Large scale development projects and star architecture in the absence of

democratic politics: The case of Abu Dhabi, UAE

Davide Ponzini

Department of Architecture and Planning, Politecnico di Milano, Via Bonardi 3, 20133 Milano, Italy
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 1 April 2010
Received in revised form 25 December 2010
Accepted 12 February 2011
Available online 16 March 2011
Keywords:
Abu Dhabi
Urban development
Star architecture
Cultural district
Structure plan
a b s t r a c t
In the last decade, scholars and policymakers have paid greater attention to the role of famous designers
pieces of architecture not only in regenerating urban areas but also in dening a positive and communi-
cative image in the global economic competition among cities. Taking into account the general back-
ground of and socio-economic changes in Western countries, this rationale assumes that the use of a
well-known architects name can give a competitive advantage to a city in many ways. Following this
legitimizing narrative, cities now strive for signature architecture, sometimes with little regard to their
urban context, their size and role in the global market, the democratic decision making process and
the urban effects. Although moderate success in urban regeneration, tourist attraction and economic
development may be achieved in some cases, the high expectations of policymakers are often not met.
In this sense, a better understanding of this urban issue is relevant for the current debate on urban plan-
ning. The manuscript draws on an extensive case study of Abu Dhabi, describing the local institutional
framework and planning system, analyzing the oligarchic network and key actors in urban development
and providing an in-depth analysis of the Saadiyat Island mega-development project, which includes a
cultural district, hotel, retail and residential areas, with spectacular architecture. The local economic
and institutional conditions of Abu Dhabi are not common elsewhere, but the city is a signicant case
of the political, economic and urban criticalities of planning large scale development projects and of
collecting pieces of branded architecture in a democratic vacuum.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Super-branded-mega-development projects in contemporary
cities
We already have 11 time-lapse cameras on the island that have
been recording an image every 15 minutes for the last three
years. Aphotographer that has been commissionedto do 45 days
a year, and visits the island 4 times over a twelve month period.
We shoot the island fromabove by helicopter once a month from
xed GPS points. And on top of that we are working with a lm
company that is doing a three year documentary on the building
of Saadiyat Island. I think we have most angles covered. My other
problemis that the Island is the biggest building site in the world
and all visitors have to be accompanied for tours and need a 4
wheel drive vehicle to traverse the temporary roads. I would
suggest you visit the experience centre.
The above reply by one of the managers of the Saadiyat Island
project following a request for permission to photograph the devel-
opment site in 2010 does not require further explanation. It is
already well-known that urban development megaprojects and
contemporary architecture have become a global spectacle for
local image creation, city branding and real estate marketing.
However, similar extreme expressions are now evident in many
global and second or third tier cities. After production and commu-
nication technology innovations induced relevant delocalization
and re-modulation dynamics, cities assumed new roles in integrat-
ing innovative production and in providing specialized services.
The cities undergoing massive change are not only metropolitan
areas, but also the centers of the global ow of material and imma-
terial goods, typical of post-industrial markets (among others:
Amin, 2000; Sassen, 1994; Short & Kim, 1999). Taking into account
the general background and changes in the global economy (e.g.,
the growing role of services, immaterial production and knowl-
edge-based economy) and of Western society (e.g., more time for
leisure, growing expenditure for culture, entertainment and tour-
ism, open and cosmopolitan society) (Florida, 2002, 2005; Scott
1997, 2000), policy makers started to brand and market cities
through attractive images, cultural amenities and spectacular
architectural artifacts (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990; Clark, 2004;
Evans, 2003; Lash & Urry, 1994; Lloyd & Clark, 2002).
Cities compete by using the political and economic engine of
urban development projects with the objective of attracting
production and workers and of specializing in consumption and
entertainment, economic control and wealth redistribution. By
carefully observing Baltimores urban affairs during a period of
rapid and spectacular transformation, Harvey (1989a, 1989b) noted
0264-2751/$ - see front matter 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cities.2011.02.002

Tel.: +39 02 23992603; fax: +39 02 23992610.

E-mail address: davide.ponzini@polimi.it
Cities 28 (2011) 251259
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a connection between entrepreneurial tendencies in city manage-
ment and the presence of post-modern architecture, conference
and retail centers, cultural and entertainment facilities and of sites
for hosting sports, expos or other spectacles in potentially de-con-
textualized facilities. Given that other monopolies have been facing
difculties due to higher nancial mobility and availability, the cre-
ation of such spaces and the economic appreciation of their real es-
tate has become increasingly important (Harvey, 2002). The
justication of this growth machine in terms of potential wealth
redistribution to actors who are not involved in real estate, espe-
cially lower-income groups, has been soundly contested in Western
countries since the 1970s (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976).
Large-scale projects are not a newformula for infrastructure and
for developing large areas in a city (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothen-
gatter, 2003); the dramatic problems related to such projects due to
various kinds of political and economic constraints, uncertainties
and unbalanced effects have been widely acknowledged (Hall,
1980; Moulaert, Swyngedouw, & Rodriguez, 2002; Altshuler &
Luberoff, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2005). The use of cultural attractors for
triggering urban development is more recent, and it has often been
coupled with the spectacular artifacts and amboyant perfor-
mances of star architects (Easterling, 2005; Gospodini, 2002; Jencks,
2005; Saunders, 2005; Sklair, 2006; Sudjic, 2005; Urry, 2007).
Globally, cities apparently compete to collect new pieces of
architecture as if they were pieces of art,
1
sometimes without tak-
ing into account their urban meaning and contextual functions. Sec-
ond and third tier cities have often adopted this strategy as well. For
example, the agship project of the new Guggenheim Museum by
Frank Gehry in Bilbao was interpreted as the supposed trigger for
a broader process of branding and revitalizing the city. A number
of urban and infrastructural projects appeared in subsequent years
designed by stars such as Foster, Isozaki, Pelli and Calatrava. A closer
look at the process of economic development shows that this narra-
tive is too simplistic (Del Cerro Santamara, 2007; Plger, 2007;
Ponzini, 2010). However, the Bilbao effect narrative had a tremen-
dous effect on urban decision makers. The examples of star archi-
tects designing spectacular megaprojects are countless, although
not always as successful in urban regeneration, tourist attraction
and economic development as costumers tend to believe (Rybczyn-
ski, 2002). Among countless examples, two recent processes showed
some of the typical political shortcomings.
The developer Forest City Ratner and the public agency Empire
State Development Corporation outlined a 4 billion dollar, 22-acre
project in Brooklyn called the Atlantic Yards, which included sport
facilities, ofces, hotels, retail spaces and housing. The master plan,
designed by Frank Gehry, was heavily contested and never took off
(Ockman, 2008). A typical culture-led city-branding megaproject
for the West Kowloon Cultural District was envisioned and granted
with HK$21.6 billion budget by the Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and nally designed by the archi-
star Norman Foster. The project was intended to promote tourism
and media visibility of a world-class nancial city through interna-
tional museums such as the Guggenheim and through spectacular
architecture (e.g., the worlds largest outdoor roof and the Foster-
designed museum facility), but it was heavily contested, and, in
2006, a new and lengthy process of public consultation and new
project selection began (Lui, 2008). As of 2010, three proposals
(by Foster and Partners, Rem Koolhaas-OMA and Rocco Yin) were
at stake, while some smaller scale cultural and leisure activities
were being promoted on the site.
In these two cases, despite massive economic resources, amend-
ments of urban regulation and the aura of a star architect, the pro-
jects could not overcome political confrontation and local
community positions. Of course, a number of megaprojects inAmer-
ica as well as in Europe or Asia do not face such shortcomings. The
rising capital of consumerism can count on massive economic re-
sources, suchas Dohas amboyant sport stadiums andfacilities, ico-
nic ofce towers and hotels, various projects signed by international
rms such as Pei, Isozaki, Correa, Arup, KEO and others, and in the
subsequent accumulation of urban spectacles (Adhan, 2008). How-
ever, one can also notice that branded Olympics and European Cap-
ital of Cultureor WorldExpodevelopments havebeenmushrooming
in cities on the ve continents and tend to be affected by fewer lim-
itations than most. Signicant economic resources are provided by
nancial acts and special contributions, ad hoc powers are granted
to task forces having the mission to plan and complete these inter-
ventions, and development projects and master plans can join the
opportunities of dispensations fromordinaryplanningcogency, pro-
cedures and actual plans. This may reduce political interaction and
mutual adjustment among different actors who may be involved
or affectedbythe development project itself. Althoughsuccess inur-
ban development and regeneration may be achieved in some cases,
sometimes the special economic, planning and legal powers re-
quired cannot be justied when compared with the inadequate or
even paradoxical urban effects.
Effects, such as urban landscape homogenization, marginal in-
creases in tourist attraction, short term economic effects but long
term binding of cultural management resources and others are
not only contrary to collective goals but also to the interests of
the promoters of interventions such as the ones mentioned above
and the ones this article will consider in Abu Dhabi. A better under-
standing of this urban issue is relevant to urban policy making, but
it requires avoiding the consideration of isolated cultural artifacts
(e.g., agship projects, artsy blockbusters) to explicitly study the
urban development process and the implications of the use of large
scale architectural spectacles. The use of legitimizing narratives
and discursive constructions such as the Bilbao effect are central
in contexts of democratic governance to mobilize actors and inter-
ests for urban development (Swyngedouw, 2006). However, little
attention has been given to conditions where political interaction
is heavily constrained, assuming that democratic network coordi-
nation in local politics is crucial to collect the needed political, legal
and economic resources and to induce a shared urban outcome.
Abu Dhabi, the place described in the initial quotation, is cer-
tainly a peculiar case of a capital city using megaprojects and spec-
tacular architecture on a massive scale for global marketing
purposes, even compared with the abovementioned snapshot
examples or other rising capitals of Asia (see, among others, Kong,
2009). Despite the growing institutional and political complexity in
most national contexts, Abu Dhabis decision-making regarding ur-
ban development and implementation processes are reduced to
the basic essentials in terms of rules and power concentration,
planning procedures and veto points, and the number of actors.
Huge capitals are available and concentrated in extremely small
and cohesive networks. The analysis of emblematic projects in
Abu Dhabis accelerated economic and urban development shows
the critical limits of coupling megaprojects with spectacularized
architecture in a democratic vacuum.
2
These elements seem
1
Sudjic anticipated and mocked some characteristics of this global homogeniza-
tion trend in architecture: There is now an international ying circus which travels
the world leaving signature buildings in its wake. The major cities of the world share a
need to collect them, in the same way that art galleries from Osaka to Lige need
Henry Moore, David Hockney and Julian Schnabel. So Richard Meier builds essentially
the same building in Frankfurt and The Hague, and Michael Graves builds apartment
towers in Yokohama and ofces in Atlanta (Sudjic, 1993, 76).
2
The paper is based both on desktop and eld research undertaken in Europe, the
USA and in the United Arab Emirates between May 2008 and October 2009. The case
study draws both on documentary evidence (publications, ofcial documents,
newspaper articles, organizations newsletters, and websites) and on primary data:
in-depth interviews with 36 qualied informants and the key actors in Abu Dhabis
development as well as participant observation.
252 D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251259
relevant when reecting on economically, politically and institution-
ally more complex situations in Western countries and beyond.
Programming the urban growth machine in Abu Dhabi
With the precise intention of being the pinnacle of branded
large scale development projects, Abu Dhabi has recently been at
center stage in newspapers and architectural magazines. From
the few descriptions available in the literature, it is necessary to se-
lect some local historic, institutional and socio-economic informa-
tion to better understand the current of spatial planning and urban
development trends (for a detailed report, see Elsheshtawy, 2008).
For centuries, Abu Dhabi was a small village whose economy
was based on shing and pearl diving. In the early 1960s, the dis-
covery of immense gas and oilelds gave impetus to a series of pro-
jects and transformations. After the demolition of the original
settlement, in the second half of the 1960s, an infrastructural plan
and a development and land-use scheme were conceived.
By grouping into the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the seven sul-
tanates became a single independent sovereign unit in 1971, with
Abu Dhabi as their capital city. Until 2004, the founding father of
the nation, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, guided the country
through a simple and concrete approach, providing the region with
basic structures and facilities: streets, an airport, a stadium, and
the Cultural Center. Development has systematically been com-
bined with the planting of millions of palm trees to mitigate the
climatic conditions. Following a simplied classication based on
styles, Abu Dhabi experienced four trends in architectural produc-
tion: besides the generic architecture without architects consist-
ing of the required ofce and housing buildings, the 19701980s
witnessed the interpretation of vernacular styles (e.g., Architects
Collaborative for the Cultural Center), followed by the international
style by corporate rms (e.g., KPF for the ADIA headquarters) and
more recently some spectacular architectural exponents (Koolhaas,
2007a).
The population doubled between 1986 and 2005 due to the in-
crease in temporary workers. The current population is over 1.4
million, among which less than 10% is native. It is the highest
per capita income country in the world despite dramatic social
dualism (Gimbel, 2007). Openness towards Western economies
and business models dramatically accelerated after the succession
of Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The new generation of the
ruling elite has a Western education and a strong orientation to-
wards faster economic diversication and growth. In 2006, Abu
Dhabis GDP was approximately 87 billion dollars, about 60% of
that of the UAE. It has most of the gas and oilelds in UAE and
taxation is as low as 1.7% of the GDP, due to the huge amount of
natural resources (ADCED, 2008). Beginning in 2005, a season of
reforms in real estate regulation introduced new rights for non-
emirate individuals and companies. A partial liberalization
welcomed foreign investments, and the strong building expansion
notwithstanding, the supply did not encounter problems with
vacancies, both in the housing and in the ofce sectors. Combined
with a very weak regulation framework, it induced highly specula-
tive trends (Credit Suisse, 2008).
Abu Dhabis economy is based on a solid oil economy and can
develop long term strategies, leveraging the great amounts of
liquidity as well. In the public discourse, Abu Dhabi is often op-
posed to Dubais chaotic development (Davis, 2006; Mustafa,
2007; Katodrytis, 2007). Sometimes this rhetoric stresses the
representativeness of the capitals urban environment or its care
with sustainability, as in the 22-billion dollar investment of the
carbon neutral Masdar City, a 50,000 inhabitant expansion
nanced by the government and designed by Norman Foster. For
example, Davidson (2007) and Elsheshtawy (2008) systematically
Fig. 1. Self-referential government advertisement and typical urban landscape (picture by the author).
D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251259 253
noted differences in Abu Dhabis urban historic layering, territorial
dimensions and population, property rights, cultural orientation
and pace of (post)modernization but conrmed strong similarities
in real estate strategies with Dubai (Acuto, 2010), despite the con-
sideration that the city aims at keeping its traditional position as a
political and nancial center in the Emirates (Fig. 1).
After two years of consultations, in 2008, the Abu Dhabi Council
for Economic Development, the Department of Economic Planning
and the Executive Council delivered a vision for the coordination of
plans and policies for the long term development of the region. The
2030 Economic Vision includes shared common principles regard-
ing institutional transparency, private sector empowerment, the
importance of sustainability, welfare and public infrastructure in
development. The stated objective is economic diversication to-
wards high added-value sectors, with clear allusions to global com-
petition rhetoric. The dominance of the mining and oil industry
(59% of the GDP) should be counterbalanced by the aerospace
and military, pharmaceutical and biotech, media and communica-
tion, education and tourism industries (Sharpley, 2002). The latter
is highly emphasized, forecasting a positive trend in visitors: Abu
Dhabi airport was expected to double its passenger ow between
2005 and 2010 (from 6.3 to 12.2 million); similarly, visitors should
increase from 1.6 to 3.4 million between 2006 and 2013 (ADCED,
2008). Several interviewees noted that the hotel, retail and leisure
activity structures currently do not respond to the expected expan-
sion trends.
Urban structure and the planning process in Abu Dhabi
The Economic Vision has been interacting with and inuencing
urban expansion strategies. Once the urban development pro-
grammed in the 1980s general master plan was completed, an
international team developed the Urban Structure Framework Plan
in 2007 to drive the sustainable development of the city until 2030.
The Prince declared:
This plan provides a strong and comprehensive foundation for
the development of the city of Abu Dhabi, in a strategic and
coordinated way. [. . .] while building a global capital with his
own rich cultural heritage (AD, 2007, 2). The plan states:
Abu Dhabi will manifest its role and stature as [. . .] a global
capital city (UPC, 2007, 21) and Abu Dhabis urban fabric
and community infrastructure will enable the values, social
arrangements, culture and mores of this Arabic community
(UPC, 2007, 21).
The task force designing the plan naturally recommended carry-
ing out a socioeconomic analysis of the demand and driving factors
in the real estate market. However, the most critical aspect seems
to be the denition of legally binding planning powers, a more
transparent and long-term planning process, and creation of an
authoritative planning department capable of interacting with
the actual urban development processes and actors.
The plan forecasts a population of 3 million in 2030. The current
strategy of urban development is supported by a public investment
of over 200 billion dollars between 2008 and 2013 (Colliers, 2007).
The Structure Plan expects hotel rooms to double within the rst
ve years, reaching 21,000 units. The islands surrounding the city
have been assigned tourism related functions. Urban development
is supposed to be guided by ten policy statements in the Abu Dhabi
2030 Urban Structure Framework Plan, some structural frame-
works and a regulation hypothesis that has no legal power, explic-
itly waiting for a more specic planning document. Financial
functions and government ofces should be concentrated in the
Central Business District and in the Capital District, where it is
explicitly mentioned that the use of international iconic and
branded architecture is to express local identity. Even if the Plan
includes land use regulation statements, it does not have any stat-
utory power. Each map in the document contains the following
note: These plans represent themes to be rened in further plan-
ning and design. Land uses, street patterns, and exact alignments in
all areas are conceptual, and to be subjected to detailed evaluation
and conrmation. Under no circumstances should these plans be
construed as nal directives for specic sites or areas (UPC,
2007). In the mean time, referring to infrastructural and environ-
mental invariants, urban development simply happens by dividing
the land into precincts with general use, density and typology (so-
called building block) features and assigning them to a few devel-
opers. The mega-development master plans are juxtaposed accord-
ing to specic interests and, in fact, contradicting the statements
about new urban expansions to be gradual and continuous with
existing areas. On the contrary some areas are destined for disin-
vestment while highly valuable island-like plots are going to be
accessible and appreciated thanks to new infrastructure.
In this temporary development framework, a unitary vision is
missing. The actual planning process leaves little inuence to the
planning powers, established by Decree 23 in 2007. The Urban
Planning Council (UPC) has the mission of fostering a publicpri-
vate dialog regarding the urban vision. However, even if it has re-
cently been given higher visibility, the number and dimension of
the dozens of ongoing megaprojects has been an overwhelming
workload for the one hundred ofcers. After particular parcels
are designated to key players in the real estate market and relevant
basic development principles are deduced from the Structure
Framework Plan (regarding functions, density, accessibility, public
space and services), the UPC typically negotiates directly with
developers. The lack of legally binding planning tools and the lim-
ited number of large real estate operators who are typically well-
connected to the government and royal family dramatically curtail
the inuence of the UPC.
The urban implications of this planning system are not consid-
ered nor publicly discussed because all the real estate sectors are
supposedly undersupplied, assuming the 20052009 trend as a ref-
erence and not taking in consideration the fact that Abu Dhabi has
not yet had a full cycle in the real estate market or that a market
slow-down phase is generally possible. Moreover, the possibility
of scheduling delivery to avoid risks of oversupply is not even ta-
ken into account.
Precincts, key actors and large scale development projects
Abu Dhabis urban development is based on a narrow oligarchic
system. Large-scale projects are discussed and decided by the royal
family and a cohesive network of relatives, publicly funded agen-
cies and development corporations. Compared to typical western
democratic contexts, the separation between public and private
sectors in Abu Dhabi is practically nonexistent because the same
actors have key positions in public decision making and in the
management of private companies. The tactic of attracting foot-
loose investments, tourism and specialized tertiary activities in
skyscrapers or mega-development compounds tends to make real
estate values increase towards higher values of other, perhaps geo-
graphically distant, ofce, hotel or leisure space. In recent years,
this tactic has been combined with mega-development projects
and the use of star architects.
In 2005, Aldar Properties was established primarily to create
world-class real estate developments for the nation of Abu Dha-
bi.
3
Among the shareholders are, the government vehicle, Mubadala
Development Company; the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority; the
National Bank of Abu Dhabi through its Investment Company; the
3
Retrieved from http://www.aldar.com on May 28, 2009.
254 D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251259
Abu Dhabi National Hotels Company; and the National Corporation
for Tourism and Hotels, together with other private emirate inves-
tors. Aldar has a large land stock of about 38 million square meters
valued at 12 billion dollars (Credit Suisse, 2008). The Yas Island pro-
ject covered a surface of almost 25 square kilometers, valued at 39
billion dollars. It has completed a Formula 1 circuit, a Ferarri theme
park, a hotel by Asymptote and other sport, retail, leisure and tour-
ism related facilities. Aldar completed the 360 billion dollar project
for the Central Market by Foster and Partners, located downtown
and including luxury retail and housing facilities (Fig. 2). The devel-
opment required demolition of a pre-existing and extremely popular
market to replace it with this exclusive complex, displacing both the
lower income shop-owners and users (Elsheshtawy, 2008). The pro-
ject for Al-Raha Beach, over 5 million square meters, is a 120,000
person medium density settlement along eleven kilometers of coast
line. Asymptote designed the Strata Tower for this particular project
of Aldar.
Sorouh is the largest public real estate company to be listed on
the stock exchange in Abu Dhabi, and it was created in 2005 with
an initial capital of 500 million dollars and overall 22 million
square meters in development programs. It is involved in the
development of Al Reem Island, where the highest density of ofce
buildings will comprise the Central Business District, with residen-
tial, retail and service facilities. The private company Tamouh is in-
volved in Al Reem and in the creation of the nearby Fantasy Island,
a dolphin-shaped development dedicated to entertainment. Other
relevant actors in the real estate market are Hydra and Al Qudra.
Among public companies with complex development missions,
Mubadala was created in 2002 to manage an articulated portfolio
and to interact with international partners in projects such as the
Sorbonne University campus and the expansion of Zayed
University.
To better target economic diversication goals, the govern-
ment created the Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority (ADTA) through
Decree 7 of 2004. The president of this authority is Sheikh Sultan
Bin Tahnoon Al Nahyan, who is appointed, among other posi-
tions, a member of the Council, of the environment agency and
of the Board of Etihad National Airlines and a patron of the Mid-
dle Eastern chapter of the Urban Land Institute. ADTA can pro-
pose new regulation and intervention policies in the eld of
tourism development and is in charge of managing specic pro-
grams in support of touristic expansion and consolidation in
terms of tourism licensing, infrastructure and product develop-
ment.
4
In this sense, it has a direct inuence in city and regional
planning. To better manage urban interventions and real estate
operations, ADTA created the private vehicle Tourism Development
& Investment Company (TDIC), with the mission of assisting the
provision of a world-class infrastructure which will full the
emirates ambitions of becoming a truly global destination of
distinction.
5
The Chairman is Sheikh Sultan Bin Tahnoon Al
Nahyan. Signicant land stock has been transferred from the gov-
ernment to the TDIC, composed of a large portfolio including the
Grand Cornice Hotel, the Lagoon Hotel as well as infrastructure,
resorts and the development of entire islands, such as Saadiyat
Island.
Large scale project on a global stage: Saadiyat Island and the
cultural district
The objective of diversifying Abu Dhabis oil economy and the
opportunity for the government to obtain higher nancial credit
compared to the one of natural resources has signaled a shift in fo-
cus regarding business and luxury tourism and, more recently, cul-
tural and leisure activities. The government intends to reach
beyond the Gulf area and to compete with other global destina-
Fig. 2. The Central Market site and its media representation (picture by the author).
4
Retrieved from http://www.abudhabitourism.ae on May 12, 2009.
5
Retrieved from http://www.tdic.ae on May 12, 2009.
D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251259 255
tions. For this reason, marketing and branding through spectacular
architecture have been perceived as crucial. The analysis and dis-
cussion of a signicant large scale project highlights the modes
of planning and intervention in this context.
Saadyiat Island (literally the Island of Happiness) is a 27
square kilometer development by TDIC, which is in the process
of creating about thirty hotels, three marinas, 8000 villas and
38,000 housing units along twenty kilometers of coastline with a
28 billion dollar investment. The project includes the creation of
a Cultural District as an icon in the international scene. One of
the public ofcers interviewed stated:
Abu Dhabi is trying to use international contemporary archi-
tecture in order to express the newborn identity of the UAE
nation: Abu Dhabi is a global capital city is the message and
it is certainly different from the mere business of Dubai!.
6
From the beginning, the creation of a collection of iconic build-
ings in a short period of time has been the driving idea. In the man-
agers expectations, star architects were supposed to grant identity
to the city and to link their fame and style to Saadiyat Island. The
choice of collecting different branded facilities in a highly visible
megaproject was also intended by TDIC as a way of distinguishing
the project in the overcrowded real estate market (Fig. 3).
Two years after the 2004 Gensler master plan, the Booz Allen
Hamilton consulting rm conrmed the hypothesis of creating a
cultural district to attract global tourism ow based on the fact
that the nearby Gulf cities did not have any exceptional cultural
attractions. In 2006, SOM designed a canal along which pavilions
were to be created in order to be complementary to ve large cul-
tural facilities along the coast. In agreement with the Guggenheim
foundation and the French government, Abu Dhabi started long
term art programs and will host part of their collections in signa-
ture architect buildings. TDIC directly contacted and selected Frank
Gehry for the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi Museum, Jean Nouvel for the
Louvre, Zaha Hadid for the Performing Arts Centre and Tadao Ando
for the Maritime Museum. Norman Foster was selected for the
Sheikh Zayed National Museum in a competition with other twelve
rms. For the pavilions along the canal, the architects are SOM,
Greg Lynn, Hani Rashid of Asymptote, Pei-Zhu, Charles Correa,
Shigeru Ban, Khalid Al Najar and, once again, Frank Gehry. The plan
is to create a 670-acre Cultural District.
From the beginning, this operation espoused the Bilbao effect
strategy literally, involving the protagonists of the Bilbao deed, the
director of the Guggenheim, Thomas Krens, and the archistar
Gehry. The Cultural District project was based on simplied
economic and urban evaluation, a rosy analysis of the potential
market, the study of successful cases (e.g., Guggenheim Bilbao
and Millennium Park in Chicago) and forecasting direct and indi-
rect impacts on the real estate market and the local economy. TDIC
expects 1.5 million visitors per year once the whole Cultural
District is completed in 2018. In a more realistic interview, Krens
recognized that Gehrys museum would be irrelevant in generating
any impact if it were not integrated with accessibility, economic
and cultural policies (Koolhaas, 2007b).
In 2007, the EDAW consultancy group rened the master plan
for the island including the Cultural District, Saadiyat Beach (a lux-
ury hotel and golf resort complex), Al Marina and another beach
with luxury hotels (about 7000 rooms), commerce, leisure activi-
ties, and a lagoon area with lower density, that is, the Wetlands
and Eco Point. The megaproject scheme includes a traditional
development density and typological scheme, following the natu-
ral and articial morphology of the area, and a general grid for
hosting about 150,000 people. TDIC will complete the infrastruc-
ture and the cultural facilities and will leave other development
to be carried out by smaller private partners. The cultural facilities
Fig. 3. Spectacularization of architecture in an on-site Saadiyat Island project advertisement (picture by Michele Nastasi).
6
Adhan (2008, 248) brought a similar paradoxical argument about Dohas
development by quoting the Head of Qatars tourism Agency: This [Dubai]
gigantomania is precisely what we want to avoid. Of course the speed of development
make it seems like Dubai. But we have a different plan. We want it more exclusive
[retrieved from Follath, E. (2006), Taking on Dubai Natural Gas Is Catapulting Qatar
into Modernity, Spiegel online International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/
spiegel/0,1518,428963,00.html.
256 D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251259
are expected to be managed by an organization that is yet to be
created and international partners, corroborating the criticisms
regarding the neo-colonial and franchising attitudes of cultural
institutions such as the Guggenheim and the Louvre. The construc-
tion site is ongoing, and the Guggenheim, Louvre and Sheik Zayed
Museum are expected to be completed by 2013.
The spectacularization of architecture and urban development
is evident in the initial quotation. The media and marketing goals
have certainly been achieved, fostering the image of a contempo-
rary global capital city open to western culture and business. The
use of famous architects and international cultural institutions
functions to consolidate the cultural and nancial credibility of
the operation. The Saadiyat Island megaproject attempts to appre-
ciate the value of the desert area in an unprecedented and, at the
same time, very traditional way. The creation of such a cultural dis-
trict and of such a development in the desert has not been tested
anywhere else. However, the planning, nancing and value capture
processes are grounded in the real estate, retail and tourism activ-
ities in the schematic Saadiyat Island master plan, avoiding any
opportunity for a richer interpretation of the places and their ac-
tual uses after they are completed. In the master plan, the distribu-
tion of density and functions are intended to be exclusive and
exclusionary of lower income dwellers or users. The location of
coast line resorts and lagoon low rise housing, the intersection of
cultural and hotel facilities and the canal pavilions will probably
induce the alienating effect of a high-culture-but-spectacularized
theme park in a Western-style luxury suburbia.
Large scale development projects and star architecture in the
absence of democratic politics
Even if Abu Dhabi has particular economic and institutional
conditions, this borderline case amplies several problems that
are common in contemporary large scale development projects
and in the use of star architecture.
From the political point of view, the number of actors taking
part in urban planning and development decision making is very
limited. In most cases, it is a government agency or company with
all the necessary material resources, land or nancial means. Polit-
ical consensus and legitimization seem symbolically important but
irrelevant in actual terms: laws and rules can be adapted both in
the markets (the agencies can strongly inuence law making
the example of tourism activity regulation was already discussed)
and in the urban planning eld, where the competent ofce of the
Urban Planning Council has little or non-existing power in guiding
the growth engine. Here, the entrepreneurial city is more than a
metaphor because the government is at the same time a public
authority and a private enterprise. It is no different from problem-
atic cases of publicprivate partnerships that have frequently ap-
peared in Western countries (Codecasa & Ponzini, in press).
The marketing of projects and their link to Western architecture
is dominant. The public debate over choices is irrelevant. Urban de-
sign decisions are almost entirely made by developers or their
Western consultants, proposing simplied formulae and master
plans for complex development processes. In this sense, one can
see the extreme urban effects of removing some of the local gov-
ernments political preoccupation with global competition mantras
(Beauregard & Pierre, 2000; Ponzini & Rossi, 2010). The stated
urban policy goals can be addressed in merely symbolic and evi-
dently contradictory terms. For example, Abu Dhabis environmen-
tal sustainability targets can be supercially stated in the light of
the branded Masdar City project, but the pertinent questions
regarding immense land consumption have never been raised in
the local public debate (Fig. 4).
The economic diversication goals now need to immobilize
huge capitals in the real estate market and in future urban devel-
opment. The higher the value of localized capital, due in part to
some star architects signature, the more credit the government
can realize from the international nancial system for future
investments in urban and local development. The only evident lim-
it is the overall credibility of the development operations, which
are guaranteed by the presence of international actors and cultural
institutions. The future virtual city seems to be a governments
commodity to be boosted by the spectacularization of star
Fig. 4. View of Al Sowwah Island, 2010 (picture by Michele Nastasi).
D. Ponzini / Cities 28 (2011) 251259 257
architects work. This kind of operation in a weak urban planning
framework aims to increase the value of desert areas and induce
long-term mechanisms of rent and monopoly for the retail, hotel
and residential components that will supposedly benet from the
positive externalities of the cultural and entertainment amenities
(Harvey, 2002; Zukin, 1991). The strong resource centralization
in the decision making process will require a single actor to create
and manage new sectors of the city and to program their activities.
The role of important cultural and economic institutions is cur-
tailed with reference to management but not other aspects e.g.,
spatial organization, the modes and conditions of urban growth
or the localization of other complementary functions on which
the future management will partially depend (Ponzini, 2009).
The symbolic dimension of the Cultural District and many other
large-scale projects is linked to the image of the nation and
strengthened by the artistic aura of international iconic architec-
ture in a contradictory way (McNeill, 2000; Sudjic, 2005). Gener-
ally, the representation of cities already has hierarchies and
rankings deriving from the long term accumulation of cultural
and reputational capitals, which might be difcult to change, de-
spite massive investments in cultural and specialized services or
in spectacularizing the urban environment. Even if one believes
that global economic and touristic uxes depend on the localiza-
tion of one spectacular cultural facility, it would be crucial to note
that the creation of more or less homologous functions or pieces of
design in different cities will reduce the ux in a given place (Plaza,
2000). Furthermore and more generally, the multiplication of sim-
ilarly aesthetically striking artifacts all over the world have had
and will have the paradoxical effect of internationally homogeniz-
ing the urban landscape, while individual cities expect to distin-
guish themselves by hiring one star architect and creating a
spectacular and unique place (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004; King,
1996; Muoz, 2008). The dimension of the Saadiyat Island master
plan and the need for media exposure of the Cultural District show
the enormous difculty of matching global objectives with local
identities, environments and functions, which is typical in Western
agship projects (McNeil & Tewdwr-Jones, 2003). The difculties
of a weak land use regulation system in the face of interventions
driven by competitiveness are evident (Chorianopoulos, Pagonis,
Koukoulas, & Drymoniti, 2010; Palermo & Ponzini, 2010). Further-
more, the poor and uneven social impact can be easily linked to
these kinds of planning arrangements in political vacua (Elshesh-
tawy, 2008).
Under similar conditions, the archistar or the urbanistar is
asked to produce a spectacle and to allow his aura to be linked
to projects and developers (Foster, 2002) without having the
opportunity to critically intervene in the capitalization objectives
or the creation of urban rent and monopoly. The architect can only
perform a legitimizing role and reassert the fame for which he was
hired (McNeill, 2009; Ponzini & Nastasi, 2011).
Acknowledgements
In this paper I present part of the results of a research project I
carried out while I was Visiting Scholar at Columbia University, in
the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation. I
gratefully acknowledge nancial support of the International Re-
search Scholarship in Memory of Giovanni Agnelli funded by Uni-
Credit Private Banking and the Agnelli Foundation. I also
acknowledge Michele Nastasi for his precious help with the photo-
graphic body and Jill Diane Friedman for linguistic advice.
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