4.

1 Overview of Week 4
Hello, welcome to the fourth week of our course. In this week, we will look at regional integration in a
global context. Now obviously, when we look at regional integration, there are many schemes over the
world, and actually sometimes we could even say one attempt of regional integration seems to spark
another attempt. So we will just look at a selection of cases. And obviously, the analysis that we apply
can also be valid for other regions.
We will start this lecture on European integration, how it has started, how it developed over time. Then
we will have a second lecture that looks at how the European Union developed in terms of aiming to
coordinate the position of member states in the world. We look at this over time. We look at how
political cooperation has actually developed in the EU.
After that, my colleague, Professor Giles Scott-Smith, takes you through two other examples, the
Shanghai Corporation Organization and the Arctic Council. You will get some insight about how these
organizations work and how they developed. And I think it will be very fascinating to look at this.
Also, for those of you who are in the advanced track, we really hope you enjoyed working on your
assignments, and you probably realized that this week, we have the peer review of these assignments.
That is also a fascinating thing to do. Obviously, the topic is extremely relevant, conflict resolution, and
looking at a case you're interested in. So now, let us start this, the first lectures. We will get to the
subject of regional integration.


4. 2 EU Over Time
Hello there again, and welcome to the first lecture in this week. We will deal
with an important regional organization, the European Union, or EU. And see
how it has developed over time. We will start by briefly exploring its origins,
and then see how it has developed and where it stands now. We will also
familiarize you with core concepts of some important theories of integration.

History. After World War II, an important development in European integration
was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC, formally
established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The treaty
was signed by Belgium, France, Western Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg, who are also
the founding states of what now is the European
Union. The idea behind the creation of the coal and
steel community was to integrate the coal and steel
industries of the participating states, and notably of
two former core enemies, Germany and France. The
project was initiated on the basis of important
contributions by politicians such as Robert Schuman,
Jean Monnet, and the first Chancellor of Germany after World War II, Konrad
Adenauer. In fact, the then French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, presented the plans for this coal
and steel community on the 9th of May 1950 in the Schuman Declaration.


Here's a short passage from this declaration.
The pooling of coal and steel production will change the destinies of those regions
which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions war, of which they
have been the most constant victims.

You can see that the core idea was to move forward after World War II, and to start creating the
foundations for what today is the European Union.
Different Theories. To study and understand processes of regional integration,
different theories have been developed. A famous one is Neo-functionalism.
According to the theory, to which Ernst Haas has made a very important
contribution with his 1958 book, The Uniting of Europe, regional integration
moves forward on the basis of processes of spillover. Spillover can, for example,
be functional, political, or what is called cultivated.
Functional spillover essentially means that the benefits of
integrating in one area can only be fully exploited if
integration also happens in another area. For example,
economic cooperation can mean that it makes sense to
also initiate cooperation in the area of long-term policy.
Another type of spillover is political. It occurs on the basis
of political pressures, for example, by trans-national interest groups demanding
more integration.
Finally, spillover can be cultivated, meaning it is encouraged by supranational
institutions that support or cultivate further integration.
Quite a different perspective is what is called intergovernmentalism. A major
author in this tradition was Stanley Hoffmann. According to Hoffman, regional
integration is not a self-perpetuating process. And supra national institutions
are not all that important. It's rather that the states decide on major steps in
integration. His theory seemed to be very relevant, when in 1965, the Empty
Chair Crisis occurred. At the time, the French President, Charles De Gaulle,
disagreed with plans that he saw as further reducing
the influence of governments in decision making, and
vistas. He withdrew the French ministers from council
meetings where the intergovernmental decisions
were made. As a reaction to this, some Neo-
functionalists started revising their own approaches.
You see some references to work on Neo-
functionalism and inter-governmentalism in our list
of readings. [Links provided at the end of this
document.]
Pan-European integration moved forwards and plans for the creation of a
true common market, also called the internal market, were made. A new
strand of theorizing was presented that, in a way, combined elements of
intergovernmentalism and liberalism. The most famous author in this
tradition is Andrew Moravcsik, who is a professor
of politics at Princeton University. According to
this approach, integration moves forward in two
steps: domestic preference formation and
intergovernmental negotiations. In essence, in
his work, to which you also have some links in our
readings, he claims that major steps ahead in
European integration, such as the establishment
of the internal market or of European economic and monetary union, were
based on processes in which various domestic actors determined the
preferences of member state governments.
In the next step there are intergovernmental negotiations. When the preferences of the most powerful
states in European Integration converge, there will be new agreements that may lead to major new
steps forward.
These are just a few examples of theories explaining why integration moves forward. They can, of
course, also be applicable to other examples of regional integration, but European integration in a global
comparison has developed quite far.
Developments. From its origins onwards, European integration not only aimed at increased economic
cooperation, but also at moving towards what may be called political union. We have to keep in mind
that its beginnings go back to situations of conflict and war. The integration
process, by creating increasing economic interdependence and the
establishment of supranational institutions, may have significantly
contributed to the fact that there has not been war among the member
states of this union since 1945. Given the conflictual path on the European
continent, this can be considered to be an impressive achievement. Actually,
this is one of the reasons why, in 2012, the European Union was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize. in an era in which the European Union also faced
some criticism and what is called
Euroskepticism. This prize was a welcome
moment to honor the work of many who
support and believe in European integration.
After the end of the Cold War, large parts of Eastern Europe joined the
European Union. In 2004, there was what may be called a big bang
enlargement, by a total of ten new member states. Nonetheless, we can
see that in general terms, economic integration in what is now the
European Union seems to have come easier and faster than integration
in more political domains, such as foreign or security policy. We will get
back to this in the next lecture.

In economic terms, the European Union has even moved forward after having
created an internal market in the early 1990s to the establishment of a
monetary union in which many of its members participate. In the wake of the
global financial crisis, the monetary union has also faced significant
challenges. But, it seems that these, in turn, have caused the integration
process to move forward by new agreements aiming at the maintenance of
fiscal and monetary stability. In a way, this process may then be seen as
following this neo-functionalist logic. But it is also true that governments
need to agree on such major new steps and support them, which is more in
line with intergovernmentalist reasoning.
Unfortunately, the crisis has also led to serious
challenges, notably in terms of rising
unemployment rates, such as among young
people in the European Union's south.
The EU Today. Today, the European Union is
an important actor in terms of global trade. Its
currency, the Euro, although still quite young, is
used not only in many European Union member
states, but also, for example, as a major reserve
currency in several central banks around the
globe. The crisis has posed serious challenges to
this common currency but also has led to new
pressures on European integration in terms of the
need to find common approaches, helping to
safeguard fiscal and monetary stability also in
times of crisis.

Summary. The main driving force for European
integration was the mission to integrate sovereign
states in an effort to increase their welfare but
also to prevent conflict and war between them in the future. From the
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, to the Internal
market, and later, even a Monetary union. Members have become
increasingly interdependent in economic terms. On the global scale, the
European Union is important as an economic entity. But its weight seems to
be somewhat less when we look at its collective voice in, for example, foreign
policy. This is a topic we turn to in the next lecture.


4.3 EUs Foreign Policy
Building on the last video, we will now look at how the members of what today is the European union
started cooperating in noneconomic areas over time. We will see how they tried to coordinate their
positions, in terms of foreign policy, and how they aim to act as a collective
entity in an organization such as the United Nations.
History: After World War II. Since the establishment of the United
Nations, there have been attempts of European countries to coordinate
their positions in the United Nations, starting with regular consultations.
The first actual forum of foreign policy coordination in what then was the
European Community was in 1970 when European Political Cooperation or
EPC was established. EPC relied on intergovernmental processes of
coordination, and could, of course, not always lead to member states really
speaking with one voice. In 1973, it was declared that the nine member
states of the community at the time would aim, whenever possible, to
adopt common positions within international organizations such as the
United Nations.
History: 1970s and 1980s. In 1974, the
community obtained what is called observer
status in the United Nations General Assembly,
or UNGA. This implies that it got the right to
speak as an entity at UNGA meetings. But it
could not vote on its resolutions. In 2011 the European Union obtained
what's called enhanced observer status, meaning that now it can, for
example, submit proposals or make amendments, and speak among the
representatives of major groups in UNGA debates.
In 1986, the so called Single European Act or SEA was signed. It created the
foundation for the internal markets, the free movement of goods, services,
person, and capital. Regarding European
political cooperation, the SEA also provided for
a further step, at least on paper. It established
that when all European community states were
members of a specific international
organization, they would have to endeavor to speak this one voice.
History: 1990s. In 1992, the Treaty on European Union, TEU, sometimes
also called The Maastricht Treaty, was signed. It essentially created the EU's
Monetary Union. But in terms of foreign policy it also initiated Europe's
Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP. The community committed
itself to ensuring overall consistency in all of its external activities. It also
obligated EU member states in the Security Council to inform other EU
members and the permanent members to defend the interests of the
EU and this institution.
Did these provisions enhance the extents to which EU states have
coordinated their positions, for example, in the UNGA? An analysis that
had looked at this has been co-authored by Scheon, who holds a 2014
PhD here from Leyden University, and myself. This article is available in
our reading list. We found that over time, EU states indeed had
increasingly coordinated their votes in the UNGA, but overall
coherence is not that much higher compared to some other regional
organizations.
A later treaty, the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, ensured that a High
Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy would be appointed. The first
person holding this position was Javier Solana,
who had been the secretary general of NATO
between 1995 and 1999. In 2004, in what was
called the Draft Constitutional Treaty, there
were quite ambitious plans to establish a
position of what would essentially be an EU
foreign minister. But the constitutional treaty
was not accepted in the referendums in France,
and in the Netherlands.


The 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which is currently the basis on which the European
Union operates, made this function actually somewhat more modest than
had originally been envisioned. In a sense, this also shows how reluctant
governments, but also citizens, across the
European Union, sometimes are when it
gets to transferring competencies in foreign
policy to the collective level. The new
position, created by the Lisbon Treaty, is
called High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. The first person appointed to this function
was Baroness Catherine Ashton.
Foreign Policy. The function of the high representative is a somewhat
challenging one because of the need to coordinate the preferences and
priorities of different EU institutions, and of course, of its member states. In
foreign policy, larger states sometimes have an important say, and this
cannot be ignored in practice, for example, when the EU tried to come up
with a common approach as how to react to the crisis in Libya, member
states had different visions on this matter. Before this, they were highly
divided as regards to best reactions to take in view of the war in Iraq. So,
finding common positions can be very challenging.
In December 2010, the European External Action
Service, or EEAS, was launched. It is headed by
the High Representative. In essence, it can be
seen as a gradually evolving EU diplomatic service. It also actively deals with
crisis management. Currently, European delegations exist in almost all of the
United Nation's member states. And they are headed by what now are EU
Ambassadors. The extent to which competencies are transferred to the EEAS,
however, very much depends on the willingness of the member states to
actually delegate such competences.
The EEAS is still young, but it is in constant
development. In terms of policy priorities so far,
the high representative has put much emphasis
on what could be called the use of soft power. High on the agenda are, for
example, foreign aid, support for citizens in crisis situations, development
and human rights. In the reading list, you have some work that looks at the
creation and the activities of the external action service.
External Representation. In terms of the EU's external representation,
there are also two other important functions, The President of the
European Commission and the President of the European Council. For
example, in terms of taking policy initiatives to
combat diverse effects when the global
financial crisis hit, the President of the
European Council, Herman van Rompuy, played
a very active role in terms of trying to get
member states to agree on new measures and
initiatives. Similarly, the European commission
and its President Jose Manuel Barroso laid the
foundations for several agreements that are
now in place for enhanced stability in the
future.
Sometimes in an era of Euro skepticism, these
persons have also been criticized. But we have
to keep in mind that the actions of institutions
and their responses to the crisis can often only
be taken if there actually is intergovernmental
agreement to take these steps. Given the large
number of EU states, 28 since 2014, this can be
rather difficult to achieve. So, in the process of
European integration, member states by incremental steps have started to
coordinate their actions in the domain of foreign affairs, and agreed on the
establishment of new positions. This is trying to increasingly speak with one
voice. But there is still reluctance to do so since foreign policy is often
regarded as a core domain of a state's competencies.
Summary. So, what have we learned? European integration has led to
a gradual coordination in the ways in which member states are
represented externally. It now has a young, but evolving, common
diplomatic service. While the EU still does not really speak with one
voice in world politics, it is gradually coordinating its member states'
positions in some international organizations, including the United
Nations. In the next video, you will see examples of regional
coordination in other parts of the world. Of course, we cannot look at
each regional organization since there are so many at the time. But you
will learn about two examples, the Shanghai Corporation Organization,
SEO, and the Arctic Council. The following lectures will be given by my
colleague, Professor Giles Scott-Smith.




4.4 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Prof. Giles Scott-Smith)
Hello and welcome. My name is Giles Scott Smith and I am a professor in diplomatic history at Leiden
University. In this video, we will look at the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, SCO. The SCO is an intergovernmental organization
founded in Shanghai in Beijing on June 15, 2001 by six countries: China ,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Its member
states possess a total population of 1.45 billion, about of the worlds
total. Its working languages are Chinese and
Russian.
History. The SCO was originally created by the
original Shanghai Five group, the SCO Six minus
Uzbekistan, which came together in the mid-1990s
as a measure to secure national borders in post-
Soviet central Asia. This was made official with the
1996 agreement on deepening military trust in
border regions, and the 1997 agreement on
reductions of military forces in border regions.
Uzbekistan joined in 2001, at the time of the
creation of the SCO itself.
In 2002, the SCO issued a charter outlining its purpose and governing apparatus.
The charter emphasizes the value of the organization for building trust, ensuring
regional stability, and promoting economic, social and cultural integration
amongst its members. In terms of specific areas of policy cooperation, the SCO
focuses on countering the so-called three evils of terrorism, separatism,
and extremism, as well as combating illicit narcotics, arms trafficking, and
illegal migration.
In the mid-2000s, the SCO expanded its purpose. Looking for greater
recognition as an international organization, it secured observer status at
the United Nations. A permanent
secretariat was established in Beijing, and a
regional anti-terrorism structure, the RATS,
was set us in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The
SCOs determination to be seen as an
important player in global diplomacy was
summed up by the declaration from its 2005
in Kazakhstan. This must be seen against
the background of the Western supported
regime changes in Georgia, in 2003, Ukraine
in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and also
the increasing presence of US military forces
in the central Asia region following the
attacks on 9/11. The SCO was firmly fixed
on determining its position in this context,
and asserted its primacy as the organization
legitimately tasked with ensuring central
Asian security. This measure was backed
with full scale military exercises conducted
by the Russian and Chinese forces in August 2005.
Structure. The SCOs central body is the Council of the Heads of State, which meets annually to
determine the organizations priorities and further its agenda of cooperation. The Council is supported
by a hierarchical apparatus that includes the Council of the Heads of Government, which approves the
budget, the Council of Foreign Ministers and other ministerial meetings in specific policy fields, and the
secretariat located in Beijing.
New members are welcome, to be decided upon by the Council of the
Heads of State. Since 2001, no new members have been admitted,
although since 2004, several states have joined the SCO Summit as official
observers, Afghanistan, Iran, India, Mongolia, and Pakistan. A separate
group, known as dialog partners has also been created, currently including
Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka. Iran has shown a strong determination to
join as a full member in order to use the SCO to counterbalance pressure
from the United States, but apart from the 2005 declaration, the SCO has
largely avoided taking an anti-Western path. This mainly reflects the
caution of the Chinese leadership,
and an unwillingness to include new
members who could prove divisive
within the organization and
undermine its effectiveness.
In 2012, India expressed a wish to display a constructive role as and
SCO member state, but despite Russian support, the message from
Beijing was that it was still too early.




Main Challenges. The main challenges for the SCO cover three main
areas:
1) contributing to the stabilization of Afghanistan after the
full withdrawal of NATO forces in 2014.
2) Developing the organizations involvement in new policy
areas beyond counter-terrorism and security.
3) Establishing itself as a united international body able to
facilitate and coordinate the activities of its members in
global diplomatic settings.

Afghanistan was a priority for the SCO Summit in 2012. NATO-SCO
cooperation in Afghanistan has been minimal, although some
liason did start to take place after 2010. The Afghan president
Hamid Kharzai has been
attending SCO Summits as an
invited guest since 2004,
requested further support for
security and economic development at the Beijing meeting.

Future. There is a strong likelihood that India and Pakistan,
together with possible Iran will become the next states to join the
SCO from 2014 onwards.
The current SCO states share mutual concerns about radical Islamic
terrorism networks, separatist movements, human trafficking, and drug
trafficking, with Afghanistan being the main source of the global heroin
trade. However, the challenge is not only to fill the potential power
vacuum following the departure of US and NATO forces, it is also to
maintain cooperation among its member states, even if their national
interests collide.
The key issue involves the traditional
alignments of Russia-India and China-
Pakistan, and how these will work
within the SCO instead of being kept outside. India had donated $2
billion in aid to Afghanistan up to 2013, and there is an opportunity
to use the SCO to both overcome concerns on the future of
Afghanistan, and gradually overcome the decades long rivalry
between India-Pakistan, and China-India. Should the SCO contribute
to this, it would be a considerable shift in global politics.
The second challenge concerns the SCOs evolution as a significant
player on broader policy issues, both in the Central Asian region and
beyond. In July 2007, Vladimir Putin initiated the SCOs Energy club,
with the purpose of uniting the
SCOs energy producing and
consuming energy states,
coordinating energy strategies, and
strengthening energy security. At the
center of this arrangement lies Russia
as a major energy source, and China
as the worlds second largest
consumer of oil and natural gas.
Infrastructure projects are also a priority, the proposed
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India gas pipeline will
supplement existing oil and gas deals between Kazakhstan and India,
with Afghanistan becoming a key transit state. Once again, it remains
to be seen whether the SCO can deliver on its promise, or if
geopolitical concerns and submerged rivalries, including that
between Russia and China hamper its bid to foster a comprehensive
energy market.

The third challenge lies in the SCO as an international actor. At the
2013 Summit held in Bishkek, apart from the United Nations, the only
representatives of international organizations attending were from the
Russian-led commonwealth of independent states, organization of
collective security and Eurasian economic community. Among many
diplomatic observers, the SCO still lacks credibility and is mainly
interpreted as no more than a convenient platform from which China
and Russia can exert their influence over the Central Asian region. The
Summit saw the SCO membership rejecting both the ongoing economic
sanctions against Iran and any suggestions of Western intervention in
the Syrian civil war. Chinese president Ping attended the summit as
part of a central Asian tour that saw him
announce plans for an SCO development
bank as a financial safety net for its
members.
Up until now, the SCO has lacked the credibility and the prestige
accorded to other international forums such as the G20 or the BRICS,
even though these later two have not met expectations as to their
effectiveness in global governance. While the organization has
certainly evolved in its short lifetime since 2001, an expansion of its
membership to include India, Pakistan, and possibly Iran could bring a
significant shift. It still remains to be seen whether the SCO can bring
reality in line with its stirring rhetoric.

Summary. So in summary, the SCO is one of the main regional
organizations in Central Asia, and possibly because of the
involvement of Russia and China the most important one. It focuses
on three key evils, terrorism, separatism and extremism. So far,
however, the SCO is still struggling to be recognized as an
international actor.
In the next video, we will look at a different regional organization,
namely the Arctic Council.








4.5 Arctic Council (Prof. Giles Scott-Smith)
In this video, we will look at an entirely different regional
organization, the Arctic Council. In 1996, the Ottawa Declaration
signed by the eight countries with territory above the Arctic Circle
brought the Arctic Counsel into existence. Its members are Canada,
the United States, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and
Russia.

History. The council was an extension of the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy. AEPS agreed in
1991 to address problems related to the dumping of
hazardous materials by the former Soviet Union in
previous years, and to monitor pollution in the
region in general. The council was established as an
intergovernmental forum to facilitate and promote
cooperation and coordination among the arctic
states together with the indigenous peoples from
the region on issues such as sustainable
development and environmental protection.

Of the approximately 4 million inhabitants north of the Arctic Circle, most
of them located in Russia and Norway, around 500,000 are recognized as
indigenous peoples. And there are six indigenous people's organizations
involved as permanent participants in the council.
Structure. The council holds a ministerial
level meeting once every two years. The
chairmanship also rotates among the
members, each member holding that
position for two years. Decisions are
made by consensus, and not by vote. The
council is supported by various working
groups and task forces which are established to focus on specific issues
of concern, such as conservation, emergency response, pollution
control and quality of ecosystems. The council's permanent secretariat
is located in Tromso, Norway.
Observer status is open to non-arctic states, intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations, IGOs and NGOs. They can qualify if
they meet certain criteria, including recognizing the sovereign rights
and jurisdiction of arctic states, and the applicability of international
law, in particular, the UN convention on Law of The Sea, UNCLOS, that
refers to sovereignty and determining territorial waters. There are
currently 12 observer states including India, Japan, People's Republic of
China, 9 IGOs and 11 NGOs contributing to the council as observers.








Main Challenges: The lowest extent of the Arctic ice cap was so far recorded in 2006. Since then it has
varied, but the average decline in ice coverage is around 2.6% per decade since 1981. At the same time,
the Arctic is estimated to contain 30% of the globe's untapped gas
reserves and 15% of its oil. Three principal challenges face the council in
the coming years, all of them related to the melting ice cap, making the
region more navigable and accessible.


First, [there is] the ability to manage increasing economic development of
the arctic region in a way that meets the needs of economic interests,
indigenous peoples and environmental
conservation. In 2013, Canada assumed the
chairmanship of the Arctic Council and stated as
its priority the livelihoods of the peoples living
within the region. Since then, it has played a
pivotal role in a task force for a circumpolar
business forum which, in January 2014, became the Arctic Economic Council,
the AEC. The AEC, functioning as part of the Arctic Council, will further
promote the business possibilities opening up in the Arctic, while still
maintaining a commitment to sustainable development. The danger of this
development is that the increasing economic potential will undermine, if not
prevent, the council's efforts to maintain ecosystems, and prevent further
environmental damage. Canada is spearheading a push to increase Arctic
Council coordination capabilities, a way to deal with this rising economic
activity, and has pushed for improved pollution control measures, better
safety regulations for shipping and tourism, and the introduction of a
mandatory polar code by the international Maritime Organization. The
council will increasingly be faced with questions as to its priorities. But this
expansion of responsibilities will test not only the
priorities of the Arctic Council as granted by the
Ottawa Declaration, but also the ability of the
forum to continue to function according to consensus.
The second challenge concerns the ability of the Arctic Council to deal with
increasing demands. Some have called for a strengthening of the Council's
mandate, now that the Arctic is becoming a region of great activity. But this is
contested. While the United States acknowledges the extra burden, it does
not support its transformation into an official international organization that
could issue binding agreements. Instead, it prefers to pursue flexible,
cooperative arrangements with other arctic and non-arctic states. The US
also agrees with Finland and Sweden that non-arctic states should be
allowed to join the council as full members. Opposing, Russia and Canada
both want to maintain an arctic only policy.
The third challenge concerns the increasing militarization of the Arctic by
Arctic and non-Arctic states, connected to disputed territorial claims and
opportunities for exploiting energy sources. While the world's southern pole
is protected from economic exploitation and military activity by the 1959
Antarctic Treaty, no such treaty protects the
Arctic. Neither does the Arctic Council discuss
security issues, The United States having insisted,
at the time of the Council's foundation, that this
should be excluded. Rising Russian nationalism
towards the Arctic has triggered a response from other nations. In 2007, a
mini submarine placed a Russian flag on the sea bed at the North Pole as a
symbolic indication of its interests. And in December 2013, Russian President
Vladimir Putin declared the intention to increase the Russian military
presence in the Arctic.
Individual Countries. Under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada has, in
recent years, promoted the interests of indigenous peoples, and referred to
the Arctic as central to Canadian identity, and a
national priority. A string of directives since 2006,
Canada First Defense Strategy, Northern Strategy,
arctic foreign policy have demonstrated Canadian
resolve. In 2012, Canada called the first ever
meeting of defense ministers from the arctic
states outside of the council.
The United States, which for many years
disregarded the arctic, has also recently shown
more engagement. National Security Presidential
Directive 66 on Arctic region policy from January
2009 highlighted an increasing US security and
economic interest. In 2011, then Security of State
Hillary Clinton attended the Arctic Council
Ministerial meeting in Nuke, Greenland. Yet the
Arctic does not really feature as a priority in US
military strategy.
Since 2007, Norway has also turned its security attention northwards as a
response to Russian moves. Yet Norwegian wishes to include NATO in this
term, perhaps looking ahead to invite Finland and Sweden into the alliance,
have so far been disappointed.

Main Challenge. The main challenge will be
to what extinct the Arctic states can resolve
the continuing territorial disputes between
them. Norway and Russia did reach agreement on their border in the
Barents Sea in September 2010, hopefully setting a precedent for others.
Unresolved borders also exist in the Beaufort Sea and even between
Canada and the United States. The failure of the US Senate to ratify the
UN Convention on Law of the Sea complicates this issue. Russian claims
to sovereignty over the Lomonosov ridge are contested by Canada,
Norway, and Denmark. With new claims
being made all the time, disputes over
continental shelves and arctic territorial
waters will probably increase in coming
years. This will test the ability of the
council to successful continue as the prime international site for dealing
with arctic related matters.
Summary. The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum that focuses
on environmental security, economic opportunities, and the interests of
indigenous people living north of the Arctic circle. In the years to come,
it will face many challenges that will test its regional and international
importance. Despite these difficulties, it is, indeed, the most important
organization concerned with this geographical area. I hope you enjoyed
these lectures and good luck with the rest of the course.

4.6 Wrap Up, Week 4
This week we have dealt with some examples of regional integration and the role of regional
organizations. I hope you enjoyed these lectures. There are more cases, but the tools to look at the
dynamics of regional integration can of course also be applicable to other cases. In our reading list, you
see some additional readings if you want to learn a little bit more about some of these subjects. I highly
encourage you to actually look at these additional readings too. You'll also have an end of the week test
as usual, and please make sure that you really study the regional integration literature that is assigned.
Next week we start looking at a different topic, actually a cluster of themes. We will look at the concept
of coercive diplomacy also as a tool to try to ensure peace or resolve violent conflict. We will also look at
the organization that very deliberately tries to have collective security for its members, the North
Atlantic Trade Organization, or NATO. You'll have some fascinating events next week. We look forward
to seeing you then.
Interview with Mohamed Salih African Union
Very much welcome, again. Today we have the pleasure of introducing to you Professor Mohamed Salih,
who is a professor of the Politics of developing countries at Leiden University, and also a professor at the
Institute for Social Studies in Dehake. Very much welcome.

Professor Salih: Thank you.
Professor Salih, we start out asking you a question: we have dealt in this course with a couple of regional
organizations and their role in terms of the maintenance of peace and stability. I would be very
interested. How do you see currently the activities of the African Union, in terms of contributing to the
peace and stability of the African continent?
Professor Salih: The African Union plays a very important role in peace and security in the continent,
despite many skeptics about whether this role is significant. At least, I can mention two reasons. The shift
in 2002 from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union signaled a major shift in the
orientation of Africa towards security. First of all that, the old idea about the sanctity of sovereignty and
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries has ended, allowing the African Union in its
new form, number one, to interfere in conflicts where human rights and genocide or crimes against
humanity are committed. But, also, allowing African countries to request the African Union, particularly
it is an African security council, to intervene in such counties.
This is a major shift in terms of how Africans look at security. Because in the past, look at the conflict in
the Sudan. It continued from 1555 up to 1971-72. And then started again since 1980, 83, and ended in
2005, a long period of time where African Union could not interfere. The same thing [is true] with the
conflict in Ethiopia, conflict in Angola, conflict in Mozambique. All of these conflicts because African
Union. Fault of the sanctity of the borders that the African inherited from the colonial rule, they were not
able to interfere. Today, they can do that, and they have done a number of interventions. Whether it's
through forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone, whether they're joint forces with the United Nations in Darfur
in the Sudan, in Burundi, Somalia, many other countries where you see the African community is
increasingly, involved.
And the second thing is that the new thinking in Africa, about African solutions for Africa. Shift also away
from the fact that Africa was very much dependent on foreign forces, particularly Europeans. It depends
on the country where it has a conflict. If the country was colonized by France, then of course, the anger
of foreign captives and they were French, the military which then tried to solve the problems. If it was
British, it is the principal foreign catalyst that would interfere. So, I think it plays a very, very major role.
Is it actually in institutional terms, it seems that the African Union Security Council, appears to be
muddled a bit on the bases of the example of the UN Security Council. Is that a coincidence, or has that
maybe been a deliberate attempt to account for a fair regional representation within the organization,
could such criteria have mattered?
Professor Salih: I think it is not a coincidence. First, the African Union is the architect of peace and
security, consists of the African Security Council. And then it is supported by three institutions, one
institution is stand-by force, second institution is the early warning system, and the third one is the
Military Committee, or the Committee of [INAUDIBLE]. They also have two support organizations of the
three different institutions, and that is African Peace Fund and the African Community of the Wise. The
whole structure itself is paid by the United Nations Security Council. You are right in that. But also it
derives its authority from the Security Council. It operates within the United Nations instruments.
Because if the Africans establish their completely separate security council that is not operating under
the international architecture for peace and security that is already there, they might be also isolated
from their own obligations to the international community. So, of course, you are very much right.
But, I think the main difference here, and that is something that I can consider it African, the committee
of the wise, the Wise men and women. And this committee of the wise, they're always the ones who
start the very early visits to the countries where they have a problem, conflict, to start talking with the
adversaries, the government, the position forces, and those who are involved, and try to reach a solution
before they go and those issues are discussed and delivered over the African Security Council. So there is
some small African element attitude that is to see how can Africa also use some of their own tradition
and try to solve some of these own international problems within their continent.
Actually, a very amazing way of trying to tackle that issue. It's wonderful to see that. And actually, if we
talk in a general sense in terms of African security and African security needs. I believe I have seen in
your own academic work an emphasis that maybe the military security aspect has tended to be a bit
overemphasized, and that there will be other aspects that are extremely relevant to African security,
including human dignity and trying to establish the frame works for which such concepts really can be
realized on the ground. What is your opinion on that?
Professor Salih: I think my opinion is formed by my concern about the fact that because of the confidence
that the African witnessed during the 90s and the first decade of the 21st century, the concern about
security tended to shift towards military security. That is a time where you have the genocide of Rwanda,
you have the Somali conflict, you have the Liberia conflict, you have the Syrian conflict, and all of those
conflicts which have been bloody, really in terms of crimes against humanity. These crimes have been
committed, including the Sudan. And therefore we see that there's a gradual shift from the purpose for
which the African Union and the African Security Architecture is created, that is, to maintain peace and
security for the purpose of regional integration and development. That is the purpose.
That purpose now is not as strong. I give you one example, out of over about 400 million Euros paid by
the European Union in the first installment, between 2003 and 2008, to these African Europe
partnership, all of these resources that have been paid, just in so many cases, fact is that 40 to 50% of
money has gone to self security purposes. We see increasingly of course, with the emergence of Africa
within the continent, that there is a model that one way of winning hearts and minds is also trying to use
security for other purposes. Of course the issue of securitization of the development, and the linkage is
between development and security, created some very major issues.
So my idea in that what Africa needs in fact is not military security, not the old notion of security, but
rather human security. If you look at the problems very carefully, this is a problem created by
maldistribution of resources, poverty, greed by the elite, grievances by those who feel that they are left
out, and unequal distribution of resources in the continent. But also you see that violence itself is not just
a result of the fact that there is no military force to come to grips with violence. Rather, it is the other
way around in fact. The more you militarize development, the more society is militarized, the more you
are going to have problems.
So in fact, African vision of security should be more targeted toward human security that has respect for
human dignity as you have correctly said, and also human needs, basic human needs. And therefore if
you see this point of fact that the Cold War has ended, in the African continent in general, military
expenditure has increased and increased tremendously. And sometimes your countries are very poor.
There's an increasing military expenditure at the expense, of course, of expenditure on education and on
health, et cetera. And that is why I think the shift of thinking has to be very serious where military to be
able to disagree.
I think these are absolutely relevant to the important topics in detail. On our course webpage we also
have some of your old readings on this subject matter. I think at this point we conclude this interview,
Thank you very much for this interview.
Professor Salih >> Yeah, thank you very much for inviting me.
On the course page index please have a look at the additional readings that we have listed. By Professor
Salih himself, and additional literature that you may be interested in. Thank you very much.
Required Readings
Frost, Alexander (2009): "The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, and Russias Strategic Goals in Central Asia", The China and Eurasia Forum
Quarterly, 7, 3, 83-102. Click here to read.
Vanhoonacker, Sophie and Karolina Pomorska (2013): "The European External Action Service and
Agenda-Setting in European Foreign Policy", Journal of European Public Policy, 20, 9, 1316-
1331. Click here to read.
Recommended Readings
Drieskens, Edith and Louise G. van Schaik, eds. (2014): The EU and Effective Multilateralism: Internal and
External Reform Practices. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Click here to find more information about this
publication.
Hosli, Madeleine O., Evelyn van Kampen, Frits Meijerink and Katherine Tennis (2010): Voting Cohesion in the
United Nations General Assembly: The Case of the European Union, paper presented at the 5th Pan-European
Conference, Porto, Portugal, June 24-26. Click here to read.
Jin, Xi and Madeleine O. Hosli (2011): Pre- and Post-Lisbon: European Union Voting in the United Nations
General Assembly, paper presented at the workshop "Decision-Making in the European Union Before and
After Lisbon", Leiden University (a later version of this paper has been published in 2013 in West European
Politics, 36, 6, 1274-1291). Click here to read.
John, Sarah St. (2013): Summarising the Intellectual Squabbles between Neofunctionalism and
Intergovernmentalism, September. Click here to read.
Salih, Mohamed (2005): Understanding the Conflict in Darfur. Occasional paper, Centre of African Studies -
University of Copenhagen, May. Click here to read.
Tugsbilguun, Tumurkhuleg (2008-2009): "Does the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Represent an Example
of a Military Alliance?" Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, 15-16, 59-107. Click here to read.
Wijsmuller, Witte (2013): Bridging the Gap to Represent: The EEAS and Coherence in European Foreign Policy,
Master Thesis, Leiden University. Click here to read.
Extra links
The African Union (Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission), Click here to read more about
this department.
These notes are taken from a Coursera course provided by the University of Leiden. They are intended only for
students of the course and not to be shared or sold they are the intellectual property of the University of Leiden.
Any errors are the fault of the transcriber and not the University. No payment was received for providing this
service.