LAPERAL v.

REPUBLIC (1962)
6 SCRA 357
FACTS: Elisea obtained legal separation decree from husband Enrique Santamaria,
so now she wants to revert to her maiden name. She is a businesswoman and afraid
that confusion as to the name will lead her finances to the dissolution of conj
ugal property. Art. 372 mandates that woman retains the name used prior to legal
separation, because it is indicative of status and legal separation affected no
change to her status.
HELD: SC denied her petition because she relied on the fact of her legal separat
ion and that there was no conjugal property to fear of because it has been disso
lved with the decree of legal separation. Likewise, they cannot allow easy circu
mvention of Art 372. CASE DISMISSED.
October 30, 1962
G.R. No. L-18008
ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor.
Barrera, J.:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (
Sp Proc. No. 433) a petition which reads:
1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the l
ast three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;
2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Ho
norable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled
'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was giv
en a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now
final;
3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instea
d of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal se
paration from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for ma
ny years now;
4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique
R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is de
sirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume usi
ng her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings a
re had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the s
ame violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, an
d that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reaso
n that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decree
d legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she
employed before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the co
urt, treating the petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its decision
and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a busine
sswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her marrie
d name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation
of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State C9Egf1UT.
The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of
the New Civil Code which reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using
her name and surname employed before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the
legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname em
ployed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is una
ffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to
be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicati
ve of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of
her name from Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marri
age, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name, giving as reason or cause therefor her
being legally separated from the husband Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact tha
t they have ceased to live together for many years.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the p
rocedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has bee
n observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opini
on, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petition
er is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with h
im for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refe
rs to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Art
icle 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married women legally separated f
rom their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of l
egal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opi
nion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petition
er, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the manda
tory provisions of Article 372 1x6zXl8Un.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated
that as the petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of
her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In th
e first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; henc
e, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the iss
uance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership betwee
n petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (A
rt. 106[2], Civil Cod). Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eve
ntual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petiti
on, is hereby set aside and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Pa
redes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. .
SANTERO v. CFI OF CAVITE
FACTS: petitioners are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Fel
ixberta Pacursa while private respondents are 4 of the 7 children begotten by th
e same Pablo with Anselma Diaz. Both sets od children are the natural children o
f Pablo since neither of their mothers were legally married to Pablo. On june 30
, 1982, Private respondents, thru Anselma filed a motion for allowance on ground
of support in the CFI which was opposed by petitioners. CFI granted the motion
filed by Anselma. Later, on march 25, 1985, Anselma filed another motion for all
owance to include 3 other as children of Pablo. This was also granted by the CFI
. In an amended order, the CFI directed Anselma to submit her clarification as t
o the additional 3 children. In compliance with the order, she stated that the f
irst 3 who were then of age should have neem included since all her children hav
e the right to receive allowance as adcvance payment of their shares in the inhe
ritance of Pablo. ISSUE: whether or not the lower court erred in granting the mo
tion for allowance.
RULING: The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules
of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows: Art. 290.
Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing a
nd medical attendance, according tothe social position of the family. Support al
so includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he comple
tes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyon
d the age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the survivi
ng spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property
and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted th
at amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to t
hem.
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is
of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right
to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the w
idow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code giv
es the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the pri
vate respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are
entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from the
ir father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive la
w, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support d
uring the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impair
ed by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it not
ed however that with respect to "spouse" the same must be the "legitimate opus"
(not common law spouses who are the mother of the children here)