u.s.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

SECTION 287(g) OF THE INA

TRAINING PROGRAM

Homeland
Security
This document may contain sensitive law enforcement information that is exempt from
release under Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act. The Disclosure Office
must be consulted before any of the information in this document is released.

PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK

9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

NOVEMBER 2006
 INSTRUCTOR GtJlln:

Lesson Plan Overview

~~ourse 9/11 and Terrorist Travel

Course Purpose ('his course provides an overview of immigration and border security
violations perpetrated by the 9/\\ hijackers to further their plot.

Field Performance Given a potential threat ofterrorisl attack. the student will identify
fObjective ~he border security and immigration related violations perpetrated by
he 9111 hijackers, according to the principles outlined in 9/1 J and
I'crrorist Travel.
Interim (Training) J. Identify the historical perspective ofterrorist travel tactics by
Performance Objectives terrorist plots.

Q. Identi(y the evolution or immigration and border security

from 1993-2001, and its atTect upon the 9/11 hijacker plot.

3. Identify the structurcof al Qacda for travel and travel tactics.

~. Identify the immigration violations perpetrated by theWIl

hijackers.

5. Identity State Department and Immigration and

Naturalization Service factors that impacted upon the
planning and execution of the 9/11 hijacker plot.

Instructional Methods Lecture

Method of Evaluation Multiple Choice Examination

Training Aids Overheads, Chalkboard, Handouts

Icon Legend
(Those used in this lesson are highlighted)

Iii] -- [(]
-- ~,n I((j:-I~I
-- R&~
ow Overhead Conduct Play Distribute Conduct Quiz Question and
ansparency Exercise Videotape Handout Answer Period

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 1
 Student Mnh.·rialsl 9111 and TL'ITorist Travel Studl:nt "l"l:xl
I~cfcrcnccs

i~structi()nnl I':tluipment )vcrhcad Projl:ctor. ('halkhounl

I. Title
2. Field PCl'ii.mnance <)bjccti vc
J. Interim PerliJrmance Objectives
4. Interim Pt.'Ti()rmance O~jcclivcl>
5, Creation/Purpose of 911 I Commission
6. Terrorist Groups and Travel Documents
7. Terrorist Groups and Travel Documents
8. IIistorieal Perspective ..tcrrorist tactics by plot
9. Historical Perspective-terrorist tactics by plot
10. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
1I. Landmarks Plot, June 1993
12. Atlantic Avenue Subway Plot, July 1997
13. East Africa Bombings, August 1998
14. Millennium Plot, December 1999
15. Immigration & Border Security Evolve J993-2()()1
16. DOS Visa Issuance-Intending Immigrant Provision
17. DOS Visa Issuancc--Non issuance of visas and other docs
18. DOS Visa Issuance--Terrorism
19. DOS and INS Contact in Visa Issuance
20. DOS Budget in the 1990's
21. Visa Waiver Program
~2. DOS Technology Evolution
23. 1993 World Trade Center turning .)oiI11 fbI' DOS
~4. Consular Consolidated Database
25. Immigration and Naturalization Scrvi(;CHinspections
26. Immigration and Naturalization Service-Inspections
27. Immigration and Naturalization Service-Counterterrorism
28. Immigratitm and Naturali7.ation Service~Countcrterrorism
29. INS Lookout Unit
30. INS LookoutUnitlCarricr Consultant Program
~ 1. Forensic Document Laboratory

ICE ACADEMY 9111 & TERRORIST TRAW:L

NOVEMBER 2006 PAra: 2
 __
I:\STRlTTOI{ (~l'Im:

._.... _- .. ... _---,

32. ()ni\:e of' International Affairs
33. INS hm:ign StmIent Monitoring
~..J.. 1':ntry/Exit Trucking of Fon:ign Students
35. INS Intelligence llnit
J6. INS interior Enl()f!.:el11ell!
~7. INS Interior i':nrorccmcilt Slr:lkgy
38. INS Natiol1ul Se\:urity llnit
Jt). Antiterrorism and I·:nc<.:tivc Death Penalty Act <ImlliRIRA
40. ImmigratioJl Benefits
~1.lJS Border Patrol
~2. INS Support 10 State and I.ocal Law Enforcement
4-3. Structure oj' al Qaeda for travcIlOrgani:t.utio!1 and tmining
44. Travel Facilitators
145. Travel Facilitators·
~6. Travel Facilitators
47. Reliance on Outsiders
~8. Travel Documents
49. Reliance on Saudi Arabian Passports
50. Types of Passport Alterations
51. Immigration Violations Perpetrated by the 9/l1 lIijuckcrs
52. False Statements on Visa Applications
53. Sought Entry to Engage in Terrorist Activities
54. Altered. Passports presented to DOS
55. Altered Passports presented to INS Inspectors
56. Nonimmigrant Status Violations
57. Present in Violation of Law~'
58. DOS and INS Factors Impacting the 9/11 Plot
59. Visa Policy in Berlin
60. Visa Policy in United Arab Emirates
in
61. Visa Policy Saudi Arabia
62. Visa Express Program
63. Immigration and Naturalization Service factors
64. Immigration Inspections Issues
65. Prcssure to 'tacilitate travel
66. Inspector Training Issucs

-F---
67. Summary

HANDOUTS

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 3
 I~STIU'( 'TOR (;1 '1m:

I. INTROJ)I!(TION

A. PurllOSC of ('uurse

TIll' sw,:ccss orthl' 9/1 I pill! dcpelltkd Oil 1he hijackers ubi Iity to
IIbtuin visas and pass horder inSpL'diolls to cntcl' the (lnilcd
Sllites. It ulso depended Oil their ahi Iit)' to l'cllmin in thL' United I: TlTI.I·:
Stilles tlndetl'del! whik w()rkill~ OUllhc ,h.-lui Is orthe nttuck.

I. Terrorists devote extellsive n::murces to acquiring and

manipulating pussporlH. cntry and cxit stumpN. tlnu visas.
The ul Qaeda was no exception. MemberH of al Qaedn
included expert document I()rgers. who pUNsed on their
trade to others, including M(lhmneu Atll.l. the 9111
ringleader.

2. Neither Department oj' State ('on:mlul' Officers abroad, nor

horder inspectors at US ports ()r cntry. was aware orthc
poten1ial significance or indicators of cxtremism and
terrorist aHiliatiol1 in some al Queda passports. Thcyalso
lacked inf(>rmation about passport fraud tactics employed
by al Qaeda, and fraudulent travel slamps associated with
them.

3. 9/11 commission examination regarding the 9111 If a conspirator

conspirators and visa issuance process indicated appears to be lUI
intending immigrant,
consistency with a system l()cuscd on factors other than be was denied a visll.
terrorism. Specifically. prior 10 9111 the sys1em lbcused Absent that (provided a
on excluding intending immigrants. and was dependent name based check of
upon a l1ume based data check [0 search fbr criminals and the subject was
negative), the only
terrorists.
remaining tool to
prevent entry was
border inspection.

ICE ACADEMV 9/11 & TI<:RRORIST TRAV.:L

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 4
 I:"iSTRI'('TOH Gt'lIH:

It Field I>crfornulnce Ob,iectivc - (iivell u potential thn:ut or

terrori!'il Httuck. thL: studl..'llt will jdel1til~' the border set:urity
and immigration rdated violations perpctrah.:d by the 9/11 Perro rm31lCC
hijackers. according to Ih\..' prim.:iplcs olltlinl!d in WJ 1, ~lJ1~! Objcctives
Tl:IT~ll'i Sf Tnlvcl,

1. ldcnti 1y the historical pl:rspcdi ve or terrorist travel ladies hy

krrorist plots,

I Identify the evolution of immigration and border security from

1993-200 J , and its affect upon thl: 9/11 hijacker plot.

J. Identify the structure of 1.11 (Jaeda for travel and travel.tactics.

4. Identily the immigration violations perpetrated by the 9/11

hijackers.

5. Idcntily State J)epartment and Immigration and Naturalization

Service !actors that impacted upon the planning and execution
ofthc 911 1 hijacker plot. .

I. Identify the historical perspective of terrorist travel

tactics by terrorist plots [I] IPO#I

A. Central Intelligence Agency produced Redbook focused 011

counterterrorism. It contained infotmation about. Redbook last produced
in 1992
commonalities among forged passports and travel cachets. or
visas. used by terrorists. Last production was in 1992.

1. Redbook focused on 5 types of travel document

fraud

a. lorgerics of 35 passports from 35 nations:

travel cachets from 45 countries

b. forged documents purchased from

commercial vendors

c. stolen blank passports

d. information about genuine altered passports

that were photo-substituted or given an
extended validity date

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAV.:L

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 5
 bST'U'(ToRGnm:

t,'. gCllUiIH.: 1I1l1litcn:d passports IikL'ly pro.:uretl

through .:orrupt gO\'L'rnmel1t onidals

n. Terrorist Tra\'C'I Tueaies hy Plot-l>lII'ing the I 990's, al The CIlIllII101U1fity

llUWII~lit thesl' priOl'
()aedll was involved in variolls terrorist plots ill the ( lnitC'd
Stall's. Regan.ll<:ss or mllcolllc. these plots wer<: vulunhlc.: to
terrorilit Illnts was tbe
use of inlllli~I'atioll
the terrorists as nn instnu:tionul tool. They provided critical fraud, illl:hlding filing
cx6cl'icncc entering and emhedding in the llnitcd Stutes, fraudulent Jlolitienl
Once cmhcddcd. they attempted to gain kg'll immigrution llsylmu ehlillls, clllims
'hl" CIt her benefits
status that would allow them to remain in the llnited Slate:.;,
(SA W), marriage to
prinmri Iy hy cnmmilting immigrtllion Ihllld through political lIS citizens, etc. 'I'his
asylum claims Lll1d murriagc to {Initcd States ('itizens, Once demonstrates the
ul ()acda hegan inlierting participants for the 9/1 I plot. they vulnerabilities of the
had ulrcudy guincu considerahle know/edge of Olll' interior immig"'dtion bCllcfils
system; also makes tbe
immigration and horder security systems. detection or
immigration stlltus
critical to natiollal
security
I. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing

11,3 conspirators traveled on Saudi passports

containing indicators of possible terrorist
atliliation
h, Mastermind Ram7.i YouseI' and Ahmad Aitli
traveled using fraudulent documents and aliases

c; YouseI' and I\itli liIcd fraudulent claims H)r While political asylum
political asylum to remain in the US (:Iaims were pending,
applicants were able to
renulin in the US
d, Mahmoud Abouhalimu received temporary
resident status through fraudulent claim to SAW Seasonal Agricultural
Worker program
program

c, Eyad Mahmoud Ismail took ESL classes as an F J FI admission was for

nonimmigrant overstayed nonimmigrant status duratiun of status;
Ismail failed to depart
after study concluded
') Landmarks I).ot (.June 1993)·· Most of the
a. Sheikh Omar Ahdcl Rahman and followers used cOitspirators were
married to lJS Citizells
lraudulent documents to enter the US; committed and obtained LPR
repeat immigration fraud to remain status or US
b. Other participants married US Citizens Citi~nship. A Files of
these individuals arc
protected by the
Privacy Act.

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRA VI<:L

2006
NOVl~MB"~R I>AGE 6
 I:'>ISTI{l'( 'TOR Gl 'IU

3. AthlOtit' A\,cnu(,' Subwny Plot (.rul~· 1997)

a. (inzi Ihrallim Abu Mcz-.:r committed repent

immigration J'ralld whik plotting to destroy the
stlbway using explosives: was arrested on his third
illegal entry Ii'om ('unadu: fikd fraudlilent politi(;ul
asylum daim and was relcus-.:d on hond.

h. Cocollspirator I.all Taisir Munch Khalil held a C)

transit visa. was crronl.!ollsly admitted as B2, tlnd
ovcrstayed his period of' admission

4. East Africa Ilombings (August 1998):--Bombings of

the lIS cmbassies in Dar cs Salaam. Tanzania and
Nairohi. Kenya featured 411 Qaeda opl.!rativcs linked to
the tiS

a. AJi Mohamed married <l US Citizen and bcearne ~tn In 1993 he conducted
LPR. In 1993 he conducted surveillance of US surveillance of US
target!; for al Qaeda
targets /(')1' "I Qacda.

h. Khalid Abu al Dahab' was granted LPR status alicr While in the US, he
rd
marriage to his 3 wife: subsequently naturali;l.cd provided money and
fraud docs to terrorists
, worldwide
c. Wadicl Hage studiedin the US during the 1970's
and 1980.'s: gained LPR status through tnarriage to Wadiel Hage served as
personal secretary to
a United States Citizen Usama Bin Laden

5. Millennium Plot (December 1999) During this

plot, Ahmed Ressam and associates used fraudulent
passports and immigration fraud to traveL

a. Rcssam traveled from France to Montreal with a While on' release

photo substituted passport claimed political I pending his asylum
hearing, he sold stolen
asylum in Canada. documents to a broker
for Islamic terrorists
h. Abdclghani Mcskini used a stolen identity to travel

c. Abdclllakim Tizegha filed a fi'audulcnt political He was released

asylum claim in the US. After 2 years his claim pending an asylum
hearing, which was
was denied. rescheduled 5 times for
failure to appear

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEl,

NOVI<:MBER 2006 PAGE 7
 II. E\'olutioll of immignltinll null horder securit~' from
1993-200 I, ~uul its l'ffeclu(>ol1 the 9/11 plot

1\. Intelligence ('ommuJ1it~·

I. IIlSlIflicicl1t lise or terrorist wHtch list
Inll:l inliU'lllalioll 1I0( shared betwecn agL'lldes

a. il1telligellce gutllcl'cU hy I.'HI not slmn:d

with ('II\ unit who published Redbook

J. No gov't ngency anlllyzed terrorist travel and

tm:tics in ortiL'1' to disl'lipt tt.:rrurist operatives

B. Stnte J)cpartment

1. Vhm Issuance involved completion or a visa Visa screcninJ;l foclIs

application: unum!! check" against existing records. was other than
lerrorism
including known and suspected ten'orist lii'llS

a. 214(b) Intending Immigrant Provision INA Section 214(b)

I) Every alien shall be presumed to be

an immigrant until he establishes to
the satisfaction ofthc consular
oJlicer. at the time of application for
a visa, and the immigration officers.
at the time of application fhr
admission. that he is entitled tt} a
nonimmigrant status under section
IOI(a)(15)

2) In FY 2001, 2.2 million applicants

were refused as intending
il11migl'ants (80% of total rclusah;)

ICE ACADEMY 9/1 1 & Tf:RRORIST TRAY'..:I.

NOVEMBER l006 PAm: 8
 h, 22l(g) Non-issuan(,'c of\'isas or other INA ScctioIl121(g)
doculllents

a) /:ailtln.: to comply v. ith thc applicatioll

n:quin.:I1lCI11s or othel'v.:ise indigiblc
lil!' ,I visa

::!) (Ised to deny a visa to hijacker I funi

Ilunjotll' in Septemher :WOO. when he
lllilctito attach supporting
documentation to his student visa
application

3) Jn FY 200 I. used to dC~lY 600,000

visas (20% oj' total refusals)

c. Benial on Grounds of Terrorism INA Section 212(a)(3)

I) An alien who is likely to engagc in

terrorist activity ailer entry,

. 2) Rl:lrcly u~ed ground of inadmissibility:

in FY 200 I there were only 83 visa
denials using this ground.

d. Limitc~ contact with INS

1) Consular ofticialslacked access to an

applicant's immigration records when
adjudicating visa applications

. 2) Consular officials had limited contact

with INS, and received little INS
feedback regarding their visa issuance
decisions ..

2. State Department Budget

u. During the 1990's. embassy security.

received greater resources through
congressional funding

b. Shrinking resources lor the Bureau of

Consular Affairs. yet not a lessened
workload.

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVI<:L

NOVI<~MBt:R 2006 PAGE 9
 bSTIU'( ''!OIt (~nDE

c. ViSH Wain:!" ProgrnJl1

I) Del:reased the 11l1ll1her of' app! il:anls Established ill I 9fiC! liS II

lill" visas pilot pr()~ram, the.'

:::) lit i Iizeu 1'01" coulltries \\"j th low fruud
and visa dcnj~tI rates
3) hy 9/11101. 17 million travelers used
the VWPP Ulll1llUlly
4) reducl.!d demand Ii.n nonimmigrant
visas mean!H higher percentage o/'
visas heing udjudicaled/issued in POSlli
with high fraud rates
State I)epnrtment TcchnolofiO'
VWI)I' 11111lwed vi~ifu ..s
fill' husiness or plcllsllrc
tel be IldmiUed for
lIIuillllnll ()() days
without the Ilc('cssily of
II DOlliinmigrllllt viNa;
VislI Wah'ci' PcnmlllclIl
Program Act (pu blie
Law 1U(I-39ft) signed ill
2000

u. Machine readable vistl (MRV) developed

curly 1990

h. TIPOFF terrorist watch-list

I) Main counterterrorism tool

2) Under rW:lded
3) Antiquated
4) Inti> not shared between DOS and INS

4. World Trade Center bombing of 1993 was

turning point for DOS (2126/93)

a. Lcd to a reexamination of visa issuance

procedures

1) "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel Rahman

obtained a US visa in Khartoum,
Sudan

h. Visa Viper program created 811993

I) Improved interagency communication

about terrorists who should be. on
watch-list

(a) Agencies to supply identity

info to DOS
(b) hampered by lack 'of

ICE ACADEMY 9111 & T.:RRORIST TRA Vr-:L

NOVt:MBf:R 2006 PAm: 10
 I:\STIU'CTOR G{,IJ)E

(.;(lopcl'atiO!l Jhlln Jaw cnli.m':CnlClll und intd

i.lgem:lcs

c, P<lssage ora bill enabling DOS to retain

funds gCllcratcd hy MRV kes

I) h.:cs grcw from $1 {) million (1994)

to over $l{)O million (1999)
<llll1lwtly

2) J:ees tlsed by DOS to:

(a) uulmllate consular visa
issuance systems
(b) develop secure pp and visa
technology
(c) improve computer name
check capability
(d) create worldwide realtime
consular communications
system (CCD-Consular
. Consolidated Database)

3) By J 995 all visa issuance posts had

access to DOS CLASS \(')okout
system

(a) DOS developed language Arabic in December '

algorithms to improve 1998; Russian/Slavic in
December 2000
CLASS lookout system

4) Consular Consolidated Database

(CCD)

(a) Allowed visa data entered in

any embassy or consulate to
be transferred automatically
to a central location in the
us

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRA VH,

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 11
 I NS'I'RlICTOR (;UIIU:

(0) Cuntained all aspects of the

visa application, including
photo

(c) NIV rccunls were loaded in

1999 in Fmnkfurt. Germany:
all other posts bctween
21 J999 and 1/20(} I

('. Immigration and Natumlizuliull Service

I. I nspcdions practices

u. Primary inspection rclied upon examination

or documents. database checks. and
behavioral cues to indicate suspicious
activity

b. Time constraints to make a determination

of admissibility

1) 199) Congressional mandate Regardless of number

required all flights to be cleared of Ilights arriving
simultaneously, 45
within 45 minutes minutes to clear
Federal Inspedions
Area
c. One INS HQ employee designated as State
Department Liaison Officer

1) • In caseS involving watch-list hits,

duties included obtaining into from
DOS and relaying unclassified info
to INS inspections determining
admissibility
2) if refused admission, photo and
print loaded in IDENT

2. Counterterrorism pr;lctic~s

a. Inspectors not trained in counterterrorism

1) Unaware their watch-list had a

counterterrorism component

2) No behavioral indicator training

specific to terrorist behavior

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL

NOVEM8ER2006 PAGE 12
 INSTRtJ('TOR GUII)E

.1) No truining in detection of'terrorist

indicator in tmvel documents

h, Natiunal Automated Immigration Lookout

system (NAILS) contained '1'11'01"1"
terrorist watch-list

I) Name-based system

2) Contaillcd80,OOO records on
tcrrorist activity by 9111/200 I

3) INS had higher standard fbr entry

into NAILS than nos into
TIPOFF,
Thcrcf{)rc not all DOS TIPOFF
. records were included in NAILS

3. INS Lookout Unit

a. initially created as liaison unit with DOS

1) Reviewed passenger
manifests/notified POE jf a
suspected terrorist was enroute

2) US Customs had access to airline

carrier reservation system; INS had
to depend on the goodwill of the
carrier to provide manifests

b, . Carrier Consultant Program

1) Created in 1999

2) Trained foreign airlines to

recognize fraudulent documents to
prevent boarding aircraft

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 13
 INSTRIlCTOR GllII)i<;

4. I<'oremiic f)ocument Lahoratory (Iml,)

n. Created in the early 1980's

h. Provided lruillin~ nnd mammls 011

legitimate and illegitimate travel and fn
documents.

c. Only federal crime IUh dedicated [0 lbrcnsie

exmniniltioll o( documents

d. Did not HlClIS on terrorism

5. Office of International Affairs

u. Emphasis in the 1990's was deterring

illegal cntry and aiien smuggling

h. Operation G10hal Reach (1995)

n Less than 100 INS stall' overseas

2) effort to train host country LEOs,

airline personnel and foreign
consular otlicials in detecting
fraudulent documents

3) Coordinated with DOS and DOJ

4) No counterterrorism focus

6. Foreign Student Monitoring

a. . Student/School System

1) Student registration program

2) INS recognized foreign students

could be a national security threat

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEl.

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE'14
 I NSTRIICI"OR (;tllln:

h. In 1996. ('ol1gress required INS to create a Congress established II

system to track students from countries that 2 year deadline to
accomplish
sponsored terrorism

1) . ('ongress did not appropriate funds

ror the program

2) INS invested $10 million. creating a Pilot program tcst case

Pilol Program in June J997 for National Student
Tracking System
a. . Student card included
fI) In 8/1998. INS policy
biometrics as identifiers managers deferred
testing biometric ID
card
. 3) INS managers ordered to stop work
on the program in carly 1998

a. INS management viewed the INS HQ upper

mandate as an imposition on
educational institutions. to
collect data
b. INS viewed fee collection as
a responsibility of
educational institutions
management viewed
mandate directed .
toward schools;
cancelled work on
project

c: National Association of Feared the imposition

International Educators
supported an amendment to
repeal the 1996 Student
Monitoring Program
mandate
of student fees would
deter foreign students
(rom enrolling in their
institu tions

d. By 2000, the Semite

pressured INS to stop the
fee based program

7. Entry/Exit Tracking System

a. 1996 Congressional law required the No national tracking

Attorney General to develop an entry/exit system to match
departure to admission
program of a nonimmigrant

1) Collect records on admissions and USVISIT effort to

departures collect info post 9/11 ;
stemmed from original
INS entry/exit system

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGElS
 INSTRIIC'TOR (;(111)10:

2) No counterterrorism ,/(.lCUS NSEF.RS s(Ju~ht to

rectify this post 9/11
J) ('ungrcssional fi.mding of $40
million uver 4 years fhr
develupment

b. Border communities in Mexico and Canada Feared it would inhibit

denounced an entry/exit tracking system border trade

I) Some members of ('ongress, along

with INS senior managers agreed,
und decided to automate only the
entry process

8. INS Intelligence Unit

a. Dependent on the CIA, NSA, FBI, and

DOS Intel and Research section for terrorist
" information

I) Parent agency DOJ routinely Focus of INS Intel unit

,received intet information on was alien smuggling
terrorism cases, mostly from FBI

b. Intel Unit was unable to regularly gather

information on terrorists from INS
employees assigned to work as liaison to
other agencies

9. INS Interior Enforcement

a. INS, Congress, DOJ and White House Support staffto FBI on

recognized INS as a minor counterterrorism JTTF task forces
tool .

b. lack of resources

)) Insufficient staff and detention

Space tQ locate, apprehend, detain
and remove megal aliens, including
terrorist affiliates

2) 2,000 Special Agents tasked with Referenee INS

responsibility for millions of illegal enforcement personnel
statistics, J990-2000
aliens and immigration related
crimes

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEl,

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 16
 INSTRll(''I'OR GlllO.:

c, Inw and procedures governing the'courts Administrative

geared toward henclit or doubt to the alien deportation hearill~li

1) I,ow appl.!arance bonds. i r any

Administrative liystem
2) Multiple hearings with lengthy was easy to exploit
deluys

J) ( 'usc back logs

, Interior Enjj:lrcement Strategy April 1997

1) Additional ).'1''1'1'' positions

2) Greater intelligence network

3) Counterterrorism mle for INS

4) Not implemented by INS senior

managers

National Security Unit Established 1997

1) Oversight of national security work

in tield offices, including JTTF

2) Produced security alerts lor POE's Ports of Entry

3) Worked in conjunction with DOJ

on national security issues,
including case referrals to Alien
Terrorist Removal Court

4) Understaffed 4 HQ staff (200J), 3

, FBI HQ detailees, SO
Field Agents
5) Inadequate support from INS senior
managers

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 17,
 INSTRUCTOR (;(1101<:

f. JITF detailees I)re 9111 .fTTI<' was

focus of INS
counterterrorism
I) INS Investigations requested 5
JTI'F positions in 199) Not supported by INS
Senior Management
2) 1997 request lhr 29 JlTF position!;:
approval lhr 18

g. Antiterrorism and El1cctivc Dcath Penalty

Act and IIIcgal Immigration RcI()rm and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

I) Provided new counterterrorism

tools

2} Expedited removal Established by IIRIRA

a. provision HJr expansion to

interior cn/()rcement was not
implemented by INS

3) Alien Terrorfst Removal Court Established by

a. designed to remove alien
terrorists by using classified
evidence to support the
allegations
Antiterrorism Act
DOJ considered the
court a top priority

b. J1RIR.A permitted the use of ATRC has never been

classified evidence in used
deportation hearings,
making the ATRC largely
unnecessary

h. Immigration Benefits

1) Benefits process is vulnerable to

fraud

u. multiple benefits tiles Based on service

center/asylum office
having jurisdiction
b. multiple applications in
different offices

ICE ACADEMY 9/11 & TERRORISTTRt\VEL

NOVEMBER 2006 PAGElS
 2) Tc-rrorists exploit vulnerabilities in
the hendits grunting process

a. 1993 World Tradc Ccnler Mohamed and

homhing conspirators Mahmud Abouhalima
filed fraudulent
gaincd LPR status Seasonal Agricultural
through SA W program fraud Worker claims

h. amnesty programs arc Reference testimony or

subject to widespread abuse INS Counsel Paul
Virtue, 1999, before
House Judiciary
Subcommittee
c. INS benelits adjudicators
did not have a
counterterrorism iocus

I. Border Patrol

1) Insufficient resources to control

flow of illegal aliens

2) Focus is Southwest border SW border I BP A

every 'h mile, 1999
3) No counterterrorism focus

4) Northern border understaffed Northern border 1 BPA

. every J3 !4 miles, 1999
a. terrorists have entered the 1-213 for Brooklyn
US from Canada subway conspirator .
Abu Mezer indicates 3
illegal entries /JIang
Northern border
b. Canada has more lenient
immigration laws tnan the
US

C. Border Patrol Agents lacked

access to TIPOFF and
NAILS watch-lists

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NOVEl\'IBER 2006 PAGE 19
 INSTRII("I'OR GtfllU:

j. Slule and Local Law Enlilrcement Support

1) State and Local law cnf()rccment

did not Imvc access to terrorist
walch-lists

2) INS hud insufficient stalTto respond

to all culls

.1) Law Enlhrcement Support Center U:SC is based in

created in )994 Williston. VT and
provides 24n access to
ICE
u. 1988 anti-drug law required
INS to maintain a 2417
hotline to identify
aggravated n~lons

h. provides info regarding Nuns query

aliens in custody. conducted by other
LEOs
c. no counterterrorism focus

4) I)erformance of immigration officer 8 USC 1357 1287(g)

functions by state officers and INA/ created by
IIRIRA, 1996
employees

a. INS (now ICE) began Ongoing

conducting 287(g) training

IV. Identify the structure of al Qaeda for travel and travel

tactics

A. Organization and training

1. 2 senior al Qaeda operatives played key roles in KSM and Abdul

facilitating travel for terrorist activities . Zubaydah

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NOVEMBER 2006 PAGlt20
 I NSTR{lCTOR GtJIDE

2. Division or passports and host country issucs under

its security committee

a. was Joc'lted at Kandahar airport

h. manuged hy Muhammed Atcl' Atcfwas 81 Qaeda's

chief (If military ('Ps
c. altered papers. including passports. visas
and identification cards

or
d. relocated to Pakistan J()lIowing lJS Latc 2001
invasion Afghanistan

3. designated certain members with organi:r.ing

passport collection schemes to keep an available
supply of fraudulent documents '

a. .Iihadists required to surrender passports Passports recycled if

before going to the front lines in subjects did not return
Afghanistan

b. operatives were taught document forgery, Mohamed Atta

including passport alteration, purportedly trained in
passport alteration
photo substitution, erasures and additions . techniques
of travel cachets

B. Travel Facilitators

1. Abu Zubaydah

a. al Qaeda' s most seasoned traveler

b. . aided mujahideento/from Afghanistan until Aid was througb supply

1994 of false passports and
visas
c. moved al Qaeda from Sudan to
Afghanistan

d. Osama bin Laden placed him in charge of 2000

al Qaeda's foreign communication

ICE ACADEMY 9/]] & TERRORIST TRAVEL

. NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 2]
 2. Ali'ican n.ldlitalor

<l. bcgan wurking with Zuouyduh in 1996 SCllt copies of

passports/tickets;
Zubaydab would obtain
exit permits to match
h. hccamc al Qacda's Pakistan fltciliiator

c. Itlcilitatcd movemcnt or 11lldahidccn to al From Kandahar

Qacda's terrorist truining ,camps by airport opcrations base
(2000)
providing passports. visns, and entry/exit
slamps

3. Riyadh facilitator

u. Yemen based "Riyadh" fhUowcd travel of

mujahidccn to Afghan training camps

h. provided Yemeni passports; Egyptian, Worked out of 81 Jaziri

Pakistani, or Saudi visas; money; plane hotel
tickets; contact numbers; transportation to
airport

C. Reliance on outsiders

1. Document vendors provided a wide range of

counterfeit and genuine documents

a. passports from many countries, travel Some are dedicated to

cachets, blank visas, countertbils, seals, al Qaeda's cause;
others in it for profit
laminates

2. Corrupt government officials have facilitated .

terrorist travel by selling genuine travel documents

a. Ramzi Yousel claimed he bought an Iraqi Yousef was convicted in

passport from a Pakistani official for $100 the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing
b. two 9111 hijackers received Saudi passports
from a relative in the passport office Waleed and Wail al
Shehri

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NOVEMBER 2006 ,. PAGE 22
 INSTR(IC'TOR (;(llln:

3, Truvcl agcncil.:s havl.: slIpportl.:d terrorist travel No security interest

bl.:cuuse they will work with anyone who pays
them

4. I {uman smuggll.:rs have been used by terrorists to

cross horders

D. Travel Documents

1. Rescurch hus showll terrorist operatives employ 2003 study of terrorist

certain repetitive travel practices travel tactics

u, carefully selected passports Often fraudulent

b. usc of fraudulent travel stamps

c. study visa and entry requirements for

countries they travel to/through

.d. structure travel to avoid suspicion

e. usc of aliases.
E. Reliance on Saudi passports

l. Irregularities in Saudi passport issuance procedures Up to 10,000 Saudi

made Saudi passports more readily available . passports lost or stolen
.in recent years

2. Saudi Arabian citizens had visa. waiver status in Effective 912002, Saudi
most Middle Eastern countries and Canada citizens require a visa
for Canada
3. Blank Saudi passports lacked a document control #

F. Types of Passport Alterations

1. Photo substitution

2. Addition of false entry/exit stamps and visas

3. Removing visas and bleaching entry/exit stamps

4. Counterfeiting passports and substituting pages

a. Computer graphics programs Photoshop, Paintshop

h. . Scan/copy travel stamps, visas, passport

security features

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NOVEMBER 2006. PAGE 23
 INSTRU('TOR (~lllln:

IV. Immigration Violations I'crpctrated by the 9111

hijackers

A. False statements on visa application I'erpctrated by each

hijacker
I, Visa application states a visa may not be issued to
persons seeking to enter the US to engage in
terrorist activities

2. Felony punishable under 18 USC 1546 & 18 USC Inadmissible under

lOOt 212(a)(6)(c)

B. Sought entry to engage in terrorist activities Perpetrated by each

hijacker
I. Visa application states a visa may not be issued to
persons seeking to enter the US to engage in Inadmissible under
212(a)(3)(b)
terrorist activities

C. Altered passports presented to Department of State

I. Perpetrated by Satam al Suqami and Abdul May have been

Aziz al Omari perpetrated by as many
as7
2. Felony punishable under 18 USC 1543 Inadmissible under
212(a)(6)(c)
D. Altered passports presented to INS Inspectors

1. Perpetrated by Satam al Suqami and Abdul May have been

Aziz al Omari perpetrated by as many
as 11
2. Felony punishabie under 18 Lisc 1543 Inadmissible under
.1U(a)(~)(C)
E. Nonimmigrant Status Violations ..

t. Ziad Jarrah attended flight school without

properly adjusting nonimmigrant status

2. Hanjour failed to attend school after being

admitted as a student

F. Present in Violation of Law Overstays

1. Nawafal Hazmi and Suqami overstayed the

terms of their admission

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NOVEMBER 20,06 PAGE 24
 I NSTRIIC'TOR (;llillt:

2. Prior to January 2001 admission. AHa had Would have been

previollsly overstayed his period or admission inadmissible .January
200 I. if known
G. Nonimmigrunt with improper visa classification

1. Atta failed to prescnt an M-l nonimmigrant visa

during January 200 I admission

V. State Ilcpartment and Immigration & Naturalization

Service factors that impacted upon the planning and
execution urthe 9/11 hijacker plot

A. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs issues visas 15 hijackers obtained

abmad. Internal and external environmental factors'in US visas in Saudi
Arabia; 2 in United
place pre 9/11 inadvertently afl(..'Ctcd the 9/11 plot Arab Emirates; 2 in
Germany
1. Visa policy in Berlin

a. German citizens are part of visa waiver Third, Country

program; Third Country Nationals require a Nationals (TCN) are
residents of tbat
US visa '
country
b. Pilots Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah
obtained US visas in May 2000; AU are Third Country
Nationals
conspirator Ramzi Binal Shibh tried but
failed to obtain a visa

c. TCN scrutinized utilizing intending Visa applicants with

immih>ration provision of INA as main. close ties to Germany
(Atts and Jarrab)
criteria considered less likely to
immigrate to US
d. TCN long term German residents were
treated as "de facto" visa waiver applicants

2. Visa policy in United Arab Emirates

a. . pilot.Mawwan a1 Shehhi and Fayez

Banihammad obtained US visas in UAE

b. consular officia1s did not consider UAE a

national security risk pre 9/11

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NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE2S
 INS'I'RUC'TOR GillOt:

I) Some concern regarding (JAE lIAE pp's illsued to

passports cOlltuining inacclImte persons falsely cillimina
birth in UAE; pre 1970,
inn.mllutinll births were not
rccorded
2) l )AJ ': citizens not considered I)rc 9111 DOS
economic immigrants attempted to hllve lJAE
added to VWI'P

3) DOS considered lIAH a "de facto"

visa wl.liVCrCoLilltry

3. Visa Policy in Saudi Ambia

l:l. 10 hijackers (?btained US visas in Saudi

Arabia

b. Visa policy in Saudi Arabia was shaped by Pressure from US

larger US foreign policy interests Ambassador, Saudi
gov't, Congress,
business community to
issue visas
I) Saudi Arabia is world's largest
. producer of oil

2) Largest Middle Eastern market tor

US good and services

3) US/Saudi Arabia have a mutual

interest in stability in the Middle
East

c. Saudi citizens not considered economic Low interview rates,

immigrants especially in Riyadh
(slightly lIigher in
Jeddah)
d. TeN considered high risk economic
immigrants 75% were interviewed

)) Employees of Saudi citizens

required a letter from employer to
receive a US visa .

e. Visa Express implemented in fall of 2000

1) Used travel agents/drop boxes to Eliminated personal

facilitate visa issuance process interview

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NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 26
 I NSTRIJ('TOR (;lllm:

2) Mandatory 6/)/2001 fbr all Saudis

and TCN with prior lIS travel

4 hijackers received US visas In .Jeddab

through Visa Express

B. Immigration and Naturuli;r'<ltiol1 Service Review of entry info &

benefits sought
indicates hijackers
sought to exploit US
border security without
arousing suspicion.
Evidence that
Mohamed Atta was
aware of his
immigration status,
tried to remain in
status, and pursued
. status for himself &
others
1. 9/11 Commission Interviews

u. 9/11 hijackers were admitted 33 times; 26 of the 38 inspectors

refused once from 28 attempted
admissions were
interviewed by th~ 9111
commission
b. Interview results revealed:

I) Lack of counterterrorism training

2) Lack of SOP at airports Variations in port

policies
3) Wide variations
(
in inspectors .
understanding and application of
immigration law to non-immigrants'
seeking admission

2. Immigration issues

a. Inspections

]) No counterterrorism focus

2) Could not verify identity of INS inspectors lacked

nonimmigrant seeking admission by access to .DOS visa
application information
comparison of photo supplied to
bos for visa

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NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 27
 INSTRUCTOR (;tlun:

.1 ) Focus overseLls was intending INS not considered a

immigrnnts. crimimlls. drug counterterrorism tool
pre 9/11
trafliekers

4} INS inspectors lacked discretion 1J2 nonimmigrant

regarding length of admission received 6 month
admission per statute
period

5) Varied port policies dictated B I

period or admission Varied among purtli,
inspectors
6) I,ack of secondary inspection
training resulted in inconsistent Also innuenccd by port
policy
en lorcement

b. Presz.;Ure to facilitate travel

1) Environment of travel fad litation

2) Waivers or deferrals of documents Varied according to

required for admission ports, local policy

3) Inspector performance evaluations

based on speed of passenger
processing

4) ) 990 Congressional mandate 1990 Congressional

limited amount of time to inspect mandate required
clearance of Federal
an arriving aircraft to 45 Inspections Area within
minutes 45 minutes, regardless
of number of flights
arriving concurrently
c. Inspector training

1) Part time hires (OTP/WAE) did not Prevalent througbout

receive entirety of training 1990's

2) Insufficient terrorism training Few hours only

3) Insuflicient training time devoted to

conducting mock inspections

4) Insufficient secondary inspection

training

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NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE2S
 INSTRlf("TOR GIIJl)I<;

5) Document fraud training lacked ()n~()ing fraud

counterterrorism focus document training

Jacking
6) Database training OJ'J' only

VI. Summary/Conclusions

A. DlIS was created in the aftermath of 9111 in an

attempt to stream line communication amongst
government agencies

B. 9/11 Commission has provided recommendations

to be implemented to deter Juture terrorist attacks

c. . Pre 9/11much of our border security and visa

issuance lacked a counterterrorism focus

D. Pre 9/1 1 there was greater emphasis upon travel

facilitation and the intending immigrant provision

E. Though there are stilI strides to make, we have

taken proactive strides in the prevention of future
terrorist attacks against the US

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NOVEMBER 2006 PAGE 29