Nuclear Threat To Karachi

VERSION 1.
1
The Nuclear Threat to
Karachi
Occasional Paper

Syed Akhtar Ali-Energy Consultant
2/26/2014

Draft
Research on Economy and Politics of Pakistan-REAP
Syed Akhtar Ali(akhtarali1949@gmail.com)0345-2447714 Page 2

"What happened at Fukushima was, yes, a warning to the world," he said. The resulting lesson was clear: "Try to
examine all the possibilities, no matter how small they are, and don't think any single counter-measure is foolproof.
Think about all different kinds of small counter-measures, not just one big solution. There's not one single
answer."We made a lot of excuses to ourselves Looking back, seals on the doors, one little thing, could have
saved everything."
"But we have to explain, no matter how small a possibility, what if this [safety] barrier is broken? We have to prepare
a plan if something happens It is easy to say this is almost perfect so we don't have to worry about it. But we have
to keep thinking: what if
Source: , Naomi Hirose, president of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco,owners of
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant), interview to Guardian,19
th
Nov,2013


About the Author

Akhtar Ali (B.E., M.S.)is an eminent energy expert and consultant, advising public and private sector
clients on energy policy, investments and tariff issues and has authored a number of books on the
subject. He is a visiting Professor of Energy at I oBM and teaches energy management to MBA
students. He has held senior management appointments in Pakistans public and private sector. He
was Research Fellow Energy at Harvard Universitys Kennedy School of Government. He is an author
of eight books on various subjects such as energy, governance, political economy and resources. He
heads Proplan Associates, a consulting company having a current focus on Energy. He is also
Chairman (REAP) Research on Economy and Politics of Pakistan, a think tank that brings out
research publications on national issues.

Books by Akhtar Ali:
Pakistan Nuclear Dilemma: Energy & Security Dimensions. (1984).
Pakistan Energy Development: the Road Ahead.(2010).
I ssues in Energy Policy, 2012
The Political Economy of Pakistan: an Agenda for Reforms. (1994).
Pakistans Development Challenges :Federalism, Security and Governance
2010
Pakistans development; economy, resources and technology, 2012.
Nuclear Politics and Challenges of Governance. (1998)
South Asia: Nuclear Stalemate or Conflagration. (1987).


The Nuclear threat to Karachi

PAEC has launched a nuclear power expansion programme under which two nuclear Power Plants
(NPPs) are to be installed in or near Karachi. Foundation stone laying ceremony was held in November
2013.The two NPPs are to be located near the existing KANNUP site at Paradise Point (Hawkesbay). A
number of doubts and criticism have been made on the project which can be summarized as follows:
1)The NPPs are expensive and the nuclear power coming out of this project would be costly and
unaffordable.
2)The NPPs would be supplied by Chinese who are not as competent as the traditional suppliers from
the U.S. ,France and Russia. The technology is new and not tried and tested. China has acquired this
technology from the U.S. recently and has cannibalized it which can be risky from safety point of view.
And that China is using Pakistan as a guinea- pig to try out these plants.
3)It is highly unsafe to site the plants in the vicinity of KANNUP, as any reactor accident ala Three-Mile
Island or more recently Fukushima etc may cause irreparable damage to life and property of a major city
of the country.

I do not agree with the first two points which I have elaborated on earlier in these pages. I will only
summarize those here. It is true that Capital cost of NPPS are high at 4000-5000 USD per KW ,more than
twice the conventional power plants, its capacity Factor(utilization exceeds 85 and even 90% which is
30-50% higher than the conventional power plants. And nuclear fuel cost is quite cheap of the order of
one cent(one Rupee) per kWh. The total unit cost of generation would be between 7 to under 10 cents
per unit kWh, which is comparable to coal .the latter being the cheapest option otherwise. Besides the
China is offering the finance at a time when there is dearth of direct foreign investment.

The second point pertains to the traditional image of China as a supplier of second rate products which
is an outdated impression. The reactor being offered is of much safer design than the existing power
plants installed in the world till to-date involving advanced and passive safety features. The technology
is being utilized in new reactor plants in the U.S. and as well as China.

As mentioned earlier, I agree with the third point and in this article I will explain my reasons for doing
so. Before I do that, I may clarify that I am a supporter of both civilian and military (nuclear weapons)
technology. I believe that nuclear weapons have done tremendous contribution in our national security
by bringing about a dtente and counter capability. For a smaller country facing a much larger
adversary, nuclear weapons have been a good deal. Thus what I am submitting may not be dubbed away
as coming out of traditional opponents of nuclearization and nuclear energy.

PAEC the project proponent has launched its own public campaign and recently held a seminar in a local
hotel in Karachi lat week in which responsible PAEC and PNRA (Pakistan Nuclear regulatory Authority
charged with the task of regulating nuclear energy) including chairman participated. I did not attend the
event as I did not know about it nor was I invited. However, all and sundry non-specialist crowd
including students, public leaders and dignitaries were reportedly there. A brief was circulated

defending their position. As I have already mentioned that I do not agree with the first two categories of
objections, I would limit myself to the NPPs siting issue as proposed and defended by the PAEC in their
brief and make a few recommendations in this respect.

Whoever has read the PAEC brief is not convinced as to the siting decision. Karachi is a city of more than
25 Million or so now. Siting a nuclear power plant so close to it at Paradise Point, is definitely going to
cause fear and controversy. As we will demonstrate in this space from the evidence in many countries,
that in almost all the countries effort is made to locate nuclear power plants quite away from the
population centers, and in particular the large cities .Even PNRAs gazette siting guidelines require
additional considerations for large cities. It is not sufficient to argue that KANNUP has operated for the
last 40 years without any catastrophe thus more of the same can be done without any compunction or
reservation. Firstly, It was in 1950s that the decision on KANNUP was taken. KANNUP was a small
reactor (125 MW originally), Karachi was smaller then and no security and terrorist threats were there
as these are now. Karachi is no Mianwali where Chashma projects could have been sited without having
received any reservations or opposition. PAEC first surreptitiously got the environmental clearance from
SEPA, without following the due process and brow-beating the small SEPA officials. They did not
consider it necessary to engage public and are doing now when nascent public pressure has forced them
to do so.

People , experts and non-experts are rightly arguing that in a vast country with a large shoreline, is
KANNUP location the only choice and whether all other options have been examined adequately.
Although it has been claimed that Karachi would be safe, a non-technical brief without credible
documents , is hardly enough to dispel the doubts and skepticism that is there. Let me take up the siting
issue point by point in the following:

2. As a general Siting Rule, almost universally, away-from-population centers is a norm and makes
common sense. Let me reproduce, the excerpts from NRC(USA) Guidelines on the subject;
As stated in 10 CFR 100.21(h), "Reactor sites should be located away from very densely populated
centers. Areas of low population density are, generally, preferred. Locating reactors away from densely
populated centers is part of the NRC's defense-in-depth philosophy and facilitates emergency planning
and preparedness as well as reducing potential doses and property damage in the event of a severe
accident. Numerical values in this guide are generally consistent with past NRC practice and reflect
consideration of severe accidents, as well as the demographic and geographic conditions characteristic
of the United States.
Preferably a reactor would be located so that, at the time of initial site approval and within about 5 years
thereafter, the population density, including weighted transient population, averaged over any radial
distance out to 20 miles (cumulative population at a distance divided by the circular area at that
distance), does not exceed 500 persons per square mile. A reactor should not be located at a site whose
population density is well in excess of the above value.
Additionally, 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) requires reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can
and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency before an operating license for a nuclear

power plant can be issued. Adequate plans must be developed for two areas or Emergency Planning
Zones (EPZs). As stated in 10 CFR 50.47, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants
generally consists of an area about 16 km (10 mi) in radius, and the ingestion pathway EPZ generally
consists of an area about 80 km (50 mi) in radius.
Source: Regulatory Guide 4.7 - General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations,
(Draft issued as DG-4004),Revision 2,April 1998http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/environmental-
siting/rg/04-007/
There are 100 nuclear power reactors in the U.S. with a total installed capacity of slightly more than
100,000MW. In the enclosed Table, we have provided population data for 13 most dangerously located
reactors. Out of these, only 4 nuclear reactors namely Indian Point(NY),TM
Islands(Penn),Limerick(penn),and Mcquire (NC) have a populations of 880,820- to1187284 living
within 20 miles of the nuclear reactors. In most other locations, this number is typically under
200,000. Even in this list of dangerous locations, one would find sparse populations in quite a number
of situations. In the category of 10 miles(17 kms) distance, even Indian Point(NY) would fare better
than our proposed KK-2 ;a population of 272,539 as opposed to more than a million living within 17
kms of KK-2.Typically, less than 50,000 people live within 17 kms of nuclear reactors in the U.S. as
can be seen readily from the table. The figures match even with China where environment and safety
issues may fare lesser on agenda, as is the common belief. We have provided numbers on China as
well in a table. PAEC has selected only the worst possible example to prove its case. (May be God has
chosen New York for potential catastrophes for its sins).
In the case of Pradise Point (KK-2), it may be noted that it is situated in the densest part of Karachi
called Karachi West; the adjoining communities of Orangi, Lyari, Baldia, SITE area etc have a
combined population of 8.55 million people living within 20 miles. Also Clifton and Defence and PECHS
are also within more or less 20 miles. It must also be noted that in these advanced and affluent
countries, it is a lot easier task to evacuate. Most people have cars and money to eat and survive for
days if not weeks on their own. The disaster management data from Japan, for example, tells us that
only a few persons have to be assisted in most emergencies. People leave on their own unassisted. In
our case, neither the people nor the government have money and resources and nor are we organized
adequately. I have personal experience of evacuation during the Oil-Spill tragedy of Karachi and know
how difficult and painful it can be.

13 most dangerous nuclear reactor locations in the U.S.
Reactor Name State
10
miles(1)
20
miles(2)
Seabrook New Hamshire 118747 464872
Vermont
Yankee Vermont 35284 147109
Pilgrim Massachusetts 75835 307359
Millstone Connecticut 123482 317466
Indian Point New York 272539 1187284
Oyster Creek Philadelphia 133609 485719
Limerick Pennsylvania 252196 1168871
TM Island Pennsylvania 211261 880821
Salem New Jersey 52091 545820
Calvert Cliffs Maryland 48798 181324
Saint Lucie Florida 266595 420273
Mcquire North Carolina 199869 1013135

Source: NBC http://www.nbcnews.com

(1)population living within 10 miles of nuclear reactor
(2)population living within 20 miles

Population of nearby communities to KK2

Community Population
Road distance-
km St.line distance
Orangi 1,540,200 25 18.75

Baldia 406,165 22 16.5

Lyari 2,700,000 24 18

Saddar 616,051 28 21

SITE 467,560 22 16.5

Kemari 383,788 22 16.5
Total(1998
census) 6,113,764
Estimated
current

8,559,270

1)current population should be at least 40% more than the 1998 Census
2) Straight line distances have been assumed to be 75% of the road distances.


Source: Akhtar and Dhanani ,Population Distribution in Karachi City ,Sindh Univ. Res. Jour.
(Sci. Ser.) Vol.45 (1): 59-64 (2013);(dots represent population density. It is evident that the proposed
location is near highly populous parts of the Karachi city)

Source: Wikipedia

Karachi South
1. Lyari Town
2. Saddar Town
B. Clifton & DHA
Karachi West
12. Kemari Town
13. SITE Town
14. Baldia Town
15. Orangi Town

NPP Siting Framework in India; A full scope EIA with public participation is provided in Indian law.Apart
from AERB(Atomic Energy Regulatory Board),there is jurisdiction of local and regional bodies and
EPAs.EIA and AERB guidelines provide for the following distances and rejection criteria of potential sites.
You may note that no population centers of more than 100,000 are to be there within 30kms of the NPP.

Rejection Criteria (1)
Population Considerations:
1) Population Centers of more than 10,000 should not be within 10 km of the site
2) Population density within a radius of 10 km of the plant should be less than 2/3 of the state
average
3) No population centers of more than 100,000 within 30 km from the plant
4) Total population in the sterilized area should be small (< 20,000)
Source: EIA Manual for Nuclear Power Plants, India.2)AERB Guidelines
Chinese NPP location Framework:
Let me also produce a table from the relevant policy in China:

Malaysian Framework:

Malaysian Guidelines provide for rejecting a potential site if the distance to a population center of
25000 persons is less than or equal to 10 kms.
Nuclear Power Plant Siting Rejection Criteria (Malaysia)
Rejection criteria are requirements based on physical characteristics of a potential NPP site and
potential sources of external events which could jeopardize its safety.
The brief rejection criteria established are:
1. Potential sites must not be within surface faulting and geologically unstable
areas.
2. Potential sites must not be within flood prone areas.
3. Potential sites must not be located within Rank 1 Environment Sensitive Areas (ESA).
4. Potential sites must not be located within an area whereby man induced events such as installations
with explosive, flammable, corrosive, toxic or radioactive materials, airports and the approach, take -
off and flight path zones, military installations and military target practice areas etc. is within the NPP
surrounding Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

5. Within a Mukim with population density of more than 250 persons / km2
and / or straight line distance to existing major population center of more
than 25,000 people is less than 10km.
5. PNRAs Gazetted Guidelines provide for special considerations for large cities. Let me reproduce ,part
of para 6;
A population center distance of at least one and one-third times the distance from the installation to the
outer boundary of the low population zone. For this purpose, the boundary of the population center shall
be determined upon consideration of population distribution. Political boundaries are not controlling in
the application of this requirement. Where very large cities are involved, a greater distance may
be necessary because of total integrated population dose consideration.
There is no evidence that special consideration and assessments have been made as per legal
requirements. If such is the case, it should be made public.
6. Fukushima Lessons: There are various comments on Fukushima and the lessons learnt. Let me quote
from a respectable institution:
By contrast, the issue of the potential consequences of Fukushima had the wind direction been less
favourable has led for calls to tighten the siting regulations, especially with regard to population
densities downwind of nuclear plants. In a 2012 report Greenpeace said: Governmental data
released only later revealed that in a worst-case but possible scenario, evacuation would have
included the megapolis of Tokyo and other settlements up to 250 km away. Clearly, evacuation
planning based on circles with diameters of several kilometres is too rigid and hopelessly
inadequate in the case of nuclear power plants.138 (As noted earlier, the UK approach has been
based on 30 degree sectors rather than circles.) Commentators like Paul Dorfman have argued for
much more vigorous international involvement, including international reviews of security and
safety, binding international standards on safety and security and international cooperation ..

http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1344.pdf

3.As to the KANNUPs regional spatial control in the area, residents of Karachi know that all kinds of
activities have been allowed in the vicinity of KANNUP. Hawkesbay Scheme-42 has been floated and
allotments have been made. Within a few years, lacs of people are going to be populated there.
4.The proponent has chosen to get SEPAs approval in a secret manner bypassing the standard process
scrutiny. Your project, in my view, would have got more credibility and acceptance, had you chosen to
make public certain safety related details, proactively. Your belated explanations are coming after some
individuals have publicly aired their point of view. IAEAs siting guidelines provide for the due process
and public participation. It is a part of our civilian nuclear programme , where National Strategic
considerations and secrets are not involved. It is highly advisable that the two programmes are kept
separate. IAEA safeguards would ensure that such is the case. In this background, pursuit of secretive
processes and bypassing standard procedures is not understandable. All democratic societies involve
open and inclusive approaches involving public participation in nuclear siting decisions. Let me quote
from athe Annual Report of AERB India(2012);
AERB apprises the public on safety regulation to assure them that there are no adverse safety
implications envisaged in the setting up of properly designed and operated NPPs. The desirability of
public participation in review process of AERB has been raised in recent past to consider relevant public
remarks/ suggestions during the review process. Considering the demands and the public sentiments,
AERB proactively took a step forward and decided to identify approaches for public participation in
the existing process for site approval. Methodology for public participation in regulatory
process during Siting consent stage is finalized as model case for Gorakhpur Haryana Project. For this
purpose, report on Environmental Impact Assessment in respect of Nuclear & Radiological Safety (EIA-
NRS Report) of 4x700 MWe PHWR - GHAVP for public participation process has been received. AERB Task
Force for further follow up for public participation has been constituted and review of the EIA-NRS Report
is in progress. The finalized EIA-NRS report will be placed on AERB website and disseminated amongst
stakeholders for public view/comments. The comments received from public will be taken into account
during the review process for siting consent and resolution of the issues raised will be made public along
with AERB siting consent to be issued.
Source: Annual Report,2012, AERB India.
Concluding , our nuclear establishment should examine and reevaluate their workings and policies and
adapt themselves to the newer times and a new Pakistan where multi-pronged and counter-acting
sources of power have emerged; an informed public, strong media and independent judiciary. No
longer, can one hide behind the so-called national security argument endlessly and unduly. At this
moment the debate is in rather knowledgeable circles. Eventually, it will trickle down. Electronic media
has not yet become alive to this. PAEC has to make its case, if there is one, and put forth the facts and
make use of common sense. The argument and data has to be compelling. Up to now, it has not been
convincing. And it is doubtful if they can convince people that under a worst possible scenario of a
nuclear accident within or beyond design (and quite likely terrorism threats), there would be no threat
to Karachites safety, life and property.

After all what is so secret about nuclear power and nuclear reactors. There is an imported design,
originally from the U.S> and replicated and indigenized in China. And for environmental evaluations, one
need not reveal a lot of reactor details. One has to develop a dispersion models and examine the
contamination paths of air and water under various scenarios including Worst possible and most likely
cases. The kind of data that we have presented indicates that the proposed site is risky and does not
match with the generally prevalent practices and norms. Still, one would like to hear the case.
Additionally, in a country where three major military installations have been attacked with the kind of
ease that everybody has noticed, it would be impossible to make a reasonably strong or acceptable case
about impenetrable defense. It is impossible to predict and prevent such attacks, although one has the
option of doing this dangerous business elsewhere, where the impact of such happenings may be much
limited. If I were them, I would have started looking for other options. It would be in every ones interest
including the ambitious ones wanting fast track rewards and careers.


Annexures




Fukushima and Chernobyl compared
Category Fukushima Daiichi Chernobyl
SOURCE: NUCLEAR AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AGENCY, JAPANESE AUTHORITIES, UNSCEAR. *BECQUERELS
ARE A MEASUREMENT OF RADIATION
Date of
accident
11 March 2011 26 April 1986
Accident
details
A magnitude-9.0 earthquake and
resulting tsunami damaged the plant's
power systems, causing cooling
systems to fail. A series of gas
explosions followed
A sudden power output surge during a
systems test caused a reactor vessel to
rupture, leading to a series of blasts. An
intense fire burned for 10 days
Severity
rating
Level 7 - major accident Level 7 - major accident
Number of
reactors
Six; but only three of concern, plus
pools storing spent fuel
Four; but only one reactor involved
Type of
reactors
Boiling-water reactors. Japanese
authorities stress that unlike at
Chernobyl, the containment vessels at
Fukushima remain intact. Also, unlike
Chernobyl, the reactors at Fukushima
do not have a combustible graphite
core
Graphite-moderated boiling water reactor. The
graphite made it highly combustible. The
reactor also had no containment structure and
nothing stopped the trajectory of radioactive
materials into the air
Radiation
released
370,000 terabecquerels* (as of 12
April)
5.2 million terabecquerels*
Area
affected
Officials say areas extending more
than 60km (36 miles) to the north-west
of the plant and about 40km to the
south-southwest have seen radiation
levels exceed annual limits
Contamination of an area as far as 500 km
(300 miles) from the plant, according to the
UN. But animals and plants were also affected
much further away
Evacuation
zone
20km; 20-30km voluntary zone. Five
communities beyond the existing
evacuation zone have also been
evacuated
30km
People
evacuated
Tens of thousands The authorities evacuated, in 1986, about
115,000 people from areas surrounding the
reactor and subsequently relocated, after

Fukushima and Chernobyl compared
Category Fukushima Daiichi Chernobyl
1986, about 220,000 people from Belarus, the
Russian Federation and Ukraine
Related
deaths
No deaths so far due to radiation A UN report places the total confirmed deaths
from radiation at 64 as of 2008. Disputes
continue about how many will eventually die
Long-term
health
damage
Not yet known, but risks to human
health are thought to be low
Among the residents of Belarus, the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, there had been up to
the year 2005 more than 6,000 cases of
thyroid cancer reported in children and
adolescents who were exposed at the time of
the accident, and more cases can be expected
during the next decades
Current
status
Engineers have brought the plant to a
"cold shutdown condition", a key
milestone in bringing it under control. It
will take decades to dismantle it
completely however.
The damaged reactor is now encased in a
concrete shell. A new containment structure is
due to be completed by 2014

Source: BBC ,16 Dec,2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13050228


Fukushima nuclear disaster is warning
to the world, says power company boss
The Guardian, Tuesday 19 November 2013 18.10 GMT

The catastrophic triple meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in March 2011 was "a
warning to the world" about the hazards of nuclear power and contained lessons for the British
government as it plans a new generation of nuclear power stations, the man with overall
responsibility for the operation in Japan has told the Guardian.
Speaking at his Tokyo corporate headquarters , Naomi Hirose, president of the Tokyo Electric Power
Company (Tepco), which runs the stricken Fukushima plant, said Britain's nuclear managers "should
be prepared for the worst" in order to avoid repeating Japan's traumatic experience. "We tried to
persuade people that nuclear power is 100% safe. That was easy for both sides. Our side explains
how safe nuclear power is. The other side is the people who listen and for them it is easy to hear
OK, it's safe, sure, why not?
"But we have to explain, no matter how small a possibility, what if this [safety] barrier is broken? We
have to prepare a plan if something happens It is easy to say this is almost perfect so we don't
have to worry about it. But we have to keep thinking: what if "
British ministers recently agreed a commercial deal with the French state-owned energy
company EDF Energy to build the UK's first new nuclear reactor in a generation at Hinkley Point in
Somerset. The agreement included the UK government providing accident insurance.
Tepco's Fukushima Daiichi facility on the coast about 124 miles (200km) north-east of Tokyo,
comprising six nuclear reactors, was hit by a giant tsunami with waves peaking at 17 metres high
caused by the Great East Japan earthquake on 11 March 2011. In what quickly became one of the
world's worst nuclear disasters, operators lost control of the plant when the power supply, including
emergency back-up, failed amid massive flooding. As cooling systems malfunctioned, reactors 1, 2
and 3 suffered meltdowns.
Reactor 4 was closed for routine maintenance at the time. But one of several hydrogen explosions
blew the walls and roof off the reactor building. This week a delicate and lengthy operation to
remove fuel rods from that reactor began.
Radiation leakage following the explosions forced the evacuation of tens of thousands of people
from the surrounding area. An exclusion zone roughly 11 miles by 19 miles remains in force around
the plant two and half years later. The entire facility is now being decommissioned, but Tepco's
clean-up, which has been strongly criticised by environmentalists, is expected to take up to 40 years.
Hirose said that although the situation facing Fukushima Daiichi on 11 March was exceptional,
measures could have been adopted in advance that might have mitigated the impact of the disaster.
Tepco was at fault for failing to take these steps, he said.

"After I became president [in 2012], we formed a nuclear safety review committee. We focused
mainly on what we could do, what we could learn. We had a lot of data by then. Three other reports,
one from the Diet [Japan's parliament], one from government. We had a lot of information. Tepco's
own report, too. We concluded that we should have avoided that catastrophic accident, and we
could have. We could see what we should have done."
Preventative measures included fitting waterproof seals on all the doors in the reactor building, or
placing an electricity-generating turbine on the facility's roof, where the water might not have
reached it. In addition, wrong assumptions were made, he said.
"I don't know if I could have seen or thought this before the accident Probably I assumed that
people had discussed counter-measures to avoid a huge tsunami by something very special like a
complete shutdown."
It transpired that the huge cost and technical complexity of a multiple shutdown, in what was
considered the unlikely event of an abnormally large tsunami, had led managers to discount such a
scenario as implausible and inefficient, he said.
"What happened at Fukushima was, yes, a warning to the world," he said. The resulting lesson was
clear: "Try to examine all the possibilities, no matter how small they are, and don't think any single
counter-measure is foolproof. Think about all different kinds of small counter-measures, not just one
big solution. There's not one single answer.
"We made a lot of excuses to ourselves Looking back, seals on the doors, one little thing, could
have saved everything."
Tepco was willing to share its experience with British and other nuclear plant operators if they
wished, Hirose said. "We can share all the information, all the data we obtained, that we learned
from this accident, and then hope that people will use the data and information to prevent the same
thing happening."
Hirose confirmed that his company has paid a large price for the disaster. It planned to "streamline"
the business and shed hundreds of jobs through voluntary retirement to keep itself in business. "We
have a huge debt for the compensation for damages and losses and for decommissioning We
have to be sustainable as a going concern."
Concerned that Tepco may be unable to cope and responding to criticism that the company has
bungled parts of the clean-up operation, Japan's government has agreed to spend 47bn yen
(292m) on dealing with hundreds of static tanks to store radiated water at the plant.
It is also considering paying part of the cost to decommission Fukushima's damaged nuclear
reactors. Tepco will reportedly seek 500bn yen (3.1bn) in bank loans by the end of the year to help
keep itself afloat.
Asked about the severe domestic and international criticism that followed the discovery in July of
leaks from some of the tanks storing contaminated water, Hirose said the problem stemmed from a
"simple mistake" in managing the tanks. Since the discovery, the monitoring system had been
changed and new welded tanks installed, instead of the old bolted together versions.

Hirose said he could not state categorically that all leakage of contaminated groundwater into the
sea had ceased, but the outflow was much reduced. "Probably there is some leakage. It is very
difficult to say where it comes from and how much it is, but the harbour [radioactivity] level does not
go down, so that means there is some leakage We are trying to stop it."
Hirose said he felt deeply sorry for the estimated 150,000 local residents who have been forced to
leave their homes due to potentially harmful radiation levels, and may in some cases never be able
to return.
"I have visited Fukushima many times, met the evacuees, the fishing union, the farmers, many
people whose businesses have been damaged very much. I feel very sorry for them. We have to
compensate them fully for the damage we caused by our accident."
Tepco was investing in the area and creating jobs by building a new thermal power plant. But he
acknowledged reconstruction and rebuilding would take many years.
After the Fukushima catastrophe, the UK's Office for Nuclear Regulation conducted a safety review
and its chief inspector, Mike Weightman, concluded there were "no fundamental safety weaknesses"
in UK nuclear plants. He said: "We already require protection of nuclear sites against the worst-case
scenarios that are predictable for the UK."
But his report found 38 areas for improvement including risks associated with flooding and the state
of preparedness for emergencies. In 2012, documents released under freedom of information rules
showed that all eight coastal nuclear locations in the UK, including Hinkley Point, were at risk of
flooding and coastal erosion, which would worsen with climate change. EDF Energy said it was
confident its UK sites were adequately protected against storms and floods. "Without these
arrangements in place the regulator would have the authority to close us down," said an EDF
spokeswoman.
Hirose said that although there are currently no nuclear powerplants operating in Japan, nuclear
power had a future in the country. Popular former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi called last week
for Japan to abandon nuclear power altogether, saying it was demonstrably dangerous.
The best course for Japan and other developed countries was energy diversification, Hirose said,
combining nuclear power with other forms of generation, including oil, gas and renewables.
Additional reporting by Damian Carrington

Nuclear Threat To Karachi

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