CANF White Paper-2003

Recommendations for the Immediate Implementation

of a U.S. Cuba Policy under the 'Four Promises'
Doctrine
FOUR POLICY POINTS
Recommendations for the Immediate Implementation of a
U.S.-Cuba Policy under the Four Promises Doctrine
Submitted to the White House, November 2003
OUTREACH TO DISSIDENTS AND CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY
It is a well known fact that Vaclav Havels Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the strength of student
and union movements like Solidarity in Poland, gave rise to civil society, building islands of
independent thought, movement, interaction and self-reliance among the repressed peoples of Eastern
Europe. The development of a self-contained civil society within the gates of repression helped create
a parallel culture that offered the people of the former Soviet Bloc countries an alternative to the
corruption, exploitation, fear and powerlessness that characterizes communist regimes. It offered
them hope.
However, the triumph of freedom would have been much further delayed without the determined
support of the United States, through direct aid, the voice of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and
the relentless efforts of the Reagan administration to garner international support and recognition for
the brave dissidents and reformists of the time.
In Cuba we are witnessing a similar situation. Cubans, increasingly, are losing their fear and vocalizing
their desire to be architects of their own future. We see many examples of this in the efforts of such
brave dissidents as Raul Rivero, Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Victor Rolando Arroyo, and Oswaldo Paya. We


see in Project Varela the same determination to challenge the system that we saw in the Solidarity
movement two decades ago. The same resilience and determination of a Walesa or a Havel in the
dissidents of the Cuban independent library movement, and in the scores of independent journalists
that risk everything so that the world no longer claim ignorance to the barbaric practices of a ruthless
regime.
Provide direct aid to families of prisoners of conscience especially those denied access to jobs
by Cuban authorities or who have lost the wages of an imprisoned spouse or parent.This is not
only for humanitarian reasons, but also to counter the regimes continued, systematic
campaign to decimate Cubas peaceful opposition.
Initiate a vigorous and vibrant assistance to the civil society by developing and overseeing
programs that provide material resources to Cubas democratic opposition and independent
groups, including independent journalists and libraries. This can be done through Section 109
funds but more speedily through Presidential Directive, or through the State Department
classifying the funds as humanitarian aid. Material resources for Cubas activists would
include books, radios, computers, printers, digital cameras, small transmitting equipment and
low-tech items such as paper and pens.
U.S. funding should be used to promote visits by national and international civic groups to
teach nonviolent resistance methods and civil society building. The U.S. government should
coordinate with former Eastern bloc nations to use their experience and activists.
Provide democratic transition training, low-tech training, and scholarships in areas such as
accounting, bookkeeping, building antennas, radio and TV repair, appliance repair. In short,
courses throughout Latin America funded by the U.S. and run through the OAS to engage them
on U.S. policy. Cuban students could also be awarded scholarships by universities or the private
sector to attend business schools as well as computer and internet training in the U.S.
A micro loan program should also be created to help independent farms and small businesses.
The loans should be a maximum of $1500 and administered by independent groups, coordinated
with outside NGOs or the U.S. Interests Section. The idea would be to stimulate self-reliance
and encourage Cubans to break free from the regime by providing them with the means for
greater independence from the controlling and paternalistic state.
The U.S. should work with NGOs involved in medical assistance to buy and distribute
medicines on the Island, which can be distributed to unemployed physicians and medical
personnel. Over-the-counter medicines, vitamins and similar products can also be distributed
to dissidents and human rights organizations to assist in outreach within their communities.
The United States should work closely with the European Union and other allies to create a
government sponsored/privately run international fund for the protection and development of
civil society in Cuba. This fund should engage, train and provide resources for volunteers of


different nationalities to travel to the Island for several weeks providing logistical and
technical assistance to independent libraries, professional organizations, charity organizations,
journalists, educators, nurses and medical doctors working independently of the government.
MAKING RADIO AND TV MARTI WORK
Radio Marti, established in 1984, was the first opportunity the Cuban people had in decades to have an
independent source of news and information. Its effect at one point caused the Cuban government to
reorganize its radio broadcasts. Ninety percent of the population was tuning in to Radio Marti.
Unfortunately, through successive administrations, the goals of this federal program were subjected to
the whims of patronage politics.
At no time has the need for professional and reliable management combined with a directed message
of freedom to the Cuban people, been more important. However, during the last three years Radio
Marti has gone from bad to worse. The time has come for the federal government to demand
professionalism and efficiency from this very useful and critical tool of the U.S. Information Agency.
Since 1986, TV Mart was the brightest and best hope to bring about freedom and democracy to Cuba.
For 17 years now, the efforts and expenditures of TV Marti have been wasted simply because of the
lack of commitment on the part of successive administrations. For nearly two decades, every
administration has promised that TV Marti would be seen, yet not one has had the political will to
deliver on that promise.
The lack of success in reaching the Cuban people contrasts with the efforts of the U.S. throughout the
world. The voices of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty transmitted the message of hope and
freedom to those who suffered under communism in the eastern bloc. It broke down the information
barrier and successfully overcame jamming by increasing the power of transmissions or constantly
switching frequencies knowing that these countries possessed only a limited amount of transmitters for
blocking. It transmitted radio messages from the air in Afghanistan, successfully took over the airwaves
in Iraq, and has found European partners willing and able to participate in transmitting radio
programming into Tibet. The bottom line is that it has been done, and can and should be done in Cuba.
Now is the time for the U.S. to relay a consistent message that is truly in tune with its stated goals of
freedom and democracy for its closest neighbor.
To that end, we recommend the following measures be taken:


Appoint vacancies, unfulfilled since the passing of its Chairman, Jorge Mas Canosa, six years
ago, to the Presidential Advisory on Cuba Broadcasts with qualified and knowledgeable
individuals, as the law requires.
Seek out the assistance of our Caribbean and Latin American neighbors in researching possible
new locations from which to transmit Radio Marti programming.
Streamline and professionalize Radio/TV Marti administration-ensuring that individuals hired on
as personnel are thoroughly qualified, including actively recruiting technical experts that will
address the jamming issue.
Extensive research, conducted over several years, confirms the feasibility of reaching the
Island with both VHF and UHF TV signals, with little potential interference, broadcasting
through several, probably three, 2,500 ft. directional antennas. The cost of the equipment and
the antennas is estimated not to exceed $3 million dollars. Far less than the cost of a single
balloon pointed toward a narrow spectrum of the Islands population, for a few hours per day,
weather permitting, as presently done with meager results. The capability to reach the Island
exists; the funds are available, only the political will is missing.
The heroes of the Brothers to the Rescue organization have proven, with very few resources,
that it is possible to transmit a TV signal from a flying plane within the jurisdictional waters of
the U.S. and reach Cuba. The U.S. has several C-130 airplanes equipped to transmit TV signals
over extended periods of time. This approach has been used with great success in several parts
of the world, the latest in Iraq. Why not in Cuba
Distribute video cassette tapes of TV Marti programming via U.S. Interests Section in Havana.
While Iranian exiles operating out of California have made tremendous impact with their
satellite broadcasts into Iran, in Cuba, satellite dishes are illegal and extremely difficult and
costly to buy on the black market. In fact, out of a population of over 11 million, it is
estimated that only 10,000 inhabitants, outside government offices, have access to a satellite
dish. If there is to be any sort of impact from new TV Marti satellite broadcasts, the U.S. should
engage in helping to make accessible the necessary equipment to Cubans via the U.S. Interests
Section and other means, as well as distributing information on how to build antennas and
dishes.
INDICTMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO FOR THE BROTHERS TO THE RESCUE MURDERS

Perhaps there is no other issue that can provide a degree of satisfaction to Cuban Americans than
an indictment of Fidel Castro for the Brothers to the Rescue murders. For 44 years, through nine
U.S. presidents, Castro has acted with impunity, dividing and destroying a nation, and ordering


over 18,000 political assassinations, some as recently as this year. Cuban Americans are victims of
Castro's dictatorship, and they eagerly seek justice.
Cuban Americans have learned that America's greatness lies in its unflinching commitment to
justice. Unfortunately, in the case of the Brothers to the Rescue murders, that has not been the
case. Although one Castro agent, Gerardo Hernandez, was convicted of conspiracy to commit
murder, and recently the two Cuban MIG pilots and Castro's head of aviation were indicted in
Florida, the self-admitted mastermind of the murders goes unpunished.

Legal experts have advised us of the following:
Castro made a grave mistake by sending agents to Florida because
those acts subjected him to the jurisdiction of our federal and state
courts.
Concerns with the concept of universal jurisdiction and the
International Criminal Court should not be raised in this case because
again this is a local crime; four Florida residents, three U.S. citizens,
murdered pursuant to activities carried out by Castro's agents in Florida.
Castro does not enjoy head of state immunity. The downing of these small planes by
Castro's MIGs can not be considered an Act of the State protected by head of state immunity
because Cuba's national security was never implicated. The Brothers to the Rescue planes
were there to find rafters and save lives. Thus, their downing can only be deemed a criminal
act, just like dictator Manuel Noriega's drug dealing.
Simply stated, what needs to occur is for the President of the
United States to allow the U.S. Justice Department to proceed with the
indictment. Beyond justice, the indictment of Fidel Castro will make him vulnerable internationally
and within Cuba. Those that reluctantly protect him may rethink the notion if they see him as an
indicted criminal sought by the United States. The U.S. is known for going after dictators wherever
they are. Moreover, Castro will limit his trips abroad and thus minimize his continuous rallying of the
enemies of the United States.

Therefore, we propose that the United States should, without further
delay, indict Fidel Castro for the murder of the Brothers to the Rescue
pilots.
IMMIGRATION POLICY


Immigrant Visa Program
Increasing the number of visas available to Cuba guarantees nothing to civil society and keeps
control in Castros hands. It was the Castro regime that insisted on an increase to the 20,000 annual
visas, not Cubas dissidents or the Cuban American community. While we can appreciate the
sentiment that moved the present Administration to expand the visa program, that is, the humanitarian
interest of dissuading potential rafters from taking to the seas, no number of visas under the present
regime will ever satiate the demand. And it is critical to keep in mind that Cuban rafters take to the
sea not because of U.S. immigration policy, but because they are desperate to escape their island-
prison.
As it stands, current immigration policy is not acceptable. As a rule, the Castro regime does
not grant exit visas to those who have played a significant role in creating civil society, making clear
that only those who conform and toe the party line will be rewarded with a prized visa to the
U.S. The critical decision of who should benefit from the 20,000 immigrant visas granted to Cuba
every year should fall exclusively to the government of the United States, not to Castro as it presently
does.
Under the current system, the Castro regime allows a complete processing of the visas at the
U.S. Interests Section. However, determination of who actually gets to leave the country is
determined by Cubas issuing of the exit visa, known as the white card. There are literally hundreds
of cases of individuals who cannot leave the country even though they have refugee or immigrant
visas. This reality can sometimes have tragic consequences, as witnessed in the many cases of those
who have lost their lives at sea with a U.S. visa in their possession. Also tragic are the numerous cases
of mostly women and children held as hostages of the regime as when a family member has sought
asylum abroad.
Castro extorts cash payments for exit visas from professionals and families living in the U.S.
Fees between $20,000 and $30,000 is sometimes required to gain the release of doctors and lawyers,
and $15,000 for engineers. Our present distribution of immigrant visas gives the Castro government
the time and the ability to carry out such extortions. Further, the exit processing and medical exams
required under U.S. law make the Castro government again the chief beneficiary of present
policy. Medical exams for this purpose that are routinely performed in other Latin American countries
for generally less than $70, in Cuba cost between $350-400 per person, giving Castro a profit of
upwards of $5,000,000 per year. A Cuban passport, an item not required by the U.S. government, also
has to be paid for in order to obtain exit.


The cost of airfare poses a similar situation whereas Castro regime-approved charter services
(charging exorbitant fees) have become a lucrative business for Castro.
The very fact that the transactions described above are done on the basis of United States
dollars adds a Machiavellian dimension to the problem considering that most Cubans do not have
regular access to dollars, at least not to the degree that the fees exacted would require. The average
Cuban earns in pesos the equivalent of around $15 a month, and even the relatively few who are
employed by foreign companies are paid in pesos after the Cuban government confiscates roughly 95%
of the salary that the foreign employers pay to the state in dollars.
There has not been a lottery visa for Cuba since 1996, when half a million Cubans
participated. Neither the Cuban American community nor the U.S. government requested the lottery
visa program; it was Cuba. Yet, it is now a reality that must be dealt with in such a manner that
would bring the program into balance and wrench control away from Castro.
Seven years later, these visa applications are now stale. It is time to revisit the lottery, gain
control of it, and end the extortion. Our primary concern should be refugee visas, not immigrant
visas, and priorities should be set accordingly. The victims of political persecution should be the first
processed for visas under the refugee program, so that if they can leave through the Interests Section
in an organized manner, then the program will truly help to diffuse some rafter incidents.
We propose the following be enacted:
A new list of lottery applicants should be initiated and Cuban Americans in the U.S. should be
able to apply for their family members on island in order to avoid retaliation from the
regime. U.S. NGOs with extensive refugee resettlement and visa program administration
experience should also be allowed to generate lists of participants.
Cubans approved for travel by the U.S. must receive travel permits from Cuba within a
reasonable amount of time- between 30 to 45 days. After that point, processing should be
completely frozen until all those issued immigrant visas are processed. Visa processing should
not be allowed to continue while we are beholden to the whims of the regime.
For every visa not granted to a Cuban, the regime must provide a justification that merits a
denial (ex: criminal behavior as defined by international standards, not Cuban law.
An entity such as ICM (International Committee on Migration) should be tasked with
coordinating travel in order to reduce Castros profiteering on charter flights.
The U.S. should issue travel documents and disallow the use of a Cuban passport, which now
only serves to channel millions in hard currency to the regime.
Beyond Wet-foot and Dry-foot


As a result of negotiations with the Cuban regime in May of 1995, the Clinton administration
entered an immigration agreement to regulate and control the exodus of Cuban refugees. The main
result of that ill-fated accord with the greatest offender of human rights this hemisphere has ever
known was that for the first time in its proud history, the U.S. relinquished its responsibility and
avowed commitment to protect those fleeing from oppression and tyranny. To secure Castros
commitment not to precipitate another massive exodus, the U.S. agreed to return all those caught at
sea trying to escape the Island.
To enforce the agreement, while seeming to comply with U.S. law, President Clinton issued an
Executive Order creating what is known as the wet-foot/dry-foot policy. Under said order Cubans
interdicted at sea would be screened and later repatriated while those that reached land would be
eligible for adjustment of their migration status in the U.S. after one year and one day of their arrival
(as required by the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966). Three years after a new U.S. President, George W.
Bush, promised to redress the grievance committed against the Cuban people, the U.S. continues to
implement a policy whereby a human beings fate, and his possibility of being welcomed to America, is
determined by whether it is high or low tide.
Moreover, interdiction at sea takes place under circumstances that conspire against the freedom
seeker. Cubans are dehydrated, disoriented, frightened and vulnerable, yet they are being screened
at sea by minor functionaries without any semblance of due process. On the other hand, asylum
seekers that enter the country via land borders or on international flights are subjected to long-term
detentions (up to 8 months) in federal prison facilities with common criminals subjected to a process
that is, at best, unfair and undue.
The wet-foot/dry-foot policy was put into place by Executive Order, and by Executive Order it can be
revised or reversed. We suggest the following changes be enacted to make the process consistent with
the goals of a pro-active Cuba policy:
Experienced and highly trained immigration personnel should screen Cuban asylum seekers.
Those denied asylum should have the benefit of a second screening at the U.S. Interests
Section. In any case, the benefit of the doubt should be placed with the asylum seeker, as
provided by international norms.
No attempt should be made to intercept potential asylum seekers within the 3-mile limit of
territorial waters of the U.S.
Persons mentioned and/or recognized by international human rights watch organizations such
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International should be presumptively considered as valid
asylum seekers as well as those who have suffered imprisonment for political reasons.


Those caught at sea who are reclaimed by the Castro regime accused of criminal activities
connected to their attempt to escape the Island should be placed in Guantanamo Base and
given the right to due process of law.
The process by which potential refugees are held for extended periods of time aboard U.S.
coastguard vessels should be reviewed.
Although we recognize the post September 11
th
exigencies that are in place, the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BCIS) should revamp its system of processing Cuban
asylum seekers that enter through land borders or international flights so that they are
released in accordance with current law and in a timely manner.

IN CLOSING
For too many years now, we have had static, sterile policy in which the goal of a free Cuba has
been paid lip service but where conflicting political priorities have prevented the creation of a more
pro-active policy. The interest in preserving what many have referred to as stability on the island,
which is nothing more than preventing mass migration to the U.S., has made the U.S. complacent, our
policy stale and bent toward preserving the status-quo, permitting the suffering of the Cuban people to
be extended in exchange for Castros willingness to serve as warden to eleven million people.
Our community celebrated the election of a new Presidency in the year 2000 as a herald of new
ground to be broken. We believed the new Administration would make the earnest effort to succeed
where nine others had failed. We believed it shared our common vision of bringing Cuba back into the
fold of free and democratic nations in our hemisphere, with stability rooted in the respect for human
rights and real economic progress, not on the oppression of Cuban citizens.
We still firmly believe that window of opportunity has not yet closed. That the opportunity still
exists to combine a reinvigorated pro-active policy, including specific and targeted measures, with the
political will that is needed to make it happen. A new U.S. policy towards Cuba is due, one that
actively seeks to empower the Cuban people and promote their independence from the current regime.
Now, more than ever, it remains painfully clear that peaceful, positive change can only come
to Cuba if we firmly and decisively seek the challenge to join hands with the Cuban people and begin
to break the shackles of dependence forced on them by the Castro regime.