1.

REPUBLIC V NAGUIT
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision [1] of the Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999,
and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan
dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of
a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and
married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas,
Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy.
Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049,
Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an
area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation
of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the
application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and
Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the
petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a
formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to
the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano
(Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. [4] On July 9,
1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the
subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956.[5] Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who
thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco,
Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator

introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut

and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were
then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the
subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly
and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present
any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the
heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice.
On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that
the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property
Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that
the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. [6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG
stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from
Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI. [7]However, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18,
1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of
the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999,
the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.[9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12,
2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the
RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of
law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000. [10]
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending
that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need
for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public
domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the

meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot
No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period. [11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[12] in arguing that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the
subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit
could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG
argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original
registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and;
that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been established
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning

of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision,

qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership.
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.[13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation
nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule
would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes
the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v.
Court of Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.[15] In that case, the subject land had been
certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the
Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by
the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land

even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the
said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the
subject property was released and certified as within alienable and
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16]
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,
[17]
wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question
were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration
therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his
application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared
alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was
made years after the property had been certified as alienable and
disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands, [18] such as those which form
part of a reservation for provincial park purposes [19] the possession of
which cannot ripen into ownership.[20] It is elementary in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21] forest land is not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable. [22] In the case at bar, the property in
question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence,
the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower
courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration
proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from
a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register
their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from
July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been
for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which
pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is
concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to agricultural
lands of the public domain, while the Property Registration Decree
uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It
must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of
the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at

least thirty (30) years.[26] With such conversion, such property may now
fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and
thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public
land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been
planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. [27] The inherent nature
of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower
courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required
period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the
assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been
no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was
declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing
to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of
the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual,
and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower
courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of
the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the
property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by

the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-ininterest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is
indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto
which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens
system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of
an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from
any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE,
foregoing
premises
considered,
the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. HEIRS OF MALABANAN V REP
G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated
on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals
(CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of
land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he

and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,

uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land
for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation
of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad
452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters
as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 41656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming
part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower,
and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the
CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing
the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of

possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRODENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA,
his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine
especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years.
According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari
because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence
possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part
of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on
the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they argue that the reclassification of
the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription
under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the
right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the
ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor;
and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and
Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its
view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land
subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to
discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership. 11Land is considered of public
dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. 12 Land belonging to
the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but
no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the

patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications
of
public
lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18 lands of the public domain
were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide
other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and
mineral, but added national parks. 20 Agricultural lands may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, 23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must

only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber,

mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, 25 and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is
vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify
lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no
longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by
which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of
the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the
law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b)
to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations
under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-ininterest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with
the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as

agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land
of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on
the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as
agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land
as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been
made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land
prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or
glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning
point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to
the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period
of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as
written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject
of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June
12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title
is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or
title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during
the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as
the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of
law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed
by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property subject of

the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and

disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration
of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of
the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State.
The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that
a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned
by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for
the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly
recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33 in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public
land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to
area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration
of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into
patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree. 35 As such, prescription can now run
against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all

lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to
be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time
of the application, provided the applicants possession
and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes
the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already
ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes
of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode
of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua
non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and

occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since

June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of
it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the
land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or
the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
4. PALOMO VS CA
[G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997]
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and
CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J.
PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO
BROCALES,
SALVADOR
DOE,
and
other
DOES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of
land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park." The facts of the case are as follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine
Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which
reserved for provincial park purposes some 440,530 square meters of
land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay
pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission. [1]
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th
Judicial District, United States of America, ordered the registration of
15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of
Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916; [2] December 28, 1916;[3] and
January 17, 1917.[4] Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land

consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by

Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173 [5] to his heirs,
herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his
death in April 1937.[6]
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost
during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.
[7]
The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. [8]
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the
"Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and
Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area
was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property,
paid real estate taxes thereon [9] and introduced improvements by planting
rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen
vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913
and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and
spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143
before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with
damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy
Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does
who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered
the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down
bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less
than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case
No. T-176 for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving
the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners and
subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants
were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register
of Deeds of Albay.

The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed

because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the
mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon
agreement of the parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered
the following decision:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is
hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated
September 14, 1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos.
153,[10] 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911,
T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and
all transactions based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all
improvements on the lands in question that are found therein and
introduced by the defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, Plan II9299 and Lots 1, 21,[11] 3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot
Spring National Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to
cancel the alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and
176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered."[12]
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof
that the Palomos have established property rights over the parcels of
land in question before the Treaty of Paris which ended the SpanishAmerican War at the end of the century. The court further stated that
assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay were
really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the Properties
because these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was
already in force. At this point, we take note that although the Geodetic
Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the

Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his

reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan
II-9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation area, [13] the
RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205
cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence this petition raising
the following issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and
subsequent transfer certificates of titles of the petitioners over the
properties in question is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the
premises in favor of the government is against our existing law and
jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged
original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of
First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953
pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the
Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century recognized the
property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American
government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of private
citizens and declare them part of any kind of government reservation.
They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years
prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the
lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes
was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process of
law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a
number of decisions of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial
District of the United States of America which state that the predecessors
in interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous,
open and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the
time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.

The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and

conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11,
1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence,
private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in various forms, such as
(1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special
Grant,
(3) Titulo de Compra or
Title
by
Purchase
and
(4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained
under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of
January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners'
predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant.
Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations in Expediente
No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917;
Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28,
1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December
9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated
December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No.
9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay,
15th Judicial District of the United States of America presided by Judge
Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50
years.[14] The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First Instance,
however, were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies
of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of
court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their
predecessors in interest were in open , adverse and continuous
possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in
1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very
same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February
1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo,
the government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its
reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners'
predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a
number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would
have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the
reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that

the government had no right to include these properties in the

reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they
obtained the titles without government opposition, the government is now
estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which
were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of
Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not operate against the
Government for the act of its agents. [15]
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really
issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not
alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester,
records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never
declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation
prior to 1913 up to the present. [16] Moreover, as part of the reservation for
provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest
land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property,[17] unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove
ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is
that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land
registration cases.[18]
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the
matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject
lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in
force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo.
Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered
under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the
lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work
Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of
the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated
September 11, 1948[19] contains the following note, "in conflict with
provincial reservation."[20] In any case, petitioners are presumed to know

the law and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of
the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good
faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters
covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be
annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the
bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143,
[21]
were within the perimeter of the national park, [22] no pronouncement
as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with
respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation
zone.
SO ORDERED.
4. REPUBLIC V DOLDOL
[G.R. No. 132963. September 10, 1998]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National
Secondary
Technical
School), petitioner,
vs. NICANOR
DOLDOL, respondent.
D E C I S I O N ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 27, 1997, reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein petitioners complaint, as
well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of
land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On
October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the
said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of
Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the
Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965
reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This
reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.

In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to

the site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the
area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now
renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol
National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended
projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate said
portion, but he refused to move.
In view of Doldols refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a
complaint for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the schools favor and ordered
Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion
he occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from
1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National Schools motion for reconsideration of said decision having
been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998,
Opol National School elevated its case to this Court, claiming that the
Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to the
evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous,
notorious and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two
years.

notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of

the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Italics
ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court
averred that a citizen of the Philippines may acquire alienable land of
the public domain if he has possessed the same for thirty
years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two
years, it ruled that the former had acquired ownership of the same,
thereby negating Opol National Schools claim over the questioned
area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic
vs. CA[1] where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni
Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite periodipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property.

The petition is meritorious.

In ruling in Doldols favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision
on Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the
Public Land Act). Said provision, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
provides as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certification of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

x x x
xx

x x x

with the latters proven occupation and cultivation for more

than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as

specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a

right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a

certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to
be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director
of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government

grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.

notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the

public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Italics
ours)

(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of

preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands
occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such
lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them
for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title
thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect
right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired.[3]

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is

alienable and disposable, in accordance with the District Foresters
Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within
Project 8, an alienable and disposable tract of public land, as
appearing in Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.
the parties had a better right to possess the lot through the erroneous
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that
application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land
Doldol
had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only
Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor
since
1959.
The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of
General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the
lands
of
the
public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for
aforementioned section was still good law. The original Section 48(b) of
the
same
to
be
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to
1942,[2] which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of the disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959,
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the
same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to
1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now the land in question as to segregate the same from the public
reads:
domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school,
given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsNational School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the

In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession
Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is over the land in dispute.
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and Resolution dated March 27,
Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.