LEIGHTON LEE PERRY Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, JP MORGAN CHASE BANK NA, QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP, Defendants and Respondents. Supreme Court No. S220045 (Court of Appeal No. A139655 Super. Ct. No. MSC10-02914)
Appeal From a Judgment Of The Superior Court, County of CONTRA COSTA Hon. Laurel S. Brady, Judge ___________________________________________ APPELLANTS REPLY TO ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW ___________________________________________ Leighton Lee Perry 6724 Waverly Rd, Martinez, CA (925) 949-8377 LL_Perry@att.net
Appellant / Real Party, pro se
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 I.
The Petition Demonstrates Grounds for Supreme Court Review............ 4
II.
The Petition Offers Discussion Why Summary Judgment Was Improperly Granted and Affirmed........................................................... 4
CONCLUSION 8 CERTIFICATION OF LENGTH 1
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Calvo v HSBC Bank (2011) 199 CA4th 118, 130 CR 3d 815...................... 1 Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L L C (2009), 557 U.S. 519........... 2 Glaski v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013), 218 Cal. App. 4th 1079............... 3 Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149.... 6 Statutes Civ Code 2924(a)(6)...................................................................................... 6 Civ Code 2924(e) .......................................................................................... 6 Civ Code 2932.5............................................................................................ 2 Civ Code 2943........................................................................................... 1, 5 Rules Rule 8.500(b)(1) ............................................................................................ 4 Rule 8.500(e)(5) ............................................................................................ 4
Page 1 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This action is about entitlement, without which, a wrongful foreclosure on a deed of trust contract is a nullity and violation of the Penal Code. Respondents admit the transfer of possession of the promissory note stated in the assignment of the deed of trust upon which they base their entitlement was a perjury unsubstantiated by material facts. Although Respondents claim to be in possession of an adjustable rate note, there are insufficient material facts to substantiate a chain of custody and a question of law necessary to evidence entitlement as a holder in due course and party entitled to enforce. The Calvo 1 decision renders it impossible to find the answers in the county records, diminishing the marketability of California real property in its wake. It is no wonder the Trial Court names a different beneficiary from that found by the Appellate Court. Without an identified basis of entitlement, the whole issue of who might be a designated agent is as absurd as is an alleged admitted default, particularly in light of the dearth of substantiating common business records 2 . Respondents leveraged Appellants contractual obligation to warrant and defend the propertys clear title into grand theft by non-judicial foreclosure by breaking either federal and or state 3 law regarding identification of the beneficiary in order to instigate a default. It is undisputed that Appellant would have taken a different course of action except for the deceit of Respondents in hiding the beneficiarys identity. This case encompasses multiple areas of conflicting law and presents a chance for the
1 Calvo v HSBC Bank (2011) 199 CA4th 118, 130 CR 3d 815 2 Such as the amount paid for the subject loan allegedly transferred by assignment between Respondents, which was illuminated by a(n unanswered) request for a statement of decision from the trial court. The court lacks jurisdiction to provide remedy to a party who cannot demonstrate a loss. 3 The contract, provided in form by Respondents, specifically cited state law (Civ Code 2943).
Page 2 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al State to own case law respecting non-judicial foreclosure without reliance on non- binding federal decisions. The Calvo ruling regarding Civil Code 2932.5 may be examined in light of this cases inclusion of a recorded trustee substituted by an assignee who is not a holder in due course (HIDC) because the assignment of the party does not conform to the statute governing non-judicial foreclosure. Buried in this morass is the question of conflict of interest of an agent for the beneficiary who is later substituted as the trustee. The absence of the required TILA notification of a change of beneficiary and its ineffective provision for enforcement in this case point out the need for state consumer protection laws, such as Civil Code 2943, as an important deterrence to criminal activity. It is therefore in the states interest to consider the current legal landscape of cooperation since the Cuomo 4 ruling of coexisting state and federal law. Given the circumstances of the presentation of the issue of federal law preemption in a motion for summary judgment, and the ill-considered ruling by the appellate court, this area of law is a candidate for further briefing on the merits. Actions taken by the trial and appellate courts provided unwarranted support to Respondents with the result that their defense is based on the form of the law that is devoid of spirit and represent violations of abuse of discretion and due process. Were the discovery rights of Appellant denied by the trial court in accepting verbatim a ruling from a discovery facilitator who merely recited a portion of a statute in lieu of circumstances as the reason to deny the acceptance of (unopposed) discovery admissions? Was the withholding of a ruling on discovery by the trial court, bereft of a
4 Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L L C (2009), 557 U.S. 519
Page 3 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al preliminary ruling, until just a couple of days before answers to multiple motions for summary judgment were due, so prejudicial to Appellant as to give cause for judicial review? Was the acceptance (by overruling objections) by the trial court of testimony from Appellant taken out of context and ruled upon as undisputed fact over Appellants objections in a summary judgment an abuse of discretion? Was the insistence of the Appellate court to pursue its issue on agency by referring to non-existent material facts a violation of Appellants due process? Appellant points out the denial of due process by the Appellate Court in foisting this issue at oral arguments, thereby denying Appellant time to address more relevant issues. Was ignoring the question of jurisdiction of the court to provide Respondents remedy when they could produce no showing of loss a violation of Appellants due process? In light of the Glaski 5 case, are the Appellate courts giving excessive weight to the quick resolution provided by non-judicial foreclosure at the expense of the third party beneficiary interest stated by the legislature and embodied by the contract to warrant and protect clear title by the borrower? And finally, in light of the Kalicki decision, are the Appellate courts exceeding their ethical bounds by legislating from the bench and displaying untoward bias by abusing the Rules of Court regarding publication of rulings?
5 Glaski v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013), 218 Cal. App. 4th 1079
Page 4 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al LEGAL ARGUMENT I. The Petition Demonstrates Grounds for Supreme Court Review
Pursuant to Rule 8.500(b)(1), Appellant Leighton Lee Perry petitions this Court for review of the Appellate Opinion filed June 10, 2014 (Opinion) and denial of rehearing filed July 10, 2014 6 as necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle an important question of law. Review is required because the Opinion relies on erroneous hypothetical and factual premise concerning Appellants argument, thereby misstating the nature of a case of real property entitlement with that of wrongful foreclosure. Moreover, review is warranted to reconsider the Opinions resolution of statutory construction and application of relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This Reply is authorized under Rule 8.500(e)(5). Review is appropriate here where the docket reflects rehearing was denied. II. The Petition Offers Discussion Why Summary Judgment Was Improperly Granted and Affirmed
Appellants summary judgment oppositions properly disputed the facts of the assignment to Respondent Fannie Mae with objections of foundation and hearsay; that Respondents were holders in due course in the absence of a fully negotiated transfer to JP Morgan; and the impossibility of a default declared by a party who provided only evidence of a lack of common business records in support of their claim to beneficiary interest. No legal basis by argument and citation for overruling the objections was presented by either the trial or appellate court. Appellant raised the issue that testimony taken out of context and accepted by the trial court as an undisputed fact was an abuse of discretion. No legal basis (argument, citation) for overruling the objections were presented by either the trial or appellate court.
6 Presented in the online docket in the afternoon of July 11, 2014.
Page 5 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al Appellants summary judgment oppositions pointed to the contract language requiring the borrower to warrant and defend the clear title passed to the trustee, and the requirement of a (missing) statement in the notice of default that the borrower has the right to question the default or any other defenses. No legal basis (argument, citation) for denying the plain contract language accepted by both parties addressed the right of a cause of action for violation Civil Code 2943. Instead, the issue of federal preemption as a jurisdictional issue was allowed by the Trial Court to be pursued in motions for summary judgment (while ignoring the jurisdictional issue of remedy for a party who shows no loss). The issue of whether federal preemption was waived by Respondents by providing the form contract remains undetermined. The Appellate Court similarly ignored the contract language and cited a long winded argument that omitted the SCOTUS Cuomo reference cited by Appellant. And even if preemption was not waived the question remains of whether the exceptions to federal preemption for tort, contract, and real estate (entitlement) law should apply to Civil Code 2943 when used to confirm the chain of beneficiary entitlement affecting the finality of transfer of property, as in this case. Calvo / Stockwell did not consider the circumstances of this case where the homeowner is obligated to bring a suit against a substituted trustee to maintain the clear title to the property passed to the original trustee. Neither Calvo nor its precedent considered the logic that it is the beneficiary who instantiates, and may perform all the duties of a trustee, but not vice versa. A trustee is only as legitimate as the beneficiary substituting them, regardless of registering with the county. For this reason the other
Page 6 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al encumbrancer 7 language found in 2932.5 should include the encumbrance of a deed of trust that reinforces the Land Title Act [adopt 1850]. Furthermore, the conflict in the language of 2924(c) referring to the finality of the deed of sale among other encumbrancers which seems to include subordinate deeds of trust would be resolved. Gomes 8 is being cited by trial courts to deny discovery of the authority of agency; yet leave unquestioned, transfers by assignment after a notice of default in contradiction of applying the same logic to the language of Civil Code 2924 as used in Gomes. Gomes held there is no authority to interject the courts into this comprehensive nonjudicial scheme by allowing a party to file a suit to determine whether the party initiating the foreclosure has been properly authorized to do so by the owner of the note
Similarly, there is no authority to allow a transfer by assignment after a notice of default, but there is authority to substitute a trustee. This argument was partially presented at oral argument before the Appellate panel, but interrupted to pursue the agency agenda instead of the beneficiary identity derived from Civ Code 2924(e) of questioning the rebuttable presumption of beneficiary knowledge that a default exists. The Gomes case had a designated agent, MERS, found on the original documents. This case does not have MERS, and the ability to confirm agency authority by referencing the written 9
designation of the agent cited in Civ Code 2924(a)(6) is not found within the all inclusive 2924. In this case there are multiple agents for the beneficiary 10 with appropriate authority to act, and no process to determine which one was designated. This
7 This court might consider the use of encumbrancer in Civ Code 2924 to refer to subordinate holders of deeds of trust subject to a trustee sale 8 Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149 9 Necessary to conform to the doctrine of statute of frauds 10 No common business records depict any Respondent as a purchaser or seller of the Subject Loan, and Fannie Mae has multiple agents by recorded powers of attorney and a recorded assignment, as in Kalicki.
Page 7 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al legal flaw leaves a borrower defenseless against unknown accusers in contradiction of his basic constitutional right to challenge an accuser and unwarranted seizure of property. How is a party expected to challenge a rebuttable presumption and designated agent if not by a court action? In this case the presentation of a pool number on a recorded assignment 2 years after the loans creation with matching numbers found on the (alleged) promissory note indicate an intent to securitize the loan, with the same issues Glaski presented. Recent Appellate decisions denying Glaski causes of action, despite review by the CA Supreme Court 11 , show a conflict still exists. Appellant did not amend his complaint to allege the failed securitization as a cause of action because the trial court refuses to abide by the decision. This conflict might be resolved if the reasoning of the beneficial third party interest of a clear title (affecting marketability) held by a borrower was promoted by this Court as a public interest and stated consideration of the legislation defining the non- judicial foreclosure process. The presumption of holder in due course and denial of trial courts to allow defenses against mere holders of the note have become serious error in light the admission found in the (unpublished?) Kalicki case. Although multiple requests were received, with no opposition, to publish, at least partially, the admission of forged and falsely filed document by a Respondent in this case to the trial court, a single justice signed the order denying the motion to publish. The question is, if a minority opinion denying publication was issued, does that imply that the majority favored publication in light of the rule that it takes a majority of the panel to determine publication status? If so, then the decision is
11 A 5-panel court reviewed and declined to disturb the appellate order for publication. Trial courts are currently issuing rulings stating most other courts dont agree, even though no restriction on any of the considerations found in the case.
Page 8 of 8 PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al uncertain, and this Court has jurisdiction to review in light of the request for judicial notice of the Kalicki opinion pending in this case. A favorable ruling for Appellant could cause the authenticity of an unexamined adjustable rate note to shift to a disputed fact based on Appellants former objections. CONCLUSION This case comes down to two basic questions. Is the states right of real property entitlement, which affects the finality between parties and marketability of real property, of less importance to the public interest than the expediency of a trustee sale by a stranger to the contract? Did the Trial and Appellate Courts sufficiently deny Appellant due process, abuse their discretion, and display bias, thereby causing unfair prejudice to Appellant in their determinations of this case? Appellant believes he had an obligation to act upon the terms of the contract to protect a clear title, and Respondents took unfair advantage of that obligation to pursue criminal activity for unjust financial reward, as in Kalicki. The public does not expect their courts to reward the perpetrators of illegal activity. That this concept is incomprehensible to opposing counsel should be cause for concern to this Court, as it appears rife among the California judiciary.
Respectfully submitted August 14, 2014,
________________________/s/ Leighton Lee Perry, Appellant pro se
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al Certification of Length
I, Leighton Lee Perry, Appellant, hereby certify pursuant to the Cal. RC that the work count for this document is 2,627 words, excluding tables, this certificate, and any attachment permitted under RC 14(d). This document was prepared in Microsoft Word, and this is the word count generated by the program for this document. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: August 14, 2014 ________________________/s/ Leighton Lee Perry, Appellant pro se
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al PROOF OF SERVICE
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL I declare that I am a citizen of the United States and over the age of 18. My address is 6724 Waverly Road, Martinez, CA, and my phone number is: (925) 949-8377. On the date shown below, I served the following document per Local Rule Court 16: APPELLANTS REPLY TO ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW;
With service indicated for the following parties or entities named by: X Transmitting by internet from my computer a true copy thereof, to the email and U.S. mail recipients addressed as follows:
John C. Cox, Esq. Keesal, Young & Logan Charles Bell, Esq McCarthy & Holthus LLP 450 Pacific Avenue 1770 Fourth Ave San Francisco, CA 94133 San Diego, CA 92101 John.Cox@kyl.com cbell@mccarthyholthus.com
X Placing first class postage and depositing in a U.S. Mail box a true copy thereof to the recipients addressed as follows:
Clerk of Appellate Court 1DCA Div 3 Hon. Laurel Brady 350 McAllister Street 725 Court Street San Francisco, CA 94102 Martinez, CA 94553
I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 14, 2014, at Martinez, California _______________________/s/ Leighton Lee Perry, Appellant
PERRY V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA et al PROOF OF SERVICE