Election 2001 European - Union - 2001 - Final - Report

BANGLADESH
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
1 OCTOBER 2001
EUROPEAN UNION
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
FINAL REPORT
Contents
THE MISSION ________________________________________________________________________ 1

Introduction _______________________________________________________________________ 1
Structure of the mission ________________________________________Error! Bookmark not defined.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK _________________________________________________________________ 2
Constitution _______________________________________________________________________ 2
Non Party Caretaker Government _____________________________________________________ 3
Electoral Law ______________________________________________________________________ 4
Electoral Law Amendments __________________________________________________________ 4
System of Appeals__________________________________________________________________ 5
ELECTORAL BODIES AND POLITICAL PARTIES ___________________________________________ 6
Election Commission _______________________________________________________________ 6
Electoral Enquiry Committees ________________________________________________________ 7
Political Parties ____________________________________________________________________ 7
Nomination of candidates ____________________________________________________________ 8
PRE ELECTION PERIOD _______________________________________________________________ 9
The Electoral Roll___________________________________________________________________ 9
Postal Ballot ______________________________________________________________________ 11
Violence _________________________________________________________________________ 11
Minorities ________________________________________________________________________ 12
Women __________________________________________________________________________ 13
Civic Education ___________________________________________________________________ 13
Media Monitoring __________________________________________________________________ 14
Relations with the Press ____________________________________________________________ 14
Domestic Observation______________________________________________________________ 14
Electoral Campaign ________________________________________________________________ 15
Mid Term Statement________________________________________________________________ 15
ELECTION DAY _____________________________________________________________________ 16
Facts And Figures _________________________________________________________________ 16
Polling and Counting Procedures ____________________________________________________ 17
Preliminary Statement ______________________________________________________________ 17
Repolling_________________________________________________________________________ 18
CONCLUSIONS______________________________________________________________________ 19
RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________________________________ 20
This report was produced by the EU Election Observation Mission and presents the EUEOM’s findings on the Parliamentary
Elections in Bangladesh. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied
upon as a statement of the Commission’s. The European Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this
report, nor does it accept responsibility for any use made thereof.
EU Election Observation Mission Bangladesh 2001 1
Final Report on the Parliamentary Elections
THE MISSION
Introduction
Since its secession from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh has experienced a turbulent political history, with
its parliamentary democracy and multi-party system challenged by assassinations, military rule and
electoral irregularities.The political climate is marked by tensions among rival parties and leaders
especially between Awami League on one side and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) on the other.
Politics pervades all socio-economic organisations and political violence is widespread; abuses and
infringements of civil rights and lax enforcement of most economic and social rights are often denounced;
together with serious prejudice to vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and minorities.
The recent political history of the country has seen a succession of boycotts, general strikes (hartals) and
accusations of vote rigging.
In February 1991, the BNP won a Parliamentary majority of 140 seats in the general elections and
formed a coalition government with the Islamic party Jamaat-I-Islam, with Begum Khaleda Zia becoming
Prime Minister after 8 years of military rule under General H.M Ershad.
In March 1994, controversy over a parliamentary by-election led to an indefinite boycott of Parliament by
the entire opposition. Opposition MP's resigned en masse from Parliament in December 1994. The
political impasse went on for almost two years, and the opposition parties boycotted general elections
held by the BNP in February 1996. Following this election, increasing popular pressure compelled the
BNP to pass a constitutional amendment to permit election under a caretaker government and dissolve
the short-lived Parliament on March 30. New polls were contested by all the major parties in mid-June
1996. A new government led by the Awami League and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina took its seat in
late June 1996.
Even though international and domestic election observers found the June 1996 election free and fair,
the BNP protested alleged vote rigging by the Awami League. In spite of these protests the BNP party
ultimately decided to join the new Parliament. The BNP soon charged that police and Awami League
activists were engaged in large-scale harassment and jailing of opposition activists. From the end of
1996, the BNP staged protests and parliamentary walkouts over this and other grievances. In June 1999,
the BNP and other opposition parties again began to abstain from Parliament. Opposition parties staged
an increasing number of nation-wide general strikes (hartals), rising from 6 days of general strikes in
1997 to 27 days in 1999. A four-party opposition alliance formed at the beginning of 1999 announced
that it would boycott parliamentary by-elections and local government elections unless the government
took steps demanded by the opposition to ensure electoral fairness. The government did not take these
steps, and the opposition has subsequently boycotted all elections, including municipal council elections
in February 1999, several parliamentary by-elections, and the Chittagong city corporation elections in
January 2000.
On July 15th 2001 Sheikh Hasina handed over power to a caretaker government, which was charged
with holding a general election within 90 days.
The 2001 election therefore represented an important test of Bangladesh's commitment to democracy
and of the political and public resolve to maintain the tradition of parliamentary governance restored in
1991, further consolidated in 1996. The request made by the government and the major political parties
to the EU to send observers was justified by the concern that these elections would have been fiercely
contested with the possibility of irregularities and large scale violence, and by the belief that the presence
of international observers could reduce the incidence of violence and inhibit abuses of the electoral
process, thereby contributing to increasing confidence in the election process.
In its resolution of 18 January concerning the situation in Bangladesh, the European Parliament
considered appropriate for the European Union, in the light of the potentially unstable political situation in
Bangladesh and of its deepening relationship with this country, to send a mission to monitor the
forthcoming general election, and called on the Council and the Commission to decide on this matter.
Preparation and deployment of the mission
Following invitations from the Government and the major political forces in Bangladesh, the Commission
undertook a Needs Assessment Mission to the country from 27 January to 6 February. Its conclusions
endorsed “the advisability of an EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) in the light of the criteria set out
in the Council’s resolution of 28 June 1998”, observing that the four conditions for advisability were
adequately met: universal franchise (also if there were allegations that names of non existent voters had
been added to the voters’ list), political parties and individual candidates able to take part in the elections,
freedom of expression and right to free movement and assembly, reasonable access to media for all
contesting parties and candidates.
On 13 June 2001, the European Commission adopted the decision to send an Election Observation
Mission “with a strong component of Long Term Observers (32 LTOs)” as well as a Core Team of 6
experts and approximately 30 Short Term Observers (STOs).
On 5 August, the Logistic Adviser arrived in Dhaka and started preparations for the mission.
On 21 August, with 4 members of the Core Team presents in Dhaka and the headquarters established at
the BRAC Centre, the European Union Election Observation Mission in Bangladesh (EU-EOMB) started
to work at full capacity.
The EOMB Core Team included Joaquim Antonio Miranda da Silva MEP, Chairman of the European
Parliament's Committee on Development and Co-operation, as Chief Observer, Paolo Salvia (Italy) as
Deputy Chief Observer, Charlotte Souibes (France) as Media Adviser, Francesco Torcoli (Italy) as LTO
Co-ordinator, Mr. Xavier Noc, (France) as Logistics Adviser, and Michael Meixner, (Germany) as
Administrative and Financial Adviser. 32 Long Term Observers arrived on 27 and 28 August. The briefing
took place during the following two days. On 30 August, the LTOs were deployed to 14 regional offices
throughout the country. One of them had to leave for family reasons a few days after deployment.
27 Short Term Observers arrived on 21-22 September and were joined by 7 locally recruited STOs. On
Election Day, the Mission numbered 72 EU Obsservers in total.
The decision to emphasise the long-term component of the observation mission proved appropriate. The
continuous presence of observers throughout the country from 30 August until after the elections gave
the EU-EOMB the possibility to rely on substantial findings and credibility towards the Bangladesh
authorities and political parties. LTOs assigned to the mission worked with professionalism and
commitment in a very challenging environment.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Constitution
The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh was promulgated on 4 November 1972. It was
suspended after the events of March 1982 and restored on November 1986.
Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy. The Prime minister, who holds a seat in Parliament, is head
of government. The Premier is assisted by a cabinet of ministers who are for the most part
Parliamentarians. The President, who has limited power, is the Head of State, and is indirectly elected by
Parliament every 5 years. The President’s powers are substantially expanded during the tenure of a
Caretaker government.
The Bangladesh Parliament, the Jatiya Sangsad, is composed of 300 members that are directly elected
from single member constituencies through simple majority..1 Candidates for parliamentary seats do not
have to be residents of the constituencies in which they run for office. An individual may stand for as
many as five seats from different constituencies simultaneously. If the person is elected in more than one
1
During the last mandate, under a constitutional amendment that has expired, there were an additional thirty women MPs elected
indirectly through a vote by the Parliament. Cfr. The constitution of the people’s republic of Bangladesh, Part V, art. 55 (3).
constituency, he/she will be able to occupy only one seat. For the other constituencies, by elections
have to be organised.
The sections of the Constitution that relate to Elections are two:

Chapter IIA2, that regulates the activity of the non-partisan Caretaker Government and Part VII3 that
establishes the Election framework.
Non-Partisan Caretaker Government
Under Bangladesh’s Constitution, a non-partisan Caretaker Government must be appointed by the

President of Bangladesh within fifteen days after Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved. The
Caretaker administration comprises a chief adviser and not more than ten other advisors. The chief
advisor is usually the most recently retired chief justice, but if not available, qualified or willing to hold the
office, then other distinguished persons may be chosen under further provisions.4
The non-partisan Caretaker Government exercises the executive powers of the State and functions as
an interim government. It is empowered to carry out all routine functions of the government and is not
supposed to take any policy decisions, except the ones necessary to exercise ordinary operations of
government. During the period that the Caretaker administration is in power, the provisions of the
Constitution requiring prime ministerial approval for presidential actions are not applied.5
The President of Bangladesh can also exercise additional legislative powers during the period of
Caretaker Government6. When the Parliament has been dissolved, the President, if “he is satisfied that
circumstances exist which render immediate action necessary”, can promulgate ordinances which have
the force of law.7 These ordinances must be laid before the next Parliament as soon as possible to
remain effective and they cannot change the Constitution or be incompatible with it.
The meaning of the Caretaker Government is to have a neutral body to provide for fair elections.
According to Article 58D (2) of the Constitution :“The non-partisan Caretaker Government shall give to
the Election Commission all possible aid and assistance that may be required for holding the general
election of members of parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially”. The Caretaker Government does not
have the power to replace members of the Election Commission since they are appointed for a five year
term and can only be removed through an impeachment procedure.8
Since the institution of the non-partisan Caretaker Government was adopted on 25th March 1996 with the
13th Amendment to the Constitution, it has become a respected part of the political system in
Bangladesh, including in the eyes of public opinion. It is true, however, that the Caretaker administration
is usually established after important steps in the electoral process have already been completed, such
as the compilation of the voters’ list.
Electoral process 2001
The Caretaker Government took office on 15 July 2001. The broad “reshuffle” of public officers was the
first act of the Government and sent a strong symbolic message of its non-partisan approach.
On 9 September, the EU-EOMB issued the following statement: “In spite of the critics, sometimes
vociferous, towards the two main players of the game (Caretaker Government and Election
Commission), their legitimacy and authority has not been questioned so far, and this gives credibility to
the process. The reshuffle of public officers, carried out by the government as of the day of its
appointment, has given an important signal to the entire society. However, some problems remain in the
effectiveness and transparency of their actions.”
2
Artt from 58E to 58E
3
Artt from 118 to 126
4
Cfr. Constitution of the People’s Republic Of Bangladesh (English version issued by the Ministry of Law, Justice and
Parliamentary Affairs, Dhaka January 1999), Chapter IIA Art 58B, 58C.
5
Ibidem. Art. 58D, 58E.
6
Under the constitutional provisions contained in Chapter III, “Ordinance Making Power” of Part V
7
Ibidem. Art.93 (1).
8
Ibidem. Chapter VII. Art. 118 (3) (5).
The Awami League was not satisfied with the “reshuffle” during the electoral campaign and increased its
criticism towards the Caretaker Government. In a meeting with EU-EOMB, Awami League
representatives stated “we do not want a three months dictatorship”. Sheikh Hasina, the party leader,
personally took every opportunity to criticise the government regarding the amendments to the electoral
law, the deployment of Army and the worsening of the Law and Order situation. In the last phase of the
electoral campaign she accused the Caretaker Government to be part of an alleged conspiracy
organised against Awami League. The allegations of partisanship could not be confirmed..
Concerning the efficiency of the government measures, the reshuffle meant concretely that key persons
such as sub-district executive officers and officers in charge of police did not have in-depth knowledge of
the area they were assigned to. Moreover, despite the fact that the heads of particular branches of local
government had been reshuffled, the professional staff further down the ladder remained in place and
therefore patronage links established over the past 5 years were not challenged or severed. Even on
other essential points of the government’s programme, e.g. the improvement of law and order situation
and the recovery of weapons, the results were not particularly satisfactory.
However, given the short time at its disposal and the heated atmosphere in which it had to operate, on
the whole, the Caretaker Government has performed adequately, succeeding in giving the perception, if
not the substance, of an environment that provided equal opportunities to all the contenders. In the long
run however, it is a only provisional institution that has proved very useful in an emergency situation but
that should sooner or later be replaced by an elected Government and a regular democratic process.
Electoral Law
The Representation of People Order dates from December 1972. It regulates the work of the Election
Commission and the duties of its officials, provides regulations for election disputes, determines electoral
expenses and prescribes polling day procedures. The Electoral Law broadly respects international
standards for a legitimate electoral process.
In some cases however, existing regulations encounter difficulties in terms of practical implementation,
with particular reference to the postal ballot, election expenses and sanctions against violations of the
electoral campaign regulations (see below). In other cases the system leaves much room for confusion,
i.e. regarding the modus operandi of the Election Commission and the nomination of candidates (see
below). Besides, there is a void regarding the essential point of the identification of voters (see below).
Another important problem concerns the fact that the key person in charge of election administration at
constituency level is the Deputy Commissioner, responsible also for the local administration and
nominated by the outgoing government.
Amendments to the Electoral Law
The Caretaker government introduced its first reforms to the Electoral Law on 8 August 2001, namely the
Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance 2001 (Ordinance I).9
The Ordinance I was the product of protracted discussions among civil society leaders, media and
politicians, based on cumulative experiences drawn from the general elections of 1991 and 1996.
The main points of the Ordinance I were:

• definition of the ‘Law enforcing agency’ comprising: the Military, Bangladesh Rifles (paramilitary
force), “Ansar” (civilian armed forces);
• the power to arrest any person on polling day was given to the members of any law enforcing
agency;
• clear conditions to exclude persons from election were indicated;10
• security deposit on nomination was raised from taka 5,000 to taka 10,000;11
9 ‘Representation of People Order 1972’

10 Article 4 of Ordinance I of 2001 introducing articles (ai), (aii) and (aiii) to article 12 of the Representation of People Order 1972
11 Refundable on getting one eighth of total votes cast, art. 41 (1) of RPO ‘72.
• local and foreign observers for the first time were given legal status to observe the vote in the polling
stations;12
• the High Court Division was given competence on all election disputes;13
• the amount of election expenses for each candidate was raised from taka 300.000 to taka 500.000;
expenditure ceiling for parties were also established;
• any person performing any duty in connection with the elections, was given the power, if authorised
by the Election Commission, to exercise the power of a magistrate to try election related offences;14
• registration procedures for political parties were established; registration was not mandatory;15
• violations of the electoral code of conduct, after a first warning, are punished with a 20,000 taka fine
(approximately 380 Euro);
• the Election Commission was given the power to punish any person for contempt in the same
manner as a High Court;16
• the Election Commission was empowered to formulate election rules - formerly the Commission
made rules with the consent of the government.17
Some provisions of the Ordinance I created dissent amongst the political parties. The Caretaker
government was urged to amend some of the rules introduced. Eventually, the Ordinance II was passed
on 2 September with the following points:
• The possibility to appeal the decision of the High Court Division within 30 days18;
• the abolition of the power for the Election Commission to remove a candidate19;
• the abolition of the power for the Election Commission to punish any person for its contempt as if it
were the High Court Division20.
These amendments in fact restricted the role and powers of the Election Commission, making clear that
both this institution and the Caretaker Government would have a limited ability to improve the electoral
framework.
System of Appeals
Voters’ list (until 1 October)

The Election Commission appoints Revising Authority at district level for the purpose of deciding claims
and objections about Electoral Roll during the prescribed time.
Pre-poll Irregularities (19 August - 1 Oct)

The responsibility to deal with these appeals falls under the authority of the Electoral Enquiry
Committee21.
Nomination of candidates (until 3rd September)

Where the nomination paper is rejected by the Returning Officer, an appeal should be lodged with the
Election Commission within 3 days following the day of rejection by the Returning Officer. No appeal can
be lodged against the decision of the Election Commission in this matter.
Election disputes (After 1 October)
12 Articles 10 and 42 of the Ordinance I of 2001 introduced this provision to article 29 and 91C of the Representation of People
Order 1972, respectively. Their rights and privileges are clearly set out in the electoral guidelines issued by the Election
Commission.
13 Articles 42, 44, 57, 58, 60-62, 67, 68, 70-72 and 90 of the Representation of People Order 1972 are amended by the articles 15,
16, 22, 23,25-33 and 38 of the Ordinance I of 2001 to give jurisdiction to the High Court Division in certain respects. The Ordinance
I also provides that the decision of the High Court Division shall be final subject to confirmation by Appellate Division if an appeal is
preferred.
14 The offences are mentioned in articles 73, 78-82 of the Representation of People Order 1972.
15 Chapter VIA of the Representation of People Order 1972 as introduced by article 39 of the Ordinance I of 2001.
16 Article 93B of the Representation of People Order 1972 as inserted by article 43 of the Ordinance I of 2001. But this provision
caused political dissentions among political parties, specially the Awami League. Ultimately the EC issued another ordinance on
September 2, 2001, Ordinance II of 2001 and abolished article 93B.
17 Article 94 of the Representation of People Order 1972 as entirely replaced by article 44 of the Ordinance I of 2001.
18 article 2 of Ordinance II
19 article 3 of Ordinance II abolished article 91D of the Representation of People Order 1972
20 article 4 of Ordinance II abolished article 93B of the Representation of People Order 1972
21 See paragraph on “Electoral Enquiry Committees”.
Any candidate taking part in the election can file a case with the High Court Division of the Supreme
Court by presenting an election petition. The High Court Division shall ‘endeavour’ to conclude the trial
within 6 months from the date on which the petition is made22. Ordinance II of 2001 allowed appeal to the
Appeal Division against the decision of the High Court Division.
ELECTORAL BODIES AND POLITICAL PARTIES
Election Commission
Article 118 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of an Election Commission for Bangladesh,
consisting of a Chief Election Commissioner and of any such number of other Election Commissioners, if
any, as the President may from time to time direct. The President appoints the Chief Election
Commissioner and other Election Commissioners. When the Election Commission consists of more than
one person, the Chief Election Commissioner is to act as its Chairman. Under the Constitution, the term
of office of any Election Commissioner is five years from the date on which he enters in office. A person
who has held office as Chief Election Commissioner is not eligible for appointment in the service of the
Republic. Any other Election Commissioner is, on ceasing to hold such office, eligible for appointment as
Chief Election Commissioner, but is not eligible for appointment in the service of the Republic.
Powers of Election Commission23

The Election Commission is an independent constitutional body in the exercise of its functions and
subject only to the Constitution and any other law. The Commission may authorise its Chairman or any of
its members or any of its officers to exercise and perform all or any of its powers and functions under the
law. It shall be the duty of all executive authorities to assist the Election Commission in the discharge of
its functions.24 The Commission has the power to require any person or authority to perform such
functions or render such assistance for the purpose of election as it may direct.
Election Commission Secretariat

The Election Commission is supported by a full-fledged Secretariat ,which executes its decisions and
orders. The Election Commission Secretariat is headed by a Secretary to the Government. The functions
of the Election Commission Secretariat are, among others:
(a) Preparation of electoral rolls for use in all national and local bodies elections.
(b) Delimitation of Parliamentary constituencies.
(d) Reservation and allocation of symbols to political parties/candidates, when required;
(e) Supervision of polling arrangements throughout the country on the eve of each election and
appointment of polling personnel:
(f) Printing and supply of ballot papers to all polling stations located all over the country;
(j) Consolidation of all election results and their formal publication in the official gazette, as required by
law;
(k) Constitution of Tribunal for the disposal of election petitions and performance of such other functions
in this regard as may be prescribed by any other law;
Field Offices
(a) Divisional: There are 6 Deputy Election Commissioners posted at 6 Divisional Headquarters.
Functions of the Divisional Offices are to maintain liaison between the Election Commission Secretariat
and the subordinate field level offices and to co-ordinate the work relating to conduct of all types of
elections and registration of voters and preparation of electoral rolls, including day to day amendments
and corrections in the electoral rolls and other matters as and when entrusted by the Election
Commission .
(b) District: There are 83 Election Offices in the 64 District Headquarters headed by District Election
Officers. Functions: The District Election Officers carry out all work relating to registration of voters,
printing of voters’ list, management of national and local elections, training of polling personnel and all
logistical arrangements for elections. As an officer of the Election Commission, the District Election
22 Art 51(6) of Representation of People Order 1972

23 (Article 118(4) and 126 of the Constitution, read with Article 4 of the Representation of the People Order, 1972)
24 Article 126 of the Constitution and Articles 4 and 5 of the Representation of the People Order, 1972
Officer renders all possible assistance to the Returning Officer and polling personnel with forms, packets,
manuals, instructions and supply of ballot boxes, electoral rolls, ballot papers and maintains all accounts
for expenses incurred for different elections.
(c) Thana (or Upazila): At the lowest tier of the field organization, there are Thana Election Officers in all
Thanas. The main function of the Thana Election Officer is to assist divisional/district offices in the
discharge of functions relating to elections.
Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers

For all national and local elections, Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers are appointed
from among government officials by the Election Commission or by authorized officers of the
Commission for conducting specified election tasks.
Appointment of Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers

For the purpose of election of a Member of a Constituency, the Commission appoints a Returning Officer
for each constituency. A person may also be appointed as Returning Officer for two or more
constituencies. The Commission may appoint as many Assistant Returning Officers as may be
necessary. Traditionally DCs (Deputy Commissioner) and TNOs (Thana Nirbahi Officer) are appointed
as ROs (Returning Officer) and AROs (Assistant Returning Officer) respectively. This question has
raised some reservations and concerns.
Presiding Officers and Polling Officers

Within the constituency, Polling Stations are set up with up to five polling booths each, in such a way
that about four hundred voters can cast their votes at a booth between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. on polling day.
Each polling station is headed by a Presiding Officer (PO) and each booth by an Assistant Presiding
Officer (APO). Two Polling Officers assist each APO. All these officials – POs, APOs and Polling Officers
- are drawn from government and NGOs, taking into account their experience, abilities, integrity and
courage.
According to the EU-EOMB findings, the Election Commission carried out its duties in an objective way,
even though it was working under pressure from certain political parties, criticising some EC members for
alleged partisanship. Regarding the organisational and logistical aspects, the Commission has performed
satisfactorily. On Election Day, all the sensitive and non-sensitive materials were available and the
polling officers were present and committed to their job.
On the other hand, in terms of transparency, no clear regulations were in existence regarding rules and
procedures for the work of the Commission and for the publication of its decisions. In spite of repeated
requests, the EU-EOMB was not able to obtain satisfactory information on this subject.
Electoral Enquiry Committees
The Electoral Enquiry Committees (EEC) were established in 1994 at district level25 to prevent and
control pre-poll irregularities. Any interested person is able to address the EEC with a complaint. The
EEC receives the case, evaluates it and then delivers a judgement. This is later sent to the Election
Commission which gives the final verdict.
The Election Commission office that receives all complaints from the EECs, had processed 180
complaints one week before E-day, and had issued warnings in many cases, but without imposing a
single fine. The Committees themselves had initiated 60% of all complaints. Political parties complained
against one another in most other cases and very few complaints were initiated by the general public.
The considerable number of violations of the electoral code reported by the press and by the EU-EOMB
observers and the persistence of this phenomenon until the end of the electoral campaign clearly show
that the statutory redress of pre-poll irregularities has not functioned adequately.
Political Parties
25 see The Representation of the People Order, 1972 , Chapter VII art. 91(A)
The Awami League (AL), was in the past legislature the ruling party in Bangladesh, commanding over
176 out of 330 seats in Parliament, including 28 seats reserved for women. The AL chairperson is the
former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the “Father of Bangladesh”
(Banga Bandhu). Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had been leader of the Awami League before secession from
Pakistan and had served as Prime Minister and President of Bangladesh until being assassinated with
the rest of his family by army mutineers in August 1975. The last general elections in June 1996, were
observed by EU observers and considered “substantially free and fair”, AL won 36% of the popular vote.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was the main opposition party with 113 seats in the last
Parliament. Begum Khaleda Zia, the wife of General Ziaur Rahman, who founded BNP in 1977, chairs
the party. General Ziaur Rahman took over the Presidency in Bangladesh in January 1977, but was
assassinated in May 1981 by rebel army officers.
The Jatiya Party (JP) was represented in the outgoing Parliament with 33 seats. JP was founded in
1986 by the former army chief-of-staff, General Ershad, who in 1982 appointed himself Chief Martial Law
Administrator, and in December 1983 took over the Presidency. Elected as President in October 1986,
Ershad was eventually deposed in December 1990, amidst mounting civil protest led by AL Sheikh
Hasina and BNP Khaleda Zia. After the 1996 general elections, JP entered into an alliance with AL to
enable its chairperson to become Prime Minister. However, JP withdrew its support to the presently
ruling party in March 1998 and joined the opposition.
In April 1999 the Jatiya Party, split up into two factions when the party’s secretary general, Anwar
Hossain Manju, who also held a cabinet position with the AL government, formed a group comprising 12
of the 33 JP lawmakers. It split again in April 2001 when Mr. Manjur, led the split in protest against Mr.
Ershad’s.
The Jamaat-e-Islami is a religious party, represented in the last Parliament with three seats. The party
ran on a joint opposition ticket against the ruling Awami League government together with BNP, Jatiya
Party, and Islami Oikya Jote.
The 11 Parties Alliance is a coalition of small parties of the left and includes the Communist Party, the
Workers Party, and the Workers Peasants Socialist Party.
There are a considerable number of minor political parties and groupings, which have not reached
political significance or influence nation-wide.
BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, the Manjur faction of JP and Islami Oikya Jote formed the so-called 4 parties
alliance to contest the 2001 elections. The large majority of the 300 candidates belonged to BNP, 31 to
Jamaat-e-Islami, and a few others to the remaining two parties.
Polarisation, fierce rivalry, personal controversies are the main features of the political environment in
Bangladesh. Every person or institutions was supposed to be related to one of the parties. Also trade
unions, student organisations, NGOs belong or are perceived as belonging to AL, BNP or Jamaat.
A progressive monetarisation of politics is under way, with more and more rich people using elections to
promote their own interests. The use of money has become one of the key elements to gain the vote of
the electorate. This phenomenon was reflected in the problematic process of candidate nominations.
Nomination of candidates26
Candidate nomination forms contain a declaration from the candidate expressing his/her willingness to
accept the nomination and that s/he is not disqualified. The candidate's proponent and the second are
required to make a declaration that they have not subscribed to any other nomination. The candidate,
proponent or second presents the nomination paper to the Returning Officer. All subsequent nomination
papers concerning the same candidate for the same constituency shall be void.
26
The Representation of People Order 1972 article 12(2)-(7)
To be acceptable a nomination paper must fulfil the following condition: the candidate or any person on
his/her behalf has to deposit a sum of 10,000 taka (approximately 190 Euro).
Only one deposit is required for candidates contesting in more than one constituency and nobody is
allowed to contest in more than 5 constituencies.
The Returning Officer, in the presence of the persons attending the scrutiny, examines the nomination
papers and decides on objections raised by people present.
A nomination is void if:

1. the candidate is not qualified, i.e.
• a person holding any office of profit on the service of the Republic or of any statutory authority;
• a person imprisoned for offences or removed from service in any mode provided in the law;
• a trustee of a private benevolent trust;
• a person defaulted in the payment of a loan or its instalment(s).
2. the proponent or second are not qualified to subscribe;
3. the security deposit is not provided;
4. Signature(s) of the proponent or second are not genuine.
The rejection of a nomination paper shall not invalidate other valid nomination papers by the same
candidate. Minor mistakes shall not invalidate the nomination and the Returning Officer may allow it to be
remedied. Where the nomination paper is rejected by the Returning Officer, an appeal may be lodged
with the Election Commission within 3 days following the day of rejection by the Returning Officer. No
appeal can be made against the decision of the Election Commission in the matter of nomination.
Although nominations are submitted on behalf of individual candidates and not through the political
parties, each party prepares its own “unofficial” list. Once the deadline for the presentation of
candidatures has passed, there is no more possibility of “fresh” nomination. To substitute the rejected
candidates, the parties have the possibility to ask independent or so-called “rebel” candidates (persons
who have presented nomination papers against the decision of their own party) to run for their list.
During the 2001 process, the question of nominations encountered several problems, in particular in
relation to candidates presenting themselves against their own party, changes of party at the last minute
and intra-party clashes. Several interlocutors explained this situation with the fact that the candidature is
no longer reserved for people active in the framework of political parties. The tendency at present is for
affluent people to run for election and for money to become an important factor in the campaign.
Returning Officers finalised the revision of the candidate nominations at the end of August. They rejected
143 applicants, most of them because of bank loan default. The candidates had time until the 3rd of
September to present an appeal and the Election Commission should have taken a decision by 5th
September. On 6th the final list of candidates should have been published. The 6th was also the starting
day of the electoral campaign. In fact, the Election Commission postponed several times the
announcement of the result of the appeals of rejected candidates. The activity of the “rebel” candidates
for both AL and BNP gained momentum and contributed to the growing violence and confusion.
PRE ELECTION PERIOD
The Electoral Roll
According to art. 119 of the Bangladesh Constitution, the Election Commission delegates the preparation
of the electoral roll to Parliament. Under constitutional provisions, there shall be one electoral roll for
each constituency and is forbidden to classify electors according to religion, race caste or sex.27
A person is eligible to be enrolled in the voter’s register if he/she:

• Is a citizen of Bangladesh.
27
Cfr. Art. 121.
• Is not less than eighteen years of age.

• Does not stand declared by a competent court to be of unsound mind.
• Is or is deemed by law to be a resident of that constituency.28
Preparation of the 6th electoral Roll

Between 15 May and 30 June 2000, the Election Commission carried out a nationwide voter registration
exercise that resulted in the compilation of a completely new voter list, the 6th electoral roll since
independence. In total, 267,374 information collectors were involved in the exercise, 67,898 Supervisors,
6,102 Assistant Registration Officer and 83 Registration Officers.29
To accomplish the work, registrars went to each household and, according to the Election Commission's
instructions, no person should be added to the voters’ roll unless he or she was interviewed in person. A
return visit would be scheduled if members of a family unit were not at home when the registrars first
visited.30
Once the draft registers were compiled they were posted for two weeks, from 18 July to 3 August 2000,
at district and thana offices, the offices of union council chairmen and commissioners of city corporations,
educational institutions used as polling centres and other “convenient public places”. The draft list
included 74,675,749 registered voters. The deadline for appeal was set for 20th August 2000. The EC
reported that they had received 68,746 appeals from the public for corrections on the voter list, 44,621 of
which were requests for enrolment, 21,313 were objections and 2,812 requests for corrections.31 The
final roll was published on 26 October 2000.32
On 24 May 2001, the Election Commission decided by a circular that the roll should be displayed in all
Unions/Pouro and Sava/Ward of City Corporations (all units of local governments bodies at the lowest
level) from 27 May 2001 for the purpose of public scrutiny and updating.33
The EU-EOMB asked the Election Commission how may complaints, objections and requests for
correction had been received, but no clear answer was ever given. Observers were only told the total
number of voters on 15 May 2001 was 75,037,178, including 38,661,594 men and 36,402,543 women.
Controversies over the Voters’ list
The voters’ list increased by 32%, compared to that used for the 1996 Elections, when 56.716.935 voters
were registered. In some areas, even larger increases in the voters’ list were reported to the EU-EOMB.
In Comilla, the number of voters increased by 37% (2,041,895 in 1996 and 2,810,051 in 2001). In Bhola
the District Commissioner told the EU-EOMB that 668,289 voters had been registered in 1996 and
1,062,747 in 2001. In Pabna, there was an increase by 37% and in Pirojpur the District Commissioner
reported a 35% increase34.
Some points can partially explain the inaccuracies in the updated voters’ list, including:
• a rudimentary civil registration system. Most citizens have no identity documents. Tax and utility
invoices are not sufficient proof of identity.
• a high rate of illiteracy (estimated between 45 and 65 %, depending on sources). Compilation of
information on each person is only as accurate as the registrar’s judgement as to how a person’s
28
Cfr. Art 122 (2).
29
Cfr. Election Commission Annual Report July 1999 – June 2000 (only in Bengali), p. 17
30
According to an IFES report, it is probably overly optimistic to think that all these procedures have been respected. Cfr.
International Foundation For Election System, Pre-Election Technical Assessment Republic of Bangladesh, September 2000, p.17.
31
The detailed procedure for amendment corrections is given in the Electoral Roll Rules’82 (ERR’82) rule 10. As per rule 11of the
ERR’82, claims and objections by person not entitled to make or present such claim/objection shall be rejected. Here the law does
not specify the entitled persons, presumably are those persons from the same area as the Electoral Roll. See also Election
Commission, Annual Report for 2000, p.17. (only in Bengali).
32
A copy of the Electoral Register was made available for sale to the public on CD-Rom.
33 th
In the circular, it was not specified for how long the voter list should have been posted. Cf. Election Commission 24 May 2001
Circular (only in Bengali). Regarding the deadline for updating the voters list
34
According to some sources the 1996 voter’s list was not accurate at all and many persons had been missed in the registration
process, which would explain the huge increase.
name should be spelled in each case.35 Many common names are shared by thousands of persons
and the use of a “family’ name is not a common practice in Bangladesh.
• high numbers of homeless people. General estimates indicate there are 3 to 5 million people who
live in temporary shelter.36
• and financial incentives. Field workers involved in the updating of the voters’ list received 6 thaka per
form filled and had an interest in increasing the number of registered people.
Doubts on the impartiality of the officials and the objectivity of the operation, conducted during Awami
League government, were presented to the mission. The complaints focused on two main problems, e.g.
the inclusion of fake voters and the intentional exclusion of genuine ones.
BNP reported a huge number of irregularities on the voters’ list to the EU EOMB. In Comilla, BNP
candidates claimed that their supporters had deliberately not been registered. In Bogra, BNP leaders
alleged that the registrars were biased toward Awami League. In Dhaka, BNP reported that 50.000
voters had not been registered and that 30.000 voters’ names on the list were fake. However, not many
complaints had been submitted officially to the Election Commission and no evidence was provided to
support these allegations.
According to an investigative report produced by an NGO, in several constituencies the increase of

registered voters was above 40%. In Chittagong district, a high percentage of investigated cases
revealed problems. It is not possible for the EU-EOMB to give a definite assessment of the integrity of
the voters’ roll. Many elements indicate that the flaws were numerous and important, but the LTOs
reported no concrete evidence nor have the parties substantiated their allegations.
Voter identification
Another problem, directly related to the voters’ list, is the voter identification procedure. The provisions of
the Electoral Law on the identification of the voters through identity cards have been suspended.37 The
Election Commission has not issued further instructions on how to identify the voters, leaving a vacuum
in the legislation. Party agents present in the Polling Stations had the opportunity to challenge the identity
of the voters38. This system generates confusion and may be used to intimidate voters, attributing to
party representatives an inappropriate role.
Postal Ballot
The electoral law provides that government officials (civil servants, members of security forces),
prisoners and persons professionally involved in the electoral process, such as polling officers, parties
agents (and possibly domestic observers), are entitled to vote through postal ballot.39 However this
provision has not been fully implemented. It has even been reported that many Deputy Commissioners
did not have information at all on postal ballots. This meant that a very large number of citizens, (the
estimate number can easily reach one million) had been deprived of the right to vote. In fact, EU-EOMB
and UNEAD teams reported that only in 9% of 52 Consolidation Centres monitored, postal ballot papers
were received and counted.
Violence
The most striking characteristic of politics in Bangladesh is the permanent confrontation between BNP
and the Awami League. Political differences did not lead to debates but to accusations, defamation,
insults and violence. In fact, violence has severely affected the entire electoral process. Its repression
35
According to some sources the 1996 voter’s list was not accurate at all and many persons had been missed in the registration
35
process, which would explain the huge increase. Cf. The EU’s relations with Bangladesh
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/bangladesh/intro/ ), 2001 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, Stato
del Mondo 1997. Annuario economico e geopolitico mondiale, Il Saggiatore, Milano, p. 496,
36
Cfr. International Foundation For Election System, Pre-Election Technical Assessment Republic of Bangladesh, September
2000, p. 19.
37
Cfr. The Representation of the People Order, 1972, Chapter III Election Art. 31 ((8), p 21 (English Version as modified up to the
th
8 August 2001)
38
Cfr. The Representation of the People Order, 1972, Chapter III Election Art. 33
39
RPO n.155 of 1972, Chapter III-Election, Art.27
was not effective because the political parties did not commit themselves to avoiding violent
confrontations. Although they publicly complained about the spread of violence in the country, there was
little effort on their part to control their supporters.
All the parties met by the EU-EOMB condemned the use of violence during the electoral campaign and
declared to be ready to sign a common declaration, calling for the end of violence. The public speeches
of their leaders, however, seemed to contradict this statement. During Khaleda Zia’s presentation of the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party manifesto in Dhaka, a long video was shown with repeated filming of
mutilated bodies and bloodshed. The movie conveyed the impression that the party was out for revenge
and retaliation. On the opposing side, Sheikh Hasina, in a public meeting in Feni, gave full support to a
very controversial candidate, a fugitive from criminal justice. The meeting was the final act of an
aggressive campaign of the Awami League, which had asked to drop criminal charges against this
candidate, to protest against the local police's attitude and to ask for the removal of the Deputy
Commissioner (who was also the Returning Officer).
Some of the LTOs got caught in some of the clashes, such as the LTO responsible for Bhola district. On
10 September he was visiting the Upazila (administrative level below district) office in Lalmohan, while a
violent clash occurred in the street with 2 activists killed and 5 injured. In Upazila Nagarkanda on 21
September, the LTO based in Faridpur was stopped by a group of party supporters who asked him to
transport a person that had been injured (allegedly by another party’s supporters) to the hospital.
A UNEAD summary of incidents reported in the press in the period 26 August-30 September, rates the
total number of incidents at 139.40 Fifty incidents resulted in 84 deaths and 108 incidents resulted in 2780
injured. In 31% of cases, the victims were Awami League supporters and in 26% BNP supporters.
This report shows a grievous balance of violence, although both main parties portrayed themselves as
victims of attacks from their opponents. Violence is undoubtedly one of the features of Bangladesh’s
short political history and has been one of the main issues discussed by the media. In few countries were
similar levels of politically related violence reported. The level of violence observed is a clear hindrance
to the development of a normal democratic process; however it is difficult to assess how violence
affected the voters’ choice. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Election Day was surprisingly calm,
with only sporadic episodes of violence reported.
Minorities
According to official figures from the 1991 census, the religious and ethnic minorities stood at 12.6% of
the total population. Hindus account for 10.5% (12.5 million), Christian for 0.3%, Buddhist for 0.6% and
other religious minorities for 0.3%. Hindus, mostly Bangla speaking are the biggest religious minority
community and they are scattered all over the country. Similarly spread are the Christians while the
Buddhist populations are largely concentrated in Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Patuakhali. The
highest proportions of Hindus to Muslims in Bangladesh live in the city of Comilla.
The EU-EOMB mission made contacts with the Hindu community and other religious groups. Inter-
religious cohabitation seemed to vary from area to area. In Cox’s Bazar, there seemed to be a pacific
cohabitation between different communities, both in rural and urban areas, where several mosques and
temples stand side by side. During a “Motivational Workshop”, organized by the Ramu Assistant
Returning Officer, around 350 women, both Muslim and Hindu, attended the workshop even if it was
specially targeting Muslim issues. In Dhaka, the EU-EOMB was told by members of the Hindu minority
that they felt treated as second class citizens, both men and women. Regarding election issues, they
expressed concerns about the lack of ethnic minority candidates in these elections. Hindus said they
were discriminated against by most women organisations and NGOs are, who help mainly Muslim
women. Anyway, they said that their situation had improved a little in the last few years.
In meetings with the EU-EOMB, some parties (Jamaat-e-Islami and BNP especially) referred to the
Hindu minority question. These parties foresaw a low turnout, due to the overall security situation,
although this minority (10-12% of the total population) could have assumed a crucial role in the election.
40
The United Nations Electoral Assistance Division co-ordinated the work of several international observation missions in
Bangladesh.
Furthermore, they denounced the possibility that Indian nationals could come to Bangladesh to vote in
the areas along the border.
The vote of minorities became one of the main issues of the Awami League's electoral campaign. In
some areas, LTOs confirmed that women and minorities were worried that they might face problems
casting their vote freely. On election day, however, observers did not report significant obstacles
hindering the vote of minorities.
On the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT), despite the signature of a Peace accord between the government
and the tribal people three years ago, the situation was still volatile. The chairman of the Chittagong Hill
Tract regional Council during the last months accused the government of failing to implement its treaty
obligations. A separate voters’ list with only CHT “permanent resident” was demanded. Such a list
should only include indigenous people and not migrant Bengalis. The Partbattya Chattagram Jana
Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) called a two days hartal in the three districts of the Chittagong Hill Tract, to
boycott the elections. The EU-EOMB was not able for security reasons to observe in the Hill districts.
According to the figures of the Election Commission, the turnout for the three Hill Tracts districts was
much lower than in the rest of the country, but no violence or other major irregularities were reported. 41
Women
The Constitution of Bangladesh grants equal rights to women and men in all spheres of public
life.42However, due to a variety of cultural factors, women’s rights are often violated. Various laws have
been enacted and amended to protect women’s rights: the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, the
Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the Family Court Ordinance of 1985, the Child Marriage Registration Act
of 1992, and the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Act of 1974.
However, most often, women are not conscious of their rights; this is particularly true of poor women. In
spite of the work done by NGO’s to increase women’s awareness of the election process, there are still
many barriers. In particular, it is said that women usually vote according to the wish of the dominant
person in their family. In Netrokona 3 and 4 constituencies, a section of women voters never cast their
vote due to religious beliefs.
On Election Day, a high turn out of women was reported almost everywhere by EU observers43. The
team deployed in Dhaka reported that women turned out in huge numbers to cast their vote, including
“very old and frail ones”. However, in the Narayangani constituencies, women often seemed unaware
how to cast their vote.
37 Women were candidates in 47 constituencies and 6 were elected.
In meetings arranged by an LTO based in Dhaka, focussing on gender issues, the main NGO demands
were: direct election of minimum 64 seats reserved for women (one per district) and equal opportunities
for women in Parliament, local Government, and in Government Departments.
Civic Education
Various voter education programmes were held around the country by NGOs and by government
organisations. These programs used dramas and folk songs to teach people how to vote and why it was
important to vote. Especially in rural areas, these programmes played a positive role in enhancing
awareness and education about the election process. LTOs from Cox’s Bazaar reported a visible effort to
target women voters. These programs helped women realise their rights and responsibilities as equal
standing citizens but failed to explain electoral procedures. In Khulna, many NGOs were keen to get
41
National turnout 74,87%. Khagrachhari district 57,58% (in 1996 65,24%), Rangamati district 44,31% (in 1996 58,51%),
Bandarban district 58,80% (in 1996 60,24%).
42
Cf. Constitution Article 28(1), 28(2), and 28(3).
43
Official data not yet available.
involved in voter education programmes but lacked sufficient funds as they preferred to stay independent
rather than join an umbrella organisation. In few cases, LTOs reported that the programmes
implemented were politically biased, and sometimes, that the message was poor and not neutral.
Media Monitoring
As there is little literature on the media in Bangladesh, the EU-EOMB started with a comprehensive
analysis of the situation44. There is a total absence of EC rules and regulations governing media
coverage of the campaign. The EU-EOMB focussed on media access for all major political parties and
the possible influence of media coverage of the campaign on voting behaviour.
Given the absence of a legal framework regulating the media coverage of the election the EU-EOMB's
monitoring was restricted to newscast. The Bangladeshi media are, by and large, of a rare quality and
most report the news accurately. However, newspapers show political tendencies, when quantitative
data is cross-referenced with qualitative findings.
Overall, the media in Bangladesh did not attempted to sway the vote dramatically to one side or the
other. Print and electronic media showed restraint in their coverage of the violent electoral campaign.
The Mission observed no instances of news coverage directly calling to vote for one specific candidate or
against another. Political parties or candidates raised no complaint with the EU-EOMB of being denied
coverage by media outlets. There was one instance where a private television outlet [ETV] was accused
of biased coverage, but that was denied by the EU-EOMB's monitoring findings.
There were a few special programmes and debates on BTV and ETV, not regulated by the Electoral
Commission. Political campaigning advertisements were aired on private TV channels, although not
regulated by the Electoral Commission and therefore not bound to be financially transparent. BTV and
Betar broadcast no political advertisement.
On the whole, the results of the monitoring of printed and electronic media, show that there was no
significant disproportion in the space allotted to the different parties and all contestants received a
substantially fair treatment.45
Relations with the Press
The EU EOMB maintained a high profile in the Bangladeshi media throughout the mission. The Head of
Mission and his Deputy frequently talked to the press and received much media coverage. At regional
level, LTOs were also in contact with the local media to present themselves and the mission. They were
specifically briefed on the nature of their contacts with the local press and had strict guidelines to observe
when dealing with journalists.
All press conferences and communication between the EU EOMB and the English and Bangla press
were reported fairly by the media - except in one case, later corrected by the newspaper.
A press conference was held on August 29 to present the Core Team and the EU EOMB to the national
media. On September 21st, a press release was sent out to keep the media appraised of the first
debriefing of the LTOs in Dhaka. On Election night, the Head of Mission made a statement to the press,
followed by a more comprehensive press conference held on October 2nd. Finally, to present the long-
term component of the EU EOMB, an informal press meeting was held with carefully chosen LTOs, in the
presence of the Head of Mission and the Media Advisor. On the whole, the media reported the findings of
LTOs correctly.
Domestic Observation
Domestic observation was one of the most relevant issues covered by the Press. Several umbrella
organisations were willing to observe the election process and the number of observers was supposed to
reach several hundred thousand people.
44
A specific report on Media has been prepared.
45 th
The monitoring process began on September 9
In several articles the funding of these organisations, their credibility and relations with political parties
were questioned. During meetings with the EU-EOMB, almost all the political parties questioned the
neutrality of the domestic observer organisations. The Awami League in particular questioned the
participation of Fair Election Monitoring Alliance (FEMA). Some newspapers reported that individual
members of FEMA allegedly accused the leaders of the organisation of favouring one party. The EU-
EOMB received no evidence to support the allegation.
Each monitoring organisation had to apply at district level before 9 September. The Returning Officer
then was to decide on issuing authorisations, according to guidelines issued by the Election Commission
(EC). Only government-registered organisations were eligible. Domestic observer organisations, such as
FEMA and the Asia Foundation, complained that no clear rules had been established for their
authorisation, that different criteria were used in the different districts (as reported also by EU-EOMB
LTOs) and that artificial obstacles were created. FEMA at the end was given “special permission” to
observe the election although it was not registered. The EC exercised its discretionary authority to allow
FEMA to participate, as it monitored the 1996 elections. The Awami League questioned this decision.
To solve logistical problems, the Election Commission (EC) decided to distribute 150,000 accreditation
cards to local observers through the Asia Foundation. FEMA and other organisations opposed this
decision, declaring that this responsibility should not be entrusted to a private entity. The responsibility of
disseminating the accreditation cards to local observers had previously been the duty of the EC.
The great variety and numbers of domestic observers is a clear indication of the important commitment
of Bangladesh’s civil society to this election. However, this phenomenon risks widening the gap between
the general population and political parties. It is also true that such large numbers of domestic observers
represent a very difficult task to manage for an election administration already at the limit of its
capabilities. Moreover, the sheer number of observers involved meant that selection and training could
not always guarantee the necessary standard of quality.
Electoral Campaign
The electoral campaign officially started on 6 September. However, political parties started their
campaign all over the country beforehand. Campaigning mainly consisted of noisy demonstrations of
supporters, often paid by the parties, and of door to door visits. The Election Commission provided a
strict Code of Conduct, regulating in detail subscriptions and donations to parties, the use of government
accommodation, the use of posters and leaflets, the use of motorcycles and other means of transport
and a register of statements. All parties systematically violated this Code, without incurring effective
sanctions. The Election Commission issued many warnings, but no fine was imposed on any candidate.
Inflammatory language and smear campaigns were widely used by all contenders, contributing to further
increasing the level of violence and intimidation. In the Barisal Division, LTOs reported horrific colour
posters showing mutilated bodies displayed in most districts, to spread fear amongst the population.
Freedom of movement and freedom of speech, however, were generally assured for all parties, except in
certain areas, e.g. some localities in Feni and Bhola districts. Each party was able to present its
Manifesto, indicating the main points of its programme. EU-EOMB teams reported that parties hardly
debated programmes between each other. This was also the case in the press. Sheik Hasina and
Khaleda Zia, the two main protagonists of the campaign, refused to enter in a direct debate, neither on
television nor in public.
Mid Term Statement
On 21 September, after the LTO debriefing in Dhaka, the EU-EOMB released a statement with some
preliminary findings related to the electoral process:
“The European Union Election Observation Mission in Bangladesh [EOMB] is pleased to

announce the first findings of its 31 Long Term Observers [LTOs] deployed in the 14 regional
offices of Bangladesh since August 30th. During the first part of their assignment, the LTOs have
visited 63 districts. They were debriefed by the EOMB Core Team in Dhaka last week.
They will be joined by more than 30 Short Term Observers [STOs] on September 22nd and will
remain in Bangladesh until after Election Day.
The EOMB notices that:

• The LTOs report that the authorities in charge of implementing the election process are
generally carrying out their task in a fair way.
• European observers notice the existence of freedom of movement and speech in most of the
monitored districts, notwithstanding the difficult circumstances.
• Voter/civic education and awareness programs are being implemented in almost all districts.
These efforts are carried out by government officials as well as by NGOs. The European
Observers point out that some of the voter awareness effort is being directed at increasing
women voters’ information in Bangladesh.
However, the European observers stress that serious problems subsist:

• The EOMB remains concerned by politically motivated violent incidents and their effect on
the overall atmosphere of the electoral campaign. It notices that the political parties also
bear a significant responsibility in the spreading of election related violence.
• The EOMB is preoccupied by the practice of smear campaigning, the usage of inflammatory
language and brutal electoral campaigning material. These practices contribute to create a
heated atmosphere in the country and hinder the development of a peaceful election
process.
• LTOs have reported numerous violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct for Political
Parties and Candidates, which questions the authorities effectiveness in enforcing these
rules.
• Due to the limited implementation of the procedure regarding postal ballots, the Mission is
concerned that a large number of Bangladeshi citizens [Police, military, polling officers, local
observers, prisoners] could be disenfranchised in the coming elections.
• Various political parties complaints have been presented to the European observers
regarding deliberate inaccuracies in the voters’ list. However, no concrete documentation
was supplied to support these allegations.
The EOMB expresses a strong wish that its presence in all six Divisions during the coming
elections reinforces Bangladesh’s commitment to democracy through a democratic, transparent
and peaceful electoral process.”
Election Day
Facts And Figures
Date of Election Monday, 01 Oct. 2001

Polling Hours 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. (without break)
Number of constituencies 300
Number of polling stations 29978
Number of polling booths 149288
Total number of voters 75,226,722
a. Male voters 38,797,573
b. Female voters 36,429,149
Number of Returning Officers 68
Number of Assistant Returning Officers 525
Number of Presiding Officers 29978
Numbers of Assistant Presiding Officers 149,288
Number of Polling Officers 298576
Total Number of Polling Personnel 477842
Number of Divisions 6
Number of Districts 64
Number of contesting political parties 50
Total number of contesting candidates 1935
Number of candidates contesting more than

one constituency 30 (in 80 seats)
Total number of women candidates 37 (in 47 constituencies)
Number of candidates
nominated by political parties 1441
Polling and Counting Procedures
On Election Day the EU-EOMB deployed 65 teams of observers. The teams visited 368 out of 29.978
polling stations in approximately 100 out of 300 constituencies in Bangladesh. Observers assessed the
opening and polling procedure as good or fair in 91% of polling stations visited. The voting process was
generally carried out in an orderly manner throughout the country.
Polling officials generally followed the provisions of the Electoral Code. Minor infringements of the
electoral procedures were observed mainly due to lack of training or understanding. The voters’ hands
were not always properly checked and sometimes they were marked after casting the ballot. Campaign
material was present in some polling stations. None of these irregularities, however, was assessed by
observers as undermining the transparency of the process.
Party agents both from Awami League and Four Parties Alliance (led by BNP) were present in most of
the polling stations visited (95,1% the former and 93.5% the latter) and they appeared to be well briefed
and committed to the process. Domestic observers were present in 66.7% of the polling stations visited.
Stalls of political parties were observed almost everywhere at a short distance from polling centres. In the
stalls, voters were issued with slips bearing the party symbol and the voter’s name, number and polling
station. This practice can be seen as an infringement of the secrecy of vote (as the voter then is
supposed to present the slip to the polling officers) and as a form of potential intimidation. Although this
procedure is very common and was implemented by all parties, nobody complained. Political parties
should nevertheless be encouraged to drop this practice in future elections to ensure no undue pressure
is placed on voters.
In 13.9% of polling stations visited, some form of intimidation was observed or reported inside or outside.
However, from a detailed analysis of the reports and from the discussion with the observers during the
debriefing, the EU-EOMB concluded that these problems did not decisively affect the general
atmosphere in polling stations.
In some Polling stations (90 around the country), voting procedures were stopped due to violent clashes,
or to problems with election materials.
Observers witnessed considerable numbers of women voters and in 77.1% of polling stations women
were represented among polling staff.
The EU-EOMB teams observed the counting in 35 polling stations and reported a good or fair overall
assessment of closing and counting in 97% of cases. Although procedures were not all strictly followed,
the process appeared sufficiently transparent. Awami League party agents were present in 100% of
polling stations observed and the Four Parties Alliance in 94.7%.
Consolidation of results was observed in 13 centres. In 87% of the centres, EU observers rated the
process as good or fair. However domestic observers were present only in 46.2% of the centres
observed, Awami League agents in 53.8% and Four Parties Alliance in 69.2%.
Altogether, the Election Day was surprisingly quiet and well organised. Although some problems and
irregularities happened, and some cases of fraud or intimidation were reported (sometimes with no
confirmation), the general assessment of election day by EU-EOMB observers is quite positive.
Preliminary Statement
On 2 October, the EU-EOMB presented its Preliminary Statement during a Press Conference held at the
Sonargaon hotel at 1.00 pm. On TV that night (BTV, ETV and BBC) and in the newspapers on the
following day, the general presentation of election news was the following:
1. Khaleda has won;
2. Hasina has rejected the results;
3. EU-EOMB (and other observers) said that the elections were held in sufficient conditions of freedom
and fairness and have expressed the hope that all political actors will respect the people's choice.
"PRELIMINARY STATEMENT - 2 OCTOBER 2001
1. The EU Election Observation Mission in Bangladesh [EOMB] has been deployed to monitor the
October 1st General Elections on the invitation of the authorities of Bangladesh.
31 Long Term Observers [LTOs] were deployed in 14 regional offices since August 27th. During this
time, the observers have concentrated on the pre-electoral phase, in particular the election campaign
and administrative preparations.
The various authorities and electoral-related organisations have always constructively co-operated
with all the European Union Observers throughout Bangladesh in all our observation operations.
On Election Day, 72 Observers have been present in more than a third of all constituencies, and
more than half of the sixty four districts of Bangladesh. They have visited more than 500 polling
stations. They also made observations on vote counting and results consolidation.
2. The European Union Observation Mission in Bangladesh considers that the electoral process has
guaranteed sufficient conditions of freedom and fairness and represents an important step towards
democratic consolidation. We strongly hope that all the political actors will respect the people's
choice as reflected in the results announced.
The Bangladeshis have shown their strong commitment in furthering democracy in the country, and
the electoral authorities, the security forces and the media have contributed to a positive process
with a spirit of independence and authority, in challenging circumstances.
3. However, several crucial problems were observed during our six weeks presence. They must be
taken into consideration:
Politically motivated violent incidents and their effect on the overall atmosphere of the electoral
campaign.
The practice of smear campaigning and the usage of inflammatory language and brutal electoral
campaigning material. These practices have contributed to create a heated atmosphere in the
country and hindered the development of a peaceful election process. These practices have
affected, in some cases, the freedom of choice of the voters.
Several flaws in the regulation, and violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct have affected the full
implementation of the electoral process: For instance, a lacking of information about the postal ballot
system disenfranchised a large number of Bangladeshi citizens [Police, military, polling officers,
local observers, prisoners].
4. Finally, the European Union Observation Mission expresses its strong wish that the confrontation
and politically motivated violence be now replaced by dialogue in view of a furthering of democratic
progress in Bangladesh."
Repolling
A joint operation of the EU EOMB and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD)
observed the re-polling in 16 constituencies on Monday, 8 October 2001. Observers followed the voting
process in the majority of the 90 polling stations in Moulavi Bazar, Mymensingh, Kishoreganj, Barisal,
Chandpur, Lakshmipur, Shariatpur, Comilla, Brahmanbaria and Bagerhat, where the poll had been
stopped on 1 October.
The observers were present for the set-up, opening, and closing of some of the polling stations, and
visited a great number of polling stations during voting in the majority of these constituencies. Few cases
of missing electoral material were reported; polling stations opened on time; polling agents from the
Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) were present during the voting; and voting
proceeded generally according to prescribed regulations. Incidents involving intimidation, or illegal
political activity inside or outside the polling stations, observed by the observers or reported to them, had
no significant impact on the voter turnout, the count or the results.
Based on the information provided by the observers, the overall assessment and evaluation of the
opening, voting, closing, and counting procedures of the re-polling was considered “good.”
CONCLUSIONS
The electoral process in Bangladesh was marred by several serious problems. In the first place, violence
was present during all phases of the process. Moreover, continuous infringements of the electoral code
of conduct by parties and candidates went unpunished and uncertainty about the voters’ list remained.
The suffrage was restricted by the failed implementation of procedures for the postal ballot and by an
environment, which did not encourage women and minorities participation in the electoral process.
Political parties did not contribute positively to creating an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful process.
However, the bodies responsible for the conduct of the election demonstrated impartiality; freedom of
campaigning (even with some shortcomings) was guaranteed and the media played a neutral role.
Thanks to the security forces, voting and counting procedures on Election Day were carried out in a
generally calm atmosphere and were well organised. No instance of major intimidation or fraud was
reported.
The EU EOMB confirms its assessment that sufficient conditions of fairness for the participants and of
freedom of choice for the electorate were guaranteed.
Conditions for a dialogue between government and opposition, as well as a normal democratic process
need to be reconstituted. Only in such atmosphere will it be possible to undertake the necessary
improvements and reforms.
Recommendations
The confrontational character of the relationship between the main political forces, and their practice of
obstructionism, now institutionalised in Parliament, were the main obstacles to the establishment of an
effective democratic dialogue in Bangladesh. The EU-EOMB wishes to emphasise those
recommendations aimed at improving the dialogue amongst political forces, to break the confrontation
that resulted in regular boycotts not only of elections but of Parliament as well.
1. The parties should start an internal democratisation process, by establishing clear inter- and intra-
party rules; the current system of candidate nomination should also be amended.
2. The Election Commission should achieve a higher level of transparency, by redefining itself as a
deliberative body holding formal sessions where decisions are taken under appropriate rules and
regulations. Moreover EC decisions should be duly publicised in a timely manner.
3. Issuing a photo ID card to each elector would improve voter identification, enhance the accuracy of
the whole process and diminish instances of fraudulent voting and misuse of the voter register.
4. Voter education activities should be further developed and extended throughout the year, not just
limited to the short pre-election period. Special attention should be given to programmes targeting
women.
5. Domestic observer groups should be encouraged to join forces rather than multiply. Such co-
operation or re-groupings could enhance the quality of domestic observation.
6. The role of party agents should be reinforced and special training programmes developed.
7. The current electoral system increases the level of confrontation amongst political parties. The EU –
EOMB, considers it advisable to study possible electoral reforms. Such reforms should aim at
improving the practice of dialogue, increasing the representation of minority groups, reducing the use
of force and of money, and favouring the presence of women in the Parliament.
8. Postal ballot procedures should be duly implemented in a timely manner by the Election
Commission, to avoid disenfranchising many voters on Election Day.
9. Guidelines regarding the role of the media in the electoral campaign should be adopted; the Electoral
Commission could form a specialised media committee responsible for:
• monitoring access to the media for political parties during the election campaign;
• regulating political advertisement aired in electronic media;
• dealing with political parties’ complaints in case of violations of airtime allocated by the
media, or any other violations regarding the presentations of political parties in the media.
Annex: Deployment of LTOs
Name Country Regional office

Narcisse Banze Mukalay Belgium Barisal
Mats Melin Sweden
Katarina Smits Belgium
Willy Wirantaprawira Germany
Conceicao Teixeira Da Silva Portugal Bogra
Carl Grasveld Netherlands
Emmanuel Geny France Chittagong
ChristianGessner Austria
Zeina Ghandour United Kingdom Comilla
Ralf Rosvelds Belgium
Lennart Haggren Sweden Cox's Bazar
Margarida Dos Ramos Alves Portugal
Manfred Georg Aschaber Austria Dhaka
Polyna Lemos United Kingdom
Marian Kelliher Ireland
Paul Harrington United Kingdom Feni
CliveJordan United Kingdom
Gordon Currie United Kingdom Jessore
Carlo Pappalardo Italy
Therese Fallot France Khulna
Ramon Mesquita Sanchez Spain
Monica Reintjes Netherlands Faridpur
Andreas Ufen Germany
Louise Mallée Netherlands Mymengsingh
Gerard Le Marec France
Gunilla Blomquist Sweden Rajshahi
Mafalda Sousa Lara Gomes Portugal
Ron Herrmann Germany Rangpur
Anne-Marie Steemans Netherlands
Matthew Cooke United Kingdom Sylhet
Marie O'Meara Ireland

Election 2001 European - Union - 2001 - Final - Report

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Election 2001 European - Union - 2001 - Final - Report

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

BANGLADESH

THE MISSION ________________________________________________________________________ 1

Preparation and deployment of the mission

The sections of the Constitution that relate to Elections are two:

Non-Partisan Caretaker Government

Under Bangladesh’s Constitution, a non-partisan Caretaker Government must be appointed by the

Electoral process 2001

Amendments to the Electoral Law

The main points of the Ordinance I were:

9 ‘Representation of People Order 1972’

Voters’ list (until 1 October)

Pre-poll Irregularities (19 August - 1 Oct)

Nomination of candidates (until 3rd September)

ELECTORAL BODIES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Powers of Election Commission23

Election Commission Secretariat

22 Art 51(6) of Representation of People Order 1972

Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers

Appointment of Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers

Presiding Officers and Polling Officers

Electoral Enquiry Committees

A nomination is void if:

PRE ELECTION PERIOD

The Electoral Roll

A person is eligible to be enrolled in the voter’s register if he/she:

• Is not less than eighteen years of age.

Preparation of the 6th electoral Roll

Controversies over the Voters’ list

According to an investigative report produced by an NGO, in several constituencies the increase of

37 Women were candidates in 47 constituencies and 6 were elected.

Relations with the Press

Mid Term Statement

“The European Union Election Observation Mission in Bangladesh [EOMB] is pleased to

The EOMB notices that:

However, the European observers stress that serious problems subsist:

Date of Election Monday, 01 Oct. 2001

Number of candidates contesting more than

Polling and Counting Procedures

"PRELIMINARY STATEMENT - 2 OCTOBER 2001

Annex: Deployment of LTOs

Name Country Regional office

You might also like