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Mariah Maras Professor Sam Cocks Philosophy 496 Fall 2013

Aristotles Qualities Defined, Determined, and Defended from a Postmodern Perspective From a postmodern perspective, I will be focusing on defining Aristotles qualities, which he discusses in Categories. I will then determine whether these qualities are things in themselves or things said of. What I mean by things in themselves is that the meaning of things are thought of as corresponding to the meaning of the presence of the object itself as a whole, they cannot exist without that object. What I mean by things said of is that the meaning of things can be thought of and discussed separately from the meaning of the presence of the object itself, they can exist separately from the object. Throughout this discussion, I will defend my position with quotations, information, and analysis as an argument develops about whether Aristotles qualities are things in themselves or things said of.

Clarifying Postmodernism Postmodernism is a vast subject, so I will clarify how I use this term in general as best I can since, That postmodernism is indefinable is a truism. (Aylesworth). When I refer to postmodernism, I mean for it to function as a setting for analyzing principles. Postmodernism as a setting is not a background, but rather an agency for analyzing principles. It interacts with principles. It is defined by The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality to destabilize other concepts such as identity, historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning (Aylesworth). I will be using the perspective of postmodernism in particular to analyze and determine whether Aristotles qualities are either things in themselves or things said of. I will also be focusing on the roles that it plays in clarifying things about understandings of truth and about understandings of how the French

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philosopher Jacques Derrida identifies its components by using the terms adopted from Ferdinand de Saussure, signs and signifiers, to express how meaning and truth is fabricated.

The Role that Postmodernism Plays in Clarifying Truth Jacques Derrida was a French philosopher most known for originating deconstruction. According to postmodern critique, including Jacques Derridas explanation of differance, the idea of truth as corresponding to the world is rejected. Using the example of Derridas term differance, this rejection becomes evident. The basic explanation of Derridas differance is that there are accordingly about three meanings of this term: to differ, to defer, and to scatter. Each of these definitions outlines the idea that signifiers, or words used to describe things, signs, are not related to the signified, or the thing that the words are referring too, meaning. Signifiers differ from each other, they constantly defer meaning with the introduction of other signifiers, and they scatter or disperse the meaning intended in the first place. Signifiers can fabricate meaning only in relation to other signifiers. Therefore, the truth that the signifiers construct differs from what the world reflects about that construction, the signified. S. Wallace explains this rejection of truth as correspondence in his article The Real Issue: Discerning and Defining the Essentials of Postmodernism. Though there have been arguments made about the existence of metaphysics in postmodernism in the first place, I think Wallace describes its place more suitably, This essential postmodern metaphysic maintains an unmitigated nominalism and the rejection of truth as correspondence to an objective, mind-independent world (Wallace). When explaining this further, he states that this metaphysic can be best understood in comparing it to the alternative: realism. Realism attempts to define things as objective, transcendent, and capable of being exemplified by more than one thing at a time. He uses the example of Reinhardt Grossman explaining the property of whiteness in a billiard ball. Essentially he says that those who believe that the whiteness of one billiard ball is the same as the whiteness of a second billiard ball are realists, while those who reject this notion and instead believe that the whiteness of one billiard ball differs from the whiteness of a second billiard ball are nominalists. In sum, the nominalist metaphysic of

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postmodernity denies the transcendence, objectivity, and multiple-exemplification of moral values, natures, and propositions (Wallace). For the postmodernist then, there are no universals, just an infinite play of signifiers. In order to make the divide between the rejection of truth as correspondence and the acceptance of truth as correspondence, I will provide an argument for truth as correspondence to make things clear. Marian David, a writer for The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, provides a quote from Descartes accepting the belief of truth as correspondence. Descartes says, I have never had any doubts about truth, because it seems a notion so transcendentally clear that nobody can be ignorant of it...the word truth, in the strict sense, denotes the conformity of thought with its object (1639, AT II 597) (David). From this it can be inferred that those who believe in truth as correspondence believe in things in themselves, because thought conforms to that of its object, it is of itself as a whole. Therefore, it can also be said that those who reject truth as correspondence believe in things said of, or that the meaning of the thing discussed differs from the meaning of the presence of the actual object itself as a whole. It is important here to recognize that Plato, Aristotles teacher, believed in transcendent universals. Aristotle however, rejected that notion and is therefore in an interesting place between what it means to believe in universals and what it means to reject the idea of universals completely. Aristotle heavily studied biology and is a naturalist in that sense, which influenced his notion of categorizing things into primary and secondary substances. What his studies in biology most influenced though, is his idea that universals and particulars exist not in two different worlds as Plato believed, but that they existed in this world only, together. Aristotles qualities become important then when Aristotle moves from describing universals to describing particulars. Where does Aristotle fit on the grid of believing in universals and disregarding universals completely? He seems to be in the middle, for he disregards transcendence as a quality of universals, therefore redefining what it means to believe in the nature of universals. The authority that he imposes on defining universals becomes evident and provides a distinguishing resemblance to that of the authority of postmodern thinking in that he has manipulated the rhetoric of describing things in themselves to be of natural occurrence rather than to be transcendent or existing as a higher form.

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The divide between Aristotles thinking and postmodern thinking simultaneously appears when he regards things as naturally occurring in the world because, as stated previously, signifiers dont represent the signified. In other words, according to the concept of signifiers and their relation, or rather non-relation to the signified, the explanation of something in the world is not related to the actual thing that occurs in the world, it is merely constructed or fabricated. This is because, according to Derrida, what exists in the world out there is fabricated by an individual, not necessarily to be applied universally, and not ever actually present to the individual. On the other hand, I think what Aristotle means by things occurring naturally is that they occur as to be generated from within a particular person, not from the world out there. What I find most interesting regarding this consideration is when I read section five of Aristotles Categories. Here, he specifically mentions what the role of signification plays in clarifying what substance is or rather, what it does: All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of man or animal, our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words man, animal, are predicable of more than one subject. Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term white; white indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus than in that of the species: he who uses the word animal is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word man. (Aristotle 2%) Here, Aristotle uses the word signify to explain what substance does, meaning that his definition of what it means to signify differs a bit from the postmodern definition, because in the impression that Aristotle

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gives, substance appears to signify that which is individual. In this sense, the signifier is related to the signified, unlike in postmodernism where the signifier is unrelated to the signified. However, I would also like to note that he does understand that things can or cannot be signified accordingly. Id further like to note that when he says they signify substance qualitatively differentiated, the case may be that he means that the qualities determined by species and genus differ amongst each other, as signifiers, words used to describe things, do in postmodernism, to create the meaning of the substance referred to. This is because he is referring to genus and species with reference to substance, not substance itself, as was explained in the previous paragraph. Thus, the way that he explains signifiers in this quotation, to use the postmodern terminology, aligns with the postmodern definition of signifiers. Again, signifiers, such as words used to explain something in the world out there, differ in meaning, defer or put off meaning, and disperse or scatter meaning. They do not relate to the things they intend to represent or explain about the world existing out there. Accordingly, Aristotle seems to follow this definition in his statement quoted above by assumingly implying that a particular substance referred to differs from the various words, or signifiers, used to explain, or signify, the substance.

Defining What Qualities Are - According to Aristotle According to Aristotle, in section eight of Categories he states, By quality I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such (Aristotle 2%). In this statement, qualities designate the kind, in other words, the attributes of the object, giving examples such as whiteness, grammar, and justice. Aristotle uses the word said, as in things said of, so it presumably steers into that direction of thought. He then goes on to say that there are many senses of the term. The first senses he speculates are habit and disposition. Habit as compared to disposition lasts longer and is established more firmly. Disposition on the other hand, is a condition that can easily be changed to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions (Aristotle 2%). To be specific, it can be induced that habits can at the same time be dispositions, but not dispositions habits.

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Another way Aristotle defines qualities is by describing men predicating something not in virtue of their disposition, but in virtue of their inborn capacity, such as being good boxers or good runners. He states, Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue on an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease (Aristotle 2%). Even though qualities are predicating something of men in virtue of their inborn capacity, the word inborn shouldnt necessarily cause the assumption that qualities are things in themselves. The function of predication should instead be the object of focus. Qualities as predicative of their subject indicates that they are used to describe the subject, not to be part of defining the subject. Predicative, according to Dictionary.com, means to connote or imply. Connote, according to Dictionary.com, means to involve as a condition or accompaniment. Therefore, it can be said that qualities accompany the subject. In this case, being a good boxer accompanies the subject man. What it means to predicate something will be further examined later on in this paper. A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections (Aristotle 2%). This is where Aristotle gives the examples of whiteness, blackness, bitterness, sourness, heat, and cold. He further states, It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence (Aristotle 2%). To be specific again, the way he describes these things to be affective is that they have the power to affect things in a person, such as sweetness affecting the sense of taste or heat affecting the sense of touch. The fourth sort of quality is figure and shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such (Aristotle 3%). Again, Aristotle has returned to the notion of qualities being such and such, using this phrase as a placeholder for an unnamed or unspecified thing said of. Lastly, I will note that Aristotle explains qualities in such a way: One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality (Aristotle 3%). From these various definitions of qualities given by Aristotle, a better understanding is gained through analyzing whether qualities, in each of the four definitions, are possibly things in themselves or things said of.

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An Extended Interpretation of Aristotles Qualities by Aquinas Thomas Aquinas, an Italian philosopher and theologian, is known to have commented extensively on Aristotles work. In An Aquinas Reader: Selections from the Writings of Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas uses the term esse to properly and truly attribute only to whatever subsists in itself. To that though, a twofold esse is derived, at which point it seems that it becomes something to explain things said of as opposed to things in themselves. One esse, he describes as the unity of the factors from which a being comes about. I like to focus on the other esse though, where he describes the quality whiteness. The other esse is attributed to the person in addition to the factors comprising it, and this is an added or accidental esse, as to be white is attributed to Socrates when Socrates is white is said (qtd. in Clark 93). Aquinas then goes on to explain Christ, but the point he makes is that factors such as whiteness are predicated of the person, Socrates, himself rather than subsisting in the unity of Socrates, as something in the first esse might. The idea of qualities as being things said of then, is supported through this interpretation of the second esse by Aquinas.

A Syntactic Analysis of Aristotles Qualities An example given by Aristotle himself of his qualities is the sentence Socrates is white. When taking into consideration the syntactic or structure of the sentence, white is an adjective describing or modifying the noun Socrates. The word is is a form of the verb be. Again, forming the sentence Socrates is white. The adjective in this sentence predicates the noun. Predicative adjectives describe nouns or entire noun phrases. The logic definition of predicate, in Dictionary.com, means that which is affirmed or denied concerning the subject of a proposition. A proposition, according to Dictionary.com, is anything stated or affirmed for discussion or illustration. A predicative comes to be an extension, as the Latin root ex- in extension means out. What the adjective in the sentence given is not, is an attributive adjective. Attributive adjectives modify nouns. Attribute, according to Dictionary.com, means to regard as resulting from a specified cause. An attribute comes to be an intension. An example of an attributive adjective is the juxtaposition of the previous sentence

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Socrates is white and accordingly changing it to The white Socrates. This sentence does not really make sense, therefore reaffirming the fact that the adjective in the sentence Socrates is white is a predicative adjective. Another way to look at this is by reading the Encyclopedia definition on Dictionary.com, which says that intension, what attributive comes to be, indicates the internal content of a term or concept that constitutes its formal definition; and extension, what predicative comes to be, indicates its range of applicability by naming the particular objects that it denotes. From this, it can be conferred that predicative adjectives can be thought of as things said of in that they can name particular objects separate from the meaning of the presence of the original object. Therefore, attributive adjectives can be thought of as things in themselves in that they correspond to the meaning of presence of the object itself as a whole. They indicate the internal content of the object and cannot exist without that object. Aristotle explains this idea early on in section five of his Categories when explaining how substances are defined. He writes, All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition in accordance with appropriating things that define substances, meaning that all other things that we state are irrelevant to the definition therefore being predicable of the substance (Aristotle 2%). Looking even further back, Aristotle also writes, For instance, white being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white is never predicable of the body (Aristotle 2%). Here, the definition of the color white is not predicable of the body, but it acts as a predicative of that in which it is present. Again, Aristotle this time clarifies that white is predicated or said of Socrates in the sentence Socrates is white. Lastly, Aristotles further mention of the way that qualities can vary in degree, which is also predicated in reference to quality, will be examined. Again, qualities vary in degree in which a certain thing possesses them. Aristotle gives the example of one person being better versed in grammar than another or one person being more healthy or just than another. He states:

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Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality. (Aristotle 3%)

An Interpretation of Aristotles Qualities by J.L. Ackrill J.L. Ackrill in his book, A New Aristotle Reader, provides a further interpretation of how qualities are defined in terms of being predicated of something. Ackrill explains that in section five of Aristotles Categories, things that inform a person about a certain something, such as man, are predicated of that something and in effect reveal that primary substance, in this case, man. He further explains that primary substance is neither said of nor in a subject. For man is said of the individual man as subject but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man (Ackrill 8). He also points out that secondary substances are predicated of a subject. You can predicate the definition of man of the individual man, but it is not in a subject. Ackrill goes on to explain that in man there is neither two-footed nor footed. Moreover, the quality of being two-footed of a man is predicated of that man. For example, if footed is said of man the definition of footed will also be predicated of man; for man is footed (Ackrill 9). He then writes that just because these things said of man are parts of the substance they are not necessarily substances. Qualities are therefore predicated of individuals. Ackrill states that everything said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also (Ackrill 9). I think that what he means by this is that whether a man is healthier than another man, health still remains said of both individuals. In the following paragraph, Ackrill describes every substance as signifying a certain this. In regard to primary substances, such as man, it is indisputably true that each of the substances is in regard to a certain this; for the certain thing, such as man, is individual and quantitatively one. However, when someone speaks of man, such as man is white, the thought that this information about man likewise signifies a certain this is

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not true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but qualities are said of many things (Ackrill 9). Later on, Ackrill discusses that substances, such a man, can receive contraries. These contraries exist in discussing qualities. For example, an individual manone and the samebecomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good. Nothing like this is to be seen in any other case (Ackrill 10). He supports this argument by taking into consideration that statements can be either true or false. He gives the example that the statement that someone is sitting is true; however, after this person has gotten up the statement is false. This follows similarly with beliefs. Nevertheless, Ackrill points out that even if we were to accept this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are receieved (Ackrill 11). In the way of a substance, it is by itself changing that it is able to receive contraries, which also change. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in other cases too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries (Ackrill 11). On the other hand, Ackrill points out that statements and beliefs are different in this way. They are unchangeable in all ways. The reason for this is that, the actual thing changes and the contrary comes to belong to that thing. Therefore, I think that Ackrill is saying that the contrary of a particular subject cannot change of that subject, but in the way of statements and beliefs, they themselves have to completely change in order for the contrary of the prior belief or statement to exist. He gives the example of the statement about the person sitting again. He explains that the statement about the person sitting remains the same, but it is because of the change in the actual thing, the person sitting in this case, that the thing at one time is true and at a later time is false. This is similar in the way of beliefs. He continues by saying that it is not because statements and beliefs receive anything that they are necessarily said to receive contraries, but because of what happened to another thing. Essentially, it is because the actual thing exists or does not exist that a statement or belief is said to be true or false, not because, as said before, that it is in fact able to receive contraries at all. No belief or statement is changed at all by anything.

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So, Ackrill explains, that since nothing happens in statements or beliefs, they are therefore said not to receive contraries. He writes: A substance, on the other hand, is said to be able to receive contraries because it itself receives contraries. For it receives sickness and health, and paleness and darkness; and because it itself receives the various things of this kind it is said to be able to receive contraries. (Ackrill 11) In conclusion of this discussion about substances, qualities, and predication, this time Ackrill affirms that qualities are things said of by stating this specifically. He also discusses qualities as being predicated of a substance and it can be recalled that qualities as being predicated of a substance can refer to the idea that they are again things said of.

Comparing Aristotles Qualities with Derridas Form of Postmodernism Though Aristotle denied that there could be specific laws of human nature, he set out to categorize, in perhaps a metaphorical way, that which could be applied to describing phenomena through metaphysics. When doing this, both Aristotles qualities and Derridas form of postmodernism turn out to believe that there exist opposing features of something when explaining its content. What I mean by this is that Aristotles substances cannot have opposing features, but the qualities said of them can. For instance, within the realm of trees, a tree cannot have an opposite thing, but the quality of the tree, such as strong roots, can change to the opposite, weak roots. With Derridas meaning of content, various opposing signifiers can make up the meaning of one thing. Necessarily, according to Derrida, when describing one thing, there always exist traces of its opposite. When describing one thing, a person is always simultaneously providing traces of what it is not. Further, in looking back at J.L. Ackrills interpretation of contraries referring to qualities as giving information about a substance, it can be seen in the example of a man turning from pale to red, qualities can change from one extreme to another extreme. Therefore, what is not can also become what is through the change of contraries.

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Conclusion Aristotle may not be a postmodernist, but he has seemed to detect areas of postmodern thinking when defining what qualities are. These areas, as discussed earlier, point out opposing features of one thing, such as black and white. Qualities can also receive contraries, such as a trees roots going from strong to weak, creating metaphorical instances of qualities existing as a part of one thing, such as paleness existing of a man that can change to redness or blushing of the man. What divides Aristotle from the postmodernists though, when looking further at Aristotles primary and secondary substances, is that he believes that primary substances are particulars, such as Plato, while secondary substances are universals in reference to those particulars, such as Plato being white. Another conclusion I can arrive at then, according to my analysis of truth as correspondence paired with my analysis in the previous sentence, Aristotle would most likely accept truth as correspondence, yet still believe that qualities are things said of. Throughout this paper, by considering Aristotles various definitions of what qualities are, it was essentially determined that they are things said of. What qualities are was also defended using inquiry provided by various philosophers, definitions, and a structural analysis. Arguments for and against truth as corresponding to things in the world, and where Aristotle necessarily falls in that placement, was also investigated. Overall, Aristotle may not accordingly belong at one extreme, postmodernism, or another extreme, something such as Platonism, but he lives true to his theory of the golden mean by being suspended in the middle of these two extremes. At times he may have even contradicted himself when explaining the way of things throughout his works, but all in all he still provides a clear explanation, along with the help of people such as Aquinas and Ackrill in this instance, of what he aims to clarify and define, in this context, qualities.

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Works Cited Aristotle. Categories. Trans. E.M. Edghill. Aristotles Collection [29 Books] . Publish This, LLC, March 2, 2007. 2%-3%. Kindle Edition. Aristotle. Metaphysics, Logic, Physics, Psychology, Ethics, Politics, Poetics. Trans. J.L. Creed and A.E. Wardman. The Philosophy of Aristotle. New American Library, June 2008. Print. Aristotle, and J.L. Ackrill. Categories, And De Interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 3 Oct. 2013. Aylesworth, Gary. Postmodernism. The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition). Edward N. Zalta, ed. Web. 7 Oct. 2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/> Clark, Mary T., ed. An Aquinas Reader: Selections from the Writings of Thomas Aquinas. Image Books, November 1972. Print. David, Marian. The Correspondence Theory of Truth. The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition). Edward N. Zalta, ed. Web. 5 Oct. 2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthcorrespondence/#4> Foster, Kenelm, Humphries, Silvester, trans. Aristotles De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas. Yale University Press, 1954. Print. Wallace, S. The Real Issue: Discerning and Defining the Essentials of Postmodernism. n.p. n.d. Web. 3 Oct. 2013. <http://www.leaderu.com/real/ri9802/wallace.html>.