IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

PARKERVISION, INC.,
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:11-cv-719-J-37JRK
vs.
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
Defendant.


PARKERVISIONS RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO QUALCOMMS RENEWED
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL REGARDING NONINFRINGEMENT

i


TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
II. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 1
III. JMOL REGARDING DIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED. ................... 2
A. ParkerVision Presented Legally Sufficient, Unrefuted Evidence That all of The
Infringing Products Infringe The Asserted Claims. ................................................ 2
B. There Is Legally Sufficient Evidence That The Infringing Products Satisfy The
Generating Limitations. ....................................................................................... 5
1. The asserted claims require the transfer of energy from the carrier signal
and generation of the baseband signal from the transferred energy. .......... 5
2. ParkerVision provided legally sufficient evidence that the Infringing
Products met the energy transfer and the generating limitations. ........ 6
3. Qualcomms double-balanced mixer arguments are irrelevant. .............. 8
4. Qualcomms TX filter arguments are irrelevant. .................................. 10
C. The Infringing Products Satisfy The Sampling Limitations. ............................ 12
D. The Infringing Products Satisfy The Other Limitations. ...................................... 15
IV. JMOL REGARDING INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED. ............. 15
A. Qualcomm Was Aware of or Willfully Blind to Each of the Patents-in-Suit. ...... 15
1. Deference is due to the jurys induced infringement verdict. ................... 16
2. Legally sufficient evidence supports the jurys finding. ........................... 17
3. Qualcomms good-faith belief defenses fail. ............................................ 18
V. QUALCOMMS REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE DENIED. ................ 20
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 20

ii


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, LLC,
2010 WL 3860382 (E.D. Wis. 2010) .........................................................................................5
Anchor Wall Sys. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
610 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Minn. 2009) ......................................................................................16
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..........................................................................................3, 5, 6
Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp.,
732 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013)............................................................................................4, 10
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................................16, 18
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Group, LTD,
No. 09-290, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135208 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2013) .................................18
Eugene Baratto, Textures, LLC v. Brushstrokes Fine Art, Inc.,
701 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (W.D. Wis. 2010) ...................................................................................5
i4i Ltd Pship v. Microsoft Corp.,
670 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009) affd 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ...........................20
Implicit Networks Inc. v. F5 Networks Inc.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) .........................................................5
Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,
381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................10
L&W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.,
471 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................5
Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc.,
711 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................2
Lee v. Mikes Novelties,
No. LA CV10-02225 .................................................................................................................5
Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
449 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................16
Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
No. 2:06-CV-78, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53373 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2008) .............................5

iii


PACT XPP Techs., AG v. Xilinx, Inc.,
No. 2:07-CV-563-RSP ...............................................................................................................4
Penny v. Williams & Fudge, Inc.,
840 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2012) .............................................................................1, 7, 9
Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.,
491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp.,
702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................8
Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc.,
518 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................8
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc.,
502 F. Appx 945 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ....................................................................................16, 17
Source Search Techs., LLC v. Lending Tree, LLC,
588 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................12
Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys.,
665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4
Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.,
935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..............................................................................................4, 5
TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communs. Corp.,
516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................3, 4
Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013)............................................................................................6, 10
Warfield v. Stewart,
434 F. Appx 777 (11th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................................3, 10
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) & 50(a)(2) ......................................................................................................15
Rule 50(a)...................................................................................................................................3, 10
Rule 50(b) ................................................................................................................................3, 104
Rules 704 and 705 ............................................................................................................................4

1


INTRODUCTION I.
The Court should deny Qualcomms Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
and Motion for New Trial Regarding Noninfringement (dkt. 501). Qualcomm has not, and
cannot, satisfy the requirements for either request.
At trial, ParkerVision presented legally sufficient evidence of Qualcomms infringement.
With the expert testimony of Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells, ParkerVision showed infringement
through Qualcomms own circuit schematics and technical documents. ParkerVision established
that: (1) the Magellan and Solo designs infringe the asserted claims; (2) the Infringing Products
are materially the same as the Magellan and Solo designs for infringement purposes; and (3)
Qualcomm had the requisite mental state for induced infringement. Qualcomm strategically
chose not to provide any rebuttal testimony or evidence regarding infringement. Notably,
Qualcomm did not cross-examine Dr. Prucnal on his testimony that the Magellan design was
representative of the Infringing Products. Nor did it present any evidence that its litigation
arguments constituted good-faith noninfringement or validity defenses held by Qualcomm.
Instead, its motion is based on a selective quotation of Dr. Prucnals cross-examination. The jury
weighed the whole of the testimony and evidence, and found infringement. Because legally
sufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict, JMOL must be denied.
There is also no basis for a new trial: the jurys verdict is supported by the great weight of
the evidence and there was no miscarriage of justice. Although Qualcomm impugns the jury, the
fact remains that this well-educated group engaged in careful and extensive deliberations. There
is no reason to think that the jury was impermissibly swayed by emotion as opposed to evidence.
LEGAL STANDARD II.
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
allows a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on an issue. Penny v. Williams &

2


Fudge, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, JMOL is
appropriate only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party,
such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane
Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1312 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
JMOL REGARDING DIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED. III.
A. ParkerVision Presented Legally Sufficient, Unrefuted Evidence That All Of
The Infringing Products Infringe The Asserted Claims.
Legally sufficient evidence supports the jurys infringement verdict for each Infringing
Product. Dr. Prucnal offered element-by-element, claim-by-claim testimony showing that the
Magellan products infringe. He also testified that the other Infringing Products infringefor the
same reasons, and under the same analysis. Trial Tr. 10/10 at 65:7-12. He explained that he
studied the design documents and schematics for each Infringing Productas reflected in his
detailed expert reportand concluded that the design documents and circuits show that the
circuits are substantially the same as they relate to the patents. Id. at 64:19-65:12. Dr. Prucnal
thus confirmed that his testimony: (1) was based on studying Qualcomms circuit schematics,
technical documents, and product design reviews, id. 10/9 at 173:15-20, 206:12-22, 212:6-8; and
(2) appl[ied] to each of the accused products, id. at 212:11-16. Therefore, he confirmed, for the
same reasons as detailed for the Magellan products, the other Infringing Products also infringe.
Id. 10/10 at 64:9-65:12. Importantly, Qualcomm never cross-examined Dr. Prucnal on this point,
never presented evidence of any alleged difference between the Infringing Products relevant to
infringement, and never presented any contrary testimony. The jury weighed his unchallenged
and unrebutted testimony, had access to the underlying documents in its deliberations, and
returned a verdict form specifically checking each product it found to infringe.
1


1
Qualcomm states that the jurys infringement finding on the Marimba design is a clear sign of a verdict gone

3


The TiVo case is applicable and controlling here. Qualcomm argues that TiVo is
distinguishable because the Infringing Products indisputably address different standards and
have different circuit designs and different component values. Dkt. 501 at 21-22. But it never
presented any such evidence to the jury and never cross-examined Dr. Prucnal on this point.
Although its motion newly raises some alleged differences among the Infringing Products, it
points to no distinction among [them] that would require separate analysis. See TiVo, Inc. v.
Echostar Communs. Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
2
In light of
the record developed at trial, Dr. Prucnal provided unrebutted and unchallenged testimony based
on his separate analysis of each design that the Infringing Products are substantially the same as
they relate to the patents. Trial Tr. 10/10 at 65:7-12. No witness testified to the contrary and
Qualcomms unsupported argument is irrelevant. See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco
Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Unsupported attorney argument,
presented for the first time on appeal, is an inadequate substitute for record evidence.).
Moreover, Qualcomms own party-admission in PX387 supports Dr. Prucnals testimony: when
asked to identify and describe all differences between the [Infringing Products] with respect to
the receiver (or receiver function) that performs direct conversion, its interrogatory response
merely identified each Infringing Product as a passive mixer and failed to identify a single
difference. JX23 at 4. All evidence of record material to the issue supports the jurys verdict.
3


awry. Dkt. 501 at 21. However, the verdict form was jointly submitted by the partiesQualcomm agreed to its
inclusion. See Trial Tr. 10/15 at 80:2-4. The parties also agreed that the Marimba design was inadvertently included
on the verdict form and jointly brought it to the Courts attention. Id. 10/22 at 13:6-14:3. ParkerVision also did not
seek damages on the Marimba portion of these products. Id. 88:9-22. Moreover, Qualcomm waived its right to bring
a Rule 50(b) motion based on the inclusion of the Marimba design on the verdict form because it was not included in
their Rule 50(a) motion. See Warfield v. Stewart, 434 F. Appx 777, 780-81 (11th Cir. 2011).
2
See also id. (there is nothing improper about an expert testifying in detail about a particular device and then
stating that the same analysis applies to other allegedly infringing devices that operate similarly, without discussing
each type of device in detail).
3
Dr. Prucnals testimony is also supported by the testimony of Mr. Sorrells regarding Qualcomms QSC6270 (Solo
design). Mr. Sorrells testified in detail about the reverse engineering report and other public information regarding

4


The rules of evidence and Federal Circuit authority confirm the propriety and sufficiency
of Dr. Prucnals testimony. Rule 704 states that opinion testimony may embrace ultimate issues.
Fed. R. Evid. 704. Rule 705 further provides that an expert may offer such an opinionand
give the reasons for it without discussing the underlying facts or data. Fed. R. Evid. 704. In
Symbol, the Federal Circuit confirmed that testimony on the ultimate issue of infringement is
permissible in patent cases, and the responsibility for challenging the factual underpinnings of
the testimony [falls] squarely on [the defendant] during cross-examination. Symbol Techs., Inc.
v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Like the defendant in Symbol, Qualcomm
failed to seize the opportunity, provided by the Rule, to demonstrate that [Dr. Prucnals]
testimony was factually incorrect. See id. at 1576.
4
Having chosen not to expose [Dr.
Prucnals] testimony to the glaring light of cross-examination on this issue, Qualcomm cannot
here recoup for its failed litigation strategy. See id. Dr. Prucnals unrebutted and uncontested
testimony that each Infringing Product infringes is legally sufficient evidence that supports the
jurys verdict. See TiVo, 516 F.3d at 1308; Symbol Techs., 935 F.2d at 1575-76.
5

Recent district court decisions follow this authority. In PACT, for example, the court
denied JMOL under Rules 704 and 705 and Symbol, finding that, [i]n light of Defendants
failure to cross-examine [the expert] on any of these [disputed] limitations, [his] opinion
testimony is prima facie evidence of Defendants infringement. PACT XPP Techs., AG v.

this product. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 75:10-16; 77:6-15. Just as Dr. Prucnal found, Mr. Sorrells also concluded that the
QSC6270 infringes the asserted claims of the Patents-in-Suit. Id. 10/7 at 194:10-11; 10/8 at 89:9-15.
4
Dr. Prucnals testimony is consistent with his expert report on infringement. See Prucnal Expert Report (Ex. 1) at
23-47 (stating that [e]ach of the following architectures infringe in substantially the same way as the Magellan
architecture, and each architecture is substantially similar to the Magellan architecture in all respects material to
infringement and then pointing to specific schematic pages in evidence for each architecture). Qualcomm had
ample notice of Dr. Prucnals theories of infringement but nonetheless failed to cross-examine him on this point.
5
See also Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding substantial evidence
supporting jurys commercial success finding because, in important part, the record contained unrebutted
testimony establishing nexus between claimed invention and product success); Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic
Sys., 665 F.3d 1269, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that unrebutted testimony that particular cells embodied by
patent worked in same way as other cells was sufficient to support lower courts grant of JMOL on enablement).

5


Xilinx, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-563-RSP, dkt. 441 at 11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2013), attached as Ex. 2.
6

The courts thus agree: testimony regarding a representative product constitutes prima facie
evidence of infringement, and a defendants failure to cross-examine or rebut that testimony
constitutes a failed litigation strategy. See Symbol Techs., 935 F.2d at 1576.
The case law cited by Qualcomm does not support JMOLmost of those cases, in fact,
do not involve JMOL. L&W, for example, addressed a grant of summary judgment. L&W, Inc. v.
Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Federal Circuit held that the patentee
failed to satisfy its summary-judgment burdenproving the absence of any factual dispute
when it merely assumed that all the accused products were alike. Id. at 1318. Of course there is
no mere assumption here: there is unrebutted expert testimony supported by substantial record
evidence and a report containing hundreds of pages of underlying facts. In addition, every
inference had to be drawn against the grant of summary judgment in the patentees favor in
L&W; here, however, every inference must be drawn in favor of the jurys infringement finding.
7

B. There Is Legally Sufficient Evidence That The Infringing Products Satisfy
The Generating Limitations.
1. The asserted claims require the transfer of energy from the carrier signal
and generation of the baseband signal from the transferred energy.

6
The court in Lee similarly denied JMOL. Lee v. Mikes Novelties, No. LA CV10-02225 JAK (JCx), dkt. 198 at 11-
12 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2012), attached as Ex. 3. The court found [t]here is no legal support for Defendants position
that Plaintiff had a burden that extended beyond presenting [the] representative products. If Defendants wished to
present evidence to rebut Plaintiffs prima facie case of infringement with respect to certain accused products, they
had the opportunity to do so at trial. Id.
7
Qualcomms reliance on the Medtronic, Baratto, Alloc, and Implicit cases suffers from similar deficienciesnone
addresses the controlling rules of evidence, none involved any expert analysis of each product (before or at trial),
and none suggests that the Court may disregard unrebutted and uncontested expert testimony that the same analysis
applies to other allegedly infringing devices. Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2:06-CV-78, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53373, at *7-11 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2008); Eugene Baratto, Textures, LLC v. Brushstrokes Fine
Art, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080-1081 (W.D. Wis. 2010); Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, LLC, 2010 WL 3860382, (E.D.
Wis. 2010); Implicit Networks Inc. v. F5 Networks Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984, at *41 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
2013). The Implicit case supports ParkerVisions position: it distinguished the facts in that case from those in TiVo
and explained that, under the proxy theory, an expert who analyzes only one [accused] device in depth can testify
that other accused products operate similarly. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984, at *12-13&n.21. The Pharmastem and
Becton cases do not even address representative products. Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d
1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Becton, 616 F.3d at 1257-59.

6


The asserted claims require the transfer of energy from a carrier signal to a storage
device, e.g., a capacitor (the energy transfer limitation), and the use of that transferred energy
to generate a lower frequency or baseband signal (the generating limitation). See, e.g., 551
Patent at claim 23, 85:48-58; Trial Tr. 10/8 at 87:6-88:5. By controlling a switching device,
non-negligible amounts of energy (or samples) from the carrier signal are transferred into a
capacitor. See, e.g., 551 Patent at 98:4-27; Trial Tr. 10/8 at 83:3-18. Although the carrier signal
itself is not present after the switching device, its energy is transferred to the capacitor after
being sampled by the switching device. See Trial Tr. 10/10 at 217:21-218:3.
2. ParkerVision provided legally sufficient evidence that the Infringing
Products met the energy transfer and the generating limitations.
Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells
8
testified that energy is transferred from the carrier signal to
storage elements in the Infringing Products. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 81:14-84:11; 10/9 at 230:1-238:7;
10/10 at 17:2-23:10. The Infringing Products incorporate transistors with local oscillator (LO)
signals controlling their respective gates to turn them on and off. Id. 10/9 at 230:1-232:6. The
transistors operate as switches conducting current from the carrier signal into the capacitors
when the switch is closed. Id. at 230:1-232:6, 233:5-237:22 (discussing JX62 at 17). Dr. Prucnal
explained that when the transistor [in the Infringing Products] closes, some of the current from
the carrier signal is connected to the output. And thats how the current appears in the output.
Id. 10/9 at 237:14-22. When the switches are open, they do not conduct current from the carrier

8
Qualcomms argument about the sufficiency of Mr. Sorrells testimony is improperly raised. See Dkt. 501 at 5, 21
n.56. Under the guise of sufficiency of the evidence, Qualcomm challenges the admissibility of Mr. Sorrells
testimony, its evidentiary basis, and whether it is properly tied to the QSC6270 product. Id. Such questions should
be resolved under the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence and through a challenge under Daubert. Versata
Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting challenges of the jurys damages
award based on methodology used by the plaintiffs expert). Here, Qualcomm did not seek to exclude Mr. Sorrells
infringement testimony in its Daubert motion. See dkt. 288. At trial, the Court also denied Qualcomms motion to
exclude Mr. Sorrells testimony. Trial Tr. 10/7 at 131:15-135:22. And when ParkerVision moved to display the
reverse engineering report, Qualcomm did not object. Id. 10/8 at 71:17-72:10. Because the evidentiary bases for
Qualcomms argument have been waived or rejected, the Court should reject this improperly raised argument.

7


signal. Id. 10/8 at 58:10-59:12; 10/9 at 230:1-232:6; 10/10 at 25:2-27:19.
Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells testified further that the Infringing Products generate the
baseband signal from the transferred energy. Id. 10/8 at 86:19-89:6; 10/9 at 256:5-262:21; 10/10
at 11:18-15:22, 25:6-27:19, 54:17-63:11, 240:11-246:9. These devices include both a capacitor at
the switch outputs and a low impedance load in the form of a transimpedance amplifier (TIA)
downstream of the capacitors. Id. Dr. Prucnal explained that when the switch closes, energy
flows from the carrier signal at the input of the switch through the switch and charges the
capacitor. Id. at 10/10 at 242:11-20. When this switch opens, he continued, that capacitor
then releases this energy and discharges it to the rest of the circuit. Id. Thus the evidence shows
that when the switch is closed, energy from the carrier signal is transferred to the capacitor(s);
when the switch is open, the energy stored in the capacitor discharges through the low
impedance TIA, generating the baseband signal. Dr. Prucnal concluded that the Infringing
Products met the generating limitations because the energy from the carrier signal is
transferred through the switch. Its accumulated by the capacitor. And that energy is then used to
generate the baseband signal following the capacitor. Id. at 246:4-9.
This evidence provided more than a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jurys
verdict. Qualcomm improperly asks the Court to disregard Dr. Prucnals direct and re-direct
testimony (and Mr. Sorrells testimony) and instead credit only selected portions of his cross-
examination. However, in the context of a JMOL, the Court does not reweigh the evidence or
witness credibility. Penny, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. That was the jurys responsibility, and the
jury was free to believe or disbelieve any witness, in whole or part. Trial Tr. 10/15 at 149:9-14.
As explained below, ParkerVision believes that Dr. Prucnals direct and re-direct testimony is
consistent with the portions of his testimony to which Qualcomm points. Nonetheless, [e]ven if

8


[an experts] direct and cross-examination are not entirely consistent, the jury had the ultimate
discretion to evaluate his credibility and weigh his presentation. Presidio Components, Inc. v.
Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Drawing all inferences in
ParkerVisions favor, JMOL is inappropriate.
9

3. Qualcomms double-balanced mixer arguments are irrelevant.
Qualcomm argues that the double-balanced mixersnot energy in the capacitors
generate the lower frequency signal. Dkt. 501 at 10-12. It also argues that its double-balanced
mixers use extra transistors and a self-canceling criss-cross design to eliminate the RF and LO
signals and generate the lower frequency signal from the RF signal. Id. Because the assertions
are contradicted by the evidence and no Qualcomm witness testified in support of these
arguments or explained how this resulted in non-infringement of any claim, JMOL is improper.
Dr. Prucnal rejected the contention that the criss-cross design of the Infringing
Products is relevant to generating the baseband signal. He testified that [c]risscrossing itself
doesnt create the lower frequency signal. Trial Tr. 10/10 at 136:7-21; see also id. at 132:1-6.
He explained that the actual baseband signal on the baseband path is created after the
capacitor. Id. at 136:13-21. He also testified that (1) the output of the switches is labeled
baseband, id. 10/9 at 215:22-216:7, 229:14-25, 243:15-244:2; 10/10 at 137:9-12; and (2) the
output constituted the baseband signal path. Id. 10/10 at 131:21-25, 132:7-12, 136:7-21.
10
Dr.
Prucnals testimony that the output of the mixer is labelled baseband or is part of the
baseband signal path does not mean that the baseband signal is generated prior to the

9
The issue is not whether the evidence was sufficient for [Qualcomm] to have won, but whether the evidence was
sufficient for it to have lost. See Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2008).
10
Qualcomm also points to a Magellan design document (DX605 at 17) to support its mixer argument. Dkt. 501 at
12. DX605 states that the mixer downconverts the RF signal to baseband signal, but it is unclear what circuitry is
or is not included in the documents mixer. For example, PX847 at 1999 is a circuit schematic of the PRX_FE
mixer for the Magellan design and it includes several capacitors. Interpreting DX605 in light of this schematic,
DX605s mixer satisfies the energy transfer and generating limitations of the asserted claims.

9


capacitors or that energy from the carrier signal is not used to generate the baseband signal.
Rather, and as Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells unequivocally testified at trial, the down-converted
baseband signal is created as a result of the charging and discharging of the capacitor. Id. 10/8 at
86:19-89:6; 10/9 at 256:5-262:21; 10/10 at 11:18-15:22, 25:6-27:19, 54:17-63:11, 240:11-246:9.
Next, Qualcomm argues that the double-balanced mixer cancels the carrier signal. As
Dr. Prucnal testified, the carrier signal is present at the switch inputs in the Infringing Products.
Id. 10/10 at 217:1-5. The opening and closing of the switches samples the carrier signal so that
energy from the carrier signal appears at the output and then charges the capacitor. Id. at
217:1-5, 242:11-20. Thus, as Dr. Prucnal explained, the carrier signal itself in its entirety does
not go through the switch, id. at 218:1-3, but its energy is transferred to the capacitor while
switches are closed. Id. at 217:1-5, 217:21-24, 242:11-20. The evidence shows that the Infringing
Products meet the energy transfer limitations, see, e.g., 551 Patent, claim 23 (wherein said
storage module receives non-negligible amounts of energy transferred from a carrier signal).
Lastly, comments by Dr. Razavi, Qualcomms invalidity expert, cannot support JMOL,
particularly given the substantial evidence supporting the jurys verdict of infringement. First,
Dr. Razavis generalized comments regarding double-balanced mixers were entirely divorced
from any comparison to the Infringing Products or asserted claims. Second, and at best,
Qualcomm can only suggest that Dr. Razavis testimony about some unspecified double-
balanced mixer conflicts with infringement testimony by Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells.
11

However, even assuming that a conflict exists, it is inappropriate grounds for JMOLit was the
jurys job to weigh the evidence and resolve any disagreement between the experts. See Penny,
840 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. Third, whether some unspecified double-balanced mixer existed in

11
ParkerVision objected to the introduction of Dr. Razavis paper (DX1150) as the backdoor entry of unasserted
prior art. As a result, Qualcomm limited its use to establishing Dr. Razavis bona fides. Trial Tr. 10/11 at 5:17-6:2.
It should not now be permitted to use Dr. Razavis testimony thereon to backdoor a noninfringement argument.

10


the prior art is wholly irrelevantpracticing the prior art is not a defense to infringement. See
Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
12

4. Qualcomms TX filter arguments are irrelevant.
Qualcomm also argues that the generating limitations are not satisfied because the
capacitors in the TX filter block an unwanted transmit signal and do not generate the baseband.
Dkt. 501 at 13-18. The jury considered Qualcomms argument and rejected it in favor of the
evidence of infringement ParkerVision presented. This evidence showed that the Infringing
Products transfer energy from the carrier signal to the capacitors and that this transferred energy
is then used to generate the baseband signal.
Both Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells detailed how the Infringing Products satisfy the
energy transfer and generating limitations. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 86:19-89:6; 10/9 at 256:5-
262:21; 10/10 at 11:18-15:22, 25:6-27:19, 54:17-63:11, 240:11-246:9. Dr. Prucnal explained that
during the sampling process energy from the carrier signal is transferred to capacitors within
both the mixer and TX filter sections of the Magellan design. Id. 10/9 at 254:15-255:22
(identifying capacitors within the mixer (PX847 at 1999) and TX filter (PX847 at 2001)). Dr.
Prucnal further explained that the choice of components within the filter was for more than one
purpose and that these capacitors are also serving the purpose of transferring energy. Trial Tr.
10/10 at 188:20-24, 190:11-20; see also id. at 182:21-183:5 (disagreeing that TX filter was
designed so that transferred energy would simply go flying right by the capacitor).
13


12
Qualcomm waived its right to bring a Rule 50(b) motion for non-infringement based on Dr. Razavis testimony
because it was not included in their Rule 50(a) motion. See Warfield, 434 F. Appx at 780-81.
13
Qualcomms labeling of certain capacitors as a TX filter does not preclude those capacitors from being used as
a storage element for down-conversion. See Trial Tr. 10/10 at 188:20-24, 190:17-20. As Dr. Razavi conceded, it
doesnt matter what you call something it depends on how it works. Id. 10/11 at 241:2-12. Even if the capacitor
functions as a TX filter sometimes and a storage element other times (or performs both functions simultaneously), it
is well settled that an accused device that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claim[] nonetheless infringes.
Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Versata, 717 F.3d at 1262.

11


Dr. Prucnal contradicted Qualcomms argument that the TX filter has no effect on the
mixer output. See dkt. 501 at 15. Dr. Prucnal explained that the carrier signals energy would not
merely pass by the capacitors, but would flow into the capacitors. Trial Tr. 10/9 at 237:14-22;
10/10 at 245:21-246:1 (emphasizing importance of the switch circuitry to causing carrier
signal energy to charge and discharge the capacitors), 249:12-20, 250:24-251:11. He testified
that the TX Filter is needed in order to provide the charging when the switch is closed, the
storing of energy. And when the switch is opened, be discharging. Id. at 10/10 at 247:3-19. He
further explained that in a low pass filter, any input signal with a frequency greater than zero
would cause current to flow into the capacitor. Id. at 250:6-20.
14

Qualcomms argument that there is no evidence that the capacitors collect energy from
the carrier signal is belied by the record. See dkt. 501 at 16-17.
15
Dr. Prucnal explained that,
together, two pieces of evidence show that energy is transferred through the switches into the
capacitors, Trial Tr. 10/10 at 25:14-21: (1) citing JX62, he explained that the document shows
that 0.11 A of current from the carrier signal flows from the output of the switches and into the
capacitors in the TX Filter block, id. 10/9 at 233:5-237:22; and (2) he explained that each
baseband signal path contains a separate switch which turns on and off during each carrier signal
period. Id. at 238:21-251:15. Dr. Prucnal testified that the switch in each path is very important
because its the switch that completes the circuit and allows energy to flow into the capacitor. If
it were not a switch circuit, this would not be a capacitor thats being charged and discharged. It

14
Dr. Prucnal also did not testify that if the TX filter were ripped out that the mixer output would be unchanged.
See dkt. 501 at 15. Instead, he testified that the amount of current available at that node would be unchanged if the
filter were ripped out, and then further explained that the TX filter provides necessary matching to the next stage,
which is helping to enable the proper flow of current and is needed to provide the charging when the switch is
closed, the storing of energy and the discharging of energy when the switch is open. Trial Tr. 10/10 at 247:3-19.
15
Qualcomm also argues that Dr. Prucnal provided legally inadequate testimony without the required scientific
evidence because he abandoned his computer simulations. Dkt. 501 at 16-17. Unsurprisingly, Qualcomm cites no
authority for its proposition. And, as Dr. Prucnal testified on re-direct, he did not rely on computer simulations to
show infringement, especially in light of the other evidence of infringement. Trial Tr. 10/10 at 229:17-231:11.

12


would just be a continuous flow. Id. 10/10 at 245:21-247:1.
C. The Infringing Products Satisfy The Sampling Limitations.
The Court construed sampling to require reducing a continuous-time signal to a
discrete-time signal. Dkt. 243 at 6. Instead of applying this construction, Qualcomm advances a
new construction, arguing that the Infringing Products cannot infringe because they allegedly
redirect the continuous time signal through various paths in the mixer core, rather than sample
it. Dkt. 501 at 19-20. Qualcomms new construction (and argument) notwithstanding, JMOL
should be denied. The evidence shows that the output of the switches at each signal path is a
discrete-time signal, satisfying the Courts claim construction of sampling.
ParkerVision provided legally sufficient evidence that the Infringing Products satisfy the
sampling limitations. Mr. Sorrells and Dr. Prucnal testified that the switches in the Infringing
Products reduce the continuous-time carrier signal to discrete-time samples. See, e.g., Trial Tr.
10/8 at 58:2-12, 84:12-86:18; 10/9 at 224:1-232:25; 10/10 at 54:17-63:11. When a switch is on,
current from the carrier signal flows from its input to its output; and when it is off, no current
flows. Id. 10/9 at 230:1-232:6, 237:14-22, 244:3-245:1; 10/10 at 17:13-24, 25:14-21, 27:3-12,
57:8-59:18, 242:11-20, 243:14-247:1; see also JX62 at 26. As Dr. Prucnal explained, the carrier
signal is sampled [s]o the carrier itself in its entirety does not go through the switch, Trial Tr.
10/10 at 217:25-218:3, but a portion of the energy from the carrier signal appears at the output.
Id. at 216:23-217:5. Thus, a switch only allows current (or energy) to flow during discrete times
of each carrier signal period, thereby sampling the carrier signal.
16
Dr. Prucnal explained that an
image from Dr. Foxs report also showed that the output of a switch is a discrete-time signal. Id.

16
Dr. Razavi provided similar analysis, explaining sampling means that by turning the switch on and off, we let
the energy go through or not go through. Trial Tr. 10/11 at 139:3-14. He explained that this is what the Courts
construction of sampling entails in laymans language. Qualcomm should not now be heard to advance a contrary
understanding of the sampling limitations. Source Search Techs., LLC v. Lending Tree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1075
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (it is axiomatic that claims are construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.).

13


10/10 at 242:11-20 (describing that when the LO pulse is high, a switch closes, and energy from
the continuous-time carrier signal (circled below in red) is sampled creating a discrete-time
signal at the switch output (circled in black), which then flows into the capacitors (this is why the
color-coding in the figure is shown stopping at the capacitor input)).

None of Qualcomms arguments about sampling render JMOL appropriate. First, the
evidence shows that the carrier signal is sampledthe input of each switch in the Infringing
Products is a continuous-time signal; the output of each switch is a discrete-time signal. As Dr.
Prucnal explained, when the switch is on, a sample of energy from the carrier signal flows from
the input to the capacitors; and when that switch is off, no current flows through the switch.
While the switch is off, that capacitor then releases this energy and discharges it to the rest of
the circuit. Trial Tr. 10/10 at 242:11-20, 243:14-244:7, 249:12-20. As a result of sampling, the
Infringing Products use a discrete-time signal to charge each of the capacitors satisfying the
Courts sampling construction. Id. at 10/8 at 87:6-88:14; 10/10 at 55:12-59:25.
Second, Qualcomms argument about the carrier signal being redirected is a red
herring. ParkerVision was required to show (and did show, as shown above) that the Infringing
Products satisfy the Courts sampling claim construction. It is true that the sampling
limitations are not met if theres always a connection from the input to the output because in

14


that situation, the signal at the output is continuous, not discrete as required by the Courts claim
construction. As Mr. Sorrells explained, this type of constant connection from an input to an
output only occurs if there is no off time (i.e., if theres no time during which all of the
switches connected to a single output are off). Trial Tr. 10/8 at 127:9-17. If a single continuous-
time carrier signal is alternatingly directed down multiple separate output paths with alternating
off times for each output path (as with the I/Q demodulation in the Infringing Products), then the
single continuous-time carrier signal has been reduced to multiple discrete-time signals on
multiple outputs. Dr. Prucnal explained this when he testified that the Infringing Products
demodulate two signals from a single carrier signal by separating an In-phase (I) signal and a
Quadrature (Q) signal. Id. 10/9 at 245:8-252:7. To extract both pieces of information, the I and
Q mixers have separate output signal paths that are not connected (meaning that each output path
is alternatively on or off), as seen in JX62 at 17 (and Dr. Foxs figure above). Id. In addition,
each Infringing Product has two separate outputs for each I and Q down-converter (i.e. two I
paths and two Q pathscreating additional on and off times in each path), as shown in JX62 at
17 (and Dr. Foxs figure above). Id. As Dr. Prucnal testified, the Infringing Products thus create
four separate discrete-time outputs from the one input continuous-time carrier signaltwo
discrete-time outputs on both the I path and the Q path. Id. Because each of the four outputs is
separate and not recombined, there is not a single output path containing all of the carrier
signals energy. Rather each output path carries a discrete-time signal (reduced from the
continuous-time carrier signal) and each separately satisfies the sampling limitations. Id.
Third, ParkerVision established that each Infringing Product samples, including the
alleged 50% duty cycle products. As established above, Dr. Prucnal analyzed the schematics and
design documents for each product and concluded each infringes. See supra Part III.A. He also

15


testified that none of the Infringing Products always operate with a duty cycle of 50% or greater,
and, thus, they all have an off time satisfying the sampling limitations. Trial Tr. 10/10 at
65:13-66:3.
17
Having set forth prima facie evidence that the Infringing Products infringe, the
burden shifted to Qualcomm to rebut or cross-examine Dr. Prucnals testimony and establish the
noninfringement significance, if any, of a 50% duty cycle. Qualcomm did not.
D. The Infringing Products Satisfy The Other Limitations.
Qualcomms conclusory argument that ParkerVision failed to present proof regarding
three other limitations is insufficient and incorrect. Dkt. 501 at 20-21. The argument fails to
specify supporting evidence and should be denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) & 50(a)(2). The
argument also fails because Dr. Prucnal offered element-by-element, claim-by-claim testimony
showing that the Infringing Products infringe. He explained the impedance matching
limitations and the infringing use thereof. Id. 10/10 at 11:5-16:6, 29:8-31:6. He explained the
accurate voltage reproduction limitation and how energy transfer to the capacitors prevents
accurate voltage reproduction. Id. at 16:7-23:10, 38:19-39:24. And he explained that the same
evidence showing that the Infringing Products down-convert also shows that the baseband signal
is a demodulated baseband signal. Id. at 35:12-38:1.
JMOL REGARDING INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED. IV.
A. Qualcomm Was Aware of or Willfully Blind to Each of the Patents-in-Suit.
ParkerVision presented legally sufficient evidence that Qualcomm not only knew about
and possessed copies of ParkerVisions patents, but also met with ParkerVision to discuss its
patented technology, viewed demonstrations of the patented technology, and to this day retains

17
The design documents further support Dr. Prucnals conclusion. See, e.g., JX56 at 48 (duty cycle of Bahama
design between 30 and 70%); JX57 at 44 (same for Libra/Gemini design).

16


demonstration prototypes that embody the Patents-in-Suit.
18
Qualcomm admitted it had pre-suit
knowledge of the 551 and 518 Patents, that it designs the Infringing Products to comply with
United States cellular standards, and that it is aware that these products are brought into the
United States by its customers. See, e.g., JX28 at 5; JX29 at 5-7; JX38 at 9.
19

1. Deference is due to the jurys induced infringement verdict.
The intent to induce infringement may be inferred from all of the circumstances.
Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 699 (citation omitted). The jury was free to weigh the evidence presented
by the parties, including both direct and circumstantial evidence. See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v.
Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The drawing of inferences, particularly in
respect of an intent-implicating question is peculiarly within the province of the fact finder that
observed the witnesses. Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 700.
Underscoring the uphill battle it faces, Qualcomms motion does not include citation to a
single case where JMOL disturbed a jurys finding of a culpable mental state for inducement. See
Dkt. 501 at 23-25. Indeed, the Federal Circuit recently held a jurys inducement verdict was
improperly overturned on JMOL because it saw no reason to disturb the verdict. Smith &
Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 502 F. Appx 945, 949-50 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential). The
Court found the jurys verdict was sufficiently supported by the facts that the defendants
executives and engineers had knowledge of the asserted patent, that the instructions for use of
the [accused product] . . . paralleled the method steps of the asserted patent, and that the

18
Trial Tr. 10/7 at 193:16-281:17; 10/8 at 9:12-93:10; 10/8 (Wheatley); 10/8 (Kantak); 10/9 at 3:23-60:21; see also
PX86; PX177; PX37;PX45; PX64; PX307; PX91; PX92; PX97; PX114; PX115; PX154; PX164; JX28; PX133;
PX162; PX699; PX322; PX92; PX833; PX834; PX177.
19
The jurys infringement verdict is unaffected by its verdict finding of no willfulness. Willful infringement has a
higher burden of proofclear and convincing evidencethan induced infringementpreponderance of the
evidence. In another case involving Qualcomm, the Federal Circuit established that the jurys verdict on willful
infringement is irrelevant to the sufficiency of the evidence for inducement verdict. See Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding a lack of culpability for willful infringement does not
compel a finding of non-infringement under an inducement theory); Anchor Wall Sys. v. Rockwood Retaining
Walls, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1016-17 (D. Minn. 2009).

17


defendant made no attempt to investigate non-infringement. Id. at 950.
2. Legally sufficient evidence supports the jurys finding.
ParkerVision set forth legally sufficient evidence that Qualcomm infringed knowingly or
with willful blindness. It introduced evidence that high-level Qualcomm engineers, executives,
and lawyers spent months studying ParkerVisions technology and its patents, leaving many of
these employees impressed with the technology.
20
Mr. Sorrells testified that he provided several
prototype boards embodying the patents-in-suit to Qualcomm. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 24:15-25:12;
PX80. Mr. Sorrells also detailed ParkerVisions patent coverage and how to make and use the
technology to Qualcomm. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 20:22-43:1. After the patent disclosure, Dr. Wheatley,
one of Qualcomms most senior engineers, wrote that he most probably knew a lot more about
how [ParkerVisions invention] works . . . than they do and concluded that [b]ottom line is, I
think it is going to be very difficult for anybody to ever use this technique without stepping on
one or more of their claims. PX699. Qualcomm understood that it could not afford to let
[ParkerVisions technology] get by [it], PX85, and so it tried to tie the technology to itself.
PX163; see also PX566 (stating [ParkerVisions technology] would be huge . . ., we cannot
afford to miss out.). Then, after the two companies failed to reach a license agreement,
Qualcomm continued to monitor ParkerVisions products and patents

and, in 2002, requested and
then internally disseminated a ParkerVision presentation. PX584; PX308. When Qualcomms
early ZIF products began to lose competitive advantage, Qualcomm senior engineers, including
those involved in the evaluation of ParkerVisions technology, investigated technologies for the
next-generation designs, and in 2004 (as design of the first Infringing Products began) decided to

20
See, e.g., Trial Tr., 10/9 (Kantak); PX699 (showing that Qualcomm engineer Dr. Wheatley reviewed
ParkerVisions patent applications with a Qualcomm attorney); Trial Tr. 10/9 at 199:14-203:11, 203:24-204:17;
PX37 (describing ParkerVisions invention as holy grail); PX307 (stating that Qualcomm engineers were very
impressed with ParkerVisions technology and concluding it had stumbled on to something revolutionary);
PX959 (explaining benefits of ParkerVisions invention and asserting that Qualcomm should give credit to PV).

18


go over the PV approach to see whether they could make it work. PX322.
21

The inducement verdict is also supported by the absence of an opinion-of-counsel. The
failure to procure such an opinion may be probative of intent to induce. Broadcom, 543 F.3d at
699.
22
The jury was instructed that it may consider all the circumstances, including whether or
not [Qualcomm] obtained the advice of a competent lawyer. Trial Tr. 10/15 at 165:18-25.
3. Qualcomms good-faith belief defenses fail.
Qualcomms good-faith belief of invalidity defense fails. a.
Qualcomm failed to introduce evidence that it held a good-faith belief that the patents-in-
suit were invalid. Its defense is based on the invalidity testimony of Dr. Razavi, its expert hired
after the suit began. Dkt. 501 at 23-24. Qualcomm has no evidence of awareness by its personnel
of any of the invalidity theories advanced by Dr. Razavi or its reliance on any such theory at any
point in time (before or after the suit began). Moreover, Dr. Razavis lawsuit-related opinions
can have no bearing on Qualcomms state of mind during the more than six years of
infringement before suit was filed. Further, Qualcomm presented no evidence or testimony that
any of its employees shared Dr. Razavis opinionswhether before or after the lawsuit was
filed. Without evidence that the basis for such invalidity defense was known to the infringers,
Dr. Razavis opinions are irrelevant to Qualcomms state of mind.
23
In fact, the only evidence
relevant to Qualcomms state of mind shows that Qualcomm actually believed the patents-in-suit

21
ParkerVision also introduced evidence that ParkerVisions technology led to Qualcomms first-generation ZIF
products. See, e.g., JX7 (consideration of [ParkerVisions invention] led to an interesting concept); Trial Tr. 10/22
at 40:11-47 (acknowledging that a Qualcomm engineer believed Qualcomms examination of ParkerVisions D2D
technology led to [its] development of ZIF architecture).
22
Id. (Because opinion-of-counsel evidence, along with other factors, may reflect whether the accused infringer
knew or should have known that its actions would cause another to directly infringe, we hold that such evidence
remains relevant to the second prong of the intent analysis.).
23
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Group, LTD, No. 09-290, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135208, at *142 (W.D.
Pa. Sept. 23, 2013) ([I]n order for Marvell to have a reasonable defense to infringement for the infringement
period, there needs to be some proof that the basis for such invalidity defense was known to the infringers or even
the person having ordinary skill in the art.).

19


were valid: Qualcomm senior engineers reviewed ParkerVision patent applications, conducted an
independent search for references, and determined that ParkerVision had invented something
revolutionary and something different from the prior art. See PX699; PX154; PX307.
Qualcomm good-faith belief of noninfringement defense fails. b.
During the trials first phase, Qualcomm opted not to call any witnesses regarding
infringement. Instead, Qualcomm relied on its cross-examination of Dr. Prucnal and Mr.
Sorrells. Contrary to Qualcomms assertion, cross-examination tactics are not sufficient (or
proper) grounds to establish a good-faith defense of noninfringement (either before or after suit
was filed). Qualcomm has no evidence linking its cross-examination arguments to the mental
state of any of its employees at any point in time.
Qualcomms argument that JMOL is required because it had no reason to believe that
double-balanced mixers followed by low-pass filters were infringing is also unavailing. See dkt.
501 at 23. Qualcomm undisputedly knew of the patents-in-suit. As such, the labels Qualcomm
uses to describe its products are irrelevant; what matters is how the products operate and whether
Qualcomm had a good faith belief that such products did not practice the asserted claims. See
Trial Tr. 10/11 at 241:9-13. Qualcomm introduced no evidence whatsoever that any of its
personnel believed that a double-balanced mixer did not infringe or the basis for any such
belief. Moreover, in 1999 ParkerVision taught Qualcomm engineers and executives that if a
filter directly follows the energy storage device, it falls under our claims. PX160 at 22.
The emails pointed to by Qualcomm are unpersuasive and at best conflict with
ParkerVisions evidence. For example, Dr. Wheatleys statement that we are NOT using their
technique in 2000 cannot support a good-faith belief in non-infringement because it was made
six years before infringement began and concerned products not accused of infringement. See
DX951. Because all reasonable inferences are drawn in ParkerVisions favor, and it is not the

20


Courts role to (re)weigh the evidence, these emails do not render JMOL appropriate.
In sum, Qualcomms litigation-created defenses fail to establish a good faith belief of
noninfringement. i4i Ltd Pship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 581-582 (E.D. Tex.
2009) affd 598 F.3d 831, 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ([t]he number of creative defenses that [a
defendant] is able to muster in an infringement action after years of litigation and substantial
discovery is irrelevant to an analysis of the mental state of the infringer).
QUALCOMMS REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE DENIED. V.
Qualcomms request for a new trial should be denied for many of the reasons discussed
above with respect to Qualcomms JMOL requests. The infringement verdict is not against the
great weight of evidence; rather it is supported by legally sufficient evidence in all respects.
ParkerVision also did not make improper arguments, did not engage in character attacks, and
properly presented evidence from the 1998-99 negotiations according to the Courts Daubert
ruling and trial instructions. In many instances Qualcomm failed to object to the alleged
attacks and had every opportunity to call witnesses or present evidence to explain or contradict
the evidence. And for the reasons set forth above, ParkerVision did not argue an erroneous
construction of the generating limitations.
24
The well-educated and diligent jury followed the
Courts instructions and delivered a verdict based upon the evidence. A new trial is not
warranted.
25

CONCLUSION VI.
For all these reasons, Qualcomms Motion (dkt. 501) should be denied.

24
In fact, Qualcomms counsel advanced a similar understanding while cross-examining Dr. Prucnal and Mr.
Sorrells and in closing arguments. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 148:7-149:3, 168:23-169:3, 171:11-23; 10/10 at 90:19-91:14;
10/15 at 108:21-111:11.
25
Qualcomms arguments in support of its request for a new trial are repeated in another JMOL motion, dkt. 499.
The reasons why a new trial is not appropriate on any of the grounds set forth by Qualcomm are further discussed in
ParkerVisions response to dkt. 499.

21


January 24, 2014
Respectfully submitted,
McKOOL SMITH, P.C.
/s/ Douglas A. Cawley
Douglas A. Cawley, Lead Attorney
Texas State Bar No. 04035500
E-mail: dcawley@mckoolsmith.com
Richard A. Kamprath
Texas State Bar No.: 24078767
rkamprath@mckoolsmith.com
Ivan Wang
Texas State Bar No.: 24042679
E-mail: iwang@mckoolsmith.com
McKool Smith P.C.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 978-4000
Telecopier: (214) 978-4044
Kevin L. Burgess
Texas State Bar No. 24006927
kburgess@mckoolsmith.com
Josh W. Budwin
Texas State Bar No. 24050347
jbudwin@mckoolsmith.com
Leah Buratti
Texas State Bar No. 24064897
lburatti@mckoolsmith.com
Mario A. Apreotesi
Texas State Bar No. 24080772
mapreotesi@mckoolsmith.com
Kevin Kneupper
Texas State Bar No. 24050885
kkneupper@mckoolsmith.com
James Quigley
Texas State Bar No. 24075810
jquigley@mckoolsmith.com
McKool Smith P.C.
300 West Sixth Street, Suite 1700
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 692-8700
Telecopier: (512) 692-8744
SMITH HULSEY & BUSEY
/s/ James A. Bolling
Stephen D. Busey
James A. Bolling
Florida Bar Number 117790
Florida Bar Number 901253
225 Water Street, Suite 1800
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
(904) 359-7700
(904) 359-7708 (facsimile)
jbolling@smithhulsey.com
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF PARKERVISION,
INC.

22


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has
been served on all counsel of record via the Courts ECF system on January 24, 2014.
/s/ Leah Buratti
Leah Buratti