u.s.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
SECTION 287(g) OF THE INA
TRAINING PROGRAM
Homeland
Security
This document may contain sensitive law enforcement information that is exempt from
release under Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act. The Disclosure Office
must be consulted before any of the information in this document is released.
PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK
9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL
NOVEMBER 2006
INSTRUCTOR GtJlln:
Lesson Plan Overview

9/11 and Terrorist Travel
Course Purpose ('his course provides an overview of immigration and border security
violations perpetrated by the 9/\\ hijackers to further their plot.
Field Performance Given a potential threat ofterrorisl attack. the student will identify
fObjective border security and immigration related violations perpetrated by
he 9111 hijackers, according to the principles outlined in 9/1 J and
I'crrorist Travel.
Interim (Training) J. Identify the historical perspective ofterrorist travel tactics by
Performance Objectives terrorist plots.
Q. Identi(y the evolution or immigration and border security
from 1993-2001, and its atTect upon the 9/11 hijacker plot.
3. Identify the structurcof al Qacda for travel and travel tactics.
Identify the immigration violations perpetrated by theWIl
hijackers.
5. Identity State Department and Immigration and
Naturalization Service factors that impacted upon the
planning and execution of the 9/11 hijacker plot.
Instructional Methods Lecture
Method of Evaluation Multiple Choice Examination
Training Aids Overheads, Chalkboard, Handouts
Icon Legend
(Those used in this lesson are highlighted)
Iii]


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[(]

-
- --
-
ow Overhead
ansparency
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
Conduct Play
Exercise Videotape
Distribute
Handout
Conduct Quiz Question and
Answer Period
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 1
Student Mnh.·rialsl

9111 and TL'ITorist Travel Studl:nt "l"l:xl
I':tluipment )vcrhcad Projl:ctor. ('halkhounl
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
I. Title
2. Field PCl'ii.mnance <)bjccti vc
J. Interim PerliJrmance Objectives
4. Interim Pt.'Ti()rmance
5, Creation/Purpose of 911 I Commission
6. Terrorist Groups and Travel Documents
7. Terrorist Groups and Travel Documents
8. IIistorieal Perspective .. tcrrorist tactics by plot
9. Historical Perspective-terrorist tactics by plot
10. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
1 I. Landmarks Plot, June 1993
12. Atlantic Avenue Subway Plot, July 1997
13. East Africa Bombings, August 1998
14. Millennium Plot, December 1999
15. Immigration & Border Security Evolve J993-2()()1
16. DOS Visa Issuance-Intending Immigrant Provision
17. DOS Visa Issuancc--Non issuance of visas and other docs
18. DOS Visa Issuance--Terrorism
19. DOS and INS Contact in Visa Issuance
20. DOS Budget in the 1990's
21. Visa Waiver Program
DOS Technology Evolution
23. 1993 World Trade Center turning .)oiI11 fbI' DOS
Consular Consolidated Database
25. Immigration and Naturalization Scrvi(;CHinspections
26. Immigration and Naturalization Service-Inspections
27. Immigration and Naturalization Service-Counterterrorism
28. Immigratitm and Naturali7.ation
29. INS Lookout Unit
30. INS LookoutUnitlCarricr Consultant Program
1. Forensic Document Laboratory
9111 & TERRORIST TRAW:L
PAra: 2
I:\STRlTTOI{
._ .... _- .. __ ... _---,
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
32. ()ni\:e of' International Affairs
33. INS hm:ign StmIent Monitoring
1':ntry/Exit Trucking of Fon:ign Students
35. INS Intelligence llnit
J6. INS interior Enl()f!.:el11ell!
INS Interior i':nrorccmcilt Slr:lkgy
38. INS Natiol1ul Se\:urity llnit
Jt). Antiterrorism and I·:nc<.:tivc Death Penalty Act <ImlliRIRA
40. ImmigratioJl Benefits
Border Patrol
INS Support 10 State and I.ocal Law Enforcement
4-3. Structure oj' al Qaeda for travcIlOrgani:t.utio!1 and tmining
44. Travel Facilitators
145. Travel Facilitators·
Travel Facilitators
47. Reliance on Outsiders
Travel Documents
49. Reliance on Saudi Arabian Passports
50. Types of Passport Alterations
51. Immigration Violations Perpetrated by the 9/l1 lIijuckcrs
52. False Statements on Visa Applications
53. Sought Entry to Engage in Terrorist Activities
54. Altered. Passports presented to DOS
55. Altered Passports presented to INS Inspectors
56. Nonimmigrant Status Violations
57. Present in Violation of
58. DOS and INS Factors Impacting the 9/11 Plot
59. Visa Policy in Berlin
60. Visa Policy in United Arab Emirates
61. Visa Policy in Saudi Arabia
62. Visa Express Program
63. Immigration and Naturalization Service factors
64. Immigration Inspections Issues
65. Prcssure to 'tacilitate travel
66. Inspector Training Issucs
67. Summary
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F
HANDOUTS
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 3
I. INTROJ)I!(TION
A. PurllOSC of ('uurse
TIll' sw,:ccss orthl' 9/1 I pill! dcpelltkd Oil 1 he hijackers ubi I ity to
IIbtuin visas and pass horder inSpL'diolls to cntcl' the (lnilcd
Sllites. It ulso depended Oil their ahi I it)' to l'cllmin in thL' United
Stilles tlndetl'del! whik OUllhc ,h.-lui Is orthe nttuck.
I. Terrorists devote extellsive n::murces to acquiring and
manipulating pussporlH. cntry and cxit stumpN. tlnu visas.
The ul Qaeda was no exception. MemberH of al Qaedn
included expert document I()rgers. who pUNsed on their
trade to others, including M(lhmneu Atll.l. the 9111
ringleader.
2. Neither Department oj' State ('on:mlul' Officers abroad, nor
horder inspectors at US ports ()r cntry. was aware orthc
poten1ial significance or indicators of cxtremism and
terrorist aHiliatiol1 in some al Queda passports. Thcyalso
lacked inf(>rmation about passport fraud tactics employed
by al Qaeda, and fraudulent travel slamps associated with
them.
3. 9/11 commission examination regarding the 9111
conspirators and visa issuance process indicated
consistency with a system l()cuscd on factors other than
terrorism. Specifically. prior 10 9111 the sys1em lbcused
on excluding intending immigrants. and was dependent
upon a l1ume based data check [0 search fbr criminals and
terrorists.
'TOR (;1 '1m:
I: TlTI.I·:
If a conspirator
appears to be lUI
intending immigrant,
be was denied a visll.
Absent that (provided a
name based check of
the subject was
negative), the only
remaining tool to
prevent entry was
border inspection.
ICE ACADEMV
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TI<:RRORIST TRAV.:L
PAGE 4
It Field I>crfornulnce Ob,iectivc - (iivell u potential thn:ut or
terrori!'il Httuck. thL: studl..'llt will the border set:urity
and immigration rdated violations perpctrah.:d by the 9/11
hijackers. according to Ih\..' prim.:iplcs olltlinl!d in WJ 1,
Sf Tnlvcl,
1. ldcnti 1y the historical pl:rspcdi ve or terrorist travel ladies hy
krrorist plots,
I Identify the evolution of immigration and border security from
1993-200 J , and its affect upon thl: 9/11 hijacker plot.
J. Identify the structure of 1.11 (Jaeda for travel and travel.tactics.
4. Identily the immigration violations perpetrated by the 9/11
hijackers.
5. Idcntily State J)epartment and Immigration and Naturalization
Service !actors that impacted upon the planning and execution
ofthc 911 1 hijacker plot. .
I. Identify the historical perspective of terrorist travel
tactics by terrorist plots
A. Central Intelligence Agency produced Redbook focused 011
counterterrorism. It contained infotmation about.
commonalities among forged passports and travel cachets. or
visas. used by terrorists. Last production was in 1992.
1. Redbook focused on 5 types of travel document
fraud
a. lorgerics of 35 passports from 35 nations:
travel cachets from 45 countries
b. forged documents purchased from
commercial vendors
c. stolen blank passports
d. information about genuine altered passports
that were photo-substituted or given an
extended validity date
I:"iSTRI'('TOH Gt'lIH:
Perro rm31lCC
Objcctives
[I] IPO#I
Redbook last produced
in 1992
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAV.:L
PAGE 5
t,'. gCllUiIH.: 1I1l1litcn:d passports I ikL'ly pro.:uretl
through .:orrupt gO\'L'rnmel1t onidals
n. Terrorist Tra\'C'I Tueaies hy Plot-l>lII'ing the I 990's, al
()aedll was involved in variolls terrorist plots ill the ( lnitC'd
Stall's. Regan.ll<:ss or mllcolllc. these plots wer<: vulunhlc.: to
the terrorists as nn instnu:tionul tool. They provided critical
cx6cl'icncc entering and emhedding in the llnitcd Stutes,
Once cmhcddcd. they attempted to gain kg'll immigrution
status that would allow them to remain in the llnited Slate:.;,
prinmri Iy hy cnmmilting immigrtllion Ihllld through political
asylum claims Lll1d murriagc to {Initcd States ('itizens, Once
ul ()acda hegan inlierting participants for the 9/1 I plot. they
had ulrcudy guincu considerahle know/edge of Olll' interior
immigration and horder security systems.
I. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
11, 3 conspirators traveled on Saudi passports
containing indicators of possible terrorist
atliliation
h, Mastermind Ram7.i YouseI' and Ahmad Aitli
traveled using fraudulent documents and aliases
c; YouseI' and I\itli liIcd fraudulent claims H)r
political asylum to remain in the US
d, Mahmoud Abouhalimu received temporary
resident status through fraudulent claim to SAW
program
c, Eyad Mahmoud Ismail took ESL classes as an F J
nonimmigrant overstayed nonimmigrant status
') Landmarks I).ot (.June 1993)··
a. Sheikh Omar Ahdcl Rahman and followers used
lraudulent documents to enter the US; committed
repeat immigration fraud to remain
b. Other participants married US Citizens
bST'U'(ToRGnm:
The CIlIllII101U1fity
thesl' priOl'
terrorilit Illnts was tbe
use of
fraud, illl:hlding filing
fraudulent Jlolitienl
llsylmu ehlillls, clllims
'hl" CIt her benefits
(SA W), marriage to
lIS citizens, etc. 'I'his
demonstrates the
vulnerabilities of the
immig"'dtion bCllcfils
system; also makes tbe
detection or
immigration stlltus
critical to natiollal
security
While political asylum
(:Iaims were pending,
applicants were able to
renulin in the US
Seasonal Agricultural
Worker program
FI admission was for
duratiun of status;
Ismail failed to depart
after study concluded
Most of the
cOitspirators were
married to lJS Citizells
and obtained LPR
status or US
A Files of
these individuals arc
protected by the
Privacy Act.
ICE ACADEMY
2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRA VI<:L
I>AGE 6
3. AthlOtit' A\,cnu(,' Subwny Plot 1997)
a. (inzi Ihrallim Abu Mcz-.:r committed repent
immigration J'ralld whik plotting to destroy the
stlbway using explosives: was arrested on his third
illegal entry Ii'om ('unadu: fikd fraudlilent politi(;ul
asylum daim and was relcus-.:d on hond.
h. Cocollspirator I.all Taisir Munch Khalil held a C)
transit visa. was crronl.!ollsly admitted as B2, tlnd
ovcrstayed his period of' admission
4. East Africa Ilombings (August 1998):--Bombings of
the lIS cmbassies in Dar cs Salaam. Tanzania and
Nairohi. Kenya featured 411 Qaeda opl.!rativcs linked to
the tiS
a. AJi Mohamed married <l US Citizen and bcearne
LPR. In 1993 he conducted surveillance of US
targets /(')1' "I Qacda.
h. Khalid Abu al Dahab' was granted LPR status alicr
marriage to his 3
rd
wife: subsequently naturali;l.cd
c. Wadicl Hage studiedin the US during the 1970's
and 1980.'s: gained LPR status through tnarriage to
a United States Citizen
5. Millennium Plot (December 1999) During this
plot, Ahmed Ressam and associates used fraudulent
passports and immigration fraud to traveL
a. Rcssam traveled from France to Montreal with a
photo substituted passport claimed political I
asylum in Canada.
h. Abdclghani Mcskini used a stolen identity to travel
c. Abdclllakim Tizegha filed a fi'audulcnt political
asylum claim in the US. After 2 years his claim
was denied.
I:'>ISTI{l'( 'TOR Gl 'IU
In 1993 he conducted
surveillance of US
target!; for al Qaeda
While in the US, he
provided money and
fraud docs to terrorists
, worldwide
Wadiel Hage served as
personal secretary to
Usama Bin Laden
While on' release
pending his asylum
hearing, he sold stolen
documents to a broker
for Islamic terrorists
He was released
pending an asylum
hearing, which was
rescheduled 5 times for
failure to appear
ICE ACADEMY
NOVI<:MBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEl,
PAGE 7
II. E\'olutioll of immignltinll null horder from
1993-200 I, its l'ffeclu(>ol1 the 9/11 plot
1\. Intelligence
I. IIlSlIflicicl1t lise or terrorist wHtch list
Inll:l inliU'lllalioll 1I0( shared betwecn agL'lldes
a. il1telligellce gutllcl'cU hy I.'HI not slmn:d
with ('II\ unit who published Redbook
J. No gov't ngency anlllyzed terrorist travel and
tm:tics in ortiL'1' to disl'lipt tt.:rrurist operatives
B. Stnte J)cpartment
1. Vhm Issuance involved completion or a visa
application: unum!! check" against existing records.
including known and suspected ten'orist lii'llS
a. 214(b) Intending Immigrant Provision
I) Every alien shall be presumed to be
an immigrant until he establishes to
the satisfaction ofthc consular
oJlicer. at the time of application for
a visa, and the immigration officers.
at the time of application fhr
admission. that he is entitled tt} a
nonimmigrant status under section
IOI(a)(15)
2) In FY 2001, 2.2 million applicants
were refused as intending
il11migl'ants (80% of total rclusah;)
Visa screcninJ;l foclIs
was other than
lerrorism
INA Section 214(b)
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER l006
9/1 1 & Tf:RRORIST TRAY' .. :I.
PAm: 8
h,
c.
22l(g) Non-issuan(,'c of\'isas or other
doculllents
a) /:ailtln.: to comply v .. ith thc applicatioll
n:quin.:I1lCI11s or othel'v.:ise indigiblc
lil!' ,I visa
::!) (Ised to deny a visa to hijacker I funi
Ilunjotll' in Septemher :WOO. when he
lllilctito attach supporting
documentation to his student visa
application
3) J n FY 200 I. used to 600,000
visas (20% oj' total refusals)
Benial on Grounds of Terrorism
I) An alien who is likely to engagc in
terrorist activity ailer entry,
. 2) Rl:lrcly ground of inadmissibility:
in FY 200 I there were only 83 visa
denials using this ground.
INA ScctioIl121(g)
INA Section 212(a)(3)
d. contact with INS
1) Consular ofticialslacked access to an
applicant's immigration records when
adjudicating visa applications
. 2) Consular officials had limited contact
with INS, and received little INS
feedback regarding their visa issuance
decisions ..
2. State Department Budget
u.
b.
ICE ACADEMY
2006
During the 1990's. embassy security.
received greater resources through
congressional funding
Shrinking resources lor the Bureau of
Consular Affairs. yet not a lessened
workload.
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVI<:L
PAGE 9
c. ViSH Wain:!" ProgrnJl1
I) Del:reased the 11l1ll1her of' app! il:anls
lill" visas
:::) lit i I izeu 1'01" coulltries \\"j th low fruud
and visa rates
3) hy 9/11101. 17 million travelers used
the VWPP Ulll1llUlly
4) reducl.!d demand Ii.n nonimmigrant
visas mean!H higher percentage o/'
visas heing udjudicaled/issued in POSlli
with high fraud rates
State I)epnrtment TcchnolofiO'
u. Machine readable vistl (MRV) developed
curly 1990
h. TIPOFF terrorist watch-list
I ) Main counterterrorism tool
2) Under rW:lded
3) Antiquated
4) Inti> not shared between DOS and INS
4. World Trade Center bombing of 1993 was
turning point for DOS (2126/93)
a. Lcd to a reexamination of visa issuance
procedures
1) "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdel Rahman
obtained a US visa in Khartoum,
Sudan
h. Visa Viper program created 811993
I) Improved interagency communication
about terrorists who should be. on
watch-list
(a)
(b)
Agencies to supply identity
info to DOS
hampered by lack 'of
bSTIU'( ''!OIt
Established ill I 9fiC! liS II
pilot the.'
VWI)I' 11111lwed .. s
fill' husiness or plcllsllrc
tel be IldmiUed for
lIIuillllnll ()() days
without the Ilc('cssily of
II DOlliinmigrllllt viNa;
VislI Wah'ci' PcnmlllclIl
Program Act (pu blie
Law 1 U(I-39ft) signed ill
2000
ICE ACADEMY
NOVt:MBf:R 2006
9111 & T.:RRORIST TRA Vr-:L
PAm: 10
(.;(lopcl'atiO!l Jhlln Jaw cnli.m':CnlClll und intd
i.lgem:lcs
c, P<lssage ora bill enabling DOS to retain
funds gCllcratcd hy M RV kes
I) h.:cs grcw from $1 {) million (1994)
to over $l{)O million (1999)
<llll1lwtly
2) J:ees tlsed by DOS to:
3)
(a) uulmllate consular visa
issuance systems
(b) develop secure pp and visa
technology
(c) improve computer name
check capability
(d) create worldwide realtime
consular communications
system (CCD-Consular
. Consolidated Database)
By J 995 all visa issuance posts had
access to DOS CLASS \(')okout
system
(a) DOS developed language
algorithms to improve
CLASS lookout system
4) Consular Consolidated Database
(CCD)
(a) Allowed visa data entered in
any embassy or consulate to
be transferred automatically
to a central location in the
us
I:\STIU'CTOR G{,IJ)E
Arabic in December '
1998; Russian/Slavic in
December 2000
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRA VH,
PAGE 11
(0) Cuntained all aspects of the
visa application, including
photo
(c) NIV rccunls were loaded in
1999 in Fmnkfurt. Germany:
all other posts bctween
21 J 999 and 1/20(} I
('. Immigration and Natumlizuliull Service
I . I nspcdions practices
u. Primary inspection rclied upon examination
or documents. database checks. and
behavioral cues to indicate suspicious
activity
b. Time constraints to make a determination
of admissibility
1) 199) Congressional mandate
required all flights to be cleared
within 45 minutes
c. One INS HQ employee designated as State
Department Liaison Officer
1) • In caseS involving watch-list hits,
duties included obtaining into from
DOS and relaying unclassified info
to INS inspections determining
admissibility
2) if refused admission, photo and
print loaded in IDENT
2. Counterterrorism
a. Inspectors not trained in counterterrorism
1) Unaware their watch-list had a
counterterrorism component
2) No behavioral indicator training
specific to terrorist behavior
I NS'I'RlICTOR (;UIIU:
Regardless of number
of Ilights arriving
simultaneously, 45
minutes to clear
Federal Inspedions
Area
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEM8ER2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 12
.1) No truining in detection of'terrorist
indicator in tmvel documents
h, Natiunal Automated Immigration Lookout
system (NAILS) contained '1'11'01"1"
terrorist watch-list
I ) Name-based system
2) Contaillcd80,OOO records on
tcrrorist activity by 9111/200 I
3) INS had higher standard fbr entry
into NAILS than nos into
TIPOFF,
Thcrcf{)rc not all DOS TIPOFF
. records were included in NAILS
3. INS Lookout Unit
a. initially created as liaison unit with DOS
1 ) Reviewed passenger
manifests/notified POE jf a
suspected terrorist was enroute
2) US Customs had access to airline
carrier reservation system; INS had
to depend on the goodwill of the
carrier to provide manifests
b, . Carrier Consultant Program
1 ) Created in 1 999
2) Trained foreign airlines to
recognize fraudulent documents to
prevent boarding aircraft
INSTRtJ('TOR GUII)E
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 13
4. I<'oremiic f)ocument Lahoratory (Iml,)
n. Created in the early 1980's
h. Provided l r u i l l i n ~ nnd mammls 011
legitimate and illegitimate travel and fn
documents.
c. Only federal crime IUh dedicated [0 lbrcnsie
exmniniltioll o( documents
d. Did not HlClIS on terrorism
5. Office of International Affairs
u. Emphasis in the 1990's was deterring
illegal cntry and aiien smuggling
h. Operation G10hal Reach (1995)
n Less than 100 INS stall' overseas
2) effort to train host country LEOs,
airline personnel and foreign
consular otlicials in detecting
fraudulent documents
3) Coordinated with DOS and DOJ
4) No counterterrorism focus
6. Foreign Student Monitoring
a. . Student/School System
1)
2)
Student registration program
INS recognized foreign students
could be a national security threat
INSTRIlCTOR GllII)i<;
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEl.
PAGE'14
h. In 1996. ('ol1gress required INS to create a
system to track students from countries that
sponsored terrorism
1 ) . ('ongress did not appropriate funds
2)
ror the program
INS invested $10 million. creating a
Pilol Program in June J 997
a. . Student fI) card included
biometrics as identifiers
. 3) INS managers ordered to stop work
on the program in carly 1998
a.
b.
c:
INS management viewed the
mandate as an imposition on
educational institutions. to
collect data
INS viewed fee collection as
a responsibility of
educational institutions
National Association of
International Educators
supported an amendment to
repeal the 1996 Student
Monitoring Program
mandate
d. By 2000, the Semite
pressured INS to stop the
fee based program
I NSTRIICI"OR (;tllln:
Congress established II
2 year deadline to
accomplish
Pilot program tcst case
for National Student
Tracking System
In 8/1998. INS policy
managers deferred
testing biometric ID
card
INS HQ upper
management viewed
mandate directed .
toward schools;
cancelled work on
project
Feared the imposition
of student fees would
deter foreign students
(rom enrolling in their
institu tions
7. Entry/Exit Tracking System
a.
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
1996 Congressional law required the
Attorney General to develop an entry/exit
program
1) Collect records on admissions and
departures
No national tracking
system to match
departure to admission
of a nonimmigrant
USVISIT effort to
collect info post 9/11 ;
stemmed from original
INS entry/exit system
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGElS
b.
2) No counterterrorism ,/(.lCUS
J) ('ungrcssional fi.mding of $40
million uver 4 years fhr
develupment
Border communities in Mexico and Canada
denounced an entry/exit tracking system
I) Some members of ('ongress, along
with INS senior managers agreed,
und decided to automate only the
entry process
8. INS Intelligence Unit
a. Dependent on the CIA, NSA, FBI, and
DOS Intel and Research section for terrorist
" information
I) Parent agency DOJ routinely
,received intet information on
terrorism cases, mostly from FBI
b. Intel Unit was unable to regularly gather
information on terrorists from INS
employees assigned to work as liaison to
other agencies
9. INS Interior Enforcement
INSTRIIC'TOR (;(111)10:
NSEF.RS s ( J u ~ h t to
rectify this post 9/11
Feared it would inhibit
border trade
Focus of INS Intel unit
was alien smuggling
a. INS, Congress, DOJ and White House Support staffto FBI on
recognized INS as a minor counterterrorism JTTF task forces
tool .
b. lack of resources
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
) ) Insufficient staff and detention
Space tQ locate, apprehend, detain
and remove megal aliens, including
terrorist affiliates
2) 2,000 Special Agents tasked with
responsibility for millions of illegal
aliens and immigration related
crimes
Referenee INS
enforcement personnel
statistics, J 990-2000
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEl,
PAGE 16
INSTRll(''I'OR GlllO.:
c, Inw and procedures governing the'courts Administrative
,
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
geared toward henclit or doubt to the alien deportation h e a r i l l ~ l i
1 ) I ,ow appl.!arance bonds. i r any
2) Multiple hearings with lengthy
deluys
J) ( 'usc back logs
Interior Enjj:lrcement Strategy
1) Additional ).'1''1'1'' positions
2) Greater intelligence network
3) Counterterrorism mle for INS
4) Not implemented by INS senior
managers
National Security Unit
1)
2)
Oversight of national security work
in tield offices, including JTTF
Produced security alerts lor POE's
3) Worked in conjunction with DOJ
on national security issues,
including case referrals to Alien
Terrorist Removal Court
4)
5)
Understaffed
Inadequate support from INS senior
managers
Administrative liystem
was easy to exploit
April 1997
Established 1997
Ports of Entry
4 HQ staff (200J), 3
, FBI HQ detailees, SO
Field Agents
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 17,
f. JITF detailees
I ) INS Investigations requested 5
JTI'F positions in 199)
2) 1997 request lhr 29 JlTF position!;:
approval lhr 18
g. Antiterrorism and El1cctivc Dcath Penalty
Act and IIIcgal Immigration RcI()rm and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
I ) Provided new counterterrorism
tools
2}
3)
Expedited removal
a. provision HJr expansion to
interior cn/()rcement was not
implemented by INS
Alien Terrorfst Removal Court
a. designed to remove alien
terrorists by using classified
evidence to support the
allegations
INSTRUCTOR (;(1101<:
I)re 9111 .fTTI<' was
focus of INS
counterterrorism
Not supported by INS
Senior Management
Established by IIRIRA
Established by
Antiterrorism Act
DOJ considered the
court a top priority
b. J1RIR.A permitted the use of ATRC has never been
classified evidence in used
deportation hearings,
making the ATRC largely
unnecessary
h. Immigration Benefits
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
1) Benefits process is vulnerable to
fraud
u.
b.
multiple benefits tiles
multiple applications in
different offices
Based on service
center/asylum office
having jurisdiction
9/11 & TERRORISTTRt\VEL
PAGElS
2) Tc-rrorists exploit vulnerabilities in
the hendits grunting process
a.
h.
1993 World Tradc Ccnler
homhing conspirators
gaincd LPR status
through SA W program fraud
amnesty programs arc
subject to widespread abuse
c. INS benelits adjudicators
did not have a
counterterrorism iocus
Mohamed and
Mahmud Abouhalima
filed fraudulent
Seasonal Agricultural
Worker claims
Reference testimony or
INS Counsel Paul
Virtue, 1999, before
House Judiciary
Subcommittee
I. Border Patrol
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEl\'IBER 2006
1 ) Insufficient resources to control
flow of illegal aliens
2)
3)
4)
Focus is Southwest border
No counterterrorism focus
Northern border understaffed
a. terrorists have entered the
US from Canada
b. Canada has more lenient
immigration laws tnan the
US
C. Border Patrol Agents lacked
access to TIPOFF and
NAILS watch-lists
SW border I BP A
every 'h mile, 1999
Northern border 1 BPA
. every J 3 !4 miles, 1999
1-213 for Brooklyn
subway conspirator .
Abu Mezer indicates 3
illegal entries /JIang
Northern border
9111 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 19
j. Slule and Local Law Enlilrcement Support
1 ) State and Local law cnf()rccment
did not Imvc access to terrorist
walch-lists
2) INS hud insufficient stalTto respond
to all culls
.1)
4)
Law Enlhrcement Support Center
created in ) 994
u. 1988 anti-drug law required
INS to maintain a 2417
hotline to identify
aggravated n ~ l o n s
h. provides info regarding
aliens in custody.
c. no counterterrorism focus
I)erformance of immigration officer
functions by state officers and
employees
a. INS (now ICE) began
conducting 287(g) training
IV. Identify the structure of al Qaeda for travel and travel
tactics
A. Organization and training
1. 2 senior al Qaeda operatives played key roles in
facilitating travel for terrorist activities .
INSTRII("I'OR GtfllU:
U:SC is based in
Williston. VT and
provides 24n access to
ICE
Nuns query
conducted by other
LEOs
8 USC 1357 1287(g)
INA/ created by
IIRIRA, 1996
Ongoing
KSM and Abdul
Zubaydah
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGlt20
2. Division or passports and host country issucs under
its security committee
a. was Joc'lted at Kandahar airport
h. manuged hy Muhammed Atcl'
c. altered papers. including passports. visas
and identification cards
d. relocated to Pakistan J()lIowing lJS
invasion or Afghanistan
3. designated certain members with organi:r.ing
passport collection schemes to keep an available
supply of fraudulent documents '
a.
b.
.Iihadists required to surrender passports
before going to the front lines in
Afghanistan
operatives were taught document forgery,
including passport alteration,
I NSTR{lCTOR GtJIDE
Atcfwas 81 Qaeda's
chief (If military ('Ps
Latc 2001
Passports recycled if
subjects did not return
Mohamed Atta
purportedly trained in
passport alteration
photo substitution, erasures and additions
of travel cachets
. techniques
B. Travel Facilitators
1 . Abu Zubaydah
a. al Qaeda' s most seasoned traveler
b. . aided mujahideento/from Afghanistan until Aid was througb supply
1994 of false passports and
visas
c. moved al Qaeda from Sudan to
Afghanistan
d.
ICE ACADEMY
. NOVEMBER 2006
Osama bin Laden placed him in charge of
al Qaeda's foreign communication
2000
9/]] & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 2]
2. Ali'ican n.ldlitalor
<l. bcgan wurking with Zuouyduh in 1996
h. hccamc al Qacda's Pakistan fltciliiator
c. Itlcilitatcd movemcnt or 11lldahidccn to al
Qacda's terrorist truining ,camps by
providing passports. visns, and entry/exit
slamps
3. Riyadh facilitator
u. Yemen based "Riyadh" fhUowcd travel of
mujahidccn to Afghan training camps
h. provided Yemeni passports; Egyptian,
Pakistani, or Saudi visas; money; plane
tickets; contact numbers; transportation to
airport
C. Reliance on outsiders
1. Document vendors provided a wide range of
counterfeit and genuine documents
a. passports from many countries, travel
cachets, blank visas, countertbils, seals,
laminates
2. Corrupt government officials have facilitated .
terrorist travel by selling genuine travel documents
a.
b.
Ramzi Y ousel claimed he bought an Iraqi
passport from a Pakistani official for $100
two 9111 hijackers received Saudi passports
from a relative in the passport office
SCllt copies of
passports/tickets;
Zubaydab would obtain
exit permits to match
From Kandahar
airport opcrations base
(2000)
Worked out of 81 Jaziri
hotel
Some are dedicated to
al Qaeda's cause;
others in it for profit
Yousef was convicted in
the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing
Waleed and Wail al
Shehri
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006 ,.
9/1 t & TERRORIST tRAVEL
PAGE 22
3, Truvcl agcncil.:s havl.: slIpportl.:d terrorist travel
bl.:cuuse they will work with anyone who pays
them
4. I {uman smuggll.:rs have been used by terrorists to
cross horders
D. Travel Documents
E.
1. Rescurch hus showll terrorist operatives employ
certain repetitive travel practices
u, carefully selected passports
b. usc of fraudulent travel stamps
c. study visa and entry requirements for
countries they travel to/through
.d. structure travel to avoid suspicion
e. usc of aliases.
Reliance on Saudi passports
l.
2.
Irregularities in Saudi passport issuance procedures
made Saudi passports more readily available .
Saudi Arabian citizens had visa. waiver status in
most Middle Eastern countries and Canada
3. Blank Saudi passports lacked a document control #
F. Types of Passport Alterations
1. Photo substitution
2. Addition of false entry/exit stamps and visas
3. Removing visas and bleaching entry/exit stamps
4. Counterfeiting passports and substituting pages
a. Computer graphics programs
h. . Scan/copy travel stamps, visas, passport
security features
INSTR(IC'TOR (;(llln:
No security interest
2003 study of terrorist
travel tactics
Often fraudulent
Up to 10,000 Saudi
passports lost or stolen
.in recent years
Effective 912002, Saudi
citizens require a visa
for Canada
Photoshop, Paintshop
~
ICE ACADEMY 9111 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
NOVEMBER 2006. PAGE 23
IV. Immigration Violations I'crpctrated by the 9111
hijackers
A.
B.
False statements on visa application
I, Visa application states a visa may not be issued to
persons seeking to enter the US to engage in
terrorist activities
2. Felony punishable under 18 USC 1546 & 18 USC
lOOt
Sought entry to engage in terrorist activities
I. Visa application states a visa may not be issued to
persons seeking to enter the US to engage in
terrorist activities
C. Altered passports presented to Department of State
I.
2.
Perpetrated by Satam al Suqami and Abdul
Aziz al Omari
Felony punishable under 18 USC 1543
D. Altered passports presented to INS Inspectors
1.
2.
Perpetrated by Satam al Suqami and Abdul
Aziz al Omari
Felony punishabie under 18 Lisc 1543
E. Nonimmigrant Status Violations ..
F.
t. Ziad Jarrah attended flight school without
properly adjusting nonimmigrant status
2. Hanjour failed to attend school after being
admitted as a student
Present in Violation of Law
1. Nawafal Hazmi and Suqami overstayed the
terms of their admission
INSTRU('TOR
I'erpctrated by each
hijacker
Inadmissible under
212(a)(6)(c)
Perpetrated by each
hijacker
Inadmissible under
212(a)(3)(b)
May have been
perpetrated by as many
as7
Inadmissible under
212(a)(6)(c)
May have been
perpetrated by as many
as 11
Inadmissible under

Overstays
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 20,06
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 24
2. Prior to January 2001 admission. AHa had
previollsly overstayed his period or admission
G. Nonimmigrunt with improper visa classification
1. Atta failed to prescnt an M-l nonimmigrant visa
during January 200 I admission
V. State Ilcpartment and Immigration & Naturalization
Service factors that impacted upon the planning and
execution urthe 9/11 hijacker plot
A. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs issues visas
abmad. Internal and external environmental factors'in
place pre 9/11 inadvertently afl( .. 'Ctcd the 9/11 plot
1. Visa policy in Berlin
a. German citizens are part of visa waiver
program; Third Country Nationals require a
US visa '
b. Pilots Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah
obtained US visas in May 2000;
conspirator Ramzi Binal Shibh tried but
failed to obtain a visa
c. TCN scrutinized utilizing intending
immih>ration provision of INA as main.
criteria
d. TCN long term German residents were
treated as "de facto" visa waiver applicants
2. Visa policy in United Arab Emirates
a. . pilot.Mawwan a1 Shehhi and Fayez
Banihammad obtained US visas in UAE
b. consular officia1s did not consider UAE a
national security risk pre 9/11
I NSTRIIC'TOR (;llillt:
Would have been
inadmissible .January
200 I. if known
15 hijackers obtained
US visas in Saudi
Arabia; 2 in United
Arab Emirates; 2 in
Germany
Third, Country
Nationals (TCN) are
residents of tbat
country
AU are Third Country
Nationals
Visa applicants with
close ties to Germany
(Atts and Jarrab)
considered less likely to
immigrate to US
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE2S
I )
2)
Some concern regarding (JAE
passports cOlltuining inacclImte
inn.mllutinll
l ) AJ ': citizens not considered
economic immigrants
3) DOS considered lIAH a "de facto"
visa wl.liVCrCoLilltry
3. Visa Policy in Saudi Ambia
l:l. 10 hijackers (?btained US visas in Saudi
Arabia
b.
c.
d.
Visa policy in Saudi Arabia was shaped by
larger US foreign policy interests
I) Saudi Arabia is world's largest
. producer of oil
2) Largest Middle Eastern market tor
US good and services
3) US/Saudi Arabia have a mutual
interest in stability in the Middle
East
Saudi citizens not considered economic
immigrants
TeN considered high risk economic
immigrants
) ) Employees of Saudi citizens
required a letter from employer to
receive a US visa .
e. Visa Express implemented in fall of 2000
1) Used travel agents/drop boxes to
facilitate visa issuance process
INS'I'RUC'TOR GillOt:
lIAE pp's illsued to
persons falsely cillimina
birth in UAE; pre 1970,
births were not
rccorded
I)rc 9111 DOS
attempted to hllve lJAE
added to VWI'P
Pressure from US
Ambassador, Saudi
gov't, Congress,
business community to
issue visas
Low interview rates,
especially in Riyadh
(slightly lIigher in
Jeddah)
75% were interviewed
Eliminated personal
interview
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 26
B.
2) Mandatory 6/)/2001 fbr all Saudis
and TCN with prior lIS travel
4 hijackers received US visas
through Visa Express
Immigration and Naturuli;r'<ltiol1 Service
1. 9/11 Commission Interviews
u.
b.
9/11 hijackers were admitted 33 times;
refused once
Interview results revealed:
I) Lack of counterterrorism training
2)
3)
Lack of SOP at airports
Wide variations in inspectors
( .
understanding and application of
immigration law to non-immigrants'
seeking admission
2. Immigration issues
a. Inspections
]) No counterterrorism focus
2) Could not verify identity of
nonimmigrant seeking admission by
comparison of photo supplied to
bos for visa
I NSTRIJ('TOR (;lllm:
In .Jeddab
Review of entry info &
benefits sought
indicates hijackers
sought to exploit US
border security without
arousing suspicion.
Evidence that
Mohamed Atta was
aware of his
immigration status,
tried to remain in
status, and pursued
. status for himself &
others
26 of the 38 inspectors
from 28 attempted
admissions were
interviewed by t h ~ 9111
commission
Variations in port
policies
INS inspectors lacked
access to .DOS visa
application information
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 27
b.
c.
ICE ACADEMV
NOVEMBER 2006
.1 )
4}
5)
6)
Focus overseLls was intending
immigrnnts. crimimlls. drug
trafliekers
INS inspectors lacked discretion
regarding length of admission
period
Varied port policies dictated B I
period or admission
I,ack of secondary inspection
training resulted in inconsistent
en lorcement
Presz.;Ure to facilitate travel
1) Environment of travel fad litation
2) Waivers or deferrals of documents
required for admission
3) Inspector performance evaluations
based on speed of passenger
processing
4) ) 990 Congressional mandate
limited amount of time to inspect
an arriving aircraft to 45
minutes
Inspector training
1) Part time hires (OTP/WAE) did not
receive entirety of training
2) Insufficient terrorism training
3) Insuflicient training time devoted to
conducting mock inspections
4) Insufficient secondary inspection
training
INSTRUCTOR (;tlun:
INS not considered a
counterterrorism tool
pre 9/11
1J2 nonimmigrant
received 6 month
admission per statute
Varied among purtli,
inspectors
Also innuenccd by port
policy
Varied according to
ports, local policy
1990 Congressional
mandate required
clearance of Federal
Inspections Area within
45 minutes, regardless
of number of flights
arriving concurrently
Prevalent througbout
1990's
Few hours only
9/1 I & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE2S
5) Document fraud training lacked
counterterrorism focus
6) Database training OJ'J' only
VI. Summary/Conclusions
A. DlIS was created in the aftermath of 9111 in an
attempt to stream line communication amongst
government agencies
B. 9/11 Commission has provided recommendations
to be implemented to deter Juture terrorist attacks
c. . Pre 9/11 much of our border security and visa
issuance lacked a counterterrorism focus
D. Pre 9/1 1 there was greater emphasis upon travel
facilitation and the intending immigrant provision
E. Though there are stilI strides to make, we have
taken proactive strides in the prevention of future
terrorist attacks against the US
INSTRlf("TOR GIIJl)I<;
( ) n ~ ( ) i n g fraud
document training
Jacking
ICE ACADEMY
NOVEMBER 2006
9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL
PAGE 29

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