Gangs, Pagad & the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape

by Bill Di on & !isa"#arie $ohns

Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 2, May 2001. Bill Di on is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Criminal Justice, University of Cape o!n, an" a researcher at the #nstitute of Criminolo$y. !isa"#arie $ohns is a former %esearcher at the #nstitute of Criminolo$y. %c&no'ledgments &e !oul" li'e to than' all the people !e spo'e to "urin$ the course of our research for ma'in$ the pro(ect possi)le. &e are also in"e)te" to *ran"on +am)er an" ,iers ,i$ou for their e"itorial support, to -lrena van "er Spuy for her comments on the report in "raft form an" to &en"y Meyer for ma'in$ the contacts that nee"e" to )e ma"e. .lso, than' you to &ar"ie Leppan, ,ro(ect /fficer, #nternational Development %esearch Centre 0#D%C1, for his on$oin$ support of, an" insi$ht into, the Violence an" ransition ,ro(ect. his )oo'let !as fun"e" )y #nternational Development %esearch Centre 0#D%C1. he Violence an" ransition Series is a pro"uct of an e2tensive research pro(ect con"ucte" )y the Centre for the Stu"y of Violence an" %econciliation 0CSV%1 into the nature an" e2tent of violence "urin$ South .frica3s transition from aparthei" rule to "emocracy. his series comprises a set of self4containe", )ut interrelate" reports, !hich e2plore violence across the perio" 1560 to 2000 !ithin 'ey social loci an" areas, inclu"in$7

%even$e Violence an" Vi$ilantism8 9orei$ners 0immi$rants an" refu$ees18 +ostels an" +ostel %esi"ents8 -24com)atants8 State Security 9orces 0police an" military1, an" a2i violence.

&hile each report $rapples !ith the "ynamics of violence an" transition in relation to its particular constituency all are un"erpinne" )y the )roa" o)(ectives of the series, namely7

o analyse the causes, e2tent an" forms of violence in South .frica across a timeframe that starts )efore the political transition an" moves throu$h the perio" characterise" )y political transformation an" reconciliation to the present8 o assess the le$acy of a violent past an" the impact of formal "emocratisation an" transition on the contemporary nature of violence )y researchin$ continuities an" chan$es in its form an" tar$ets8

o investi$ate the role of perpetrators an" victims of violence across this timeframe8 o evaluate reconciliation strate$ies an" institutions, such as the ruth an" %econciliation Commission, esta)lishe" to ameliorate future violence in South .frica8 o "evelop a macro4theory for un"erstan"in$ violence in countries movin$ from authoritarian to "emocratic rule, i.e. :countries in transition:, an" o contri)ute to local an" international "e)ates a)out reconciliation an" (ustice for perpetrators an" victims of $ross violations of human ri$hts.

hrou$h these o)(ectives, the Violence an" ransition Series aims to inform an" )enefit policy analysts, $overnment officials an" "epartments, non4$overnmental an" civic or$anisations, an" researchers !or'in$ in the fiel"s of7

Violence prevention8 ransitional criminal (ustice8 Victim empo!erment8 ruth commissions8 %econciliation8 +uman ri$hts, an" Crime prevention.

.s a country emer$in$ from a past characterise" )y violence an" repression South .frica faces ne! challen$es !ith the slo! maturation of "emocracy. Violence to"ay is comple2, "ynamic an" creative in form shape" )y )oth aparthei" an" the mechanisms of transition itself. #n or"er to un"erstan" 4 an" prevent 4 violence "urin$ transition in South .frica an" a)roa" an on$oin$ action4research a$en"a is re;uire". hrou$h this series the Centre for the Stu"y of Violence an" %econciliation offers an initial an" e2ploratory, yet "etaile", contri)ution to this process. he Violence an" ransition Series is fun"e" )y the #nternational Development %esearch Centre 0#D%C1. &or' on the pro(ect focusin$ on the ruth an" %econciliation Commission !as supporte" )y the -m)assy of #relan", the Charles Ste!art4Mott 9oun"ation an" the Scottish Catholic #nternational .i" 9un" 0SC#.91. Series -"itors *ran"on +am)er ,iers ,i$ou *ron!yn +arris

Contents:

-2ecutive Summary

#ntro"uction Conte2t an" /ri$ins Chronolo$y <arratives ,a$a"3s story he State a$ents3 story he 0reforme"1 $an$sters3 story .nalysis %econciliation7 impact an" prospects Conclusions %eferences <otes

( ec)tive S)mmary he report )e$ins )y settin$ popular activism a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s in the historical an" social conte2t of the &estern Cape. #t $oes on to provi"e a short history of ,eople .$ainst =an$sterism an" Dru$s 0,a$a"1 4 as seen throu$h the eyes of the me"ia 4 since its formation in Decem)er 155>. he main )o"y of the report is "evote" to the accounts of ,a$a"3s ori$ins, "evelopment an" current status provi"e" )y the nine people intervie!e" for the research7 t!o senior police intelli$ence officials, t!o former $an$sters, a prominent mem)er of ,a$a", t!o seasone" o)servers of the or$anisation an" t!o anti4 crime activists !ith an intimate 'no!le"$e of ,a$a" an" recent "evelopments in the &estern Cape. &hat emer$es from these competin$ narratives is an e2tremely comple2 picture. Definin$ moments 4 the "eath of +ar" Livin$s $an$ lea"er %ashaa" Sta$$ie in .u$ust 155?, the failure of successive roun"s of peace ne$otiations )et!een representatives of ,a$a" an" the security services, a 3shoot4out3 in the afelsi$ area of Mitchells ,lain in May last year )et!een police an" arme" 3vi$ilantes34 are su)(ect to vastly "ifferent interpretations. he conclu"in$ sections of the report try to ma'e some sense of the events of the last five years. hey trace the ori$ins of $an$ an" vi$ilante violence in the &estern Cape an" provi"e an analysis of ,a$a"3s formation, its "evelopment an" the evolution of the state3s response to it, first as a popular movement, then as a 3vi$ilante $roup3 an" no! as an 3ur)an terror3 or$anisation. he report en"s !ith an assessment of the prospects for reconciliation )et!een ,a$a", the State an" the $an$s an" an en" to or$anise" violence in the &estern Cape.
*rigins o+ violence

he ori$ins of $an$sterism, "ru$ "ealin$ an" violence on the Cape 9lats lie "eep in the uni;ue social structure of the &estern Cape. 9orce" removals an" other aparthei" policies provi"e a partial )ut )y no means complete e2planation for the violence. he history of the people e2pelle" from the inner city an" Cape o!n3s southern su)ur)s to Manen)er$, +anover ,ar' an" Mitchells ,lain "i" not )e$in or en" !ith the removals. /n the contrary, the removals an" the creation of ne! 3coloure"3 $hettos on the Cape 9lats has to )e seen in the conte2t of the 3s'ollie3 0youn$ hooli$an or la!4)rea'er1 tra"ition of areas such as

District Si2 an" the impact, post4aparthei", of $lo)alisation an" neo4li)eralism on the economy, culture an" social structure of the &estern Cape. Many people )elieve that South .frica3s transition to constitutional "emocracy coinci"e" !ith a massive upsur$e in crime. &hether this is true or not, ,a$a"3s formation in 155> offere" a solution to crime !ith !i"e popular appeal. #nstea" of "epen"in$ on the uncertain efforts of the state, ,a$a" calle" for the empo!erment of communities an" the mo)ilisation of popular opposition to $an$sterism an" "ru$s.
Pagad,s +ormation

,a$a" ori$inate" in a net!or' of hitherto "isparate an" isolate" anti4"ru$, anti4crime $roups an" nei$h)ourhoo" !atches frustrate" )y their ina)ility to tac'le pro)lems !hose roots e2ten"e" far )eyon" their in"ivi"ual localities. ,re"ominantly, )ut )y no means e2clusively Muslim, ,a$a" )e$an !ith a loose or$anisational structure an" an informal, collective style of lea"ership. #t !as open to approaches from other anti4crime $roups an" prepare" at least to consi"er !or'in$ !ith the police. Many of the more violent actions ta'en a$ainst "ru$ "ealers, such as the attac' on %ashaa" Sta$$ie in .u$ust 155?, !ere neither planne" nor formally sanctione" )y the or$anisation as a !hole. Pagad,s development ,a$a"3s "evelopment since these early "ays cannot )e seen simply as the unfol"in$ of a master plan conceive" an" e2ecute" )y a small $roup of #slamic ra"icals. %ather it has to )e vie!e" as the outcome of the interplay )et!een many internal an" e2ternal forces 4 of action )y ,a$a" an" its constituent elements an" reaction )y the State an" its a$encies in the specific political, social an" economic conte2t of the &estern Cape. he state3s vie! of ,a$a" has chan$e" "ramatically over the last four years. 9rom a popular anti4crime movement it has )ecome first a violent, an" therefore ille$itimate, vi$ilante or$anisation an" then, since 1556, an ur)an terror $roup threatenin$ not (ust the State3s monopoly on the use of coercive force )ut the very foun"ations of constitutional "emocracy. #n line !ith these altere" perceptions, the State3s response to ,a$a" has chan$e" from constructive en$a$ement !ith it to "emonisation an" repression. #nsi"e ,a$a", the first t!o years of its e2istence !ere critical. Dissatisfaction !ith the potentially "an$erous spontaneity an" political incoherence of the or$anisation3s early "ays $re! rapi"ly in the secon" half of 155?. So too "i" concern at the increasin$ly violent resistance of "ru$ "ealers to ,a$a"3s esta)lishe" tactic of marchin$ on their homes an" hol"in$ mass pu)lic "emonstrations. Disillusionment !ith the State3s apparent ina)ility to respon" to repeate" "eman"s for action a$ainst the $an$sters !as also )ecomin$ more o)vious. hese chan$es coinci"e" !ith 0an" may !ell have contri)ute" to1 the )ur$eonin$ influence !ithin ,a$a" of more hi$hly politicise" an" or$anisationally e2perience" elements associate" !ith @i)la an" other ra"ical #slamic $roups. o$ether !ith $ro!in$ pressure from the State, this in turn seems to have le" to a series of chan$es in ,a$a" inclu"in$ the emer$ence of a ne! lea"ership, the "evelopment of a ti$hter or$anisational structure an" the a"option of more ro)ust tactics.

Pagad today

Com)ine" !ith or$anic chan$es insi"e the or$anisation, the security forces3 t!in trac' strate$y of ri$orous enforcement an" "emonisation )y association 0!ith $lo)al #slamic 3fun"amentalism31, has succee"e" in transformin$ ,a$a" from a popular mass movement e2ten"in$ )eyon" the )oun"aries of #slam into a smaller, ti$hter, )etter or$anise", )ut also more homo$enous, isolate" an" "efensive $roup. &hen the intervie!s on !hich this report is )ase" !ere con"ucte" in the first half of 2000, security officials an" anti4crime activists ali'e ten"e" to )elieve that ,a$a"3s "ays as a mass movement !ere over. #t mi$ht continue to have a small, mainly mi""le class, )ase in the Muslim community, )ut its )ac' ha" )een )ro'en )y the "etention of more than a hun"re" activists, most of !hom !oul" eventually fin" themselves permanently )ehin" )ars. #f, as is !i"ely )elieve", ,a$a" also e2ists as an un"er$roun" or$anisation structure" into autonomous cells for the purposes of military operations this is as li'ely to )e the conse;uence of increase" State repression as the realisation of some sinister, fun"amentalist master plan.
Pagad and )rban terror

#t remains unclear !hether ,a$a" is responsi)le 0an" if so, to !hat "e$ree1 either for the assassination of more than a "oAen lea"in$ $an$sters in 1556, or for the !ave of )om)in$s that has hit the &estern Cape since the )e$innin$ of that year. Certainly the or$anisation3s attitu"e to!ar"s the t!o 'in"s of violence "iffers mar'e"ly. Stu"iously in"ifferent to the elimination of $an$ lea"ers, ,a$a" has repeate"ly an" pu)licly con"emne" attac's on !hat may )e terme" civilian tar$ets. *om)in$s an" shootin$s have continue" since this research !as complete" in the late autumn of 2000. =overnment ministers have )een ;uic' to )lame ,a$a" 4 an" ,a$a" alone 4 for attac's that inclu"e the shootin$ of &yn)er$ ma$istrate, ,ieter heron, an" the )om)in$ of tar$ets in Constantia, =atesville, /)servatory an" central Cape o!n. #t is impossi)le either to prove or "isprove such claims on the )asis of this research. .ll that can )e sai" is that, in the course of the intervie!s for this research, respon"ents offere" many "ifferent e2planations for the continuin$ violence 0ran$in$ from the assassination of lea"in$ $an$sters to the )om)in$ of the ,lanet +olly!oo" an" St -lmo3s restaurants1, !ho !as )ehin" it an" !hat the motivation of the perpetrators mi$ht )e. .mon$ those hel" responsi)le !ere $an$sters settlin$ ol" scores or fi$htin$ for ne! turf, ro$ue elements connecte" to the security forces see'in$ to un"ermine the cre"i)ility of national or provincial $overnment, an" anti4$an$ militants !hose metho"s ,a$a" either con"ones or con"emns "epen"in$ on the softness of the tar$et.
Cycles o+ violence and the prospects +or reconciliation

The current cycle of violence in the Western Cape is closely if sometimes indistinctly related to earlier cycles. Contemporary events can only be fully understood in the historical context of (for example):

lin's )et!een lea"in$ $an$sters an" security officials for$e" "urin$ the aparthei" era8 co4operation )et!een other $an$sters an" the li)eration movements in the run4 up to the 155B election8 the use, in the "emocratic era, a$ainst or$anisations li'e ,a$a" of security strate$ies "evelope" to counter the opponents of aparthei", an" "ivisions opene" up in the Muslim community of the &estern Cape "urin$ the 3stru$$le3 years )et!een a conservative lea"ership an" ra"icals involve" in the fi$ht a$ainst aparthei" an"Cor the $lo)al politics of ra"ical #slam.

he prospects for )rea'in$ the current cycle of violence to prevent it spirallin$ out of control seem )lea'. Mutual "istrust an" antipathy sour relations )et!een 0even former1 $an$sters, the State, ,a$a" an" other anti4crime activists. Det the alternative to some form of reconciliation process 4 still more ri$orous enforcement action 4 is e;ually unpromisin$.
Preventing violence: the 'ay ahead-

%e"ucin$ levels of violence in the &estern Cape cannot )e achieve" )y !innin$ any 3!ar3 a$ainst crime. #n the short term, there is no practical alternative to constructive en$a$ement )et!een all those stuc' in the current impasse of attac' an" counter4attac', crime an" reaction 4 $an$s, police an" anti4crime $roups. /ver the lon$er term, somethin$ must also )e "one to tac'le the roots of violence in the political economy of $an$sterism an" "ru$ "ealin$ an" their "evastatin$ effects on economic an" social life in nei$h)ourhoo"s across the Cape 9lats. .ntrod)ction
Bac&gro)nd

he Centre for the Stu"y of Violence an" %econciliation 0CSV%1 commissione" this research from the #nstitute of Criminolo$y 0#oC1 at the University of Cape o!n. #t forms part of a lar$er pro$ramme of research )y CSV% on transition, violence an" reconciliation in South .frica. he focus of this stu"y is vi$ilantism an" reven$e violence in the &estern Cape an" its association 4 real or assume" 4 !ith the activities of ,eople .$ainst =an$sterism an" Dru$s 0,a$a"1.1 #n "raftin$ this report !e have sou$ht to concentrate on CSV%3s interests reflecte" in the fun"in$ proposal 0Centre for the Stu"y of Violence an" %econciliation, 15561 for the )roa"er pro(ect of !hich this research forms part. .s !e un"erstan" them, an" as they seem to apply to this particular piece of research, these concerns can )e summarise" as follo!s7

the causes of, an" tren"s in, vi$ilante violence an" reven$e 'illin$s8 the impact of reconciliation strate$ies such as the ruth an" %econciliation Commission 0 %C1 on this form of violence, an" the lessons that can )e learnt from this for the "evelopment of violence prevention strate$ies an" the process of criminal (ustice reform.

Following on from this C!"# also wishes to test three general hypotheses in relation to transition violence and reconciliation in !outh $frican. These propositions can be summed up thus: 1. .lthou$h the nature an" form of violence chan$es "urin$ perio"s of transition from authoritarian to "emocratic rule, the le$acy of past political violence means that its e2tent "oes not. 2. he impact of reconciliation strate$ies such as truth commissions !ill )e limite" unless the chan$in$ nature of violence is reco$nise". E. here is a si$nificant relationship in historically violent societies )et!een victimisation an" violent offen"in$ 4 many violent offen"ers are themselves the victims of violence, an" many victims are also perpetrators. $gainst this bac%ground the &nstitute of Criminology undertoo% to:

trace the "evelopment an" the social an" political ori$ins of vi$ilantism an" reven$e violence in the &estern Cape8 e2amine the impact on reven$e violence an" vi$ilantism of lon$4term processes of reconciliation8 reflect on the lin's, if any, )et!een present, past an" possi)le future cycles of violence, an" assess the implications of the violence an" the impact of reconciliation for reform of the criminal (ustice process an" future strate$ies of violence prevention.

/he research

/ur approach !as to concentrate on ,a$a" an" its various manifestations as a popular movement a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s, a vi$ilante $roup an" an ur)an terrorist or$anisation. /ur aim !as to $o )ehin" the often laAy $eneralisations an" $li) superficialities of the 0no! e2tensive1 me"ia covera$e of the or$anisation to $et a sense of ho! ,a$a" sees itself, an" is seen )y others !ho have ha" "ealin$s !ith it. #n accomplishin$ this !e face" the usual constraints of limite" fun"s an" a limite" timeframe of 16 !ee's !ithin !hich to finish the pro(ect. Moreover, !e !ere also confronte" !ith the e2tremely "elicate tas' of ne$otiatin$ access to or$anisations 4 $an$s, the police an" intelli$ence services an" ,a$a" itself 4 that are not naturally open to the researcher3s critical $aAe, an" "iscussin$ !ith them matters, literally, of life an" "eath. /ur inte$rity as researchers an" the confi"entiality of the research process !as therefore of the essence throu$hout. #nevita)ly perhaps the some!hat am)itious tar$ets !e set ourselves at the outset prove" har" to achieve. .rran$in$ intervie!s !ith ,a$a" an" the $an$s !as more "ifficult an" too' far lon$er than !e ha" anticipate". <or !ere !e a)le to tal' to the ran$e of people !e ha" initially hope" to intervie!. ,a$a", for instance, !ere prepare" to arran$e for us to tal' to an official spo'esperson, )ut it soon )ecame o)vious that !e !oul" not )e a)le to canvass a ran$e of vie!s a)out the or$anisation from the insi"e.

#n the time availa)le to us !e ha" to i"entify intervie!ees an" arran$e intervie!s either throu$h our o!n contacts or those of collea$ues at the #nstitute to !hom !e 0as ever1 are e2tremely $rateful for their help. &e therefore ma'e no claims that our sample of 5 respon"ents is representative of the population of security officials, ,a$a" mem)ers, reforme" $an$sters or anti4crime activists in any strict sense. +o!ever !e "o )elieve that the stories they tol" an" the vie!s they e2presse" are not atypical of the particular constituencies from !hich they are "ra!n.
#ethods

. total of 6 intervie!s involvin$ 5 in"ivi"ual respon"ents !ere con"ucte" for the research. %espon"ents inclu"e" a spo'esperson for ,a$a", t!o anti4crime activists 0one )roa"ly sympathetic to ,a$a", the other more critical of it1, t!o reforme" $an$ mem)ers 0intervie!e" (ointly at their o!n re;uest1, t!o police officials, an" t!o in"epen"ent o)servers.2 #n an i"eal !orl" !e !oul" have li'e" to have spo'en to a much !i"er ran$e of people "irectly involve" in ,a$a" an" in the $an$s )ut 4 as many have foun" )efore us 4 real life rarely lives up to the e2pectations of ea$er researchers. #ntervie!s !ere con"ucte" )y Lisa4Marie Johns 0*ill Di2on !as also present on three occasions1 an" varie" in len$th from three4;uarters of an hour to t!ice that. .ll )ut one of the intervie!s !as in -n$lish 0the other !as mainly )ut not e2clusively in .fri'aans1 an" too' place either at the #nstitute of Criminolo$y or at the respon"ent3s !or'place. .$ain !ith one e2ception 0!here a contemporaneous note !as 'ept1 all the intervie!s !ere tape recor"e" !ith the consent of the intervie!ee an" have )een transcri)e" in full.
/he report

his report reflects CSV%3s concerns an" our constraints in some important !ays. 9irstly 4 thou$h !e use me"ia reportin$ of events as the )asis for the chronolo$y !ith !hich the report )e$ins 4 !e have ten"e" to rely for the most part on the primary intervie! "ata collecte" specifically for this research rather than secon"ary material accessi)le to anyone !ith access to a li)rary an" an internet connection. #n referrin$ to this material !e have sou$ht to maintain respon"ents3 confi"entiality )y attri)utin$ "irect ;uotations to in"ivi"uals in the follo!in$ !ay 3F@uotation G 0%n, "ate of intervie!1H3. . secon" point is that the "ata !e collecte" "oes not reveal a sin$le truth a)out the events of the last > years in the &estern Cape, ho! they relate to earlier cycles of violence, an" ho! attempts at !hat may )roa"ly )e terme" reconciliation have faile". /n the contrary it reflects multiple truths 4 truths that may )e easy to "ismiss as partial an" su)(ective )ut !hich appear su)stantial an" convincin$ to those !ho )elieve in them.E .s o)servers !ith not much more than ei$ht intervie!s, a lar$e pile of ne!spaper clippin$s an" 0in L4MJ3s case1 a lon$4term research interest in the su)(ect to $o on it !oul" )e arro$ant of us to see' to ar)itrate )et!een these truths. hus our aim here is to "o no more than present these multiple truths as honestly as possi)le an" then to use these narratives as !e !ill call them as a )asis for some necessarily tentative ans!ers to the ;uestions a)out violence, prevention an" reconciliation !ith !hich CSV% is concerne". his report )e$ins !ith an attempt to set vi$ilantism an" reven$e violence in the &estern

Cape in its historical conte2t. &e then present a short chronolo$y of events since ,a$a"3s launch in 155>. his chronolo$y is inten"e" as an anchor for the narratives an" analysis that follo!. #n an area !here even the most apparently trivial happenin$ can )ecome investe" !ith massive si$nificance an" su)(ecte" to numerous incompati)le interpretations, !e try to "istin$uish )et!een fact, speculation an" opinion in a section )ase" mainly on me"ia reports that ten" to )e an unhelpful mi2ture of all three. Some of the "isparate threa"s in the competin$ narratives offere" )y ,a$a", the reforme" $an$sters an" the State are pulle" to$ether in the ne2t section of the report !here !e "eal more "irectly !ith the formation an" "evelopment of ,a$a", its current status, the connection )et!een present an" past cycles of violence, the impact of an" prospects for reconciliation, an" the lessons to )e learnt for the "evelopment of violence prevention strate$ies an" the reform of policin$ an" criminal (ustice. . conclu"in$ section then sets out to summarise the evi"ence !e have collecte" in so far as it relates to CSV%3s three hypotheses an" en"s !ith some su$$estions a)out the future "irection that the process of reconciliation mi$ht ta'e in the &estern Cape. Conte t %nd *rigins . research report of this nature is not the place to attempt to unravel the comple2 an" controversial aetiolo$y of violence, $an$sterism an" the "ru$ tra"e in the &estern Cape. . !i"e variety of e2planations is alrea"y on offer. 9rom the point of vie! of criminolo$ical theory most consist of an eclectic mi2 of i"eas !ith neo4Mertonian notions of anomie an" Chica$o School social "isor$anisation theories particularly prominent. .ll are leavene" !ith ritual references to the pernicious le$acy of aparthei" an" some han"4!rin$in$ a)out the shortcomin$s of States in transition.B Criminolo$ically unsatisfactory thou$h these accounts may )e as e2planations for the e2tent an" persistence of violence an" $an$sterism, it is har" to improve upon them !ithin the confines of this stu"y. .t the ris' of mu""yin$ the !aters still further !hat !e present in this section is a "istillation of the main conte2tual factors lyin$ )ehin" the all too familiar pro)lems of $an$sterism, "ru$s an" vi$ilante action as i"entifie" )y the people !e spo'e to in the course of this research.
Demographic di++erence: 'hat is to become o+ ,die br)inmense,-

-ven if they "i" not ma'e the point e2plicitly, all our respon"ents !ere clear a)out one thin$7 they, an" !e, !ere tal'in$ a)out $an$sterism, "ru$s an" vi$ilantism in a very specific "emo$raphic conte2t7 the so4calle" coloure" population of the Cape 9lats. he &estern Cape is, of course, one of only t!o provinces !ith a coloure" ma(ority 0the other is the <orthern Cape1. .ccor"in$ to the 155? census >BI of the province3s E.5 million inha)itants are coloure" an" aroun" a thir" of these are Muslim 0+affa(ee, 20001. .s !e shall see, the "istinctive "emo$raphic profile of the &estern Cape !ith its su)stantial !hite minority 020.6I1 an" relatively small )lac'C.frican population 020.5I1 looms lar$e in the min"s of those !ho, li'e the reforme" $an$sters !e spo'e to, see 3"ie )ruinmense3 0the )ro!n people1 as "oome" )y their ori$ins to a mar$inal e2istence 4 not !hite enou$h in the eyes of the ol" aparthei" $overnment, not )lac' enou$h for the ne!.
Ghettos b)ilt on sand: the legacy o+ grand apartheid

hat the &estern Cape is so "emo$raphically "istinctive is no historical acci"ent )ut the

"eli)erate conse;uence of the social policies of $ran" aparthei". he lo!er mi""le an" !or'in$ class coloure" $hettos of the Cape 9lats that e2ten" from Mitchells ,lain on the shores of 9alse *ay throu$h Laven"er +ill, Manen)er$, +anover ,ar', +ei"evel", *onteheu!el an" -lsies %iver to Jensin$ton an" *roo'lyn in the north are a pro"uct of the Cape3s lon$4stan"in$ status as a coloure" la)our preference area com)ine" !ith the !aves of force" removals that sa! non4!hite people )ull"oAe" out of their homes in District Si2 an" e(ecte" from the southern su)ur)s of <e!lan"s, Claremont an" &yn)er$.> he social "islocation of force" 4 often repeate" 4 removals to purpose )uilt $hettos lac'in$ )oth )asic communal amenities an" local sources of employment too' its toll on people !hose e2istence on the social an" economic mar$ins of !hite South .frica ha" al!ays )een precarious. .ccountin$ for the initial popularity of ,a$a" as the 3saviours3 of many a $an$4 ri""en to!nship nei$h)ourhoo", one o)server ha" this to say7 /ne nee"s to un"erstan" that the people involve" here really FareH mostly the coloure" community, an" these !ere the people remove" from District Si2 !ho have )een "umpe" in *onteheu!el an" these places !hich !ere really $roun"s for the $ro!th of social evils, particularly $an$sterism an" "ru$s. So one !oul" e2pect G that these people !oul" !elcome Fa $roup li'e ,a$a"H an" # thin' they ha" tremen"ous support amon$st the or"inary people 0%>, 10 .pril 20001. .nother respon"ent also tal'e" at some len$th a)out the impact of the removals on the informal net!or's of communal !elfare an" social control, )uilt aroun" the mos;ue an" the #mam, that ha" operate" in District Si2 an" else!here. hat infrastructure !as, # thin', "ramatically )ro'en "urin$ the aparthei" removal. # "on3t thin' people actually ever $ot to$ether. . lot of Muslims still thin' nostal$ically of 3this is ho! !e use" to "o thin$s3 )ut in actual fact that is not the reality. F/Hne can spea' a)out the aparthei" removals an" you 'no! that G as the people move" out into the to!nships they still pai" alle$iance FtoH !here they move" out from, li'e Muir Street or mos;ues in &oo"stoc'. So they !oul" still $o there on -i" or on a special occasion, )ut there is no community left there 4 only the memory of the community that use" to )e 0%?, B .pril 20001. raumatic thou$h the removals !ere, all the )lame for the $ra"ual collapse of tra"itional mechanisms of social control cannot )e lai" at the "oor of the aparthei" planners. .s'e" a)out the role of #mams in provi"in$ counsellin$ an" support for "ru$ users in the imme"iate pre4,a$a" years, this o)server also pointe" to other, more recent, challen$es to tra"itional !ays of "ealin$ !ith "eviance. # "on3t thin' that Fthe tra"itional, mos;ue4)ase" systemH !as !or'in$ throu$hout. #t !asn3t !or'in$ sufficiently. #t3s )ase" on very small types of societies. Dou )asically have a community, a mos;ue, the #mam at the hea" of the mos;ue an" every)o"y )ein$ loyal an" o)e"ient or least payin$ alle$iance to the mos;ue. hat mo"el actually $oes )ac' to the nineteenth century G an" # thin' the pro)lem !e G face" at the en" of the 1560s F!asH that the mos;ue system !as not sufficient, partly )ecause of the fact that the community F!asH $ro!in$ very )i$ an" !e have a much lar$er society than the small little

communities livin$ ne2t "oor. #n many cases Muslims continue to spea' a)out their G counsellin$ systems aroun" #mams )ut in reality they "on3t often !or', partly )ecause their techni;ues are out"ate" 4 they haven3t 'ept up !ith the times as it !ere, they haven3t 'ept up !ith the "ifferent socialisation of the person. G F9Hor e2ample if a !oman FhasH pro)lems 4 "ru$ pro)lems or other social pro)lems G the 'in"s of solutions they offer G people mi$ht not re(ect them )ut in principle they "on3t thin' they3re sufficient. So often the 'in" of solution they !oul" say is, 3Dou al!ays have to )e aroun" Muslims. Dou must pray re$ularly3. /r 3&omen must accept the lea"ership of their hus)an"s or the authority of the hus)an"3. *ut FpeopleH are not prepare" to ta'e these 'in"s of solutions G they use" to !or' )efore, )ut no!a"ays they "on3t !or' 0%?, B .pril 20001.
.slam: a +aith divided-0

.s these e2tracts su$$est, the Muslim communities of the &estern Cape are not 4 an" pro)a)ly never have )een 4 )astions of reli$ious ortho"o2y an" political unanimity. #n"ee" one respon"ent sa! the 3,a$a" phenomenon3 as a s'irmish in a lar$er )attle for the very soul of South .frican #slam "atin$ )ac' !ell over thirty years )et!een those for !hom the "istinction )et!een reli$ion an" politics !as meanin$less an" others !hose commitment to the li)eration stru$$le o!e" little to their reli$ious faith. &hen the stru$$le a$ainst aparthei" reache" its hei$ht in the 1560s these "ifferences )ecame o)vious7 hen there !as the )i$ start !ith "eli)erations 4 in the 1560s 4 Fa)outH the formation of the Unite" Democratic 9ront as to !hether Muslims shoul" no! actively participate in the li)eration stru$$le on the )asis of the reli$ion as they un"erstan" it comprehensively no! Fas a !ay of life, !ith its o!n political a$en"aH. .n" it !as a very, very intense "e)ate an" that is !here the FMuslim DouthH Movement split, for instance. F/Hne vie! !as that no, they shoul" not FparticipateH 4 they shoul" first of all 3islamise3 the community, $et their un"erstan"in$ ri$ht, their thou$hts ri$ht. hen there !ere others Fnames himself an" t!o !ell4'no!n pu)lic fi$uresH !ho sai" 3<o. &e are South .frican. &e nee" to $et involve" in thin$s li'e that3. .n" !e parte" !ays there G !e parte" !ays 0%>, 10 .pril 20001. #n effect he ar$ue" that the 3,a$a" phenomenon3 ha" to )e seen in the historical conte2t of a lon$4"ra!n out stru$$le !ithin the Cape Muslim communities )et!een the tra"itionally conservative, an" stu"iously apolitical, lea"ership of the Muslim Ju"icial Council, in"ivi"ual charterists !ho too' up the politics of li)eration an" ra"ical #slamic $roups inspire" )y the revolution in #ran !ho, thou$h active on the mar$ins of the anti4aparthei" stru$$le, preferre" political #slam to constitutional "emocracy as their ultimate $oal.K
/he politics o+ nationalism

#ntert!ine" !ith these tensions !ithin #slam is the uni;uely fracture" political tra"ition of the Cape. hou$h rarely referre" to "irectly )y our respon"ents, competin$ strains of nationalism 4 the racial nationalisms fostere" un"er aparthei" an" !rit lar$e in the policies of the 0ol"1 <ational ,arty an" the ne! 0some!hat am)i$uous1 .frican nationalism of the

mainstream li)eration movements 4 are reflecte" in fault lines runnin$ throu$h the coloure" population of the Cape.6 #n the e)) an" flo! of "emocratic politics in"ivi"uals have foun" it relatively easy to ma'e the transition from one tra"ition to the other. Committe" tricameralists have )ecome lea"in$ li$hts in the .<C. Det, for the most part, the ur)an !or'in$ class coloure" vote has remaine" stu))ornly loyal to the 0no! <e!1 <ational ,artyCDemocratic .lliance 0<<,CD.1 as its most "epen"a)le )ul!ar' a$ainst the "an$ers of )lac' ma(ority rule. .s a result the &estern Cape remains 4 t!o $eneral elections into South .frica3s ne! "emocracy 4 the only province !here provincial $overnment provi"es an institutional )ase for the politics of opposition. hus, tension )et!een the t!o tra"itions 4 )et!een an <<,CD.4le" provincial a"ministration an" a national $overnment firmly in the han"s of the .<C 4 remains )uilt into the political architecture of the &estern Cape.
/he catalyst: crime, gangsters and dr)gs

#t is a$ainst this infinitely comple2 an" "ynamic "emo$raphic, social, an" political )ac'$roun" that ,a$a" emer$e" in 155>. *ut 4 an" here a$ain this seeme" so o)vious to our respon"ents as to )e almost un!orthy of comment 4 the catalyst for its emer$ence !as crime or, to )e more specific, the !i"esprea" popular perception that, alon$ !ith li)eration, ha" come licence an" la!lessness. &hether either crime in $eneral or the particular 'in"s of crime 4 violence, "ru$ "ealin$ an" so on 4 associate" !ith $an$sterism really "i" increase "urin$ the transition of the early 1550s is a ;uestion that !ill pro)a)ly never )e ans!ere" to the satisfaction of criminolo$ists !ith a professional "istaste for official statistics an" a nose for a moral panic.5 <or is there over!helmin$ evi"ence that levels of fear of crime too' off over this perio". Det, !hatever the criminolo$ical sceptics mi$ht say, crime !as clearly re$ar"e" )y enou$h people as a )i$ enou$h pro)lem for the simple messa$e of the $roup3s name 4 ,eople .$ainst =an$sterism an" Dru$s 4 to resonate !ith lar$e num)ers of people across the Cape 9lats. .s one cautious o)server of ,a$a"3s su""en rise to prominence put it, popular support for a $roup prepare" to 3)eat the "rum3 a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s !as 3massive3. &ith the family, the mos;ues an" the other institutions of civil society apparently incapa)le of resistin$ the $an$sters an" the "ru$ "ealers, an" the State una)le 0or un!illin$1 to act a$ainst them, the time !as ripe for an or$anisation prepare" to confront the pro)lem hea" on, !ithout compromise, an" !ithout fear of the conse;uences of confrontation. +o! ,a$a" emer$e" an" !hat happene" to it is controversial an" forms the su)(ect matter of the ne2t t!o sections. Chronology .ny chronolo$y of an or$anisation that has attracte" !i"esprea" me"ia interest from the "ay it !as esta)lishe", must )e selective. &hat !e have trie" to "o here is not (ust to pic' out the main events of the last four an" a half years, )ut to $ive some sense of the controversies, alle$ations an" counter4alle$ations that have s!irle" aroun" ,a$a", the $an$s, the State, an" the interaction )et!een them, since the en" of 155>.
1223

December

,eople a$ainst =an$sterism an" Dru$s 0,a$a"1 is esta)lishe".

1220

January - June ,a$a" hol"s pu)lic meetin$s, "emonstrations an" marches.

#ay Pagad marches to parliament to call on relevant $overnment "epartments to a""ress the pro)lems of $an$sterism an" "ru$s. Marchers $ive the $overnment ?0 "ays to respon". Dissatisfie" !ith the $overnment3s response, ,a$a" )e$ins a pro$ramme of action marchin$ to "ru$ "ealers3 homes an" issuin$ ultimatums to them to stop "ru$ "ealin$.

%)g)st Rashaad Staggie 0t!in )rother of %ashie" Sta$$ie an" co4lea"er of the +ar" Livin$s, one of the most po!erful $an$s in the &estern Cape1 is attac'e" an" 'ille" follo!in$ a ,a$a" protest march to his house in Lon"on %oa", Salt %iver. Journalists an" photo$raphers at the scene alle$e that ,a$a" mem)ers threatene" them 0=ol"in$4Duffy, 155?1. . prominent mem)er of ,a$a", .li 'Phantom' ,ar'er, calls for a 3(iha"3 0holy !ar1 a$ainst $an$sters an" "ru$4"ealers. Later ,a$a" insists it is neither militant, nor e2clusively Muslim, nor a vi$ilante $roup. Pagad issues an ultimatum to $an$s to stop "ru$ "ealin$ )y Mon"ay 12 .u$ust 155?. =an$sters respon" )y threatenin$ to )urn "o!n mos;ues an" "isrupt schools an" Muslim )usinesses. hey !arn ,a$a" of the "an$ers of startin$ a full4scale !ar. ,a$a" mem)er, 9aiAel %y'lief, is 'ille" in !hat is )elieve" to )e a revenge attack by gangsters. Pagad receives international media attention, )ut har"ly of a positive 'in". Covera$e refers to the threat of 3heili$er 'rie$3 0holy !ar1 0Jnemeyer, 155?1 )y 3#slamic militants3 0$gence France 'ress, 10.6.155?1. Me"ia reports lin' ,a$a" !ith ,alestinian an" Le)anese $roups, +amas an" +eA)ollah an" tal' of secret military trainin$ camps )ein$ esta)lishe". he -m)assy of the #slamic %epu)lic of Iran denies any links ith Pagad in a letter to a ne!spaper. ,a$a"3s +ea" of Security, <a"thmie -"ries, is arreste" on char$es of se"ition. .li ,ar'er an" 9arou' Jaffer are !ante" on similar char$es. The allegations against all three are ithdra n a month later.

Signs o! internal divisions in ,a$a" )e$in to emer$e !ith alle$ations that it has fallen un"er the control of ra"ical #slamic $roup, @i)la. @i)la lea"er, .chmat Cassiem, is profile" in the me"ia as a 'holy arrior'.

September . ne!spaper hea"line proclaims, '"angs mobilise as Pagad splits' 0Lu"s'i L van Villa, 155?1. Community /utreach 9orum 0Core1 is forme". #t is sai" to )e an um)rella )o"y inclu"in$ lea"ers from the most po!erful $an$s in the &estern Cape. #t claims to inclu"e )oth current an" reforme" $an$sters. Core sta$es a protest march on ,arliament callin$ for 3present an" previous $overnments3 to 3accept responsi)ility for them turnin$ to crime3. Parker# Ja!!er and $dries are 'e%pelled' from ,a$a" follo!in$ a meetin$ at the +a)i)ia mos;ue. ,ar'er claims that his e2pulsion is the result of his 3"iscovery of @i)la3s hi""en a$en"a3. ,ar'er an" Jaffer re$ister a section 21 company in the name of 3,a$a"3.

*ctober !o )rothers, &ur and '(eer )ooley# are arrested in connection !ith the Sta$$ie 'illin$. 'Police get tough on Pagad' say the hea"lines 09rie"man, 155?1. he $overnment announce that the open carryin$ of firearms at pu)lic $atherin$s !ill not )e tolerate". #n a""ition, it is announce" that the 15?5 ,rohi)ition of Dis$uises .ct !ill also )e applie" if necessary. he police, un"er mountin$ pressure to )e seen to )e 3"oin$ somethin$ a)out crime3, rai" "ru$ "ealers3 homes an" fin" petrol )om)s an" $uns.

4ovember * Pagad protest at the &aterfront results in a clash !ith police. he )rother of a Muslim cleric is fatally shot. here are alle$ations that a @i)la4le" faction of ,a$a" provo'e" the shootin$. ,a$a" calls for a )oycott of the Cape Times in protest at the paper3s misrepresentation of the or$anisation as fun"amentalist. Lea"in$ Muslim or$anisations inclu"in$ the Muslim Ju"icial Council 0MJC1, Call of #slam, an" the #slamic Council of South .frica 0#CS.1 4 to$ether !ith prominent clerics an" aca"emics 4 call for ,a$a" to 'mobilise public a areness ithout violating any la s' 0Financial (ail, 22.10.155?1. .slam oefy emer$es as a leading spokesperson for ,a$a". #t is alle$e" that he is also a mem)er of @i)la.

December )isagreements about firearms and mas%s inhi)it attempts to me"iate )et!een ,a$a" an" the $overnment. Pagad protests outsi"e Cape o!n #nternational .irport to hi$hli$ht the nee" to control the influ2 of "ru$s at ma(or entry points. he protest is "eclare" ille$al an" several ,a$a" mem)ers are arreste". Supporters protest a$ainst the arrests at *ellville Ma$istrates3 Court. ,olice accuse ,a$a" of havin$ )ecome '+ust another gang' an" 'part o! the crime problem' 0Cape $rgus, 20.12.155?1.

1225

Increasing violence on the Cape 9lats is attri)ute" to inter4$an$ conflicts, as !ell as attac's an" counter4attac's involvin$ )oth the $an$s an" ,a$a". he me"ia report further "ivisions in ,a$a". Many reli$ious lea"ers move to "istance themselves from ,a$a". Community ra"io station K6? is foun" $uilty of )iase" reportin$ an" accuse" of incitin$ people to violence. .n article in a *ritish ne!spaper alle$es that the #slamic Unity Convention 0#UC1 is )ehin" the formation of %a"io K6? an" is usin$ it to promote @i)la3s ra"ical political a$en"a 0Financial Times *nline, 1?.6.155?1. Late in the year the police launch 'peration Recoil to cur) the escalatin$ violence involvin$ $an$s, "ru$ "ealers an" anti4crime $roups.

%pril . ,a$a" 'drug a areness' meetin$ is "isrupte" in Manen)er$ an" ,a$a" mem)ers are chase" out of the area. . "ru$ "ealer3s home in the *o4Jaap is attacked and burnt do n. %eports emer$e in the press that ,a$a" mem)ers are alle$e"ly )ein$ traine" in Li)ya an" .f$hanistan. ,a$a" ma'es overtures to the Pan *!ricanist ,ongress -P*,.10 ami"st alle$ations that the or$anisation is plannin$ to contest the 1555 elections 0 hiel, 155K1. ,ore announces it is callin$ in the "e)t they claim the .<C $overnment 3o!e" them for support in the li)eration stru$$le3. %ashie" Sta$$ie, a lea"in$ li$ht in Core an" )rother of the late %ashaa", says he !ill contest the 1555 elections 0 hiel, 155K1.

$)ne

Cape o!n is )i""in$ to host the /001 'lympic "ames. he )i" committee meets !ith anti4crime $roups an" $an$s to a""ress the crime pro)lem. ,a$a" threatens to )oycott the sponsors of the /lympic *i" ar$uin$ that it is impossi)le to have 3normal sport in an a)normal, "ru$4fille" society3 0 he Star, K.>.155K1.

September Several mos;ues an" !ell4'no!n Muslim )usinessmen are attac'e" an" a num)er of people are 'ille". ,ress reports lin' the attac's to the continuing ' ar' bet een Pagad and the gangs 0Cape imes, 2B.5.155K1.

*ctober .nother attempt at co4operation )et!een Pagad and the police is initiate" only to )e suspen"e" three !ee's later )ecause ,a$a" claim that the police are not intereste" in a""ressin$ their concerns 0Jaco)s, 155K1.

4ovember &ational ,o-ordinator *slam Toe!y# resigns !rom Pagad. here are su$$estions that he "isa$rees !ith @i)la lea"ers over strate$y an" the use of violence. -vi"ence of apparent police complicity in the activities of )oth "ru$4"ealers an" ,a$a" surfaces 0Duffy, 155K8 /liver, 155K1. Rival gang ar bet een 2ard 3ivings and ,lever 4ids appears to resume after three4year respite.

1226

. strin$ of prominent $an$ mem)ers are 'ille" in "rive4)y shootin$s in the first ;uarter of 1556. .mon$ the "ea" are Moenee) .)rahams, Leonar" .chilles an" #van /liver of the +ar" Livin$s, as !ell as Jaty4.nn .ren"se an" 9arie" Davi"s of he 9irm.

$an)ary he year opens !ith claims that Pagad is a spent !orce an" that internal lea"ership s;ua))les have ren"ere" the or$anisation ineffective 0Vernon, 15561. Lans"o!ne police station is )om)e".

7ebr)ary he trial o! '(eer )ooley opens. +e faces char$es of mur"er, ro))ery, pu)lic violence an" unla!ful possession of a firearm an" ammunition in connection !ith the events of B .u$ust 155? an" the "eath of %ashaa" Sta$$ie. 9resh alle$ations of police corruption an" an un!illin$ness to com)at crime are

ma"e 0Duffy, 15561 Consi"eration is $iven to ne! le$islation aime" at proscri)in$ $an$ mem)ership an" participation in $an$4relate" activities 0Le May, 15561.

#arch 9our youths are mur"ere" at the &aterfront. Pagad member# Da ood 'sman, is sentence" 0<ovem)er 15551 to E2 years imprisonment for his part in the attac'. 5ulti *gency Delivery *ction 5echanism -5adam. is launche" !ith the aim of re"ucin$ $an$sterism an" normalisin$ community life )y encoura$in$ a partnership approach to crime prevention.

%pril Pagad clashes ith gangsters in 5itchells Plain. Several pipe an" petrol )om)s e2plo"e the same evenin$.

#ay Pipe bombs are thro!n at the homes of t!o !ealthy Muslim )usinessmen.

$)ne Me"ia reports of a ne! Pagad 'hit s6uad' appear. he $roup is sai" to )e in"epen"ent of the $roup3s e2istin$ military !in$ 0'no!n as the =4force1 !hich is suppose" to have )een infiltrate" )y )oth police an" $an$s. Police intelligence ac'no!le"$es that it is still unclear a)out the precise source of the violence )ecause of confusion )et!een inter4$an$ !ars an" attac's on $an$s an" "ru$ merchants )y ,a$a" 0Van Milla, 15561. Mo!)ray police station is "ama$e" in a bomb attack.

$)ly he home of prominent aca"emic, -)rahim Moosa, is the tar$et of a pipe bomb attack.

%)g)st ,harges against '(eer )ooley in relation to the Sta$$ie 'illin$ are "roppe" as the State3s case collapses, ostensi)ly )ecause of tensions )et!een operational police an" the intelli$ence community. .n e%plosion outside the )ellville o!!ices o! the special police task team investi$atin$ ,a$a" results in the "eath of a street ven"or.

Planet 2olly ood Restaurant at the Victoria L .lfre" 0VL. 1&aterfront is )om)e", leavin$ t!o people "ea" an" 2? in(ure". he attac' is sai" to )e a response to recent attac's )y the Unite" States of .merica on alle$e" terrorist )ases in Su"an an" .f$hanistan. Pagad restates its commitment to !ighting gangsterism and drugs, )ut "enies claims that they are losin$ support. hey also criticise the me"ia for hol"in$ ,a$a" responsi)le for )om) attac's. he phrase 'urban terror' )e$ins to ma'e re$ular appearances in official statements an" me"ia reportin$ on violence in the Cape.

4ovember #smail .pril 0alias *o))y Mon$rel1, lea"er of he Mon$rels $an$, an" .mericans $an$ supremo, Jac'ie Lonte, are gunned do n7 "overnment-issue eapons are reporte"ly use" in )oth shootin$s. Pagad member# $brahim Jeneker# is arrested in connection !ith the 'illin$ of Moenee) .)rahams, )ut the case soon collapses for lac' of evi"ence. 9our attempte" mur"er char$es a$ainst ,a$a"3s <ational Co4or"inator, .)"us Salaam -)rahim, are !ith"ra!n )ecause evi"ence has )een tampere" !ith. .ttempte" mur"er cases a$ainst -)rahim an" nine other ,a$a" mem)ers are postpone" !hen t o itnesses are shot 0Carter L Mertons, 1556)1.

December . )om) e2plo"es outsi"e a syna$o$ue in &yn)er$. here are )om) attac's in %etreat, Lans"o!ne an" Sher!oo" ,ar' over the Christmas an" <e! Dear holi"ays.

1222

1555 is the year of South .frica3s secon" "emocratic elections.

$an)ary he <e! Dear is ushere" in !ith a car bomb e%plosion at the V 8 * 9ater!ront. Days later an attac' on the Claremont police station is sai" to )e the !or' of vi$ilantes. ,a$a" accuse the police of runnin$ a smear campai$n a$ainst them 0The !tar, 6.1.15551. * Pagad member is shot "urin$ a protest a$ainst the visit of *ritish ,rime Minister, ony *lair, at the Castle in central Cape o!n 0+lectronic (ail , -uardian, 15551. )ombs e%plode outsi"e the Cale"on S;uare an" &oo"stoc' police stations.

'peration "ood 2ope is launched as a continuation of earlier anti4ur)an terror operations, %ecoil an" Sala"in. Le$islation "esi$ne" to cur) ur)an terrorism is intro"uce" in ,arliament 0Chan"ler, 15551. Senior detective# )ennie 3ategan# is 'assassinated' on the Cape 9lats. +e ha" )een investi$atin$ the <e! Dear3s Day car )om)in$, as !ell as the alle$e" role in the violence of prominent mem)ers of )oth ,a$a" an" the $an$s.

#arch 5uslim businessman Ra!iek Parker is killed in a "rive4)y shootin$ in .thlone. . similar inci"ent at Cape o!n #nternational .irport results in the "eath of a senior "etective !or'in$ on ur)an terror cases.

%pril Claims are ma"e that a backlog on court rolls is hamperin$ /peration =oo" +ope. #t emer$es that Rashied Staggie has become a born-again ,hristian. *dielah '5ama *merica' Davids# her daughter and niece are 'ille" in a shootin$ at their =rassy ,ar' hair salon. Reports o! a 'hitlist' o! prominent 5uslim businessmen coinci"e !ith the shootin$ of =atesville )usinessman, ."am Vinoos 0Smith, 15551. Later in the year a ,a$a" mem)er name" %a$moe"ien Jene'er is char$e" !ith the mur"er of Vinoos. +e is "enie" )ail an" the issue of !itness intimi"ation is hi$hli$hte" in the me"ia 0Mail L =uar"ian, 1.6.15551. Pagad is alleged to be running an e%tortion racket "eman"in$ protection money from Muslim )usinessmen. .ttac's are then "irecte" at non4payers an" anyone suspecte" of "ru$ "ealin$ 0Mail L =uar"ian, 1.6.15551. &ell4'no!n $an$ster "len 4ahn is killed in a drive-by shooting.

#ay he :S State Department classi!ies Pagad and ;ibla as terrorist $roups. he #slamic Unity Convention 0#UC1 calls on Muslims to )oycott the June 2 elections. Police uncover plans !or a pre-election bombing campaign by Pagad 0The !unday Times, 1?.>.15551. ,a$a" opens a "ru$ counsellin$ centre in %ylan"s. . car )om) e2plo"es outsi"e .thlone police station.

%)g)st ,a$a" mem)er an" intelligence in!ormer, .yo) Mun$alee 0arreste" in 9e)ruary 15551 claims that $an$sters !ere )ein$ supplie" !ith police4issue arms an" ammunition from =auten$ 0Merton L <$o)eni, 15551 he ne! elite 3police3 unit, the Scorpions, ta'es over the investi$ation of ur)an terror an" or$anise" crime.

4ovember The )lah )ar in "reen Piont is bombed. +omopho)ia is thou$ht to )e a possi)le motive for the attac'. * pipe bomb e%plodes inside the St $lmo's pi((eria in ,amps )ay. Community Safety M-C Mar' &iley imme"iately accuses ,a$a" of )ein$ responsi)le for the attac'.

December here are reports that /peration =oo" +ope is to )e !oun" up. Deon 5ostert is arrested in connection ith the St $lmo's bombing. +e claims to )e a police informer an" to have )een involve" in )oth the St -lmo3s an" *lah *ar )om)in$s. #t su)se;uently emer$es that he !as !or'in$ for a =auten$4)ase" police anti4corruption unit. he Mostert sa$a lea"s to rene!e" alle$ations of police complicity in ur)an terror. ,a$a"3s .)"us Salaam -)rahim is arreste" in connection !ith the mur"er of %ashaa" Sta$$ie.

8999

$an)ary #t is announce" that /peration =oo" +ope is to )e restructure" to !or' on ur)an terror in tan"em !ith the Scorpions. .yo) Mun$alee, e2 ,a$a" mem)er an" intelli$ence informer, implicates one of his former collea$ues in the ,lanet +olly!oo" )om)in$.

7ebr)ary he State opposes .)"us Salaam -)rahim3s application for )ail on the $roun"s of possi)le itness intimidation. . police captain claims to 'no! of a !itness a)le to i"entify ,a$a" mem)ers involve" in *ennie Late$an3s 'illin$ 0Cape .r$us, 5.2.20001

#ay T o State itnesses involve" in the Late$an mur"er case an" another case concernin$ an e2plosion outsi"e the &yn)er$ Ma$istrate3s Court earlier in the year are murdered. Pagad marches in Ta!elsig# 5itchells Plain. .n e2chan$e of fire )et!een ,a$a" marchers an" arme" $an$ mem)ers follo!s. Several ,a$a" mem)ers are arreste" an" char$e" !ith pu)lic violence, $atherin$ ille$ally an" the ille$al possession of firearms. . )om) !rappe" in a plastic )a$ is foun" on the pavement outsi"e the &e <ork )agel restaurant in Sea Point. he "evice is safely "iffuse" )ut, a month later, a car )om) e2plo"es outsi"e the same venue in(urin$ three people.

$)ly * bomb e%plodes at ,ape To n International *irport. Director of ,u)lic ,rosecutions, *ulelani <c$u'a )lames ,a$a" for the )last.

%)g)st . car )om) e2plo"es outsi"e a coffee shop in the upmarket ,onstantia Village shopping comple%. Safety an" Security Minister, Steve sh!ete, alle$es that the )om)in$ is ,a$a"3s response to the arrest of four ,a$a" mem)ers. . lin' !ith the conviction earlier in the "ay of another ,a$a" mem)er, #smail -"!ar"s, for the attempte" mur"er of a "ru$ "ealer is also su$$este". . spo'esperson for ,a$a" con"emns the )om)in$ an" "enies ,a$a"3s involvement in the inci"ent. . !ee' later another car )om) is "etonate" outsi"e The )ron%, a !ell4'no!n $ay ni$ht4spot in =reen ,oint. en "ays later the thir" car )om) of the month $oes off "urin$ the afternoon rush hour on .""erley Street in the heart of Cape o!n3s C*D.

September 9ynberg magistrate# Pieter Theron, is 'ille" in the "rive!ay of his ,lumstea" home. .$ain the fin$er is pointe" in ,a$a"3s "irection )ecause he !as presi"in$ in several cases involvin$ the or$anisation3s mem)ers. he ne2t evenin$ a )om) $oes off on the "oorstep of a popular local cafN in the stu"ent su)ur) of /)servatory. Det another )om) e2plo"es outsi"e the Sama+ ,entre in "atesville on the Cape 9lats !here the ne!ly forme" Democratic .lliance is a)out to hol" a rally. Seven people are in(ure". &estern Cape provincial premier, =eral" Mor'el, !al's past the "evice secon"s )efore it "etonates.

T o Pagad members are !ound guilty o! murdering a seven-year-old girl in /cean Vie!. Chrystal .)rahams !as cau$ht in the crossfire )et!een a $roup of arme" protestors an" a suspecte" "ru$ "ealer an" his )o"y$uar"s. he t!o men, .)"ura$hman he)us an" Mo$amat ."ams, "i" not fire the fatal shots an" are convicte" of mur"er un"er the "octrine of common purpose. hey each receive ei$ht years3 imprisonment suspen"e" for five years on con"ition that they "o three years3 community service an" are not convicte" of a violent crime "urin$ the perio" of suspension. he follo!in$ "ay &estern Cape Director of ,u)lic ,rosecutions, 9ran' Jahn, announces that he is to see' leave to appeal a$ainst the 3shoc'in$ly inappropriate3 sentences. *usiness .$ainst Crime launches a '&ame the )ombers' campaign !ith a %2 million re!ar". Sa!ety and Security 5inister# Steve Tsh ete# and Justice 5inister# Penuell 5aduna# proclaim that Pagad is responsible !or the spate o! bombings in Cape o!n. #n response, ,a$a" threatens to see' an inter"ict restrainin$ them from lin'in$ the or$anisation to the attac's. he pressure for ne anti-terrorism legislation mounts as Minister sh!ete "eclares !ar on ,a$a". he +uman %i$hts Commission remains sceptical a)out the $overnment3s plans. #t is reporte" that a hi$h level "ele$ation is to visit .l$eria for a"vice on "ealin$ !ith terrorism.

*ctober .n attempt )y four a!aitin$4trial ,a$a" mem)ers to )e returne" to ,ollsmoor from prisons in the *olan" fails ami" alle$ations that shootings and bombings are being planned from insi"e the Cape o!n $aol. So4calle" ,a$a" hit4man, #smail -"!ar"s, is sentence" to 2> years for ro))ery an" the attempte" mur"er of alle$e" "ru$ "ealer, <aAeem 3 in'ie3 Smith. he Mhatey )rothers 0,a$a" supporters1 are ac;uitte" on char$es of possessin$ e2plosives. heir ac;uittal is attri)ute" to poor police investigative ork. Pagad's national co-ordinator# *bdus Salaam $brahim, is char$e" !ith terrorism un"er the ol" #nternal Security .ct. Deon 5ostert, the police informer !ho alle$e" that elements insi"e the security forces !ere )ehin" the 1555 )om)in$s in the &estern Cape, is foun" $uilty on theft char$es, "eclare" an ha)itual criminal an" sentence" to fifteen years3 imprisonment. ,ress reports of the trial of the four men accuse" of )om)in$ a &yn)er$ syna$o$ue in 1556 feature evi"ence from a <ational #ntelli$ence .$ency informer a)out the activities of the =rassy ,ar' 3cell3 of ,a$a"3s arme" !in$, or =49orce. /ther

hea"lines claim that "-!orce members are !acing a total o! more than 10 charges o! murder. . !ee' after a man "iscovers a )om) attache" to the )ottom of his car, another device e%plodes on the )usy Main %oa" in Jenil!orth close to the offices of the Democratic .lliance. Speculation in the me"ia lin's the attac' to court appearances )y ,a$a" mem)ers on mur"er char$es, continuin$ conflict in the Mi""le -ast 0Democratic .lliance lea"er, ony Leon, is Je!ish1, an" the forthcomin$ local $overnment elections. /pposition parties call for Safety an" Security Minister sh!ete to resi$n for failin$ to "eal !ith the upsur$e in violence in the &estern Cape. ,ress reports su$$est that !hile 1? mem)ers or supporters of ,a$a" have )een convicte" of offences relate" to ur)an terror, 1B have )een ac;uitte" on similar char$es. Mem)ers of the Serious Violent ,rimes :nit mar' Me"ia 9ree"om Day )y seiAin$ vi"eo tapes of events surroun"in$ the attac' on %ashaa" Sta$$ie in .u$ust 155?. he South .frican <ational -"itors 9orum 0Sanef1 con"emns the rai"s on me"ia or$anisations inclu"in$ the S.*C, .ssociate" ,ress an" %euters.

4arratives Dou can only fi$ht crime if you have a !illin$, a)le an" unselfish community to$ether !ith a !illin$, a)le, unselfish an" non4corrupt police. he t!o in isolation can3t "o FitH. &e )elieve it nee"s to )e a com)ination of the t!o. *ut if you have the in"ivi"ual, the one or the other, it3s not $oin$ to !or' 0%B, ? June 20001. .s a statement of a community4)ase" or$anisation3s commitment to partnership !ith the police this is har" to fault. Det the person !ho ma"e it represents a $roup that has come to )e associate" 4 not least in the min"s of their potential partners, the police 4 !ith )om)in$s, assassinations, arme" vi$ilantism an" ur)an terrorism. he ;uestion is, ho! "i" this happenO Pagad,s story Li'e it or not 4 an" ,a$a" itself certainly "oes not 4 the ,eople .$ainst =an$sterism an" Dru$s have )ecome the focus for any "iscussion of reven$e violence an" vi$ilantism in the &estern Cape. #t ma'es sense then for us to start !ith the or$anisation3s o!n account of its formation an" "evelopment usin$, !herever possi)le, its o!n !or"s "ra!n either from the "etaile" intervie!s un"erta'en for this pro(ect or from the ,a$a" !e)site.11
7ormation

,a$a"3s or$anisational auto)io$raphy )e$ins !ith its formation out of a net!or' of hitherto "isparate an" isolate" anti4"ru$, anti4crime or$anisations an" nei$h)ourhoo" !atches operatin$ in the coloure" communities of Jensin$ton, Salt %iver, &yn)er$, an" Surrey

-state. he initial nucleus of ,a$a" consiste" of no more than a "oAen or so activists from small local $roups frustrate" )y their ina)ility to tac'le pro)lems that ha" roots e2ten"in$ far )eyon" their in"ivi"ual nei$h)ourhoo"s. F=Han$sterism an" "ru$s is such a )i$ pro)lem G it "oesn3t stop in the &estern Cape, it $oes South .frica4!i"e, it $oes .frica4!i"e, an" it $oes !orl"4!i"e. Dou have a sno!)all3s chance of opposin$ G you3ve $ot no chance of opposin$ "ru$ "ealin$ Fat nei$h)ourhoo" levelH. .n" that !as e2actly !hat the nei$h)ourhoo" !atches !ere up to. Des !e can say they !ere "oin$ a reasona)le (o) in terms of stoppin$ petty criminals 4 an" they themselves i"entifie" "ru$ "ealin$ !as the reason for the petty criminals3 e2istence 4 )ut they "i"n3t have the capacity to "o anythin$ a)out it. *ecause G the localise" nei$h)ourhoo" !atch !oul" have the localise" $an$sters that !oul" attac' them if that !as all they !ere. he impetus )ehin" the formation of ,a$a" !as thus the realisation that "ru$ "ealin$ !as not a pro)lem that coul" )e fou$ht street )y street or nei$h)ourhoo" )y nei$h)ourhoo" )y isolate" local or$anisations. *y comin$ to$ether as ,a$a", these local $roups an" in"ivi"uals sou$ht to empo!er in"ivi"ual citiAens, families an" communities )y creatin$ an" mo)ilisin$ a critical mass of popular support for action a$ainst $an$sters. F Hhe comfort Aone that the in"ivi"ual "ru$ "ealer ha" G !as )ecause they !ere actually ma"e to feel comforta)le )y their imme"iate nei$h)ours an" simply )ecause, even if the nei$h)our re(ecte" 4 or in their hearts re(ecte" 4 the "ru$ "ealer, the nei$h)our !oul" G "urin$ a passa$e of time, )e co!ere" into apathy )ecause they 'no! that this is a "ru$ "ealer 4 he3s "oin$ )a" thin$s 4 )ut # can3t "o anythin$ a)out it. .n" that !as !hat e2iste". F<Ho! ,a$a"3s aim at the )e$innin$, an" ,a$a"3s first step, !as to say to those in"ivi"uals, 3Let us "ra! the line )et!een "ru$ "ealers an" the community !ho "o not !ant "ru$s an" $an$sterism3. <o!, )elieve it or not, that !as the most important first min"4 shift that nee"e" to happen in communities G that no lon$er FareH !e $oin$ to co4e2ist !ith "ru$ "ealers an" say the "ru$ "ealers are part of our community an" !e3ve $ot to accept it. he attitu"e !as $oin$ to )e that !e "ra! the line, 3Dou are the "ru$ "ealer an" !e are the community an" !e "on3t !ant you3. #n essence ,a$a" set out to reaffirm an" police communal )oun"aries )y empo!erin$ the $oo" an" e2clu"in$ the )a". #ts aim !as to ensure that there !as no place, no 3comfort Aone3, for the "ru$ "ealer or the $an$ster in the $oo" community.12 *ut to achieve this people ha" to )e prepare" to ma'e a pu)lic stan" a$ainst "ru$ "ealin$ in their nei$h)ourhoo"s. F Hhe only thin$ you nee"e" to "o !as to ta'e the initiative to let other people 'no! that there are more people feelin$ the same !ay. .n" that !as essentially the reason !hy ,a$a" !oul" ta'e to the street, $o an" announce to the "ru$ "ealers that !e the community !ant you to stop !ith your "ru$ "ealin$ so that the "ru$ "ealer can3t say that he has the )lessin$ of the community. .n" the aim of this rollin$ action !hich actually happene" G t!ice a !ee', sometimes thrice a !ee', !as to $o to all these F"ifferentH areas an" say, 3.ll these people

re(ect you the "ru$ "ealer. &hat say youO3 .n" that !as !hat ,a$a" )elieve" !as the most important part of the campai$n, to empo!er people to say you are the "ru$ "ealer an" !e are the community. *ut if you "i"n3t have that it "oesn3t matter !hat else you "o, you3re not $oin$ to )e a)le to solve the pro)lem of "ru$ "ealin$. Marchin$ in num)ers on a "ru$ "ealer3s house !as inten"e" to affirm the so4calle" ri$ht4 thin'in$ ma(ority3s re(ection of "ru$s an" convey in sym)olic terms their "esire to e2pel the "ealer from their community. Dealers an" their families !ere confronte" !ith star' 4 often painful 4 choices7 stop "ealin$, stop associatin$ !ith "ealers, re(oin the community, or $et out. F Hhis "ra!in$ of the line F)et!een the community an" the "ru$ "ealersH resulte" in people havin$ to ta'e a "ecision. .m # !ith the community or am # !ith my familyO F#Hf G a person in my family is a "ru$ "ealer, # have to ma'e a choice7 # have to either )e a "ru$ "ealer or # have to )e part of the community. .n" the secon" aspect on that same score is that the "ru$ "ealer !as $iven his choice7 Do # !ant to )e a "ru$ "ealer, or a "estroyer of the community, or "o # !ant to )e a )uil"er of the communityO3
Development $arly days= >??@AB

hrou$hout much of its first year of operation ,a$a" marche" a$ainst a succession of "ru$ "ealers across the Cape 9lats from +anover ,ar' to Lente$eur 0Mitchells ,lain1, an" in .thlone, &yn)er$ an" the &almer -state in &oo"stoc'.1E .t the en" of .u$ust they marche" on "ru$ "ealers in ,aarl !hile the or$anisation3s =auten$ )ranch too' to the streets in Lenasia. .t this early sta$e the structure of the or$anisation seeme" ru"imentary. F&He ha" the situation !here G E0 000 people cramme" into a sta"ium Ffor a meetin$H an" the ne2t "ay people "eci"e" no more ,a$a" 4 FifH the lea"ership "eci"e" they3re not $oin$ to or$anise another mass meetin$ 4 every)o"y !oul" G $rum)le, 3&hen is ,a$a" $oin$ to have FanotherH meetin$O3 *ut G there !as no infrastructure to ma'e it happen, to continue anythin$, )ecause it !as a" hoc, it !as loose. here !ere thousan"s of people, )ut there !as no structure. hree fi$ures, .li 3,hantom3 ,ar'er, 9arou' Jaffer an" <a"thmie -"ries, !ere particularly prominent in ,a$a" in the early part of 155? an" are referre" to on the $roup3s !e)site as havin$ serve" as Chief Comman"er, Chief Co4or"inator, an" +ea" of Security respectively. 1B +o!ever, it seems as thou$h their position as lea"ers !as relatively informal an" their hol" over ,a$a"3s mem)ership consi"era)ly less secure than their titles mi$ht su$$est. .s a local anti4crime activist close to ,a$a" at the time remar'e", the hi$h me"ia profile en(oye" )y these fi$ures "i" not necessarily reflect their status insi"e an or$anisation an2ious to avoi" the "evelopment of anythin$ resem)lin$ a cult of personality. F Hhe one thin$ a)out the !ay they operate" !as there !as no particular lea"ership )ecause they felt that ,a$a" 4 an" this is !hat they state" openly an" they Fsai"H this over an" over 4 G that the in"ivi"ual !as not important, the

or$anisation !as important G . So G you coul"n3t say that one F!asH the lea"er G 0%1, 1> May 20001.1> <or, "espite some inflammatory comments )y Chief Comman"er .li ,ar'er a)out "eclarin$ (iha" or holy !ar on the $an$sters, "i" ,a$a" have any political a$en"a )eyon" the elimination of $an$sterism an" "ru$s.1? .lthou$h some of its activists !ere also mem)ers of ra"ical #slamic $roups such as @i)la, ,a$a" !as 4 an" remains 4 a )roa"4)ase" $roup !ith no political pro$ramme )eyon" the 3era"ication of "ru$s an" $an$sterism from society3.1K De+ining moments: death o+ a gangster o the national an" international me"ia the "efinin$ moment of these early "ays !as the "eath of %ashaa" Sta$$ie. . lea"in$ mem)er 0alon$ !ith his )rother %ashie"1 of the po!erful +ar" Livin$s $an$, Sta$$ie !as )rutally lynche" in Lon"on %oa", Salt %iver on the ni$ht of B .u$ust 155?. he inci"ent !as reminiscent of the 3nec'lacin$s3 of the aparthei" years an" !as !i"ely presente" in the me"ia as sym)olisin$ the escalatin$ violence that threatene" to en$ulf South .frica3s ne! "emocracy. 9or ,a$a", ho!ever, other events appeare" at least as important as the $an$ster3s "eath7 the )rea'"o!n in ne$otiations !ith the then Justice Minister, Dullah /mar, an" the "elaye" )ut hysterical me"ia covera$e that follo!e" a march on his %ylan"s home on ? March8 the $overnment3s failure to respon" to ,a$a"3s repeate" re;uests for firmer action to )e ta'en a$ainst "ru$s an" $an$sterism8 the shootin$ on K .u$ust of a ,a$a" marcher )y $an$sters !ho ha" i"entifie" him at a protest meetin$ in *ri"$eto!n the previous evenin$8 the first si$ns of State enforcement action a$ainst ,a$a" as ,ar'er, Jaffer an" -"ries !ere char$e" !ith se"ition8 the erection of roa" )loc's on the free!ay to prevent ,a$a" mem)ers in cars $ettin$ on to the &almer -state to "eliver an ultimatum to a !ell4'no!n "ru$ merchant, <aAier Jap"i, on 22 .u$ust8 an" the meetin$ at +a)i)ia mos;ue on 25 Septem)er !hich si$nalle" a final partin$ of the !ays )et!een ,a$a" an" its three most prominent mem)ers.
Pagad matures= >??BAC

+o! ,a$a" see events unfol"in$ in the years that follo!e" is less clear. he historical recor" on the $roup3s !e)site en"s !ith an account of the meetin$ in the +a)i)ia mos;ue an" !e !ere not a)le to loo' at its su)se;uent "evelopment in any "etail "urin$ our intervie!s. &hat !e offer here an" in the ne2t t!o su)4sections is therefore a necessarily some!hat impressionistic account of the $eneral tra(ectory of ,a$a"3s "evelopment )ase" on its spo'esman3s reaction to the issues !e !ere a)le to cover in the course of our conversation. he causes of the ,ar'er4Jaffer4-"ries triumvirate3s "emise are complicate". ,ar'er3s repeate" an" very pu)lic complaints that ,a$a" ha" )een ta'en over )y @i)la, !hich !as committe" to overthro!in$ the $overnment in furtherance of some hi""en, fun"amentalist political a$en"a, !ere one o)vious cause of the split. o those !ho staye" !ith ,a$a" after 25 Septem)er, Jaffer ha" also )ecome somethin$ of a loose canon, flyin$ aroun" the !orl" on un'no!n missions an" issuin$ statements to the me"ia !ithout consultin$ the or$anisation he claime" to represent.16 Un"erlyin$ these $rievances 4 an" implicit in much

of !hat !e !ere tol" )y our intervie!ee 4 seems to have )een the feelin$ that ,a$a" ha" out$ro!n the pra$matic populism of the triumvirate. .t the same time these so4calle" lea"ers ha" )e$un to see themselves as )i$$er than the or$anisation an" self4promotion as more important than the fi$ht a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s. 9loutin$ the principles of collective lea"ership coul" not an" !oul" not )e tolerate". .nother si$nificant "evelopment 4 also implicit in our "iscussion !ith ,a$a" 4 !as a $ro!in$ "efensiveness in the or$anisation3s outloo' "urin$ this perio". #n the first fe! months of ,a$a"3s e2istence marches !ere mainly peaceful affairs. *ut it !as not lon$ )efore the $an$sters fou$ht )ac'. he community 'ne! !ho Fthe "ru$H tra"ers !ere. So F,a$a"H !oul" march to a $uy3s house an" then (ust $ive him a !arnin$ 4 stop !ith your nonsense or the people !ill (u"$e you. /)viously that )ecame a pro)lem P they !ent to people, they $ave !arnin$s, )ut of course some people retaliate" G some "ru$ "ealers, !hoever, retaliate". hat is !here the first confrontations G too' place 0%1, 1> May 20001. he fatal attac' on 9aiAel %y'lief follo!in$ a protest march a$ainst the .mericans $an$ in *ri"$eto!n is an o)vious e2ample of the "an$ers that !ent !ith ,a$a"3s ori$inal tactics of march4an"4confront. ,ressure from the State also mounte" "urin$ this perio" as the $overnment3s attitu"e har"ene" from one of cautious en$a$ement 0evi"ent in the a)ortive tal's )et!een ,a$a" representatives an" Minister /mar in the early months of 155?1 to pu)lic opposition in the form of police accusations that ,a$a" ha" )ecome 3(ust another $an$3 0Cape .r$us, 20.12.155?1. Marchin$ on !ell4arme" "ru$ "ealers an" ta'in$ part in mass meetin$s su""enly )ecame less attractive. &ith $an$sters an" the State respectively tar$etin$ mem)ers of ,a$a" for assassination or incarceration, carryin$ a !eapon an" !earin$ a mas' )e$an to loo' li'e elementary precautions. F&Hhen you Floo'H at the marches in the )e$innin$, people !ere !al'in$ the streets G > 000 at a time. he sta"ium !as fille" !ith people.15 *ut every)o"y coul" cover their faces.20 .n" there F!ereH a !hole loa" of pros an" cons to it. *ut the one )i$ thin$ !as that people !ante" to "o somethin$. *ut the reality is that you3re not $oin$ to a soccer match. Dou3re $oin$ to a place !here you are re(ectin$ $an$sterism an" "ru$s. Dou can close your face an" sho! your num)ers. *ut if you open your face your picture is $oin$ to )e in the ne!spaper. De+ining moment: Cape /o'n .nternational, December 1220 /ne critical inci"ent "urin$ this perio" !as a ,a$a"4or$anise" protest outsi"e Cape o!n #nternational .irport !hich le" to the char$e 4 en"orse" )y the ,resi"ent3s /ffice 4 that the people a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s ha" themselves )ecome $an$sters. ,a$a"3s account of the events lea"in$ up to this "emonstration an" the State3s reaction to it illustrates the e2tent to !hich relations )et!een the t!o ha" "eteriorate" !ithin the 12 months follo!in$ the or$anisation3s foun"ation in Decem)er 155>. he )ac'$roun" to the "emonstration !as a meetin$ )et!een representatives from ,a$a" an" various criminal (ustice a$encies at !hich the chairperson, &estern Cape .ttorney4=eneral 9ran' Jahn, ha" su$$este" that if ,a$a" !ante" to "o somethin$ a)out "ru$s it shoul" focus its attention on entry points such as

Cape o!n #nternational. a'in$ Jahn at his !or", ,a$a" promptly arran$e" a "emonstration outsi"e the airport only to )e tol" not to $o near the place )y then Minister of ransport, Mac Mahara(, an" ,resi"ent <elson Man"ela. ,a$a"3s spo'esperson captures their perspective on the issue7 &oul" !e )e "oin$ (ustice to the community )y listenin$ to Mr <elson Man"ela or Mac Mahara( !hen in fact it is proven that these "ru$s come in hereO &e sai", 3<o 4 even at the ris' of the profile of the or$anisation 4 !e nee" to "o !hat is ri$ht )ecause if !e succum) to pressures from in"ivi"uals on one aspect, then !e mi$ht as !ell pac' up3. .n" that !as !here ,a$a" "eci"e" !e are $oin$ to $o ahea" !ith out protest. #t !as le$al G an" !e F!ereH $oin$ ahea". he fact that !e !ere la)elle" anti4State or !hatever !as )asically one of the thin$s that they use" a$ainst ,a$a" in or"er to tell people this is )a" ne!s for you. .n" many people turne" a!ay from ,a$a". *ut in essence the recor" spea's for itself a$ain. Seen from ,a$a"3s perspective the !hole thin$ ha" )een little more than an ela)orate set up. /ne moment a senior $overnment official !as a"visin$ them ho! to tar$et their protests more accurately, )ut moments later a senior minister, an" the ,resi"ent himself, con"emne" them as a threat to national security. *y portrayin$ them as $an$sters an" 3anti4 State3, an" as "an$erous people to )e associate" !ith, the $overnment set out on the roa" to confrontation !ith ,a$a" ami"st an atmosphere of mutual "istrust an" suspicion that poisons the relationship to this "ay.
The Terror= >??CAD

he years 155K an" 1556 !ere )loo"y ones. #n a som)re revie! of the year3s events on the Cape 9lats the <e! Dear3s -ve, 1556, e"ition of the Cape imes reporte" that a total of 202 people ha" "ie" in the violence of the previous 12 months 0Damon an" Davi"s, 1556a8 1556)1.21 Just )elo! the masthea" on the 3#nsi$ht3 pa$e that carrie" the report a monta$e of $ravestones recor"e" the violent "eaths of 11 $an$ lea"ers. .mon$ them !ere Jaty4.nn .ren"se an" -rnie 3Lapepa3 ,eters of he 9irm, #an /liver of the +ar" Livin$s an", the $ran"father of them all, #smail 3*o))y Mon$rel3 .pril. .nother report on the same pa$e recor"e" the recent 3crossfire "eaths3 of four year ol" Se"ic'a +en"ric's of Surrey -state an" Chrystal .)rahams, a$e" seven, of /cean Vie!.22 +o! "i" ,a$a" see such eventsO &hat is their vie! of the terror that s!ept across the $an$lan"s "urin$ these yearsO he ans!er is that their response is lar$ely "etermine" )y the nature of the tar$et. .s'e" for the or$anisation3s reaction to the violent "eaths of so many lea"in$ $an$sters ,a$a"3s spo'esperson !as un!illin$ either to confirm or "eny the involvement of the or$anisation or its mem)ers. +o!ever, he "i" e2press somethin$ approachin$ $rim satisfaction at the fact that the $an$sters ha" )een 'ille" an" some consi"era)le confi"ence that, as a result, fe!er innocent people !oul" "ie too. FDHurin$ one year F1556H !hen, # thin', thirteen "ru$ "ealers an" ma(or $an$sters "ie" FeveryoneH !as sayin$, 3 error. #t3s a ma(or "isaster for police. Do somethin$ a)out it. hese people are "yin$.3 *ut you 'no! !ho "ie" an" ho! manyO hirteen. .n" !hoO he people !ho !ere 'illin$ other people.

<o! F!hoH 'ille" them !e can pro)a)ly "e)ate until, you 'no!, the en" of the !orl". *ut the reality is that, ta'e any year from 1552 up!ar"s an" # challen$e you if there3s less than 1> 000 people that "ie" violently in South .frica, then you 'no! it !oul" )e a miracle. *ut no)o"y says 3 error, pro)lems, "o somethin$ a)out it3 !hen 1> 000 people, innocent people, or people !ho are not spearhea"in$ violence. hey "ie, they "ie li'e flies, they "ie every"ay. <o)o"y raises a murmur. *ut )ecause it is a person that is 'no!n to )e a terrorist, it is no! G . *ut it is not the type of terrorist that !e "isli'e you see. #t3s a terrorist that !e have come to accept in our community an" they "on3t come !ith a stereotype that they are terrorisin$ the community. *ut they in fact are. .n" !hen they "ie it3s not )ecause it3s a pro)lem, it3s )ecause !e ma'e it to )e a pro)lem. +a" any)o"y as'e" the other 1B 56> people that "ie" "urin$ that year, !hat are they "oin$, !ho 'ille" them, !hat happene"O <o)o"y cares. #t3s only the fifteen that3s important an" !e !ant to 'no! !ho "i" this. &e "on3t have to. he only important thin$ is they "ie". .n" the chances are )ecause they "ie", that the ne2t year it !ill )e 12 000 people that "ie an" not 1> 000.2E hen 4 ela)oratin$ on his point that the $ro!in$ popularity of the term 3terror3 in official pronouncements an" me"ia reportin$ on the violence reflecte" a profoun"ly cynical "isre$ar" for the e2periences of or"inary people 4 the ,a$a" spo'esperson !ent on to ;uestion popular "efinitions of 3terror3 an" prevailin$ assumptions a)out !hat counts as 3terrorism3. .n" # thin' that a$ain that is the min" shift that ,a$a" !ants in the community 4 that G people start as'in$ the ;uestion of terror. error is not !hat you see on the front pa$e. error is !hen a mother sen"s her chil" to the nei$h)our to say, 3Come help me, )ecause the $an$ster is fetchin$ my "au$hter for prostitution an" # can3t "o anythin$ a)out it3. #n fact terror is actually !hen the mother "oesn3t even 'no! she can $o to the nei$h)our to $o an" as' for help )ecause that $an$ster !ill (ust come an" fetch her. .n" this is not a)stract, this is a reality. #t happens. .n" that is the terror G . he ;uestion "oesn3t "eserve an ans!er, 3&ho 'ille" the $an$stersO3 he issue is !hat happens to the 1B 56> other people. .n" essentially !hen !e as' ourselves that ;uestion in terms of conflict resolution, fin"in$ the solution to violence or !hatever. hat is the ;uestion that nee"s to )e ans!ere". +o! "o !e solve that pro)lemO his attitu"e contrasts sharply !ith ,a$a"3s official con"emnation of attac's on softer tar$ets, an" the "eath of people unconnecte" !ith "ru$ "ealin$ an" $an$sterism7 &e, the people a$ainst =an$sterism an" Dru$s stron$ly con"emn actions that lea" to "eath an" in(ury of innocent people, li'e!ise !e con"emn the recent terror attac's in Cape o!n.
2B

De+ining moment: tal&s 'ith the police, 1226 he other main feature of this perio" !as the continuin$ "eterioration in relations )et!een ,a$a" an" the State reflecte" in the acrimonious failure of yet another roun" of tal's !ith the police. /nce a$ain ,a$a" felt that the process !as manipulate" )y the authorities an" use" not as a forum for "evisin$ solutions to the pro)lem of $an$sterism, )ut as a !ay of

o)structin$, "iscre"itin$ an" then "isa)lin$ ,a$a" )y criminalisin$ its lea"ership. Durin$ the "iscussions ,a$a" han"e" the police a list of more than a hun"re" "ru$ "ealers complete !ith names, a""resses an" "etails of their main stoc' in tra"e. he police response !as une2pecte"7 F Hhey claime" at the time that their pro)lem G is resources, that they nee" to spen" money on policin$ ,a$a" marches every !ee' an" therefore they "o not have the time to $o an" rai" the $an$sters3 houses or the "ru$ "ealers3 houses. <o! ,a$a" then si$ne" an a$reement !ith the police that for one month !e3re not $oin$ to march, !e3re not $oin$ to ta'e to the streets )ecause !e !ant to $ive the police the opportunity to use those resources to act a$ainst the "ru$ "ealers !ho they have the information on. G &e "on3t !ant to stop marchin$, )ut if they are intereste" in fi$htin$ the "ru$ "ealers then let them "o it. &e sai", if !e "on3t stop, they !ill al!ays have the e2cuse that it is ,a$a" that3s causin$ this G . &e stoppe". &e si$ne" an a$reement that for one month !e !ill stop. F.n"H in that month the police si$ne" an a$reement that they !ill actually use those resources a$ainst the "ru$ "ealers. he month !ent )y. #t !as e2ten"e" to t!o months 4 they "i"n3t act a$ainst a sin$le "ru$ "ealer !ith the resources. &hen !e starte" applyin$ for a march a$ain after this !e ma"e it pu)lic that the police no! !ent )ac' on their !or". #n fact # can tell you !hat the police "i". F&hen the tal's )e$anH the e2ecutive of ,a$a" !as relatively un'no!n to the police. *ut !hen !e )rou$ht in the "ele$ation, !e )rou$ht in our entire lea"ership. F Hhe reason !hy !e sai" !e !ant to suspen" tal's is FthatH G at the time !hen !e starte", no one ha" char$es a$ainst them. F*utH at the time !hen !e finishe" # thin' there !ere only three people !ho "i"n3t 4 !ho Fha"n3t )eenH arreste" for some char$e an" ha" a char$e a$ainst them. So !hat happene" !as that the police F!ereH no! loo'in$ at all these people G you, the representatives of ,a$a", !e !ill fin" somethin$ a$ainst you an" then !e !ill say !e "on3t spea' to people !ho have char$es a$ainst them. <o! G if that isn3t malice then !e "on3t 'no! !hat is. F.Hn" at the en" of the "ay !e sai", !hat you "i" in these t!o months !as to use your resources to hunt "o!n ,a$a" mem)ers rather than "ru$ "ealers. .n" !e sai" !e are not intereste" in this. hat is !hy the G tal's )ro'e "o!n.
Strength !rom adversity= >???A/000

&ith so many of their most prominent supporters either in prison or facin$ criminal char$es, ,a$a" have continue" to rely on the or$anisation3s collectivist tra"ition.2> /ur o!n "ealin$s !ith ,a$a" in carryin$ out this research are evi"ence of this. &hen !e first approache" ,a$a" to as' for their co4operation they su$$este" that !e shoul" spea' to their <ational Co4or"inator, .)"us Salaam -)rahim. +o!ever, !e !ere una)le to $o ahea" !ith an intervie! )ecause of "ifficulties in o)tainin$ permission from the Department of Correctional Services to spea' to him in =oo"!oo" ,rison. &e eventually ha" to as' ,a$a" to nominate an alternative. &hen !e finally "i" mana$e to meet someone from the or$anisation it )ecame clear that ,a$a" ha" a$ree" to ta'e part in the research, )ut only after len$thy "eli)eration. /ur intervie!ee !as also at $reat pains to e2plain that he !as

spea'in$ not as an in"ivi"ual )ut as a representative of ,a$a" an" that he !as only one of several people authorise" to spea' on the or$anisation3s )ehalf. he com)ine" effect of !hat ,a$a" sees as State repression, me"ia misrepresentation an" the threat of violent retaliation )y $an$sters has )een to chan$e the nature of the or$anisation3s support since the hea"y "ays of 155?. ,a$a" also point to three more specific factors that have contri)ute" to their ina)ility to mo)ilise lar$e num)ers of people for marches an" rallies. #t must have )een a calculate" thin$ to )rin$ this G la! in that sai" that, !hen you are in a $atherin$, you can3t cover your face. #t is a metho" of re"ucin$ the num)ers G )ecause people G can3t affor" to ris' their lives. <ot all of them have cars, they have to travel )y )us, they have to $o via the $an$sters an" so on. &hereas in the past G people in Salt %iver coul" actually !al' the street in Manen)er$ )ecause Manen)er$ $an$sters !oul"n3t ever $et to them )ecause they stay in Salt %iver. hat3s the nature of thin$s. *ut no! you $o to a march, your face is on television. &hether you march in Manen)er$ or Salt %iver the Salt %iver $an$ster3s $oin$ to see you. .n" that is !hy people F"on3t come outH 4 not )ecause they "on3t !ant to $o out an" support F,a$a"H, )ut )ecause of the simple reality 4 not even fear 4 it3s the reality of havin$ to "efen" yourself. F.n" thenH the ne2t point FisH that people !ere even prepare" to "efen" themselves. *ut the police systematically confiscate" firearms of ,a$a" mem)ers an" they still "o. &hen that happens, the $an$ster has an ille$al firearm, you have nothin$. <o! G it3s a stupi" person that tries to "efen" himself !ith his han"s !hen someone else has $ot a firearm. .n" that is !hy people also say it3s /J !hen #3m there no!, )ut !hen # am alone #3" rather not $o to a pu)lic function. %eality. hir" one7 you may )e a!are of the survey !hich !as "one )y #D.S. in t!o consecutive years.2? he first survey !as FonH violence in the &estern Cape or somethin$ li'e that. .n" it "ealt e2tensively !ith ,a$a"3s support )ase an" the police not havin$ that particular 'in" of support in the community. hey then analyse" that it !as the reli$ious personalities that !oul" chan$e the min"s of people re$ar"in$ the ,a$a" alternative. he fact of the matter is that people sa! ,a$a" as the $enuine alternative. *ut that report sai" that if people3s min"s !oul" )e chan$e", it !as $oin$ to )e the reli$ious personalities that !ere $oin$ to "o it. .n" the State use" the reli$ious personalitFiesH in or"er to say to people 4 "on3t $o the ,a$a" route, $o the other route. %i$ht. =o the !hat they call tolerance, ne$otiation, !hatever route. F Hhese reli$ious personalities "i"n3t come out of the )lue an" "eci"e to ma'e statements a$ainst ,a$a". #t !as )ecause of the #D.S. report that they felt, ho! "o !e cut off the community from ,a$a". .n" they "i" it. <o! the fact that they !ant to ma'e a couple of statements re(ectin$ the violence no! an" the 'illin$ of this person an" that person an" 4 it3s a !hole, it3s a )i$ hypocrisy )ecause they ha" a chance to support the community an" they "i"n3t !ant to. hey chose the esta)lishment, rather than the community.

.n" that !as also a point !here people !ho !ere still han$in$ onto the cloa's of the reli$ious lea"ers, rather than onto the cloa' of truth. hose !ere the people that separate" from ,a$a" an" chose to pray their prayer in the mos;ue an" in a church rather than "o their supplication on the street !here they nee" to "efen" their community. .n" that3s !here more people left. -2pose" to violent retaliation from "ru$ "ealers, una)le to "efen" themselves, an" un"er concerte" i"eolo$ical attac' from reli$ious lea"ers, ,a$a"3s less committe" supporters have $ra"ually melte" a!ay. 9or them the 3fa"3 of fi$htin$ $an$sterism an" "ru$s has passe". he para"o2ical result is that ,a$a" has emer$e" from these e2periences a smaller, leaner or$anisation, )ut also a stron$er one !ith a more active, more purposeful, mem)ership. F Hhe infrastructure Fof ,a$a"H is so em)e""e" that it !ill continue, it !ill continue. .n" G the amaAin$ thin$ is, there3s a !hole lot of thin$s stac'e" a$ainst ,a$a" G you mi$ht almost thin' it3s stupi" of any)o"y to (oin ,a$a" no!. *ut the reality is that there are people that are actually (oinin$ ,a$a" no!. .n" those are the people that !e 'no! are people !ho have alrea"y seen !hat it entails 4 it3s the more meanin$ful participation. *ecause they !ere not necessarily there !hen it !as popular to )e there G )ut they realise no! that this is a vehicle that can help them. So participation no!, mem)ership no!, is sort of in our vie! a thousan" times stron$er than the participation of an in"ivi"ual that ha" )een there )efore. So if you $ain one mem)er no!, it3s li'e $ainin$ a hun"re" mem)ers three years a$o. *ecause the person ma'es a conscious "ecision, that, 3# 'no! !hat all the pro)lems are. # 'no! # can "ie. # 'no! # can )e (aile". # 'no! # can 4 everythin$ can happen to me 4 )ut # !ant to "o it3. .n" that3s the "ifference in terms of the stren$th. .n" for that reason !e )elieve G that pu)lic perception in terms of me"ia an" (ust a)out everythin$ is a$ainst ,a$a". *ut pu)lic support in terms of the people !ho suffer is very much for ,a$a". .n" mem)ership has $one "o!n "ramatically, )ut every sin$le mem)er that is no! a""e" is a meanin$ful one rather than one that you "on3t 'no! e2ists. hus, !hile the num)er of mem)ers has $one "o!n, the ;uality of those that remain or (oin is much hi$her than in the "ays of mass mo)ilisation. #n short, ,a$a" has "ra!n stren$th from a"versity.
De!ining moment= 5itchells Plain# 5ay /000

&e intervie!e" ,a$a"3s spo'esperson on ? June last year shortly after the me"ia ha" )een full of stories of rene!e" $an$ fi$htin$ an" a 3,a$a" shoot4out3 in afelsi$, a poor !or'in$ class nei$h)ourhoo" in Mitchells ,lain !ith an unenvia)le reputation for violence 0Cape imes, 22.>.20001. his inci"ent cast a lon$ sha"o! across the intervie! an" illustrates many of the frustrations that ,a$a" feels to"ay, > years after its foun"ation as a popular movement a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s. ypically, the story )e$ins !ith violence an" the apparent ina)ility 0or reluctance1 of the police to "o anythin$ to stop it. 9or three !ee's FtheH community !as )lee"in$, persons "yin$ almost every "ay. .n" the police !ere no!here to )e foun".

*ut then 4 an" this too is typical of ,a$a"3s e2periences !ith the police7 G the Sun"ay afternoon ,a$a" $oes into afelsi$ an" you ha" police an" helicopters an" everythin$ every!here. .n" # !ant to say that G !hen a policeman $ets out of FhisH car an" announces Fto ,a$a" mem)ers $ettin$ out of their vehiclesH that, 3 his is an ille$al $atherin$. # $ive you ten minutes to "isperse or # !ill act.3 hen in the normal sense one !oul" appreciate the fact that this policeman has seen a crime )ein$ committe", an" no! he3s actin$, ri$htO So you !oul" pat him on the )ac'. *ut if you thin' G to yourself that for !ee's crimes are )ein$ committe" an" the police "oesn3t come there, they "on3t come in there G the same policemen G they "on3t come in there an" say to the "ru$ "ealer, 3. crime has )een committe". his is an ille$al activity. # $ive you ten minutes to stop or # !ill ta'e action3. <o they "on3t. #n fact G that is !hy # say confi"ently that the police are not intereste" in fi$htin$ crime. F.Hn" # !ant to ma'e FaH secon" analo$y. ,a$a" is of the vie! that the police can an" must $o into the "ru$ "ealers3 houses an" $o an" seiAe their possessions an" "o !hat they nee" to "o in or"er to stop "ru$ "ealin$. *ut the police have consistently tol" us G they nee" a s!orn affi"avit, they nee" a !arrant, they nee" (ust a)out everythin$ in or"er to $et into a "ru$ "ealer3s house. /n the "ay Fof the afelsi$ inci"entH the police !ent into a ,a$a" mem)er3s home, smashe" his house in, smac'e" the !oman that !as stan"in$ in the front "oor an" arreste" three ,a$a" mem)ers insi"e the home, on a fin$er )ein$ pointe" )y a $an$ster that that person ha" terrorise" him )efore. <o! there !as no affi"avit, there3s no search !arrant, there3s no nothin$. *ut they can "o it G Dou have these t!o inci"ents7 G a policemen ma'in$ his (u"$ement there G firin$ tear $as, firin$ ru))er )ullets at the cro!" Fof ,a$a" supportersH )ecause he )elieves they are "oin$ an ille$al thin$. #t3s not )ecause Fthe policeH are opposin$ crime. #t3s not )ecause the people are "oin$ somethin$ ille$al. #t3s )ecause people are "oin$ !hat the police "on3t !ant them to "o. .n" there is a )i$ "ifference. F&Hhere people carry on !ith "ru$ "ealin$ the police "on3t min". *ut !hen you protest a$ainst "ru$ "ealin$, it puts 4 an" this is the secon" layer 4 it puts a picture into people3s min"s that all is not !ell 4 that !hen a community rises an" ta'es to the street then it puts a picture to the rest of the !orl" that all is not !ell in South .frica. *ut !hen a "ru$ "ealer is in his house an" pumps "ru$s into chil"ren an" the $uys "ie or they 'ill their mothers, it3s normal, it3s a statistic G it3s all a)out num)ers. .""e" to this an$er at police "ou)le stan"ar"s an" their apparent acceptance of "ru$ "ealin$ an" $an$ violence as une2ceptional an" tolera)le, is ,a$a"3s "isillusionment !ith the me"ia an" its slavish "evotion to reportin$ not !hat ,a$a" actually "oes, or the e2periences of or"inary people livin$ !ith $an$sterism an" "ru$s, )ut !hat the police say ,a$a" "o an" !hat the $overnment !ants to hear. F&hatH stic's in the min"s of people Fa)out the afelsi$ inci"entH is FaH report on Flocal ne!s ra"io stationH that says a splinter $roup of people G left a march G that turne" chaotic. .n" they calle" it eye!itness ne!s. # sa! the Fra"io stationH person an" # still !ant to 'no! !here the eye!itness F!asH G . *ut

a$ain those are the realities that !e as ,a$a" have to conten" !ith. .n" the only thin$ for us really is !hen you listen to the people of afelsi$, then all these thin$s that every)o"y else in their to!ers 4 protecte" to!ers 4 say is insi$nificant. hey can say !hat they li'e. &e 'no! that !hen you $o to afelsi$ then the people of afelsi$ !ill say, 3Man you can say !hat you li'e, F)utH no)o"y3s $oin$ to protect us. #t3s only ,a$a" that3s $oin$ to protect us.3 .n" that is the only thin$ of importance to us. #t3s not !hat the ne!s people say )ecause they3re Fnever $oin$ toH report the truth )ecause it3s not in line !ith, unfortunately, the police report. <or is it in line G !ith !hat the $overnment !oul" li'e to hear an" therefore they3re not $oin$ to say it. .n" this is e2actly the same that happene" in the aparthei" era. here3s no "ifference. #t3s e2actly the same. .n" # (ust !ant to say that the issue really a$ain is ,a$a" isn3t concerne" any more a)out "istortion in the press. ,a$a" is more concerne" a)out ho! people on the $roun" see !hat is )ein$ "one. :ard ;)estions his completes the inevita)ly incomplete story of ,a$a"3s "evelopment that !e !ere a)le to $lean from our intervie!. *ut it still leaves three important issues outstan"in$ 4 issues that !e )elieve are critical for ,a$a", its future, an" the prospects for an en" to the violence.
1< Going it alone: shared ob=ectives, irreconcilable methods

he first of these 4 )riefly allu"e" to earlier in this narrative 4 is the ;uestion of ,a$a"3s relationship !ith other anti4crime $roupin$s an" !hy, "espite its state" aim of co4operatin$ !ith 3people an" people3s or$anisation FsicH, havin$ similar aims an" o)(ectives3, ,a$a" stan"s virtually alone in its fi$ht a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s.2K ,a$a"3s position on this is ;uite clear. ,a$a"3s constitution says that !e !ill !or' !ith every an" any or$anisation that shares the o)(ectives of ,a$a". herefore ,a$a" has ma"e approaches to (ust a)out every type of or$anisation an" F!eH actually accepte" the approaches )y G all types of or$anisations in or"er to !or' to$ether. +o!ever there are instances that Fnee"H to )e G un"erstoo". 9or e2ample, ta'e the G Manen)er$ situation !here ,a$a"3s un"erstan"in$ of solvin$ the pro)lem is that !hen it G !as alrea"y ma"e a)un"antly clear G to the $an$sters an" "ru$ "ealers that here is the community, here is the mass of people, an" all of them re(ect you not )ecause of !ho you are )ut )ecause of !hat you "o, your "ecision is !hether you !ant to continue to )e $an$sters or come to the community. &e )elieve that if they ha" enou$h )rain po!er to sell "ru$s an" to set up the )usiness then they also ha" to have enou$h )rain po!er to "eci"e !hich si"e of the line they3re on. .n" that is !hy !e )elieve that it is important that they "eci"e an" ma'e the "ecision !here they are G an" then the community must G cut themselves off Ffrom the "ealersH. he FcommunityH police forum 4 an" ta'e Manen)er$ for e2ample 4 ha" a "ifferent vie! an" not only a "ifferent vie! G superficially G )ut G a

ra"ically opposin$ vie! to ,a$a". .n" that is that they )elieve that 4 an" this !as the catch phrase # thin' 4 that harmony an" peace coul" )e achieve" )y tal'in$ to !hat they calle" )oth G si"es of the !arrin$ factions. /J no! !hen !e3re tal'in$ a)out peace in the community if a $roup FofH people attac's the community then !e are not tal'in$ a)out si"es ForH !arrin$ factions, !e3re tal'in$ a)out an a$$ressor an" a community that must )e "efen"e". .n" G ,a$a"3s position !as that if $an$sters an" "ru$ "ealers terrorise an" 'ill people then the community has alrea"y sai" !e "on3t li'e you, !e "on3t !ant you, irrespective of !hether F"ru$ "ealin$H is le$al or not. .n" that is the point !here ,a$a" "iffers from the community policin$ forum. &e "on3t tal' to $an$sters )ecause !e !ill FonlyH tal' to them !hen they leave their $an$sterism. &e !ill tal' to them !hen they leave their "ru$ "ealin$ in terms of ne$otiatin$ !here they !ant to fin" themselves in the spectrum of the community. &e !ill only $ive a messa$e to them to say that 4 an" that is the only tal'in$ that !e !ill "o to $an$sters an" "ru$4"ealers 4 !e !ill inform them !hat the community e2pects from them an" that is to $ive up their !ays. &e3re not $oin$ to inform them ho! they can F$ive upH. &e3re not $oin$ to ne$otiate !ith them ho! they can continue their "ru$ "ealin$ an" $an$sterism an" fin" their place in the community. .n" that is !here the )i$ "ifference is )et!een !hat the police forums have "one an" !hat ,a$a" has "one an" is "oin$. .n" )ecause of that !e coul" not reconcile our pro$ramme !ith that of the community police forum !here you have $an$sters that "eci"e !hat FtheH limitations of their operation is $oin$ to )e an" in the meantime they3re still terrorisin$ the community. &e can3t !or' li'e that G an" therefore !e ma"e it a)un"antly clear !e "i"n3t !ant to !or' !ith FthemH. 9rom ,a$a"3s perspective, the roc' on !hich all attempts to !or' !ith other anti4crime $roups foun"ers is their insistence that processes of ne$otiation, reconciliation an" reinte$ration can only )e$in !hen "ru$ "ealers have )een confronte" )y the community, accepte" the error of their !ays, an" "eci"e" once an" for all that their future lies !ith the community rather than the $an$s. F&He )elieve that every person that !ants to "o his ounce of $oo" nee"s to )e encoura$e". *ut not at the e2pense of acceptin$ a person !ithin your ran's that is actually $oin$ to 'ill your son or your "au$hter. .n" that3s !hat the $an$sters "o. So G !e have "ifferent !ays of loo'in$ at it simply )ecause !e can3t see the rationale in spea'in$ to a $an$ster !hen he says to you, to your face, 3# !ill continue !ith my "ru$ "ealin$, )ut you3ll fin" a place for me in your society3. here is no place for such a person in society.
8< >ibla and a political agenda

he secon" issue has also )een referre" to earlier )ut 4 since it $oes to the heart of !hat ,a$a" sees as its "emonisation )y a malevolent State an" a plia)le me"ia 4 it merits further consi"eration here. -ssentially the char$e 4 first levelle" )y .li 3,hantom3 ,ar'er in 155? 4 is that ,a$a" is little more than a front or$anisation for #slamic militants $roupe" aroun" @i)la an" the #slamic Unity Convention.26 .s such, its state" concern !ith the era"ication of $an$sterism an" "ru$s provi"es cover for a !i"er, more sinister, an" less popular political a$en"a aime" at su)vertin$ the authority of the State an" reversin$ pieces of social le$islation that are "eeme" inconsistent !ith a narro!ly sectarian version of #slam, such as

the le$alisation of homose2uality an" a)ortion an" the a)olition of capital punishment. here are several aspects to ,a$a"3s response to these alle$ations. he first is that, even if the char$e is true an" @i)laC,a$a" "oes have a political a$en"a, that is their prero$ative. # !ant to put it this !ay7 G there is no pro)lem, FasH # un"erstan" it, to have a political a$en"a in South .frica. .t least if !e have a "emocracy you have every ri$ht to have a political a$en"a G # !ant to say that it "oesn3t matter if F,a$a"H ha" Fa political a$en"aH, an" it "oesn3t matter if it even emer$e" from @i)la G #3m not (ust $oin$ to say that it3s not true, #3m $oin$ to say even it !ere so, !hat is the pro)lemO he first line of "efence then is that, in the ne! "emocratic South .frica, everyone 4 inclu"in$ ,a$a" an" @i)la 4 has a ri$ht to )e political. his flo!s into a secon" line of ar$ument !hich is, ;uite simply, that ,a$a" is not an" never has )een in @i)la or any other or$anisation3s political poc'et. he truth a)out it is that there are G people !ho are mem)ers of @i)la that are also mem)ers of ,a$a". here are people !ho are mem)ers of @i)la that are not mem)ers of ,a$a". .n" there are "iver$ent vie!s FonH mo"us operan"i )et!een !hat people in @i)la feel nee"s to )e "one an" !hat people in ,a$a" feel nee"s to )e "one. otally in"epen"ent. *ut there are mem)ers in common an" there are mem)ers !ho choose only to )e ,a$a" mem)ers an" not FinH @i)la. . thir" stran" in their response is less "efensive an" aims to sho! ho! the association !ith @i)la has )een use" to un"ermine popular support for ,a$a". F.Hn easy !ay to )rea' "o!n an or$anisation that has foun" its !ay into the hearts of people is 4 instea" of tryin$ to fin" factual issues 4 you say this is !here the or$anisation is $oin$ !ron$, you lean on a stereotype that has alrea"y )een create" an" then lin' the or$anisation to that stereotype. .n" then G you ta'e it from there. ,eople can then say "o you or "on3t you !ant to )e part of this or$anisation. <o! the issue of @i)la. @i)la has )een "emonise" for !hatever reason )y the previous re$ime. #t3s sa" that mem)ers of @i)la ha" actually fou$ht si"e )y si"e !ith mem)ers of the li)eration movement "urin$ the aparthei" stru$$le. *ut those very same mem)ers are no! sayin$, 3*e!are, @i)la has $ot a political a$en"a3 to F"oH !hatever. .n" it is )orne out in the emer$ence of ,a$a". *ut !hy !as it ;uestione" !hether ,a$a" or @i)la ha" a political a$en"a.O FDHet 50I of the people fall for it. hey say 3$an$sterism an" "ru$s is !hat you say you3re fi$htin$, )ut you actually have a political a$en"a.3 9or ,a$a" then the irony is that a $overnment !hose mem)ers fou$ht alon$si"e @i)la in the li)eration stru$$le have use" its reputation for militancy 4 carefully crafte" )y their former foes in the aparthei" re$ime 4 to "iscre"it ,a$a" an" proclaim them $uilty )y association of the car"inal sin of Muslim fun"amentalism.

Muslims in the &estern Cape ha" actually rallie" to ,a$a" )ecause they sa! in it some salvation. *ut the po!ers that )e 'ne! that @i)la !as actually not favoure" )y the ma(ority of Muslims in the &estern Cape an" also Muslims ha" )een con"itione" 4 # am tal'in$ a)out Muslims per se 4 ha" )een con"itione" )y the reli$ious lea"ers as e2tensions of the aparthei" re$ime to say that !hen you in"ul$e yourself in political affairs, then you3re starin$ "o!n the )arrel 4 you "on3t $et involve" !ith it. ,a$a"3s fourth an" final ar$ument on this ;uestion of politicisation is a ;uestion of tactics. hey maintain that, ne2t to arms, 3the "ru$s in"ustry3 is pro)a)ly the lar$est in the !orl". #t cannot therefore )e 3unrelate" to economics an" politics3 in the )roa"est sense. *ut, nonetheless, it !oul" )e foolish of an or$anisation li'e ,a$a" to turn the fi$ht a$ainst "ru$s into a party political matter or itself into an electoral machine. F#Ht !as ,a$a"3s vie!, an" still is, that !hen you "eci"e that you are $oin$ to $o for a political office or G $o an" score political points, you !ill of necessity run up a$ainst other political parties. .n" then you !ill say to people, 3Ma'e your choice7 support the ,.C or support ,a$a", support the .<C or support ,a$a"3. .n" that in itself !e )elieve !oul" un"ermine the ;uest to have a uniform society that3s a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s. .n" that is !hy ,a$a" )elieves that it is not in our interest or in the interest of the community to for$e ahea" !ith a political a$en"a, G strivin$ to $et into political office. F Hhe o)(ective isn3t to have a person3s voice hear" in parliament a)out the issue, )ut G to $et all parliamentarians to have the voices of the community hear" on the issue of $an$sterism an" "ru$s. .n" for that reason # am sayin$, !hile G there3s no pro)lem in havin$ a political a$en"a 4 any)o"y can 4 )ut the issue is it actually "efeats the purpose of )in"in$ the community on the issues across the political spectrum. Un"erlyin$ this attempte" sti$matisation of ,a$a" )y association !ith @i)la lies fun"amental fla!s in South .frica3s ne! "emocracy7 firstly the real 4 an", at least to ,a$a", increasin$ly !ell4"ocumente" 4 association )et!een the main political parties an" lea"in$ $an$sters, an" secon"ly the .<C3s $ro!in$ intolerance of political "issent. .n" # !ill tell you no! !hat the issue at han" is. #t is all a)out fascism. F&Hhen you oppose the .<C then you start )ecomin$ a political pro)lem. .n" !hen it no! emer$e" that the alle$ations that ,a$a" ma"e at its emer$ence is true, that the .<C an" the ,.C !ere fun"e" )y "ru$ money, they "enie" it. <o! it3s comin$ up. .n" the fact that the <ational ,arty campai$ns !ere also fun"e" )y the li'es of F!ell 'no!n $an$lor" an" lea"in$ mem)er of he 9irmH is comin$ up no! an" it !ill come out. .n" that is !hy !hen you start stirrin$ the political pot, then they come )ac' !ith a political )ac'lash.
?< Pagad and the bombings

he last of the three issues !e "iscusse" !ith ,a$a" in "etail has alrea"y )een covere" at some len$th in our "iscussion of the terror of 155KC6. .ll that !e !ant to "o here is repro"uce our intervie!ee3s reaction to speculation that the or$anisation 0or at least its arme" !in$ or =4force1 has )een involve" in 3spectaculars3 such as the )om)in$ of ,lanet

+olly!oo" at the &aterfront in .u$ust 1556 an" the St -lmo3s piAAeria in Camps *ay in <ovem)er 1555. .s !ith so many of his replies his response to our ;uestionin$ conveys )oth a sense of frustration at the !ay in !hich pu)lic fi$ures an" the me"ia leap to conclusions a)out ,a$a"3s responsi)ility for this 'in" of attac', an" an acute a!areness of the "an$ers of $ivin$ cre"i)ility to such !il" accusations )y ta'in$ the trou)le to "eny them. Des, ,a$a" has )een accuse" of many of these thin$s. # simply !ant to respon" li'e this. a'e the St -lmo3s )om). /n the "ay it happene" G &iley Fthen M-C for Community Safety in the &estern CapeH sai", 3#t3s ,a$a", no ;uestions as'e"3. #t3s amaAin$ that he coul" in fact )e allo!e" to $et a!ay !ith it in the pu)lic sphere, )ecause it3s a travesty of (ustice. #t actually un"ermines any investi$ation that you3re $oin$ to "o. *ut the ;uestion that !as put to me )y a (ournalist !as, 3&as it a ,a$a" mem)er that "i" itO3 /ur position is !e "on3t "o such thin$s, !e "on3t or"er it, an" it3s not part of our a$en"a. *ut the ;uestion that !as as'e" is, 3Can it )e, an" is it a ,a$a" mem)erO3. .n" # !oul" say that any other or$anisation !oul" have sai", 3<o, a)solutely not3. *ut # put it to the (ournalist that to )e fair, t!o thin$s are $oin$ to happen. #f # say no, the fact that you have as'e" ,a$a" the ;uestion is alrea"y $ivin$ me an in"ication that you thin' that ,a$a" is possi)ly responsi)le for it. <o! !hat St -lmo3s has to "o !ith ,a$a", # "on3t 'no!, ri$ht. Call it sensationalism. <o! you say, 3*ut !hy ,a$a"O &hy "on3t you )lame the <ational ,arty, or the .<C, or the ,.C, or *lac' Sash, or UC O &hy ,a$a"O3 #t is the ;uestion that is stereotype" in people3s min"s. #n fact !hen this thin$ happene" in <orth .frica, !here they )le! up the -m)assy in !herever G F*D7 JenyaH G in Jenya. &e !ere havin$ a conference in J!a4Mulu <atal. .n" one of the (ournalists as'e" !hether ,a$a" ha" anythin$ to "o !ith it. <o! that3s the 'in" of hysteria that happene". *ut the ans!er is 4 an" this is the factual ans!er 4 if # !ere to tell you that it3s not a ,a$a" mem)er, then # !oul" )e in the same )oat as Mar' &iley accusin$ ,a$a" of "oin$ it, )ecause then G 4 (ust for the sa'e of "efen"in$ the or$anisation an" its mem)ers 4 # !oul" say it3s not ,a$a", ri$ht. #t3s not a ,a$a" mem)er. *ut # challen$e a priest in the area of Camps *ay to tell me, an" # challen$e any)o"y to as' the priest, 3#s it possi)le that it is FaH mem)er of your con$re$ation that plante" that )om)O3 #f the priest says, 3.)solutely not3, then he3s lyin$ )ecause he cannot say it !ith certainty. +e "oesn3t 'no! !hat the $uy ha" for lunch, )rea'fast or supper an" therefore he cannot say !ith certainty that it3s not a mem)er of that con$re$ation. /he State agents, story82 %unnin$ parallel an" occasionally intersectin$ or overlappin$ !ith this narrative is the story tol" )y t!o State a$ents. &e !ill ta'e the t!o main threa"s of this narrative 4 as seen )y t!o intelli$ence operatives 4 in turn, )e$innin$ !ith their vie! of ,a$a"3s "evelopment. /nce a$ain !e present the story as strai$htfor!ar"ly as possi)le an" as one of many truths.

E0

/he State on Pagad

.ccor"in$ to our intervie!ees, the ori$ins of ,a$a" in the concerns of mainly mi""le an" lo!er mi""le class Muslims contrast sharply !ith !hat the or$anisation later )ecame un"er the tutela$e of @i)la3s #slamic i"eolo$ues. #n"ee" the State3s vie! of its formation is remar'a)ly similar to ,a$a"3s o!n account. .t that point in time F)efore 155>H G people from @i)la G !ere plannin$ to esta)lish an anti4crime or$anisation 4 FanH anti4$an$sterism, anti4"ru$s or$anisation. *ut the later formation of the or$anisation Fas ,a$a"H !as not necessarily a reflection of FtheirH he$emony P in other !or"s they !ere not necessarily the "ominant force. /J, #3ll e2plain that. Mostly the core mem)ers initially of ,a$a" 4 the mass mem)ers 4 !ere militant F)ut theyH !ere actually anti4crime activists FfromH +anover ,ar' an" all those 'in"s of areas G Surrey -state G nei$h)ourhoo" !atch people G !ho happene" to )e Muslim. hat !as the core 4 they !ere not i"eolo$ically inspire" 4 they !ere FnotH politicalFlyH G oriente", )ut (ust ha" a very political approach to "ealin$ !ith "ru$s an" $an$4relate" pro)lems. *ut their )ase !as entirely semi4mi""le class, lo!er mi""le class G . hat3s !hy they never coul" "evelop a !or'in$4class )ase.
Populism and spontaneity

9rom these relatively )lameless )e$innin$s a very "ifferent, an" more "an$erous, ,a$a" !as soon to emer$e. *ut, at least in the early "ays, the $roup !as a loosely structure" an" $enuinely popular movement a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s hea"e" )y an informal $roup of lea"ers !ho ha" emer$e" rather than )een electe". FDHou3re not tal'in$ a)out an or$anisation that e2ists as an or$anise" structure F!ithH )ureaucratic processFesH. Dou3re tal'in$ a)out some people at one sta$e havin$ the G e2presse" intent to form G a movement Fa$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$sH, )ut )ein$ cau$ht up in the momentum of the ener$y they $enerate from the mass si"e. So you have a populist 'in" of effect an" the in"ivi"uals !ho lea" at that point in time, <a"thmie -"ries G .li ,ar'er, are not necessarily lea"ers )y virtue of )ein$ electe" G )y havin$ arrive" there throu$h a formal process. Militancy 4 violent attac's on in"ivi"ual "ru$ "ealers an" $an$sters 4 !as lar$ely spontaneous an" unplanne". #n so far as a military !in$ 0the so calle" =4force1 e2iste", its operations !ere restricte" to 3marshallin$ functions3 on ,a$a"3s re$ular rallies an" marches on the homes of "ru$ "ealers. . 3turnin$ point3 came mi"!ay throu$h 155?, after the )rea'"o!n of tal's !ith Justice Minister Dullah /mar, !hen a march on a $an$ster3s house in +anover ,ar' en"e" in violent confrontation )et!een the police an" arme" activists. F Hhe turnin$ point !as the first march to F$an$ster3sH place in +anover ,ar' G !here, asi"e from the march, this $roup of so4calle" =4force people (ust )ro'e out an" turne" on the police. F#t !as aH spontaneous 'in" of thin$ G it s!ept up

G it ha" no "eli)erate i"eolo$ically "efine" a$en"a. 9rom this point on shootin$s )ecame more fre;uent. *ut the violence remaine" lar$ely spontaneous up to an" inclu"in$ the attac' on %ashaa" Sta$$ie in Salt %iver on B .u$ust. F&Hith the Sta$$ie inci"ent for e2ample, <a"thmie -"ries an" .li ,ar'er an" them really "i"n3t 'no! that !as $oin$ to happen. hat !as (ust spontaneous action of a small militant $roup insi"e it. *ut they "i"n3t plan it. hrou$hout the first nine months of its e2istence then ,a$a" resem)le" an unten"e" )o2 of fire!or's 4 somethin$ coul" $o off at any time )ut you !ere only $oin$ to $et hurt )y the e2plosion if you !ere stan"in$ ri$ht ne2t to the )o2.
'rganisation and ideology

*ut, accor"in$ to the intelli$ence operatives intervie!e", even as Sta$$ie !as )ein$ attac'e" !ith the ori$inal populist lea"ership stan"in$ i"ly )y, the influence of @i)la !as $ro!in$. Slo!ly )ut surely ,a$a" !as chan$in$ from a loosely structure" popular movement into a more i"eolo$ically "riven an" ti$htly controlle" political or$anisation. *ut aroun" that perio" F.u$ust 155?H another $roup is slo!ly )e$innin$ to )uil" its he$emony 4 it3s )e$innin$ to structure the or$anisation, /J 4 an" that3s @i)la. hey3re )e$innin$ to "evelop their or$anisation into an or$anisation an" this is !here their F,a$a"3sH lea"ers G actually come !ith @i)la )ecause they F@i)laH have the or$anisational e2perience from the previous era. hey 'no! ho! to or$anise people. hey starte" filterin$ in to the rituals of ascen"ance )y .u$ust. So !hen the or$anisation !as structure" there !as no! no more nee" for the populist, impulsive lea"ership of -"ries, ,ar'er an" those 'in" of people. hin$s !ere structure" in an or$anise" manner no! G that !as up till G a)out the Septem)er 35? !here they 'ic'e" out -"ries an" all of them. hat !as a natural F"evelopmentH G )ecause populists !ho are not "efine" )y an i"eolo$ical a$en"a G are not $oin$ to 4 for e2ample 4 "istin$uish from a principleF"H perspective G ho! !ron$ it !oul" )e for e2ample to $et involve" in ne$otiations !ith the police, )ecause all you3re intereste" in is "ealin$ !ith "ru$s. +o!ever the people !ho 'ic'e" them out have an i"eolo$ical a$en"a an" they use that opportunity 4 )ase" on ne$otiatin$ !ith us Fthe police H to actually 'ic' these people out of the or$anisation 4 la)el them as traitors, munafi;s an" all those 'in"s of thin$s. Usin$ or$anisational s'ills hone" "urin$ the anti4aparthei" stru$$le, an" arme" !ith the i"eolo$ical pro$ramme of political #slam, @i)la $ra"ually asserte" its ascen"ancy over ,a$a". .fter the "eparture of the populist triumvirate, a ne!, more principle" lea"ership !ith a more instrumental attitu"e to!ar"s co4operation !ith the State emer$e" aroun" .slam oefy. +o!ever, !ithin (ust over a year he too ha" fallen foul of @i)la3s i"eolo$ues.
5ilitarisation and political consciousness

.lon$ !ith this politicisation of ,a$a" came a $ro!in$ militarisation. #n much the same !ay as the arme" !in$s of the li)eration movements ha" )een force" to a"apt un"er the

harsh operatin$ con"itions of the aparthei" police State, ,a$a" too restructure" a much4 e2pan"e" =4force into 3a separate entity3 capa)le of mountin$ attac's more or less on its o!n initiative an" ;uite in"epen"ently of the marches un"erta'en )y the mainstream or$anisation. Det, even to"ay, there are those in the intelli$ence community 4 inclu"in$ one of our respon"ents 4 !ho )elieve that ,a$a" is not simply a @i)la4o!ne" )ran" name for the politics of militant #slam. .ccor"in$ to this perspective, "ominate" )y i"eolo$ues it may )e, )ut the $rassroots mem)ership of ,a$a" remains only loosely committe" to @i)la3s fun"amentalist a$en"a. Until to"ay, # still maintain that the =4force mem)ers an" even FsomeH ,a$a" mem)ers are firstly @i)la mem)ers. hey mi$ht have "ominate" the militia 4 @i)la mem)ers "efinitely 4 )ut that "oes not translate into all of the mem)ers "o!n FtHhere )ecomin$ part of some fun"amentalist $roup, )ecause people "on3t have that political consciousness here. hey mi$ht )e a)le to spe! the slo$ans, )ut they "on3t have it.
State responses to Pagad

he secon" threa" !oven into our respon"ents3 story starts much closer to home an" relates to the State3s response to ,a$a". %ather than continue !ith the rou$hly chronolo$ical approach !e have a"opte" up to no!, this section of the report len"s itself to a more thematic treatment, not least )ecause 4 !hile the State3s attitu"es to!ar"s ,a$a" chan$e" as the or$anisation itself evolve" from popular movement into ur)an terror or$anisation 4 its un"erlyin$ strate$ic orientation to the t!in pro)lems of $an$sterism an" vi$ilantism "i" not.
The pains o! trans!ormation

he most o)vious feature of the State3s response to ,a$a" is the e2tent to !hich it has )een structure" )y the process of "emocratic transformation )ein$ un"erta'en )y police an" intelli$ence services steepe" in the thin'in$ an" practices of authoritarianism. Moreover, neither transformation nor the co4or"ination of an effective response to $an$sterism an" ,a$a" has )een ma"e easier )y the crisis of resources face" )y a ne! "emocratic $overnment !ith so many popular e2pectations to meet. -2amples of the hesitancy an" uncertainties that have "o$$e" the police approach to ,a$a" a)oun". *ut the e2planation that one of our respon"ents provi"e" for police inaction on the evenin$ of B .u$ust 155? provi"es a particularly stri'in$ illustration of the pro)lems e2perience" )y a service stru$$lin$ to span the "ivi"e )et!een the 3s'op, s'iet en "on"er3 of aparthei" policin$ an" the more su)tle metho"s of cro!" control e2pecte" of a "emocratic police or$anisation. /ur respon"ent3s vie! of the events surroun"in$ the "eath of %ashaa" Sta$$ie is that the police !ere "isa)le" 4 an" therefore perceive" to )e 3complicitous FsicH !ith !hat !as happenin$3 4 for three main reasons. 9irstly, as a result of their 3re4trainin$ an" re4 acculturisation to the ne! environment3, they 'ne! 3!hat not to "o so as not to repeat the mista'es of the past3, )ut 3they "i"n3t 'no! !hat to "o in the ne! "emocratic or"er3.E1 Conse;uently, as the march 3erupte"3 aroun" them, they ma"e !hat, from a pu)lic or"er policin$ perspective, !as a )asic error 4 they hesitate". F#Hn front of FtheH casspirs people are )urnin$ thin$s G an" F%ashaa"H Sta$$ie

!as )urnin$ ... it !as (ust simply that people "i"n3t 'no! !hat to "o 4 they really "i"n3t 'no!. hat3s one !ea'ness that they ha" G they !ere more inhi)ite" to act on the )asis that G pu)lic or"er policin$ !as al!ays in the spotli$ht in terms of their actions on the person. .n" this !as the first real test in this province of them performin$ their !or' function )y "eman"in$ a little )it G stron$er action than stan"in$ aroun" at ,arliament !hen people stan" an" protest. he secon" failure !as one of plannin$ an" the learne" ina)ility of paramilitary policin$ units to operate !ithout a clear set of instructions an" accor"in$ to !ell4rehearse" plans of action. he secon" Fpro)lemH !as a lac' of plannin$ for the event. Dou see pu)lic or"er policin$ has eleven mo"els of performance Faccor"in$ to the )ehaviour in a cro!"H. F he ,a$a" marchesH "i"n3t fit into the moul" of any of those eleven mo"els G . So in an environment !here you3re "ealin$ !ith a $roup Fpu)lic or"er policin$ unitH that G is pro)a)ly one of the most paramilitary4oriente" structures !ithin policin$ G in the a)sence of clearly "efine" instructions ForH $ui"elines 4 you !ill "o 3.3 !hen 3*3 happens an" 3C3 !hen that happens G . F#Hn the a)sence of that, if you place a person in FaH situation !here there is no prescri)e" frame!or' that fits that particular situation, that person is not $oin$ to react. F#Hf you $ive confuse" instructions in that perio" you3ll cause total confusion 0%6, 1B .pril 20001. he thir" pro)lem !as a simple lac' of resources. &ith the pu)lic or"er units alrea"y at full stretch to contain an out)rea' of violence in the ta2i in"ustry, too fe! people !ere "eploye" to effectively police ,a$a" marches7 So they ha" to a"(ust )et!een t!o very hi$h profile an" G la)our4intensive, "eman"in$ G policin$ e2periences an" (u$$le their minimal resources )et!een meetin$ those nee"s an" in the en" not meetin$ FeitherH at all successfully 0%6, 1B .pril 20001. 9rom this intervie!ee3s perspective then, Sta$$ie3s "eath an" the contri)ution of the police to it, !as the result not of a conspiracy )ut of uncertainties an" constraints attri)uta)le to the or$anisation3s transformation. .n" yet this clumsiness in "ealin$ !ith ,a$a" !as not limite" to those responsi)le either for plannin$ particular operations, or for carryin$ them out. /n the contrary, it seems to have perva"e" the entire police or$anisation as t!o "iametrically oppose" schools of thou$ht clashe" over the strate$ic orientation of the State3s response to ,a$a". here !ere t!o G there are factional interpretations of ho! !e shoul" "eal !ith the F,a$a" an"H the $an$ issue. FLMJ7 9rom the police si"eOH Des, there !ere people !ho, ri$ht in the )e$innin$, !ere callin$ them fun"amentalists, no more. here !ere people li'e me !ho sai" that is not !hat they are at this moment in time. here are fun"amentalists amon$ them, )ut that is not !hat they are. So G that 'in" of approach G ma'es you more open, you 'no!, ma'es you more open to en$a$e G )ut the other people !ho en"e" up even investi$atin$ us for possi)le police complicity came from a "ifferent 'in" of 4

very ill4informe" assumption 4Fa)outH it 4 an 3ol" or"er3 assumption G )ecause an ol" or"er situation is7 the enemy nee"s to )e neatly "efine", neatly structure" an" neatly or$anise". he reality even till to"ay on the ,a$a" si"e "oes not len" itself to such an interpretation. #f you3re $oin$ to !aste your time chasin$ the structure, an" chasin$ the route to "efine the enemy, you miss the issue. &e Frespon"ent3s unitH spo'e of threats in a situational conte2t G un"erstan"in$ full !ell that the conte2t coul" spontaneously chan$e into violence, not as part of a pre4"efine" structural a$en"a 0%6, 1B .pril 20001. /n the one han" there !ere elements in the upper reaches of the security esta)lishment 4 still clin$in$ to the comforta)le, 3ol" or"er3 nostrums of the aparthei" era 4 !ho coul" see no point in en$a$in$ !ith an or$anisation they ha" alrea"y !ritten off as a front for Muslim fun"amentalism in much the same !ay as the security apparatus of the aparthei" State ha" portraye" the .<C as a puppet of international communism. /n the other si"e of the "e)ate !ere those 4 our respon"ent amon$ them 4 !ith a more su)tle appreciation of the internal "ynamics of ,a$a" an" a )elief that there !as scope for ne$otiation !ith the more pra$matic elements !ithin the or$anisation an" its lea"ership. 9or reasons e2plore" in more "epth in the analytical sections of this report, ol" or"er thin'in$ seems to have !on out in the en". .s another of our respon"ents 0also a senior intelli$ence official1 a"mitte", the State3s approach to policin$ ,a$a" has )een in"istin$uisha)le from the anti4su)version strate$ies employe" un"er aparthei"7 3people chan$e an" politics chan$e, )ut the metho"olo$y remains the same3 0%K, ? .pril 20001.
* house dividedE

he ac'no!le"$e" e2istence of such "ivisions !ithin the State3s security a$encies over strate$y, tactics an" the nature of ,a$a" "oes not mean that all the me"ia stories a)out in4 fi$htin$ an" personality clashes )et!een aparthei" era 3securocrats3 an" ne! )loo" "ra!n from the military an" intelli$ence arms of the li)eration movements are true. #n reality, the sources of the tensions that "o e2ist 4 for e2ample )et!een investi$ators an" intelli$ence operatives 4 ten" to )e structural rather than personal or political. &hereas the emphasis of intelli$ence !or' is actuarial 4 the assessment an" minimisation of ris' 4 the point of investi$ative !or' is retri)utive 4 the apprehension, conviction an" punishment of the $uilty. .n" these "istinctive aims ten" to pro"uce "iver$ent, often mutually incompati)le, operatin$ practices. &hile the priority of the intelli$ence officer is to cultivate an" protect informants in or"er to anticipate an" prevent the commission of offences, one of the primary concerns of the investi$ator is to fin" !itnesses a)le to testify in a case a$ainst an accuse" in respect of somethin$ that has alrea"y happene". F Hhese are systemic issues G these are not personal issues. #t !as frustratin$ Ffor the investi$atorsH to G hear information FthatH 3this is $oin$ to happen an" this is $oin$ to happen3 an" then it "oesn3t happen G )ecause Fintelli$enceH use our sources to neutralise it from happenin$ G . #t is one thin$ 'no!in$ !hat they F,a$a"3s =4forceH are $oin$ to "o, FanotherH provin$ that they "i" it at such a point in time )ecause there are no !itnesses, an" the only people !ho coul" potentially )e !itnesses are informers !ho !e )y la! have to protect 0%6, 1B .pril 20001.E2

'*cting on in!ormation received'

.nother facet of the security services3 stru$$le to come to terms !ith the "eman"s of constitutional "emocracy also serves as an illustration of ho! relations )et!een ,a$a" an" the State have "eteriorate" a$ainst a )ac'$roun" of mutual incomprehension. Durin$ the course of the ,a$a" narrative relate" earlier !e hear" its spo'esperson complainin$ that the police ha" faile" to ta'e action a$ainst "ru$ "ealers his or$anisation ha" i"entifie". #t !ill )e recalle" that ,a$a"3s interpretation of this !as that, instea" of movin$ "ecisively a$ainst their 4 an" their political masters3 4 ol" frien"s in the $an$s, the police ha" ta'en the opportunity presente" )y a hiatus in ,a$a"3s o!n campai$n a$ainst "ru$ "ealers to fa)ricate char$es a$ainst its lea"ership. .s one mi$ht e2pect, the police "emur from this conspiratorial vie! pointin$ once a$ain to the pains of transformation to account for their apparent reluctance to act on information receive" from ,a$a". F#Hn some of Fthe ne$otiatin$ sessionsH !here they G came !ith lists G !e follo!e" it up. *ut fin$er4pointin$ is not evi"ence. Dou can $ive me a list G # 'no!, !e 'no!, most of the "ru$ "ealers G !e 'no! all of the "ru$ "ealers. So you comin$ to us an" tellin$ us, 3 here3s one, listen this is his name an" he smu$$les "ru$s3, is not the startin$ point of the case, you un"erstan". #f you coul"3ve tol" me 0!hich they coul"n3t "o1, 3&e3ve !atche" this chap, he "elivers at this point in time3, then !e have a latch4point, you 'no!. /ther!ise !e have to mount the !hole operation ourselves. .n" they often $ave us hun"re"s of lists !here you re;uire surveillance first to actually collect the evi"ence G . &e "on3t have the resources to every !ee' $ive you fee")ac' on hun"re"s )ecause !e can3t run a hun"re" surveillance operations every !ee' on the list that you $ive to us. So G there !as a sense in !hich G ,a$a" "i"n3t appreciate the 'in" of practical pro)lems that !e3" have in terms of )ein$ G rea"y to respon" to their Fsense ofH imme"iacy G in !antin$ to 'no! F!hat !as happenin$H. &hat from ,a$a"3s stan"point loo's li'e a !ilful "ereliction of "uty )ecomes, from the police perspective, the inevita)le result of a re$retta)le ina)ility to follo! up alle$ations nee"in$ painsta'in$ investi$ation if convictions are to )e secure" in !ays that meet the e2actin$ constitutional stan"ar"s e2pecte" of the police un"er the ne! "emocratic "ispensation. /he @re+ormedA gangsters, story /f the three narratives !e have to relate here the thir" an" last is )y some !ay the least complete, an" therefore the most unsatisfactory. ,art of the reason for this is that 4 as !e in"icate" in the intro"uction 4 !e !ere una)le to intervie! as many people from any of the main cate$ories 4 ,a$a", State an" $an$s 4 as !e !oul" have li'e". *ut it is also "ue to the unusual nature of our meetin$ !ith the t!o e24$an$sters to !hom !e "i" mana$e to spea'. his turne" out to )e less an intervie! than a monolo$ue "elivere" )y one of our respon"ents. .vailin$ himself of a perhaps rare opportunity to "emonstrate the "epth of his ne!4foun" reli$ious convictions to a captive au"ience, he respon"e" !ith a )ravura performance containin$ much to hol" the interest of a stu"ent of popular theolo$y )ut little of use to the present authors. Unfortunately time "i" not permit us to arran$e any supplementary intervie!s so !hat follo!s is )ase" on the some!hat mea$re insi$hts !e !ere a)le to o)tain from the "iscussion that "i" ta'e place.

Die bruinmense= a race apart

he )roa" picture that emer$es from our meetin$, an" from informal conversations )oth )efore an" after the intervie! too' place, is of people uncertain of their an" their 0coloure"1 peoples3 place in the ne! South .frica, "isillusione" !ith the !ay they have )een treate" )y politicians !ho promise" much )ut have "elivere" nothin$, an" convince" that they, as reforme" $an$sters, have a critical, )ut hitherto unac'no!le"$e", role to play in en"in$ the violence that continues to "evastate their communities. 9or the ori$ins of the violence they point to a crisis of i"entity 4 a sense almost of self4 hatre" 4 in the coloure" community that allo!s 3"ie )ruinmense3 to slau$hter each other in a !ay that other population $roups 4 !hite an" )lac' 4 !oul" fin" unthin'a)le7 Do you seeO *lac' people "on3t $o an" attac' their o!n people. hey 'no! ho! to i"entify the enemy. &e )ruinmense "on3t $o out there an" slau$hter farmers. &e are not )lac' people. &e are )ruinmense 0%Ea, > June 20001. Compoun"in$ this is a sense of the hopelessness of the 3coloure" con"ition3. Mar$inalise" )y the !hites un"er aparthei", the coloure" people have fare" little )etter at the han"s of a )lac' $overnment since 155B. Die !it mense het $e"room en "ie "room is realisties $eraa'. -n "ie s!art mense "room nou G nou ons 'leurlin$e, "aar is nie 3n "room nie. Die hartseer is orals. he !hite people "reame" an" the "ream )ecame a reality. <o! the )lac' people are "reamin$. *ut no!, us coloure"s G there isn3t a "ream. he pain is ever!here 0%E), > June 20001. .n" then there is a sense of victimisation that they, the coloure" $an$sters, are sin$le" out for special treatment as thou$h $an$sterism !as in some !ay a uni;uely coloure" pro)lem. Jy sien !at hulle nou alles vir "ie s!artmense "oen. =an$s is mos nie net )ruinmense nie G . &aar is "ie F$an$HO &aar is "ie F$an$HO Jy hoor ni's !ant 4 hoe'omO 4 al "aar"ie ouens is "ie $overnment. +ulle 4 "ie $root s'ur'e 4 is in "ie $overnment. Dou see everythin$ they "o for the )lac' people no!O =an$s are not only )ro!n people G . &here are the F$an$HO &here are the F$an$HO Dou hear nothin$ )ecause 4 !hyO 4 all those $uys are in $overnment. he )i$ scoun"rels are in $overnment 0%E), > June 20001.
)roken promises

o our reforme" $an$sters the pain of their re(ection )y the $overnment 4 an" the continue" political mar$inalisation of coloure" people 4 is ma"e !orse )y a sense of )etrayal. Diso!ne" )y the .<C lea"ers !ho approache" them )efore the 155B elections, they are an$ry at $ettin$ nothin$ in return for their help. Si2 years on, the chan$es for the )etter they !ere promise" have not materialise". Die mense !at toe na ons $e'om het, "esty"s !as Valli Moosa hulle, Steve sh!ete, revor Manuel hulle, en "ie manne !at saam met ons $esit het en vir ons "an verse'erin$ $e$ee het G !at hulle met ons $epraat het, ver$ely' het,

iets $roter $aan $e)eur na "ie veran"erin$. he people !ho came to us at that time !ere Valli Moosa an" them, Steve sh!ete, revor Manuel an" them G these man sat to$ether !ith us an" $ave us an assurance. &hat they spo'e to us a)out G somethin$ )i$$er !as $oin$ to happen after the chan$e 0%E), > June 20001. .s !e !ere leavin$ one of our respon"ents recalle" ho! a lea"in$ mem)er of the .<C 0no! a $overnment minister1 ha" personally "elivere" com)i4loa"s of 4shirts to a $an$ in Manen)er$ a""in$ !ith some )itterness that all they !ere intereste" in no! !as un"erminin$ the <ational ,arty )y ma'in$ the &estern Cape un$overna)le.
The search !or peace

. more imme"iate source of resentment is the lac' of interest sho!n )y the police 4 an", to a much lesser e2tent, )y ,a$a" an" other anti4crime $roups 4 in their repeate" offers of help in resolvin$ the on4$oin$ crises of $an$sterism an" violence on the Cape 9lats. +avin$ cut their ol" affiliations an" em)race" a ne! faith, they are mortifie" )y the !i"esprea" cynicism an" "istrust !ith !hich their conversion an" their commitment to peace are treate". 3+y is )e'eer, maar hy smo''el no$.3 Dit 'an nie )e!ys raa' nie 4 voor =o" !eet e', e' smo''el nie G "ie sar'astiese manier van "ie polisie !ant hulle vir se'ere mense !il sN, 3Mense raa' !a''er. +ulle3s )e'eer, maar hulle smo''el no$ G . -' sN vir "ie polisie, 3=aan voort om my te on"ersoe', in"ien (ulle van menin$ is "aar is is mis"aa" in my le!e G . Maar moenie om el'e )os G . +oe $aan hulle vir FmyH in "ie tron' 'ry G "it )ree' my as mens oo' af. -' !at (ammer voel vir !at e' $e"oen het.3 F hey say,H 3+e3s converte", )ut he3s still smu$$lin$3. #t cannot )e proven. *efore =o" # 'no! that # am not smu$$lin$ G the sarcastic manner of the police G they !ant to say to certain people, 3&a'e up, people. hey3re converte", )ut they3re still smu$$lin$ G3 # say to the police, 3=o ahea" an" investi$ate me if you thin' there is crime in my life G . *ut "on3t $o loo'in$ un"er every )ush G ho! they are $oin$ to $et me in $aol G it )rea's me up, # !ho feel sorry for !hat # have "one3 0%E), > June 20001. 9or its part, ,a$a"3s attitu"e is 0in the !or"s of one of our respon"ents17 3&e "on3t tal' to scum3. #nstea" of spen"in$ 1K million ran"s installin$ close" circuit television cameras in Manen)er$ to provi"e proof !hen people have "one !ron$, the $overnment shoul" )e !or'in$ !ith the community to )rin$ people to$ether !ho a"mit they have "one !ron$ an" !ant to "o somethin$ to put matters ri$ht.EE he pro)lem as our respon"ents see it is lar$ely one of communication )et!een all those involve" in the violence. /ns praat van me'aar en nie met me'aar nie G . =eneen se susters moet ver'ra$ raa' nie, $eneen se )roers moet $es'iet raa' nie. Maar om "it te 'an voor'om, moet ons 'an 'ommuni'eer. &e tal' a)out each other an" not !ith each other G . <o4one3s sisters shoul" )e rape", no4one3s )rothers shoul" )e shot. *ut to prevent this !e nee" to communicate. 0%E), > June 20001

Despite the cynicism they face from the $overnment, ,a$a" an" other $an$sters li'e our respon"ents remain convince" that they an" only they have the influence, the stature an" the cre"i)ility !ith their erst!hile collea$ues an" rivals that is nee"e" to resolve the pro)lem of $an$sterism. /ns !as "eel van "ie pro)leem, maa' vir ons nou "eel van "ie oplossin$. &e !ere part of the pro)lem, no! ma'e us part of the solution 0%E), > June 20001. %nalysis he purpose of the last t!o sections of this report is to provi"e an initial analysis of our intervie! "ata or$anise" aroun" the research ;uestions an" hypotheses set out the CSV% for this piece of commissione" research. &e also try to ma'e some sense of the competin$ narratives set out in the prece"in$ section !ithout "istortin$ the "istinctive, su)(ective 3truths3 that each of them represents. #n "oin$ so !e hope to emphasise those points !here the stories intersect an" overlap !ithout !ishin$ a!ay the fact that, in many respects, they reflect very "ifferent, perhaps irreconcila)le, accounts of !hat has happene" since Decem)er 155>.
*rigins o+ violence

he precise aetiolo$y of violence an" $an$sterism on the Cape 9lats is, as !e sai" at the outset, outsi"e the scope of this report. &hat !e can say on the )asis of this stu"y is that the roots of the pro)lem lie "eep in the uni;ue an" hi$hly comple2 social structure of the &estern Cape. emptin$ thou$h it is to lay all the )lame for the creation of socially an" economically "ysfunctional, racially e2clusive $hettos on the force" removals of the aparthei" years, they provi"e an e2planation of the rise of reven$e violence an" vi$ilantism that is far from complete. .parthei" policies of racial an" cultural "ifferentiation, institutionalise" "iscrimination an" political an" social e2clusion have un"ou)te"ly left an in"eli)le mar' on the &estern Cape. #n themselves, ho!ever, they are not enou$h to un"erstan" the specific forms that $an$sterism an" vi$ilantism have ta'en on the Cape 9lats. .mon$ these a""itional factors 4 an" !e ma'e no claims either to ori$inality or completeness here 4 must )e the 3s'ollie3 tra"ition of the ol", often romanticise" $hettos of District Si2 an" &oo"stoc' from !hich people !ere remove" an" the painful )irth of a ne! "emocracy un"er con"itions of rapi" $lo)alisation. he force" removals "i" not happen in a social vacuum. hey happene" to people !ith a "istinctive history an" a tra"ition of survivin$ on the mar$ins of a racist an" "iscriminatory society. .n" the history of the people remove" from the inner city $hettos to the periphery of the metropolis 0an" their "escen"ants1 has not stoppe" unfol"in$ since the 15?0s. Li'e all South .fricans they live" throu$h the li)eration stru$$le, an" the transition to "emocracy, an" are no! livin$ throu$h its consoli"ation in a !orl" !here neo4li)eralism rei$ns supreme. ,olitical li)eration may have )een achieve", )ut to those still stran"e" on the mar$ins of the ne! society the massive chan$es they !ere )rou$ht up to e2pect have )een slo! in comin$. Social institutions an" informal control mechanisms !ea'ene" )y the force" removals have )een further un"ermine" )y increasin$ e2posure to the rampant materialism an" in"ivi"ualism characteristic of a late mo"ern mar'et society. Mean!hile the State itself faces fiscal crisis as it stru$$les to transform its o!n a$encies of social control from instruments of

oppression to effective mechanisms of "emocratic $overnment. &hether or not 4 an" if so, !hy 4 the su""en arrival of constitutional "emocracy in South .frica si$nalle" a su""en upsur$e in crime nationally an" in violence, $an$sterism an" "ru$ "ealin$ in the &estern Cape remains "eeply controversial. he important thin$ is that, for lar$e num)ers of people, crime, the fear of crime an" the apparent ina)ility of either the institutions of civil society or the State to "o anythin$ a)out them )ecame 4 secon" only to concerns a)out employment an" financial security 0or the lac' of them1 4 the most potent threat to their sense of personal an" communal !ell4)ein$. &hat happene" to!ar"s the en" of 155> !as that an or$anisation, ,a$a", !as create" that reflecte" these concerns as they manifeste" themselves amon$ the people of the Cape 9lats. More importantly it also offere" a solution to the crime pro)lem that "epen"e" not on the uncertain help of the State, )ut on the empo!erment of communities an" the mo)ilisation of popular opposition to $an$sterism an" "ru$s. Unsurprisin$ly, the appeal of ,a$a" !as )oth instant an" !i"esprea".EB
/he birth o+ Pagad

.s !e "iscovere" in the course of this research almost everyone has an opinion on !here, !hen an" ho! ,a$a" !as forme", !ho came up !ith the name 0an" the acronym1 an" !hat motivate" the in"ivi"uals !ho first came to$ether as ,eople .$ainst =an$sterism an" Dru$s. Leavin$ asi"e the in"ivi"ual claims to parenta$e of the name, there seems to )e a )roa" measure of a$reement a)out the ori$ins of the or$anisation as a $enuinely popular mass movement a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s. ,re"ominantly, )ut not e2clusively Muslim, 0a %oman Catholic priest too' the chair at some early meetin$s1, ,a$a" !as particularly stron$ in mi""le an" lo!er mi""le class nei$h)ourhoo"s. 9rom the )e$innin$ its lea"in$ fi$ures !ere populists convince" of the nee" for communities themselves to "o somethin$ a)out $an$sterism an" "ru$s, )ut open to approaches from other anti4crime $roups an" prepare" at least to consi"er !or'in$ !ith the police an" other State a$encies. ,erhaps as a conse;uence of its ori$ins in a num)er of more localise" anti4crime initiatives, ,a$a" a"opte" an open or$anisational structure an" an informal, collective style of lea"ership. Many of the more violent measures ta'en a$ainst "ru$ "ealers in the early "ays !ere neither planne", nor sanctione". hese ten"e" to )e the outcome of spontaneous action )y small, more militarise" su)4$roupin$s shelterin$ un"er the )roa" um)rella that ,a$a" provi"e".
Pagad,s development

,erhaps the most important, o)vious, )ut easily overloo'e", aspect of ,a$a"3s "evelopment is that it is neither linear nor inevita)le. %ather, it is the contin$ent outcome of the interplay of many internal an" e2ternal forces, of action )y the or$anisation an" its mem)ers, an" reaction )y the State an" its a$encies in the specific political, social an" economic conte2t of 3coloure"3 Cape o!n. *earin$ this in min", !hat !e present here is an account of ho! the or$anisation, an" the violence that has surroun"e" it, has "evelope" since 155>. his is consistent !ith the intervie! "ata an" the chronolo$y of events containe" in the last t!o sections of this report. 9or us the 'ey "ynamic in the history of the last five years is the relationship )et!een ,a$a" an" the State. his vie! is reflecte" in !hat follo!s !ith the inevita)le result that $an$s an" other anti4crime $roups are cast in relatively minor 4 )ut )y no means unimportant 4 supportin$ roles. Much as ,a$a" resents the convenient, if

sometimes mislea"in$, la)els stuc' on them )y the me"ia at the )ehest, as they !oul" have it, of the State3s propa$an"a machine, !e !ill ta'e the 0perhaps ill4informe"1 outsi"er3s vie! of the or$anisation3s "evelopment from popular movement to ur)an terror or$anisation as a frame!or' for our analysis.E>
From 'popular movement' to 'vigilante group' - >??BAC

he first year of its e2istence !as a critical perio" )oth in ,a$a"3s internal "evelopment an" in its evolvin$ relations !ith the State an" other anti4crime $roups. #nsi"e ,a$a", "issatisfaction !ith the potentially "an$erous spontaneity an" pro$rammatic incoherence of the or$anisation3s early "ays !as $ro!in$. So too !as concern at the increasin$ly violent resistance of "ru$ "ealers to the or$anisation3s esta)lishe" tactic of march4e2pose4an"4 confront. Disillusionment !ith the State3s ineffectual response to repeate" "eman"s for tou$her action a$ainst the $an$sters !as also )ecomin$ more o)vious. hese three factors all coinci"e" !ith 0an" may !ell have contri)ute" to1 the )ur$eonin$ influence of a more hi$hly politicise" an" or$anisationally e2perience" su)4$roupin$ associate" 0ho! closely is "ispute"1 !ith @i)la. his in turn le" to a series of internal chan$es in ,a$a", inclu"in$ the emer$ence of a ne! lea"ership, the "evelopment of a ti$hter or$anisational structure an" the a"option of more ro)ust 0or confrontational1 tactics. #t !as at this time too that ,a$a" activists )e$an appearin$ in pu)lic !earin$ mas's an" openly carryin$ firearms. 9inally, althou$h the circumstances )ehin" the upsur$e in #slamic rhetoric remain o)scure, the perio" runnin$ up to the chan$e in lea"ership !as also mar'e" )y ,a$a"3s pu)lic pronouncements ac;uirin$ a "istinctly political accent. .t the same time, t!o lea"in$ activists tol" us, ,a$a"3s relations !ith other anti4crime $roups )e$an to "eteriorate. -arly meetin$s )et!een mem)ers of the &estern Cape .nti4 Crime 9orum 0&C.C91 an" the populist triumvirate of ,ar'er, Jaffer an" -"ries ha" )een cor"ial if unpro"uctive. +o!ever, relations soon )ecame straine" as "eath threats 0attri)ute" )y our respon"ent to elements !ithin ,a$a"1 !ere ma"e a$ainst a lea"in$ mem)er of the 9orum. Later meetin$s !ith ,a$a" lea"ers !ere marre" )y the presence of mas'e" an" arme" =4force mem)ers. 9un"amental "isa$reements )et!een ,a$a" an" anti4 crime or$anisations such as &C.C9, crystallise" aroun" the former3s pu)lic refusal to tal' to $an$sters, its !illin$ness to ta'e action outsi"e the )oun"aries of the la! an" !hat other $roups 4 )oth Muslim an" non4Muslim 4 sa! as its $ro!in$ reli$ious a)solutism.E? Chan$es in the or$anisation, tactics an" pu)lic profile of ,a$a", to$ether !ith mountin$ pressure on the State to )e seen to )e "oin$ somethin$ a)out violence, irrespective of those responsi)le 0$an$s or anti4$an$ activists1, eventually le" to a har"enin$ in the State3s position. #nstea" of )ein$ seen as part of a possi)le, al)eit hi$h4ris', solution to the pro)lem of crime an" violence, ,a$a" su""enly )ecame part of that pro)lem 4 a threat )oth to the ne! State3s le$itimacy an" to its monopoly on the use of force. #n the vie! of an increasin$ly )elea$uere" $overnment, the cure of popular mass action !as provin$ as "e)ilitatin$ as the "isease of $an$sterism. Statements a)out ,a$a" havin$ )ecome 3(ust another $an$3 ma"e to!ar"s the en" of 155? si$nalle" this chan$e in attitu"e an" the )e$innin$ of more systematic attempts to associate the $roup !ith the menacin$ political a$en"a of militant #slam. #n reality, the lin' )et!een ,a$a" an" @i)la may )e as insu)stantial as an overlap in their respective support )ases. Det, !ith the popular ima$ination fire" )y the lon$4runnin$ $lo)al moral panic over #slamic fun"amentalism, the

a)ility to connect the t!o or$anisations, an" present the former as a front for the latter, has prove" a po!erful !eapon in the armoury of the State in its attempts to strip a!ay ,a$a"3s support amon$ mo"erate Muslims an" non4)elievers ali'e.
From 'vigilante group' to 'urban terrorists' - >??CA?

9or the ne2t t!o years the spiral of action an" reaction "ra$$e" relations )et!een ,a$a" an" the State ever "o!n!ar"s into confrontation an" violence. he chan$es that ha" ta'en place insi"e ,a$a" to!ar"s the en" of 155? !ere consoli"ate" as mem)ership of the or$anisation soon )ecame a hi$h4ris' enterprise. he $an$s respon"e" to the threat pose" )y ,a$a" )y comin$ to$ether to form Core, !hile pressure from the security forces !as unremittin$ in its intensity. &hatever their political affiliation may have )een, it seems clear that ,a$a"3s mem)ership shran' as the "an$ers attache" to it multiplie", )ut simultaneously )ecame more active an" more committe". his in turn may have contri)ute" to the further chan$es in the lea"ership an" structure of the or$anisation that occurre" in late 155K an" appear to have )een a feature of ,a$a"3s "evelopment throu$hout this perio". he relationship, if any, )et!een ,a$a" an" the assassins an" the )om)ers responsi)le for the 3terror3 that reache" its hei$ht in 1556 remains shrou"e" in mystery. Some cre"i)le 4 an" some fran'ly incre"i)le 4 evi"ence e2ists that the violence an" counter4violence stem from several sources7 anti4$an$ militants !hose metho"s ,a$a" "eprecates !ith varyin$ "e$rees of vehemence "epen"in$ on the softness of the tar$et, ro$ue elements connecte" to the security forces, an" unreforme" $an$sters ta'in$ a"vanta$e of the $eneral mayhem either to settle ol" scores or ac;uire ne! turf. #n any event, the $overnment3s response !as to step up the fi$ht a$ainst !hat !as no! routinely "escri)e" )y official spo'espeople an" the me"ia as 3ur)an terror3 )y launchin$ 0in January 15551 the most am)itious an" !ell4pu)licise" of a series of special police operations, /peration =oo" +ope. -ver more fearful of the threat pose" to South .frica3s ne! "emocracy )y violent crime an" its palpa)le ina)ility to "o much to control it, the State re"ou)le" its efforts to "isrupt ,a$a" )y arrestin$ an" char$in$ activists in unprece"ente" num)ers. Sa"ly !e have no means of verifyin$ the accuracy of our respon"ents3 o)servations. +o!ever, if the ma(ority of those unconnecte" !ith the or$anisation are correct an" ,a$a" ha" )een ta'en over )y !ell4or$anise" #slamic militants, an" then restructure" on classical 3stru$$le3 lines, this is at least as li'ely to have )een a reaction to increase" State repression as the unfol"in$ of some fun"amentalist master plan. @uite un"erstan"a)ly, ,a$a" chose neither to confirm nor "eny any lin's !ith the assassins responsi)le for the "emise of so many lea"in$ $an$sters. *ut a$ain, if ,a$a" "i" esta)lish a !ell4traine" military !in$ !ith the cell structure typical of an un"er$roun" or$anisation, it is impossi)le to say !hether that !as part of a lon$4term strate$y for ,a$a"3s "evelopment !or'e" out )y @i)la, an opportunistic reaction to the t!in "an$ers of State repression an" $an$ retaliation, or a com)ination of the t!o.
From 'urban terrorists' to empty shell= Pagad no

Untan$lin$ the recent past in or"er to "iscern some pattern in the rapi"ly unfol"in$ events of the last four an" a half years is har" enou$h. Still more "ifficult is the tas' of assessin$ !here ,a$a" is to"ay. 9rom ,a$a"3s o!n perspective it is a leaner, )ut stron$er or$anisation

than it !as )ac' in 155? !hen it coul" fill sta"iums an" put thousan"s on the streets. #t continues to play a vital social an" political role in empo!erin$ communities sappe" of their vital ener$y )y $an$sterism an" "ru$s. /ne respon"ent "escri)e" this as a contemporary form of the tot system. F+Historically in the &estern Cape specifically people !ere oppresse" )y the tot system. he farmers !ere in po!er )ecause they $ave their la)ourers !ine to "rin' G . <o! they FareH more sophisticate" G an" the politicians 'no!, !ith all "ue respect, an" the economists 'no!, that if you3ve $ot to )attle a$ainst "ru$ a""iction an" if you are G not $oin$ to )e so)er for most of your life, then you3re never $oin$ to )e economically pro"uctive, to fen" for yourself. <or are you $oin$ to )e politically clear in or"er to G or$anise your o!n community G . <o! !hat !e FareH sayin$ is that if you !ant to empo!er the community to )e politically active an" to )e economically active then !e3ve $ot to un"o the tot system an" the sophisticate" tot system in "ru$s an" $an$sterism. .n" that is !hat our perspective is, that the community !ill al!ays )e su)(u$ate" if they continuously have to fi$ht a$ainst the a""iction of "ru$s an" the terrorism of $an$sterism 0%B, ? June 20001. ,a$a" is also em)roile" in an apparently en"less )attle !ith a State that treats it, rather than $an$sterism, as the primary threat to la! an" or"er, an" that is prepare" to consi"er "raconian measures to prevent it from operatin$. #n this respect at least the security forces seem to )elieve that they have achieve" some nota)le successes. *om)in$s still occur, levels of violence on the Cape 9lats remain tra$ically hi$h, an" the failure to convict those responsi)le for outra$es such as the ,lanet +olly!oo" an" St -lmo3s restaurant attac's $ets more em)arrassin$ )y the "ay. Det there seems to )e a $ro!in$ conviction in police an" intelli$ence circles 4 share" )y some of our more neutral respon"ents 4 that ,a$a"3s "ay has come an" $one. <o "ou)t, they conce"e, ,a$a" !ill continue to have a small popular, mainly mi""le4class, constituency in the Muslim community as lon$ as $an$sterism an" "ru$ "ealin$ persist. he $unmen associate" !ith it an" other ra"ical #slamic $roups such as Mail 0Muslims .$ainst #lle$itimate Lea"ers1 an" Ma$o 0Muslims .$ainst =lo)al /ppression1 may continue to attac' the occasional tourist tar$et, or to assassinate the o"" $an$ster, )ut ,a$a"3s )ac' has )een )ro'en )y the "etention of more than a hun"re" 'ey activists, most of !hom !ill eventually fin" themselves permanently )ehin" )ars. hus, from their very "ifferent perspectives, )oth ,a$a" an" the State seem to a$ree that the t!in trac' strate$y of "emonisation an" ri$orous enforcement employe" )y the security forces over the last four years, com)ine" !ith or$anic chan$es insi"e ,a$a", has succee"e" in transformin$ it from a popular mass movement e2ten"in$ !ell )eyon" the confines of respecta)le #slam into a smaller, ti$hter, )etter or$anise", )ut also more homo$enous, isolate" an" "efensive $roup. #n the meantime the violence that le" to ,a$a"3s formation in the first place continues un"iminishe" either )y the elimination of so many lea"in$ $an$sters, or the lar$ely unsuccessful efforts of the State to $et to $rips !ith or$anise" crime.EK #n"ee", as one stu"ent of $an$sterism on the Cape 9lats put it, the full implications of the )loo"lettin$ of 1556 may only no! )e emer$in$ in a rene!e" upsur$e of violence over the past fe! months. <ineteen ninety4ei$ht !as the !atershe" year 4 fifteen $an$ lea"ers, all

affiliate" to Core, !ere 'ille". hey !ere e2ecute". So in that sense # !oul" say ,a$a" achieve" its aim G it "i" achieve its state" aim of $ettin$ ri" of $an$ lea"ers. *ut it "i" a $reater "isservice to the community )ecause )y ta'in$ a!ay those $uys an" 'illin$ them G !hat has arisen is that the $an$s have )ecome "ecentralise". ,reviously un"er Fthe ol"H tra"ition the $an$s !ere centralise" G they Fha" anH i"entifie" lea"ership an" FthatH lea"ership too' responsi)ility for all actions of their mem)ers7 they ha" to issue $uns, they ha" to "eal !ith "ru$s, they ha" to store $uns, they ha" to pay people an" !e coul" all i"entify FthemH. &hen those lea"ers !ere ta'en a!ay 4 !hat !e have no! on the Cape 9lats 4 all these $an$ fi$hts occurrin$ 4 !e have ne! emer$in$ youn$sters !ithin the $an$FsH that have their o!n factions. F hereH3s (ostlin$ for lea"ership 4 an" the only !ay they can prove their lea"ership is to actually ta'e their $an$, unite them, an" $o an" fi$ht a$ainst the others. <o! G in *onteheu!el, in Manen)er$, in Mitchells ,lain, $an$ fi$hts FhaveH flare" up no!. #t3s evi"ence of this vacuum in lea"ership in the $an$s. .n" so it3s $oin$ to ta'e some time an" much more $an$ fi$hts )efore you3re $oin$ to have a ne! "iscerni)le layer of lea"ers in the $an$s. F=Han$s have "ecentralise" an" that3s G much more "an$erous for us in the community, )ecause !hen the $an$s "ecentralise, then you "on3t 'no! !ho3s "oin$ !hat G . hen you can ta'e ei$ht or nine or ten people an" they can form their o!n section of the $an$, they can specialise in arme" ro))eries for instance. &hereas un"er centralisation you coul" "etect G imme"iately !hat3s $oin$ on 4 no! you can3t "o that 0%2, ? .pril 20001. #f this analysis is correct it su$$ests that the current spiral of violence an" counter4violence must )e )ro'en if further )loo"she" is to )e prevente" in the future. *ut this ta'es us into another specific area of concern to CSV% 4 the lin's )et!een past an" present cycles of violence.
Cycles o+ violence

&e have alrea"y ar$ue" that the violence 4 attac', counter4attac', an" counter4counter4 attac' 4 that has overta'en the &estern Cape in the last five years is not, an" never has )een, either inevita)le or unstoppa)le. here is no sense in !hich the present cycle of violence 0if in"ee" it can )e seen as such rather than as a series of mini4cycles as the analysis in previous para$raphs su$$ests1 is the result of some fateful historical lo$ic !or'in$ itself out. *ut this is not to say that no connections can )e ma"e )et!een !hat has occurre" since 155> an" the violence of earlier years. 9ar from it, for all our respon"ents !ere clear that 4 complicate" thou$h the $enealo$y may )e 4 violence )ree"s violence. he follo!in$ are (ust some of the !ays in !hich they sa! history if not repeatin$ itself in the current violence then at least reachin$ out to touch the main players in the )loo"y "rama of the late 1550s.
Gangster politics

/versha"o!in$ everythin$, )ut e2plainin$ little, is of course the $ran" violence of aparthei" in the specific form of the institutionalise" violence that lies at the heart of any police State. .s !e have seen, the force" removal of lar$e num)ers of people from the

inner city "istricts an" ver"ant su)ur)s at the foot of a)le Mountain create" an environment in !hich $an$sterism coul" flourish. hen, havin$ create" an" populate" the ne! $hettos on the Cape 9lats, the aparthei" State a)an"one" them, choosin$ for the most part to police only those 0politically motivate"1 infractions that threatene" the security of the State or those in"ivi"uals !ho chose to prey not on their nei$h)ours, )ut on the !hite social elite.E6 .s the li)eration stru$$le intensifie" in the late 15K0s an" 1560s, an increasin$ly "esperate police force also turne" to the $an$s for help a$ainst their political opponents.E5 #n e2chan$e for money, arms an" the State3s tacit approval for their illicit operations 0provi"e", it seems safe to assume, that those operations !ere restricte" to the $hetto1, at least some $an$sters !ere happy to o)li$e )y harassin$ 4 even 'illin$ 4 anti4 aparthei" activists. Convenient thou$h they !ere at the time, the relationships for$e" )et!een $an$sters an" police officers have come )ac' to haunt those amon$ the latter $roup !ho no! fin" themselves servin$ their former political opponents an" encum)ere" )y the heavy )a$$a$e of the past. +o!ever, it !as not only the ol" aparthei" State an" its a$ents that en$a$e" !ith $an$ster elements. &e have alrea"y seen ho! the reforme" $an$sters !e spo'e to claim to have )een approache" )y senior politicians for help prior to the 155B elections. -ven allo!in$ for some e2a$$eration in the accounts !e !ere $iven, it is har" to see ho! any political or$anisation coul" have hope" to operate in places li'e Manen)er$ !ithout the ac;uiescence of lea"in$ $an$sters as the area3s "e facto civil authority.B0 <or !ere the former li)eration movements unsympathetic to those $an$sters ea$er to play a more active political role )y (oinin$ their ran's as party mem)ers. hus, one respon"ent !ith some personal 'no!le"$e of the affair tol" us that, !hen several mem)ers of one of the most notorious Cape 9lats $an$s 0inclu"in$ its then lea"er1 trie" to (oin the .<C, their applications !ere re(ecte" )y the local party )ranch only to )e approve" at provincial level. B1 Mean!hile other $an$sters !ere cementin$ ol" alliances )y ple"$in$ their support to the <ational ,arty in the forthcomin$ elections.B2 he si$nificance of all this for present purposes is not that relationships !ere for$e" )et!een $an$sters on the one han", an" police officials an" politicians from all the ma(or political parties in the &estern Cape on the other. %ather, !hat concerns us here is that these relationships create the appearance 0if not the reality1 of collusion )et!een the State an" the $an$s. his in turn un"erpins an" len"s cre"i)ility to ,a$a"3s claims that the State 4 compromise" )y the criminal connections of its personnel 4 )lithely i$nores the )latantly ille$al an" socially "estructive activities of the $an$s !hile mo)ilisin$ all the force at its "isposal to crush an anti4crime or$anisation such as itself.
Pagad, >ibla and the str)ggle tradition

he precise relationship )et!een ,a$a" an" ra"ical #slamic $roups such as @i)la is, as !e have seen, )itterly "ispute". #t is impossi)le for us to "ra! any conclusions on the su)(ect from the "ata at our "isposal. <evertheless it is har" to "eny that the "ivisions !ithin the Muslim population of the Cape opene" up "urin$ the violent "eath throes of aparthei" may help to e2plain !hy a popular movement a$ainst $an$sterism an" "ru$s, supporte" )y many or"inary Muslim people, mi$ht have attracte" political activists from @i)la an" other li'e4min"e" or$anisations. Several respon"ents su$$este" that the he$emony of a tra"itionally conservative an" politically ;uiescent lea"ership 4 tarnishe" )y its over4

accommo"atin$ attitu"e to!ar"s the country3s aparthei" rulers 4 !as )ro'en "urin$ the stru$$le years as more hi$hly politicise" charterists an" #slamic ra"icals either (oine" or ali$ne" themselves !ith one or other of the li)eration movements. #f this !as in"ee" the case, it is unremar'a)le that )oth the issue of crime, $an$sterism an" "ru$s, an" the popular movement )uilt aroun" it, )ecame sites of political stru$$le once li)eration ha" )een achieve". hat the mem)ership of ,a$a" an" @i)la overlaps shoul" come as no surprise to anyone 4 an" least of all to the seasone" political activists !ho no! occupy senior positions in $overnment. <o political $roup !orth its salt 4 an" fe! self4respectin$ political activists 4 confronte" !ith the opportunity that ,a$a" presente" 0say1 to @i)la coul" have resiste" the temptation to !or' !ithin such a mass movement in the lon$ term interests of the party.BE .t a time !hen the post4li)eration lea"ership of South .frican #slam !as at sta'e, no or$anisation in ,a$a"3s position coul" have remaine" untainte" )y politics for lon$. <or is it outra$eous to speculate as !e have "one earlier in this report that those mem)ers of @i)la !ho (oine" ,a$a" )rou$ht !ith them a sense of political purpose 4 an" or$anisational s'ills to match 4 that !oul" ena)le the or$anisation to survive the har" years that follo!e" the honeymoon months of early 155?. hus here too, in the "evelopment of ,a$a" itself, it is possi)le to see a connection !ith the violence of the stru$$le years, firstly in the i"eolo$ical form of a "istinctively South .frican strain of #slamic ra"icalism an" secon"ly in the more su)stantial shape of the or$anisational s'ills nee"e" to popularise that i"eolo$y an" turn it into a political pro$ramme.
:ammers and nails: the state o+ the State

he terms of the ne$otiate" settlement that pave" the !ay for the 155B elections an" the harsh realities of e2ercisin$ State po!er meant that the .<C4"ominate" $overnment of national unity ha" little choice )ut to rely on personnel inherite" from its pre"ecessor. Unpopular, mistruste" an" compromise" )y their past as many of them !ere, the ne! $overnment ha" no ne! police force, no rea"y4ma"e intelli$ence service, !aitin$ in the !in$s to "o its )i""in$. his continuity of personnel e2plains 4 at least in part 4 the persistence into the "emocratic era of strate$ies trie" an" teste" "urin$ the aparthei" years. &ith four "eca"es an" more e2perience of (ustifyin$ their suppression )y tarrin$ the .<C an" its allies !ith the )rush of communism, the "efault response of the post4aparthei" security services !as similarly constructe" on the t!in pillars of propa$an"a an" repression. ,a$a" !as a thorn in the flesh of the authorities an" the authorities nee"e" G to portray the stereotype of an or$anisation that !as oppose" to the State. .n" if you are oppose" to the State, this le$itimate State, then any)o"y !ill say yes, the State is (ustifie" in ta'in$ action a$ainst these in"ivi"uals. *ut !hat people "i"n3t realise 4 an" this !as unfortunately the "emocratic $overnment actin$ on the pre(u"ices that Fha"H )een )uilt into peoples3 min"s )y the aparthei" system. .n" that is that, if you !ear a uniform then you are correct an" you are operatin$ !ithin the la!. F*utH if you "o not !ear a uniform an" you ta'e any action, then you are unla!ful an" that is !here G people (ustifie" action a$ainst ,a$a" 0%B, ? June 20001. Lon$4accustome" to reachin$ for their familiar hammers the security forces sa! ,a$a" as

(ust another nail 4 a threat to the authority of the ne! State much li'e the UD9, the .<C an" the rest ha" )een to the ol". Reconciliation: impact and prospects #nasmuch as the violence that has !rac'e" the &estern Cape since 155? is cyclical )oth in its relationship !ith earlier conflicts connecte" to the foun"ation an" "estruction of aparthei", an" in the sense that one roun" of violence !ithin the present cycle seems to spar' another, the primary aim of any reconciliation process must )e to )rea' into those cycles thus re"ucin$ the chances of violence recurrin$. Ju"$e" a$ainst this yar"stic', the history of attempts at reconciliation )et!een the 0often literally1 !arrin$ parties on the Cape 9lats is a "epressin$ litany of failures an" misse" opportunities.
Truth# reconciliation and the TR,

he evi"ence presente" in this report is minuscule in comparison !ith that of the ruth an" %econciliation Commission 0 %C1.BB Det it captures somethin$ implicit in the %C3s !or' 4 the near4impossi)ility of constructin$ a sin$le, o)(ective 3truth3 from multiple, su)(ective 3truths3. &ith this in min" !e "o not inten" to (oin those !ho "amn the !hole %C process for revealin$ little of !hat actually happene" un"er aparthei", an" lea"in$ to no more than a superficial reconciliation )et!een the social forces represente" )y those !ho fou$ht for an" a$ainst it. +o!ever, the process of national reconciliation em)o"ie" in the %C seems to have left lar$e areas of the &estern Cape, an" millions of people, virtually untouche". he 1555 elections an" their aftermath reveale" the politics of the province to )e as virulently racialise" an" the tactics of 3s!art $evaar3 almost, )ut not ;uite, as )rutally effective as ever. Cape o!n itself remains 4 not!ithstan"in$ the 3$reyin$3 of some 0hitherto e2clusively !hite1 mi""le class areas 4 a city "ivi"e" a$ainst itself. <or has the spirit of reconciliation touche" the reforme" $an$sters !e intervie!e" in the !ay they hope" )ac' in 155B. &hile police officers have receive" amnesty for crimes committe" in the name of aparthei", they 4 its victims 4 still fin" themselves on the !ron$ si"e of the la! thus a""in$ to their sense of )etrayal )y a $overnment they supporte" an" )elieve to )e in their "e)t. 9rom the $an$sters3 vie!point, the process of $ran" reconciliation follo!in$ the "emise of aparthei" "i" too little to resolve the peculiar pro)lems of the &estern Cape. *ut, conversely, it may also have "one too much )y entrenchin$ the positions of shop4soile" ol" or"er )ureaucrats ill4e;uippe" to "eal !ith the pro)lems of a ne! "emocratic era an" prone to resort to the stereotype" thin'in$ an" faile" tactics of the past.
Reconciliation on the ,ape Flats

#f the %C4le" process of national reconciliation seems to have passe" the Cape )y, its shortcomin$s have scarcely )een ma"e $oo" )y repeate" attempts at reconciliation 4 or at least ne$otiation 4 )et!een the ma(or players involve" in the continuin$ violence on the Cape 9lats. o our 'no!le"$e no fe!er than three sets of tal's have ta'en place )et!een ,a$a" an" the State alone in the perio" since 155?. %epeate" attempts to resolve the pro)lems of $an$ an" vi$ilante violence )y tal'in$ rather than )y shootin$, )om)in$, prosecutin$ an" imprisonin$ have )ro'en "o!n ami"st a )arra$e of mutual recrimination. .ll the 'ey players !e tal'e" to 4 police, ,a$a", anti4crime activists, o)servers an"

reforme" $an$sters 4 proclaim their commitment to en"in$ the violence. -ach of them )elieves that they have a si$nificant, even essential, part to play in reachin$ that $oal. &here they "iffer 4 )itterly an" apparently irreconcila)ly 4 is over ho! they can, an" in"ee" !hether they shoul", co4operate to achieve that common o)(ective. Moreover, the tas' of resolvin$ these "ifferences is ma"e more "ifficult than it mi$ht other!ise )e )y the mutual an tipathy an" "istrust that has $ro!n up )et!een the various parties !ith each suspectin$ the others of "uplicity an" )a" faith in their approach to the various roun"s of tal's that have ta'en place. So, for e2ample, a fra$ile transitional State vie!s street $an$sters, or$anise" crime syn"icates, arme" vi$ilantes an" civil society anti4crime $roups as, to varyin$ "e$rees, a threat to its (ealously $uar"e" monopoly on the use of le$itimate coercive force. Un"er severe pressure to live up to its )illin$ as the ultimate $uarantor of social or"er, ne$otiation can )e interprete" as a si$n of !ea'ness, an a"mission that the State 4 in +o))esian terms 4 is una)le to stop the !ar of all a$ainst all. o people in ,a$a", surveyin$ the "esolation in their communities, the failure of the State to )rea' the hol" of the $an$s is proof of its incompetence an" venality !hile the or$anisation3s e2perience of ne$otiation is em)ittere" )y memories of provocation an" "ou)le4"ealin$. &ith the State inactive an" untrust!orthy an" other anti4crime $roups naQve enou$h to )elieve that $an$sters an" "ru$ "ealers can )e ca(ole" into chan$in$ rather than confronte" !ith the necessity for chan$e, they )elieve that ,a$a", an" ,a$a" alone, stan"s )et!een $oo" people, the $oo" community, an" chaos. .s for the reforme" $an$sters, they are paine" at the State3s scepticism a)out the sincerity of their conversion to the path of ri$hteousness an" "isillusione" )y the failure of the 3)lac'3 $overnment to "eliver on its promises either to them as in"ivi"uals or to the mar$inalise" 3)ruinmense3 !ho they, li'e ,a$a", claim in some !ay to represent. Mean!hile, even those anti4crime $roups !ith an instinctive commitment to reconciliation hesitate to tal' to people !ho )rin$ $uns to the ne$otiatin$ ta)le or !hose commitment to !or'in$ in a $enuine partnership !ith civil society has !ane" !ith their ac;uisition of State po!er.
Prospects !or peace

#f this analysis is any!here near correct, the prospects for reconciliation are )lea'. .ll si"es seem set on achievin$ their common $oal usin$ their o!n metho"s an" !ith nothin$ )ut fear, "istrust or contempt for !hat others are "oin$. +o!ever, )efore !e "ismiss the possi)ility of reconciliation entirely, let us loo' very )riefly at the alternatives.
Prevention, policing and criminal =)stice re+orm

*itterly critical of its present role as they are, ,a$a", other anti4crime $roups an" the reforme" $an$sters all reco$nise the centrality of the State to solvin$ the pro)lem of violence. Despite re$ular, an" increasin$ly plaintive, appeals for the community to (oin it in a partnership a$ainst crime an" violence, the State continues to see ri$orous enforcement as the ans!er to the pro)lem. Le$islation on asset forfeiture an" the prevention of or$anise" crime has $iven the State a )attery of ne! po!ers to use a$ainst crime syn"icates an" in"ivi"ual $an$ lea"ers. #n recent months ne! anti4terrorism la!s have )een "rafte" in response to the )om)in$s in the &estern Cape. Ur)an terror is also amon$st the list of most serious offences to )e investi$ate" )y the ne! elite Scorpions unit un"er the "irect supervision of a ministerial committee hea"e" )y the ,resi"ent 0Cape imes, E.6.20001. .s

one of our respon"ents in"icate", the emphasis on intelli$ence4le" policin$ may )e $reater no! than it !as four years a$o, )ut more an" )etter policin$ 0!ith prosecution an" imprisonment to follo! for those foun" responsi)le for violence1 remains the "ominant theme in the State3s response.
The en!orcement option

his is not the place to "e)ate the merits either of recent le$islation or of the creation of elite investi$ative units in any "etail. he potential "ifficulties !ith a conventional la! enforcement approach are not reme"ia)le simply )y passin$ more penal statutes an" hirin$ more people to enforce them. he first point is that all of these steps are aime" at improvin$ the reactive, rather than the preventive capacity of the State. /f course, efficient )an"it4 catchin$ may have a preventive effect, )ut it is a less certain an" more e2pensive form of prevention than other strate$ies tar$ete" more "irectly at the causes of crime.B> his )rin$s us to the secon" point, the perennial pro)lems of capacity an" resources. Does the State have the !here!ithal nee"e" to ma'e the ne! le$islation !or' an" ensure that routine policin$ 4 the point at !hich most people actually e2perience policin$ as a service 4 is not ro))e" of resources so as to fun" the activities of ne! elites invisi)le to the or"inary personO here is also the apparent ina)ility of the security services to operate effectively !ithin constitutional constraints. &hether it is )ecause 4 as the police an" other enforcement a$encies li'e to assert 4 their han"s are tie" )y over4ela)orate proce"ural re;uirements "esi$ne" to safe$uar" the ri$hts of suspects or )ecause they have faile" to $rasp the )asic principles of "emocratic la! enforcement, the fact is that the security forces "o not have much to sho! for four years of often frenAie" activity an" a )e!il"erin$ succession of special operations. ,a$a" may have )een "ecapitate" )y the incarceration of its lea"ers, yet fe! if any of them have actually )een convicte" of a serious offence. -;ually "istur)in$ is evi"ence 4 confirme" )y our respon"ents 4 that senior security service personnel remain "ivi"e" a)out the nature an" seriousness of the ur)an terror pro)lem an" the !is"om of continuin$ !ith a strate$y that relies so heavily on enforcement. &orse still are the persistent "ou)ts a)out the inte$rity of the police. he suspicion that elements attache" to 0if not actually insi"e1 the security an" intelli$ence apparatus are implicate" in acts of ur)an terror is not limite" to a lunatic frin$e of conspiracy theorists, an" pu)lic 'no!le"$e of the historic lin's )et!een senior fi$ures in the police an" lea"in$ $an$sters is !i"esprea". /ur vie! is that )etter traine" an" e;uippe" investi$ators !ho 'no! their !ay aroun" the mass of ne! le$islation passe" since 155B, an" have $ro!n up !ith the ri$ours of constitutional policin$, may )e a)le to overcome some of these o)stacles. La!4ma'in$ an" police reor$anisation may provi"e some temporary respite from the pro)lems of $an$sterism an" vi$ilantism. +o!ever, they are unli'ely to resolve those pro)lems in the lon$ term )ecause they fail even to )e$in to tac'le the roots of the violence. Certainly the prospects for the successful implementation of a strate$y )ase" on ri$orous enforcement an" clever propa$an"a are not $oo". #n spite of resortin$ to metho"s far )eyon" the pale of constitutional "emocracy, the aparthei" $overnment !as una)le to resolve the security crisis en$en"ere" )y its o!n policies. he construction of a "e facto police State an" almost total control of the me"ia !ere not enou$h to control the an$er of the "isenfranchise" ma(ority.

&hat is more, perhaps the most stri'in$ lesson to )e learnt from the 3terror3 of 1556 is that enforcement 4 in the "raconian form of the e2tra4(u"icial e2ecution of lea"in$ $an$sters 4 "oes not provi"e a lon$ term solution to the pro)lem of $an$sterism.B? .s one of our respon"ents ar$ue" in a passa$e ;uote" earlier, the li;ui"ation of one tier of lea"ers may !ell have le" to a potentially "an$erous chan$e in $an$ structure an" to the current upsur$e in $an$ violence.BK #n much the same !ay, the removal )y incarceration of many prominent mem)ers of ,a$a" lea"ers is unli'ely to resolve the correspon"in$ pro)lem of vi$ilantism. &ith its tra"ition of collective lea"ership, !e have no "ou)t that ,a$a" !ill continue to e2ist 4 even if it "oes not e2actly thrive 4 as lon$ as the pro)lems of $an$sterism an" "ru$s persist.
%lternatives

he implications of these ar$uments are clear. -nforcement alone !ill not solve the pro)lems of vi$ilante violence an" reven$e 'illin$ in the &estern Cape. %eformin$ the criminal (ustice system may )e a necessary con"ition for peace since it is har" to "eny that some measure of pu)lic confi"ence in the inte$rity an" efficiency of the security services must return )efore the current impasse in relations )et!een the State, ,a$a" an" everyone else can )e )ro'en. -;ually, criminal (ustice reforms alone !ill not suffice. &e !ill $ive some in"ication of !hat else nee"s to )e "one at the en" of this report. *ut first !e must return very )riefly to the three hypotheses referre" to in CSV%3s )riefin$ !hen contractin$ this research. Concl)sions
/hree hypotheses

he narrative evi"ence an" analysis presente" in this report allo!s us to "ra! only tentative conclusions a)out the chan$in$ nature of violence in post4transitional societies, the impact of chan$e on reconciliation processes an" the overlappin$ i"entities of victims an" offen"ers.
The changing nature o! violence

Un"ou)te"ly the nature of violence "oes chan$e !hen its focus shifts from li)eration to the "istri)ution of the fruits of free"om after a formal transition to "emocracy has )een accomplishe". /nce the $oal of li)eration has )een achieve", the unity for$e" in stru$$le soon )rea's "o!n. /l" alliances "issolve, or )ecome sources not of stren$th )ut em)arrassment. <e! relationships in a ne$otiate" transition can )e for$e" )et!een ancient enemies. .ttitu"es to!ar"s violence an" characterisations of it as criminal or political also chan$e in transitional an" post4transitional societies. F Hhere !as a criminalisation of politics un"er the ol" $overnment. .n" un"er the ne! $overnment !e FhaveH ha" the politicisation of crime !here crime G has )ecome an intensely political issue.B6 his happens, a)ove all, )ecause State po!er, an" !ith it the po!er to re"ra! the )oun"aries of the criminal, chan$es han"s. .t the same time, the e2ercise of State po!er

also )ecomes more ti$htly circumscri)e" )y ne! constitutional safe$uar"s an" responses to crime an" political "issent more closely re$ulate" )y proce"ural rules. Limite" as it !as, our research foun" evi"ence of all these chan$es an" more at !or' in the &estern Cape !here, )roa"ly as hypothesise", the nature of violence has chan$e" )ut not 4 at least not necessarily 4 its e2tent.
Post-transitional reconciliation

#n these circumstances, it is unli'ely that processes of reconciliation "esi$ne" to heal the !oun"s opene" in the fi$ht for "emocracy !ill suffice once "emocracy has )een esta)lishe". /n li)eration, the parties to the process 4 a State that coul" no lon$er sustain itself an" a li)eration movement prepare" to ac'no!le"$e its ina)ility to triumph )y force of arms 4 !ere of rou$hly e;ual stren$th. hey !ere a)le to "etermine the rules of the reconciliation $ame more or less for themselves "urin$ the e2ten"e" perio" of political interre$num that prece"e" the 155B elections. &hat !e are confronte" !ith in the &estern Cape to"ay is, )y contrast, a )e!il"erin$ array of competin$ interests 4 or$anise" an" "isor$anise", le$itimate an" ille$itimate, arme" an" unarme" 4 the most po!erful of !hich is a transitional 0an" )y no means omnipotent1 State )oun" to play )y the still unfamiliar rules of constitutional "emocracy. Until all those involve" reco$nise 4 as the parties to South .frica3s ne$otiate" settlement "i" 4 that the fi$ht a$ainst $an$sterism, vi$ilantism or ur)an terrorism cannot an" shoul" not )e !on, reconciliation !ill remain a chimera.
"angsters are victims too1?

/ne reason !hy fi$htin$ tal' an" the lan$ua$e of )attle, victory an" "efeat are so "an$erous is su$$este" )y the thir" hypothesis. 9or it is only possi)le to see the elimination of an opponent as a "esira)le $oal if the essential humanity of that opponent is "enie". /ne very po!erful !ay of un"erminin$ an opponent3s claim to humanity is to emphasise hisCher otherness or inhumanity )y )ran"in$ himCher a criminal or an outla! no lon$er "eservin$ of the consi"eration to !hich the la!4a)i"in$ are entitle". his process of "istancin$ an" "enial !as evi"ent in much of !hat !e hear" from our respon"ents. ,a$a"3s construction of the "ru$ "ealer as the enemy of the community, an incu)us to )e e2pelle", !as perhaps the most e2plicit e2ample of this. +o!ever, it !as also implicit in the State3s )rutally effective la)ellin$ of @i)la an", )y association, ,a$a" as fun"amentalist an", therefore, part of some hy"ra4hea"e" $lo)al conspiracy. Det, runnin$ counter to these 0often successful1 attempts at "emonisation is another )o"y of evi"ence !e collecte". his in"icates that 4 as the thir" hypothesis su$$ests 4 it is possi)le to )e an offen"er an" a victim at one an" the same time7 a victim of aparthei" social en$ineerin$ an" a $an$ster8 an arme" vi$ilante an" a parent afrai" for a youn$ family $ro!in$ up in $an$lan"8 or a police official !ith unsuita)le frien"s an" illicit sources of income una)le to survive on !hat the State can affor" to pay an" terrifie" of the conse;uences of )rea'in$ free of the $an$sters3 em)race.
Preventing violence: the 'ay ahead-

Comin$ up !ith our o!n prescriptions for re"ucin$ levels of violence in the &estern Cape $oes some !ay )eyon" the scope of this report. So !e !ill )e )rief an" confine ourselves to no more than t!o o)servations, )oth of !hich flo! from !hat !e have ar$ue" else!here in

this report. 9irstly 4 an" not!ithstan"in$ the many o)stacles in the !ay of reconciliation 4 !e )elieve that the alternative to some form of constructive en$a$ement )et!een the State, ,a$a", other anti4crime or$anisations, $an$sters 0unreforme" as !ell as reforme"1 an" the or"inary people !ho have to live un"er $an$ rule is more violence. &ars on crime, !hoever the com)atants may )e 0e.$. State a$ents or freelance assassins1 are rarely, if ever, !inna)le. he !ars a$ainst $an$sterism an" vi$ilantism currently )ein$ !a$e" in the &estern Cape are no e2ceptions to this rule. &e are convince" that ne$otiations of some sort are therefore the only !ay for!ar" 4 at least in the short term. #n the lon$er term 4 an" this )rin$s us to our secon" point 4 somethin$ must )e "one a)out the social con"itions in !hich $an$sterism has ta'en root. /ne of many similarities )et!een ,a$a" an" the State in their approach to $an$sterism is an apparent un!illin$ness to see it not as a manifestation of in"ivi"ual $ree" an" !ic'e"ness, )ut in its !i"er social conte2t. here is nothin$ inevita)le a)out a youn$ man $ro!in$ up in a place li'e Manen)er$ (oinin$ a $an$. +o!ever, to say that it is as easy to avoi" the +ar" Livin$s an" i$nore the re!ar"s of $an$ mem)ership in Manen)er$ as it is in Jen!yn 0let alone Constantia1 is nonsense.>0 Spea'in$ of ,a$a" 4 thou$h his !or"s are e;ually applica)le to the State 4 one of our respon"ents put it li'e this7 F&Hhat ,a$a" "i"n3t have !as a pro$ramme for the re4"evelopment of the communities. &hilst it ha" $ran" i"eas a)out $ettin$ ri" of "ru$ "ealers, !hich unite" people, !hat it nee"e" to complement that !ith !as a pro$ramme of action to re4)uil" communities. Development !or' is al!ays more "ifficult than slo$anisin$ 4 al!ays more "ifficult 0%2, ? .pril 20001. Later in the intervie! the same respon"ent summe" up the lon$4term challen$e of "ealin$ !ith the roots of violence in !or"s that !e fin" har" to improve upon. F Hhe $an$s un"erstan" the Fsocio4economicH con"itions F!ithin the communitiesH far )etter than the politicians. hey 'no! !hen to provi"e thin$s for the communities, an" so the communities un"erstan" that if the police come, the police !ill come an" they !ill $o. *ut the $an$s !ill remain. #f social !or'ers come, social !or'ers !ill come an" $o. *ut the $an$s !ill remain. .n" mem)ers in those poverty4stric'en communities 'no! that. hey un"erstan" that time is lon$er than rope, an" that the $an$s !ill al!ays )e !ith them. .n" unless !e )rea' that sym)iotic FrelationshipH that the $an$s have !ith the communities, then !e !on3t !in this fi$ht. .n" !e can only )rea' that )y creatin$ more (o)s, )y ma'in$ the community less "epen"ent on $an$s, )y creatin$ a ne! culture in this community, of responsi)ility, of lea"ership. #f !e "on3t "o that, then the $an$s !ill continue to $ro! )ecause more layers of people an" more youn$ people !ill (oin their ran's. he schools are unattractive for G people to $o to, an" there3s more money to )e ma"e there in the $an$s 0%2, ? .pril 20001. /ur final point is therefore not to su$$est that $an$sterism !ill ;uietly melt a!ay if poverty an" alienation are tac'le" effectively, )ut to su$$est that the sym)iotic relationship )et!een

$an$ an" community cannot )e )ro'en )y force. Loosenin$ the economic an" social )on"s that constitute this relationship !ill ta'e time. *ut it !ill only happen !hen people have some $roun"s for )elievin$ that that 3time3 is not lon$er than 3rope3 an" that they !ill not have to !ait forever for the (o)s, schools, services, an" social infrastructure that !oul" allo! them to )ecome full citiAens of a "emocratic South .frica.
Postscript

Since !or' on this report !as complete" in early .u$ust 2000 violence has returne" to the streets of Cape o!n !ith a ven$eance. *om)s have )een $oin$ off from Constantia to =atesville. he &estern Cape3s first citiAen has narro!ly avoi"e" serious in(ury. . prominent mem)er of the (u"iciary has )een assassinate". Su)ur)an shoppin$ malls, $ay )ars, )usy city centre streets, stu"ent cafNs an" the offices of political parties have all )een tar$ete". Lea"in$ politicians an" senior fi$ures in la! enforcement have )een ;uic' to )lame ,a$a" for this latest upsur$e in !hat is no! routinely referre" to as 3ur)an terror3. Safety an" Security Minister Steve sh!ete has sai" that the police 3are not loo'in$ any!here else3 for the people )ehin" the )om)in$s 0*usiness Day, 12.5.20001. .ll that remains is for the information the security forces alrea"y have at their "isposal to )e turne" into evi"ence an" put )efore the courts. ,ronouncements to this effect )y sh!ete an" his collea$ue at the Department of Justice, ,enuell Ma"una, have not $one unchallen$e" ho!ever. /pposition parties across the political spectrum have lam)aste" the $overnment for failin$ either to present har" evi"ence of ,a$a"3s involvement or to )rin$ those responsi)le for the )om)in$s to )oo' 0Cape Times, 1E.5.20008 .usiness )ay, 1E.5.2000a1. .ca"emics an" me"ia commentators have )een e;ually sceptical a)out ministerial claims that the case a$ainst ,a$a" is over!helmin$.>1 ,a$a" mean!hile has con"emne" attac's such as the )om)in$ of the Constantia Villa$e shoppin$ comple2 an" threatene" le$al action a$ainst those !ho accuse the or$anisation of )ein$ )ehin" the violence. %ecent me"ia reportin$ of the num)er of ur)an terror cases outstan"in$ 4 or alrea"y "eci"e" 4 a$ainst ,a$a" an" its mem)ers su$$ests that the authorities are not $oin$ to ta'e these criticisms lyin$ "o!n 0Cape .r$us, 11.10.20001. &i"ely reporte" accounts of the activities of the =4force3s =rassy ,ar' cell presente" )y a <ational #ntelli$ence .$ency informer at the trial of four lea"in$ mem)ers of ,a$a" seem to len" further !ei$ht to the case a$ainst the or$anisation 0Cape $rgus, 10.10.20001. estimony $iven un"er oath )y informers in open court an" the pu)lication of lists of ,a$a" supporters !ho have )een foun" $uilty of ur)an terror4relate" offences or have cases pen"in$ a$ainst them certainly $ives some su)stance to ministerial claims that ,a$a" 4 an" ,a$a" alone 4 is responsi)le for the )om)in$s an" shootin$s of the last t!o years. *ut it is )y no means conclusive evi"ence of their involvement. he four men alle$e" to have )een active in the =rassy ,ar' cell of the =4force have not )een foun" $uilty of anythin$ as yet an" the truth of the alle$ations a$ainst them lar$ely unteste". /f the si2teen ,a$a" mem)ers an" supporters !ho have )een convicte" of so4calle" 3ur)an terrorism3, more than half face" char$es relatin$ to the ille$al possession of e2plosives, firearms an" ammunition rather than their use. #n the t!o cases !here activists !ere foun" $uilty of mur"er, the

inten"e" tar$ets for their actions !ere people )elieve" to )e "ru$ "ealers or $an$sters an" their associates.>2 he research reporte" here is e;ually inconclusive. #t !oul" )e i"le of us to speculate a)out the e2tent to !hich ,a$a", its mem)ers an" supporters are involve" in ur)an terror )ase" on the intervie! an" other "ata !e !ere a)le to collect. &hat !e can say is that !e fin" the term 3ur)an terror3 itself "istinctly unhelpful. .t )est it is a piece of convenient (ournalistic shorthan" for offences that ran$e from the ille$al possession of firearms an" ammunition to motor vehicle theft an" mur"er. ,articularly important in our vie! are the closely relate" ;uestions of motivation an" tar$et selection. &hy are certain in"ivi"uals, institutions or locations attac'e"O .n" ho! plausi)le is ,a$a"3s involvement $iven ,a$a"3s 'no!n social an"Cor political o)(ectivesO .nalyse" in this !ay, the violence of the last five years seems to have )een "irecte" a$ainst at least four "istinct types of tar$et7 1. $an$sters, "ru$ "ealers, their associates an" places 0inclu"in$ some ostensi)ly le$itimate )usinesses1 use" for, or as fronts for, "ru$4"ealin$ or $an$4relate" activities8 2. $overnment )uil"in$s such as police stations an" in"ivi"ual State a$ents involve" in the investi$ation or a"(u"ication of cases involvin$ ,a$a" or its mem)ers8 E. places such as syna$o$ues, theme restaurants or $ay )ars that sym)olise either the international economic an" i"eolo$ical he$emony of .merica, the &est an" the Ju"aeo4Christian tra"ition or the ne!4!on constitutional protections en(oye" )y social $roups !ho fall foul of the conservative social morality associate" !ith ra"ical #slam, an" B. 3soft3 tar$ets 4 shoppin$ centres, restaurants, coffee shops, city streets an" so on 4 that have no o)vious connection !ith either the e2plicit social, or assume" political, a$en"a of ,a$a" or ra"ical #slam. here are, of course, "ifficulties !ith ta'in$ such an analysis too far an" the cate$orisation of any $iven inci"ent is li'ely to )e controversial on the )asis of evi"ence in the pu)lic "omain. *ut !hat it "oes provi"e is some critical purchase on the plausi)ility of the State3s claim that there is no nee" to loo' )eyon" ,a$a" for the perpetrators of ur)an terror !hatever its tar$et may )e. So, for e2ample it allo!s us to "istin$uish )et!een, on the one han", attac's on restaurants, shoppin$ centres an" other 3soft3 tar$ets !hich ,a$a" has pu)licly con"emne" an" are "ifficult to connect to any of its state" o)(ectives an", on the other, arme" action a$ainst "ru$ "ealers for !hich ,a$a" has not claime" "irect responsi)ility )ut evi"ently )elieves to )e socially )eneficial. *y the same to'en, the lar$e num)er of cases either hear" or pen"in$ a$ainst ,a$a" supporters in connection !ith attac's on "ru$ "ealers may su$$est 4 if only on a no4smo'e4 !ithout4fire )asis 4 that the $roup3s mem)ers are not averse to usin$ violence a$ainst people they 'no! or suspect are involve" in $an$sterism. *ut this "oes not mean that !e shoul" accept !ithout ;uestion the claim ma"e )y <ational Director of ,u)lic ,rosecutions,

*ulelani <$cu'a, that the )om)in$ of t!o $ay )ars 0the *lah *ar in <ovem)er 1555 an" the *ron2 in .u$ust last year1 3ma'eFsH sense in ,a$a"3s terms )ecause homose2uality is con"emne" )y #slam3 or that other, apparently motiveless attac's on an up4mar'et shoppin$ comple2 an" a stu"ent cafN can )e e2plaine" )y their coinci"ence !ith the appearance of ,a$a" mem)ers in court 0*usiness Day, 1E.5.2000)1. &hile !e "o not have access to the intelli$ence reports that, !e assume, lea" Mr sh!ete, his ministerial collea$ues an" senior officials li'e Mr <$cu'a to conclu"e that ,a$a" are to )lame for all the violence of the secon" half of last year 0an" much more over the prece"in$ four an" a half years1, !e fin" such a )roa" proposition )oth intuitively unattractive an" profoun"ly unhelpful. #t is, in essence, an appeal not to a $reater un"erstan"in$ of violence an" its ori$ins )ut to less. Det, if !e learnt nothin$ else from our research, it !as that the ori$ins of violence are rarely either simple or clear. 9or the time )ein$ at least, !e remain firmly a$nostic on the nature an" e2tent of ,a$a"3s involvement in ur)an terror )ut convince" that the use of that term shoul" not in itself )ecome an o)stacle to un"erstan"in$ the comple2 social "ynamic un"erlyin$ recent events in the &estern Cape. Re+erences .frica, C., Christie, J., Mattes, %., %oefs, M., L aylor, +. 015561. Crime an" community action7 ,a$a" an" the Cape 9lats, 155? 4 155K. 'ublic *pinion !ervice #eport /o 0. Cape o!n7 #D.S.. $gence France 'resse. 0155?, 10 .u$ust1. ,olice rein in #slamic militants in anti4 $an$ !ars. *arr, %., L ,ease, J. 015501. Crime ,lacement, Displacement an" Deflection. #n <. Morris L M. onry 0-"s.1 Crime an" (ustice7 a revie! of research, 12. Chica$o7 University of Chica$o ,ress. *rantin$ham, ,.J., L 9aust, L. 015K?1. . Conceptual Mo"el of Crime ,revention. Crime and )elin1uency 227 26B45?. *ro$"en, M., L Shearin$, C. 0155E1. 'olicing for a /ew !outh $frica. Lon"on7 %outle"$e. .usiness )ay. 02000, 12 Septem)er1. -vi"ence of terror points to ,a$a". .usiness )ay. 02000a, 1E Septem)er1. <$cu'a outlines strate$y to com)at )om)in$s. .usiness )ay. 02000), 1E Septem)er1. /pposition attac's $ovt over terrorism. Cape $rgus. 02000, 5 9e)ruary1. ,a$a" !itnesses 3afrai" to testify3. Cape $rgus. 02000, 10 /cto)er1. #nsi"e ,a$a"3s =4force. Cape $rgus. 02000, 11 /cto)er1. he cases a$ainst ,a$a". Cape $rgus. 0155?, 20 Decem)er1. ,a$a" no! part of the crime pro)lem says police chief.

Cape Times, 02000, 1K March1. ,lanne" assassination of /mar calle" off )y CC* after his heart attac' 4 Van Myl. Cape Times. 02000, 22 May1. .rrests after ,a$a" shoot4out. Cape Times. 02000, E .u$ust1. <e! la!s to tac'le )om)ers7 M)e'i to lea" ministerial committee !hich !ill $ui"e !or' of Scorpions Unit. Cape Times. 02000, 1B Septem)er1. &itch4hunt !ill not stop )om)in$s. Cape Times. 02000, 1E Septem)er1. Ma"una7 Li)yan4traine" $uerillas )ehin" )om)in$s. Cape Times. 0155K, 2B Septem)er1. &ron$ tar$et relives or"eal. Cape Times. 02000, 11 /cto)er1. Court tol" of pipe )om)s. Carter, C., L Mertens, M. 01556, 1K <ovem)er1. he fast life an" har" "eath of Jac'ie Lonte. -lectronic Mail L =uar"ian. Carter, C., L Merten, M. 01556, 20 <ovem)er1. Cops )un$le rai" on ,a$a" house. Mail L =uar"ian. Centre for the Stu"y of Violence an" %econciliation. 015561. Funding 'roposal: Transition "iolence and #econciliation in !outh $frica. Chan"ler <. 01555, 2E January1. =overnment unveils tou$h anti4terror la!. The !tar. Cohen, S. 0155?1. Crime an" politics7 spot the "ifferenceO *ritish Journal of Sociolo$y, BK, 1, 1415. Damon, J., L Davi"s, %. 01556a, E1 Decem)er1. =reat pain, no $ains in 3the most ruthless year3. Cape Times. Damon, J., L Davi"s, %. 01556), E1 Decem)er1. =irls3 crossfire "eaths shoc'. Cape Times. Duffy, .. 0155K, 2B 4 E0 /cto)er1. ,olice lin'e" to Cape !ar. (ail , -uardian. Duffy, .. 01556, E0 January 4 > 9e)ruary1. *lue line )uc'les in $an$lan". (ail , -uardian. +lectronic (ail , -uardian. 01555, 12 January1. Cops )race for violence as ,a$a" man "ies. Financial (ail. 0155?, 22 <ovem)er1. ,a$a"7 curious support. Financial Times *nline. 0155?, 1? .u$ust1. %a"ical #slam7 he ,a$a" connection. 9rie"man, %. 0155?, 2> /cto)er1. Violence !ill not )e tolerate" 4 police $et tou$h on

,a$a". Cape Times. 9rie"man, %. 01556, 1? 9e)ruary1. he roots of Cape $an$sterism7 from )ac' streets to )usiness empires. Cape Times. =alant, %. L =amiel"ien, 9. 0-"s.1. 0155?1. Dru$s, =an$s, ,eople3s ,o!er7 -2plorin$ the ,a$a" ,henomenon. Cape o!n7 Claremont Main %oa" Mas(i". =astro!, ,. 015561. /r$anise" crime in South .frica. &!! (onograph !eries /o 23. +alf!ay +ouse7 #nstitute for Security Stu"ies =ol"in$4Duffy, J. 0155?, 1? .u$ust1. Cape (ournos !or' in fear. Mail L =uar"ian. +a"lan". . 02000, 12 Septem)er1. Mr 9i2it turns talent to ma$ic !ith num)ers. Cape $rgus. +affa(ee, 9. 02000, 21 January1. ,a$a", Muslims an" the Scorpions. &nteractive Financial (ail. Jaco)s, J. 0155K, 2E /cto)er1. ,a$a" pulls out of tal's7 $roup !ants list of concerns a""resse". !aturday $rgus. Jinnes, #. 020001. 9rom ur)an street $an$s to criminal empires7 the chan$in$ face of $an$s in the &estern Cape. &!! (onograph !eries /o 03. ,retoria7 #nstitute for Security Stu"ies. Jnemeyer, . 0155?, 1> .u$ust1. <ach "em -n"e "er .parthei" verschafft sich .llah =ehRr. )ie Welt. Le May, J. 01556, 15 9e)ruary1. =an$s to )e ille$al un"er ne! la!. Cape $rgus. Le$$ett, . 02000, 1> 4 21 Septem)er1. sh!ete is )ar'in$ up !ron$ tree. (ail , -uardian. Lu"s'i, +., L van Milla, L. 0155?, 2E Septem)er1. Cape imes. Merten M., L <$o)eni, -. 01E .u$ust 15551. Cops sol" !eapons to ,a$a". Mail L =uar"ian. <ina, D. 020001. Dirty +arry is )ac'7 Vi$ilantism in South .frica 4 he 0re1emer$ence of the 3$oo"3 an" 3)a"3 community. $frican !ecurity #eview 4 5, 16426. /liver, ,. 0155K, 1B Decem)er1. ,olice #D foun" at "ru$ house. !unday $rgus. ,a$a" !e)site. F/n4lineH. .vaila)le #nternet7 http7CC!!!.pa$a".co.Aa ,illay, S. 020001. ,ro)lematiAin$ the ma'in$ of $oo" an" evil7 $an$s an" ,a$a". ,aper presente" to the hir" Crossroa"s in Cultural Stu"ies, University of *irmin$ham, 21 4 2> June 2000.

SchSrf, &. 015651. Community ,olicin$ in South .frica. $cta 6uridica, 20?4EE. SchSrf, &. 015501. he resur$ence of ur)an street $an$s an" community responses in Cape o!n "urin$ the late ei$hties. #n D. +ansson L D. van Myl Smit 0-"s.1. o!ar"s JusticeO Crime and !tate Control in !outh $frica. Cape o!n7 /2for" University ,ress. SchRnteich, M. 015551. +o! or$anise" is the state3s response to or$anise" crimeO $frican !ecurity #eview, 6, 2, E412. Smith, .. 01555, 1E .pril1. *usinessmen spea' out on $an$ hitlist. Cape $rgus. ruth an" %econciliation Commission. 015561. Truth and #econciliation Commission of !outh $frica #eport. The !tar. 0155K, K May1. ,a$a" slams $an$ster crime plan8 his too echoes an ol" 3stru$$le3 slo$an. The !tar. 01555, ? January1. Cape police ta'e tou$h line on ur)an terrorism. The !tar. 01555, 6 January1. ,olice runnin$ smear campai$n 4 ,a$a". !unday Times. 01555,1? May1. ,olice foil ,a$a" plan to "isrupt elections. hiel, =. 0155K, B .pril1. Dru$ lor"s aim at political po!er. -lectronic Mail L =uar"ian. van Milla, L. 01556, 10 9e)ruary1. =an$ !ar erupts in Manen)er$. Cape Times. Vernon J. 01556, 16 January1. ,a$a"3s po!er "issipate" )y internal split. !unday Times. 4otes:
1

o avoi" clutterin$ the te2t !ith intrusive punctuation !e use terms li'e 3reven$e violence3, 3ur)an terror3 an" 3vi$ilantism3 an" their "erivatives !ithout the a""ition of inverte" commas. &e ac'no!le"$e that these terms have )ecome i"eolo$ically an" politically loa"e" an" our use of them in this !ay "oes not imply that !e have any particular vie! as to their applica)ility to the activities of any or$anisation or in"ivi"ual. .lthou$h it may )e possi)le to treat reven$e violence an" vi$ilantism as "istinct phenomena, !e !ill use the t!o terms more or less interchan$ea)ly here.
2

#t is !orth emphasisin$ here that the $an$ mem)ers !e spo'e to )oth claim to have $iven up their ol" !ays. Much to the cha$rin of the in"ivi"uals concerne" the police an" mem)ers of rival $an$s treat these claims !ith some scepticism. &e ho!ever !ill ta'e them at face value an" refer to our respon"ents as reforme" $an$sters. #t $oes !ithout sayin$ that particular caution shoul" )e ta'en in treatin$ !hat these in"ivi"uals say as representative of 0unreforme"1 $an$sters $enerally.
E .s

!e shall ar$ue later in this report, the tenacity !ith !hich these multiple truths are )elieve" in as the only truth is one of the main o)stacles to reconciliation. hus !e use the

!or" truth or truths 0rather than, say, perspective0s11 here not out of any commitment to relativism )ut as a means of conveyin$ the "epth an" sincerity of the conviction !ith !hich competin$, often mutually contra"ictory, accounts or narratives are )elieve".
B

See Jinnes 020001 for a recent e2ample of this approach !ith an emphasis on the "evelopment of !hat the author calls an 3ille$itimate opportunity structure3 in the &estern Cape.
>

,illay 020001 ri$htly o)serves that the area commonly 'no!n as the Cape 9lats is )y no means culturally, socially or economically homo$enous 0p.201. &e use it in this report as a convenient shorthan" term for the main areas of settlement of the coloure" 0another pro)lematic term1 "iaspora reco$nisin$ )oth that places li'e Mitchells ,lain an" =rassy ,ar' are not uniformly !or'in$ class an" that the, a$ain so4calle", )lac' to!nships of Lan$a, =u$uletu, <yan$a an" Jhayelitsha are also locate" on the 9lats, an" are also the pro"uct of aparthei" social en$ineerin$.
?

9or a much more "etaile" an" am)itious analysis of ,a$a" in the conte2t of #slamic politics )oth $lo)ally an" in South .frica see ,illay 020001.
K

@i)la, for e2ample, supporte" the *lac' Consciousness Movement an" ,an .fricanist Con$ress "urin$ the stru$$le era an" re(ecte" the .<C3s support for a ne$otiate" settlement 0/mar in =alant L =amiel"ien, 155?1.
6 . sense

of coloure" nationalism 03ons is 3n nasie31 !as evi"ent in the reforme" $an$sters3 repeate" references to 3"ie )ruinmense3 as a "istinct, an" "istinctly "isa"vanta$e", $roup.
5

SchSrf 015501,=astro! 015561 an" Jinnes 020001 have all ar$ue" from sli$htly "ifferent perspectives that even if the num)er of $an$s 0an"Cor $an$ mem)ers1 "i" not su""enly increase as South .frica emer$e" from authoritarianism an" isolation critical chan$es "i" occur in the internal structure an" or$anisation of esta)lishe" $an$s such as the .mericans an" the +ar" Livin$s, an" in the relationship )et!een street $an$s an" more sophisticate" criminal or$anisations operatin$ )oth !ithin South .frica an" internationally. /ne estimate )y a seasone" me"ia commentator has put the total num)er of $an$sters in the Cape at )et!een E> 000 an" 60 000 an" the num)er of i"entifia)le $an$s at !ell over 100 09rie"man, 15561. Less so)er press estimates of $an$ mem)ership ran$e from 100 000 to B00 000.
10

,a$a" has su)se;uently use" slo$ans such as 3one F"ru$H merchant one )ullet3 freely a"apte" from the ,.C3s famous call "urin$ the stru$$le years for 3one settler, one )ullet3 0 hiel, 155K1.
11

Unless other!ise state" all ;uotations in this section of the report 03,a$a"3s story31 are from our intervie! !ith a spo'esperson from ,a$a" 0%B1 hel" on ? June 2000. ,a$a"3s homepa$e is at http7CC!!!.pa$a" co.Aa
12

See <ina 020001 for more on ,a$a" an" the notion of the 3$oo" community3.

1E 1B 1>

http7CC!!!.pa$a".co.AaCpast.htm 02> July 20001 http7CC!!!.pa$a".co.AaCpast.htm 02> July 20001

he notion of collective lea"ership appears to survive to this to"ay if our e2perience of arran$in$ an intervie! !ith ,a$a" is anythin$ to $o )y. he "ecision to ta'e part in the research seems to have )een ta'en collectively an" the in"ivi"ual !e eventually intervie!e" !as "eli)erately self4effacin$ ma'in$ it clear that he !as only one of several people authorise" to spea' on )ehalf of ,a$a" an" en(oye" no particular status in the or$anisation )eyon" that.
1?

See Cape Times, ? .u$ust 155?, for ,ar'er3s reporte" statement an" )elo! for more on ,a$a"3s alle$e" hi""en political a$en"a.
1K

he ;uotation is from ,a$a"3s vision statement at http7CC!!!.pa$a".co.AaCvision.htm 02> July 20001.

16 15

http7CC!!!.pa$a".co.AaCpast.htm 02> July 20001

,a$a" hel" numerous rallies at Vy$ies'raal Sta"ium an" other venues in .thlone an" across the Cape 9lats in 155?.
20

#n late 155?, the $overnment ma"e it 'no!n that an ol" piece of le$islation preventin$ the !earin$ of "is$uises !oul" )e enforce" a$ainst ,a$a" activists !earin$ mas's in pu)lic places.
21

#t shoul" )e note" that the report !as )ase" on police fi$ures an" !ent on to attri)ute 166 acts of ur)an terror 4 inclu"in$ shootin$s an" pipe4 an" petrol4)om)in$s 4 to ,a$a" an" BK5 to the $an$s.
22 2E

3=irls3 crossfire "eaths shoc'3, loc cit.

he "iscrepancy )et!een the t!o fi$ures 4 thirteen an" fifteen 4 mentione" in this ;uotation an" the eleven "eaths referre" to in the Cape imes article can pro)a)ly )e put "o!n to "efinitional "ifferences a)out !ho to count as a $an$ lea"er an"Cor seen as no more than a slip of the ton$ue on the part of our respon"ent.
2B

http7CC!!!.pa$a".co.AaC 02> July 20001 &ith a revision "ate of 15 March 2000 the reference to 3recent3 terror attac's cannot refer to inci"ents such as the ,lanet +olly!oo" )om)in$ of .u$ust 1556 )ut their flat con"emnation of this 'in" of action clearly illustrates the contrast )et!een ,a$a"3s unsympathetic attitu"e to!ar"s attac's on $an$sters an" their apparent revulsion at violence "irecte" at other tar$ets.
2>

,illay 020001 su$$ests that ,a$a" is le" )y a sin$le eni$matic fi$ure !ho appears at meetin$s !earin$ a scarf an" is a""resse" as 3amir3 or 3lea"er3 )y mem)ers 0p. 151. he presence of such a fi$urehea" is not necessarily inconsistent !ith our vie! that, for reasons

that have as much to "o !ith the or$anisation3s survival as any principle" commitment to collectivism, "ay4to4"ay "ecision4ma'in$ is in the han"s of a $roup of people rather than any one in"ivi"ual.
2? .frica, 2K 26

Christie, Mattes, %oefs L aylor 015561.

http7CC!!!.pa$a".co.AaCaims.htm 02> July 20001.

he #UC is an um)rella or$anisation for many smaller ra"ical #slamic $roups 0a mem)ership of more than 200 is claime" )ut hotly "ispute"1 oppose" to the tra"itional lea"ership of the Muslim Ju"icial Council 0MJC1.
25

Unli'e the ,a$a" spo'esperson, the t!o in"ivi"uals !e spo'e to !ere not nominate" )y the security forces to provi"e an official account of the State3s vie!s on ,a$a". &hat follo!s is therefore a personal vie!point. +o!ever, as !e sai" in the intro"uction, !e "o not )elieve that their narrative is either !holly i"iosyncratic or unrepresentative of at least one stran" of official truth.
E0 .ll

;uotations in this section of narrative are ta'en from our intervie! !ith %6 on 1B .pril 2000 unless state" other!ise. he nature of the "ata !e collecte" from this intervie! an" the conversation !ith %K 0? .pril 20001 "oes not len" itself to ;uite such e2tensive "irect ;uotation as the material repro"uce" in the ,a$a" narrative. *ut !e have attempte" as far as possi)le to capture the sense of !hat !e !ere tol" in the te2t that follo!s.
E1 E2

%6, 1B .pril 2000.

9or the last year or so the security forces have !or'e" har" to resolve these tensions )et!een the intelli$ence an" investi$ative functions )y encoura$in$ informers to )ecome !itnesses. +o!ever, as our respon"ent conce"e", pro)lems remain 4 not least !ith a !itness protection pro$ramme that continues to offer a less than satisfactory lifestyle to those una)le to return to their communities.
EE

he installation of CC V in Manen)er$ is a recent "evelopment that our respon"ents referre" to !ith "is$ust on several occasions. #n reality the scheme is li'ely to )e fun"e" not )y $overnment )ut )y *usiness .$ainst Crime )ut the point a)out the reactive, retri)utive emphasis of State policy remains clear enou$h.
EB .lthou$h

,a$a"3s popular appeal !as roote" in fears a)out hi$h levels of crime an" the perceive" ina"e;uacy of the State3s response, these factors alone !ere pro)a)ly not enou$h to prompt people either to (oin or support ,a$a" even in these early years. /pinion surveys con"ucte" )y #D.S. in .u$ustCSeptem)er 155? an" .pril 155K su$$este" that people !ho support ra"ical collective action, support ,a$a" or (oin ,a$a" are "istin$uishe" as much )y i"entity an" i"entity4relate" values, an" i"entity4relate" evaluations as they are )y feelin$ unsafe or "isapprovin$ of la! enforcement institutions 0.frica et al., 15567 2, emphasis in ori$inal1.
E>

#nci"entally it is !orth notin$ here that ,a$a"3s complaints of me"ia )ias a$ainst them

are mirrore" )y police frustration at !hat they perceive to )e ne$ative reportin$ of their efforts an" ,a$a"3s correspon"in$ success in paintin$ themselves as the innocent victims of oppressive, anti4Muslim, aparthei"4style policin$.
E? EK

%2, ? .pril 2000.

=astro! 015561 provi"es somethin$ close to an official vie! of the threat pose" )y or$anise" crime )ut !ith a "istinctly Capetonian slant8 an" see SchRnteich 015551 for an account of the $overnment3s le$islative travails en"in$ !ith the much amen"e" an" still !i"ely criticise" ,revention of /r$anise" Crime .ct 121 of 1556.
E6

See SchSrf 015651 an" *ro$"en L Shearin$ 0155E, chapter B1 for accounts of the racially "iscriminatory security4oriente" policin$ that )ecame a feature of the closin$ years of the aparthei" era.
E5

<o4one no! seriously "isputes that the security forces !or'e" closely !ith $an$sters "urin$ this perio". %ecent revelations )efore an amnesty committee of the ruth an" %econciliation Commission 0 %C1 merely confirm the e2tent of the co4operation an" the len$ths to !hich its a$ents !ere prepare" to $o in or"er to eliminate enemies of the State. 9or e2ample, at a hearin$ hel" in Cape o!n early last year, former Civil Co4operation *ureau 0CC*1 operative, .)ram 3Slan$3 van Myl, tol" the committee a)out his part in a plot to hire a $an$ster 'no!n as 3,eaches3 to assassinate the then chairperson of the Unite" Democratic 9ront in the &estern Cape 0an" no! Minister of ransport1, Dullah /mar 0Cape Times, 1K March 20001.
B0

-ven this !as no $uarantee that politicians !oul" )e allo!e" to "o as they please". /ne inci"ent !e !ere tol" a)out involve" a $roup of lea"in$ .<C fi$ures )ein$ stone" on a visit to Manen)er$ !hile the intervention of a lea"in$ $an$ster an" .<C loyalist faile" to "issua"e another local $an$ from ta'in$ violent e2ception to the presence of politicians on their turf 0%2, ? .pril 20001.
B1 B2 BE

%2, ? .pril 2000 %2, ? .pril 2000

he relationship )et!een the South .frican Communist ,arty an" mass or$anisations such as the .<C, C/S. U an", in former years, the UD9 is an o)vious, if imperfect, analo$y.
BB B>

ruth an" %econciliation Commission 015561.

he stan"ar" "istinction ma"e in the literature is )et!een tertiary an" primary or secon"ary forms of prevention 0*rantin$ham L 9aust, 15K?1.
B?

+ere too the crime prevention literature su$$ests a possi)le e2planation in the form of perpetrator "isplacement 0*arr L ,ease, 1550, p. 2K51. his ta'es place !here a certain type of crime 4 here the !i"e ran$e of offences associate" !ith $an$sterism 4 is so lucrative

that ne! offen"ers rapi"ly fill the vacancies create" )y removal of e2istin$ perpetrators.
BK B6

%2, ? .pril 2000.

%2, ? .pril 2000 an" cf. Cohen 0155?1. he e2tent to !hich politics has )een "ecriminalise" since 155B is ar$ua)le. ,a$a" !oul" no "ou)t maintain that the State3s 0"isin$enuous1 use of the @i)la connection to (ustify its attempts to suppress the or$anisation is tantamount to the criminalisation of politics.
B5

his paraphrases the te2t of a notice on the !all of the office !here !e met our reforme" $an$ster respon"ents.
>0

Jen!yn is a mi2e", pre"ominantly mi""le class, su)ur) !ith a su)stantial Muslim population. Constantia, of course, nee"s no intro"uction.
>1

See, for e2ample, +a"lan" 0200018 Cape Times 02000, 1B Septem)er18 an" Le$$ett 020001.
>2

#n the secon" of these cases t!o ,a$a" supporters !ere foun" $uilty of mur"erin$ a si24 year4ol" $irl, Chrystal .)rahams, "urin$ a firefi$ht )et!een arme" protestors an" an alle$e" "ru$ "ealer an" his )o"y$uar"s.