Oppermann 1

Christopher Oppermann
Gov 1052
Bernardo Zacka
December 3, 2012
Hege v! "ant on Ob#ectivit$% &he 'etaph$sica (mptiness o) the Noumena and the Categories
Why does Kant distinguish between the no*menon and phenomenon+ between appearances and
the thing-in-itself? What is Hegel's criticism of Kant's epistemological dichotomy between the
two? On what grounds does it rest?
The Encyclopedia ogic ,the )irst vo*me o) Hege-s Encyclopedia of !hilosophical
"ciences. contains, among other things, an e/tended disc*ssion o) the contemporar$ importance
and roe o) 0hat Hege cas 1Critica 2hiosoph$1 ,340.! 5epresented primari$ b$ the tho*ght
and 0ork o) "ant, critica phiosoph$, according to Hege, makes an attempt to respond to the
empiricist, anti6metaph$sica chaenged eveed against phiosoph$ and traditiona metaph$sics
b$ David H*me ,33768.% i), as H*me aeges, a kno0edge o) the 0ord comes thro*gh the )orm
o) partic*ar, individ*ai9ed sense impressions, then phiosophers m*st provide an acco*nt )or
ho0 one ind*ces *niversa or genera propositions )rom s*ch observations! :) "ant cannot
provide an aternative acco*nt )or *niversa concepts that does not red*ce them to mere
ps$choogica associations, then m*ch o) the pro#ect o) phiosoph$, inc*ding metaph$sics,
becomes damning$ s*spect! B$ proposing his method o) transcendenta ideaism, "ant proposes
a rehabiitation o) some o) the traditiona ;ristoteian categories o) *nderstanding, abeit on ne0
gro*nd 0hich he beieves 0i meet the skeptica chaenge! ;t the same time, "ant hopes that
these ne0 epistemoogica )o*ndations )or phiosophica in<*ir$ might aso serve to deineate
and imit the e/panse o) metaph$sics, paving the 0a$ )or a more empirica, 1ob#ective1 acco*nt
o) reait$ *nimpeded b$ the e/cesses o) metaph$sica spec*ation! Despite ackno0edging some
o) the s*ccesses o) this ne0 theor$, Hege nevertheess beieves that "ant-s acco*nt o) the
categories as providing a conditiona e/perience o) the thing6in6itse) )ai to provide s*))icient
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metaph$sica )o*ndation )or their content% "ant-s de)ective acco*nt o) the *nconditioned renders
a probematic acco*nt o) o*r *nderstanding o) the observabe 0ord! &his paper 0i e/pore
Hege-s engagement 0ith "ant-s thinking concerning the categories o) the *nderstanding, and
their reation to the no*mena ,the *nconditioned. and the phenomena ,the conditioned. o)
e/perience! =irst, it 0i brie)$ e/pain "ant-s o0n theor$ regarding these concepts, pa$ing
partic*ar attention to ho0 "ant beieves that the$ can hep sove the probems posed to
phiosoph$ b$ empiricism, 0hie at the same time deineating proper bo*ndaries )or
metaph$sica in<*ir$! >e/t, it 0i disc*ss Hege-s criticism o) "ant! ?hie Hege beieves that
"ant correct$ identi)ies the necessit$ to acco*nt )or both the conditioned and *nconditioned
eements o) e/perience, he nevertheess beieves that "ant-s acco*nt o) the no*mena, 0hich
red*ces the *nconditioned thing6in6itse) to a ream o*tside o) the h*man kno0edge, eaves "ant
0ith an empt$ conception o) the conditioned content o) the categories o) mind! On$ b$
gro*nding e/perience in his ne0 metaph$sica acco*nt o) the ;bso*te does Hege beieve one
can overcome the shortcomings o) "ant-s 1v*gar @!!!A s*b#ectivism1 ,3 4B.!
"ant-s #riti$ue of !ure %eason, among other things, serves as a response to the skeptica
chaenge concerning the ind*ction o) *niversas ,B 1C.! ;mong other probems, one o) the most
important, )or "ant, remains the probem o) ind*ction pointed o*t b$ David H*me! Beca*se
strict empiricism re<*ires one to ana$9e a concepts in the mind as arising )rom partic*ar
sensor$ impressions, the habit o) re)erring to phenomena in *niversa terms becomes
probematic, given that empirica$, one cannot ind*ce an$ necessary reation bet0een distinct
sensor$ impressions! =or instance, one might speak o) di))erent ob#ects o) e/perience as bearing
some reation to each other 6 )or e/ampe, in some ca*sa manner ,e!g! &he bat hits the ba.+ or
0hen one perceives to ob#ects to share in some 1essence1 and beong to the same genera
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categor$! :) taken serio*s$, ho0ever, empiricism denies an$ ob#ective vaidit$ to these *niversa
modes o) *nderstanding! Ca*sation, )or instance, can on$ be *nderstood as a ps$choogica
association arbitrari$ dra0n bet0een t0o ogica$6independent events ,B 4+ ; /v+ ; 112.!
H*me damns the pro#ect o) metaph$sics be red*cing it 1to a mere de*sion o) an aeged insight
o) reason into that 0hich has in )act mere$ been borro0ed )rom e/perience and )rom habit has
taken on the appearance o) necessit$+ an assertion @!!!A destr*ctive o) p*re phiosoph$1 ,B 20.!
&ho*gh "ant does in some sense endorse the pro#ect o) destro$ing the dogmatism o) traditiona
metaph$sics ,B /iv+ B /vii., he nevertheess beieves that some non6skeptica acco*nt o)
metaph$sics and epistemoog$ remains necessar$ i) one hopes to not *nderc*t the )o*ndations o)
science and phiosoph$ ,)or even nat*ra science, tho*gh )o*nded on empirica principes,
)*ndamenta$ depends *pon decided$ non6ind*ceabe concepts s*ch as ca*sation.!
"ant o))ers a compe/ and ength$ so*tion to this probem! One s*ch critica part, the
de)ense o) the s$nthetic a priori, cannot be e/amined nor de)ended here! D*))ice it to sa$ that
"ant arg*es, contrar$ to H*me, )or the e/istence o) concepts 0hich, tho*gh not dra0n )rom an$
partic*ar e/perience or sense impression, nevertheess cannot aternative$ be red*ced to mere
ta*toogies ,"ant-s most saient e/ampes inc*de mathematica or geometrica propositions. ,B
1465.! :n addition to "ant-s de)ense o) the s$nthetic a priori, the de)ense and e*cidation o) his
theor$ o) categories constit*tes another cornerstone o) his attempt to provide an acco*nt o)
*niversa concepts derived )rom e/perience!
=or these p*rposes, "ant empo$s his method o) 1transcendenta ded*ction1 in order to
demonstrate 1the 0a$ in 0hich concepts reate to ob#ects a priori1 ,; 85.! &hat is, "ant 0i
attempt to demonstrate the necessity o) categories o) the mind in order to transcendenta$ prove
the e/istence o) certain categories inherent to the mind! :n other 0ords, tho*gh he cannot
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positive$ prove their e/istence, "ant arg*es that 0itho*t these 1categories,1 o*r minds-
concept*a cognition o) the e/terna 0ord 0o*d not be possibe! :) the process o) cognition
0ere mere$ red*ced to the process o) generating concepts )rom a p*re$ a priori standpoint, then
an$ concepts in the mind 0o*d have no connection 0hatsoever to the e/terna 0ord, and th*s
0o*d be devoid entire$ o) their content% 1;n a priori concept that 0as not reated to the @entire
ob#ect o) possibe e/perienceA 0o*d be on$ the ogica )orm )or a concept, b*t not the concept
itse) thro*gh 0hich something 0o*d be tho*ght1 ,; C5.! On$ b$ providing some ink bet0een
the concept*a and the empirica can "ant hope to provide an acco*nt o) concepts that de)$ the
H*mean dichotom$ o) spec*ative ta*toog$ on the one hand or mere ps$choogica association
on the other ,; 113.! &h*s, the transcendenta arg*ment caims that the e/istence o) the
categories is necessary )or e/perience o) the 0ord to be inteigibe to the *nderstanding% 1&he
categories @!!!A are nothing other than the conditions o) thinking in a possibe e/perience @!!!!A
&he$ are there)ore aso )*ndamenta concepts )or thinking ob#ects in genera )or the appearances,
and the$ there)ore have a priori ob#ective vaidit$, 0hich 0as #*st 0hat 0e rea$ 0anted to
kno01 ,; 111.! On$ thro*gh these a priori 1origina p*re concepts o) s$nthesis1 can 0e perceive
ob#ects in the 0ord as the$ stand in reation to each other ,; 81+ B 107.! &he mind does not
perceive empirica reait$ as a mere$ *ninteigibe and abso*te$ partic*ar series o) sense
impressions% rather, e/perience itse) is on$ possibe b$ mediation o) categories s*ch as <*antit$,
<*ait$, reation, and modait$ ,; 80+ B 10B.% 1B$ these concepts aone can @the *nderstandingA
*nderstand something in the mani)od o) int*ition, i!e!, think an ob#ect )or it1 ,:bid.!
&his acco*nt o) the reation bet0een sensor$ int*ition and the )ac*t$ o) the
*nderstanding as mediated b$ the categories has important impications )or "ant-s conception o)
metaph$sics! Beca*se the categories make possibe the inteigibe e/perience o) empirica
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reait$, "ant re)ers to the e/terna 0ord that gives rise to these sense impressions as the
1*nconditioned1 ,; 323.! "ant grants the empiricist point that the data given to the mind b$ the
e/terna 0ord consists not in direct access to the ob#ects o) cognition themseves, b*t rather
mere$ to the appearance o) s*ch ob#ects! &ho*gh "ant transcendenta$ ded*ces the e/istence
o) *nconditioned ob#ects ,the things6in6themseves. that give rise to the e/perience, he
nevertheess maintains that, beca*se the categories o) the mind constit*te the necessar$
conditions )or cognition, that these 1things6in6themseves1 cannot be accessibe to o*r cognitive
po0ers, )or this 0o*d necessitate some other kind o) kno0edge! 5epresentations are di))erent
)rom the things6in6themseves ,0hatever the$ ma$ be., and beca*se a cognition stemming )rom
e/perience is conditioned, the *nconditioned can never become an ob#ect o) cognition% 1=or 0e
have to do on$ 0ith o*r representations+ ho0 things in themseves ma$ be ,0itho*t regard to
representations thro*gh 0hich the$ a))ect *s. is entire$ be$ond o*r cognitive sphere1 ,; 1C0.!
&his gives rise to "ant-s distinction bet0een the noumenon and phenomenon 0ith regard to
1sensibe int*ition1 ,B 307.! ?hie the phenomena correspond to the appearances o) ob#ects,
)rom 0hich the mind s$nthesi9es concepts )rom e/perience, the noumena correspond to a sphere
inaccessibe to cognition, 1inso)ar as it is not an ob#ect o) o*r sensibe int*ition1 ,B 307.! "ant-s
identi)ication o) the no*mena ream, there)ore, provides him 0ith a negati&e sense in 0hich he
ma$ deineate the bo*ndaries o) metaph$sics! B$ trans)orming, thro*gh the transcendenta
method, traditiona$ metaph$sica <*estions into ones o) epistemoog$ ,ho0 is it possibe )or the
mind to have cognition o) the e/terna 0ordE., "ant seeks to avoid embroiing himse) in the
cassic <*andaries o) dogmatic metaph$sics b$ reegating them to sphere o*tside o) the capacit$
)or h*man reason!
Oppermann B
:n his disc*ssion o) critica phiosoph$ in the Encyclopedia, Hege aso takes *p the
probem 0hich concerns "ant% to 0hat e/tent can one gain inteigibe access to the
*nconditioned 0ordE ;t times, Hege praises "ant )or some o) his insights into this )*ndamenta
epistemoogica probem! =or e/ampe, he notes that "ant correct$ arg*es that 1the categories
are not contained in immediate sensation1 ,3 42!3.! :n the case o) ca*sation, )or e/ampe, 1the
ca*sa ne/*s bet0een @ca*se and e))ectA is not perceived+ on the contrar$, it is present mere$ )or
o*r thinking1 ,ibid.! Hege aso beieves that some acco*nt o) categories or the conditioned is
necessar$ to provide the )o*ndation )or o*r cognition o) reait$! :n )act, Hege seems to aso be
taken *p 0ith the ver$ same concern o) avoiding the creation o) an impassabe gap bet0een
menta concepts on the one hand and on the other hand the ob#ects o) e/perience that the$ m*st
respond to! F*st as "ant seeks to prod*ce an acco*nt o) the categories in order to prevent menta
concepts )rom descending into mere emptiness, Hege too beieves that 1these concepts @!!!A are
conditioned b$ the given materia @b*tA the$ are empt$ on their o0n acco*nt and have their
appication and *se on$ in e/perience1 ,3 43.!
Despite this concern, Hege beieves that "ant-s acco*nt o) the menta categories, and the
s*bse<*ent distinction bet0een the no*menon and phenomenon 0hich )oo0s, *timate$
s*cc*mbs this ver$ same de)ect ,3 41.! Hege )irst takes iss*e 0ith "ant-s treatment o) the
ob#ective and the s*b#ective, beieving that "ant dooms his epistemoogica pro#ect b$ dra0ing
s*ch a deep dichotom$ bet0een the concepts o) things as opposed to the things6in6themseves%
1;ccording to "ant, tho*ght, atho*gh the$ are *niversa and necessar$ determinations, are sti
only our tho*ghts, and are c*t o)) )rom 0hat the thing is in6itse) )rom an impassabe g*) @!!!!b*tA
o*r tho*ghts are not mere$ o*r tho*ghts, b*t at the same time the :n6itse) o) things and o)
0hatever ese is ob#ective1 ,3 41.! Hege here appears to be arg*ing that "ant-s acco*nt o)
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ob#ectivit$ in )act depends on too m*ch sub'ecti&ity% tho*gh "ant conceives o) the categories as
necessary )or e/perience, he nevertheess sti considers them p*re$ a priori prod*ct o) the mind!
B$ considering the connection bet0een concepts and their 1determinations1 in the e/terna
0ord, "ant on$ considers them in terms o) 1s*b#ective or ob#ective,1 and, d*e to his dichotom$
bet0een the no*mena and the phenomena, aread$ proscribes himse) )rom 1consider@ingA them
in and )or themseves1 ,3 41.+ instead, he can on$ gro*nd the 1*niversait$1 and 1necessit$1 o)
the categories in the 1(go1 ,3 42!1., making 1the content o) o*r conscio*sness something that is
only o*rs1 ,3 45.!
Hege p*shes )*rther aong this metaph$sica ine o) arg*ment% 0hie he agrees 0ith "ant
that the possibiit$ o) content )or conditioned e/perience can on$ be g*aranteed b$ the rea
e/istence o) the *nconditioned, he beieves that "ant-s acco*nt o) the *nconditioned is 0anting!
:n this sense, he )oo0s a ine o) arg*ment simiar to that o) =ichte ,and he in )act cites =ichte
e/picit$ 0hen presenting an arg*ment concerning the nat*re o) 1tho*ght6determinations1 @3
41!2A. ,3 42.! Gike =ichte, Hege arg*es that "ant-s conception o) the thing6in6itse) remains
probematic, in that "ant provides no possibiit$ o) cognitive access to it! Het i), as "ant, Hege,
and =ichte a agree, the *nconditioned ,the no*menon, the thing6in6itse). *timate$ provides
the )o*ndation )or the concepts in the mind conditioned )rom e/perience! ;nd )or this reason
"ant-s reegation o) the things6in6themseves to the *nkno0abe no*mena ream becomes
probematic, )or 0itho*t a )*er acco*nt o) the *nconditioned, it remains *ncear ho0 the
*nconditioned co*d serve as the determination o) concepts gained thro*gh e/perience! Dince
"ant arg*es that the cognitions derived )rom e/perience have 1the gro*nd o) their being 0ithin
themseves, b*t 0ithin something ese,1 ,3 45., Hege arg*es that "ant eaves *nans0ered the
<*estion 1ho0 this other is determined1 ,ibid.! 5ather than compicate matters b$ generating a
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dichotomo*s epistemoogica acco*nt o) the 0ord, Hege beieves that there e/ists an obvio*s
so*tion to a probem that not even "ant-s eaborate theor$ o) the categories can sove! Dince
these 1categories @!!!A cannot become cogni9ant o) things6in6themseves,1 Hege e/presses
s*rprise 1to read so o)ten that one does not kno0 0hat the thing6in6itse) is+ )or nothing is easier
to kno0 than this1 ,3 44.!
&ho*gh Hege does not address this point e/picit$, he departs )rom =ichte in providing a
so*tion to this probem! 2recise$ beca*se he thinks that "ant-s soe )oc*s on the s*b#ective6
ob#ective reation o) concepts to e/perience )ais on its o0n terms b$ red*cing a conditioning
and tho*ght6determination mere$ to the (go ,3 42., Hege beieves that he m*st 1arrive at the
determinations o) the :1 ,ibid.! ;nd this, in his mind, re<*ires a ess restricted conception o)
reason that can access the )*ndamenta determination o) cognition% Hege, in )act, de)ines reason
as 1the )ac*t$ o) the *nconditioned,1 and in this he proposes to gro*nd not on$ cognition, b*t
aso the determination o) the 1( in thin)ing1 ,3 45.! &his act o) s*))icient gro*nding, ho0ever, can
on$ take pace thro*gh a metaph$sica acco*nt 0hich breaks do0n the dichotomo*s s$stem o)
appearance v! thing6in6itse), and phenomenon v! no*menon constr*cted b$ "ant% 1&he things o)
0hich 0e have immediate kno0edge are mere appearances, not only for us, b*t aso in-
themsel&es, and that the proper determination o) these things, 0hich are in this sense -)inite,-
consists in having the gro*nd o) their being not 0ithin themseves, b*t in a *niversa divine :dea1
,ibid.! "ant-s 1s*b#ective ideaism1 renders itse) incompetent to provide a )o*ndationa acco*nt
o) the conditioning o) e/perience, precise$ beca*se, tho*gh it identi)ies the necessit$ o) the
*nconditioned, it is considered *ninteigibe and *nkno0abe! :nstead, b$ gro*nding the concept
o) the *nconditioned *nder the aegis o) 1abso*te ideaism,1 Hege sec*res a metaph$sica
)o*ndation that "ant cannot provide ,ibid.! &ho*gh eaborating in )*rther detai on the e/act
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nat*re and p*rpose o) the ;bso*te e/ceeds the competence o) this paper, it s*))ices to sa$ the
)oo0ing% 0hie avoiding the ma#or pit)as necessitated b$ "ant-s empt$ categories 6 0hich he
considers 1*n)it to be determinations o) the ;bso*te1 ,3 44. 6 Hege beieves that the ;bso*te
provides a coherent acco*nt o) the *nconditioned 0ord 6 accessibe, *nike "ant-s, to o*r reason
6 0hich aso provides the determination o) concepts derived )rom o*r e/perience o) this 0ord%
1:t is the goodness o) the ;bso*te, so to speak, that ets sing*ar ,beings. en#o$ their o0n seves,
and it is #*st this that drives them back into abso*te *nit$ ,3 42.! :n this 0a$, the ;bso*te sti
manages to per)orm the cognitive$6s$nthesi9ing )*nctions intended )or the mind b$ "ant!
&his paper has eaborated on the di))erences bet0een "ant and Hege regarding their
acco*nts o) menta categories, and the reevance o) metaph$sics )or gro*nding these acco*nts!
?hereas "ant beieves that transcendenta and epistemoogica acco*nt o) the categories
imposes certain imits on both the empirica criti<*e and the competence o) metaph$sics, Hege
beieves that the "antian acco*nt o) menta cognition thro*gh categories, and the
metaph$sica$6skeptica dichotom$ that emerges )rom it, remains empt$ 0itho*t a gro*nding in
a metaph$sica acco*nt o) the *nconditioned 6 an ideaism o) the ;bso*te!