UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

DODGING SITUATIONISM CAN VIRTUE ETHICS AND SITUATIONISM COEXIST?

A PAPER SUBMITTED TO JUSTIN WEINBERG IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF PHIL760 THE EMPIRICAL IN ETHICS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

BY BRETT YARDLEY

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA DECEMBER 2013

Introduction Pick up any work on situationisms critique of virtue ethics and the text will inevitably mention dimes, seminarians in a hurry, and shockingly how obedient people can be. All of these are hallmarks from experiments in moral psychology that situationists cite as empirical evidence that moral actions are grounded in situations and not character as virtue ethics claims. Mark Alfanos book Character As Moral Fiction1 presents a clear and precise reflection on the situationist view promoted by Gilbert Harman and John Doris, and three of, what he claims to be, virtue ethics failed responses to their critique. After a brief overview of virtue ethics, situationism, and their current debate, this paper will argue that Mark Alfanos objections to one of the responses to situationism, the dodge, are insufficient, and thus virtue ethics in its traditional form survives. Once it is shown that the evidence from situationism does not in fact disprove virtue ethics, ideas for ways forward will be proposed since if virtue ethics need not fear situationism, then it ought to embrace potential benefits from its findings.

The Skirmish in Progress The Defender: Virtue Ethics Before launching into situationism and Alfanos critique in particular, it seems wise to gain a little background on the two competing theories before one can truly understand where the disagreement lies. Due to the extended history of virtue ethics (having begun with Aristotle as
1

Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. New York: Cambridge University Press,

2013.

outlined in Nicomachean Ethics, its prolonged reign until the enlightenment, and relatively recent reemergence heralded by Anscombes paper Modern Moral Philosophy2 in 1958), it has a wide range of interpretations. However, there is a suitable core which most, if not all, virtue ethic theories possess, which for the purposes of this paper is all that is necessary to present since this foundation is precisely, as shall be shown below, what situationists are calling into question. As an ethical theory, virtue ethics claim can be as simple as the right action is that which would be chosen by a virtuous person. Admittedly, this statement requires unpacking. As book one of Nicomachean Ethics illustrates, Aristotle held to a teleological view of the world in which everything has a purpose or final end, including human beings. For human beings this highest end is eudaimonia (a term difficult to translate, but often seen as happiness or flourishing), best summarized by Alasdair MacIntyre as the state of being well and doing well in being well, of a mans being well-favored himself and in relation to the divine, in which the virtues are precisely those qualities the possession of which will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of which will frustrate his movement toward that telos.3 This does not make virtue a means to an end for Aristotle, but that is another matter. As qualities, virtues go to the core of who someone is, otherwise known as character traits. Virtues thus take two forms: intellectual virtues (knowledge, good judgment, and practical wisdom) which can be taught, and moral virtues (courage, honesty, magnanimity, etc.) which must be acquired independently (and thus cannot be taught). Several aspects cannot taught because virtuous activity must be undertaken

Anscombe, E. (1958). Modern Moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33.

MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. 139.

knowingly and for its own sake.4 In other words virtue ethics emphasizes being in addition to knowing and doing, such that a virtuous person is one who knows what is right, does what is right, and does it for the right reason. According to Rosalind Hursthouse, in following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and continence, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise,5 whereas the incontinent recognize the temptation and yield to it and those in possession of vice act in accordance with those characteristics. Thus, virtues must be acquired (meaning these virtues or character traits are not innate) and the means of acquiring them is through reflection on the virtues and what a person in possession of that virtue would do in any given circumstance. Aristotle gives the impression in Nicomachean Ethics 2. 6, that to obtain many of the virtues is like walking the edge of a knife where it is possible to fall off into excess or shortage of the virtue. From here Aristotle makes two claims of those who have acquired the virtues: first, if someone fully possesses one virtue, they possess them all,6 and second those with the virtues are not even tempted to do other than the virtues dictate. Thus, achieving eudaimonia is a lifelong and difficult task (in Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11, Aristotle toys with the idea of whether one can justifiably be said to have reached eudaimonia during their lifetime). The culmination of this basic portrait of virtue ethics is that obtaining eudaimonia, that is becoming a virtuous person, is extremely rare and thus most people are not virtuous. Despite this, virtue ethicists typically Aristotle, and Terence Irwin. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2000. 1105a30-b1. Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/>.
6 5 4

Aristotle, and Terence Irwin. Nicomachean Ethics. 1144b30-1145a2.

claim that anyone can be virtuous, which is to say that not everyone can become a virtuous; but that a virtuous person can come from anywhere.

The Opposition: Situationism Mark Alfanos situationist critique of virtue ethics is largely built upon the foundations laid by Gilbert Harmons Moral Philosophy meets Social Psychology7 and John Doriss far more charitable works Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics8 and Lack of Character.9 Their basic claim is that although historically ethical actions or inactions have been attributed to character traits possessed by an agent in the virtue ethics tradition established by Aristotle, psychological studies seems to indicate that situational factors, rather than character traits of virtue or vice, are more indicative of an agents actions. Harman argues that the attribution of virtue and vice is simply the result of confirmation bias, or more pejoratively, the fundamental attribution error.10 John Doris summarizes his own critique in one of his later works claiming that the argument, in a nutshell, is that these [psychological] experiments show moral behavior is often Harman, G., 1999, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series), 119: 316 31.
8 7

Doris, John M., 1998, Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics, Nos, 32 (4): 50430.

Doris, John M. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Harman gives a concise definition of confirmation bias as Given a hypothesis, one tends to look for confirming evidence. Finding such evidence, one takes it to support the hypothesis. Evidence against the hypothesis tends to be ignored or downplayed and subsequently applies the concept of the fundamental attribution error, namely the attribution of good of bad behavior to someone as internal or external based on an individuals experience of and relation to the subject, to the attribution of character traits (see Harman, G., 1999, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology, 315, 325).
10

remarkably inconsistent across situations, a finding that confounds many virtue theoretic moral psychologies, which suppose that behavior is ordered by robust traits issuing in cross situationally consistent behavior.11 These experiments typically include a list of about a dozen usual suspects, designed to measure helpfulness, group think, destructive behavior, and sometimes honesty.12 Since it is unnecessary to go through them all, only a handful of the post popular cases will be showcased here: Isen & Levin (1972) created an experiment where subjects either found a dime in a payphone return coin slot or they did not and then a confederate walking by would drop a stack of papers in their path. Their results showed that people, regardless of their character, were disproportionately likely to help the woman if they had found a dime than those who did not. Similarly, Baron & Thomley/Bronfen (1994) created an experiment asking people if they would make change for a dollar either in front of pleasant smelling bakery or a neutral smelling dry goods store. Their results showed that people were more likely to make change in front of the

Doris,John. 2010, Heated agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good, Philosophical Studies, 148 (1): 135146. 136. Helping cases include: Oskar Schindler (1945) who helped Jews escape Germany despite his mercenary nature, Isen & Levin (1972) which measured helping acts when people found a dime, Darley & Batson (1973) measured to see how many seminarians would actually be a Good Samaritan, and Baron & Thomley/Bronfen (1994) measured people making change in front of bakery. Group Think cases include: Catherine Genovese (1963) a woman whose murder could have been prevented had 37/38 witnesses done something to help, Latane & Darley (1970) measured responses when smoke filled a room, Latane & Redin (1969) measured reactions when a woman screamed after crash in next room, and Latane & Darley (1970) measured responses when participants overhead a seizure. Destructive Behavior cases include: the Holocaust (1945) when humans willing carried out genocide in extermination camps, Zimbardo (1943) which measured student responses in a prison experiment, Milgram (1974) measured peoples obedience in giving dangerous electric shocks to someone else, and Rwanda (1994) when Tsutsis massacred their neighbors. Honesty cases include: Hawthorn & May (1928) performed a character education inquiry to measure honesty in school children, and Dan Ariely (2008) primed honesty through recalling the ten commandments or an honor code.
12

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bakery (another study shows that people are less likely to help in the presence of a leaf blower or any number of other fell ambient factors). In another study, Darley & Batson (1973) conducted an experiment asking seminarians to present a talk either on the Good Samaritan (a biblical story about a virtuous person helping an unfortunate) or another neutral topic on the other side of campus, in which they would pass someone in distress (a confederate of the experiment). Remarkably, the greatest factor in predicting behavior was not religious affiliation or even the topic, but whether or not the seminarian was told they were in a hurry. Only 10% of the students stopped to help when told they were in a hurry, whereas 63% stopped when they were told they had ample time. Finally, there is the infamous experiment conducted by Milgram (1974) who measured to see how obedient people would be in giving dangerous electric shocks to another person (an actor not actually being shocked) when told to continue by the experimenter (in an increasingly mandatory sequence). Few people were expected to go beyond 150 volts marked very strong shock, but in at least one experiment, all forty subjects surpassed it with many going beyond voltage levels marked extremely intense shock, danger: severe shock, and XXX. The situationists indicate that these experiments (and their counterparts) frequently show that behavior is systematically not cross-situational as traits would suggest, that is the traits are not consistent or stable in their manifestation, and that seeming irrelevant ambient factors can alter someones behavior. In the words of Doris, trait attribution is often surprisingly inefficacious in predicting behavior in particular novel situations, because differing behavioral outcomes often seem a function of situational variation more than individual disposition. To put

things crudely, people typically lack character.13 In summary, situationists claim that the results of these experiments give an indirect argument14 that globalism (the idea that character traits are consistent, stabile, and integrated) does not exist, and therefore character as understood in the traditional sense as consisting of various traits or virtues, is at best an inadequate theory, and at worst a myth.15 The situationists therefore conclude that if empirical evidence from psychological studies on morality has shown that the emperor of virtue ethics has no clothes, then there is no point in keeping with the theory and instead work in ethics should focus on studying and engineering situations and the relevant factors that affect peoples behavior.

Responses, Objections, and Counters in the Debate Virtue ethicists have not sat idly in the wake of the situationist attack, and have published numerous works in response to the critique. Mark Alfano has identified the virtue ethicists responses into three helpful camps (whereas other situationists have seemingly lumped different approaches into only one or two groups overlooking their key differences16) which he dubs the Dodge, Retreat, and Counterattack.17

13

Doris, John M., 1998, Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics, 506. Doris, John M. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. 38. Ibid., 23. Doris,John. 2010, Heated agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good, 135. Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 62.

14

15

16

17

The most prevalent response to date has been the counterattack, that the empirical evidence [from the experiments] does not support the situationist critique18 (Alfano spends the majority of his chapter on responses objection to various forms of this claim), in which virtue ethicists discredit the studies stating that upon closer inspection the results are far from as conclusive as the situationists seem to indicate. Whether this is due to debates within psychology itself which Doris notes,19 or, as Harman points out, the relatively few studies of this type available since these studies are difficult to carry out (and moral implications bar the implementation of others) depends on each study in question.20 This approach also points out the ease in which one can lie, cheat, and steal by manipulating numbers. This is by no means meant to indicate that Alfano, Doris, or Harman (or any situationist of note) is a charlatan, on the contrary it appears that their concerns and subsequent goals are genuine and well motivated. However, since these studies (and often times their sample sizes) are so small numbers can be deceiving, and the selection process by which evidence is included in the presentation should caution situationists to be aware of the very confirmation bias they accuse virtue ethicists of (the dime study of Isen & Levin (1972) is a perfect example).21 Despite all this, while the

18

Ibid., 62.

Doriss honesty regarding the challenges of not only working cross disciplinary but also with psychology's own challenges is refreshing, as he acknowledges that psychologys treatment as a scientific is not unquestioned since when compared with advances in the natural sciences, psychology has exhibited little uncontroversial progress, (see Doris, John M. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. 7).
20

19

Harman, G., 1999, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology, 316.

The results from this study are often presented as nearly 90% of participants helped when they found a dime and over 95% did not help when they did not find a dime, when the small sample size consisted of just 16 people who found dimes and 25 people who did not. Furthermore, these results could not be duplicated in follow up studies by other moral psychologists. In Blevins and Murphy (1974) the recreated study found that there was no

21

counterattack response is worthy of note it will not be defended here. As Doris points out, situationism does not hang on any one experiment or two22 and without another complimentary response (such as the dodge), the counterattack may bear the burden of responding to each individual study. Furthermore, this approach seems to be primarily reactive vs. proactive. The retreat response admits that although the situationist critique shows that traditional virtues are chimerical, an empirically informed theory of virtue can still be formulated in terms of virtuous actions or local traits. 23 Doris himself proffers a local virtue theory for this approach. Since this approach is largely considered to yield far too much ground to situationism, often to the invalidation of virtue ethics, it is not considered a viable option and not defended. Last is the dodge,24 which according to Alfano claims that virtue is a rare ideal, so empirical evidence that most people are not virtuous is irrelevant. 25 In fact, it would seem that the evidence from such empirical studies actually compliments what traditional virtue ethics relationship between finding dimes and helping when more people did not help than did help when they found a dime. Levin and Isen also did another study with subjects finding dimes and mailing a letter left behind in which they found results similar to their original study, but again the results could not be duplicated in Weyant and Clark (1977) with almost equal numbers of people not helping regardless of whether or not they found a dime (see Miller, Christian (2003). Social psychology and virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics 7 (4):365-392. Appendix). While, it is entirely possible that all these studies are just as equally susceptible to the confirmation bias, Blevins and Murphy (1974) and Weyant and Clark (1977) never appear in situationist data.
22

Doris, John M. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. 13. Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 62.

23

Some virtue ethicists might take dodge to be a pejorative term since, as shall be shown below, traditional virtue ethics never moves its position in light of the situationist attack (the term miss may seem more representative), but this label will be maintained for the sake of clarity in responding to Alfanos critique.
25

24

Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 62.

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teaches, that obtaining virtue is so difficult that very few people can actually be considered virtuous. As a result, virtue ethicists have far more interest in the one person who stops to help without finding a dime or the 10% of seminarians who stopped even though they were in a hurry, since these individuals may be of the rare few who are well on their way to becoming a virtuous person. In other words, virtue ethicists acknowledge globalism only as it applies to truly virtuous people, since only they possess virtue to the extent that they will perform the corresponding virtuous act in every appropriate circumstance for that virtue. However, according to Alfano, this approach is not free from worry, and provides three objections to this response, including: 1) the dodge abandons the core qualities of egalitarianism, explanatory power, and predictive power; 2) the dodge does not have an adequate response to situational factors that affect moral decisions which have nothing to do with the traditional distinctions between virtue/vice and continence/incontinence; and 3) the dodge makes virtue ethics equally guilty of moral schizophrenia in moral education since most people are non-virtuous. The remainder of this section will be devoted to showing why these objections ultimately fall short allowing the dodge to remain a viable response to situationism.

Does the dodge abandon egalitarianism? Situationists Objection: According to Alfano the dodge appears to cede the egalitarianism, explanatory power, and predictive power conjuncts in the hard core of virtue ethics.26 Alfano denies the existence of what he considers real saints (except as an ideal that people can strive for, but never expected to actually obtain), and as a result he writes off the stronger form of
26

Ibid., 63

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egalitarianism in which one can become truly virtuous (a real saint), opting for a weaker interpretation of egalitarianism. Alfanos modification of egalitarianism states that this relaxed condition does not go so far as to require that anyone can be virtuous, just that almost anyone can be brought reliability to do what the virtuous person would do.27 To illustrate his weaker form of egalitarianism, Alfano provides what he calls the saturation metaphor, which is the image of a blue sheet of paper. He states that in order to be called blue the paper does not necessarily have to be completely uniform in shade or coverage, which he refers to as depth and breadth, such that parts of the paper may be dark blue, while others are light blue, and even small areas where white spots still appear. In this light someone may be called virtuous even though the depth and breadth of their possession of the virtues is not uniform or complete, and may possess a few blind spots where vice still has not been extinguished.28 He makes this move in order to support the claim that a large enough portion of the population is close enough to fully possessing virtue, so that it can still be said that virtues are responsible for behavior and thus their possession explain actions.29 Alfano indicates that virtue ethics relies on the assumption that virtues are explanatory in that an explanation for why someone behaves the way they do necessarily points to the possession of the source virtue.30 For predictive power Alfano distinguishes between high-fidelity and low-fidelity virtues as those requiring near-perfect consistency vs. much higher consistency than one would expect without the trait in question such that attribution of faithfulness to ones spouse is lost after even one failure, whereas the
27

Ibid., 33 Ibid., 29. Ibid., 32 Ibid., 30

28

29

30

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attribution of honesty does not require such a strict adherence.31 To use the saturation metaphor, full breadth and depth is required for high-fidelity virtues while only some level of breadth and depth is required for low-fidelity virtues.32 On the contrary, if few people were virtuous it would be difficult to see how virtue could explain actions and if traits are not causal then neither are they predictive. Thus there is no global trait possession, so why teach children virtue ethics if so few could become virtuous?

Virtue Ethics Counter: Alfano himself admits that virtue ethics can insulate itself from the situationist critique by claiming that virtuous people are rare.33 As such, according to Christian Miller the psychological experiments pointed to by situationists should not be seen as evidence that the participants do not possess any global character traits whatsoever.34 Instead what this indicates is that those studied do not fully posses the traits being tested. In this light, Alfanos objection falls short since it is based on a weaker version of egalitarianism that is espoused by virtue ethics. Alfanos saturation metaphor is extremely helpful, but seems to over reach by conflating the locution that a piece of paper is blue with the truth that it is only mostly blue, or shades of blue with white speckles. This distinction is not insignificant. For one can be judged by others as virtuous, and subsequently called such (Harmans fundamental attribution error critique seems to fit here), indeed people can even be brought to do what a virtuous person would do (laws coerce people precisely in this manner) but not for the right reason. For the virtue

31

Ibid., 31 Ibid., 31-32 Ibid., 32 Miller, Christian (2003). Social psychology and virtue ethics. 15.

32

33

34

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ethicist, unless that person actually is in complete possession of the virtues (not just the highfidelity virtues and most of the low-fidelity virtues), and performing them for the right reason, then that person is not virtuous. To state otherwise would seem agree that close only counts in horseshoes, hand-grenades, and (apparently) ethics. Alfano himself points out that for this proposal the devil is of course in the details, since now a qualification is necessary to indicate what counts as close, and what a significant portion of the population is. Even this sliding scale of ethics does not seem to fit the common understanding of moral attributions, since with lowfidelity virtues even a dishonest person will be honest most of the time in order to be believed when they do lie to maximize their personal gain. Instead, the saturation metaphor should be seen as accounting for variations as people progress through the traditional categories of virtue, continence, incontinence, and vice. So while only a rare few ever fully achieve virtue such that it always explains and predicts their behavior perfectly, the vast majority possesses ever changing mixtures of virtue and vice as they progress toward full virtue often experiencing relapses into vice as they struggle to inculcate the virtues and overcome flaws in their persona. In other words, just because one has not fully achieved virtue does not mean that a virtue or a vice fails to explain or predict their behavior. These latter individuals are merely continent or incontinent. As such, anyone still can become fully virtuous in which their character traits will never fail to predict and explain their actions, while for the remainder the virtues and vices still explain their behavior in an increasingly predictable manner as their loose possession of a virtue or a vice is practiced and reflected upon. In response to the difficulty of ascertaining virtue, Anthony Appiah points out that other disciplines including formal logic and mathematical probability theory define standards here since they are very difficult to conform to in practice, yet few

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would question the benefits of pursuing them despite their inherent difficulty.35 Thus, it follows that virtues should not only be taught, but also should be taught from an early age in order to give people the maximum amount of time to progress toward fully possessing them.36

Can the dodge account for situational factors? Situationists Objection: By referring to the distinction among virtue, continence, incontinence, and vice, this response constricts the range of situational factors it can handle namely situational non-reasons such as ambient sensibilia and mood effects having nothing to do with continence and incontinence. 37 Standing on the evidence from moral psychology Alfano claims that if people are unconsciously susceptible to aspects of situations that seem irrelevant, like finding a dime, the smell of a bakery, or their degree of hurry, then these experiments suggest that most people do not even have flimsy virtues, let alone robust ones,38 which is to say that actions are caused not by the possession of a character trait in any depth, but by situational factors the agent is oblivious to. While the possession of flimsy virtues, or the lack thereof, fits the claim that virtues are rare, the influence of external factors raises a challenge. Alfano divides such external influences into two categories which he calls bad reasons and the sinister situational non-reasons. Bad reasons are loosely defined as any reason an agent has for

35

Appiah, Anthony. Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,

2008. 51.
36

Aristotle, and Terence Irwin. Nicomachean Ethics. 1099b29-32. Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 63. Ibid., 37.

37

38

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an action that fails to align with the behavior dictated by, all things considered, reason and manifest themselves in two forms: the first are classic temptations, which require no discussion here; the second are demand characteristics which are elements of situations that reduce an individuals effectiveness in processing good and bad reasons. 39 Prime examples of the latter are group think and the diffusion of responsibility in which the presence of other people (and their reactions) or social distance cues alter an individuals perception of a situation.40 Since these influences tend to go unnoticed by individuals, Alfano likens them to temptations in disguise. 41, Since situationists are content with the way virtue ethics has traditionally handled temptation, these influences are a non-issue. The other is situational non-reasons, which Alfano calls the heart of the situationist challenge.42 These are different than bad reasons since, even though their sly nature is similar to demand characteristics, these situational influences cannot provide an individual a single reason for their behavior. In other words, people are not succumbing to temptation as the incontinent person does, but having their moral reasoning and conduct disproportionately altered by a seeming unperceived non-temptation.43 To name two such examples, Alfano points to mood and ambient sounds. In the former, mood is thought to be morally irrelevant and easily induced as shown by finding dimes or being asked for change in front of bakery, but since people

39

The difference almost seems to echo Humes violent vs. calm passions.

These have been shown by cases such as: Catherine Genoveses murder (1963); Latane & Darley (1970), reporting smoke; and Latane & Redin (1969), responding to screams.
41

40

Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 43. Ibid., 43. Ibid., 44.

42

43

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are more likely to engage in helping behavior when they are happy (compared to just neutral let alone a dour state) it seems to affect moral behavior. Alfano quotes two studies in which suspects were more likely to help when they felt responsible (i.e., guilty) for causing an accident, even if the subsequent help was unrelated to the event. In the latter, ambient sounds have been found to exacerbate individuals already in an angered state, and effect whether people stop to help in the presence of higher decibels as one case found that less people helped when a confederate dropped papers near a leaf blower. Alfano states that both of these factors can cause attentional focusing in which people limit their awareness by over focusing on the most prominent features of their surroundings, thereby under focusing on everything else, often to the detriment of others. As such, people in a good mood and people not intentionally ignoring aspects of their surroundings are more likely to recognize opportunities to be helpful. To put it more succinctly, Alfano states that much evil is committed and good omitted not so much out of ill will but out of ignorance of and lack of attention to morally relevant cues44 which questions the ability of an individual to acquire virtues if most people are oblivious to situational influence. Thus, Alfano claims that the dodge at best only responds to the sub-class of situational influences namely bad reasons, which he deems intuitively less worrisome than situational non-reasons.45

Virtue Ethics Counter: At the outset, it seems that situational non-reasons could actually be another type of bad reasons and thus fully accountable by virtue ethics just like any other

44

Ibid., 50. Ibid., 63.

45

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temptation or demand characteristic (a temptation in disguise). Finding a dime could trigger any number of thought processes such as pay it forward or karma, while causing an accident invokes notions of recompense, both of which would cause an individual to help when they otherwise would not have had this thinking not been triggered. Unfortunately, none of cited studies appear to have followed up with subjects to ascertain the individuals stated reasoning for why they did or did not help (though this information may prove unreliable). If it is true that situational reasons may in fact be another class of behavioral characteristic, then the heart of the situationist critique dissolves and the dodge is content in its claim that virtue is exceedingly rare and these helpful individuals are acting rightly, but not for the right reasons. Yet, even if situationists can prove that situational non-reasons truly are a class all of their own and cannot be considered alongside behavioral characteristics, the dodge still survives by addressing how attentional focus is different for virtuous individuals over and against non-virtuous people. However, before going into how the mental processes of a truly virtuous person will differ from those of a non-virtuous person, the extent to which attentional focus applies has to be qualified. If ought implies can, then moral intuitions indicate that an agent cannot be guilty of omission in situations in which they are rendered unable to identify opportunities to help. For example, moral intuitions would likely not hold a blind seminarian responsible for failing to stop and help someone slumped over in a doorway that they would have no way of seeingthey are literally blind to the opportunity to help. Similarly, if part of being aware that someone has dropped a stack of papers is the sound and this is drowned out by the drone of a leaf blower, it is difficult to see how someone who did not stop to help could be considered responsible unless they saw the event. Where this phenomenon becomes most perplexing is in the Wesley Autrey thought experiment Alfano proposes in which multiple

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bystanders fail to respond to Hollopeters fall onto the train tracks before an oncoming train including one man, John Doe, who did not notice the fall because he was listening to his iPod at maximum volume.46 If John Doe was unable to hear the fall, then is he morally responsible in this example? It seems that Alfano is right that people in cities who intentionally invoke this phenomenon in order break their connection with beggars and cat-callers so that they do not even notice them surely would be culpable,47 but to conclude that John Doe is responsible would seem to indicate that a virtuous person does not use iPods, or anything else for that matter which might hinder their attentional awareness (but does not this seem a tad extreme?) Such a question may be worthy of an empirical study and a paper all of its own, and thus for the sake of argument it will be assumed that all these qualifications can be addressed. This granted, Alfano is on the right path in that a virtuous person requires a kind of moral attentiveness that necessarily allows them to notice the relevant moral cues in any situation so that they can act on them.48 To assess precisely how the mind of a virtuous person operates differently than that of a non-virtuous person falls outside of philosophy and into the realm of moral psychology; however, two theories will be presented here as to how the empirical evidence for attentional focus might best be accounted for. First, is what might be called the developed attention theory in which individuals may hone and habituate their awareness over time to situational cues as part of the process in becoming virtuous so that they achieve the necessary moral attentiveness. The non-virtuous then are merely susceptible to situational influences because they have not been trained to recognize them. Second, is what might be called the distracted
46

Ibid., 75 Ibid., 44,49 Ibid., 76.

47

48

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attention theory in which individuals already have the necessary moral attentiveness, but due to character defects (selfishness, vanity, licentiousness, viciousness, etc.,) easily have their focus drawn away from morally relevant cues in their surroundings. The virtuous then, no longer even being tempted to do the wrong thing, would no longer be tempted to focus on distractions, and thus left with their moral attentiveness unclouded. For both theories, Alfanos saturation model might help picture development, and finding a person with the appropriate moral attentiveness would still be rare, but this is precisely what the dodge expects.

Does the dodge bankrupt moral education? Situationists Objection: If most people are non-virtuous, then moral education may involve the very moral schizophrenia that virtue ethicists have criticized in other ethical theories.49 Alfano here is pointing out (as others including Doris have50) that the critique raised by Michael Stocker that moral theories often leave moral agents unable to ground their actions in motives or reasons cuts both ways.51 Put more succinctly, Alfano explains that: the contents of their [an agents] motives and their reasons might coincide extensionally, but not intensionally, or if they did coincide intensionally, the agent would seem cold, detached, even immoral. Hence, either the justification or reason for their behavior would differ from the motive driving their behavior, or it would be the same but appear immoral.52,53

49

Ibid., 64. Doris, John M., 1998, Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics, 520.

50

Stocker, Michael. The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral Theories, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 453-466.
52

51

Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 21.

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Originally, it was argued that this split only affected deontology and consequentialism since virtue ethics advises individuals to do the right thing and for the right reason, thereby fusing motivational and evaluative components to avoid the theoretical mediation that plagues its competitors.54 However, if very few people are virtuous as the dodge claims, then virtue ethics is susceptible to the same schizophrenia between actions and motives since most people (morally educated according to virtue ethics) are acting on the ideal or reflection of what a virtuous person would do, and not out of a character trait they actually possess. In other words, when asked why someone did the right thing, their response would be something akin to because it is what a virtuous person would do, which is arguably tantamount to the responses of other theories. 55 If this is true, then claims to superior moral education through virtue ethics, because teachers promote the instilling of personal virtues over the application of abstract principles, are empty. In the end, teachers are still asking students to appeal to an abstract principle of what a virtuous person would do even though they the practitioner will likely never achieve such virtue.56

Alfano provides the urinal fly case to illustrate moral schizophrenia, in which an Amsterdam airport suffering from vile restrooms was able to encourage male patrons to aim properly not through appeals to virtue (these failed), but by placing a sticker of a horsefly in the urinal. The desired action was achieved, but did not coincide with the motive of the patrons, who acted rightly not because it was the right thing to do, but in order to piss on a fly (Ibid., 21).
54

53

Ibid., 21-22.

The traditional example is of a friend visiting someone in the hospital who reveals they chose to come not in order to spend time with the patient, but because it was required by their moral duty (i.e., deontology: the right action; or consequentialism: maximized utility). As a result, this action feels empty or cold compared to one compelled by compassion or concern for the others well being.
56

55

Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 23-24.

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Virtue Ethics Counter: Until an ethical theory completely free from moral schizophrenia can be presented, the problem of self-effacing does not make for a very strong objection. For at worst, even if this argument maintains, then all it achieves is showing that all moral theories are in the same boat, in which case even Alfano admits of virtue ethics that perhaps it is merely the best of a bad lot.57 However, virtue ethics can respond to the charge of moral schizophrenia in a way perhaps the other moral theories cannot. First, if moral schizophrenia does apply to virtue ethics, it seems to only apply to the non-virtuous, and not the few who have actually achieved virtue. Second, if the saturation model is conceived of for the process of becoming virtuous, then moral schizophrenia would never apply to high-fidelity virtues, and would rarely apply to low-fidelity virtues (and then in ever decreasing amounts). Christian Miller even argues that the problem primarily only arises in situations which require reflection, namely new or uncertain situations.58 This would appear to be a vast improvement, since virtue ethics allows for a vastly diminished appearance of moral schizophrenia. Thus, in regards to moral education, if there are actually very few virtuous people, then there are likely even less virtuous teachers who can model appropriate behavior to students. Consequentially, the result tends to be non-virtuous agents teaching non-virtuous agents how to be virtuous (just like the adage the blind leading the blind). If population growth outstrips virtuous growth, then it seems that many will be stuck reflecting on an ideal than actually being tutored to acquire virtue. However, it seems unlikely that Aristotle would have a problem with this in light of his insistence that virtue would manifest among the elite. In the end, even if only the idyllic version of virtue education survived, pragmatically it may still be superior. Since practically speaking, and by the empiricists own
57

Ibid.,24. Miller, Christian (2003). Social psychology and virtue ethics. 17.

58

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affirmations, moral education via exhortations to maximize happiness or do ones duty fall flat but encouragements to act according to virtue have proven more effective since they catch the audiences attention and imagination.59 As moral philosopher Anthony Appiah puts it: Even if Im persuaded by situationist moral psychologythat I cannot be a prudent or just or courageous, or a compassionate person through and through, as our virtue ethicist wants me to aim to be, I can see the point of being prudent or courageous or compassionate; and, at least sometimes, that fact can get me to behave accordinglywhich is part of what makes for a good life.60

Peaceful Resolution through an Empirical Character? Historically irenic solutions have been castigated as overly sanguine.61 However, if the assertions of the dodge are true, then there may be room for the empirical evidence of situationism and the character of virtue ethics to coincide. In the end, members from each ethical theory want people to act morally and thus the end goal is the same. Disagreement then could be said to appear in terms of orthodoxy while ultimately the orthopraxy is the same. Situationists want to control environments in order to determine better behavior while virtue ethicists want to instill virtues, or moral attentiveness, so that better behavior emerges in those same situations. It could even be said that the two go together, for situations in themselves are not enough to elicit right actions and virtues are displayed and habituated through exposure to situations.62

59

Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. 23-24. Appiah, Anthony. Experiments in Ethics. 69. Doris, John. 2010, Heated agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good, 136.

60

61

To use Doriss example of situation ripe for infidelity, a three times divorced philanderer will surely seek out corrupting situations regardless of attempts to engineer them otherwise, unless there is an alternation of character (Doris, John M., 1998, Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics, 515, 517).

62

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If virtue ethics is true and survives the situationist attack in light of the dodge, then it has nothing to fear from empirical studies. So instead of seeking to blunt the force of empirical critiques as critics claim,63 virtue ethicists may be able to learn more about their own tradition by complimenting their theory with empirical studies. Not by embracing the situationist critique or watering down virtue ethics similar to the retreat position,64 but using situationist evidence to better understand the virtuous mind and thus means to develop moral character. As pointed out above, the inner workings of the virtuous mind falls to moral psychology. It has already been shown that understanding the brain and how neural pathways can be altered by habits and addictions can be instrumental in both understanding and treating such disorders.65 As such, if virtue ethicists and situationists (or at least sympathetic empiricists) worked in tandem, then there does not seem to be any reason why empirical studies could not support virtue ethicists claims. Assuming that enough people considered to be virtuous could be summoned to generate a large enough sample size (perhaps by recreating the dime and seminarian experiments in search of those 10%?),66 studies could be conducted on attentional focusing to ascertain what

63

Doris,John. 2010, Heated agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good, 135.

Virtue ethicist Robert Adams A Theory of Virtue can be said to have taken this approach, but even Doris has said that Id like to say that Adams theory of virtue is so deflationary that hed be better off calling it something else. (John. 2010, Heated agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good,142). Articles and books abound on the subject, but an example of each includes: Hakyemez, H l ne. Dopamine and Monetary Reward Two Positron Emission Tomography Studies. Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada Biblioth que et Archives Canada, 2008; and oung, Kimberly S. Caught in the Net: How to Recognize the Signs of Internet Addiction--and a Winning Strategy for Recovery. New York: J. Wiley, 1998. It seems unlikely that simply asking the virtuous to simply volunteer would work, since if humility is a virtue, then the virtuous would be too humble to step forward, and anyone who did volunteer would in fact have probably just disqualified themselves.
66 65

64

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virtuous people notice that most people do not, and hopefully, why it is they notice it when others do not. The research methods conducted by Greene et al using MRI technology67 could be used to produce brain scans of virtuous people to see what areas of their brains are active compared with non-virtuous. All such results could then be incorporated into moral education and the further honing of virtues in the next generation. The empirical benefit to virtue ethics need not end there either. Since situationists want to discuss Aristotles claim that ethical training can develop habits of emotion, deliberation and action proper to virtue before devoting scarce educational dollars,68 virtue ethicists could conduct empirical studies to prove the effectiveness of moral education. One proposal would be to test the claim by people who have had the Milgrim experiment (or any of the other experiments) explained to them, that if they had been a part of the original experiment they would have been one of the virtuous ones who acted rightly.69 If virtue ethics is right, then learning of the experiment and the situation in which it was conducted could be considered moral training. One could easily conceive of recreating Isen & Levins dime study (1972), Darley & Batsons Good Samaritan study (1973), or even Milgrams obedience study (1974) in which there are (at least) two test groups (properly filtered of course): one that reads about the original study and its results, and a control group that does not. Afterward, whether immediately or after some lapse of time, subject both groups to a recreation of the experiment or a similar situation in

See the MRI work of Johsua Greene or Jonathan Haidt such as: Greene, Joshua, and Jonathan Haidt. 2002. "How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 6, no. 12: 517-523.
68

67

Doris, John M., 1998, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. 6. Harman, G., 1999, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology. 322.

69

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which the basic principle is the same (and interview both groups upon completion). If virtue ethicists claims are accurate, then the morally educated group should have more individuals act rightly than in the control group. Follow up interviews would hopefully show whether this was due to reflection on moral traits, an expanded moral attentiveness, or something else entirely. This would show that again Appiah is right in that being educated on these experiments will remind agents that they are often tempted to omit doing what they ought to do, and thus to think that these psychological claims by themselves undermine the normative idea that compassion [or any other relevant trait] is a virtue is just a mistake.70

Conclusion At this point it should be clear that Alfanos objections to the dodge response leave virtue ethics largely unmoved. Therefore, far from being merely the result of confirmation bias, character traits do exist and are responsible for moral behavior, but situations wreak havoc on all but truly virtuous agents, who as situationists have shown empirically, are just as rare as virtue ethicists have claimed. This rarity, as the dodge purports, more than accounts for the critiques of the situationists. As a result, a way forward may exist in which the virtue ethicists can work with situationists, or if all else fails capitalize on their findings, to provide enhanced moral training that is scientifically verifiable and potentially learn more of the inner secrets possessed by truly virtuous agents (such as the processes key to ascertaining moral attentiveness). In the end, the old hackneyed expression might be true of the situationist attack on virtue ethics, that whatever does not kill you only makes you stronger.

70

Appiah, Anthony. Experiments in Ethics. 49.

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Bibliography Adams, Robert Merrihew. A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Alfano, Mark. Character As Moral Fiction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Anscombe, E. (1958). Modern Moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33. Appiah, Anthony. Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008. Aristotle, and Terence Irwin. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2000. Doris, John M., 1998, Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics, Nos, 32 (4): 50430. ____________. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ____________. 2010, Heated agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good, Philosophical Studies, 148 (1): 135146. 136. Foot, Philippa. 1997. "Virtues and Vices". Virtue Ethics / Edited by Roger Crisp and Michael Slote. Geach, P. T. The Virtues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Greene, Joshua, and Jonathan Haidt. 2002. "How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 6, no. 12: 517-523. Harman, G., 1999, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series), 119: 31631. Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/>. MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.

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Miller, Christian (2003). Social psychology and virtue ethics. Journal of Ethics 7 (4):365-392. Appendix). Sabini, John, and Maury Silver. 2005. "Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued". Ethics.115, no. 3: 535. Sherman, Nancy. The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press, 1989. Slote, Michael A. Goods and Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Stocker, Michael. The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral Theories, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 453-466. Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.