Paternalism: Why Social Workers Need to Know Moral
Theory Caroline E. Reid, MSW Eastern Kentucky University Caroline.Reid@eku.edu C. Kamper Floyd, MA University o Sout!ern Mississippi "alerie #ryan, $!% University o Sout! Ala&ama Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, "olume ', (um&er ) *)+,+- Copyri.!t )+,+, W!ite /at Communications
0!is te1t may &e reely s!ared amon. individuals, &ut it may not &e repu&lis!ed in any medium 2it!out e1press 2ritten consent rom t!e aut!ors and advance notiication o W!ite /at Communications. Abstract 0!is paper speaks to t!e comple1ity o t!e social 2ork practice environment t!at re3uires social 2orkers to kno2 moral t!eory. 0!e aut!ors present a rationale or social 2orkers usin. moral t!eory and demonstrate !o2 t!is can inorm et!ical reasonin. in t!e conte1t o case decision4makin.. Key Words5 Social Work Code, Et!ics, Moral 0!eory, $aternalism ! "ntrod#ction Alt!ou.! social 2ork !as a Code o Et!ics *(ASW, )++6- and eac! state !as codes &ased on t!e national code, it remains a 3uestion as to !o2 codes o et!ics can lead to et!ical reasonin. amon. social 2orkers in practice settin.s. 7t 2ould appear t!at et!ical codes can constrain unet!ical actions, &ut t!ey cannot promote et!ical reasonin. due to t!eir in!erent structure as &asically non4 mali.nancy statements pro!i&itin. certain actions. /o2ever, t!e comple1ity o t!e practice environment inevita&ly means t!at codes alone cannot .uide all or even most o daily social 2orker actions 2it! t!eir clients. 7n addition, t!e code does not esta&lis! a !ierarc!y o et!ical principles leavin. t!e practitioner 2it! unans2ered 3uestions suc! as !o2 one solves a pro&lem 2!en principles collide. For e1ample, t!e principles o promotin. a client8s 2ell4&ein. and promotin. a client8s autonomy oten come into conlict. W!at is needed is a template or et!ical reasonin. t!at, 2!ile &ein. per!aps reconcila&le to ormal and deontolo.ical codes, arms social 2orkers to deal 2it! t!e ininite variation in case scenarios and c!allen.es and t!at provides a 2ay to navi.ate &et2een key et!ical principles in Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e speciic case instances. 0!is paper 2ill present a rationale or social 2orkers usin. moral t!eory and 2ill also demonstrate !o2 t!is can inorm et!ical reasonin. in t!e conte1t o case decision4makin.. 9ert, Culver, and Clouser *)++6- &elieve t!at in proessions, codes o et!ics serve as a collective reco.nition &y mem&ers o a proession8s responsi&ilities: it can !elp create an environment in 2!ic! et!ical &e!avior is t!e norm: it can serve as a .uide or reminder in speciic situations: can serve as an educational tool, providin. a ocal point or discussion in classes and proessional meetin.s: and inally, a code can indicate to ot!ers t!at t!e proession is seriously concerned 2it! responsi&le, proessional conduct. 9ert, Culver, and Clouser *)++6- maintain t!at t!e primary purpose*s- o a proessional code o et!ics is to !elp educate and sociali;e ne2 mem&ers into t!e proession, as 2ell as current mem&ers o t!e proession. 7t s!ould &e o practical use. A Code o Et!ics s!ould tell individuals !o2 t!ey ou.!t to act. A Code o Et!ics s!ould rest on a pu&lic moral system t!at includes rules and ideals. Social 2ork8s Code o Et!ics, alt!ou.! inormed &y contemporary principlism, is &ased upon t!e proessional purpose and mission o social 2ork, and as social 2ork8s ocus and emp!ases !ave c!an.ed over time, so !as t!e Code. 0!e current Code o Et!ics *)++6- indicates t!at t!e social 2ork proession is <rooted in a set o core values44service, social =ustice, di.nity and 2ort! o t!e person, importance o !uman relations!ips, inte.rity and competence> *p. ,-. #ecause social 2ork is a moral activity re3uirin. social 2orkers to make and implement diicult decisions a&out !uman situations t!at involve t!e potential or !arm and .ood, social 2orkers s!ould !ave a solid kno2led.e &ase and t!eory upon 2!ic! t!ey can make decisions, especially et!ical decisions. 0!e current (ASW Code o Et!ics *)++6- is &uilt on principlism. 0!e most 2idely accepted ormulation o principlism, put ort! &y #eauc!amp and C!ildress *)++,-, includes t!e ollo2in.5 respect or autonomy *respect or people8s values and decisions-: &eneicence *!elpin. ot!ers-: nonmaleicence *not !armin. ot!ers-: and =ustice *treatin. all cases alike: distri&utin. &eneits and !arms airly-. 0!e our principles are considered role4speciic duties and are prima acie *duties considered al2ays to &e in eect-. 0!e (ASW Code o Et!ics ackno2led.es t!at it does not <speciy 2!ic! values, principles, and standards are most important and ou.!t to out2ei.! ot!ers in instances 2!en t!ey are in conlict> *p. ?- &ut at t!e same time it indicates t!at one o its purposes is to <!elp social 2orkers identiy relevant considerations 2!en proessional o&li.ations conlict...> *p. )-. 0!e Code indicates t!at values and standards s!ould &e rank ordered 2!en conlicts arise, &ut does not speciy !o2 to rank order. $! A %rie& 'istory o& Social Work (thics @iterature identiyin. and speciyin. t!e relations!ip &et2een social 2ork8s core et!ical values and practice !as e1isted almost as lon. as t!e proession itsel, alt!ou.! its ocus !as noticea&ly s!ited over time. At t!e midpoint o t!e last century, keen interest in 2!at social 2ork8s .uidin. values s!ould &e &e.an to emer.e. 0!e irst ma=or 2ork pertainin. to social 2ork et!ics pu&lis!ed in ,ABA, %he %eachin& of Social Work Values and Ethics &y Muriel $ump!rey, identiied Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e proessional, societal, and cultural values as t!e desired ocal point o et!ics education *Reamer, ,AAC, as cited in #ryan, )++6-. 0!is era is oten identiied as t!e ori.in o serious sc!olarly interest in social 2ork8s et!ical oundation *Reamer, ,AAD, ,AAC: /aynes, ,AAA-. W!en t!e political up!eaval o t!e ,A6+s s!ited national ocus to civil ri.!ts and social =ustice issues, t!e social 2ork et!ics literature rom t!is era also relected t!is rene2ed emp!asis. 7n ,A6+, t!e (ational Association o Social Workers *(ASW- adopted its irst Code o Et!ics. Eorts to identiy 2!at social 2ork8s core values 2ere and to unite t!e proession around t!ese principles continued on t!rou.!out t!e ,A6+s and ,A'+s *Reamer, ,AAC-. 'onte"porar( Social Work Ethics )iterature. 0!e most recent version o (ASW8s Code o Et!ics *)++6- continues to relect t!e principlist emp!asis contained 2it!in earlier versions, 2it! its ocus upon t!e proession8s values &ase. 7t lists t!e previously identiied si1 <core values> and states t!at t!ese provide <t!e oundation o social 2ork8s uni3ue purpose and perspective> *(ASW, )++6, p. ,-. Social 2ork et!ics literature 2it!in recent decades discusses t!e application o t!ese core values across a 2ide ran.e o practice domains and topical issues, varyin. rom social 2orkers8 personal perspectives on !uman nature and t!eir resultant eects upon practice *9oldstein, ,ACA: Reamer, ,AC?- to t!e identiication o values conlicts as encountered across various client settin.s *A&ramson, ,ACB: 9ray, ,AA6: Al&ers E Al&ert, ,AAC: %ean E R!odes, ,AAC-. Social 2ork et!ics sc!olars !ave tended to emp!asi;e and e1plore t!e diiculties in mana.in. conlicts &et2een et!ical principles as t!ey emer.e rom issues includin. &ut not limited to client autonomy and paternalism *A&ramson, ,ACB: Al&ers E Al&ert, ,AAC-, duty to protect versus client conidentiality *%ickson, ,AAC-, and inormed consent 2it!in coercive settin.s *Re.e!r E Antle, ,AA'-. 7n a compilation o !istorical and empirical social 2ork et!ics literature, Reamer *,AAD- speciies t!e values conlicts t!at may emer.e rom eorts to accommodate social 2ork8s core values5 personal versus proessional values, values and &elies o t!e 2orker related to t!e nature o clients8 pro&lems, and disputes over t!e relative importance o t!e proession8s values. 0!e 3uestion o !o2 one mi.!t address t!ese conlicts o principles !as directed t!e development o decision4 makin. models and social 2ork et!ics curricula 2it!in recent years *c.. Con.ress, )+++: Fleck4/enderson, ,AA,: /aynes, ,AAA: $ine, ,AC'-. All s!are a common strate.y o askin. a series o 3uestions .rounded in an e1ploration o principles t!at pertain to moral conlicts and applyin. t!ese investi.ative 3uestions to et!ical pro&lems. /o2ever, no t2o decision models ask e1actly t!e same 3uestions, 2!ereas all re3uire individual interpretation 2it!out any orm o pu&lic =ustiication, 2!ic! may lead to inconsistent, capricious decision makin. *#ryan, )++6-. All similarly lack a t!eoretical oundation. Wit! t!e s!it in attention rom values e1ploration t!at emer.ed in t!e ,AB+s to moral conlict resolution and strate.ies to accomplis! t!is in recent years, it is necessary or social 2ork to more careully evaluate t!e process t!rou.! 2!ic! et!ical conlicts s!ould &e resolved. 0!ou.! inconsistent, decision models do tend to elicit t!e underlyin. moral 3uandary preventin. a simple Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e outcome. /o2ever, it must &e noted t!at t!e capa&ility to identiy a conlict in values does not necessarily make resolution o t!e conlict any easier. (o matter !o2 e1plicit t!e identiication o conlictin. values may &e, one may &e no more prepared to decide 2!at to do t!an i t!e conlict !ad not &een clariied in t!e irst place. Somet!in. &eyond t!e use o at!eoretical decision4makin. models or <decision trees> is clearly needed. )! The Need &or Moral Theory: The (*ample o& Paternalism Social 2orkers need to kno2 moral t!eory in order to make t!e &est et!ical decisions 2it! re.ard to clients. Social 2orkers are at risk or makin. poor decisions, especially 2!en it comes to &e!avin. paternalistically to2ard t!eir clients. 0!is paper relies on t!e 2ork o 9ert and Culver *,A'A-, 2!ic! provides a systematic and useul 2ay to deal 2it! t!e pro&lem o paternalism in social 2ork. 0!e aut!ors assert t!at sometimes paternalism can &e =ustiied and sometimes it cannot &e =ustiied. For acts o paternalism to &e =ustiied, t!e aut!ors assert t!at t!ere must &e a procedure o =ustiication. Conse3uentialism, deontolo.y, casuistry, t!e t!eory o virtue, situation et!ics, and principlism do not aid in !elpin. to distin.uis! &et2een cases o =ustiied and un=ustiied paternalism. Usin. t!e e1ample o paternalism, t!is paper 2ill e1plicate t!e key concepts o 9ert, Clouser, and Culver8s *,AA'- common morality rame2ork &y applyin. !is analytic steps and =ustiication procedure to t!e case o paternalistic actions. 9iven t!e many people 2!o !ave 2ritten a&out paternalism, one mi.!t 2onder 2!y more needs to &e said a&out t!e topic. 0!e classic 2ork on paternalism is ound in Mill8s *n )i+ert( *,A'C-. Ft!er, more recent classic articles include %2orkin8s *,A'?- ,aternalis", Carter8s *,A''- Justif(in& ,aternalis", and #uc!anan8s *,A'C- -edical ,aternalis". 0!ese 2orks discuss paternalism in relation to t!e .overnment and individual li&erty or in t!e medical conte1t, 2!ere paternalism is pervasive. Alt!ou.! t!ese are classic 2orks on paternalism, none o t!em ties paternalism to social 2ork. Reamer *,AC?- discusses paternalism in t!e conte1t o social 2ork. 7n t!is oundational 2ork, !e clearly understands t!e importance o t!e topic to social 2orkers and makes some o t!e same kinds o points t!at are made in t!e ollo2in. para.rap!s re.ardin. paternalism and client sel4determination. /e also oers a &rie !istory o some o t!e classic 2orks mentioned a&ove. /o2ever, Reamer mana.es to discuss paternalism in social 2ork 2it!out ever e1plicitly mentionin. moral t!eory. 0!is is a .ap t!at t!e present article &rid.es. 0!is article ties paternalism to social 2ork and does so in a 2ay t!at !i.!li.!ts t!e importance o moral t!eory or social 2ork practice. 7t is important to remem&er t!at t!e main point o t!is article is one a&out t!e need or social 2orkers to !ave an understandin. o moral t!eory. 0!e e1ample o paternalism is intended to acilitate an understandin. o t!is main point, and, .iven t!e comple1ities o social 2ork practice, paternalism is a natural c!oice. Conse3uently, a discussion o t!e !istory o paternalism is limited to t!ese remarks. $aternalism is, in simplistic terms, actin. on anot!er8s &e!al 2it!out !is or !er e1plicit consent. A more sc!olarly deinition is .iven &y A&ramson *,ACB-5 <$aternalism is a orm o &eneicence in 2!ic! t!e !elpin. person8s concepts o &eneits and !arms dier rom t!ose o t!e Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e client, and t!e !elper8s concepts prevail> *p. ?CA-. 7t arises out o a 2is! to !elp ot!ers and can &e &eneicial to clients in certain cases, particularly 2!en clients !ave limited decision4makin. capacity. /o2ever, paternalistic actions undermine t!e value o sel4determination and limit autonomy &y takin. a2ay clients8 ri.!ts to make t!eir o2n decisions. #ecause paternalism limits reedom, t!is su..ests a need or t!e a&ility to determine in 2!ic! cases paternalistic decisions s!ould or s!ould not &e made. ,aternalis" and Social Work: 'larif(in& the ,ro+le" W!y mi.!t one t!ink t!at social 2orkers are in dan.er o actin. paternalistically in t!e irst placeG Ater all, i social 2orkers rarely act paternalistically, t!e claim t!at social 2orkers need to kno2 moral t!eory to avoid actin. paternalistically is not compellin.. 0o assert t!e claim t!at social 2orkers are re3uently in dan.er o actin. paternalistically, one need only consider t!e aim o social 2ork and t!e nature o paternalistic &e!avior. Since social 2orkers care a&out !elpin. ot!ers, it is important t!at t!ey not impede t!eir clients in &ecomin. autonomous. 0o do so 2ould undermine t!e very value o t!eir eorts. /o2ever, it is diicult to discern 2!en t!e social 2orker8s assistance is !elpul and 2!en it serves as an o&stacle or client sel4determination. 0!is is due to several actors, includin. t!e po2er dierential in!erent in t!e social 2orkerHclient relations!ip, t!e conte1t o t!e 2orkin. relations!ip, namely, t!e kinds o issues t!at led to t!e ormation o t!e relations!ip, and t!e vulnera&ility o t!e clients. 0!ese, o course, are interrelated issues. 0!e social 2orker is placed in t!e position o !elpin. a client &etter !er lie, and s!e must do so 2it!out underminin. t!e client8s pro.ress to2ard sel4 determination. As a result, t!e social 2orker is al2ays in dan.er o makin. decisions on &e!al o t!e client8s 2ell4 &ein.. 0!e social 2orker is in dan.er o actin. paternalistically i s!e does not make and carry out t!ese decisions 2it! due care. $aternalism is an in!erent component o social 2ork. Social 2orkers8 duties to ot!ers, includin. protectin. ri.!ts, intervenin. in !i.! risk situations, providin. court4mandated services or assistance to involuntary clients, and providin. *or not providin.- inormation durin. t!e consent process and in ot!er client contacts all involve evaluatin. decisions a&out potentially paternalistic acts *Reamer, ,AA?, as cited in Kaplan E #ryan, )++A-. Simultaneously, social 2orkers are mandated to respect individual sel4determination and to en!ance societal 2ell4&ein., 2!ic! may conlict in practice. Al&ers and Al&ert *,AAC- identiy t!e very purpose o social 2ork as em&edded 2it!in t!e conlict &et2een t!e needs o t!e sel and t!ose o society. 7n many cases, a.ency policies may indicate t!at t!e social 2orker s!ould act paternalistically, 2!ereas t!e Code o Et!ics 2ould su..est t!e opposite. Conlicts &et2een social 2orkers and clients commonly occur 2!en t!ey disa.ree a&out 2!et!er or not 2orkers8 paternalistic actions are &eneicial to clients rom t!e clients8 perspective *A&ramson, ,ACB, as cited in Kaplan E #ryan, )++A-. 0!ese kinds o decisions call or =ustiication o t!e proessional8s actions *Kaplan E #ryan, )++A-. 02o distinctions re.ardin. t!e meanin. o paternalism are relevant !ere. 0!e irst distinction is &et2een paternalistic acts and acts t!at seem Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e paternalistic &ut really are not. For e1ample, a mot!er8s actions to2ard !er very youn. c!ildren mi.!t count as paternalistic. Ater all, mot!ers oten act on &e!al o t!eir c!ildren 2it!out t!eir e1plicit consent. /o2ever, to vie2 t!is as paternalism is clearly a&surd. Restrictin. a t2o4year old8s reedom or t!e sake o !is or !er o2n .ood is a parental, not paternalistic, action. 0!is is =ust 2!at parents are supposed to do in order to raise t!eir c!ildren. Su..estin. t!at t!ese kinds o parental acts are paternalistic misses t!e point o 2!at it means to &e a parent. 0!e second distinction is &et2een =ustiied acts o paternalism and un=ustiied acts. A =ustiia&le act o paternalism is one in 2!ic! an act counts as paternalistic, &ut it is one most rational persons 2ould e1cuse. An un=ustiia&le paternalistic act is one t!at most rational persons 2ould not e1cuse, t!ere&y !oldin. t!e a.ent as morally culpa&le or causin. a person !arm. 7 all acts o paternalism are un=ustiied, t!en it is likely t!at social 2orkers commit many acts o un=ustiied paternalism. 0!is conclusion, i sound, 2ould severely undermine t!e social utility o t!e social 2ork proession. 7t amounts to t!e claim t!at t!e social 2ork proession is &ased on practices t!at ultimately perpetuate immorality. 0!e social useulness o t!e social 2ork proession is evident in t!e lives o t!e many people 2!o !ave &een !elped &y social 2orkers. Unless social 2orkers 2ant to em&race t!e idea t!at actin. immorally is a .ood 2ay to .o a&out !elpin. ot!ers, t!en some acts o paternalism are =ustiied. 7 social 2orkers cannot properly =ustiy any acts o paternalism, t!ey place t!eir clients in !arm8s 2ay. 0!e (ASW Code o Et!ics *)++6- speaks to paternalism in Section ,.+'&. We 2ill no2 turn to 9ert, Clouser, and Culver8s *,AA'- concept o t!e common moral system *also kno2n as common morality- and e1plore its key eatures o rules, morally relevant eatures, rules violations, and =ustiication. 7t 2ill &e s!o2n !ere t!at paternalistic acts are like ot!er rules violations in t!at t!ey re3uire =ustiication to &e morally accepta&le. 7n doin. so, 2e 2ill deine paternalism in suc! a 2ay t!at allo2s distin.uis!in. &et2een morally pro!i&ited and morally permissi&le paternalistic acts. +! Moral ,#sti&ication, Morally Relevant -eat#res, and Moral Theories -oral .ules and .ules Violations. Accordin. to 9ert, Clouser, E Culver *,AA'-, morality is an inormal pu&lic system. All inormal pu&lic systems s!are t2o eatures5 *a- all t!ose to 2!om t!e system applies understand it, and *&- it is rational to su&mit onesel to t!e system. 0!ey deine rationality in terms o irrationality5 <to act irrationally is to act in a 2ay t!at one kno2s, or s!ould kno2, 2ill si.niicantly increase t!e pro&a&ility t!at onesel, or t!ose one cares or, 2ill suer deat!, pain disa&ility, loss o reedom or loss o pleasure: and one does not !ave an ade3uate reason or so actin.> *p. )6-. 0!eir system o morality is an e1plicit ormulation o 2!at t!ey take to &e implicit in t!e 2ay most people deal 2it! everyday moral issues. 0!ey su&mit ten moral rules t!at relect t!e emp!asis on !arm t!at is evident in t!eir deinition o irrationality5 do not kill, do not cause pain, do not disa&le, do not deprive o reedom, do not deprive o pleasure, do not deceive, keep your promise, do not c!eat, o&ey t!e la2, do your duty *9ert, Culver, E Clouser, )++6-. Accordin. to t!ese Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e aut!ors8 concept o common morality, moral rules are not a&solute, &ut =ustiied violations o t!ose rules must &e impartial and must &e pu&lic *in t!e sense t!at all rational persons 2ould allo2 suc! violations i t!ey 2ere in a similar situation-. 0!e rules provide t!e oundation o t!e common morality rame2ork. 9ert, Clouser, and Culver *,AA'- note t!at t!ese are .eneral, universal rules t!at are made speciic &y conte1t. For e1ample, a speciic case o violatin. <%o not cause pain> may involve spankin. a mis&e!avin. c!ild, makin. cruel comments to a riend, or assistin. a patient 2it! p!ysical re!a&ilitation e1ercises. /e reasons t!at rational persons a.ree to a&ide &y t!e moral rules so t!at t!ey avoid !avin. t!ese !arms committed a.ainst t!em. Alt!ou.! it is asserted t!at all are e3ually important, t!e second ive rules tend to increase t!e likeli!ood t!at one o t!e irst ive rules 2ill &e &roken. For instance, deceivin. a client *rule 6- &y not providin. all inormation a&out !er c!oices durin. t!e inormed consent process increases t!e likeli!ood t!at !er reedom to make an inormed decision 2ill &e impaired *rule D-. -orall( .ele$ant Features #ecause t!e rules are .eneral, t!ey re3uire interpretation to &e applica&le in particular cases. 7t is possi&le or people to disa.ree a&out !o2 to correctly apply t!e rules in particular cases. Conse3uently, 2!at may at irst seem like a .ross violation o a moral rule may actually &e morally permissi&le. #ecause paternalistic acts involve, &y deinition, t!e &reakin. o a moral rule, all acts o paternalism re3uire =ustiication. 9ert, Clouser, E Culver *,AA'- also make it clear t!at sometimes t!ere are situations in 2!ic! t!ere 2ill &e disa.reement a&out rules violations, even 2!en t!e circumstances are t!e same. 7n every case o a potential rules violation, t!e social 2orker must irst determine t!e morally relevant eatures and t!en consider t!e conse3uences s!ould everyone kno2 t!at it is permissi&le to violate rules under t!e same circumstances to =ustiy !is or !er position. 9ert *,AAC- presents a series o 3uestions as a .uideline desi.ned to elicit important acts a&out a moral issue *morally relevant eatures-, 2!ic! t!e social 2orker s!ould ask 2!en considerin. a violation o a moral rule 1. What "oral rule is +ein& $iolated/ 2. What har"s are +ein& caused +( the $iolation/ What har"s are +ein& a$oided +( $iolatin& the rule/ What har"s are +ein& pre$ented +( the $iolation/ 0. What are the rele$ant desires and +eliefs of the person to!ard !ho" the rule is +ein& $iolated/ 1. 2s the relationship +et!een the person $iolatin& the rule and the persons to!ard !ho" the rule is +ein& $iolated such that the for"er has a dut( to $iolate "oral rules !ith re&ard to the latter independent of their consent/ 3. What &oods are +ein& pro"oted +( the $iolation/ 4. 2s the rule +ein& $iolated to!ard a person in order to pre$ent her fro" $iolatin& a "oral rule !hen the $iolation !ould +e un#ustified or !eakl( #ustified/ 7. 2s the rule +ein& $iolated to!ard a person +ecause he has $iolated a "oral rule un#ustifia+l( or !ith a !eak #ustification/ 5. 6re there an( alternati$e actions or policies that !ould +e prefera+le/ Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e 7. 2s the $iolation +ein& done intentionall( or onl( kno!in&l(/ 10. 2s the situation an e"er&enc( such that no person is likel( to plan to +e in that kind of situation/ *9ert, ,AAA pp. ,'4,A-. (ot all o t!e 3uestions apply to every case. Some 3uestions are more important in some conte1ts t!an ot!ers. 0!ere may &e, 9ert *,AAC- admits, many morally relevant properties t!at t!e 3uestions do not !elp !i.!li.!t. 7t is t!ese kinds o considerations t!at make t!e 3uestions <.uidelines.> 0!e ans2ers to t!e 3uestions are t!e morally relevant properties one s!ould consider in decidin. 2!et!er a particular act is morally permissi&le. Justification of .ules Violations. 0!e analysis !in.es upon an important process o =ustiication, ar.ua&ly t!e most useul eature o t!e common moral system o decision4makin.. 9ert *,AAA- su..ests t2o 3uestions related to t!e deontolo.ical concept o t!e cate.orical imperative in order to evaluate i violatin. t!e rules is =ustiied in a case5 ,- 'ould an(one in these kinds of circu"stances $iolate these rules/ and 28 Would it still +e allo!ed if e$er(one kne! that these rules could +e $iolated in these circu"stances/ 0!ese 3uestions ans2er 2!et!er or not rules violations in particular circumstances are impartially and pu&licly allo2ed. 0!is analysis re3uires t!e practitioner to consider 2!et!er t!e lon.4 term conse3uences o violatin. rules do more !arm t!an not violatin. rules in particular situations *#ryan, )++6-. ,aternalis" as a -oral .ules Violation Returnin. to t!e previous discussion re.ardin. paternalism, it s!ould &e clear t!at paternalistic acts in some cases are =ustiied violations o moral rules, and in ot!ers, are un=ustiied. /o2ever, t!e deinition o paternalism must &e made e1plicit to assist t!e social 2orker 2it! analysis o t!e situation. 9ert E Culver *,A'A- deine paternalistic &e!avior in t!e ollo2in. 2ay5 A is actin. paternalistically to2ard S i and only i A8s &e!avior *correctly- indicates t!at A &elieves t!atI
918 his action is for S:s &ood; 928 he is <ualified to act on S:s +ehalf; 908 his action in$ol$es $iolatin& a "oral rule 9or !ill re<uire hi" to do so8 !ith re&ard to S; 918 S:s &ood #ustifies hi" in actin& on S:s +ehalf independentl( of S:s past, present, or i""ediatel( forthco"in& 9free, infor"ed8 consent; and 938 S +elie$es 9perhaps falsel(8 that he 9S8 &enerall( kno!s !hat is for his o!n &ood 9p.1748. Fne8s actions are paternalistic, t!en, i t!ey are motivated &y certain kinds o &elies. For e1ample, suppose an adult client admits !e intends to !arm !imsel p!ysically &ut !as no desire or !is social 2orker8s assistance in !elpin. !im 2ork t!rou.! t!is issue. 0!e social 2orker decides t!at t!e client s!ould &e placed under suicide 2atc!, and t!e social 2orker does 2!at is needed to !ave !im !ospitali;ed. *0!is is a simpliied version o a case t!at 9ert, Clouser, E Culver, ,AA', ormulate.- 0!e social 2orker8s action is motivated &y t!e ollo2in. Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e &elies5 0!e client is &etter o alive t!an !e is dead *condition ,-: t!e social 2orker8s trainin. provides t!em 2it! t!e necessary skills and kno2led.e to act on t!e client8s &e!al *condition )-: t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at !ospitali;in. t!e client restricts !is reedom andHor could cause !er some ot!er kind o !arm *condition ?-: t!e social 2orker does not t!ink t!at s!e needs t!e client8s permission to !ave !im !ospitali;ed *condition D-: and t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at, as a rational adult, t!e client .enerally kno2s 2!at is in !is &est interest *condition B-. Considerin. all o t!e &elies t!at motivate t!e social 2orker8s &e!avior, t!e social 2orker8s c!oice to involuntarily !ospitali;e !er client is a paternalistic one, as deined &y 9ert and Culver. 0o &e sure, t!e social 2orker8s &e!avior mi.!t &e e1cusa&le. W!et!er or not it is e1cusa&le is discussed &elo2. A violation o a moral rule involves, accordin. to 9ert, Clouser, and Culver *,AA'-, causin. !arm suc! as deat!, pain, disa&ility, loss o reedom, opportunity, or pleasure. 7n actin. 2it!out o&tainin. t!e consent o !er client, a social 2orker is violatin. a moral rule I deprivin. !er client o reedom *9ert E Culver, ,A'A. p. B,-. So, in ulillin. condition D, one is causin. !arm, t!us ulillin. condition ?. As stated, some paternalistic acts are =ustiia&le and ot!ers are not. W!at is important to reco.ni;e is t!at all cases o paternalism, &y t!eir very nature, violate t!e moral rules, &y deprivin. clients o t!eir ri.!t to reely make t!eir o2n c!oices. Ften, ot!er rules are also violated. 0!ereore, all potential acts o paternalism s!ould &e analy;ed as to t!eir moral permissi&ility. 7 social 2orkers 2is! to avoid committin. un=ustiia&le paternalistic acts to2ard t!eir clients, t!ey must kno2 moral t!eory. 0!is section e1plains t!e dierence &et2een =ustiied and un=ustiied paternalistic acts and demonstrates !o2 social 2orkers can avoid actin. in an un=ustiia&ly paternalistic to2ard t!eir clients. Suc! avoidance depends on social 2orkers kno2in. moral t!eory. First, an e1planation o t!e dierent kinds o paternalism is in order. 0o identiy cases o =ustiied paternalism, one must &e a&le to identiy 2!ic! acts are morally permissi&le. A morally permissi&le act is one t!at a person is allo2ed to do &ut not re3uired to do, as stated &y some moral t!eory. Contrast a morally permissi&le act 2it! an act t!at is eit!er morally re3uired or morally or&idden. A morally re3uired act is an act t!at one is o&li.ated to do. A morally or&idden act is an act t!at is al2ays 2ron. to perorm. E1actly 2!ic! acts are deemed morally re3uired or or&idden depends on t!e moral t!eory under consideration. For e1ample, utilitarians t!ink t!at t!e moral value o an act is derived rom t!e act8s conse3uences. %eontolo.ists t!ink t!at t!e moral value o an act depends on t!e intention 2it! 2!ic! a person perorms t!e act. 9iven t!eir dierent assessments o 2!at .ives moral value to an act, it is clear t!at utilitarians and deontolo.ists 2ill dier on t!eir lists o morally re3uired and morally or&idden acts. 0!ese are =ust t2o e1amples. Ft!er moral t!eorists, ones 2!o are not deontolo.ists or utilitarians, 2ould say t!at moral value is derived ultimately rom somet!in. ot!er t!an conse3uences or intentions. W!atever t!e case, .iven a moral t!eory, most people 2ould a.ree on 2!ic! acts are morally or&idden and morally re3uired, and t!ey 2ould likely a.ree t!at Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e many acts do not all into eit!er cate.ory. Justiied acts o paternalism are morally permissi&le. (o acts o paternalism are ever morally re3uired. Claimin. t!at some acts o paternalism are =ustiied means t!at some acts o paternalism are not morally or&idden. For t!ese acts, compellin. reasons are needed to convince ot!ers t!at t!e acts are morally permissi&le. Ferin. reasons in t!ese kinds o cases amounts to .ivin. a =ustiication or t!e moral permissi&ility o some acts o paternalism. W!at counts as a =ustiication or a paternalistic actG 9ert and Culver *,A'A- claim t!at any =ustiication o a paternalistic act must !ave t!e ollo2in. necessary eatures5 *,- a description o t!e &eneit t!at 2ould &e .ained &y t!e person to 2!om t!e paternalistic act is directed and *)- t!e !arms prevented &y t!e paternalistic act need to &e <muc! .reater> t!an t!e !arm o committin. t!e act. For a =ustiication to count as suicient, it must say !o2 t!e paternalistic act 2ould &e accepta&le to all rational persons in similar circumstances. So, a =ustiication o paternalism must s!o2 t!at *,- it 2ould &e irrational or t!e person a.ainst 2!om t!e act o paternalism is committed not to a.ree to t!e act, .iven t!e c!ance and *)- all rational persons 2ould a.ree t!at i t!ey 2ere in a similar situation paternalism 2ould &e accepta&le. W!et!er or not an act o paternalism is =ustiied depends on t!e 3uality o t!e =ustiication .iven or t!e act. 0!ere are dierent kinds o moral =ustiication *9ert, Clouser, E Culver, ,AA'-. 0!e reasons t!at one .ives or &reakin. a moral rule could &e accepted &y almost everyone, or t!ere could &e disa.reement a&out 2!et!er one s!ould accept t!e =ustiication. Accordin. to 9ert and Culver *,A'A-, i t!e =ustiication is accepted &y all rational people, it counts as a stron. =ustiication. Acts o paternalism t!at are stron.ly =ustiied 2ould count as morally permissi&le acts. 0!is amounts to t!e claim t!at all people 2ould a.ree t!at universally allo2in. t!e act o paternalism in certain circumstances 2ould prevent more !arm t!an it 2ould cause. W!en t!ere is a disa.reement a&out t!e rational accepta&ility o t!e =ustiication, t!e =ustiication counts as 2eak. Acts o paternalism t!at are 2eakly =ustiied are acts t!at mi.!t &e morally permissi&le, &ut t!ere may &e conse3uences or doin. t!em. As noted earlier, t!e =ustiication o a paternalistic act s!ould !ave t2o eatures5 *,- it 2ould &e irrational or t!e person a.ainst 2!om t!e act o paternalism is committed not to a.ree to t!e act, .iven t!e c!ance and *)- all rational persons 2ould a.ree t!at i t!ey 2ere in a similar situation, paternalism 2ould &e accepta&le. Consider t!e 3ualiications in turn. 7 3ualiication , 2ere alse, t!en it 2ould &e rational or persons to act in suc! a 2ay as to <si.niicantly increase t!e pro&a&ility t!at onesel, or t!ose one cares or, 2ill suer deat!, pain disa&ility, loss o reedom or loss o pleasure: and one does not !ave an ade3uate reason or so actin..> Clearly t!is deies lo.ic. Consider 3ualiication ). Accordin. to 9ert, Clouser, E Culver *,AA'-, speciyin. t!e circumstances is a matter o speciyin. t!e kinds o paternalistic acts one could pu&licly advocate.
0o say t!at an act is one t!at could &e pu&licly advocated is to say t!at it could &e e1plicitly incorporated into t!e inormal, pu&lic system o morality 2it!out underminin. t!e system. Kant8s e1ample o t!e person 2!o lies to o&tain a loan illustrates 9ert and Culver8s point *9re.or, ,AA6-. 7 one 2ere to pu&licly advocate t!e moral permissi&ility o lyin. in order to o&tain a loan, t!e inormal pu&lic practice o lendin. money Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e 2ould &e undermined. 7t 2ould &e undermined &ecause t!e lenders 2ould not !ave t!e assurance t!at de&tors 2ould pay &ack t!e loans. So, t!ey 2ould cease lendin. money. $u&licly advocatin. t!e moral permissi&ility o an act t!at is inconsistent 2it! t!e inormal pu&lic system o morality 2ould 2eaken t!e system8s social eicacy. 0!e or.oin. remarks mi.!t indicate 2!y speciyin. t!e circumstances is important, &ut it says little a&out !o2 one is supposed to i.ure out 2!at situations count as similar, as stated in 3ualiication ). /o2 does one i.ure out 2!ic! situations are similarG 0o i.ure out t!e similarities in t2o dierent cases, one needs a 2ay to sit t!rou.! all t!e eatures o &ot! cases, pickin. out and comparin. t!e salient eatures o eac! case. W!y is suc! a met!od neededG 0!e reason is simple. Suppose it is possi&le to list everyt!in.Ievery action, t!ou.!t, &ack.round inormation, or e1ampleI t!at constitutes t!e conte1t o eac! case. 7t is reasona&le to suppose t!e lists 2ould &e too lon. to practically compare one 2it! t!e ot!er. Even i it 2ere not practically impossi&le, .iven t!e comple1ity o lan.ua.e, t!ere are ininitely many 2ays to descri&e eac! case. Wit!out a met!od to pick out certain eatures o eac! case, t!ere 2ould &e no possi&le 2ay to *,- decide 2!ic! descriptions s!ould &e compared and *)- decide 2!ic! eatures o t!ose lists 2ould count as compara&le eatures. Any met!od t!at could &e used or sitin. t!rou.! t!e various aspects o a situation and pickin. out t!e relevant eatures o eac! case 2ould need to .ive an e1planation o *a- 2!y it picks certain eatures over ot!ers, *&- 2!y t!ese eatures are relevant, and *c- !o2 *a- and *&- relate to paternalism. Ft!er2ise, t!ere 2ould &e no 2ay to c!oose a met!od. 0!e p!ilosop!ical 2ork t!at t!ese e1planations do is =ust 2!at t!eories are supposed to do. 0!eories are =ust e1planations t!at systematically tie to.et!er various p!enomena in a certain domain. #ecause one needs some sort o met!od or decidin. 2!ic! eatures o t!e situations are similar, t!e 3uestion arises5 can one c!oose a met!od or decidin. on suc! eatures t!at does not presuppose some kind o moral t!eoryG 7 t!is is a possi&ility, t!en it 2ould count a.ainst our main claim t!at it 2ould &e possi&le to avoid actin. in an un=ustiia&ly paternalistic manner 2it!out kno2in. moral t!eory. $er!aps one mi.!t 2ant to advocate usin. intuitions to i.ure out t!e matter. Even .rantin. t!at t!is kind o met!od does not presuppose some kind o moral t!eory, t!ere are o&vious pro&lems 2it! t!is met!od. %ierent people !ave dierent intuitions in dierent cases. So, t!ere 2ould &e no 2ay to =ustiy any act o paternalism. W!yG Recall t!at to =ustiy an act o paternalism, reasons must &e mars!aled t!at 2ould persuade ot!ers. 7 people do not s!are t!e same et!ical intuitions, people needin. to &e convinced 2ill not respond to ar.uments &ased upon uns!ared intuitions. #ut, t!ere is .ood reason to t!ink t!at some acts o paternalism are =ustiied. So, usin. intuitions to decide t!e similarity o dierent cases does not 2ork. #ecause t!e =ustiication o paternalism is a moral matter, t!e relevant, compara&le eatures o eac! case are moral properties. 9ert *,AAA- deines t!e morally relevant properties in t!e ollo2in. manner5 <A morally relevant eature o a moral rule violation is a eature t!at i c!an.ed could c!an.e 2!et!er some impartial rational person 2ould pu&licly allo2 t!at violation> *p. ,6-. 7 intuitions can8t &e used, t!en one must rely on Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e somet!in. else. W!atever met!od one adopts, it must &e conceptually related to t!e moral properties under consideration. 0!is restriction automatically discounts pure descriptive met!ods. A pure descriptive met!od is value ree. 0o use a pure descriptive met!od to e1plain 2!ic! moral properties one s!ould consider salient 2ould &e violatin. t!e <isHou.!t> distinction. Many people t!ink t!at t!is allacy is a .enuine lo.ical allacy t!at s!ould &e avoided: derivin. an <ou.!t> statement rom premises t!at only contain <is> statements conuses t!e dierence &et2een description and prescription. #ut suppose a descriptive met!od is not completely value ree. A descriptive met!od t!at is not value ree and e1plains t!e relevant moral properties is a kind o normative t!eory. A normative t!eory is one t!at e1plains t!e action4.uidin. nature o values. All moral t!eories are normative ones, &ut not all normative t!eories are moral ones. For e1ample, a t!eory t!at e1plains eti3uette is a normative t!eory t!at is not a moral one, &ecause matters o eti3uette are not matters o moral si.niicance. #ecause paternalism is a moral issue, any normative t!eory t!at e1plains paternalism 2ould !ave to &e a moral t!eory. So, 2e !ave t!e ollo2in. results. Eit!er a t!eory e1plains 2!at counts as similarities, or intuitions do, and 2e !ave esta&lis!ed t!at intuitions cannot. A t!eory is eit!er purely descriptive or it is normative. A purely descriptive t!eory cannot do t!e 2ork. So, a normative t!eory must do t!e 2ork. A normative t!eory t!at is suiciently stron. to e1plain paternalism is a moral t!eory. So, decidin. t!e similarities o dierent cases means utili;in. a moral t!eory. F course, one cannot utili;e a moral t!eory i one does not kno2 moral t!eories. W!ereas kno2in. at least one moral t!eory is suicient or t!e ar.ument presented a&ove, it is &etter, at least rom a practical standpoint, i social 2orkers kno2 many moral t!eories. A.ain, dierent moral t!eories accord dierent moral value to particular acts. 7t stands to reason t!at dierent moral t!eories also consider as morally relevant dierent eatures o similar situations. For e1ample, &ecause utilitarians are ultimately concerned 2it! t!e conse3uences o an act, t!ey 2ill place little or no value on t!e intentions o t!e person actin., e1cept insoar as t!ose intentions actually &rin. a&out certain conse3uences. #ecause deontolo.ists ultimately care a&out a person8s intentions or actin., t!ey 2ill place little importance on t!e actual conse3uences o t!e act. Ft!er moral t!eorists 2ill determine 2!at counts as morally relevant accordin. to t!e t!eories t!ey preer. So, eac! kind o moral t!eorist is ultimately concerned 2it! dierent aspects o any particular case. Conse3uently, t!ere is no common .round rom 2!ic! to decide 2!ic! description o a case is to &e utili;ed. 7 a social 2orker, t!en, 2ants to =ustiy an act o paternalism, s!e needs to kno2 enou.! a&out moral t!eories to oer reasons to someone 2!o may adopt a dierent moral perspective t!an s!e !as. 0o make t!e application o paternalism, reconsider t!e case outlined in t!e irst section o t!is paper. Recall t!e case5 suppose an adult client admits !e intends to !arm !imsel p!ysically &ut !as no desire or t!e social 2orker8s counsel in !elpin. !imH!er 2ork t!rou.! t!is issue. 0!e social 2orker decides t!at t!e client s!ould &e placed under suicide 2atc!, and t!e social 2orker does 2!at is needed to !ave !im !ospitali;ed. 0!e social 2orker8s action is motivated &y t!e Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e ollo2in. &elies5 t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at t!e client is &etter o alive t!an !e is dead: t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at !isH!er trainin. as a social 2orker provides !imH!er 2it! t!e necessary skills and kno2led.e to act on t!e client8s &e!al: t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at !ospitali;in. t!e client restricts !is reedom andHor could cause !im some ot!er kind o !arm: t!e social 2orker does not t!ink t!at !eHs!e needs t!e client8s permission to !ave !imH!er !ospitali;ed: and t!e social 2orker &elieves t!at, as a rational adult, t!e client .enerally kno2s 2!at is in !isH!er &est interest. Considerin. all o t!e &elies t!at motivate t!e social 2orker8s &e!avior, t!e act o !avin. t!e client !ospitali;ed is a paternalistic one. #ut, is it an un=ustiia&ly paternalistic actG Alt!ou.! t!is paper !as only descri&ed t!e case in outline, satisyin. 9ert and Culver8s t2o conditions or =ustiication is easy to do. Considerin. t!e irst point, t!e .reatest &eneit t!at t!e client receives rom t!e act o paternalism is t!at !e is prevented rom endin. !is lie or si.niicantly causin. dama.e to it. @ivin. a lie, it is assumed, is &etter t!an prematurely endin. it. @ivin. a lie 2it! less si.niicant p!ysical dama.e is &etter t!an livin. a lie 2it! more si.niicant p!ysical dama.e. Fne could disa.ree 2it! t!e irst &eneit and still a.ree 2it! t!e second. 0!e second &eneit is a suiciently stron. &eneit t!at t!ere is no need to list more &eneits. Wit!out a reason t!at 2ould out2ei.! t!e &eneits .ained rom not actin. paternalistically in t!is case, t!e client is actin. irrationally. Re.ardin. t!e second point, to s!o2 t!at all rational persons 2ould a.ree t!at i t!ey 2ere in a similar situation paternalism 2ould &e accepta&le, amounts to s!o2in. 2!at t!e morally relevant properties o t!e case are and determinin. 2!et!er one 2ould pu&licly allo2 t!is kind o violation. As ar.ued, determinin. t!e morally relevant properties o a case depend on kno2in. moral t!eory. Usin. t!e moral t!eory developed &y 9ert *,AAA-, one can i.ure out t!e morally relevant properties o t!e case. A.ain, not!in. !in.es on t!is particular moral t!eory. Fne could use anot!er moral t!eory to t!e same end. /o2ever, .iven t!e .eneral nature o t!eir met!od o !i.!li.!tin. morally relevant properties, it is pro&a&ly t!e case t!at t!eir met!od is consistent 2it! ot!er moral t!eories. F&viously, t!e more inormation a&out a case one kno2s, t!e easier it 2ill &e to ans2er t!e 3uestions listed a&ove. 0!e case 2e are considerin. lacks muc! inormation t!at one mi.!t 2ant. (evert!eless, one can see !o2 t!e 3uestions !elp even in cases in 2!ic! t!e inormation is lackin.. Consider 3uestions ,, ), D, and B. Acts o paternalism, &y deinition, involve &reakin. t!e moral rule a.ainst deceivin. ot!ers. #y actin. paternalistically in t!is case, certain !arms are &ein. prevented, suc! as si.niicant p!ysical dama.e, possi&ly leadin. to deat!. 0!e relations!ip &et2een t!e social 2orker and t!e client is suc! t!at t!e social 2orker !as a duty to act in t!e manner s!e does. 0!e client 2ill receive certain &eneits, as e1plained a&ove, rom !er act o paternalism. Wit! more inormation, it 2ould &e possi&le to ans2er all ten o t!e 3uestions. From t!e ans2ers .iven so ar, t!ere is enou.! inormation or decidin. 2!et!er t!is kind o act 2ould &e pu&licly advocated, t!at is, 2!et!er it 2ould &e morally permissi&le. 7 all rational persons 2ould a.ree t!at allo2in. paternalism in t!is kind o case is =ustiied, t!en t!e act is morally permissi&le. 7 t!ere is disa.reement allo2in. paternalism in Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e similar circumstances, t!e act mi.!t &e morally permissi&le. 7t is plausi&le, &ased only on t!e inormation .iven a&ove, t!at t!e social 2orker8s act is most likely morally permissi&le. Even i it is not, t!e e1ample makes clear !o2 a social 2orker mi.!t .o a&out =ustiyin. an act o paternalism &ased on !er kno2led.e o moral t!eory. .! /oncl#sion 0!e ar.ument developed so ar in t!is paper may &e summari;ed in t!e ollo2in. manner5 *,- 0o avoid actin. in a paternalistic manner t!at is pro&lematic in a case, social 2orkers need to =ustiy t!e acts o paternalism t!ey commit. *)- 0o =ustiy t!e acts o paternalism t!ey commit, social 2orkers need to kno2 t!e morally relevant eatures o t!e cases o paternalism t!ey commit. *?- 0o kno2 t!e morally relevant properties o t!e cases o paternalism social 2orkers commit, t!ey need to kno2 moral t!eory. *D- 0o avoid un=ustiied paternalistic actions in a case, social 2orkers need to kno2 moral t!eory. 7 social 2orkers are in dan.er o re3uently committin. un=ustiied paternalistic acts to2ard t!eir clients and t!e ar.ument a&ove is sound, t!e implications or social 2ork education are clear. 0!e most o&vious implication is t!at social 2ork educators need to take seriously t!eir c!ar.e to teac! social 2orkers moral t!eory. Currently, most social 2ork pro.rams teac! et!ical t!eory t!rou.! one o t2o models. 0!e irst model is t!e diused model. 7n t!is model, social 2ork students do not take a course in moral t!eory. Rat!er, students are tau.!t moral t!eory as a part o every class t!ey take. 0!e second model re3uires students to take a discrete class on moral t!eory. 0!ere is some evidence t!at t!e second model !elps social 2ork students develop t!eir moral reasonin. skills &etter t!an t!e irst model. 0!e researc! su..ests t!at &y makin. moral t!eory a part o every class, it is eventually ne.lected *see Sanders, )++6-. Social 2ork educators, t!en, need to take more seriously t!e idea t!at re3uirin. social 2ork students to take a discrete et!ics course is more useul or t!e moral &urdens o social 2ork practice t!an re3uirin. t!em to learn moral t!eory t!rou.! a process o diusion. W!atever met!od sc!ools c!oose to teac! moral t!eory to social 2ork students, t!ey need to take et!ical t!eory more seriously t!an it appears t!ey do. Anot!er implication o t!e ar.ument is t!at social 2orkers need to !one t!eir moral reasonin. skills as proessionals. 7t is not enou.! to take one et!ics course as an under.raduate social 2ork ma=or or as a .raduate master8s student. 7ncorporatin. moral t!eory into t!e continuin. education pro.rams t!at proessional social 2orkers must complete 2ould not only serve proessionals 2ell: more importantly, it could prevent clients rom &ein. unnecessarily !armed &y t!eir social 2orkers. 7 social 2orkers are as concerned 2it! t!e 2ell &ein. o t!eir clients as t!ey claim to &e, takin. t!e education o et!ics seriously is a moral imperative t!at social 2orkers cannot aord to ne.lect. 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Coercive inluences5 7normed consent in court4 mandated social 2ork practice. Social Work, 12*?-, ?++4?+'. Sanders, S. *)++6-. Ethics education in social !ork: 'o"parin& outco"es of &raduate social !ork students fro" discrete and infused pro&ra"s, %octoral dissertation, University o Kentucky, @e1in.ton. Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2010 http:!!!.social!orker.co"#s!$e