Executive Nomination Fights: The Case of Ted Sorensens Nomination for DCI Gene Giannotta 22 July 2011 Ted

Sorensen, former advisor to John F. Kennedy and a close confidant of the

Kennedy family, was nominated by President-elect Jimmy Carter to the position of Director of Central Intelligence after the 1976 election. Sorensen had advised the campaign and waited quite a while for an appointment, almost giving up hope before it came just before Christmas. He was unsure if the office as the head [of] the most secretive and deceptive agency in government suited him - he had been a conscientious objector and was a moralist who demanded candor and truthfulness and had little experience in intelligence matters. (486) Soon after, word got out about his conscientious objector status, and Carters political aides began to fear for the president-elects image. Despite this, he refused to renounce his views on nonviolence. Senator Barry Goldwater raised this himself, telling Sorensen that he would have supported me for almost any other job in government, but that I had a basic dislike for the responsibilities of the job (488). In addition to his own personal views on violence, other things became issues with his nomination. It was revealed early on that he taken classified material with him when he left the White House staff in 1964 to write a book (Hess 2001, 120). His two failed marriages were raised as a possible question of whether he was sufficiently stable for the job (488). The criticisms began on the right, but soon spread to his own Democratic party, and turned into a flood tide. North Carolina Senator Robert Morgan was critical

of Sorensens alleged role in the assassination plots that had apparently targeted Fidel Castro, and also told him that he detested Bobby Kennedy for incivility, and so it appears that Sorensens deep ties to the Kennedy family also haunted his nomination. Senator Daniel Inouye, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, objected because of Sorensens conscientious objector status, but also because the Carter team had not consulted with him on the choice, a complaint shared by others (489). Carters inability to engage the Senate as far as promoting his choice for DCI and making senators feel like partners in the process, and look like he was just pushing his choice on them, apparently rubbed some of them the wrong way, including the influential Inouye. The CIA itself was also apparently opposed to Sorensens nomination, seemingly because the agency was afraid he might upset the apple cart too much. Sorensen received word years later by a former CIA operative that some of the dirty tricks and other opposition for my nomination had come from within the agency (494). Senator Joe Biden comes off as somewhat two-faced in Sorensens telling. At first, he was congenial - on my first courtesy call to his office, he could not have been more enthusiastic, supportive, and gracious, calling me the best appointment Carter has made! (499) But he soon went after Sorensen for his role in supporting the release of the Pentagon Papers, finding the affidavit that contained Sorensens declaration that their release would not harm national security (490-93). When the hearing began, Biden is quoted as saying, Quite honestly, Im not sure whether or not Mr. Sorensen could be indicted or convicted under the espionage statuswhether Mr. Sorensen intentionally took advantage of ambiguities in the law or carelessly ignored the law. (499-500) But,

once Sorensen withdrew, Biden told him that he was one of the classiest men I have ever run across in my whole life. (500) Like Carter and the other senators, Biden seems to have rolled with the political winds and been sure to at least make a good show of respect for Sorensen once the ordeal was concluded. Senator Ted Kennedy was quiet in his support, apparently concerned that Sorensens advice regarding the Chappaquiddick accident might become an issue (495). Sorensen wanted to have the opportunity to respond to all of the leaked accusations in a public forum prior to withdrawing from consideration, so he decided to go ahead with the hearing, which was scheduled for a Monday. The weekend before, it became clear that Sorensens nomination was dead. Carters own commitment was questionable. His Assistant Press Secretary and the President-elect himself had declined to offer much, if any, support for Sorensen when publicly prodded. Carter did, however, give a supportive statementSunday afternoon, once he was alerted to my forthcoming withdrawal. (498) And the night before, he had called to tell Sorensen that he was behind him, but also kept hinting to me that my withdrawal was the best solution (496). Even so, in writing to Sorensen after the fact, Carter insisted on making it sound as if it was his sole decision to withdraw - Your withdrawing is a loss for all of usIll always wonder if it would have been better to fight it out. (501) Carters own political concerns played a role in his tepid support for Sorensens nomination: he did not want to use any of the political capital he was husbanding to get his longtime friend Griffin Bell confirmed as attorney general (495). Bell, a friend and fellow Georgian, had faced criticism for his record on civil rights, but after six days of hearings and a promise

to appoint an African American judge as solicitor general, he was approved by a 75-21 vote (Hess 2001, 119). In the end, Carters commitment to Sorensen appears to have been lukewarm, and the president-elects unwillingness to fight for his DCI designate or consult with the Senate allowed the leaked accusations to drive the political narrative and essentially force the senators to take positions in opposition to Sorensens appointment. Hess argues that it was a defeat for the president-elect and that had he more carefully cultivated the committee before making the appointment, perhaps the outcome would have been different (2001, 120). Without a compelling counter, there was no public rebuttal (and nothing more than tepid public support from the president-elects team) until Sorensen had decided to withdraw at the hearing. Its difficult to tell how serious Carter actually was about Sorensen, given his lack of public support after the firestorm hit, but at the same time, if he was not serious and was simply trying to reward the former campaign advisor with an expected job that he figured he might not be confirmed for, it betrays a sense of Carters naivet - why put a candidate forward that might embarrass an incoming president?

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References Sorensen, Ted. 2008. Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History. New York: Harper. Hess, Stephen. 2001. First Impressions: Presidents, Appointment, and the Transition. In Mackenzie, G. Calvin, Innocent until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 107-148