed results adverse to his case that he submitted a motion to dismiss.Both parties in this case claim that the vacant lot is within their property. This is an issue that can be best resolved by the trial court inthe exercise of its general jurisdiction.After the land has been originally registered, the Court of Land Registration ceases to have jurisdiction over contests concerning thelocation of boundary lines. In such case, the action in personam has to be instituted before an ordinary court of general jurisdiction.[19]The regional trial court has jurisdiction to determine the precise identity and location of the vacant lot used as a jeepney terminal

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Tags: damages, digest, fortune tobacco, torts, vinzons-chato, vinzons-chato v. fortune tobacco

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco (2007) / Ynares-Santiago

Facts Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subject to ad valorem [accdg to value] tax [2045%]. Two days prior (1 Jul '93) to RA 7654's effectivity, VC [Comm., BIR] issued the RMC reclassifying the brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% AV tax (brands were subjected to RA 7654, Sec. 142 (c)(1) before it took effect). On 2 Jul, BIR Deputy Comm sent a copy of RMC to Fortune via fax. It was only on 15 Jul when Fortune received a certified photocopy of the RMC. Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC's recall but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV tax deficiency (9M~) was demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which issued an injunction enjoining RMC's implementation (defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the CA, and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune filed a complaint for damages against VC in her private capacity in the RTC, saying that she should be held liable for damages under NCC 32 (RMC issuance violated right against property deprivation without due process + equal protection of the laws). VC filed a motion to dismiss since she issued RMC in the performance of her fxn, within authority, and said that being an agent of RP, the latter is the one responsible for her acts, and that the complaint did have a cause of axn because there was no allegation of malice/bad faith. RTC denied VC's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case as well, saying that under NCC 32, liability may arise even if defendant did not act with malice/bad faith. CA also said that Admin Code is the general law on puboff's civil liab while NCC 32 is the special law governing this case, and that malice/bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. VC filed this complaint, saying that what shld be applied is the Admin Code [liab attaches only when there is a clear showing of bad faith / malice / gross negligence] and said that Admin Code is the special law, and that NCC is the general law.

Issues and Holding 1. WON a puboff be sued in his private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge

of ofc fxns. YES, when [#3]

1.

GEN RULE: PubOff not liab for damages which another suffers from just

performance of official duties, within scope of tasks + RP not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent 1. HOWEVER, puboff not immune from damages in personal capacity for acts

done in bad faith (not protected by mantle of immunity) [See cited Admin Code provision + Sec 39 of the same] 2. Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA - puboff who in/directly violates another's consti rights

may be sued for damages under NCC 32 even though there is no malice / bad faith 3. SO: puboff may be sued [...] 1. 2. 2. when there is malice, bad faith, negligence when he violated a consti right of plaintiff

NCC 32 or Admin Code Sec. 38, Book I? NCC 32 1. LegMeth knowledge - gen, special law shld be harmonized if possible; special law

prevails; the circ that special law is passed before or after gen law does not change principle 2. Discussion of Code Comm (Dean Bocobo) 1. There was a proposal re NCC 32 that puboff be held liable for consti right

violation only if there is malice / bad faith but he said that Code Comm opposes this 1. 2. Nature of NCC 32 - wrong may be civil or criminal To make such a requisite would defeat main purpose (effective

protection of individual rights) 3. Object is to put an end to abuse by plea of good faith; in US the remedy

is in the nature of tort 3. NCC 32 patterned after Am law tort - WRONG, TORTIOUS ACT DEFINED AS THE

COMMISSION/OMISSION OF ACT BY ONE, WITHOUT RIGHT, WHEREBY ANOTHER RECEIVES SOME INJURY IN PERSON, PROPERTY, OR REPUTATION 1. 4. Liab in tort not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent

Aberca v. Ver - With NCC 32, principle of puboff acctability under Consti acquires

added meaning, assumes larger dimension

5.

Admin Code - bad faith, malice, negligence vital elements to make puboff liable for

damages; subject is general ("acts" done in performance of duties, without specifying action/omission that may give rise to civil suit) 1. IN CONTRAST TO NCC 32 which specifies clearly the acts that may give rise

to axn for damages (tort for impairment of rights, liberties) 3. WON VC may be held liable for damages. YES (no explicit / direct answer on this though) 1. Complaint brought under NCC 32 which does not require bad faith and malice, so

the failure to allege it will not amount to failure to state cause of action UCPB vs. Beluso (2007) Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: In 1996, UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit Agreement whereby the latter could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum amount of P1.2 Million pesos for a term ending in April 1997. In addition to the promissory notes, the spouses Beluso also constituted a real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Roxas City. Subsequently, the said Credit Arrangement was amended to extend the amount of the Promissory Notes Line to a maximum of P2.35 Million pesos and to extend the term thereof to February 1998.

The spouses executed three promissory notes which were renewed several times. In 1997, the payment of the principal and interest of the latter two promissory notes were debited from the spo uses Belusos account with UCPB; yet, a consolidated loan for P1.3 Million was again released to the spouses Beluso under one promissory note with a due date of 28 February 1998.

To completely avail themselves of the P2.35 Million credit line extended to them by UCPB, the spouses Beluso executed two more promissory notes for a total of P350 thousand. However, the spouses Beluso alleged that the amounts covered by these last two promissory notes were never released or credited to their account and, thus, claimed that the principal indebtedness was only P2 Million.

In any case, UCPB applied interest rates on the different promissory notes ranging from 18% to 34%. During the term of these promissory notes, the Belusos were able to pay the total sum of about P760 thousand. However, they failed to pay for the interest and penalty on their obligations. As a result, UCPB demanded that they pay their total obligation of P2.9 millionbut the spouses Beluso failed to comply therewith. Thereafter, UCPB foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the spouses Beluso to secure their credit line, which, by that time, already ballooned to nearly P3.8 million.

Two months after the foreclosure, the spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages against UCPB with the RTC of Makati City. UCPB moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the spouses Beluso instituted another case before the RTC of Roxas City, involving the same parties and issues. UCPB claims that while the Roxas City case initially appears to be a different action, as it prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to stop foreclosure of spouses Belusos properties, it poses issues which are similar to those of the present case.

The spouses Beluso claim that the issue in the Roxas City case is the propriety of the foreclosure before the true account of spouses Beluso is determined. On the other hand, the issue in the Makati case is the validity of the interest rate provision. The spouses Beluso claim that the Roxas City case has become moot because, before RTC Roxas City could act on the restraining order, UCPB proceeded with the foreclosure and auction sale. As the act sought to be restrained has already been accomplished, the spouses Beluso had to file a different action, that of Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale with RTC Makati.

RTC ruled in favor of the Belusos. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed due to forum shopping

Held: YES. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, however, that only one cause of action is involved in the two civil actions, namely, the violation of the right of the spouses Beluso not to have their property foreclosed for an amount they do not owe, the Rules of Court nevertheless allows the filing of

the second action. The case in Roxas City was dismissed before the filing of the case with RTC Makati, since the venue of litigation as provided for in the Credit Agreement is in Makati City.

Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the following instances:

(a) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;

(b) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; and

(c) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds.

When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the dismissal of an action is either of those aforementioned that the action cannot be refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment of the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as the case may be.

The MR filed by the Belusos in the Roxas City case that has not yet been resolved upon the filing of the Makati case does not change the SCs findings. It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between the same parties on the same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this rule is not absolute. In the case of Allied Banking v. CA, it was ruled that: Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the later action is the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between the parties.

Applying the said ruling in the case at bar, the Court found that the Makati City case is the more proper action in view of the execution of the foreclosure sale. Moreover, Makati is the proper venue of the action

as mandated by the Credit Agreement. Hence, the Court deemed that the Makati Case is the more appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties, as compared to the Roxas City case.

^^ CIVIL PROCEDURE INSURANCE LAND TITLES AND DEEDS PROPERTY REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS SPECIAL COMMERCIAL LAWS TRANSPORTATION LAW LABOR LAW CONFLICT OF LAWS CIVIL LAW 2 POLITICAL LAW RSS Feed FAJARDO VS. FREEDOM TO BUILD Leave a comment Eliseo Fajardo Jr., vs Freedom to Build Inc. G. R. No. 134692 August 1, 2000 Facts: Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing sold to petitionerspouses a house and lot in the De La Costa Homes, in Barangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to sell executed between the parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to wit: Easements. For the good of the entire community, the homeowner must observe a two-meter easement in front. No structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front easement. Upward expansion. A second storey is not prohibited. But the second storey expansion must be placed above the back portion of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building. Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be extended in the front beyond the line as designed and implemented by the developer in the 60 sq. m. unit. In other words, the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house, just as provided in the 60 sq. m. units. The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering the lot issued in the name of petitioner-spouses.

The controversy arose when the petitioners despite repeated demand from the respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall. Respondent filed before the RTC an action to demolish the unauthorized structures. The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner ordering them to immediately demolish and remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the Branch Sheriff of this Court will execute the this decision at the expense of the defendants. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the for the lack of a specific provision, prescribing the penalty of the demolition in the Restrictive Covenant in the event of the breach thereof, the prayer of the respondent to demolish the structure should fail. Ruling: The Court held that the argument of the petitioner-spouses has no merit; Article 1168 of the New Civil Code states that: When the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall be undone at his expense. This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, which has merely adjudged the payment of damages in lieu of demolition. In the aforementioned case, however, the elaborate mathematical formula for the determination of compensatory damages which takes into account the current construction cost index during the immediately preceding 5 years based on the weighted average of wholesale price and wage indices of the National Census and Statistics Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is explicitly provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered into by the parties. This unique and peculiar circumstance, among other strong justifications therein mentioned, is not extant in the case at bar. In sum, the Court holds that since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the Restrictive Covenant, petitioner spouses can be required to demolish the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed floor area limits. Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition forannulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage? True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrateproper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083 Fact:

a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest

the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; 2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: YES

petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment Mercado case Facts Case Background Petitioner Robert G. de Galicia was a business partner in RCL Enterprises. He was asked by his partner Carmen Arciaga to co-sign with her a Philbank check for P50,000 payable to cash. Allegedly without his knowledge and consent, Arciaga rediscounted the check with respondent Mely Mercado at 8% interest, thus, only the sum of P46,000 was given.

Checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Mercado then filed a complaint for estafa and for violation BP 221 against petitioner and Carmen Arciaga. Petitioner countered by filing in the RTC Manila, a case for the declaration of nullity of the agreement to pay interest between respondent and his partner, Arciaga. He prayed that the agreement, together with the rediscounted check, be declared void for being contrary to public policy. Lower Court Rulings RTC: dismissed petitioners case for lack of jurisdiction. Motion for reconsideration was denied. o Arciaga, one of the parties in the so-called agreement, was not a party to the present case. o The subject check amounting to P50,000 was way below the jurisdictional amount vested in the Regional Trial Court. Since this is a pure question of law, the petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the SC.

Issues: Procedural Issue: Whether RTC did not err in dismissing the complaint because Arciaga, as an indispensable party, was not impleaded; Substantial Issue Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over its subject matter simply because the amount involve was only P50,000.

Held and Ratio Procedural Issue Yes, this Court sustains the dismissal of the subject complaint for its failure to implead an indispensable party. o Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. o The interests of such indispensable party in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity; such that a complete and efficient determination of the equities and rights of the parties is not possible if he is not joined. Arciaga, being a co-signatory of the re-discounted check and being privy to the assailed agreement, was an indispensable party to the suit. Her interest in the suit was intertwined with the rights and interest of both petitioner and respondent. Substantial Issue Yes, the subject of the action before the trial court was incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the RTC. o Under BP 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction lies in the municipal courts or in RTC depending on the amount involved.

However, if the issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, jurisdiction lies with the RTC. In this case, what was being assailed was the payment of interest, not the recovery of a sum of money as found by the trial court. Lagunilla case Indispensible PartiesDe Galicia vs. Mercado (2006)Facts: Petitioner was a business partner in RCL Enterprises. In 1997, he was asked by his partner Carmen Arciaga to co-sign a check worth P50k payable to cash. Carmen rediscounted thecheck with respondent Mely Mercado (respondent) at 8% interest.Respondent gave the sum of P46k, representing the value of the check less 8% to Carmen. Respondent presented the check for payment but was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, she then filed a complaint for estafa and for violation of BP 22 against petitioner and Carmen. Petitioner countered by filing acase for declaration of nullity of the agreement to pay interest between respondent and Carmen. There was a question of jurisdiction but I wont put it in this digest, because its superfluous.Issue: Whether or not the case (against respondent) should be dismissed for its failure to impleadan indispensible party? Held: YES. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. The interests of suchindispensable party in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the otherparties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. As a rule, an indispensable partys interest in the subject matter is such that a complete and efficient determination of the equities and rights of the parties is not possible if he is not joined.Here, we hold that Carmen was an indispensable party to the suit filed by petitioner againstrespondent. Her interest in the suit was intertwined with the rights and interest of both petitioner andrespondent. She was as involved in the suit as petitioner and respondent, being a co-signatory of the re-discounted check and being privy to the assailed agreement. Had the subject complaint been resolvedon the merits, any judgment made by the trial court was going to affect not only respondent but Carmenas well. Unfortunately, due to the failure of petitioner to implead her in the complaint, any judgmenttherein could not bind her. It was as if the complaint had not been filed at all.In Aracelona v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the joinder of all indispensable parties mustbe made under any and all conditions , their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of the judicialpower. There, we ruled that when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should bedismissed.It is interesting to note that petitioner filed the subject complaint after respondent initiated acomplaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. The filing of the complaint for declaration of nullity of theagreement to pay interest and the nullity of the check appeared to be an afterthought and an attemptto affect the outcome of the criminal complaint against him. Lagunilla vs Velasco Indispensable Parties If not impleaded, there can be no final determination. N.B. The codal does not use the word complete. So they are compulsorily joined. SEC. 7.

Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determinationcan be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants .Patricio, Magdalena, Vivencio, Macaria and Andrea are all siblings. Petitioners in this case are the children of Vivencio, Rafael and Dionisia. The Siblings own several parcels of land in la union and QC. Patricio andMagdalena, along with Pedro Velasco were co-owners of the QC property. Patricio, Magdalena and Vivencio are now dead. Andrea and Macaria executed an extrajudicial donation of the QC property to Andreas son Pedro Velasco Jr. (who I also assume to be the son of the coowner velasco, it wasnt stated in the case.) Donation was made, and title given to Pedro JR. Enter Rafael and Dionisia, they claim that they have rights asheirs of their father (Vivencio) over the QC property. They filed for Annulment of Documents and Damages.The case went on, but just before the end, Petitioners filed an amendment to the complaint asking to includePedro Jr as indispensible party. But it was denied by the RTC and case decided in favor of respondents. TheCA affirmed. Issue : For obvious reasons, the issue here is the denial of the RTC of the amendment for the inclusion of Pedro Jr as Indispensible Party. Held: The SC ruled that the amendment should have been mandatory on the part of the RTC. The case wasremanded with order to include Pedro Jr as an indispensible party. (Also, note that the case has been going onfrom 1997 to 2009.) Well -settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. It is a condition sine qua non to theexercise of judicial power. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain finality. Onewho is not a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court; otherwise, he will be deprived of hisright to due process. That is why the case is generally remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx Even without having to scrutinize the records, a mere reading of the assailed decision readily reveals that Pedro is an indispensable party. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the title to the QuezonCity property was already registered in the name of Pedro The central thrust of t he complaint was that respondents, by themselves, could not have transferred the Quezon City property to Pedro becausepetitioners, as heirs of Patricio and Magdalena, also have rights over it. Accordingly, petitioners specificallyprayed that the extrajudicial settlement with donation be annulled and the transfer certificate of title and tax declarations (in the name of Pedro) issued pursuant thereto be canceled. (TEST)An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affectingthat interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy,but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be

made without affectinghis interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be

wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that anindispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination betweenthe parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, anindispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly goforward. A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversyor subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justicebetween them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merelypermit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has nointerest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person tobe an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation Marmo v. AnacayFacts: Respondent was the co-owner of property together with his wife (already deceased). Heauthorized petitioner to sell the property but respondent eventually found out that hisTCT was already cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of petitioner. Thecancellation of the TCT was due to the presentation of the alleged Deed of Absolute Salein favor of petitioner.Respondent filed for annulment of sale, recovery of title with damages against petitioner. Petitioner, however, claims that respondents children as co-owners of the property (sincewife was already dead) are indispensable parties and should have been impleaded in the present case.The RTC ruled in favor or respondent. Issue: Whether the children of respondents are indispensable parties? NO. Ruling: No, the children are not indispensable parties. The main issue in the present case is the falsification of respondent and his wifes signature in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner. The issue is personal to respondent and his wife, therefore, it does not require the participation of respondents co -owners (children) at the trial. The present action can bedetermined without their presence because they are not parties to the document as their signatures do not appear therein.T he childrens rights and interests as co -owners are adequately protected by their father since thecomplaint was made precisely to recover the ownership and possession of the properties. The co-owners are not even necessary parties because a complete relief can be accorded in the suit evenwithout their participation since the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of all.

Topic: indispensable partiesFACTS:Catalino Villamater was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship MV Monaco, owned by petitioner World Marine Panama through the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation

as the local manningagent. 4 months after his deployment, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given blood transfusion which continued together with intermittent intestinal pain. He was diagnosedwith (what appears like) cancer and was advised to undergo chemotherapy. Villamater was later repatriated as soon as he was deemed fit to travel. When he arrived in the Philippines, he wasreferred to companydesignated physicians who opined that Villamaters condition appears not to be work related and suggested a disability grading of 1. when no improvements occurred,Villamater filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of NLRC for payment of permanentand total disability benefits plus reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses. The LArendered judgment ordering Leonis to pay Villamater as his illness was compensable which wasfor his permanent tota l disability benefits. Upon appeal, NLRC dismissed and affirmed LAs decision. Petition for certiorari in CA dismissed, MR denied, hence this petition.RULING:Petitioners allege that CA erred in dismissing outright their petition for certiorari on the groundof non-joinder of indispensable parties. It should be noted that petitioners impleaded only thedeceased Villamater as respondent to the petition, excluding his heirs. Rule 3, Section 7 of theRules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties in interest without whomthere can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who possess such aninterest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that thecourts cannot proceed without their presence. A party is indispensable if his interest in thesubject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with the other parties interest.Unquestionably, Villamaters widow stands as an indispensable party to th is case.Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is aground for the dismissal of an action, thus:Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties isground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court onmotion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.The proper remedy is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court,either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint in order to includeindispe nsable parties. If the plaintiff ordered to include the indispensable party refuses to complywith the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to includeor to amend is the action dismissed

AUTOCORP and Rodriguez vs. ISAC and BOC G.R. No. 166662 June 27, 2008 FACTS: Autocorp Group, represented by its President, Rodriguez, secured an ordinary re-export bond from private respondent Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (ISAC) in favor of public Bureau of Customs (BOC), to guarantee the re-export of 2 units of car (at 2 different dates) and/or to pay the taxes and duties thereon. Petitioners executed and signed two Indemnity Agreements with identical stipulations in favor of ISAC, agreeing to act as surety of the subject bonds In sum, ISAC issued the subject bonds to guarantee compliance by petitioners with their undertaking with the BOC to re-export the imported vehicles within the given period and pay the taxes and/or duties due thereon. In turn, petitioners agreed, as surety, to indemnify ISAC for the liability the latter may incur on the said bonds Autocorp failed to re-export the items guaranteed by the bonds and/or liquidate the entries or cancel the bonds, and pay the taxes and duties pertaining to the said items, despite repeated demands made by the BOC, as well as by ISAC. By reason thereof, the BOC considered the two bonds forfeited.

Failing to secure from petitioners the payment of the face value of the two bonds, ISAC filed with the RTC an action against petitioners to recover a sum of money plus AF. ISAC impleaded the BOC as a necessary party plaintiff in order that the reward of money or judgment shall be adjudged unto the said necessary plaintiff. Petitioners filed a MTD, which was denied. RTC ordered Autocorp to pay ISAC and/or BOC the face value of the subject bonds plus AF. Autocorps MR was denied. CA affirmed the trial courts decision. MR was denied. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari ISSUE: WON these bonds are now due and demandable, as there is yet no actual forfeiture of the bonds, but merely a recommendation of forfeiture, for no writ of execution has been issued against such bonds, therefore the case was prematurely filed by ISAC HELD: PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT YES The Indemnity Agreements give ISAC the right to recover from petitioners the face value of the subject bonds plus attorneys fees at the time ISAC becomes liable on the said bonds to the BOC, (specifically to re-export the imported vehicles within the period of six months from their date of entry) regardless of whether the BOC had actually forfeited the bonds, demanded payment thereof and/or received such payment. It must be pointed out that the Indemnity Agreements explicitly provide that petitioners shall be liable to indemnify ISAC whether or not payment has actually been made by the [ISAC] and ISAC may proceed against petitioners by court action or otherwise even prior to making payment to the [BOC] which may hereafter be done by [ISAC]. Article 2071 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2071. The guarantor, even before having paid, may proceed against the principal debtor: (1) When he is sued for the payment; (2) In case of insolvency of the principal debtor; (3) When the debtor has bound himself to relieve him from the guaranty within a specified period, and this period has expired; (4) When the debt has become demandable, by reason of the expiration of the period for payment; (5) After the lapse of ten years, when the principal obligation has no fixed period for its maturity, unless it be of such nature that it cannot be extinguished except within a period longer than ten years; (6) If there are reasonable grounds to fear that the principal debtor intends to abscond; (7) If the principal debtor is in imminent danger of becoming insolvent. In all these cases, the action of the guarantor is to obtain release from the guaranty, or to demand a security that shall protect him from any proceedings by the creditor and from the danger of insolvency of the debtor. NOTES: A demand is only necessary in order to put an obligor in a due and demandable obligation in delay, which in turn is for the purpose of making the obligor liable for interests or damages for the period of delay. Thus, unless stipulated otherwise, an extrajudicial demand is not required before a judicial demand, i.e., filing a civil case for collection, can be resorted to

Thursday, March 25, 2010 AGDEPPA vs. HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE AGDEPPA vs. HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE G.R. No. 164436, January 15, 2010 Nachura, J.: Facts: In 1979, respondent Dorotea Bonete, widow of the late Igancio Bonete, obtained a loan in the amount of P55,000.00 from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)in order to buy farm implements. The loan was secured by a parcel of agricultural land. In 1982, Dorotea received a notice of collection from DBP. Respondents alleged that herein petitioner and counsel, Atty. Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa (Littie Sarah) accompanied Dorotea to DBP and obligated herself to pay the loan. Thereafter, Dorotea was made to sign a document as Little Sarahs security for the amount which the latter paid to DBP in connection with the said loan. Since 1982, Littie Sarah and her representatives had been gradually easing them out of the subject property and that they were ordered to stop the cultivation of their respective ricefields. Eventually, respondents were forcibly ejected from the subject property. On this account, respondents inquired from the Register of Deeds and found that the title to the subject property, which was in the name of respondents predecessor-in-interest, the late Ignacio Bonete, had already been canceled and transferred to Littie Sarah under TCT No. T-75454 by virtue of a purported deed of sale. According to Dorotea, Littie Sarah took advantage of her by letting her sign a contract, ostensibly as security for the loan from DBP, which later turned out to be a deed of sale. Thus, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession and/or Annulment of Deed of Sale of the Subject Property before the RTC. Littie Sarah filed a Motion to Dismiss. Respondents filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 21, 1990, the RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint and held that respondents were not real parties in interest and lacked the personality to sue. Respondents went to the CA which reversed and set aside the RTC Order, and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings because Dorotea, being the former owner of the subject property, was a real party in interest. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the respondents are real party in interest. Held: While it is true that respondents committed a procedural infraction before the RTC, such infraction does not justify the dismissal of the case. Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action. It bears stressing that TCT No. T-56923, covering the subject property, was issued in the name of Dorotea. This is established by the record, and petitioners themselves admit this fact. However, because TCT No. T-75454, allegedly issued in favor of Littie Sarah, and the purported deed of sale, allegedly executed by Dorotea in favor of Littie Sarah, are not on record. Considering the allegations in the pleadings, it is best that a trial on the merits be conducted. A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in situations involving excusable formal errors in a pleading, as long as the same do not subvert the essence of the proceeding, and they connote at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment, if blind and stubborn adherence to procedure would result in the sacrifice of substantial justice for technicality. To deprive respondents, particularly Dorotea, of their claims over the subject property on the strength of sheer technicality would be a travesty of justice and equity.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire Standard 24 SCRA 663 (1968) Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted. ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated to warrant writ of HC? HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to the guilty Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise: A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Marasigan vs. Marasigan (del Rosario)FACTS: Alicia owned in common with her siblings 13 parcels of land called Hacienda Sta. Rita in Pili and Minalabac,Camarines Sur. Alicia left behind her 2/21 shares in the 13 parcels of land.Alicia was survived

by her siblings: Cesar, Apolonio, Lilia, and Benito; Marissa, a sister-in-law; and the children ofher brothers who predeceased her: Francisco, Horacio, and Octavio. Complaint for Judicial Partition of the Estateof Alicia Marasigan was filed before the RTC by her heirs (private respondents) namely, Apolonio, Lilia, Octavio,Horacio, Benito, and Marissa, against Cesar.RTC decided in favor of the heirs and issued an order of partition of the estate of Alicia Marasigan. They orderedthe partition into 1/7 each of the 2/21 shares of the 13 parcels of land.The parties could not agree on how they shall physically partition among themselves Alicias estate, private respondents filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners following the procedure outlined in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 ofRule 69 of the Rules of Court.The RTC granted the Motion and appointed Badiong, Assistant Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur, as Chairmanof the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents nominated Dacara as the second commissioner. Cesar failedto nominate a third commissioner despite due notice. Upon lapse of the period given, only two commissionerswere appointed. Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection. Commissioners Report was released: Considering that thephysical division of the 2/21 pro-indiviso share of the decedent, Alicia Marasigan cannot be done because of thedifferent locations and conditions of the properties, undersigned Commissioners hereby recommend that the heirsmay assign their 1/7 share to one of the parties willing to buy the same (Sec. 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court)provided he pays to the heir[s] willing to assign his/her 1/7 share such amounts the Commissioners have recommended and duly approved by the Honorable Court. Cesar opposed and prayed for the disapproval of thereport. RTC issued an Order approving the recommendations embodied in the Commissioners Report, particularly that the property be assigned to one of the heirs. Motion for Reconsideration by Cesar that was denied.In the meantime, Cesar died. He was substituted by his heirs and herein petitioners. The heirs of Cesar, petitioners,elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 claiming graveabuse by the RTC judg e in approving the Commissioners Report. CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the RTC acted within its authority. ISSUE : Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming in toto the RTC Order adopting the Commissioners recommendation on the manner of partition of the estate of Alicia Marasigan. They did not err in affirming theRTC Order!! HELD :In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, the trial court, after determining that aco- ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial courtpromulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if theparties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be.The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. Thisphase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownershipdoes not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received bythe defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able toagree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm thepartition so agreed upon.The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition"

directedby the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more thanthree (3) commissioners. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.While the lack of notice to Cesar of the viewing and examination by the Commissioners of the real properties comprising Alicias estate is a procedural infirmity, it did not violate any of his substantive rights nor did it deprive him of due process. It is a matter of record, and petitioners cannot deny, that Cesar was able to file his Comment/Opposition to the Commissioners Report. He had sufficient opportunity to present before the RTCwhatever objections or oppositions he may have had to the Commissioners Report.

The Commissioners found, after a viewing and examination of Alicias e state, that the same cannot be divided without causing prejudice to the interests of the parties. The impracticality of physically dividing Alicias estate becomes more apparent, considering that Hacienda Sta. Rita is composed of parcels and snippets of land located intwo different municipalities, Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur. Cesar and his heirs are entitled only to his 1/7share in the yet unidentified, unsegregated 2/21 proindiviso shares of Alicia in each of the 13 parcels of land thatcomprises Hacienda Sta. Rita. Dividing the parcels of land even further, each portion allotted to Alicias heirs, with a significantly reduced land area and widely scattered in two municipalities, would irrefragably diminish the valueand use of each portion, as compared to keeping the entire estate intact. The correctness of the finding of the RTC and the Commissioners that dividing Alicias estate would be prejudicial to the parties cannot be passed upon by the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. The writ of certiorariissues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court can only presume that the proceedings beforethe RTC, including the recommendation made by the Commissioners, were fairly and regularly conducted.Inasmuch as the parties continued to manifest their desire to terminate their co-ownership, but the co-

heirs/co-owners could not agree on which properties would be allotted to each of them, this Court finds that the Court ofAppeals was correct in ruling that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the Commissioners recommendation that the co -heirs/co-owners assign their sharesto one of them in exchange for proper compensation. Thus, contrary to petitioners averments, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting andconfirming the recommendations of the Commissioners. PETITION DENIED. Tantuico v. Republic, 204 SCRA 428 (91) Facts: A case was filed by the PCGG vs. the Marcoses & Tantuico, the latter on the theory that he collaborated & aided the Marcoses in concealing the ill-gotten wealth. Tantuico filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The SolGen opposed the motion saying that the matters sought by Tantuico are evidentiary in nature & that the complaint was sufficient as it contains the essential elements of a cause of action. Held: A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action. Its office or purpose is to inform the defendant clearly & definitely of the claims made vs. him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at trial. The complaint should inform the defendant all the material facts on w/c the plaintiffs rely to support his demand The complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts on w/c the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action w/c forms the bases of the plaintiffs claim of liability. The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the ultimate facts, & the second, the evidentiary facts. The term ultimate facts as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. TEST: A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out w/o leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. Ultimate facts are important & substantial facts w/c either directly form the basis of the primary right & duty, or w/c directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by w/c these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of w/c, the entire cause of action rests. Evidentiary facts are those facts w/c are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon w/c conclusions of ultimate facts are based. Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, & (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action. However, where the allegations of the complaint are

vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars.

G.R. No. 163785 December 27, 2007 KKK FOUNDATIONVS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGASFACTS: On March 1, 2002, petitioner, filed a complaint for Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of Sheriffs Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.3 Petitioner alleged that: (1) the auctionsale was made with fraud and/or bad faith since there was no public bidding; (2) the sheriff did not post the req uisite Notice of Sheriffs Sale; (3) the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally defective since it sought to foreclose properties of two different entities; (4) the foreclosed properties wereawarded and sold to Imelda A. Angeles for an inadequate bid of only P4,181,450; and (5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered byindividual titles but the same were sold en masse. On March 7, 2002, Judge Calderon-Bargas issued TRO preventing Angeles from consolidating herownership to the foreclosed properties. On even date, petitioner and Angeles executed a Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay Angeles the bid price of the eight parcels of land within 20 days. The parties then filed a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.On April 1, 2002,petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement since the other property owner and other trustees of petitioner were notconsulted prior to the signing of the agreement. Angeles opposed the motion.Judge CalderonBargas issued an Order stating that Record shows that theUrgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s]. 4 and 5,Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings have no specific date of hearing. The reason why the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement up tonow has not yet been acted upon was that it has no date of hearing.Thus, these are considered mere scrap[s] of paper. The TC approved theCompromise Agreement. Angeles then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The TC required petitioner to comment on the motion within ten(10) days.TC directed the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of execution. On the same date, the trial court received petitioners Motion for Extension of Timeto File Comment with Entry of Appearance which was denied on October 10, 2002. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the October 3, 2002Order.Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The CA denied the petition and ruled that petitioner was not deprived of dueprocess when the trial court issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders since it was given sufficient time to file its comment. Theappellate court did not rule on the second and thir d issues after noting that petitioners motion for reconsideration of the October 3, 2002 Order had notyet been resolved by the trial court. It did not resolve the issues even after the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on December 12, 2003,11 ratiocinating that the trial courts denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration did not operate to reinstate t he petition because at the time itwas filed, petitioner had no cause of action.Hence , this petition. ISSUES: WON the tria l court seriously erred: (1) in issuing the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders without awaiting petitioners com ment;(2) in granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of hearing; and (3) in issuing the writ of execution sinceit varied the tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002.

HELD: On the first issue, we note that in its September 9, 2002 Order, the trial court gave petitioner ten (10) days to file its co mment to Angeless Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the Order only on September 21, 2002, Angeles counters that petitioner received it on September 12, 2002. We are more inclined to believe Angeless allegation since the trial court itse lf declared in its Order dated October 10, 2002 thatthe Order dated September 9, 2002 was personally served upon petitioner on September 12, 2002.13 Thus, petitioner had until September 22, 2002within which to file its comment or to request for an extens ion of time. Consequently, petitioners motion for extension and comment were not seasonably filed and such procedural lapse binds petitioner. Anent the second issue, a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 1514 of the Rules of Court is considered aworthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motioncontaining a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with theserequirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1) wherea rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in thequestioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice willbe served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to theadverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.A notice of hearing is anintegral component of procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through suchnotice, the adverse party i s given time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. Records show that while Angeless Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of the hearing. However, scstill find that petitioner was notdenied procedural due process . Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion only after the reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly,petitioner was given time to study and comment on the motion for which reason, the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.Proceduraldue process is not based solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberallyconstrued to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding.On the last issue, SC note that the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial court in its Decision dated June 28, 2002 merely provided thatpetitioner would pay Angeles the bid price of P5,500,000, for the eight parcels of land subject of the auction sale, within twenty (20) days. Uponpayment, Angeles would execute a Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage, and surrender to petitioner the titles tothe eight parcels of land. Nevertheless, when the trial court issued the writ of execution, the writ gave Sheriff Bisnar the option "to allow the consolidationof the subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles."Undoubtedly, the writ of execution imposed upon petitioner an alternative obligation which was not included or contemplated in the Compromise Agreement. While the complaint originally sought to restrain Angeles from consolidating her ownership to the fore closed properties, that has beensuperseded by the Compromise Agreement. Therefore, the writ of execution which directed Sheriff Bisnar to "cause the Register of Deeds of Morong,Rizal, to allow the consolidation of the subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles" is clearly erroneous because the judgment underexecution failed to provide for consolidation. Because the writ of execution varied the terms of the judgment and exceeded them, it had no validity. Thewrit of

execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Neither may itgo beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it,it has pro tanto no validity.20WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2004 of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965 are MODIFIED such that the writ of execution issued on October 11, 2002 by Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas is declared NULL and VOID.SC ordered that the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, which is hereby ORDERED to issue another writ ofexecution against petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc., in conformity with the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the trial court. This is without prejudice to filinga new motion for consolidation by respondent Angeles