Bayan v.

Zamora

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered
into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement
was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-
President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of
the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation
of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Issue:
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
Held:

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of
the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case
of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States
of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA
only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to
be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government
has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United
States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.