FIRST DIVISION

LIFE HOMES REALTY G.R. No. 120827

CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS AND
MARVI DEVELOPMENT, INC., Promulgated:
Respondents.
February 15, 2007
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
38409 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Life Homes Realty Corporation for lack of
merit. The CA ruled that the ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by
petitioner against private respondent Marvi Development, Inc. (Marvi) is not the proper
remedy in this case.

The facts are:

Petitioner Life Homes Realty Corporation is the registered owner of two parcels of
land located in Barrio Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal covered by TCT No. N-28603 (Psu-
52080) and TCT No. 31730 (Psu-52085) of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, which have
been subdivided into lots for residential/subdivision purposes. To the south and
southwest of the lots is a parcel of land registered in the name of private respondent
Marvi under TCT No. 309740 (Psu-52084) of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Private
respondents property has likewise been subdivided into lots for residential/subdivision
purposes.

In 1979, petitioner discovered, upon a relocation and verification of the
boundaries of its property, that the southern and southwestern portions of its property
were encroached upon, developed and occupied by private respondent for subdivision
purposes. The encroachment of private respondents property (plan Psu-52084) over
petitioners properties (plan Psu-52080 and Psu-52085) allegedly covered a total area
of 10,365 square meters.

Both parties subsequently agreed to have an independent relocation survey conducted
by a Government Geodetic Engineer to decide whether there was overlapping of the
aforementioned properties, and that the party found to have an erroneous survey shall
shoulder the expenses of the relocation survey. Marvi agreed to such proposal in its
letter of April 10, 1981.
[1]


Thus, in a letter
[2]
dated May 11, 1981, the parties requested the Director of the
Bureau of Lands, Manila for a relocation survey of their properties.

After acceding to the request, the Chief of the Technical Services of the Bureau of
Lands, Engr. Felipe R. Venezuela, submitted his report (Venezuela report) of the
verification survey of Psu-52080, Psu-52084 and Psu-52085, Barrio Ampid, San Mateo,
Rizal in a letter dated April 28, 1983 addressed to the Regional Land Director through
the Chief, Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands.

The report reads:
x x x
Sir:

In connection with Office Memorandum dated 26 April 1981 regarding the joint request
of Life Homes Realty Corporation and Marvi Hills Development to verify the lots covered
by plan Psu-52080, Psu-52084 and Psu-52085 as relocated by their respective
surveyors, the undersigned respectfully submit[s] the following findings based on the
verification survey conducted to wit:

1) Engr. Isabelo Muoz was hired by Marvi Hills Development to relocate
their properties covered by plan Psu-177242 and plan Psu-52084. His relocation was
conducted prior to the cadastral survey of San Mateo, Rizal. The boundaries and
corners were then set on the ground by using the technical description as appearing on
transfer certificate of title No. 4641 and approved plan Psu-52084;

2) On November 10, 1964 to December 20, 1965, the municipality of San
Mateo, Rizal was cadastrally surveyed by Engr. Regino Rigor under Cad-375-D, San
Mateo, Rizal, plan Psu-52084 becomes identical to lot 3680 and 3031, San Mateo
Cadastre. Similarly plan Psu-52080 and plan Psu-52085 were assigned a cadastral lot
number of 3037 and 3031, Cad-375-D, San Mateo Cadastre. These three lots were
accepted by the cadastral survey;

3) Engr. Regino Natividad is the Geodetic Engineer of Life Homes Realty
Corporation. As such, his duty is to relocate the boundaries of plan Psu-52080 and plan
Psu-52085 for the development of Life Homes Subdivision. It was during this relocation
survey that he found out plan Psu-52084 encroached plan Psu-52080 and plan Psu-
52085 thus the request for verification survey was referred to this office;

4) Considering that the request is for us to decide who is correct between
Engr. Isabelo Muoz and Engr. Regino Natividad relocation survey, the survey done by
Engr. Natividad is correct in the sense that it adopt[s] the system of Cadastral
survey. Furthermore, during the execution of the cadastral survey, plan Psu-177242 a
titled property was found defective. It was not accepted and as amended, line 9-10 was
amended from S.35 deg. 22E., 108.75 m. to S. 28 deg. 43E., 129.62 m. Also line 14-
15 was amended from N.64 deg. 17W., 371.91 m. to N.60 deg. 52W., 382.58 m. Due
to this amendments its area increases by THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTY NINE (3,539) SQ. METERS.

In view of the foregoing findings it is recommended that the Relocation survey executed
by Engr. Regino Natividad be followed and that plan Psu-52084 as relocated by Engr.
Isabelo Muoz be Re-relocated using corner 7 and 8 of plan Psu-52080 and corner 4 of
plan Psu-52085 as starting point and reference.
[3]


Thereafter, petitioner made a demand on private respondent to vacate the
alleged encroached area but private respondent refused.

On July 11, 1984, petitioner filed a complaint
[4]
against private respondent with the
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 (RTC) for recovery of possession
and damages, and prayed that private respondent be directed to move its boundaries
common with that of the two parcels of land owned by it to those points and lines as
determined by the verification and relocation survey included in the Venezuela report
dated April 28, 1983; to vacate the encroached area, and pay the expenses for the
relocation survey, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

In its Answer, private respondent alleged that it is petitioners parcels of land that
wrongfully overlap its (private respondents) property. By way of affirmative and/or
special defenses, private respondent alleged that the agreement to allow Geodetic
Engineer Venezuela to decide which of the two conflicting surveys is correct is null and
void, and that the petitioners land survey was a later survey which disregarded the
previous survey of private respondents property.

In its counterclaim, private respondent alleged that petitioner put up a steep boundary
along private respondents property, which posed a grave risk and danger of soil
erosion, causing lot buyers to discontinue paying for the subdivision lots affected, and
as a result deprived private respondent of profits. Hence, private respondent sought
payment of unrealized profits, attorneys fees of P50,000, litigation expenses of P10,000
and the refund of P3,482 which it paid to the Bureau of Lands.

On May 21, 1992, the RTC dismissed both the Complaint and the Counterclaim for lack
of basis. The RTC ruled:

There is no gainsaying the fact that this case is anchored on the report of Felipe R.
Venezuela. Objections interposed to the said report by the defendant are found to be
impressed with merit in view of the following considerations: The report contained an
admission that Plan Psu-177242, a titled property, was found defective and hence was
amended. There is no showing, however, that the amendment of the said Plan was
made by virtue of a Court Order nor that notice thereof was given to the owners of the
adjoining lots, in violation of law and indeed, of due process. Since Plan Psu-177242
was approved by the Court resulting in the titling of the property, it follows that any
amendment or alteration thereof, being mere incidents, would equally have to have
judicial sanction.

Under the circumstances therefore, Venezuelas report, which sustained as correct the
survey done by Engineer Natividad (for the plaintiff) based on the aforesaid amendment
done violative of law, is necessarily void and of no effect.

Further compounding the observable inefficacy of Venezuelas report is the fact that
said report was merely recommendatory, which can only mean that without the
approval of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands to whom it was submitted, it
can have no force and effect, and fittingly, can only be regarded as a mere scrap of
paper. Plaintiff offered no proof thatVenezuelas report was duly approved.

Rejecting therefore the correctness, validity and efficacy of Venezuelas report, this
complaint, which primordially hinges on the said report, has no more leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
basis. No pronouncement as to costs.

Defendants counterclaim is likewise dismissed for lack of credible basis, the evidence
submitted in support thereof being at the most, self-serving.

SO ORDERED.
[5]



Both petitioner and private respondent appealed from the decision of the trial
court to the CA.

Petitioner questioned the dismissal of its complaint, while private respondent questioned
the dismissal of its counterclaim.

On June 22, 1995, the CA rendered judgment dismissing both appeals for lack of
merit. The CA ruled that the report of Government Geodetic EngineerVenezuela was
not binding upon the parties. Moreover, as pointed out by petitioner, the defects in the
technical description contained in the plans prepared in connection with areas
adjudicated in ordinary or voluntary registration proceedings may be corrected after a
cadastral survey in accordance with Sec. 112 of Act 496,
[6]
which has been superseded
by Sec. 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
[7]


The CA stated that under Sec. 112 of Act 496, now Sec. 108 of P.D. No. 1529, the
petition for correction shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree
of registration was entered. Hence, the CA held that the ordinary civil action for
recovery of possession is not the proper remedy of petitioner.


On August 8, 1995, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the CA.

Petitioner raised the following issues:

I. The respondent Court erred in holding that the Venezuela report is not
binding upon the parties.

II. The respondent court erred in holding that the re-relocation survey
recommended by Venezuela amounts to an erasure, alteration or amendment of a
certificate of title which requires the filing of a petition for that purpose in the original
case in which the decree of registration was entered.
[8]



Petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding that the Venezuela report is not binding
upon the parties, because:

a. the engagement of the Government Geodetic Engineer to conduct an
independent survey to determine whether there was overlapping of the subject lots was
based on an agreement between the parties that they would be bound by the results
thereof and to accordingly make the proper adjustments to their landholdings;

b. the objection of private respondent to the Venezuela report was natural
since it was unfavorable to it. Before the report was made, private respondent never
made an issue of the supposed amendment of petitioners survey plan; hence, raising
such issue after the Venezuela report is an afterthought; and

c. private respondent is estopped from repudiating the Venezuela report
because it agreed with petitioner that an independent survey be conducted to decide
once and for all their respective irreconcilable surveys.

Petitioners argument is without merit.

The CA correctly ruled that the Venezuela report is not binding upon the parties, thus:

First, when the parties agreed to request the Director of the Bureau of Lands to settle
the disagreement between their respective surveyors regarding the common boundary
in the actual ground, there was no express agreement that the verification survey
would be deemed final and binding upon the parties, a stipulation which the parties
could have easily entered into had they so intended.

Second, when a copy of the Venezuela report was furnished to private respondents
counsel, the latter promptly objected to the report as erroneous on the ground that
Geodetic Engineer Venezuela erred in adopting the relocation survey made by
petitioners geodetic engineer because it was based on the illegal amendment of Psu-
17742, a titled property, by the cadastral survey since the amendment was made
without court order. Contrary to the contention of petitioner, the objection cannot be
considered an afterthought.

Third, the request
[9]
of the parties for a verification survey to be conducted by a
Government Geodetic Engineer was addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Lands,
and the report of Geodetic Engineer Venezuela was addressed to the Regional Land
Director through the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands, National Capital
Region. There is no evidence that the Bureau of Lands Regional Director to whom the
report was submitted approved the report. Hence, the report has remained
recommendatory and not valid without the approval of the proper government authority.

Fourth, petitioner does not dispute the conclusion of the RTC that the alleged
amendment or alteration of Plan Psu-177242, a property titled before the cadastral
survey of the municipality of San Mateo, Rizal in 1964-1965, was made without notice
to the owners of the adjoining lots. Such an amendment/alteration effected without
notice to affected owners would not be in compliance with law nor the requirements of
due process.

Moreover, the Venezuela report contained an admission that Plan Psu-177242, a titled
property (owned by Marvi), was found defective and was amended, thus:

[D]uring the execution of the cadastral survey, plan Psu-177242 a titled property was
found defective. It was not accepted and as amended, line 9-10 was amended from
S.35 deg. 22E., 108.75 m. to S. 28 deg. 43E., 129.62 m. Also line 14-15 was
amended from N.64 deg. 17W., 371.91 m. to N.60 deg. 52W., 382.58 m. Due to this
amendments its area increases by THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY
NINE (3,539) SQ. METERS.


The Court agrees with the CA that such defects in plans prepared in connection with
areas adjudicated in ordinary or voluntary registration proceedings may be corrected
after the cadastral survey in accordance with Sec. 108 of P.D. No. 1529, thus:

SEC. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -- No erasure, alteration, or
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of
title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by Register of
Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or
other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register
of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by
petition to the court upon the ground that registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have
arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate
or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other
reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all
parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry
or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper;
Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to
reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered
by the court, which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their
written consent. x x x

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of
this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in
which the decree or registration was entered.
[10]

The last paragraph above provides that a petition for correction shall be filed and
entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. As stated by
the CA, the jurisdiction to entertain the petition lies with the Land Registration
Court which heard and decided the voluntary registration proceedings filed by private
respondent. The rule aims to prevent confusion and to avoid difficulty in tracing the
origin of entries in the registry.
[11]


Next, petitioner argues that Geodetic Engineer Venezuelas recommendation of a re-
relocation survey is not tantamount to an alteration of the title earlier issued to Marvi by
virtue of a private survey. Petitioner asserts that it is clear from the letter-request of the
parties to the Bureau of Lands that the titles and the survey plans of the parties do not
overlap each other. The overlapping occurs only on the actual plotting on the
ground. This indicates that there is nothing wrong with the technical description of the
Marvi property as stated in the court decree and court-approved plan. There is thus no
need to deviate therefrom. What is only required is that Marvi follow the correct starting
point and reference which, as stated in the report of Geodetic Engineer Venezuela, is
to use corner 7 and 8 of plan Psu-52080 and corner 4 of plan Psu-52085. Petitioner
contends that this is not the erasure, alteration or amendment referred to in Section 112
of Act 496, now Sec. 108 of P.D. No. 1529, which requires court approval. Instead, it is
a simple matter of Marvi properly plotting its landholdings using the proper starting
points. Hence, petitioner contends that the finding of the CA that a court order to correct
the defects in Marvis plans and title is necessary must be set aside.

The argument is untenable.

Granting that the Venezuela report is an authorized issuance of the Bureau of Lands,
said report stated that Marvis properties were covered by Plan Psu-177242 and Plan
Psu-52084. The properties were relocated prior to the cadastral survey of San Mateo,
Rizal. The boundaries and corners of the property were set on the ground by using the
technical description appearing on OCT No. 4641 (Plan Psu-177242)
[12]
and Plan Psu-
52084. However, Plan Psu-177242 was later amended, without court order, during the
cadastral survey as it was found defective. It is only proper that the amendment made
during the cadastral survey be properly reflected in the corresponding TCT of Marvi or
the proper party in accordance with Sec. 108, P.D. No. 1529.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38409 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and G.R. No. 123346
MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CARPIO-MORALES,
CORPORATION, AZCUNA,
Respondent. TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 14, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI- G.R. No. 134385
CULTURE, INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus -


HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY
HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING
SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR
CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON
AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS
LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND
ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER OF DEES OF
MALABON,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


R E S O L U T I O N


TINGA, J.:

The stability of the countrys Torrens system is menaced by the infestation of fake
land titles and deeds. Any decision of this Court that breathes life into spurious or
inexistent titles all but contributes to the blight. On the contrary, the judicial devotion is
towards purging the system of illicit titles, concomitant to our base task as the ultimate
citadel of justice and legitimacy.

These two petitions
[1]
involve properties covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate.
[2]
The
vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities, comprising an area larger than the
sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.
[3]
Despite their prime location within
Metropolitan Manila, the properties included in
OCT No. 994 have been beset by controversy and sullied by apparent fraud, cloudy
titles and shady transfers. It may as well be renamed the Land of Caveat Emptor.

The controversy attending the lands of OCT No. 994 has not eluded this Court.
Since 1992, our findings and ruling in MWSS v. Court of Appeals
[4]
have stood as the
Rosetta Stone in deciphering claims emanating from OCT No. 994, as was done
in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,
[5]
and in the Courts Decision dated 29 November 2005
(2005 Decision) in these cases.
[6]
Yet in the course of resolving these motions for
reconsideration came the revelation that OCT No. 994 was lost in translation
following MWSS. Certain immutable truths reflected on the face of OCT No. 994 must
emerge and gain vitality, even if we ruffle feathers in the process.

I.

A recapitulation of the facts, which have already been extensively narrated in the
2005 Decision, is in order. For clarity, we narrate separately the antecedent facts in
G.R. Nos. 123346 and 134385.

A. G.R. No. 123346, Manotok Realty, Inc.
and Manotok Estate Corporation, vs.
CLT Realty Development Corporation


On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from
Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession
of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129.
[7]

CLTs claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013 issued in
its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds, which title in turn was derived from
Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage
dated 10 December 1988. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimsons (Dimson) TCT
No. R-15169, a title issued pursuant to an order of the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Caloocan City, Branch 33. Dimsons title appears to have been sourced from OCT
No. 994.
[8]

For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming
that Dimsons title, the proximate source of CLTs title, was irregularly issued and,
hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The
Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from
several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority.
[9]
The Manotok
title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994 which, on 9 September 1918,
was transferred to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously acquired
the property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an Escritura de Venta executed by Don
Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Llopis.
[10]
On 3 March 1920, Ruiz and Leuterio sold
the property to Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until 22 August 1938 when the
property was transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez, Consuelo Susana Gonzalez, Juana
Francisca Gonzalez, Maria Clara Gonzalez, Francisco Felipe Gonzalez and Concepcion
Maria Gonzalez under TCT No. 35486. The lot was then, per annotation dated 21
November 1946, subdivided into seven (7) parcels each in the name of each of the
Gonzalezes.
[11]

The trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and conclusions arrived at by
the majority commissioners appointed to resolve the conflict of titles. It was established
that the entire Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496 by virtue of which OCT
No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
[12]
that Lot 26 was transferred to
CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived from the Dimson title and that on the basis of
the technical descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles, the latters
property indeed encroached on the property described in CLTs title.
[13]


The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
[14]
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,
[15]
they filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court, ascribing error to the appellate court in upholding the
trial courts decision which decided the case on the basis of the majority commissioners
report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioners report.
[16]

B. G.R. No. 134385, Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs of
Jose B. Dimson, et. al.


On 18 December 1979, Dimson filed with the then CFI of Rizal, Branch
33, Caloocan City a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta). Dimson alleged that he was the absolute owner of
part of the Maysilo Estate in Malabon covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City. Alleging that Araneta had been illegally occupying the land and
that the latter refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands, he prayed that
Araneta be ordered to vacate the same and remove all improvements thereon and to
return full possession thereof to him. Araneta for its part admitted occupancy of the
disputed land by constructing some buildings thereon and subdividing portions thereof
in the exercise of its right as absolute owner. He alleged that Dimsons title to the
subject land was void and hence he had no cause of action.
[17]

The trial court ruled for Dimson in its Decision dated 28 May 1993 with these findings:
first, there were inherent technical infirmities or defects in the titles that formed each link
in the chain of ownership that culminated in the Manotok title, i.e., that the technical
descriptions in the titles were written in Spanish whereas those in the alleged mother
title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an abnormal state that deviated from the
usual practice in the issuance of titles; and second, it was established procedure to
indicate in the certificate of title, whether original or transfer certificate, the date of the
original survey of the mother title together with the succeeding date of subdivision or
consolidation. Thus, the absence of the original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on
Manotoks chain of titles, the trial court added, should mean that OCT No. 994 was not
the mother title not only because the original survey dates were different but also
because the original survey date must always be earlier than the issue date of the
original title. OCT No. 994 was issued on May 3, 1917 which was much ahead of the
survey date indicated in the succeeding titles, which is December 22, 1917.
[18]

Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals which, on 30 May 1997, affirmed the lower courts
decision.
[19]
In so holding, the appellate court declared that the title of Araneta to the
disputed land is a nullity. It noted that Dimsons TCT No. R-15169 was derived from
OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 and that the same was obtained by Dimson
simultaneously with other titles, viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and 15168 by virtue of the
Decision dated October 13, 1977 and Order dated October 18, 1977, in Special
Proceedings No. C-732. It was also pointed out that Aranetas TCT No. 13574 and
21343 were both derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 which was
previously declared null and void by the Supreme Court inMetropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals.
[20]

Araneta then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court attributing error to the
Court of Appeals in failing to recognize that it had a better right of possession over the
property than did Dimson.
[21]

As both petitions involved interrelated challenges against the validity of the parties
separate titles to portions of the greater Maysilo Estate, they, along with G.R. No.
148767
[22]
, were consolidated per Resolutions dated 21 April 1999 and 6 March 2002.
Also in 2002, the Republic of the Philippines sought and was allowed intervention in
these cases.

On 29 November 2005, the Third Division of the Court rendered the 2005
Decision,
[23]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[24]


The Court acknowledged that the paramount question raised in the petitions is whether
the titles issued in the name of Dimson and of CLT are valid. Noting that this question
is one purely of fact, the Court held that the same was beyond its power to determine
and so, the factual findings of the trial courts in these cases as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals must be accorded the highest degree of respect and not disturbed at all.
Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to discuss the absence of merit in the
petitions. First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Court upheld the
validity of the trial courts adoption of the commissioners majority report as part of the
decision inasmuch as the same is allowed by Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court
and that a case of overlapping titles absolutely necessitates the assistance of experts in
the field of geodetic engineering who, on account of their experience and expertise, are
in a better position to determine which of the contending titles is valid. For this reason,
the Court emphasized, the trial court may well rely on their findings and
conclusions. Second, the Court pointed out that the titles of respondents in all three
cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City
registered on 19 April 1917. However, because the validity of said mother title was
upheld by the Court itself in MWSS and reiterated in Heirs of Gonzaga, the Court chose
not to delve anymore into the correctness of the said decisions which had already
attained finality and immutability.
The Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On 5
June 2006, the cases were elevated to the Court en banc, which heard oral arguments
on 1 August 2006. The Court formulated the issues for oral argument, thus:
From the above petitions, the following principal issues are gathered:

I.

Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid:

A. Petitioners titles:

1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107,
21485, 26405, 26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 63268, 55896, T-
1214528, 163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc., and TCT No. T-
232568 in the name of Manotok Estate Corporation;
2. TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta Institute of Agriculture; and
3. TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374 in the name of Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan
Association, Inc.

All these titles were derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 registered
on May 3, 1917 in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate, same city.





B. Respondents Title:

1. TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation;
2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson; and
3. TCT No. T-1770 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation/

All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or on April 19, 1917,
covering the same Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.

II.

Can this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in Metropolitan Water Works
and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103558, November 17,
1992) andHeirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 96259, September 3,
1996) sustaining the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 and nullify the
same OCT No. 994 registered later, or on May 3, 1917?

III.

How will the Reports of the Department of Justice and the Senate Fact-Finding
Committee, not presented in evidence before the trial courts concluding that the valid
title is OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, affect the disposition of these cases?

Will it be necessary to remand these cases to the trial courts to determine which
of the Certificates of Title are valid? If so, which trial court?
[25]



A crucial fact emerged during the oral arguments. The Republic, through the
Solicitor General,
[26]
strenuously argued that contrary to the supposition reflected in the
Advisory, there was, in fact, only one OCT No. 994.

x x x In this particular case, it appears that on December 3, 1912, the Court of Land
Registration, the Judge Norberto Romualdez presiding, acting on Land Registration
Case No. 4429 rendered judgment ordering the GLRO to issue a decree. Pursuant to
this order, the GLRO prepared Decree No. 36455 and issued the same on April 19,
1917 at 9:00 oclock in the morning, at Manila, Philippines. It may be observed that at
the face of the OCT 994 which was then on file at the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
and now kept in the LRA, the following entry can be seen. Received for transcription at
the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal this 3
rd
day of May 1917
at 7:30 a.m. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of
transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. It appears that the
transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. There is no other date to speak of. In the records of the
Land Registration Authority, there is only one OCT 994, on its face appears the date of
transcript,May 3, 1917. The validity then of all subsequent titles tracing their origin from
OCT 994 should be tested in the light of these set of facts. x x x
[27]



On the other hand, the counsel for CLT stated during the same oral argument that he
had seen a photocopy of an OCT No. 994 that was dated 19 April 1917,
[28]
and
manifested that he could attach the same to CLTs memorandum.
[29]
At the same time,
on even date, the Court directed the Solicitor General and counsel for CLT to submit to
the Court certified true copies of the Original Certificate of Title No. 994 dated May 3
1917 and April 19, 1917, respectively, on or before Friday, August 4, 2006.
[30]

In response to this directive, both the Solicitor General and the counsel for CLT
submitted their separate Compliance to this Court, with their respective copies of OCT
No. 994 attached thereto. Both copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the Solicitor
General and CLT indicate on their face that the decree of registration issued on 19 April
1917 was received for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal on 3 May 1917. Indeed, there is no evident variance between the
copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the OSG and CLT, and CLT admits just as much in
its Memorandum dated 3 September 2006.
[31]

The claim of the Solicitor General that there is only one OCT No. 994 was duly
confirmed though belatedly by CLT itself. Even the ponente of the 2005 Decision has
recognized this fact, as indicated in her present Dissenting Opinion. The emergence of
such fact, contrary as it is to the crucial predicate underlying the issues presented in the
Courts Advisory, has changed the essence and complexion of the controversy. The
key to grant or deny the motions for reconsideration is the answer to the
question: which is the true date of OCT No. 994, 17 April 1917 or 3 May 1917?

II.
We turn to the date of OCT No. 994 as reflected in the quoted portion of the certified
true copy thereof submitted by the Republic of the Philippines:
[32]



Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in accordance
with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of said xxx

Witness: the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate Judge of said Court, the
3rd day of December, A.D. nineteen hundred and twelve.

Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19
th
day of April A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M.


ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office of Justice


Received for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for
the Province of P.I. this third day of May, nineteen hundred and seventeen at 7:30
A.M. (emphasis supplied)


As evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of registration was issued on 19
April 1917, and actually received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May
1917. Interestingly, even as CLT admits that there is only one OCT No. 994, that
which the Solicitor General had presented to the Court,
[33]
it maintains that the OCT
should be deemed registered as of the date of issuance of the decree of registration, 19
April 1917, instead of the date it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds
on 3 May 1917. The argument is based on the theory that it is the decree of registration
[that] produces legal effects, though it is entered before the transmittal of the same for
transcription at the Register of Deeds.
[34]


This argument marks a radical departure from CLTs earlier theory that there were two
OCTs No. 994, one dated 19 April 1917 and the other 3 May 2007, a theory which was
likewise reflected in the Courts earlier Advisory on the issues prior to the oral
argument.
[35]
Yet the argument smacks of plain sophistry.

The process involved is what this Court called the method of giving a paper
title.
[36]
It is spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Act:

SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a
certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court, to the register of deeds for the
province, or provinces, or city in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall
transcribe the decree in a book to be- called the 'registration book,' in which a leaf, or
leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made
by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title,
and shall be signed by him and sealed
with the seal of the court. All certificates of title shall be numbered consecutively,
beginning with number one. The register of deeds shall in each case make an exact
duplicate of the original certificate, including the seal, but putting on it the words
'Owner's duplicate certificate,' and deliver the same to the owner or to his attorney duly
authorized. In case of a variance between the owner's duplicate certificate and the
original certificate the original shall prevail. The certified copy of the decree of
registration shall be filed and numbered by the register of deeds with a reference noted
on it to the place of record of the original certificate of title: Provided, however, That
when an application includes land lying in more than one province, or one province and
the city of Manila, the court shall cause the part lying in each province or in the city of
Manila to be described separately by metes and bounds in the decree of registration,
and the clerk shall send to the register of deeds for each province, or the city of Manila,
as the case may be, a copy of the decree containing a description of the land within that
province or city, and the register of deeds shall register the same and issue an owner's
duplicate therefor, and thereafter for all matters pertaining to registration under this Act
the portion in each province or city shall be treated as a separate parcel of land.

SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in
regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book 'Original certificate
of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at' (stating
time and place of entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take
effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating
to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled 'Transfer from number' (the
number of the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also the words
'Originally registered' (date, volume, and page of registration.")


With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two vintage and sound
rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree
of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held that there is a marked
distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the
entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the
certificate of title is made by the register of deeds.
[37]
Such difference is highlighted by
Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the certificate of title is issued in pursuance of
the decree of registration. In the second, it was stressed that what stands as the
certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar
of deeds in the registry.
[38]


Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title
itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the recipient from the land
registration office of the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the
transcriber no less. Since what is now acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994
indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3
May 1917, it is that date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able
to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being the
original certificate of title.
[39]
Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by
the register of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.

The textbook writers and authorities on Land Registration are unanimous on the matter.
The late Commissioner Antonio Noblejas, widely acknowledged as the leading authority
on the subject during his time, wrote, thus:

Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the Registrar of
Land Titles transcribes the same in the registry book called the Registration Book and
issues an owners duplicate certificate of title to the applicant upon payment by him of
the necessary registration fees. The entry made by the Registrar of Land Titles in his
registry book is actually the original copy of the original certificate of title and shall be
signed by him and sealed with the seal of the Court and of his office. Pursuant to Rep.
Act No. 113, the Registrar of Land Titles may now use only the seal of his office,
dispensing with the court seal.
[40]


Professor Florencio Ponce, who was also once Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
Deputy Register of Deeds of Manila, was of the same conviction:

A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the Commissioner of
Land Registration (formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the name of the Judge to the fact that
the land described therein is registered in the name of the applicant or oppositor or
claimant as the case maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the
registration book and signed by the register of deeds, the page on which the
transcription is made become the original certificate of title, more commonly called
the Torrens title.

xxx

The land becomes a registered land only upon the transcription of the decree in
the original registration book by the register of deeds, the date and time of such
transcription being set forth in the process and certified to at the foot of each entry or
certificate of title.


xxx

The issuance of the original and owners duplicate certificates are basic for the valid
existence of the title. Issuance of additional copies are permissive and their non-
existence does not affect the status of title. A certificate of title is deemed as regularly
issued with the issuance of the original copy and owners duplicate.
[41]


So was Professor Francisco Ventura:

Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the
Commissioner of Land Registration sends a certified copy thereof, under seal of the
said office, to the Register of Deeds of the province where the land lies, and the register
of Deeds transcribes the decree in a book, called the Registration Book, in which a
leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order should be devoted exclusively to each title. The
entry made by the Register of Deeds in said book constitutes the original certificate of
title and is signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office.
[42]


The same view came from Professor Narciso Pea, also a former Assistant
Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and Acting Register of Deeds of
Manila, as he wrote, thus:

Thus, Section 42 of Act No. 496 provides that the certificate first
registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall
be entitled in the registration book Original Certificate of Title, entered pursuant to
decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at (stating time and place of entry of
decree and the number of the case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date of
the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall
be in like form, but shall be entitled. Transfer from number (the number of the next
previous certificate relating to the same land), and also the words Originally registered
(date, volume, and page of registration).
[43]



The dissent has likewise suggested that the variance between these two dates is
ultimately inconsequential. It cannot be so for otherwise, the recent decision of the
Court in Alfonso v. Office of the President
[44]
would simply be wrong. In Alfonso, the
Court precisely penalized Alfonso, the former register of deeds of Caloocanbecause she
acquiesced to the change of the date of registration of OCT No. 994, as reflected in
several subsequent titles purportedly derived from that mother title, from 3 May
1917 to 19 April 1917. If indeed the difference in dates were inconsequential, then it
should not have really mattered that Mrs. Alfonso, as found by the Court, had invariably
issued certificates of title, reflecting either the 19 April or 3 May date, a circumstance
which, the Court concluded, was irregular. But if the Court were to accede to the dissent
and agree that it did not really matter whether the date of registration of OCT No. 994
was 3 May or 19 April, then poor Mrs. Alfonso should be spared of the penalty of
dismissal from the service which the Court had already affirmed.

III.

Even the dissent does not insist, as the 2005 Decision did, that there is an OCT No.
994 registered or dated 19 April 1917. This new stance squarely contravenes or
deviates from the following unequivocal pronouncement in the 2005 Decision:


We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in all these three (3) cases
involves the validity of the parties' overlapping titles. The titles of the respondents in
these cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds
of Caloocan City registered on April 19, 1917. The validity of such mother title has
already been upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 103558, MWSS v. Court of Appeals, et al.
dated November 17, 1992 earlier cited in the assailed Decisions. Significantly, the ruling
in MWSS was reiterated in G.R. No. 96259, Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals dated September 3, 1996.

We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the Decision of this Court in MWSS.
The said Decision, confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917 from
which the titles of the respondents in the cases at bar were derived, has long become
final and executory. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains
finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
[45]



This new conclusion likewise differs from what the Court had to say regarding
OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 in the adverted MWSS v. Court of
Appeals
[46]
decision:

It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No.
36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the other
hand, private respondents' title was derived from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April
19, 1917. Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails . . . In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued
in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under
the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly
from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
Hence, in point of priority of issuance, private respondents' title prevails over that of
petitioner MWSS.
[47]


Four years later, the Court promulgated the Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals
[48]
decision,
which essentially reaffirmed foregoing factual pronouncements made in MWSS.

Notwithstanding the emerging error in fact that informed
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, the dissent now claims that said decisions
confirmed the validity of the OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917. But if we
examine MWSS closely, it appears to be beset with semantic confusion. We make the
following relevant references from that decision, presented sequentially:

(1) Jose B. Dimson was the registered owner of a parcel land situated in Balintawak,
Kalookan City with an area of 213,012 square meters, more or less, and covered by
TCT No. C-15167 which was registered on June 8, 1978. Said parcel of land was
originally Lot 28 of the Maysilo Estate (OCT) No. 994 which wasregistered on April 19,
1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in Land Registration Case No. 4429.
[49]


(2) Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that petitioner's title
over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square meters was based on the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34, while private respondents'
title was derived from OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917;
[50]


(3) It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No.
36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the other
hand, private respondent's title was derived from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April
19, 1917;
[51]

(4) Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same
land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in
existence.
5
Since the land in question has already been registered under OCT No.
994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3,
1917 is null and void;
[52]

In one (1) out of the four (4) times that reference was made to the mother title of Dimson
in MWSS, it was OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917 which is the language
preferred by the dissent since it hews to the date of issuance of the decree of
registration in the authentic OCT No. 994. However, the same decision inconsistently
refers to it also as OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, dated April 19, 1917,
and registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917. Notably, the context
of MWSS in making the final citation, registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19,
1917, was to point out that as a result the subsequent registration of the same land on
May 3, 1917 is null and void; hence, no other conclusion can be reached than that the
Court deemed Dimsons mother title as having been registered on a date earlier than 3
May 1917.
Since the dissent and even CLT now acknowledge that there is only one OCT No. 994
which was registered by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, the earlier
factual finding in MWSS is indefensible. MWSS recognized an OCT No. 994 registered
on 19 April 1917, a title that never existed and, even assuming that it did exist, is now
acknowledged as spurious.
Gonzaga primarily relied on the ruling of the Court in MWSS upon a finding that the
case involved facts that are exactly the same as those that we have passed and ruled
upon in the [MWSS case]. The title which was affirmed by the Court in Gonzaga, TCT
No. C-26806 in the name of Lilia Sevilla, was a transfer from Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No.
36455.
[53]
It was further observed by the Court that on the one hand, [therein]
petitioners titles indicate original registration to have been made on May 3, 1917, but on
the other hand, private respondents title indicates original registration to have been
made on April 19, 1917.
[54]

It was the title originally registered on 19 April 1917 which was made to prevail
in Gonzaga, following MWSS. Since there is no OCT No. 994 originally registered on 19
April 1917, as now acknowledged, it follows that Gonzaga, like MWSS, is no longer
reliable as well.
The argument has been raised by the ponente of the 2005 Decision that the 3 May
1917 OCT No. 994 must be distinguished from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917
involved in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases because the former title was based on the
Cadastral Survey of Kalookan City under Cadastral Case No. 34, also covering the
Maysilo Estate. It is elemental to note that assuming said 3 May OCT was somehow
flawed because it was based on Cadastral Case No. 34, it does not mean that the so-
called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994 is valid or had existed in the first place. Since even
the dissent now discounts the existence of the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994, it
should necessarily follow that any title that is sourced from the 17 April 1917 OCT is
void. Such conclusion is inescapable whatever questions there may be about the
veracity of the 3 May 1917 OCT based on Cadastral Case No. 34.
It would be especially incoherent for the Court to reiterate MWSS and Gonzaga when
they effectuated the OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 and acknowledge at the
same time that the same OCT never existed, the genuine OCT No. 994 being that
which was registered on 3 May 1917. We need not go as far as to revive
the MWSS or Gonzaga decisions, but certainly we can decline to infuse further validity
to their erroneous basic premise that there was an OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April
1917. The dissent proposes that we perpetuate the erroneous premise even as the
error is plainly acknowledged, a stance that will not serve the Court well should it
prevail.

Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions now before us.
Undisputedly, the two cases involved different parcels of land. The present petitioners
could not be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto
and and their properties were not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is
basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
[55]


We can take instruction from the tack previously taken by this Court in dealing with
municipalities created by executive orders. Beginning with Pelaez v. Auditor
General,
[56]
the Court declared as a general principle that the President had no power to
create municipalities through executive orders. However, instead of nullifying the
creation of all municipalities created in the same manner, the Court only annulled those
municipalities whose creation was specifically attacked in the petition filed by then-
Vice President
Pelaez.
[57]
With respect to the other municipalities which were not
annulled in Pelaez, the Court would, in the next few decades, annul only the
municipalities which were specifically challenged in petitions raised before the
Court.
[58]
However, after the adoption of the Local Government Code of 1991 that gave
statutory recognition to the de facto municipalities which had not yet been annulled, the
Court started to affirm the legal existence of such municipalities.
[59]


As in Pelaez, the operative effect of the doctrines pronounced
in MWSS and Gonzaga can extend only to the parties and properties involved in said
cases, even if it can be argued that the rights involving other parties and properties are
afflicted with inconsistency as regards the legal rulings therein, similar to the
municipalities created which though created by void executive orders were not however
annulled. Yet with the emergence of a new factthe enactment of the Local Government
Code vis--vis Pelaez, or the present acknowledgment that only the 3 May 1917 OCT
No. 994 exists vis--vis MWSS and Gonzagasubsequent rulings would be informed
primarily by the new developments, rather than by the previous precedents that were
not able to take into account the true or new factual premises.

IV.

The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should
be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid.
If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then
such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true
basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such
OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings
have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the law of the case
doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.

This approach immensely differs from that preferred by the 2005 Decision and the
dissenting view, which dwells in the main on the alleged flaws in the titles held by the
Manotoks and Araneta, without making a similar inquiry into the titles held by CLT and
the Heirs of Dimson. Since the decision in favor of CLT and the Heirs of Dimson was
ultimately grounded on a factual predicate now acknowledged as erroneous, it follows
that the primary focus should have been whether the titles held by CLT and the
Dimsons are valid and with force and effect. To that end, we need only examine the
titles relied upon by CLT and the Dimsons.

In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally filed a complaint for annulment of the
titles in the name of the Manotoks, alleging that it was the registered owner ofLot 26 of
the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. T-177013 of the Registry of Deeds
of Caloocan City. Reproduced below is what appears on the face of TCT No. T-
177013:
[60]


IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19
th
day of
April, in the year, nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume 36455, page ____, as Original Certificate of
Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____ Record No. _____in
the name of ___________.

This certificate is a transfer from Trans. Certificate of Title No. R-17994/T-89, which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.

Entered at City of Kalookan
Philippines, on the 15
th
day of March
In the year nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine at 19:48 a.m.

CLT further alleged that it derived TCT No. T-177013 on 10 December 1988 from
Estelita Hipolito whose title, TCT No. R-17994, is depicted, thus:
[61]


IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19
th
day of
April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page NA, as Original Certificate of Title
No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429, Record No.
________.

This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-
15166/T-75, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is
concerned.

Entered at the City of Caloocan
Philippines, on the 12
th
day of December
in the year nineteen hundred and seventy-
eight at 3:30 p.m.

Dimsons original complaint for recovery of possession against Araneta was
founded on the claim that he was the absolute owner of a parcel of land located at
Malabon, comprising fifty (50) hectares of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. R-
15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Said TCT No. R-15169 is reproduced
below:
[62]


IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19
th
day of
April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen, in the Registration Book of the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page___ , Original Certificate of Title
No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455, issued in LRC Case No. 4429, Record No. __

This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. [illegible]
which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.

Entered at Caloocan City
Philippines, on the 8
th
day of June
in the year nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight at 10:34 a.m.


It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat the properties
they purport to cover were originally registered on the 19th day April, in the year
nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal. Note, as earlier established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally
registered on 19 April 1917.

The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of these three titles can be
accorded recognition simply because the original title commonly referred to therein
never existed. To conclude otherwise would constitute deliberate disregard of the truth.
These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19
April 1917 had actually existed. CLT and the Dimsons were given the opportunity to
submit such proof before this Court, but they did not. In fact, CLT has specifically
manifested that the OCT No. 994 they concede as true is also the one which the Office
of Solicitor General submitted as true, and that is OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917.

Given this essential clarification, there is no sense in affirming the 2005 Decision which
sustained the complaints for annulment of title and/or recovery of possession filed by
CLT and the Dimson when their causes of action are both founded on an inexistent
mother title. How can such actions prosper at all even to the extent of dispossessing the
present possessors with title?

The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called 19 April 1917 OCT from which
the Dimson and CLT titles are sourced. As earlier mentioned, the focus is instead
placed on the purported flaws of the titles held by the Manotoks and
Araneta notwithstanding that said parties swere the defendants before the lower court
and,
therefore, the burden of proof did not lie on them. The established legal principle in
actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish
not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that
the land sought to be reconveyed is his.
[63]
In an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness
of the defendant's claim.
[64]


V.

The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the present
acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and the titles
involved in the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It dwells on the fact that the titles debunked
in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases, which find origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3
May 1917, seem to have been derived from Cadastral Case No. 34 also covering the
Maysilo Estate. It is in fact the theory of the dissent that there are, in effect, two
competing sources of title the OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 arising from the
issuance of Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994
dated 3 May 1917 based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City in Cadastral Case
No. 34. It is further opined that the registration of lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No.
34, even if the date of such registration is 3 May 1917, is void since such registration
could not supplant the earlier decision of the land registration court.

The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles in land cases. Had
it been adopted by the Court, the effect would have been to precipitate the utter
astonishment of legal scholars, professionals and students alike.

The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in
ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court inPamintuan v. San
Agustin.
[65]
Such jurisdiction is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in
the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial
rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a
registered owner of his title.
[66]
It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz
[67]
that the
limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even extends to the
determination of which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as
such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the
land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered
to be within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings.
[68]


The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar
[69]
concerned the validity of an order of a
cadastral court directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Sideco
and his children, at Sidecos own prayer, over land previously registered in the name
of Crispulo
Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did not amount to a
readjudication of the title. After the cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the
chief surveyor had reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a decree
in a land registration proceeding and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor
recommended that the title be cancelled and a new one issued in the names of such
persons as the court may determine. In ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court
stated that [t]he proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the title already
issued, or to readjudicate the title of the land. They were precisely predicated on the
finality of the title already issued, because it was the registered owner who was asked to
express his desire with respect thereto, and the courts order precisely followed the
petition of the registered owner.
[70]


The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds,
explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the issuance of new titles in
place of the title issued under voluntary registration proceedings:

Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number, it is necessary that
a new title be issued, giving the lot its cadastral number in accordance with the
cadastral survey. This does not mean that the court has the power to alter the decree
entered in the previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the
said decree. It does not adjudicate the title
anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for the
convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him to identify his property
inasmuch as all the lands brought under the cadastral survey are designated by
cadastral numbers.
[71]



What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land, already issued in
the name of a person, in the name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title
already issued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his
substantial rights.
[72]
Yet such prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not
have jurisdiction over the action involving the previously registered land, as explained
in Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at all
even if it would not impair the rights of the previously registered owner, as emphasized
in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that because there
was a cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such
titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such titles issued, and
they would be valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the original registrant
to whom OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued.



VI.

From these premises, the Court is able to make the following binding conclusions. First,
there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be
the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of
the decree of registration on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as
the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is
void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made
specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of
such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to
invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is
placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.

Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court
of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of
an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent.
Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same
as or similar to that at bar.

With these conclusions, what then is the proper course of action to take with
respect to the pending motions for reconsideration? Considering that CLT and the
Dimsons clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the
action for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for
ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court. However, such
solution may not satisfactorily put to rest the controversy surrounding the Maysilo
Estate.

More pertinently, after the instant petitions were filed with this Court, the Republic
of the Philippines, through the OSG, had sought to intervene. The Republic did not
participate as a party when these cases were still before the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals. While the Republic had originally prayed for the grant of the petitions filed by
all the petitioners in these consolidated cases, instead it presently seeks of the Court
the promulgation of a new ruling upholding the validity of OCT No. 994 issued
[73]
or
registered
[74]
on May 3, 1917. Rather than suggest whether the petitions be granted or
denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration from this Court that it is the 3 May
1917 mother title that is valid, a remand of this case to the Court of Appeals, to settle
which among the private parties derived their titles from the existing OCT 994, is
proper
[75]


Notably, both the Manotoks and Araneta are amenable to the remand of the petition,
albeit under differing qualifications. The Manotoks submit that there should be a remand
to the court of origin, consolidating all the present petitions, and that a full trial be
conducted by the trial court.
[76]
On the other hand, Araneta proposes four (4) options for
the Court to consider: (1) the dismissal of the original complaint filed by Dimson; (2) a
ruling granting Aranetas appeal and dismissing Dimsons complaint, but at the same
time remanding the case to a new division of the Court of Appeals for factual
determination pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; (3) the suspension
of the resolution of the present motion for reconsideration while the case is remanded to
the Court of Appeals for factual determination; or (4) the remand of the proceedings to
the Court of Appeals for the reception of further evidence, particularly the Senate and
DOJ Reports, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, and the consequent
resolution by the appellate court of the instant petitions.

The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the motion for reconsideration,
then Chief Justice Panganiban suggested that a remand may be required to determine
the status of the original title.
[77]
Considering that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that
issued on/ registered on/dated 3 May 1917, a remand would be appropriate to
determine which of the parties, if any, derived valid title from the said genuine OCT No.
994. On the one hand, the appreciation of facts is beyond the province of this Court,
since it is not a trier of fact
[78]
as well as not capacitated to appreciate evidence at the
first instance. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals has the competence to engage in
that undertaking.

Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari,
[79]
the
Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the
evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or
office.
[80]
The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.

The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact.
[81]
Its
conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is
a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual
matters, including documentary evidence.

In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before
it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court
of Appeals,
[82]
this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division

of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more
particularly to determine the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are open spaces
and/or areas reserved for certain purposes, determining in the process the validity of
such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to.
[83]
The
Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a
Commissioners Report shortly thereafter.
[84]
Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is
not a deviant procedure.

The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority
to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule
32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a
commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon
motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into
effect.
[85]
The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report
evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of
evidence.
[86]
The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the
court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.
[87]
In Republic, the
commissioners report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the
matter. The same result can obtain herein.
VII.

The OSG likewise adverts to the findings reached in the respective investigations and
reports by the Department of Justice and the Philippine Senate, components of the two
other co-equal branches of the government. Both the DOJ Report dated 28 August
1997 and the Senate Report dated 25 May 1998 conclude that there is only one (1)
OCT No. 994 issued or registered on 3 May 1997. The OSG argues that the contents of
both of these reports may be considered as evidence. It also points out, with basis, that
these reports may be taken judicial notice of by this Court, following Section 1, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that these reports fall within the
ambit of the official acts of the legislative [and] executive departments.
[88]


It bears noting that the DOJ and Senate Reports were rendered on 28 August
1997 and 25 May 1998 respectively. They were issued some years after the trial courts
had promulgated their respective decisions in the Manotok and Araneta cases, and
even after the Court of Appeals handed down its decision against the Manotoks
which is assailed in its present petition.
[89]
In Aranetas case, the Court of Appeals had
first ruled against Araneta in its Decision dated 30 May 1997, or just shortly before the
rendition of the DOJ and Senate Reports.

Since this Court is not a trier of fact, we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by
the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence,
though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of
the parties. The Court, in the 2005 Decision, refused to take into account
the reports on the regrettable premise that they could somehow override the judicial
decisions earlier arrived at.
[90]
The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn
judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the
same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they
were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to
accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still
undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to
accept or reject them.

There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be
threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. The Manotoks and Araneta advert
to certain factual allegations relating to their titles and backstories to advance their
respective positions. Still, if it indeed emerges from the determination of the Court of
Appeals on remand that notwithstanding the clear flaws of the title of respondents the
titles of petitioners are cut from the same counterfeit cloth, then the Republic of the
Philippines, an intervenor in these cases, is armed anyway with any and all appropriate
remedies to safeguard the legitimate owners of the properties in question.

VIII.

The definitive conclusions reached by the Court thus far in these cases are
spelled out in Part VI of this Resolution. Said conclusions serve to guide the Court of
Appeals in hearing these cases on remand.

The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear
these cases on remand. The Special Division shall be composed of three Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals, namely; Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as
Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar
B. Dimaampao as Junior Member.

The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings
and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within
three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.

In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division
is directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence already on
record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to
wit:

i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT
No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?

ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in
the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws
sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?

iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the
1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders
establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as
opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?

iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation
proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so
what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government and
whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government
through expropriation.

v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting
claims of title should prevail.


WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division
of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII
of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152007 January 22, 2007
PROCOPIO TAPUROC, HEIRS OF ANTONIA EBE (Deceased) represented by her
children namely: HEIRS OF CELEDONIA PUTONG, namely: FORTUNATO
ESCUDERO, TERESITA TABALDINA, CONCORDIO E. NEBRIA, PEDRO
ESCUDERO and LUISA PEDRERA; HEIRS OF EUFEMIO PUTONG, namely:
RICARDO PUTONG and PORFERIA PUTONG; HEIRS OF GREGORIO PUTONG,
namely: ROSALIO PUTONG, PERSEVERANDA LOPEZ, BERNARDO PUTONG and
ROSALINDA OMAGAC; HEIRS OF MARIANO PUTONG, namely: SERAPIA DALHOG,
TEODORA AYENG, MARCIANO PUTONG, RESTITUTA LIQUIT, SERAPIA LUAY,
FAUSTINO PUTONG and SOFRONIA PATROLLA, ALL REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, AUREA P. MERCIDOR, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMELITA LOQUELLANO VDA. DE MENDE and the HEIRS OF EVANS MENDE,
namely: ERIC MITCHEL, ERIC LYNDON, ERIC FERDINAND, JOSE ERIC ERVIN and
JENNIFER MILDRED, ALL SURNAMED MENDE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
THE CITY OF TAGBILARAN, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64548, to wit:
1. Decision
1
dated September 21, 2001, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Sale, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (8585) T-4767 and
all Subsequent Documents and Damages, thereat commenced by the herein petitioners
against the respondents; and
2. Resolution
2
dated January 23, 2002, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The petition embodies an alternative prayer for this Court to remand the case to the trial
court for the presentation of an expert witness.
The facts:
On September 19, 1996, in the RTC of Tagbilaran City, a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent
Documents and Damages
3
was filed by the petitioners against respondents Carmelita
Loquellano Vda. de Mende, the Heirs of Evans B. Mende, and the Register of Deeds of
the City of Tagbilaran. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5970 and raffled to Branch
47 of the court, the Complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the
successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs
and/or descendants of the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5,795
square meters, more or less, situated in the Barrio (now District) of Booy, Tagbilaran,
Bohol and previously covered by TCT No. 3444; that sometime in 1992, when the
petitioners decided to partition the subject property, they discovered from the Office of
the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain
Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in favor of the latter by
their predecessors-in-interest on December 30, 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged
document because the alleged vendors therein, who were Procopio Tapuroc and the
predecessors-in-interest of the other petitioners, did not sign the conveying deed nor
receive any consideration therefor; and that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe,
had already passed away in 1960, or long before the purported Deed of Sale was said
to have been executed in 1967. Petitioners, as plaintiffs, thus pray for the nullification of
the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto in the name
of Evans Mende and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus damages.
In their Answer,
4
the respondent Mendes, as defendants, denied the material
allegations of the Complaint and averred that the late Evans Mende, husband of
respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende and father of the herein co-
respondents, bought the subject parcel of land from its previous owners on December
12, 1967 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly notarized by Atty. Rodolfo Yap. They
further assert that they had been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the
land in question from the time of said sale, and had been religiously paying the realty
taxes due thereon. By way of affirmative defense, the respondents assert that
petitioners cause of action, if any, had already prescribed in view of the unreasonable
delay in filing the suit in court, let alone the fact that their (respondents) title has
become indefeasible.
On June 7, 1999, after due proceedings, the trial court came out with its
decision
5
finding that the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs (now petitioners) was
insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. The
court explained that despite the opportunity given them, the plaintiffs failed to present a
handwriting expert to determine whether the said Deed of Sale was indeed a forged
instrument, adding that laches had already set in because of plaintiffs inaction and
neglect in questioning the supposed forged character of the document after the lapse of
more than twenty-nine (29) years from the time of its execution. Accordingly, the trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING
the complaint for lack of merit. No compensation for damages, moral, exemplary and
litigation expenses is awarded for failure of plaintiffs (sic) to prove by preponderance of
evidence the existence of malice or bad faith in filing the instant case.
SO ORDERED.
From the adverse decision of the trial court, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, faulting the court of origin in ruling that they failed to present
convincing evidence to prove the fact of forgery in the execution of the assailed Deed of
Sale. They likewise faulted the lower court in denying their motion to have the original
copy of the Deed of Sale in dispute and their own Special Power of Attorney containing
the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest, be examined by a handwriting
expert.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its Decision
6
of September 21,
2001, dismissed the petitioners appeal and affirmed that of the trial court. Their motion
for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution
7
of January 23,
2002, the petitioners are now with this Court via the instant recourse on their main
submission that -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE SUFFICIENCY
OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONERS,
and presenting for our resolution the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED ON DECEMBER
30, 1967 BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST AND THE
RESPONDENTS IS VALID.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CONTRADICTED ITSELF AND
ARRIVED AT A CONCLUSION CONTRARY TO THE RECORDS, LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
The recourse must fail.
As it is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. This is evident from the
pleadings they filed with this Court. In their main petition
8
and Memorandum,
9
the
petitioners emphatically state:
The issue in the case at bar boils down to whether or not the signatures of the
petitioners predecessors-in-interest and Procopio Tapuroc (the only surviving vendor to
the alleged deed of sale) were forged; and if they were, is the declaration of nullity of the
said deed of sale dated December 13, 1967 is proper (sic).
Clearly, the foregoing statement calls for a determination of the truth or falsehood of an
alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve. Well-settled is the rule that factual
questions may not be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court is explicit. It reads:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)
Evident it is from the above that the function of the Court in petitions for review on
certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the
lower courts. And, as a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and
accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so when, as here, such
findings are undisturbed by the appellate court. This factual determination, as a matter
of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed
on appeal, save only for the most compelling reasons,
10
such as when that
determination is clearly without evidentiary support or when grave abuse of discretion
has been committed.
11
This is as it should be since the Court, in petitions for review of
CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to
questions of law. Stated otherwise, it is not the function of the Court to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of the factual holdings of lower
courts.
12
The Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts, more
so when those findings are affirmed by the CA, as here. To do otherwise would defeat
the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which it is
not meant to be.
13

What is more, it appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public
document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap who,
unfortunately, had already passed away. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in
question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution. To overthrow that presumption, sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is
required, otherwise the document should be upheld.
14

Petitioners maintain, however, that by merely examining the signatures in the
questioned Deed of Sale and the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest in
their Special Power of Attorney, the glaring dissimilarities between the two sets of
signatures are immediately evident to support their claim of forgery.
We are not convinced.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof
lies on the party alleging it.
15
Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.
As it were, the petitioners merely alleged that they filed two motions before the trial
court to have the original copy of the documents in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Tagbilaran City be examined by handwriting experts but their motions were ignored
by the trial court. They then harp on the excuse that they could not be expected to prove
forgery if the trial court denied them the opportunity to do so.
We are not persuaded.
The trial court correctly ruled that the parties themselves dictate the course and flow of
the presentation of evidence, as well as the witnesses for each side. Considering that
the case before it is civil, not criminal, the lower court certainly cannot, on its own, issue
an order requiring a handwriting expert to appear before it and compare the documents
presented by the parties. It behooves upon the parties themselves to call forth their own
set of witnesses and present their own evidence to bolster their respective claims. If the
petitioners failed to present an expert witness, only themselves ought to be blamed. For,
as the trial court itself pointed out in its decision:
x x x. Plaintiffs, despite the opportunity given them by this Court, failed to present a
handwriting expert to determine whether there was indeed forgery in the execution of
the subject Deed of Sale. In the absence of the testimony of the handwriting expert, the
allegations of forgery by the plaintiffs is merely self-serving. Unfortunately, this Court is
not in the position to assess or evaluate the differences and similarities in the
questioned signatures, much less, categorically state whether or not forgery exists.
Neither could this court rely on the observation of the plaintiffs as to the alleged "glaring
differences and dissimilarities" of the questioned signatures. (Underscoring ours)
Moreover, the technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful
in the examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the
examination or comparison of handwritings.
[16]

In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United
Presbyterian Church in the USA,
[17]
the Court identified and explained the factors
involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings:
xxx [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes,
signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signatures and
the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the formers authenticity. The result
of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and
scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be
taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which
the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings
and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the
general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case,
absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on
the character of the questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to
characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an
authentic one.
And to determine forgery, the Court in Cesar v. Sandiganbayan
18
(quoting Osborn, The
Problem of Proof) wrote:
The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent,
kind, and significance of this resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes
necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different
personality, or is only the expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing
of the same writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result
of a more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance
which naturally appears in a genuine handwriting. When these two questions are
correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved.
In the present case, all that the petitioners had to offer by way of evidence on the issue
of forgery was their bare denial that their predecessors-in-interest signed the subject
Deed of Sale. Such denial will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of
notarized documents, to overthrow which, the countervailing evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
19

Moreover, and as aptly pointed out by the lower court in its decision of June 7, 1999:
However, even if it were true that the signature of Antonia Ebe is forged, it cannot brush
aside the fact that all the heirs of Antonia Ebe, namely: Celedonia Putong, Eufemio
Putong, Gregorio Putong and Mariano Putong all signed in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
As earlier discussed their signatures cannot be said to have been forged as evidence
presented to prove the same is found to be insufficient. Henceforth, all the rightful heirs
who could question the subject sale are themselves signatories of the supposed
questionable transaction.
Meanwhile, granting that Procopio Tapurocs signature found on Exh. C is indeed a
forgery, he testified in open court that he discovered the sale and the fact of Mendes
possession of the subject land in 1967 yet and did not do anything about it.
At the other end of the spectrum, the respondents presented sufficient proof of their
claim of ownership over the property in dispute. The respondent Mendes maintain that
they had been in continuous, peaceful and open possession of the property since 1967,
the year of the alleged sale, or for more than thirty (30) years now. No less than the
petitioners themselves acknowledged this in their pleadings
20
before this Court. And
beginning the year 1968, the respondents have been religiously paying the realty taxes
due on the same property. Likewise, when TCT No. 3444 was lost, respondent
Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende filed a petition for judicial reconstitution to secure
a second owners copy of the lost title. Said petition went through the proper procedure
and thereafter Carmelita was issued a second owners copy of TCT No. 3444 which
was later changed to TCT No. (8585) T-4767.
All told, we find that the petitioners, who initiated in the court of origin the basic
complaint in this case, have not sufficiently met the burden of proof to sustain their
cause. Additionally, we agree with the CA in ruling that laches had barred the
petitioners:
xxx The records show that they [petitioners] did not institute any action against the order
of the then Court of First Instance, 14th Judiciary District. Their inaction and failure to
assert any right, if any, over the disputed lot, bars them from recovering the same as
said failure clearly asserts to laches.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the petitioners filed their complaint of declaration of
nullity only after twenty-nine (29) years from the execution of the alleged forged deed of
sale. In the meanwhile, title to the property had already been in the name of respondent
Mendes since 1967. The Mendes had been in open, continuous and peaceful
possession of the subject land, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due
thereon. These are hard facts that ought not to be disregarded. The Court, in a long line
of cases,
21
has uniformly held in favor of the registered owner who had been in
possession of a disputed property for a considerable period of time. With the Mendes
possession in this case having been in the concept of an owner and the land itself
registered in their names for more than thirty (30) years now, their title thereto had
become indefeasible and their possession could no longer be disturbed. The petitioners
failure to take the necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty-nine
(29) years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the ground
of laches.
As a final note, we emphasize that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The
question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be
raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented by
the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled
in a collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale
commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding
required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129471 April 28, 2000
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS CAJES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the decision
1
and resolution
2
of the
Court of Appeals dated August 30, 1996 and April 23, 1997, respectively, declaring
private respondent Carlos Cajes the owner of 19.4 hectares of land embraced in TCT
No. 10101 and ordering the segregation and reconveyance of said portion to him.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The land in dispute, consisting of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province of
Bohol, was originally owned by Ulpiano Mumar, whose ownership since 1917 was
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 3840.
3
In 1950,
4
Mumar sold the land to private
respondent who was issued Tax Declaration No. R-1475 that same year.
5
The tax
declaration was later superseded by Tax Declaration Nos. R-799 issued in 1961
6
and
D-2247 issued in 1974.
7
Private respondent occupied and cultivated the said
land,
8
planting cassava and camote in certain portions of the land.
9

In 1969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez succeeded in obtaining the
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468.00 square meters,
10
in his
name for which he was issued OCT No. 546 on June 16, 1969.
11
The parcel of land
included the 19.4 hectares occupied by private respondent. Alvarez never occupied nor
introduced improvements on said land.
12

In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya to whom
TCT No. 10101 was issued.
13
That same year, the spouses Beduya obtained a loan
from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines for P526,000.00 and, as security,
mortgaged the land covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank.
14
In 1978, the SAAD
Investment Corp., and the SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., represented by Gaudencio
Beduya, and the spouses Beduya personally executed another mortgage over the land
in favor of petitioner to secure a loan of P1,430,000.00.
15

The spouses Beduya later failed to pay their loans, as a result of which, the mortgage
on the property was foreclosed.
16
In the resulting foreclosure sale held on January 31,
1985, petitioner was the highest bidder.
17
As the spouses Beduya failed to redeem the
property, petitioner consolidated its ownership.
18

It appears that private respondent had also applied for a loan from petitioner in 1978,
offering his 19.4 hectare property under Tax Declaration No. D-2247 as security for the
loan. As part of the processing of the application, a representative of petitioner, Patton
R. Olano, inspected the land and appraised its value.
Private respondent's loan application was later approved by petitioner.
19
However after
releasing the amount of the loan to private respondent, petitioner found that the land
mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in
the name of the spouses Beduya. Petitioner, therefore, cancelled the loan and
demanded immediate payment of the amount.
20
Private respondent paid the loan to
petitioner for which the former was issued a Cancellation of Mortgage, dated March 18,
1981, releasing the property in question from encumbrance.
21

Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-appraisal of
the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by petitioner's representatives.
It was then discovered that private respondent was occupying a portion of said land.
Private respondent was informed that petitioner had become the owner of the land he
was occupying, and he was asked to vacate the property. As private respondent
refused to do so,
22
petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
against him. The case was assigned to Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran
City,
23
which after trial, rendered a decision, dated August 22, 1989, declaring petitioner
the lawful owner of the entire land covered by TCT No. 10101 on the ground that the
decree of registration was binding upon the land.
24
The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the court renders judgment:
1 Declaring plaintiff bank Development Bank of the Philippines the true and legal owner
of the land in question covered by TCT No. 10101 farm of Gaudencio Beduya;
2 Dismissing defendant's counterclaim;
3 Ordering defendant to vacate from the land in question; the portion of which he claims
to belong to him for without basis in fact and law;
4 Ordering defendant, his agents or any person representing him or those who may
claim substantial rights on the land to vacate therefrom, cease and desist from
disturbing, molesting and interfering plaintiff's possession of the land in question, and
from committing any such act as would tend to mitigate, deny or deprive plaintiff of its
ownership and possession over said land.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and gave judgment for private respondent,
declaring him the owner of the 19.4 hectares of land erroneously included in TCT No.
10101. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new
decision is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint.
2. Declaring the disputed 19.4000 hectares of land embraced in TCT 10101 as
exclusively belonging to defendant-appellant, ordering its segregation from plaintiff-
appellee's title and its reconveyance to appellant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
25

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in a resolution dated
April 23, 1997.
26
Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that:
I. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF LAW (Sections 38 and 46 of ACT 496) AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, PARTICULARLY IN THE
CASE OF BENIN VS. TUASON, 57 SCRA 531.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OVERLOOKED THE ISSUES ABOUT THE DBP
BEING AN INNOCENT MORTGAGEE FOR VALUE OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
AND OF HAVING PURCHASED LATER THE SAME DURING A PUBLIC AUCTION
SALE.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT'S RULING DECLARING DBP IN ESTOPPEL IS
ILLOGICAL.
27

First. Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Benin v. Tuason
28
in support of its
claim that its predecessor-in-interest, Jose Alvarez, became the owner of the land by
virtue of the decree of registration issued in his name. In Benin, three sets of plaintiffs
filed separate complaints against Mariano Severo Tuason and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
praying for the cancellation of OCT No. 735 covering two parcels of land called the Sta.
Mesa Estate, or Parcel 1, with an area of 8,798,617.00 square meters, and the Diliman
Estate, or Parcel 2, with an area of 15,961,246.00 square meters. They asked that they
be declared the owners and lawful possessors of said lands.
Benin is distinguished from this case. In the first place, Benin involved vast tracts of
lands which had already been subdivided and bought by innocent purchasers for value
and in good faith at the time the claimants obtained registration. Secondly, when the
claimants' ancestors occupied the lands in question and declared them for tax purposes
in 1944, the lands were already covered by the tax declarations in the name of J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. In 1914, OCT No. 735 was issued in the name of Tuason so that,
from that time on, no possession could defeat the title of the registered owners of the
land. Thirdly, the validity of OCT No. 735 had already been recognized by this Court in
several cases
29
and, as a result thereof, the transfer certificates of title acquired by the
innocent purchasers for value were also declared valid. It was held that neither could
the claimants file an action to annul these titles for not only had these actions
prescribed, but the fact was that the claimants were also barred from doing so by
laches, having filed the complaint only in 1955, or 41 years after the issuance of OCT
No. 735 to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Thus, it was not solely the decree of registration
which was considered in resolving the Benin case. What was considered decisive was
the valid title or right of ownership of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and that of the other
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith compared to the failure of the claimants
to show their right to own or possess the questioned properties.1wphi1.nt
Petitioner maintains that the possession by private respondent and his predecessor-in-
interest of the 19.4 hectares of land for more than 30 years cannot overcome the decree
of registration issued in favor of its predecessor-in-interest Jose Alvarez. Petitioner
quotes the following statement in the Benin case:
It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice
to establish a cause of action. If such prescription was completed before the registration
of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and
extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either
begun or completed after the decree of registration, it conferred no title because, by
express provision of law, prescription can not operate against the registered owner (Act
496).
30

Petitioner would thus insist that, by virtue of the decree of registration, Jose Alvarez and
those claiming title from him (i.e., the spouses Beduya) acquired ownership of the 19.4
hectares of land, despite the fact that they neither possessed nor occupied these lands.
This view is mistaken. A consideration of the cases shows that a decree of registration
cut off or extinguished a right acquired by a person when such right refers to a lien or
encumbrance on the land not to the right of ownership thereof which was not
annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon. Thus, Act No. 496 provides:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate
of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those
noted on said certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws of Constitution of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statutes of the Philippine Islands
cannot require to appear of record in the Registry.
Second. Taxes within two years after the same became due and payable.
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been
determined.
But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land
which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain
so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until
cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner.
Hence, in Cid v. Javier,
31
it was held:
. . . Consequently, even conceding arguendo that such an easement has been
acquired, it had been cut off and extinguished by the registration of the servient estate
under the Torrens system without the easement being annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act.
This principle was reiterated in Purugganan v. Paredes
32
which also involved an
easement of light and view that was not annotated on the certificate of title of the
servient estate.
But to make this principle applicable to a situation wherein title acquired by a person
through acquisitive prescription would be considered cut off and extinguished by a
decree of registration would run counter to established jurisprudence before and after
the ruling in Benin. Indeed, registration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership
over immovable property. As early as 1911, in the case of City of Manila v. Lack,
33
the
Court already ruled on the purpose of registration of lands, viz.:
The Court of Land Registration was created for a single purpose. The Act is entitled "An
Act to provide for the adjudication and registration of titles to lands in the Philippine
Islands." The sole purpose of the Legislature in its creation was to bring the land titles of
the Philippine Islands under one comprehensive and harmonious system, the cardinal
features of which are indefeasibility of title and the intervention of the State as a
prerequisite to the creation and transfer of titles and interest, with the resultant increase
in the use of land as a business asset by reason of the greater certainty and security of
title. It does not create a title nor vest one. It simply confirms a title already created and
already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible. . .
Again, in the case of Angeles v. Samia
34
where land was erroneously registered in
favor of persons who neither possessed nor occupied the same, to the prejudice of the
actual occupant, the Court held:
. . . The purpose of the Land Registration Act, as this court has had occasion to so state
more than once, is not to create or vest title, but to confirm and register title already
created and already vested, and of course, said original certificate of title No. 8995
could not have vested in the defendant more title than what was rightfully due her and
her coowners. It appearing that said certificate granted her much more than she
expected, naturally to the prejudice of another, it is but just that the error, which gave
rise to said anomaly, be corrected (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324). The
defendant and her coowners knew or, at least, came to know that it was through error
that the original certificate of title in question was issued by the court which heard
cadastral case No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to March, 1933, but from the time
said certificate was issued in their favor, that is, from December 15, 1921. This is
evidenced by the fact that, ever since, they remained passive without even attempting
to make the least showing of ownership over the land in question until after the lapse of
more than eleven years. The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act
protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the
expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Angelo vs. Director of Lands,
49 Phil., 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions
thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by
mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns,
with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued
to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda
and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). This is permitted by section 112 of Act No. 496,
which is applicable to the Cadastral Act because it is so provided expressly by the
provisions of section 11 of the latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as stated in
the case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y Cia. (55 Phil., 361), errors in the plans
of lands sought to be registered in the registry and reproduced in the certificate of title
issued later, do not annul the decree of registration on the ground that it is not the plan
but the land itself which is registered in the registry. In other words, if the plan of an
applicant for registration or claimant in a cadastral case alleges that the land referred to
in said plan is 100 or 1,000 hectares, and the land which he really owns and desires to
register in the registry is only 80 ares, he cannot claim to be the owner of the existing
difference if afterwards he is issued a certificate of title granting him said area of 100 or
1,000 hectares.
35

The principle laid down in this 1938 case remains the prevailing doctrine, its latest
application being in the case ofReyes v. Court of Appeals
36
wherein we ruled that the
fact that a party was able to secure a title in his favor did not operate to vest ownership
upon her of the property.
In the present case, private respondent has been in actual, open, peaceful and
continuous possession of the property since 1950. This fact was corroborated by the
testimony of Eleuterio Cambangay who personally knew that Ulpiano Mumar transferred
the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3840
37
in favor of private respondent in
1950.
38
Private respondent's claim based on actual occupation of the land is bolstered
by Tax Declaration Nos. R-1475, R-799 and D-2247
39
which were issued in his name in
1950, 1961 and 1974, respectively. Together with his actual possession of the land,
these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by
him. As we said in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals:
40

Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
More importantly, it was established that private respondent, having been in possession
of the land since 1950, was the owner of the property when it was registered by Jose
Alvarez in 1969, his possession tacked to that of his predecessor-in-interest, Ulpiano
Mumar, which dates back to 1917.
41
Clearly, more than 30 years had elapsed before a
decree of registration was issued in favor of Jose Alvarez. This uninterrupted adverse
possession of the land for more than 30 years could only ripen into ownership of the
land through acquisitive prescription which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other
real rights over immovable property. Prescription requires public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten
(10) years, in case the possession is in good faith and with a just title. Such prescription
is called ordinary prescription, as distinguished from extraordinary prescription which
requires possession for 30 years in case possession is without just title or is not in good
faith.
42

In contrast to private respondent, it has been shown that neither Jose Alvarez nor the
spouses Beduya were at any time in possession of the property in question. In fact,
despite knowledge by Gaudencio Beduya that private respondent occupied this 19.4
hectares included in the area covered by TCT No. 10101,
43
he never instituted any
action to eject or recover possession from the latter. Hence, it can be concluded that
neither Jose Alvarez nor the spouses Beduya ever exercised any right of ownership
over the land. The fact of registration in their favor never vested in them the ownership
of the land in dispute. "If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which
includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the
system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the
lands illegally included."
44

Considering the circumstances pertaining in this case, therefore, we hold that ownership
of the 19.4 hectares of land presently occupied by private respondent was already
vested in him and that its inclusion in OCT No. 546 and, subsequently, in TCT No.
10101, was erroneous. Accordingly, the land in question must be reconveyed in favor of
private respondent, the true and actual owner thereof, reconveyance being clearly the
proper remedy in this case.
The true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land judicially
settled and the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the
cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendants, the
registered owner to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be
the true owner thereof." (Vital vs. Amore, 90 Phil. 955) "The reconveyance is just and
proper in order to terminate the intolerable anomaly that the patentees should have a
torrens title for the land which they and their predecessors never possessed which has
been possessed by Novo in the concept of owner." (Bustarga v. Novo, 129 SCRA
125).
45

Second. Generally, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust, such as the instant case, prescribes in 10 years from the date of issuance of
decree of registration.
46
However, this rule does not apply when the plaintiff is in actual
possession of the land. Thus, it has been held:
. . . [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the
deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of
the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession
of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to
be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
47

Having been the sole occupant of the land in question, private respondent may seek
reconveyance of his property despite the lapse of more than 10 years.
Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT No. 10101. It is true
that the indefeasibility of torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked. In the instant
case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against
private respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of
TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a
case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral attack. However, it should
not be overlooked that private respondent filed a counterclaim against petitioner,
claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. Hence, we could rule on the
question of the validity of TCT No. 10101 for the counterclaim can be considered a
direct attack on the same. "A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is
the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. . . . It stands on the same footing and
is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action."
48
In an analogous
case,
49
we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact that the original
action instituted before the lower court was a case for recovery of possession. The
Court reasoned that since all the facts of the case are before it, to direct the party to
institute cancellation proceedings would be needlessly circuitous and would
unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy which has already dragged on for
20 years.
Third. Petitioner nonetheless contends that an action for reconveyance does not lie
against it, because it is an innocent purchaser for value in the foreclosure sale held in
1985.
This contention has no merit. Sec. 38 of Act No. 496, the Land Registration Act,
provides:
If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated
in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation
and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and
quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall
be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation,
or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall
not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court
of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided
no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said
term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this
section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of
registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject
only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no decree or
certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or
annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring
the decree. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent
phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee,
or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No.
3630.)
Succinctly put, 38 provides that a certificate of title is conclusive and binding upon the
whole world. Consequently, a buyer need not look behind the certificate of title in order
to determine who is the actual owner of the land. However, this is subject to the right of
a person deprived of land through fraud to bring an action for reconveyance, provided
that it does not prejudice the rights of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith.
"It is a condition sine qua non for an action for reconveyance to prosper that the
property should not have passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value."
50
The same rule applies to mortgagees, like petitioner. Thus, we held:
Where the certificate of title is in the name of the mortgagor when the land is
mortgaged, the innocent mortgagee for value has the right to rely on what appears on
the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite suspicion, said mortgagee is
under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. Although Article 2085 of the Civil
Code provides that absolute ownership of the mortgaged property by the mortgagor is
essential, the subsequent declaration of a title as null and void is not a ground for
nullifying the mortgage right of a mortgagee in good faith.
51

The evidence before us, however, indicates that petitioner is not a mortgagee in good
faith. To be sure, an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive
investigation on the history of the mortgagor's title. Nonetheless, especially in the case
of a banking institution, a mortgagee must exercise due diligence before entering into
said contract. Judicial notice is taken of the standard practice for banks, before
approving a loan, to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as
collateral and to investigate who are the real owners thereof. Banks, their business
being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence
than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands.
52

In this case, petitioner's representative, Patton R. Olano, admitted that he came to know
of the property for the first time in 1979 when he inspected it to determine whether the
portion occupied by private respondent and mortgaged by the latter to petitioner was
included in TCT No. 10101. This means that when the land was mortgaged by the
spouses Beduya in 1972, no investigation had been made by petitioner. It is clear,
therefore, that petitioner failed to exercise due care and diligence in establishing the
condition of the land as regards its actual owners and possessors before it entered into
the mortgage contract in 1972 with the Beduyas. Had it done so, it would not have failed
to discover that private respondent was occupying the disputed portion of 19.4 hectares.
For this reason, petitioner cannot be considered an innocent purchaser for value when it
bought the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in 1985 at the foreclosure sale.
Indeed, two circumstances negate petitioner's claim that it was an innocent purchaser
for value when it bought the land in question, including the portion occupied by private
respondent: (1) petitioner was already informed by Gaudencio Beduya that private
respondent occupied a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 10101; and (2)
petitioner's representative conducted an investigation of the property in 1979 to
ascertain whether the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in TCT No.
10101. In other words, petitioner was already aware that a person other than the
registered owner was in actual possession of the land when it bought the same at the
foreclosure sale. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create
suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. "It is a
well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor."
53

Petitioner deliberately disregarded both the fact that private respondent already
occupied the property and that he was claiming ownership over the same. It cannot
feign ignorance of private respondent's claim to the land since the latter mortgaged the
same land to petitioner as security for the loan he contracted in 1978 on the strength of
the tax declarations issued under his name. Instead of inquiring into private
respondent's occupation over the land, petitioner simply proceeded with the foreclosure
sale, pretending that no doubts surround the ownership of the land covered by TCT No.
10101. Considering these circumstances, petitioner cannot be deemed an innocent
mortgagee/purchaser for value. As we ruled:
The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would
have taken under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of land in the actual,
visible and public possession of another person, other than the vendor, constitutes
gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
In this connection, it has been held that where, as in this case, the land sold is in the
possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond
the certificates of title and ma[k]e inquiries concerning the rights of the actual
possessor. (Citations omitted.)
x x x x x x x x x
One who purchases real property which is in the actual possession of another should, at
least, make some inquiry concerning the right of those in possession. The actual
possession by other than the vendor should, at least put the purchaser upon inquiry. He
can scarcely, in the absence of such inquiry, be regarded as abona fide purchaser as
against such possessors.
54

Fourth. From the foregoing, we find that the resolution of the issue of estoppel will not
affect the outcome of this case. Petitioner claims that the fact that it approved a loan in
favor of private respondent and executed a mortgage contract covering the 19.4
hectares covered by tax declarations issued under private respondent's name does not
mean that it is estopped from questioning the latter's title. Petitioner accuses private
respondent of having made misrepresentations which led it to believe in his valid title
and ownership.
The claim has no basis. Private respondent made no misrepresentation with regard to
the land occupied by him as he is actually the real owner thereof. Moreover, when
private respondent entered into a mortgage contract with petitioner, his claim of
ownership was supported not only by the tax declarations but also by a certification of
the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Bohol that no civil, land registration or
cadastral case has been filed or instituted before the court affecting the validity of Tax
Declaration No. D-2247 covering the land located in Bugang, San Miguel, Bohol and
declared in the name of Carlos Cajes.
55
These documents were relied upon by private
respondent in support of his claim of ownership. We cannot consider the submission of
these documents as misrepresentations by private respondent as to the actual
ownership of the land. Rather, private respondent believed in good faith and with good
reason that he was the owner of the 19.4 hectares occupied by him.
As to the question of estoppel, we do not find petitioner to be estopped from questioning
private respondent's title.1wphi1 "Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admission, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts."
56
In the case
at bar, upon learning that the land occupied by private respondent was also covered by
TCT No. 10101, petitioner immediately demanded full payment of the loan and
thereafter cancelled the mortgage contract, a fact that is admitted by private respondent
himself.
57
Indeed, nothing in record indicates that petitioner impliedly acquiesced to the
validity of private respondent's title when it found out that the latter was occupying a
portion of the land covered by TCT No. 10101.1wphi1.nt
However, for reasons aforestated, we uphold private respondent's ownership of 19.4
hectares occupied by him. As a necessary consequence thereof, such portion of land
included in TCT No. 10101 must be segregated and reconveyed in his favor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-76265 March 11, 1994
VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL LAND
TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, CONSTANCIO
SIMANGAN, and IGLESIA NI KRISTO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-83280 March 11, 1994
AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A. PANLILEO, FELICIDAD
VERGARA VDA. DE PINEDA, FERNANDO L. VITUG I, FERNANDO M. VITUG II,
FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, ELENO M. OSTREA and FELISA C.
CRISTOBAL-GENEROSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERANO-MANALO,
respondents.
Alampay & Manhit Law Office for petitioner in G.R. 83280.
Araceli Bavieraa for petitioner in G.R. 76265.
Cuevas, De la Cuesta & De las Alas for respondents INC and Manalo.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for intervenors.
Eliseo M. Cruz for the heirs of Lucia de la Cruz.
Cruz, Tafalla, Castillo, Jr., Peren & Associates for private respondent INC.
R E S O L U T I O N

MELO, J.:
The Decision of the Second Division of this Court promulgated April 22, 1992 (208
SCRA 215) dismissing, for lack of merit, these two (2) consolidated petitions, is assailed
by petitioners in their separate motions for reconsideration.
The assailed Decision states:
With this Court's ruling promulgated in 1984, it is our considered view that the
petitioners can not raise anew the question of ownership of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot
671 which had been determined by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme
Court in the de la Cruz case. Well-settled in the rule enunciated in Church Assistance
Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408 [1989] that:
When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate.
The Court's ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership of Lot 671 finally
disposed of several years ago. This declaration must be respected and followed in the
instant case applying the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment. The less familiar concept of less terminological usage
of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the
judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined therein or which were necessarily included therein. (De la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, 187 SCRA 165 [1990]).
Inevitably, the de la Cruz ruling should be applied to the present petitions since the facts
on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before us
now (See Rivas v. SEC, 190 SCRA 295 [1990]). Even the petitioners substantially adopt
the same findings of facts in their pleadings. The factual inquiry with regards to the
history of Lot 671 has already been laid to rest and may no longer be disturbed.
xxx xxx xxx
In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners try to convince us to look or
inquire into the validity of the reconstitution proceedings initiated by Lucia de la Cruz
ruling, contending that the implementation of de la Cruz ruling would deprive them of
their properties without due process of law. We have looked long and hard into the
records of the case but the facts and circumstances plus law and jurisprudence on the
matter do not warrant such action from the Court. INK's title over Lot 671 which
necessarily included Lot 671-A had already become incontrovertible and indefeasible.
To reopen or to question the legality of INK's title would defeat the purpose of our
Torrens system which seeks to insure stability by quieting titled lands and putting to a
stop forever any question of the legality of the registration in the certificate or questions
which may arise therefrom. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra.) In fairness to INK, as
registered owner it is entitled to rest secure in its land title.
In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public interest and the maintenance of the
integrity and stability of the Torrens system of land registration that all transfer
certificates of title derived from the reconstituted title of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea
de la Cruz be annulled in order to prevent the proliferation of derivative titles which are
null and void. The legality or validity of INK's title over Lot 671 has been settled. The
Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure
stability in legal relations and avoid confusion. (See Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80
[1988]).
(pp. 224-225; 229-230.)
In G.R. No. 76265, petitioners seek a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision because
allegedly, the same is contrary to the following settled principles of law and doctrines
laid down this Court, to wit:
1. That a judgment rendered in an action in personam binds only the parties to the
action;
2. That a petition for "reconstitution" of a certificate of title filed in 1971, thirty years after
the sale to respondent Lucia de la Cruz in 1941, without personal notice to petitioners
and other title holders of Lot 671-A, whose titles date from 1952, is void and can be
collaterally attacked;
3. That the registration of the sale to respondent Lucia de la Cruz in the Primary Entry
Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila in 1943 of a land located in Caloocan, Rizal,
cannot be the operative act to convey said property to the vendee, as the record of the
title to said property was then in Pasig, Rizal and then transferred to Quezon City, after
the war;
4. That the indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one year from issuance, refers to the
indefeasibility of a decree of registration after one year from entry thereof in an original
registration or cadastral proceeding, and by analogy, the principle is extended to a
patent issued in an administrative proceeding, but not to a reconstitution of a certificate
of title allegedly lost, nor to the issuance of subsequent transfer certificate of title; and
5. That respondent Iglesia ni Kristo cannot be considered as an innocent purchaser for
value as far as petitioners and other title holders to Lot 671-A are concerned, because
the titles of respondent Iglesia ni Kristo are derived from the "reconstituted" title of
respondent Lucia de la Cruz issued in 1971. Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo is deemed to
have actual and constructive knowledge of the rights of more than 80 buyers of Lot 671-
A who were issued transfer certificates of title dating from 1952.
In G.R. No. 83280, petitioners assail the decision on the following grounds:
1. The decision in the de la Cruz case does not bind the petitioners.
2. The Iglesia ni Kristo, represented by public respondent, is not an innocent purchaser
for value of the parcels of land in dispute.
3. Petitioners, as duly registered owners of land under the Torrens system, are
purchasers in good faith whose titles have become indefeasible.
Aware of the importance of the case, the Court granted the request of petitioners to
have their motions for reconsideration be considered by the Court en banc.
At the core of the controversy is the case of Agustina de la Cruz et al. vs. Lucia de la
Cruz, Iglesia ni Kristo and Hon. Court of Appeals (130 SCRA 666 [1984]) which has
settled once and for all the question of ownership of Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate in
Barrio Culiat, Quezon City. A portion of this lot, Lot 671-A, is the subject of these two (2)
consolidated petitions at bar.
In said de la Cruz case, the Court found and held:
1. The mother title of Lot 671 is OCT. No. 614 registered on March 12, 1912 in the
name of the Philippine Government. When Lot 671, with an area of 184,268 square
meters, more or less, was segregated the original title was partially cancelled and TCT-
40355 T-201 was issued to Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz by virtue of Entry
No. 3241 which reads:
. . . Vendido a Eugenia de la Paz y Dorotea de la Paz y Dorotea de la Cruz el Lote No.
671 del terreno en este certificado de titulo, mediante escritura ratificada al 27 de Julio
de 1931 en Manila, ante Vicente Garcia, Notario Publico, se cancela parcialmente al
presente certificado de titulo, en cuanto al lote mencianado y se expide otro a nombre
de las compradoras con el No. 40355, folio 5, Tomo T-201 del libro de transferencias;
archivandose la escritura de que se ha hecho referencia en el Legajo
T-No. 40355.
2. On November 29, 1941 Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz sold Lot 671 to
Lucia de la Cruz and TCT No. 40355 T-201 was cancelled by virtue of Entry No. 258,
Page 7, volume 7, Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Said entry
reads as follows:
1. Number of Entry 258
2. Date of filing:
Month, day & year July 17, 1943
Hour and Minute 10:15 A.M.
3. Nature of Contract Sale
4. Executed by Doroteo (sic)
de la Cruz, et al.
5. In favor of Lucia de la Cruz
6. Date of Instrument 11-29-41
7. Relative to:
Certificate of
Title No 40355
Book T-201
8. Papers presented by:
Name Regino Cleofas
Address Pasong Tamo,
Quezon City
9. Contract value P2,500.00
10. Remark Caloocan
3. In 1971, Lucia de la Cruz petitioned for the reconstitution of her title in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The court granted the petition and the Register of Deeds of
Manila issued to her TCT No. RT-58, thereby cancelling TCT 40355 T-201. (at p. 698.)
4. The petition for reconstitution was duly published and proper notices posted in
accordance with law; and after due hearing, was granted by the court in the exercise of
its authority and jurisdiction. "Hence, We reject petitioners' assignment of error that the
Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz is
absolutely null and void." (at p. 698.).
5. "With respect to the reconstituted title of Dorotea de la which was granted by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal on December 14, 1945 and TCT 5284 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City was issued in substitution and/or reconstitution of TCT 40355 of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal, . . . it may be true that the order granting reconstitution
was null and void by reason of the failure to cause the necessary publication of the
petition, and, therefore, the reconstituted title was ineffective. More than that, it is
established that Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz had previously sold the land
to Lucia de la Cruz on November 29, 1941 as indicated in Entry No. 258 so that Dorotea
de la Cruz was no longer the owner at the time she petitioned for reconstitution." (at pp.
298-699.)
6. "Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Dorotea de la Cruz together with Eugenia de la
Paz were the registered owners of Lot 671 under TCT 40355, T-201 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal and they could legally transfer the same to Lucia de la Cruz who
thereafter sold in favor of Iglesia ni Kristo." (at p. 699.)
7. Under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, "the registered title of Lucia de la Cruz
reconstituted as TCT No. RT-58 in 1971 became indefeasible and incontrovertible one
year from its issuance. As registered owner, Lucia de la Cruz had the perfect and legal
right to sell, assign, and convey the property to respondent Iglesia ni Kristo who as
purchaser for value in good faith hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted in said certificate (Sec. 39 Land Registration Act). The Iglesia may then
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the will in no
way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property".
(at p. 7063.)
The rule is well-settled that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer
amend, modify, much less, set aside the same (Adez Realty Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
212 SCRA 625 [1992]); otherwise, endless litigation will result (Fabular vs. Court of
Appeals, 119 SCRA 329 [1982])
In fact, in Duenas vs. Mandi (151 SCRA 530 [1987]) cited in Adez, we held that the trial
court and the appellate court may have committed error in the assignment or partition of
the eight (8) parcels of land to the parties in said case, but considering that their
judgments are already final, the error, assuming one was committed, can no longer be
amended or corrected.
In Icao vs. Apalisok (180 SCRA 680 [1989]), likewise cited in Adez, we ruled that even
the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify
correction of the judgment after it has become final.
Our decision in these two consolidated petitions is an application of this well-established
rule, that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer modify, amend, much
less, set aside the same. To grant a reconsideration of this decision would also
reconsider, reverse, and set aside our 1984 decision which was long become final. For,
while the 1984 decision declared the reconstituted title RT-58 of Lucia de la Cruz valid
and legal, petitioners would want us to reach 10 years back and declare the same title
null and void; while the 1984 decision declared the Iglesia ni Kristo a purchaser in good
faith and for value, petitioners would want us to do a complete turn around and find the
Iglesia ni Kristo a purchaser in bad faith.
In the case of Legarda vs. Savellano (158 SCRA 194 [1988] the Court stated:
. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn
and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a
disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive
determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest.
Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law, more than
an important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a
fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound
practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies.
If we were to allow repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT Nos. 1348-1355 issued to
Benito Legarda, Sr. in 1907, the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens
systems and land registration, which the Philippines has adopted, will be defeated and
set to naught. (at p. 200.)
The Court, speaking through Justice Nocon, in Swan vs. Court of Appeals (212 SCRA
114 [1992]) stated:
It is high time that we write finis to a litigation that has been pending for years not only to
the prejudice of the prevailing parties, but also to the prompt determination of
controversies, and in violation of the fundamental concept that public policy and sound
practice demand that judgments of courts shall become final at some definite date fixed
by law. (at p. 124)
Petitioners contend that the de la Cruz case is not applicable and that the doctrine
of res judicatashould not have been applied. We do not agree.
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former
judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question
which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein as far as the parties to the action and persons in privity with them are concerned
and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies,
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or
different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It
has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is
essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity
of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197
SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to
the distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of
judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in
issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions
necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been
made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of
the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding
the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain
premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself . . .
(at pp. 186-187.)
The issue of the validity of the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz over Lot 671 of the
Piedad Estate, the issue of whether or not the Iglesia ni Kristo was an innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith, and the issue of the validity of the reconstituted
title of Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz (herein petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest) were actually, directly, and expressly raised, controverted, litigated and
resolved in our 1984 decision. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, these
issue may no longer be relitigated in these present petitions.
Petitioners cannot evade the conclusive effect of the 1984 decision, merely because
they were not impleaded parties in the said case. It has been said that the foundation
principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought no to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for
such trials has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties those in privity with them in law or estate. (Nabus
vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
In the case of Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz (161 SCRA 36 [1988]), the Court stated:
The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the decision in Civil Case No. C-120
which has long become final and executory can be enforced against the petitioner who
is not a party to the aforementioned case.
Petitioner alleged in her memorandum that she is not affected by the decision in C-120
as persons who are not parties to a suit are not bound by the judgment and that she
purchased the lot in good faith from an entirely different person the Heirs of Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and not from either the plaintiffs or defendants of the
aforesaid case.
It is a generally accepted principle "that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger . . .
[but] being a privy, the petitioner can be reached by the order of execution and Writ of
Demolition.
(at pp. 43-44.)
Also, in the case of Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro (43 SCRA 503 [1972]), the Court
ruled:
In the face of these declarations in a final decisions of the highest Court of the land, it
becomes indubitable that the action in the court below was definitely barred: for while
present private respondents were not parties in the 1993 cause, their predecessor-in-
interest Quintin Mejia was such a party and the final judgment against him concludes
and bars his successors and privies as well.
(at pp. 510-511.)
Admittedly, petitioners derived their title from Amando Clemente and/or Clemville
Subdivision. Amando Clemente derived his title from Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia
de la Paz. Being privies and/or successors in interest to the parties in the 1984 decision,
petitioners are bound by said decision.
Likewise untenable is petitioners' contention that the reconstituted titled of Lucia de la
Cruz, RT-58, is void.
Proceedings for judicial reconstitution or certificates of title are proceedings in rem.
Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication is sufficient to clothe the Court with
jurisdiction and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the
property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the
proceedings.
In Adez Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (212 SCRA 625 [1992]), the Court, through
Justice Bellosillo, held:
Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. de la Cruz (17 Phil. 41) We already ruled that
the land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and
therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the
land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power and authority over
the res. Thus, while, it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to
petitioners when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did
not amount to a jurisdictional defect. (See PNR vs. De la Vina & Zamacona, 109 Phil.
342). In Register of Deeds of Malabon vs. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170 (G.R.
No. 886623, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 788), We said that "the purpose of the
publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to
apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded
to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the
court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
word as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."
Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe
the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a
legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to
invalidate the proceedings. (at p. 628.)
Besides, the official records of the Quezon City Municipal Hall, as certified to by the
Office of the City Assessor of Quezon City (pp. 456-556, Rollo of G.R. No. 83280) show
that there are no improvements whatsoever on the property in question thus signifying
that the property is unoccupied. Therefore, it would have been impossible for Lucia de
la Cruz to notify petitioners.
Be this as it may, the issue of the validity of the 1971 reconstitution proceedings is no
longer a valid issue in these petitions at bar, its validity having already been resolved
with finality in the 1984 decision.
The contention that the registration of the November 29, 1941 sale by Dorotea de la
Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz to Lucia de la Cruz, with the Register of Deeds of Manila is
irregular deserves scant consideration.
As certified to by the Administrator of the Land. Registration Authority (p. 448, Rollo of
G.R. No. 83280) the City of Manila and the nearby towns and cities were treated as a
single political unit, that is Greater Manila, during the Japanese Occupation. Thus, the
Excerpts from volume 7 of the Registry Book of Manila, year 1943 (p. 447, Rollo of G.R.
No. 83280), show, among other things, the following entries:
(a) The sale of a parcel of land located in Quezon City executed by Magdalena Estates,
Inc. in favor of Dionisio Bravo;
(b) The mortgage of a parcel of land in Quezon City by Antonio Zuzuareggui in favor of
Elena Africa, et al.; and
(c) The sale of a parcel of land in Quezon City to Lucia de la Cruz by Dorotea de la
Cruz, et al.
clearly indicating that transactions involving parcels of land located in Quezon City were
indeed recorded and registered in the Registry of Manila.
Under the law, it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyance that serves as the
operative act to convey the land registered under the Torrens system. The act of
registration creates constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such
conveyance. (Quilisadio vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 401 [1990]; De la Calzada-
Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 390 [1992]).
We cannot go along with petitioners' position that their titles, because they were issued
in 1952, must prevail over the title of the Iglesia ni Kristo.
The titles issued to petitioners are derived from TCT No. 5284. This title, TCT No. 5284
is the reconstituted title of Dorotea de la Cruz which was declared null and void in the
1984 decision.
3. With respect to the reconstituted title of Dorotea de la Cruz which was granted by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal on December 14, 1945 and TCT 5284 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City was issued in substitution and/or reconstitution of TCT 40355 of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal by virtue of the following inscription on TCT 40335, to wit:
Se expide otra copia para el dueno del presente certificado de titulo en sustitucion del
duplicado que se alega haberse quemado, en virtud de na orden del juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Rizal dictada el 14 de Deciembre, 1945, en Expediente G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 5975, y en donde se declara nulo y ninguna valor dicho duplicado quemado.
MAMERTO TINGKUNGKO
Register of Deeds Interino it may be true that the order granting reconstitution was null
and void by reason of the failure to cause the necessary publication of the petition, and
therefore, the reconstituted title was ineffective. More than that, it is established that
Dorotea de la Cruz and Eugenia de la Paz had previously sold the land to Lucia de la
Cruz executed on November 29, 1941 as indicated in Entry No. 258 so that Dorotea de
la Cruz was no longer the owner at the time she petitioned for reconstitution.
Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Dorotea de la Cruz together with Eugenia de la Paz
were the registered owners of Lot 671 under TCT 40355, T-201 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, and they could legally transfer the same to Lucia de la Cruz who
thereafter sold in favor of respondent Iglesia ni Kristo.
(at pp. 698-699.)
Needless to state, all subsequent certificates of title including petitioners' titles are also
void because of the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher than its source (De
Santos vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 295 [1988].) The law must protect
and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of
any transmissible rights (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 354 [1988]).
Finally, both petitions are procedurally erroneous because certiorari is not the proper
remedy.
G.R. No. 76265 stemmed from a letter in consulta addressed by the then Acting
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to the Administrator of the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration involving the registrability of a deed of sale presented
for registration. by Mr. Constancio Simangan.
The Administrator issued a resolution dated April 4, 1988 ordering the Register of
Deeds to register the deed of sale subject of the consulta.
The Register of Deeds moved for reconsideration. Herein petitioner Virginia Calalang
moved to intervene.
The Acting Administrator denied both motions. Calalang filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied, and forthwith, Calalang filed the present
petition.
The proper remedy available to Calalang is an appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Republic Act No. 5434, and
not certiorari or prohibition.
Sec. 117, PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) Procedure . . . the party in interest
who disagrees with the final resolution, ruling or order of the Commission relative to
theconsultas may appeals to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner
provided in Republic Act No. 5434.
Sec. 2, RA 5434 (Uniform Procedure for Appeals) Appeals to Court of Appeals.
Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
ruling, award, order, decision or judgment or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity; . . . If no appeal is filed within the periods
here fixed, the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment shall become final and may be
executed as provided by existing law.
The other case, G.R. No. 83280, stemmed from an injunction suit filed by Augusto de
Leon et al. against the Iglesia ni Kristo and Bishop Manalo.
The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. Instead of appealing the order of
dismissal, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals the following.
1. A "Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam"; and
2. An "Omnibus Motion Incident to Execution of the Decision"
The Court of Appeals denied both motions. Hence, the other herein petition.
It is elementary that a petition for certiorari can not substitute for a lost appeal. The
order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the case was appealable. Petitioners in the
second petition failed to appeal the same, consequently the order has already become
final and may no longer be reviewed oncertiorari.
Moreover, these petitions amount to a collateral attack on the title of the Iglesia ni
Kristo. Well-settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Section 48, PD No.
1529.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners' Motion for Reconsiderations are hereby
DENIED