Bargaining Over Berlin

Southern Political Science Association
Bargaining over Berlin: a Re-analysis of the First and Second Berlin Crises
Author(s): Stephen G. Walker
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Feb., 1982), pp. 152-164
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association
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Bargaining over Berlin:
a Re-analysis
of the First and Second
Berlin Crises
STEPHEN G. WALKER
IT HAS BEEN over thirty years since the 1948 Berlin Blockade, and
almost two decades have passed since the 1961 confrontation over
the Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, these relics of the Cold War remain
interesting as episodes of crisis bargaining. Soviet decision makers
initiated the blockade of Berlin in 1948 with two bargaining goals in
mind. Their maximum goal was to convince the other occupying
powers, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, that
their recent decision to unify the three zones of occupation in West
Germany was unacceptable. In the event that the West German
reunification decision could not be reversed, the minimum Soviet
goal was to force the other three powers out of Berlin. A successful
Western airlift over the Soviet blockade of land and water routes to
Berlin ended in 1949 with a Russian agreement to remove the
blockade. This outcome was a diplomatic victory for the Western
allies, since both Soviet goals were thwarted.'
The second Berlin crisis followed a series of ultimatums from the
Soviet government over the last two years of the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration and culminated in the first year of the Kennedy Ad-
I
This sketch of the 1948 Berlin crisis is based upon two recent reviews of the
monographic literature dealing with the Berlin problem. See Glenn H. Snyder and
Paul.Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System
Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977),
559-561; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 107-139.
BARGAINING OVER BERLIN 153
ministration with the construction of the wall between East and
West Berlin. Unlike the 1948 crisis, when the maximum Soviet goal
was to prevent the formal division of Germany, this time the Rus-
sians wanted to make the division official. Their bargaining objec-
tives were to force the Western Powers out of Berlin and to gain
recognition that German reunification was no longer possible
without the mutual consent of the existing East and West German
governments. As tensions heightened between Washington and
Moscow, the Soviets also wanted to stop the emigration of refugees
from East Germany through Berlin into West Germany. The Allies
were not forced out of Berlin, but the successful establishment of the
Berlin Wall curbed the refugee flow and constituted a partial
diplomatic victory for the Eastern Bloc.2
Within each crisis the two sides selected a series of actions which
led to these outcomes. In this essay the goal is to analyze their
bargaining moves from a crisis management perspective and answer
some questions associated with this area of inquiry.
Models and Measures of Crisis Management
International crisis management is concerned with the identifica-
tion and analysis of strategies and tactics which will realize the goals
of the participants in a conflict situation and, at the same time,
avoid potentially undesirable consequences such as war or submis-
sion in the form of a military or diplomatic victory by the
opponent.3 In a recent review and appraisal of scholarly efforts to
understand international crises one analyst concludes, "A body of
[crisis management] propositions exists; it is unclear, however, how
much confidence one should place in this knowledge for use in crisis
management situations."4 In particular, there is ambiguity regard-
ing the most effective actions for eliciting a de-escalatory response
from the opponent. In Table 1 are four types of crisis bargaining
moves. The tactics which can be constructed from these moves vary
according to the direction (escalation or de-escalation) and the
2
Snyder and Diesing, ibid., 564-567; George and Smoke, ibid., 390-446.
3
Snyder and Diesing, ibid., 207. See also Alexander L. George, David K. Hall,
and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1971), 8-15; Raymond Tanter, "International Crisis Behavior: An Ap-
praisal of the Literature." Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, III (Winter-
Spring, 1978), 340-374.
4
Tanter, op. cit., 366.
154 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 44, 1982
resolve (the degree of motivation to stand firm) communicated by
their actions. A series of firm, unidirectional moves is sometimes
discredited as a bargaining tactic, because one variant (brinkman-
ship) courts war while the other (appeasement) risks domination.
Less risky tactics, such as coercive diplomacy and graduated-
reduction-in-international-tension
(G.R.I.T.), feature a flexible
series of escalatory and de-escalatory moves which attempt to com-
municate a resolve to negotiate and de-escalate only on a reciprocal
basis.5
TABLE 1
A TYPOLOGY OF CRssis BARGAINING TACrICS
RESOLVE
Flexible Firm
Escalation Coercive
Escalation
Brinkmanship
DIRECTION
De-Escalation G.R.I.T. Appeasement
Crisis participants estimate each other's resolve from whatever in-
dicators are available, including one another's past and present
escalatory or de-escalatory moves." Corson has gathered such data
for the two Berlin crises.7 The Corson data are observations of
physical and verbal actions which vary along a conflict continuum
within and across the two crises. The characteristics of the Corson
data make it possible to rank the conflict intensity of each observa-
tion as more intense, less intense, or equally intense in comparison
with the other observations in the data set. Operationally, the
direction of an observation can be classified as an escalatory or a de-
5 George, Hall, and Simons, op. cit., and Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War
or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).
6 Snyder and Diesing, op. cit., 254-256, who also identify the stakes and
capabilities of each participant as indicators of resolve; however, these indicators tend
to remain constant rather than vary within a crisis.
I
Walter Corson, "Conflict and Cooperation in East-West Relations: Measurement
and Explanation." (Prepared for the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association in Los Angeles, CA, September 8-12, 1970.) The Corson
data for the two Berlin crises are reported in Raymond Tanter, Modelling and Manag-
ing International Conflicts: the Berlin Crises (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1974).
BARGAINING OVER BERLIN
155
escalatory move, depending upon whether its conflict intensity was
higher or lower than the actor's previous move.8
It is also possible to construct two measures of resolve with the
Corson data. The first is the degree of continuity in the series of
moves made by the actor who is initiating the present move. This
indicator is a measure of resolve which places the present move in
the context of the direction of the immediately preceding move by
the same actor. The two sequences of moves which communicate
flexible resolve are an escalation preceded by a de-escalation, and
vice versa. The sequences which indicate a firm resolve either to
escalate or de-escalate, respectively, are two escalations in a row
and two de-escalations in a row. The second measure of resolve is
the range of variety in an actor's present move, which may also com-
municate flexible or firm resolve. If actor A's move incorporates
only one type of action at one level of intensity prior to actor B's
response, or if A's combination of actions are all in the same direc-
tion prior to B's response, then the move communicates firm resolve.
However, if the variety of A's activities ranges in direction both
above and below the intensity of A's preceding move, then it signals
flexible resolve.9
In his analysis of Corson's data, Tanter identifies July 2, 1948 and
August 16, 1961 as the points which mark the peak intensity for each
Berlin crisis. On July 1, 1948, the U.S.S.R. formally withdrew
from the Berlin Command and by July 3rd had refused to lift their
blockade of traffic into Berlin until plans for a separate West Ger-
man government were dropped. On August 15, 1961, the Western
powers vigorously protested the Soviet border closure of August 13th
8
Corson, ibid., used the opinions of expert judges to place each observation on a
continuum, which contained numerical weights at selected intervals along its length.
These numerical values are irrelevant for simply ranking one observation as more or
less intense than another one.
9
When the variety of activities in a move ranges above and below the position of
the preceding move on the Corson scale, the numerical scale values for the move's
highest and lowest activities are combined with the numerical scale value of the
preceding move according to this formula: CNI
=
(HA
-
PM)
-
(PM
-
LA) + PM,
where CNI = the Composite Numerical Index of the scale value of the move in ques-
tion, HA = the numerical scale value of the move's Highest Activity, LA = the
numerical scale value of the move's Lowest Activity, and PM= the numerical scale
value of the Preceding Move by the same actor. This index ranks the move in question
by indicating the move's net change above or below the position of the actor's previous
move on the Corson scale. Approximately 20 percent of the 108 moves extrapolated
from Corson's Berlin data required the calculation of this index.
between East and West Berlin; by August 17th both sides had
deployed armed forces along the border.'0 In the following
analysis, the moves by East and West surrounding these crisis peaks
are extrapolated from the Corson data and classified according to
their escalatory or de-escalatory direction and their flexible or firm
resolve. "
This set of moves constitutes the bargaining interactions during a
very intense phase of each crisis, when crisis managers are par-
ticularly interested in identifying tactics which will elicit de-
escalatory responses. An analysis of the response patterns to dif-
ferent types and combinations of these moves during this phase of
the two crises may answer some important crisis management ques-
tions regarding the effective implementation of the tactics associated
with the bargaining moves in Table 1. Are escalatory or de-
escalatory tactics more likely to elicit a de-escalatory response? Are
the flexible tactics associated with G.R.I.T. and coercive diplomacy
more successful than the firm tactics characteristic of brinkmanship
or appeasement? Which is more closely associated with a de-
escalatory response, the sequence of moves or the range of activities
which constitute a move? What combinations of resolve and direc-
tion are the most effective bargaining tactics?
During the intense confrontation phase of an international con-
flict, it is plausible on theoretical grounds to assume that escalation
rather than de-escalation is the more likely response to any tactical
move. The confrontation itself is a product of the attempts by each
participant either to dominate or to resist domination. Under these
circumstances an escalatory move is likely to be countered with an
10
Tanter, op. cit., 88-91.
11
The observations for the 1948 crisis span the period between June 7, 1948 and
August 1, 1948, while the data for the 1961 crisis include observations between June
10, 1961 and September 12, 1961. Although the time frame is slightly longer for the
second crisis than for the first one, each ending date corresponds to the end of the in-
tense phase for each crisis (See Tanter, ibid., 84-85). The beginning dates mark the
occurrence of a dramatic event which precipitated a confrontation between East and
West. On June 7, 1948, the West announced the London Conference's recommenda-
tions for a separate West German state, and on June 4, 1961, the U.S.S.R. delivered
the latest six-month ultimatum regarding Berlin. The time frames for each crisis also
encompass approximately the same number of bargaining moves in the Corson data
set. There are no significant differences in the distribution of de-escalatory responses
among the moves before and after the dates identified by Tanter as the points of peak
intensity ( . 10; Yates corrected chi-square p > .05). Consequently, it is reasonable
to consider these moves as a set whose elements do not come from generically different
phases of the two conflicts.
escalatory response in order to avoid domination and demonstrate
resolve.'2 A de-escalatory move is also likely to be met with an
escalatory response in this context, if both sides prefer to dominate
rather than compromise. According to Snyder and Diesing, in both
Berlin crises each bloc leader ranked domination over the opponent
as a first preference and compromise as a second preference, because
these outcomes provided them with the two greatest payoffs. Each
one also wanted to avoid war and submission, because the payoffs
associated with these outcomes were less than the payoffs for
domination or compromise.'3
If this analysis of preference orderings by Snyder and Diesing is
correct, then the probability of a de-escalatory response to either
escalatory or de-escalatory tactics during the most intense phase of
each conflict is less than 50-50. Indeed, Tanter's (1974: 155-162)
previous analysis of the Corson data for the crisis phases of the two
Berlin conflicts shows no significant covariation between the actions
of one side and the responses of the other side. This absence of
covariation is consistent with the hypothesis that a de-escalatory
response is unlikely no matter what tactic is pursued. This point
has important implications for assessing the effectiveness of various
types or combinations of tactics.
Methodologically, it would appear that under these cir-
cumstances the normal social science definition of a "significant"
finding should be revised. Instead of defining the null hypothesis of
"no relationship" between tactic and response as an equiprobable
dichotomous distribution of escalatory and de-escalatory responses,
the null hypothesis for the expected frequency distribution should be
set at p < .50. At what level below p
=
.50 is determined by iden-
tifying the level below p
=
.50 where the liklihood of observing at
12
Snyder and Diesing, op. cit., 14, describe the confrontation phase of a crisis as
follows: "The collision of challenge and resistance produces a confrontation, which is
the core of the crisis . . . and is characterized by high or rising tension and predomi-
nately coercive tactics on both sides, each standing firm on its initial position and issu-
ing threats, warnings, military deployments, and other signals to indicate firmness, to
undermine the other's firmness, and generally to persuade the other that he must be
the one to back down if war is to be avoided." (Underlining is Snyder and Diesing's.)
13
Ibid., 92-93, 113-114, 268-275, 482. Snyder and Diesing argue that the motiva-
tions of both sides within each crisis were symmetrical, i.e., each one ranked the four
outcomes in the same order. However, they assert that the preference order for the
war and submission outcomes varied across the two crises. In the 1948 crisis each side
preferred submission (3rd) over war (4th), while in the 1961 crisis these preferences
were reversed.
least the actual frequency of de-escalatory responses by chance is c
.05. The closer the expected probability can be set to p = .50 and
still have the actual frequency of de-escalatory responses occurring
by chance be p
<
.05,
the more significant the association between
these responses and their tactical stimuli.'4
Consequently, the following analysis of crisis bargaining over
Berlin involves two steps. First, the frequency distributions of de-
escalatory and escalatory responses to various tactics are retrieved
and presented. Second, the frequency of de-escalatory responses to
each tactic is analyzed under different assumptions of expected
probability, ranging from p = .50 to p = .05.15 With this informa-
tion, it is possible to identify the most effective tactics. Even if the
odds are against any tactic eliciting a de-escalatory response, it is
still conceivable that the odds are worse for some tactics than for
others-which is important for crisis managers to know.
Bargaining over Berlin
The decision tree in Table 2 contains the distribution of responses
for the eight possible variants of de-escalatory tactics when both the
sequence and the range measures of resolve are taken into account.
The variety of appeasement tactics is low for the two Berlin crises.
The only one to appear frequently is the "pure" appeasement tactic
[H], in which both the sequence and the range communicate firm
de-escalatory resolve. This variant is also rather ineffective. The
null probability of a de-escalatory response would have to be as low
as (p
=
.20), in order to hypothesize that there is a statistically
significant (p c .05) relationship between this tactic and the actual
14 This reasoning resembles the argument advanced by some students of cluster bloc
analysis in computing indices of voting agreement and determining how strong the
agreement must be in order to be significant. Instead of selecting some arbitrary level
of strength, such as a voting agreement index value of .4 or .8, they argue that it is best
to select a high enough level of agreement so that the liklihood of gaining that level of
agreement by chance is quite low. See G. David Garson, Political Science Methods
(Boston: Holbrook Press, 1976), 211-213, and Peter Willetts, "Cluster Bloc Analysis
and Statistical Inference," American Political Science Review LXVI
(June, 1972),
569-582.
15 The probabilities are calculated from the binomial distribution according to the
formula which appears in Table 2. The logic of the binomial distribution and the
concept of probability are reviewed clearly and extensively in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr.,
Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), 97-134, and more succinctly in
Dickinson L. McCaw and George Watson, Political and Social Inquiry (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1976), 283-287.
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frequency of de-escalatory responses. By contrast, the G.R.I.T.
variants [A] and [C] are more effective in eliciting a de-escalatory
response. A greater proportion of de-escalatory responses is
associated with these tactics; the null probability of a de-escalatory
response can also be set closer to (p = .50) without rejecting the
hypothesis that there is a statistically significant (p < .05) relation-
ship between the responses and G.R.I.T. tactics [A] and [C].
The decision tree for escalatory tactics is in Table 3. A "pure"
brinkmanship tactic [H] is least effective; more effective brinkman-
ship variants are [F] and [G] in which the range of one move com-
municates flexibility. Coercive diplomacy tactics are most fre-
quent, and variant [D] is as effective as G.R.I.T.'s [A] tactic. The
null probability of a de-escalatory response can be set at (p = .30)
without rejecting the hypothesis that there is a statistically signifi-
cant (p < .05) relationship between the actual frequency of de-
escalatory responses and this type of coercive diplomacy tactics. A
comparison of Tables 2 and 3 indicates that flexible, controlled
pressure tactics are both the most frequent and most effective com-
binations of moves, while "pure" appeasement and brinkmanship
tactics are least frequent and least effective. Coercive diplomacy
tactics and the "semi-flexible" brinkmanship tactics [F] and [G] are
generally more effective controlled pressure tactics than the
G.R.I.T. variants except for G.R.I.T. tactic [A].
Conclusion
The generalizability of these findings to the analysis of other in-
ternational crises is limited by two sets of considerations. First,
their validity is subject to the constraints imposed by the small
number of observations and the small differences in effectiveness
among the various bargaining tactics. For five of the eight de-
escalatory tactical variants in Table 2, there are no more than two
observations per tactic. For most of the de-escalatory variants,
therefore, the evidence is simply insufficient to make an empirical
judgment about their effectiveness as tactics. Second, as Alexander
George has noted, the effectiveness of the more frequent coercive
diplomacy tactics depends ultimately upon the answers to three
questions. What response is expected of the opponent? How
strongly disinclined is the opponent toward this response? Which
specific tactics are likely to be most effective given the answers to the
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first two questions?"' This analysis of the Berlin crises has by no
means exhausted all of the implications associated with these ques-
tions.
Regarding the first question, George distinguishes between two
types of responses which may be expected from an opponent: "The
opponent may be asked to stop what he is doing; or he may be asked
to undo what he has been doing or to reverse what he has already ac-
complished.'7 He argues that this distinction among demands is
important, because the manipulative actions associated with coer-
cive diplomacy are likely to be more effective in achieving the first
type of demand. ". . . because it asks less of the opponent, the first
type of demand is easier to comply with and easier to enforce."',8 In
the 1948 crisis, the Western bloc succeeded in the demand that the
East stop their blockade of Berlin. However, the Soviets were un-
successful in reversing the Allied decision to unify West Germany. In
1961, the Soviet Union was effective in getting the United States to
mute (stop) its opposition to the establishment of the Berlin Wall,
whereas the United States was unable to tear down (undo) the Wall.
In neither crisis were the Russians able to force the Western Allies
out of Berlin. These outcomes are consistent with the limits of coer-
cive diplomacy and imply that it will be relatively ineffective in
other crises where the opponent is expected to undo or reverse what
has already been accomplished.
However, this conclusion is partly contingent on the answer to the
second question, viz., how disinclined is the opponent toward the
desired response? George hypothesizes that an opponent's
disinclination to yield is greater when the structure of the demand is
to undo what has been successfully accomplished rather than to stop
what is being attempted. He identifies this consideration plus
several other conditions which define how strongly the opponent is
disinclined toward a de-escalatory response.
"'
Most of these condi-
tions are not explicitly examined in this analysis of the Berlin crises.
Instead, they are presumed to be exogenous variables which con-
tribute to Snyder and Diesing's ranking of crisis outcomes for the
participants.20 The confrontation phase itself is also postulated as a
16
George, Hall, and Simons, op. cit., 22-23, 230-244.
17
Ibid., 22-23. George attributes these distinctions to Thomas Schelling, Arms
and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 72, 77.
18
George, Hall, and Simons, ibid., 23.
19
Ibid., 23, 215-228.
20
From the perspective of the coercer, the eight conditions which affect a successful
condition which makes each participant disinclined (p < .50)
toward de-escalation and compliance with the demands of the other
side. Consequently, the generalizability of these findings may well
be limited to the confrontation phase of other crises with identically
ranked outcome preferences and structurally similar demands.
The answer to the third question regarding the relative effec-
tiveness of specific tactics, therefore, depends significantly upon the
conditions identified in the first two questions. Within the context
of these conditions George identifies two tactical variants of coercive
diplomacy, the try-and-see approach and the tacit-ultimatum ap-
proach, which he conceptualizes as located at the end points of a
continuum that appears to include both the coercive diplomacy and
the brinkmanship variants in Table 3.21 The continuum represents
the degree to which a given tactical move communicates the con-
tents of the classical diplomatic ultimatum: a specific demand on the
opponent; a time limit for compliance; a threat of punishment for
non-compliance that is sufficiently strong and credible.22 George's
analysis of the variables which form the contents of a move include
the variety of words and actions in the message and the mix of
positive inducements and negative sanctions that constitute the
move.23 It is these types of variables that are analyzed in Table 3
with the measures of direction and resolve for the moves in the
Berlin crises.
Tactic [A] in Table 3 is the weakest variant of coercive diplomacy,
while tactic [H] may extend beyond George's endpoint for strong
variants of coercive diplomacy. He argues that". . . coercive
diplomacy . . . [may] require genuine concessions to an opponent as
part of a quid pro quo that secures one's essential demands. Coer-
cive diplomacy, therefore, needs to be distinguished from pure coer-
cion; it includes the possibility of bargains, negotiations, and com-
promises.as well as coercive threats."24 The lack of any flexibility in
outcome for coercive diplomacy are (1) the strength of the coercer's motivation; (2) an
asymmetry of motivation favoring the coercer; (3) the clarity of the coercer's objec-
tives; (4) the sense of urgency to achieve the coercer's objectives; (5) the adequacy of
the coercer's domestic political support; (6) the coercer's usable military options; (7)
the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation; (8) the clarity concerning the precise
terms of settlement. George, Hall, and Simons, 215-228. See also Snyder and Dies-
ing, op. cit., 479-480, 488-493, 510-514.
21
George, Hall, and Simons, ibid., 27.
22
Ibid., 27-28.
23
Ibid.,
25-30.
24 Ibid., 25.
the sequence or range of the moves for tactic [H] puts it at least on
the endpoint of George's coercive diplomacy continuum-and
beyond it if some positive inducement is a necessary characteristic of
even the strongest variant of coercive diplomacy. Tactic [A] falls
barely within the other endpoint of the continuum, because both the
sequence and the range of the moves for this escalatory tactic are
flexible.
The relative strength of each tactical variant, therefore, may be
compared by its mix of firm and flexible values for the sequence and
range measures. The most effective tactics in Table 3 are the flexi-
ble sequence/firm range combination [D] and the firm
sequence/semi-flexible range combination [G]. Although [D] and
[G] are intermediate variants between purely flexible (A) and purely
firm [H] escalatory tactics, they are strong tactics in comparison to
the other intermediate variants of escalatory moves. Both [D] and
[G] have "firm" values for two out of three measures. The other in-
termediate variants have only one "firm" value except for tactic [F],
which is the next most effective variant along with tactic [B]. The
last two variants share the common property of a firm value for the
range of the second move. The least effective intermediate variant,
[C], is also the weakest one in that it has only one firm property and
the range value of the second move is "flexible".
The relative success of "strong" rather than "weak" tactical
variants of coercive diplomacy in the two Berlin crises is consistent
with two features of these cases. First, strong tactics that stop just
short of pure coercion may be necessary during the confrontation
phase of a crisis, in order to overcome the tendency toward counter-
escalation that characterizes this phase of a crisis. Second, strong
tactics are more likely to be necessary when the motivation to resist
by the protagonists is symmetrical. The identical preference order-
ing for crisis outcomes, which Snyder and Diesing assign to both
sides in the Berlin crises, is consistent with the attribution of sym-
metrical motivations to East and West and with the relative effec-
tiveness of strong bargaining tactics during the two crises. Con-
versely, the relative effectiveness of strong coercive diplomacy tac-
tics for these crises is not likely to be generalizable to other interna-
tional crises with asymmetrical motivational structures.

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