Neolib 2AC

Framework

A) Our interpretation --- the sole purpose of the ballot is to answer the
resolutional question: Is the enactment of a topical plan better than the
status quo or a competitive policy option?

Definitional support --- Resolved means to enact a policy by law
Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)
Definition of the word resolve, given by Webster is to express an opinion or determination
by resolution or vote; as it was resolved by the legislature; It is of similar force to the word enact,
which is defined by Bouvier as meaning to establish by law.

B) Violation: The negative team attempts to politicize the ballot beyond the
bounds of a resolutional debate by making it a statement of whether
Neoliberalism is good or bad

C) Standards: Our interp is best because---
1. Predictability ---its derived from the wording of the resolution.
Alternative frameworks are infinite, lack clear criteria for decision, and
are biased toward the Neg by allowing them to pick any one
representation in the 1AC to criticize for 9 minutes. Fairness outweighs ---
its critical for our ability to engage their arguments in the first place.
2. Grounds As just alluded to, by allowing a non-resolutional debate to
occur, the negative teams ground explodes with an innumerable amount
of Ks to run without clear focus and relevance while the AFF is stuck.
3. Education a policy debate focus preserves a common basis for debate to
begin for both sides. All debate is educational but having a common
starting point creates superior focus and depth. They can still run
critiques but they have to frame them as they relate to specific policy
ideas
D) Voting issue --- resolving the framework is a pre-condition for debate to
occur

Shively 00 (Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political
Theory, p. 181-2)
The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas
and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational
persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to
discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of
contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest.
In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities
but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of
contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It
seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic
sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of
agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not
communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different
ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it
is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about
euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's
target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a
policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or
communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some
shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in
must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being
resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how
one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Conditionality
A) Interpretation: Conditional Arguments are bad for policy debate

B) Violation: The K is conditional

C) Standards
1. Strat Skew- Completely screws up the Affirmatives strategy by making us
focus on arguments that could be kicked out at any moment
2. Reciprocity- The affirmative team has an unconditional plan and must
stick to it, but by accepting condo good, the neg team can hypothetically
run as many plans/k as they wish without
3. Moving Target- The neg can switch advocacy with each speech and from
within them multiple times, this kills the affs ability to defend and create
offense, as well as education
D) Vote Aff on conditionality
1. Education- Education is lost by allowing the neg to read off
innumerable plans instead of focusing in depth within the debate
2. Fairness-Fairness is a check against abuse, which is why a vote on
conditionality bad is key

Perm
1. Perm- do both the plan then the alt. There is no reason why we cannot
alleviate the issues of the 1AC Then reject neoliberal policies.
2. Perm solves better- pure leftist goals fail in the context of Latin America
Steve ELLNER Intl and Public Affairs @ Columbia 4 Leftist Goals and the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal
Strategy in Latin America Science & Society 68 (1) p. 29-30
Petras' celebration of grass-roots struggles and his criticisms of globalization concepts place him at the opposite extreme from the defensive
strategies of Castaeda and Harnecker. Petras takes issue with the tendency of the globalization paradigm to view national actors as locked
into internationally imposed relations and to posit limited op- tions (Ellner, 2002, 78). Far from characterizing relations between developed
nations as harmonious, as globalization writers do, Petras stresses inter-imperialist rivalry, which he claims has intensified since September
11, 2001. In addition to objective factors, Petras takes issue with globalization writers who downplay social struggle and dissolve the issue of
class altogether (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001, 78). In arguing that subjective conditions are ripe to
produce radical change in Latin America, Petras is at odds with another tendency of globalization writers: to write
off subjective factors as irrelevant in light of the inevitability of the emerging structures brought on by globalization. Petras' anti-determinist
view is carried to an extreme by other writers who are opposed to Castaeda's and Harnecker's defensive strategies. Venezuelan leftist
activist Toby Valderrama, for instance, questions Harnecker's argument that the left needs to put off far- reaching change due to the lack of
international support by saying: "No revolution - and this is a law - has ever been initiated under favorable conditions for the revolutionaries;
on the contrary, they always act [in these circumstances] in the face of desperate condi- tions." Valderrama points out that Fidel Castro's
attempted seizure of power on July 26, 1953 occurred against all odds, but that the revolution's triumph (as Che Guevara pointed out)
refuted the no- tion held by orthodox Communists of the impossibility of a revolu- tion just 90 miles from U. S. shores (Valderrama, 2002).
Indeed, Valderrama's vanguardist argument could also be applied to the quixotic coup staged by Hugo Chavez on February 4, 1992. In short,
Petras and others who raise the possibility of far-reaching change in the current stage emphasize the importance of subjective factors per se,
and are optimistic in their assessment of those condi- tions. At the other extreme, Castaeda belittles the effectivenes social movements (as
he did at the time of the Zapatista uprsing in 1994) and instead favors negotiations from above, an approach that militant, autonomous
social movements could undermine. Harnecker occupies a middle space on the optimist-pessimist spectrum. On the one hand, she considers
that conditions are not ripe for adopting an anti-imperialist strategy . On the other hand, she
considers the left sufficiently strong to be able to play a dominant role in anti-neoliberal alliances with groups to its right. The recent events
discussed in this article are helpful in assess- ing the viability of the three strategies. Thus, the left's political fiasco in Argentina under de la
Rua, and the failure of the governments of Fox, Caldera and (to a lesser extent) Lagos to follow an anti-neoliberal course, place in doubt the
effectiveness of Castaeda's approach. In the second place, Bush's foreign policy puts the lie to the claim that the United States has turned
its back on its imperialistic past in favor of the defense of a grandiose "global" order. These developments may indicate that the
proclamation of the end of anti-imperialist revolu- tions by Sandinista leaders, which influenced Harnecker in the for- mulation of her anti-
neoliberal strategy, may have been premature, to say the least. Finally, the Chavez and Lula phenomena point to
the advantages and even necessity of alliances with organizations representing non-
leftists, at least at an initial stage, contrary to Petras' approach. In the case of Venezuela, the non-leftists who
supported Chavez (MAS and the followers of Luis Miquilena) unceremoniously left the government coalition prior to the April 2002 coup.
However, Chavez's rise to power might not have occurred in the first place - nor might the Chavista constitution of 1999 have been
promulgated - had it not been for the support and participation of these non-leftists at the time. Simi- larly, Lula's electoral agreement with
the Liberal Party, which led to his embrace of free-market reforms, may not be a "sell-out," as Petras claims. An alliance between Lula and
President Nstor Kirchner of Argentina (joined by Alan Garcia of Peru at a future date) may pro- vide an arena for the formulation of anti-
neoliberal positions that would ease pressure on Venezuela's Chavez. These stands may include collective negotiation of the foreign debt
and South American tariff agreements prior to the establishment of the FTAA. Thus Petras' rejection of the
organizational support of non-leftists - like Trotsky's position before him - deprives the left of allies,
which, while not reli- able for achieving long-term goals, are useful in the struggle
against neoliberalism.

3. Perm solves, we can use a Marxist mindset combined with capital to do
the aff as long as we understand the consequences of possibly
perpetuating colonial relations
Kapoor, Dip. 12 Apr. 2011 ."Subaltern Social Movement (SSM) Post-Mortems of Development in India:
Locating Trans-Local Activism and Radicalism." Journal of Asian and African Studies. SAGE,
Web. 5 July 2013. <http://jas.sagepub.com/content/46/2/130.full.pdf>.
In fact, it is even plausible to surmise based on this research into LAMs politics that there are partial but significant
areas of political convergence/overlap between a Marxist project and certain
subaltern political projects vis--vis capital (in/direct associations) that has encouraged the formation of a nascent
Gramscian historic block and a counter-hegemonic anti-capitalist politics (as is perhaps being demonstrated, with mixed results, in the Latin
American context see Petras and Veltmeyer, 2007), which are feasible developments provided Marxists
are prepared to acknowledge their complicity in perpetuating colonial relations of
subordination and/or understanding subaltern political projects on their own terms.
Such ground realities and prospects are not entirely consistent with the anti-Marxist label being used to describe the trans-local politics of
SSMs like LAM.

Link

1. NO LINK AT ALL. WATER MANAGEMENT AND COOPERATION IS INHERENT
WITHIN THE STATUS QUO GLOBALLY
2. Is not substantial, and they really need to prove as to why this instance of
neoliberal policy making is key to the overall disestablishment of
neoliberalism.

3. The link itself is extremely generic as always, the neg needs to really
prove as to why a water bank and data exchange is critical

4. Were doing all of the funding and construction, mexico is voluntarily
joining

5. We engage with Mexico all the time, US-Mexco high level economic
dialogue now- makes the link non-unique
Christopher 9/20/13, Woodrow Wilson Institute- Associate at the Mexico Institute of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Christopher, Biden Kicks-off US-Mexico Economic Dialogue, 9/20/13,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/biden-kicks-us-mexico-economic-dialogue)
Five years ago, the United States and China launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a reflection of the growing complexity and
enormous importance of US-China relations. Earlier this year at their meeting in Mexico City, President
Obama and President Pea Nieto agreed to a similar initiative, the US-Mexico High Level
Economic Dialogue (HLED), for much the same reasons, and Vice President Biden is in Mexico today to officially launch the
initiative. Before looking at the content of the Dialogue, lets take a quick look at why this matters: Mexico is the United
States second largest export market (Canada is first), and since 2009, exports to Mexico
have grown faster than exports to any of our other top trading partners. Some six
million US jobs depend on trade with Mexico. Investment and financial flows between the two countries are also
important, but the massive trade relationship is still the centerpiece of the economic
relationship. In addition to being big, trade with Mexico is also unique. Imports from China
contain, on average, four percent US content. This is because most of the parts and materials in Chinese goods are either produced
domestically in China or regionally in Asia. Imports of final goods from Mexico, on the other hand, contain an
average of forty percent US content. US inputs are widely used in Mexican factories,
which means any growth in Mexicos manufacturing sector fuels growth in the US, and
vice versa. A look at the chart below shows how closely linked industry on both sides of the border have become, and also how quickly
production in Mexico has expanded in the years since the Great Recession. Pillar 1. Promoting Competitiveness and Connectivity: Whats
important here is the decision to put these two issues together. Back in the Nineties, NAFTA eliminated most tariffs on trade within the region
and thereby stimulated a huge increase in commerce. The construction of transportation infrastructure, the highways and border crossings on
which this trade travels, have lagged way behind the growing flows of goods and people. Increased border security following the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 made the border an even greater bottleneck, and at this point infrastructure and border crossing issues have become a big drag
on the competitiveness of manufacturers in the region. This is the local version of the worldwide transition from trade policy based on tariff
reductions to one based on non-tariff barriers and the building of robust supply chains. Connectivity also refers to other areas of joint
opportunity like telecommunications and electricity. Pillar 2. Fostering Economic Growth, Productivity and Innovation: As technology and
advanced manufacturing techniques have evolved, they have lowered the portion of production costs devoted to unskilled labor, and although
many may still think of Mexican industry in terms Maquiladoras along the border pumping out cheap electronics, Mexico has slowly but surely
climbed up the rungs of the value-added ladder, from sewing t-shirts and cobbling shoes to building cars and airplanes. So at this point,
whether in the United States or Mexico, the formula for creating good, high-paying jobs is based on building human capitalincreasing the
knowledge and skills of workers. Instead of line workers, the US and Mexico need highly-skilled programmers, designers and engineers, and
since our manufacturing sectors are deeply interconnected, we need them not only in the US or Mexico. We need them in both countries.
Closely connected to the HLED is an initiative that hits at the heart of these issues. The
Mexico-United States Entrepreneurship and Innovation Council (or MUSEIC) is
coordinated by the two governments but involves private sector representatives from
both countries. Meeting regularly to discuss ways in which entrepreneurship and
innovation affect competitiveness, sub-committees deal with a range of issues from
tech clusters to the role of women in business. And the talks are not just at the
abstract level: a meeting of the sub-committee on financing issues in July resulted in
the signing of 35 deals between participants. The Vice President will also touch on the theme of educational
cooperation during his visit, an issue to which the Mexican government has attached great importance. Increasing university level exchanges
between the two nations and improving human capital formation in both countries will be a crucial component in securing future
competitiveness. Despite the depth of US-Mexico ties, there are currently less than 14,000 Mexican students studying in American universities,
and Mexico ranks ninth among countries that send students to the United States for undergraduate education and tenth for graduate
education, far below Turkey, Iran, and other smaller and more distant countries. Increasing educational exchange would help both countries
achieve their human capital goals. Pillar 3. Partnering for Regional and Global Leadership: In this context, trade is an especially relevant topic.
The United States and Mexico are each in the midst of negotiating super-regional
trade agreements, and given the integrated nature regional production, the US and
Mexico have a great number of shared interests in these negotiations. It makes sense,
then, for the two countries to negotiate as a bloc. Both countries are already parties to the negotiation of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, making it the perfect venue to begin such an approach. Mexico and the US would each also do well to consider
inviting the other into the Pacific Alliance and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, respectively. Within these three pillars, a
number of specific programs will be developed. Some will be the next stage of ongoing projects, but several will be brand new. The topics of
innovation and entrepreneurship, for example, are being added to the bilateral agenda for the first time. Domestic factors, like the economic
reform agenda in Mexico and the battle over the budget in the United States, will always be the main determinants of each countrys economic
competitiveness, but the new ideas being generated through the HLED, backed-up by the
leadership of Vice-President Biden and the strong momentum behind the recent
growth in US-Mexico trade, could provide both nations with a significant boost.


Alt

1. Fails -- Cant solve for the impacts of the affirmative. Only by initiating the
plan do we allow for the international framing that is necessary for the
stability and peace in water deprived regions as well as ensure as best
possible peoples access to it and food.
2. Alt fails -- Cant solve the kritik
Jones 11 (Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author
of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change
nothing", 2011, www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html
My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-
the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in
an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of
apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits from Seattle to Prague to Genoa and the
authorities were rattled. Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall
Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or
determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction,
the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa.
Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial
epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a clich) has been
cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for
the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's
class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning." The Occupy movement has provoked fury
from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who predictably labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be
worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a
coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. Neo-
liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow. There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is
good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a
resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its
opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat.
That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of
existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered
by the trade union movement. But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-
conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African
National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left
wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it
direction and purpose.

3. Alt fails: Attempting to move away from capitalism will cause transitional
conflicts that will end in increased domination and unsustainable
exploitation.
Mark Avrum Gubrud @ the Center for Superconductivity Research, 1997, Nanotechnology and
International Security, a/online
With molecular manufacturing, international trade in both raw materials and finished goods can be replaced by decentralized production for
local consumption, using locally available materials. The decline of international trade will undermine a powerful source of common interest.
Further, artificial intelligence will displace skilled as well as unskilled labor. A world system based on wage labor, transnational capitalism and
global markets will necessarily give way. We imagine that a golden age is possible, but we dont know how to organize one. As global
capitalism retreats, it will leave behind a world dominated by politics, and possibly
feudal concentrations of wealth and power. Economic insecurity, and fears for the material and
moral future of humankind may lead to the rise of demagogic and intemperate national leaders. With
almost two hundred sovereign nations, each struggling to create a new economic and social order, perhaps the most
predictable outcome is chaos: shifting alignments, displaced populations, power
struggles, ethnic conflicts inflamed by demagogues, class conflicts, land disputes, etc. Small and
underdeveloped nations will be more than ever dependent on the major powers for
access to technology, and more than ever vulnerable to sophisticated forms of
control or subversion, or to outright domination. Competition among the leading technological powers for
the political loyalty of clients might imply reversion to some form of nationalistic imperialism.



Impacts

1. Aff Solves, Impact talks about overproduction. Data sharing and water
conservation puts a cap onto that, saves enviro
2. No Impact -- Neoliberalism is environmentally sustainable
Zimmerer 11
(Karl S., PHD. Editor, Pennsylvania State University CONSERVATION BOOMS" WITH AGRICULTURAL GROWTH?
hhttp://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/Vol46noSI/Zimmerer_82-114_46-4.pdf, Assed today 6/27/13 M.D.)

The concept of nature-society hybridity, as used in geography and environmental planning and management, considers conservation and use
of land and other resources "coproduced" through governance and human-environment interactions, rather than as strictly social outcomes
(Swyngedouw 1999; Zimmerer 2000, 2006). A second, albeit distinct, concept of hybrid also is used here to refer to variants of
neoliberal governments that may foster, even conspicuously, certain sustainability policies and environment
protection (on protected-area conservation and community-based resource management of hybrid neoliberalism in Latin America,
see Zimmerer 2009). Coproduction of conservation relies also on the concept of territory making or territorialization, which is integral to
national policies and statecraft in environment and resource management (Orlove 2002; Scott 1998). Conservation territories have often
arisen through multiscale interactions with international and global organizations as well as local and regional institutions. Taken together,
these concepts are associated with the approach of Latin American political ecology (Campbell 2007).^ They enable an
understanding of protected areas and PES as not merely gatekeepers and reinforcement of
wilderness relicts but as arising through socioeconomic, political, environmental, and
spatial processes involved How did Latin American governments interact with and respond to the environmental agendas and
political pressures of conservation organizations, social groups, and private interests propelling protected-area expansion? More broadly,
how were national approaches to protected areas shaped amid other state policies toward land and resource use? Predominantly neoliberal
governments and resource policies, which varied throughout Latin America, were characteristic of the period from 1985 to 2008.
Governments in Mexico and Costa Rica pursued chiefly neoliberal policies throughout this time, and
shifts to the center-left and nationalist-populist political regimes have occurred in Brazil since 2002 and in Bolivia since 2006. Moreover,
there has been a mixed political model in Peru since 2003 (Petras 2006; Roberts 2009; Weyland 2004, 2009). This study's principal framing
from 1985 to 2008 enables comparative analysis of state-sanctioned environmental conservation under
shifting neoliberalism, with a secondary focus on potential shifts associated with country-specific movements at least partly
away from neoliberal policies. Finally, the 1985-2008 period encompassed emphasis on both protected-area expansion and the newer PES.
Championed by the influential Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in the early 2000s, PES is globally concentrated in Latin American
countries.^This study's second goal is to identify the persistent tension between the successful political activism of civil-society groups (e.g.,
social movements, indigenous organizations, conservation supporters) and the typically depoliticizing national technocratic approaches
toward protected areas for environmental stability and sustainability. The former has contributed to the notable, albeit partial, shift of
protected-area governance in Latin American countries from the strict dictates of the so-called Yellowstone Park model to
the broader compass of protected area related social issues, including the territorial roles of peasant, indigenous, and resource-user groups.
This shift in environmental conservation policy has been incorporated into a wide spectrum
of political perspectives on social welfare, poverty alleviation, development,
demographic growth, and economic markets (Adams et al. 2004; Brockington, Igoe, and Schmidt-Soltau 2006;
Naughton-Treves, Buck Holland, and Brandon 2005).This study's focus is national-level institutions and policies, especially the unfolding of
territorial designations (i.e., territorializing), as both a condition and an effect of expanded environmental governance in Latin America. In
addition to nature protection per se, political and economic functions of conservation areas in these countries have ranged from legal,
territorial, and business based (e.g., tourism) to serving as important discursive foundations of national sustainability efforts and as a way of
thinking in popular media and increasingly in the personal subjectivities of citizens (Zimmerer 2006a, 2006b; Zimmerer, Galt, and Buck 2004).
Expanding protected-area designations and environmental governance amid land-use change have also created political winners and losers in
these countries (on Brazil, for example, see Fearnside 2003). These trends raise the question of how conservation expansion, growth of land
and resource use, and environmental policy making more generally occurred between 1985 and 2008 in Latin America in the context of mostly
neoliberal national policies. Central to this question is the role of social movements, indigenous federations, NGOs, citizen groups, and
environmental activists and institutions that have been highly effective in conservation-
related environmental politics and governance (e.g., Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Stevens and De Lacy 1997).
Influence of these civil-society groups was especially marked in the conservation boom in Brazil (Hecht and Cockburn 1990; Keck 1995; Pieck
2006; Schmink and Wood 1992).Numerous Latin American countries have emerged as global centers of environmental conservation and land-
use modernization during recent decades(Brandon, Redford, and Sanderson 1998). Between 1985 and 2008, protected natural areas in
Latin America, such as parks and reserves, grew more than threefold in number and area to cover nearly 3,500 sites and more than 3
million square kilometers in Latin America (UN Environmental Programme [UNEP] and World Conservation Monitoring Centre [WCMC] 2008).
This expansion consisted of conservation booms in each of the individual countries as well as a composite Latin America-wide
trend (Zimmerer and Carter 2002, 207). Countries of Latin America now account for nearly 15 percent of global coverage of protected areas.
Governance of environmental conservation has included civil society groups, ranging from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs, both
international and national),indigenous groups and federations, communities, and political networks(Brush and Orlove 1996; Keck 1995; Lemos
and Agrawal 2006; Stocks 2005), as well as state agencies from municipal to national levels, international organizations,and multilateral
lenders. At the same time, increased scientific, technological, andlegal capacities have been
designed to support the protected areas and thereby promote environmental
conservation in Latin American countries.' The majorityof these conservation areas, as elsewhere globally, have
functioned reasonablywell, albeit incompletely and subject to continued evaluation and debate (Bruneret al. 2001; Joppa, Loarie, and Pimm
2008). Expansion of protected-area conservation runs counter to earlier arguments of the political and economic infeasibility of significant
environmental advances in Latin America (on Mexico, see Mumme, Bath, and Assetto 1988).

3. Offense-The root cause of structural violence is a lack of free markets.
Areas that have started to develop must transition to the next level of
neoliberalism or they will be locked in misery for a very long time key to
the environment and freedom.
Goklany 7 (Indur, scholar who has 25 years of experience working and writing on global and national
environmental issues. He has published several peer-reviewed papers and book chapters on an array of
issues Author of The Improving State of the World: Why We're Living Longer, Healthier, More
Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet, Mar. 23, http://www.reason.com/news/show/119252.html,
twm)
Environmentalists and globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and
consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and
free tradethe mainstays of globalizationdegrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed,
the 20th century saw the United States population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon
dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from
47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed
byetween eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades,
and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population. Among the very young, infant mortality
has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements havent
been restricted to the United States. Its a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life
expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. Indias and Chinas infant mortalities
exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the
population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in
population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-
world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low
income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more
literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as
they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They
are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social
and professional mobility have also never been greater. Its easier than ever for people across the world to
transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work
fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Mans environmental record is more
complex. The early stages of development can indeed cause some environmental
deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and
lack of education, basic public health services, safe water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because greater
wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on
economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental
deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and
human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings
about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and
technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All
of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing
countries have yet to get past the green ceiling, they are nevertheless ahead of where todays developed countries used to be when they
were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US
introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000. India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per
capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of
ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of
trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countriesin this case, the
technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left
behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a cycle of progress
composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and
technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free
markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism
and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, servicesmost importantly in knowledge and
ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the
free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or
regression.

4. Turn Markets are key to peace
Gartzke 9 (The Capitalist Peace Erik Gartzke Columbia University 2009 Erik Gartzke is an associate professor in the
Department of Political Science and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University
http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke_ajps_07.pdf American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 51, No. 1, January 2007, Pp. 166
191

The discovery that democracies seldom fight each other has led, quite reasonably, to the conclusion that democracy causes peace, at
leastwithin the community of liberal polities. Explanations abound, but a consensus account of the dyadic democratic peace has been
surprisingly slow to materialize. I offer a theory of liberal peace based on capitalism and common interstate interests. Economic development,
capital market integration, and the compatibility of foreignpolicy preferences supplant the effect of democracy in standard
statistical tests of the democratic peace. In fact, after controlling for regional heterogeneity, any one of these three variables is
sufficient to account for effects previously attributed to regime type in standard samples of wars, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and
fatal disputes.1 If war is a product of incompatible interests and failed or abortive bargaining, peace ensues when states lack differences worthy
of costly conflict, or when circumstances favor successful diplomacy. Realists and others argue that state interests are inherently incompatible,
but this need be so only if state interests are narrowly defined or when conquest promises tangible benefits. Peace can result from at least
three attributes of mature capitalist economies. First, the historic impetus to territorial expansion is tempered by the
rising importance of intellectual and financial capital, factors that are more expediently enticed than
conquered. Land does little to increase the worth of the advanced economies while resource competition is more cheaply pursued through
markets than by means of military occupation. At the same time, development actually increases the ability of states to project power when
incompatible policy objectives exist. Development affects who states fight (and what they fight over) more than the overall frequency of
warfare. Second, substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of developed nations in the postWorldWar II period further
limits the scope and scale of conflict. Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international system has
allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist in the next
century is a question open to debate. Finally, the rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism for
competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight. Separately, these processes
influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. Together, they explain the absence of war among states in the
developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace. The notion of a capitalist peace is hardly new.
Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, Mill, Cobden, Angell, and others saw in market forces the power to end war. Unfortunately, war continued,
leading many to view as overly optimistic classical conceptions of liberal peace. This study can be seen as part of an effort to reexamine
capitalist peace theory, revising arguments in line with contemporary insights much as Kantian claims were reworked in response to evolving
evidence of a democratic peace. Existing empirical research on the democratic peace, while addressing many possible alternatives, provides an
incomplete and uneven treatment of liberal economic processes.Mostdemocraticpeace researchexamines trade in goods and services but
ignores capital markets and offers only a cursory assessment of economic development (Maoz and Russett 1992). Several studies explore the
impact of interests, though these have largely been dismissed by democratic peace advocates (Oneal and Russett 1999a; Russett and Oneal
2001). These omissions or oversights help to determine the democratic peace result and thus shape subsequent research, thinking, and policy
on the subject of liberal peace. This study offers evidence that liberal economic processes do in fact lead to peace, even accounting for the well-
documented role of liberal politics.

4. Turn--Neoliberalism solves global poverty
Perry 9 professor of economics and finance @ Univ of Michigan, M.A. and Ph.D @ George Mason
University, MBA in finance from Curtis L. Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota,
11-18-2009 (Mark, World Poverty Rate Plummets, http://blog.american.com/?p=7291, RBatra) note
NBER = national bureau of economic research
In Kevin Hassetts National Review article The Poor Need Capitalism, he points to a new NBER study, Parametric
Estimations of the World Distribution of Income, and writes: The chart [below] draws on a landmark new study
by economists Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. The authors set out to study changes in the world distribution of income
by gathering data from many different countries. As a byproduct of their work, they are able to count the number of individuals who live on
$1 per day or less, a key measure of poverty. According to their calculations, the number of people living in poverty
so defined has plummeted, from 967,574,000 in 1970 to 350,436,000 in 2006, a decrease of a whopping 64 percent.
Whence the reduction? The biggest factor is the emergence of middle classes in previously
poverty stricken China and India. And the spread of capitalism to other countries has
similarly been followed by prosperity. The trend is even more impressive if one considers that the world population
skyrocketed over that time, increasing by 3 billion. If the trend continues for just 40 more years, poverty will have
been essentially eradicated from the globe. And capitalism will have done it. There are those who have
argued that the current financial crisis has served as proof that capitalism is a failed ideology. The work of Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin
suggests that there are about a billion people whose lives prove otherwise. The NBER paper also finds that the world poverty rate fell by 80
percent, from 26.8 percent in 1970 to only 5.4 percent in 2006 based on the $1 per day poverty measure (see chart below). The study also
estimates poverty rates separately for five geographical regions (see chart below), with some pretty amazing results for East Asia (China,
Taiwan, and S. Korea), which in 1960 had the highest regional poverty rate in the world by far, at 58.8 percent, compared to 39.9 percent for
Africa, 11.6 percent for Latin America, 8.4 percent for MENA (Middle East and North Africa), and 20.1 percent for South Asia. In the 36-year
period between 1970 and 2006, the poverty rate in East Asia fell to only 1.7 percent, which is now below all of the other regions: Africa (31.8
percent), Latin America (3.1 percent), MENA (5.2 percent), and South Asia (2.6 percent). poverty3Bottom Line: The 80 percent
decrease in the world poverty rate between 1970 and 2006 has to be the greatest
reduction in world poverty in such a short time span ever in history, and the 97
percent reduction in the poverty rate of East Asia (from 58.8 percent to 1.7 percent) has to be the most
significant improvement in a regional standard of living in history over such a short
period. Thanks to Hassett for pointing out that capitalism is alive and well, and is spreading around the world
helping to eliminate poverty.