Applications of 3D QRA technique to the re/explosion simulation

and hazard mitigation within a naphtha-cracking plant

Yet-Pole I
*
, Chi-Min Shu, Ching-Hong Chong
Department of Safety, Health and Environmental Engineering, National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Douliou, Taiwan
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 30 November 2008
Received in revised form
3 April 2009
Accepted 3 April 2009
Keywords:
CFD
Fire and explosion
Maximum physical effect
Naphtha-cracking plant
QRA
a b s t r a c t
This research employed computational uid dynamics (CFD) re and explosion simulation software,
FLACS, to evaluate the possible hazards of different worst-case scenarios within a petrochemical plant.
After the effect factors (overpressure, pressure impulse, and thermal radiation temperature) were
calculated, the results of interest were, in turn, adopted to a self-developed risk analysis module to
estimate the corresponding 3D individual risk value. The latter value can further be utilized as an index
for assessing suitable preventive action against specic hazard before any accident happens. The whole
procedure was realized by applying a preliminary consequence analysis on a naphtha-cracking plant site.
The simulation results can assist the relevant personnel in understanding all the varied conditions during
an accident and can also be used as a reference for emergency response planning. According to the
results, the size of the vapor cloud has great inuence on the hazard consequence. Furthermore, a water
spray system alone has limited potential on a disastrous accident and its mitigation effect can be
observed via the corresponding 3D risk values. With the aid of the 3D dynamic consequence simulation
and QRA (quantitative risk assessment) technique, the plant site safety can be effectively improved by
means of implementing the preliminary hazard assessment and suitable preventive control strategies.
Crown Copyright 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Owing to the continuous growth of global population, the
requirement of raw materials and energy has also increased during
the past decades. The petrochemical industry, which plays such
a major role inthe dailylives of humanbeings, has alsobecomemore
prosperous and even larger at the same time. Common petro-
chemical plants usually have complex production processes and
store a large amount of hazardous substances. A very serious
consequence may happenonce these ammable or toxic substances
are ignited or released accidentally; therefore, people have to pay
close attention to the environment and public security problems for
the industry. Among all the available safety analysis techniques,
computational uid dynamics (CFD) is a very useful tool that can
estimate possible hazardous consequences and their corresponding
mitigation measures beforehand (Dharmavaram, Hanna, & Hansen,
2005; Coirier, Kim, & Marella, 2005; Hanna et al., 2006; Hanna,
Hansen, Ichard, & Strimaitis, 2009; Kisa & Jelemensk y, 2009).
With the rapid development of computer hardware as well as the
abundant explosion data of eld experiments during recent years,
the high-speed computing capability has substantially improved the
maturity of CFD technology as applied to re and explosion simu-
lation. Hansen, Talberg, and Bakke (1999) utilize CFD software to
implement a gas explosion simulation, and the result is highly
consistent with the experimental data. Berg, Bakke, Fearnley, and
Brewerton (2000) employ CFD to simulate the explosion conse-
quence of a oating production, storage and ofoading vessel (FPSO)
and have proposed many explosion mitigation measures at the same
time. Ryder, Sutula, Schemel, Hamer, and Van Brunt (2004) use CFD
software to simulate a re that takes place within a tank farm. The
simulation results show an ignited chemical, which released from
a partially opened tank roof, in combination with changing wind
conditions can severely inuence the thermal plume and the radiant
ux incident on the adjoining tanks. One can see that while one tank
is severally exposed and at risk, tanks equally as far away are not in
danger from radiant ux at the time. I, Chiu, and Wu (2009) utilize
CFD software to reconstruct the air recirculating ow pattern within
a semiconductor fab. Different released scenarios were applied in
their study to investigate the corresponding hazard range and
severity. Mitigation measures, such as a water spray system and
a pressure relief panel, were also provided to study their effective-
ness to relieve thermal radiation and overpressure hazards within
a conned working place.
Although more and more scholars have used CFDto simulate res
and explosions (Di Benedetto, 2009), little of themhave explored risk
analysis issues. In this research, a ame acceleration simulator
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 886 5 5342601x4421, 4493 or 4496; fax: 886 5
5312069.
E-mail address: iyp@yuntech.edu.tw (Y.-P. I).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
j ournal homepage: www. el sevi er. com/ l ocat e/ j l p
0950-4230/$ see front matter Crown Copyright 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2009.04.002
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515
(FLACS), which is CFD software, was employed on an intricate
naphtha-cracking process area and its re and explosion simulation
results were used to calculate the individual risk by a self-developed
3D risk analysis technique.
The traditional risk analysis technique can only predict risk
value in a 2D static format; the result is quite different from a real
situation since it neglects the cavity effect caused by terrain and
buildings. The 3D risk analysis technique employed in this research
not only can take the risk values of different height levels and
obstacles into consideration, but also can estimate the effects of
different re and explosion measures.
2. Simulation background
A petrochemical process area, mainly designed for propylene
separation and purication within a naphtha-cracking plant, was
selected to conduct the re and explosion risk analysis. The target
process contains four reactors, ve distillation towers, four storage
tanks, 31 heat exchangers, and 18 pumps, and is divided into four
regions (Structures P, R, R1 and M; see Fig. 1). Usually the distribution
of population can directly affect the results of risk analysis, and
workers will not always stay at the same place all day long. Therefore,
a survey for population distribution, appearance probability and
densityshouldbe done before riskcalculationinorder to reect a real
situation. During a normal operating period, it is supposed that only
one person appears hourly around the process area to perform
a 10 min job of equipment inspection and meter recording, which
results inanappearanceprobabilityof 10/600.167. Twopersons are
assigned to execute a two-week equipment-repair job during the
annual repair period, which results inanappearance probability of 2/
52 0.038. The average appearance probability at the process area
thus becomes (1/3) 0.167 (2/3) 0.038 0.081 (see Table 1). On
the other hand, the appearance probability of vacant lots is set as 0.5/
60 0.008 since these places do not have any equipment and people
usually spend half a minute to pass through themin order to get into
the process area. Fig. 2 diagrams the related information about
population distribution within the simulation site.
3. Research methods
Risk analysis, which originated in the aviation industry and the
nuclear power industry, aims at nding and preventing the
potential hazards within a system. The related risk analysis tech-
niques include hazard identication, consequence analysis,
frequency analysis, and risk quantication (Lees, 1986).
Three worst-case scenarios (WCSs) were studied in this research
(see Table 2 for details). Case 1 was a large scale vapor cloud igni-
tion case that originated from a distillation tower collapse. The
released chemical contained 95% propylene (with 5% propane) and
formed a 38 m diameter, 100% concentrated spherical gas cloud.
After 11 s dispersion, the ammable gas cloud was ignited by an
ignition point. Fig. 3 shows the location of the gas cloud and the
ignition point. Cases 2 and 3 discussed the deagration accidents
(arising froma reux tank rupture followed by the ignition of static
electricity) without and with a water spray mitigation system. The
released chemical contained 100% propylene and formed a 15 m
diameter, 100% concentrated spherical gas cloud. Fig. 4 depicts the
position of the gas cloud and its ignition point. Furthermore, Fig. 5
shows the layout of 20 water spray zones, where the blue and the
black frames represent double and single layer, respectively.
3.1. Consequence analysis
Consequence analysis is mainly used to investigate the hazard
severities and their possible ranges when incidents occur within
a simulation site. Usually, consequence analysis includes two parts.
One is the physical model, used for evaluating the characteristics of
all hazard factors and their corresponding impact zones caused by
different incidents. The other one is the effect model, mainly used
for estimating the damage levels to employees or equipment within
the impact zones by different hazard factors.
3.1.1. Physical model
This study employed FLACS as a tool of the physical model to
estimate the results of 3D physical parameters. The governing
equations in FLACS included mass, momentum, and energy
conservation equations and turbulent energy equations. By using
FLACS software, one can simulate all the necessary physical
parameters within a certain period of time and space, and the
results can be expressed as F
i
(x, y, z, t). To predict the hazard level at
the simulation site, the maximumphysical effects in each specic
coordinate (x, y, z) within the hazard elapsed period were calcu-
lated during this research. Different physical parameters (F
i
(x, y, z,
t)) were accessed from the FLACS output les and processed as
Nomenclature
i index of the hazardous physical effect (dimensionless)
n total number of the hazardous physical effect
(dimensionless)
t time (s)
t
e
radiation elapse time interval (s)
u dummy variable (dimensionless)
(x, y, z) Cartesian coordinates (m)
ER equivalence ratio is a measure for concentration of fuel
(ammable gas cloud) compared to its stoichiometric
concentration; ER is dened as F=O=F=O
stoichiometric
,
where (F/O) is the ratio of fuel to oxygen. ER equals 1 at
stoichiometric concentration; from no fuel to pure fuel
(no oxygen and other inert gases) ER varies from zero
to innity (dimensionless)
F
i
different physical parameters calculated via FLACS
software (F
1
, F
2
, and F
3
equal P, J, and T
correspondingly)
F
i,max
maximum physical effects (maximum value of F
i
within a certain period of time)
F
I
incident frequency (1/yr)
IR individual risk at specic location (death/yr)
I thermal radiation (kW/m
2
)
J pressure impulse (Pa s)
K
i,1
, K
i,2
conversion factors of the corresponding physical
effects (see Table 3)
NW northwest direction
P overpressure (barg)
P
Di
death percentage (%)
P
I
ignition probability (dimensionless)
P
WIND
probability of wind direction (dimensionless)
P
Zi
appearance probability of employees (dimensionless)
T radiation temperature (K)
T
a
initial ambient temperature (K)
V directional wind velocity projected on y-axis (m/s)
VVEC wind velocity vector (m/s)
Y
i
probit value of different physical effects
(dimensionless)
Y.-P. I et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515 507
time-independent maximum physical effects (F
i,max
(x, y, z))
according to Eq. (1) (Cheng, 2005). Where F
i
(x, y, z, t) can be
substituted as P(x, y, z, t), J(x, y, z, t), or T(x, y, z, t) while the over-
pressure, pressure impulse, or thermal radiation is calculated. It is
necessary to convert the maximum temperature value into radia-
tion dose with Eq. (2) before calculating the thermal radiation term
(CPR-14E, 1997).
F
i;max
x; y; z Max
t 1;2;.n
F
i
x; y; z; t (1)
Ix; y; z 5:67 10
8
_
Tx; y; z
4
T
4
a
_
(2)
3.1.2. Effect model
An effect model can adopt the simulation results froma physical
model. It can evaluate the degrees of personnel casualty or facility
damage affected by overpressure, pressure impulse, or thermal
radiation. The theory of the effect model is proposed by Eisenberg,
Lynch, and Breeding (1975). In this study, the effect model was
constructed with Fortran 95 language and the METFOR graphical
library. Necessary data were accessed fromthe FLACS output les in
order to calculate the re and explosion effects, and the nal results
were displayed by a series of 3D death percentage diagrams. When
brought into practice, rst the maximum physical effects are
converted into personnel casualty probit values (Y
i
(x, y, z))
according to Eq. (3), where K
i,1
and K
i,2
represent the conversion
factors of the physical effects, and their corresponding values are
listed in Table 3 (Lees, 1986). Later the probit values are converted
into personnel death percentages (P
Di
(x, y, z)) that are used for
calculating the death toll of certain hazard incidents (see Eq. (4)
proposed by Finney, 1971).
Fig. 1. Equipment layout of the simulation site.
Table 1
Population distribution and its appearance probability at the simulation site.
Location
a
Employee
number
Appearance
probability
Employee number
appearance probability
Ground areas 3 0.081 0.243
P-2 area 3 0.081 0.243
P-3 area 3 0.081 0.243
R-2 area 3 0.081 0.243
R-3 area 3 0.081 0.243
R1-2 area 3 0.081 0.243
R1-3 area 3 0.081 0.243
R1-4 area 3 0.081 0.243
M-2 area 2 0.038 0.076
M-3 area 2 0.038 0.076
M-4 area 2 0.038 0.076
Vacant lots 1 0.008 0.008
a
The numbers after - represents oor number.
Fig. 2. Population distribution used in this study, different colors represent different
locations where their corresponding numerical values were shown in Table 1 (red:
Structure P-2/P-3 areas, green: Structure R-2/R-3 areas, orange: Structure R1-2/R1-3/
R1-4 areas, blue: Structure M, pink: ground area, light-blue: vacant lots area). (For
interpretation of the references to color in this gure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
Y.-P. I et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515 508
Y
i
x; y; z K
i;1
K
i;2
ln
_
F
i;max
x; y; z

(3)
P
Di
x; y; z
1
2p
1=2
_
Y
i
x;y;z5
N
exp
_

u
2
2
_
du (4)
3.2. Frequency analysis
The containment failure frequencies used in this study were
based on the bibliography and experience from previous
researches. According to I, Tsai, and Her (1999), the general rupture
frequency for a petrochemical vessel is around 2 10
6
110
5
/yr.
Due to the lack of relevant information as well as to facilitate the
assessment process, the incident frequencies used in this study
were roughly divided into three categories: which are possible
(frequency 1 10
5
/yr), less likely (frequency 1 10
6
/yr) and
very unlikely (frequency 1 10
7
/yr). Since all the incidents
discussed may cause disastrous accidents, their frequencies were
categorized as very unlikely to occur, which is 1 10
7
/yr.
3.3. Risk quantication
This paper focused on the damage caused by res and explo-
sions. Therefore, the risk value was assumed to be a function of
containment failure frequency, gas cloud ignition probability, wind
direction probability, personnel appearance probability, and
personnel death probability. The calculation algorithm for indi-
vidual risk was a revised form from Considine (1984) as was
expressed in Eq. (5). Here IR(x, y, z) stands for the individual risk at
a specic location; i and n stand for the index and the number of the
hazardous physical effects (for overpressure, pressure impulse, and
thermal radiation; n equals 3); F
I
stands for incident frequency
(1 10
7
/yr was chosen in this study); P
I
denotes for ignition
probability of the released cloud (1 was chosen to represent 100%
ignition); P
WIND
expresses probability of wind directions, which can
be found from the local meteorological data (set at 0.0015 for
southeast wind in this study); P
Zi
(x, y, z) and P
Di
(x, y, z) represent
employee appearance probability and death percentage, respec-
tively, both of them belong to the function of the coordinate. The
total individual risk was the cumulative summation of risk values
under different hazardous physical effects fromcertain enumerated
incidents. The nal result was displayed in a 3D iso-surface form
and superimposed with the 3D plant facilities layout to enable
better understanding by the relevant personnel.
IRx; y; z

n
i 1
F
I
P
I
P
WIND
P
Zi
x; y; zP
Di
x; y; z (5)
4. Results and discussion
4.1. FLACS simulation results
Wind can directly affect the gas cloud dispersion and lead to
a different hazard scope. After the wind direction was deliberately
chosen, a prior 120 s wind eld simulation was performed to
stabilize the wind before the explosion simulation (see Fig. 6).
Figures 79 show the simulation results of Case 1. In Fig. 7 we see
that most of the gas cloud was moving to the right of the graph and
the affected sites were far to the right of the target process (the red
square) since the southeast wind was blowing from the left of the
graph. The hazard impact zone may become very large if the gas
cloud were ignited after 60 s of dispersion (the gure shown here
was a pure dispersion simulation and the gas cloud was not
Table 2
Simulation cases and their related parameters.
Case no. Scenario Gas volume (m
3
) Gas concentration (%) Ignition time (s) Ignition coordinates (m) Mitigation measure
1 Distillation column collapse 28,731 100 11 (59, 25, 1) No
2 Reux tank rupture 1767 100 0.5 (16, 12, 3) No
3 Reux tank rupture 1767 100 0.5 (16, 12, 3) Water spray
Fig. 3. Position and ignition point of a ammable gas cloud released from a distillation column.
Y.-P. I et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515 509
ignited). The 3D temperature diagram of Fig. 8 indicates the
deagration ame in the air (22 s after ignition) is slightly shifted to
the northwest due to the wind effect. The high temperature at the
bottomis distributed widely beyond the target area and it may have
a very serious effect on the nearby process sites. Fig. 9 shows that
the overpressure is also distributed widely; however, its value is
rather small since the maximum value at the explosion center is
only 0.0227 barg (see Table 4).
Cases 2 and 3 represent the same scenario (see Table 2) without
and with water spray. The gas cloud was ignited immediately after
the reux tank was ruptured. The macroscopic views of the simu-
lation results for the two cases do not showa signicant difference
(the related gures are not shown here due to space limitations).
One can only nd the appearing time of the highest overpressure in
Case 3 (2.5 s after ignition) was about 0.5 s earlier than that of
Case 2, which might be the result of turbulent effects caused by the
water spray activation. A turbulent ow can accelerate the mixing
effect of the released gas and the surrounding air and push the gas
cloud to reach its ammable limit earlier. A similar phenomenon
can also be observed in Table 4, where the maximum temperature
value of Case 3 does not decrease as expected. In addition, the
maximum overpressure and pressure impulses are ever higher
than those of Case 2. It was postulated that the turbulent ow can
accelerate the ame speed, and thus simultaneously increase the
maximum value of overpressure and pressure impulse.
To further investigate whether the water spray has a positive
mitigation effect, two monitoring points (P9 and P18, see Fig. 4)
were observed and compared at the same time (where P9 was
Fig. 4. Position and ignition point of a ammable gas cloud released from a reux tank.
Fig. 5. Layout of 20 water spray zones (blue: double layer, black: single layer). (For interpretation of the references to color in this gure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
Y.-P. I et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515 510
located inside of both the gas cloud and the water spray zones,
while P18 was located outside of the gas cloud but within the
water spray zones). Table 5 shows that after water spray is acti-
vated, the overpressure values of these two monitoring points are
still larger than those without mitigation. However, it was
observed that both temperature values of these two points with
water spray were actually lower than those without mitigation
(P9 decreased 300 K, while P18 decreased 650 K). These results
indicated that although water spray cannot reduce the maximum
temperature near the explosion center, nevertheless, it can still
alleviate the thermal radiation hazard of the surrounding area. In
this study, the hazard impact zones of Cases 2 and 3 were obvi-
ously much smaller than that of Case 1 and mainly concentrated
at the surrounding of the target area. However, the impact can
become more severe should the ignition time be delayed until the
concentration of most gas cloud is within the ammable limit. An
additional simulation case, Case 4, was implemented to prove
such speculation. Case 4 is similar to Case 2 except the gas cloud
was located at the center of the target area and its concentration
equaled 1.5 times of stoichiometric concentration of the complete
combustion reaction. It was observed that the overpressure of
Case 4 (0.0144 barg, not shown here) was about 3 times as large
as that of Case 2. Case 2 behaved much more like a reball
phenomenon instead of a deagration since its gas cloud
concentration was 100%; therefore, the ammable cloud center
Table 3
Effect models of different hazard categories.
Hazard category Effect model
Thermal radiation Y
1
x; y; z 14:9 2:56 ln
_
teIx; y; z
4=3
10
4
_
Pressure impulse Y
2
x; y; z 46:1 4:82 ln Jx; y; z
Overpressure Y
3
x; y; z 77:1 6:91 ln Px; y; z
Fig. 6. Side view of wind eld simulation result, where VVEC stands for velocity vector and V denotes directional velocity projected on y-axis.
Fig. 7. Gas cloud dispersion result of Case 1 (60 s after released, without ignition).
Y.-P. I et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515 511
Fig. 8. 3D temperature diagram of Case 1 (22 s after ignition).
Fig. 9. 3D cross-sectional overpressure diagram of Case 1 (3.5 s after ignition).
Y.-P. I et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515 512
could not have been burnt unless its concentration was diluted
below the upper explosion limit (UEL).
4.2. 3D risk analysis results
The risk analysis module adopted the FLACS output value for
risk calculation and presented the calculation results in a 3D
format. From the 3D risk diagram (gure not shown here), Struc-
ture R1 had the highest risk value once the Case 1 accident
occurred. The mortality rate of the target area could be as high as
98.6%, which means almost no one could have survived under such
high temperature circumstance. In addition, a domino effect could
also have been triggered since there were many different processes
surrounding the target area. Figs. 10 and 11 show the results of
thermal radiation effect and its 3D risk value for Cases 2 and 3,
where different graphs represent (a) temperature iso-surfaces, (b)
mortality rate iso-surfaces, and (c) 3D risk iso-surfaces (the
temperature and the mortality rate iso-surfaces of Case 3 are not
Table 4
Maximum values of different simulation hazards.
Case Temperature (K) Overpressure (barg) Pressure impulse (Pa s)
1 2351 0.0227 3233
2 2277 0.0046 2055
3 2277 0.0051 2061
Table 5
Comparison of water spray effect at different monitoring points.
Case Monitoring point Temperature (K) Overpressure (barg)
2 P9 1700 0.0025
2 P18 1900 0.0025
3 P9 1400 0.0034
3 P18 1250 0.0031
Fig. 10. (a) Maximum temperature iso-surfaces of Case 2. (b) Mortality rate iso-surfaces of Case 2. (c) 3D risk iso-surfaces of Case 2.
Y.-P. I et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22 (2009) 506515 513
shown here due to space limitations). They showed that the related
hazardous impact contours of Figs. 10 and 11 are similar, no matter
whether the water spray activated or not; nevertheless, the risk
values of Structure R (indicated by red squares) for the two cases
were obviously different as can be seen by their colors. The risk
value of Structure R for Case 3 was 1.0 10
12
person/yr, which is
somewhat smaller (has lighter color) than that of Case 2 (1.4
10
12
person/yr). Such phenomena can also be seen by conse-
quence analysis from the mortality rate of employees at the target
area, where Case 2 was 53.7% but Case 3 decreased to 51.2%.
Therefore, the water spray still had a positive effect on relief of
thermal radiation hazard even during a disastrous accident.
The individual risk values of three simulation cases at different
oors and regions of the target area are shown in Table 6. Because
of the largest gas cloud, Case 1 had the highest risk value (from
8.0 10
20
to 3.4 10
12
person/yr) all over the regions except for
Structures P and R since some of the ammable gas had been
dispersed to the other processes via wind effect (see Figs. 7 and 8).
For Cases 2 and 3, Structures P and R had the largest risk values
among all the regions. The risk values of Case 3 at these two
structures (6.0 10
13
and 1.0 10
12
person/yr) were smaller
than those of Case 2 (7.0 10
13
and 1.4 10
12
person/yr), the
reason for which had already been analyzed in the previous para-
graph. One can notice that Structure R1 has zero risk values for
Cases 2 and 3 because their gas clouds were relatively smaller and
were ignited immediately. Therefore, the corresponding thermal
hazards were relatively concentrated around the leak point and did
not spread so widely as that of Case 1. One can also observe that the
risk values on the high oors were all larger than those on the
ground areas, since thermal radiation played the major role in
the mortality rate in all these cases and the reball became larger
and larger once it rose up to the sky (see Fig. 8).
5. Conclusions
A CFD model, FLACS, was employed in this study to simulate the
re andexplosionconsequences of three WCScases withina complex
naphtha-crackingprocess area. Witha self-developedriskcalculation
module, the FLACS simulation results can be used to analyze the 3D
risk value inside the target area. The 3D risk analysis technique can
overcome the limitations of the traditional methods that can only
predict the risk value on the ground. Unlike the traditional methods
that usually neglect the inuence of terrain and buildings, the 3D
method can differentiate the risk difference at different heights with
the help of the CFD algorithm. The WCS simulation results showed
that inmost places employees at highlevels wouldexperience higher
risks (1.0 10
12
5.7 10
13
person/yr), while the risk values onthe
ground areas and vacant lots would be the lowest (6.0 10
20

8.0 10
20
person/yr). Therefore, an apparent risk difference existed
between different heights at the same location.
In addition, this study also investigated whether a re and
explosion hazard can be mitigated by installing a water spray
system. According to the simulation results, water spray activation
alone has very limited potential to directly reduce the hazardous
consequences of a disastrous incident. Besides, the turbulent effect
caused by water droplets can also shorten the initiation time of an
explosion and slightly increase the overpressure. All these subtle
differences can be observed via the 3Drisk values. One believes that
the 3Drisk analysis technique not merely can be used in the re and
explosion simulation in this study, but can also be employed as
a test platform in the future for validating the effectiveness of any
novel mitigating measure for chemical release (Gupta, 2005) before
it can be formally implemented in a process plant. Such application
is being studied by the authors currently. It is foreseeable there are
more and more engineering projects that related to the process
safety design can be evaluated via using this technique.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to GexCon AS, Norway for providing the
FLACS software and partial nancial aid (NSC 96-2628-E-224-001-
MY3) from the National Science Council of Taiwan to support this
study.
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Fig. 11. 3D risk iso-surfaces of Case 3.
Table 6
Comparison of individual risk value of three cases at different oors and regions.
Location Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Ground areas 8.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
P-2 area 5.7 10
13
7.0 10
13
6.0 10
13
P-3 area 5.7 10
13
7.0 10
13
6.0 10
13
R-2 area 5.7 10
13
1.4 10
12
1.0 10
12
R-3 area 5.7 10
13
1.4 10
12
1.0 10
12
R1-2 area 3.4 10
12
0 0
R1-3 area 3.4 10
12
0 0
R1-4 area 3.4 10
12
0 0
M-2 area 8.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
M-3 area 8.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
M-4 area 8.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
Vacant lots 8.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
6.0 10
20
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